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Columbia Accident Report Hearing, Senate Science Committee, September 3, 2003 — Transcript

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0:00c-span 2.
0:07next a hearing on the columbia space
0:09shuttle then ken starr and floyd abrams
0:12on the challenge to campaign finance
0:14laws
0:14after that mexican president vicente fox
0:17last week the shuttle columbia accident
0:19investigation board
0:21released its final report nasa
0:23administrator sean o'keefe
0:25and the head of that investigative board
0:26harold gaiman testified on capitol hill
0:29this is just under two and a half hours
0:40last week the columbia accident
0:42investigation board released its report
0:44on the causes of the space shuttle
0:47accident that occurred seven months ago
0:49and today the committee will begin a
0:50thorough examination of its conclusions
0:54the board's final report is one of the
0:55most comprehensive ever produced
0:57concerning the management and operations
0:59at nasa
1:01it must serve as a wake-up call to nasa
1:03and the nation
1:05that we have for too long put off hard
1:07choices and force the space program to
1:09limp along without adequate guidance or
1:11funding
1:12as stated in the report quote unless the
1:15technical
1:16organizational and cultural
1:18recommendations made in this report are
1:20implemented
1:21little will have been accomplished to
1:23lessen the chance
1:24that another accident will follow
1:26unquote that's a very chilling
1:29and powerful statement and i hope all
1:31members of congress
1:33will pay close attention to that
1:35statement if nothing else in this report
1:38the report reminds us that we are still
1:40in the developmental stage of space
1:42transportation and that space is an
1:44unforgiving environment
1:46which challenges our technical expertise
1:49it also raises a number of important
1:51issues that will have to
1:52be considered as we plan for the future
1:54of the space program
1:56most importantly we will have to figure
1:58out where we want the space program to
2:00go
2:01and what we expect to get out of it then
2:04we will have to ensure that adequate and
2:05on earmarked funds
2:07are provided for these missions it is
2:10imperative that we eliminate wasteful
2:12spending and make efficient use of those
2:13resources we commit to space exploration
2:17the board worked tirelessly to identify
2:19and clarify the causes of this accident
2:21i'm deeply grateful to its members for
2:23their dedication
2:25although the technical causes the
2:26accident have been suspected for some
2:28time
2:29the board's findings concerning the role
2:31that nasa's organizational structure and
2:33culture
2:34played in this tragedy are as troubling
2:37as they are valuable
2:39as the board reported quote complex
2:42systems
2:43almost always fail in complex complex
2:46ways unquote
2:48the many factors that contributed to the
2:50accident largely demonstrate how far
2:52nasa has regressed
2:54its incomplete and invalid impact
2:56analysis
2:57its rejection to seek satellite images
2:59of the damaged shuttle
3:01its reliance on past successes as a
3:03substitute
3:04for sound engineering practices its
3:07organizational barriers
3:09that prevented effective communication
3:11of critical information
3:13and stifled professional differences of
3:15opinion
3:16and its lack of integrated management
3:18across program
3:19elements the report further describes
3:23nasa's culture as including
3:25quote flawed decision-making
3:28self-deception
3:30introversion and diminished curiosity
3:33about the world
3:33outside we'll want to hear from
3:36administrator o'keefe
3:38about precisely how and when
3:41this culture can be changed i welcome
3:45administrator o'keefe and admiral gaiman
3:47and look forward to hearing from them
3:48on the investigation board's findings
3:50and recommendations in nasa's plan to
3:52return the space shuttle program
3:55to flight i'd also like to comment i
3:57thank
3:58admiral gaiman and his board members
4:00again for their outstanding work
4:02i also think it's appropriate to note
4:04that
4:05that mr o'keefe and his staff were
4:08completely
4:09cooperative and helpful in the board's
4:11investigation
4:12that's not always true in the past but i
4:15think they
4:16they deserve credit for being helpful
4:19even though
4:20sometimes it was obviously painful
4:23i'd like to uh turn to my friend of many
4:26years and
4:28ranking member of the committee senator
4:30hollings who
4:31as we all know made an announcement that
4:33he would not seek re-election
4:36i know that senator hollings until the
4:38last moment is here will continue
4:40to pursue with bigger passion and always
4:43non-controversial
4:45issues that have interested him and
4:49i must say to my friend he's not gone
4:51but i
4:52and all members of this committee will
4:53miss him
4:55because of his long and outstanding and
4:57courageous service on this committee and
4:59as a member of the united states senate
5:01senator hollings i thank our
5:04distinguished chairman and my good
5:06friend
5:07john mccain when i left town
5:11in the 1st of august
5:14i was a bum i'd been serving
5:17almost well over 50 years in some public
5:20office
5:21and as long as you continue to serve
5:23your bum
5:25but as soon as i said i was going to get
5:26out of the way i became a statesman
5:30you ought to see the crap that i had put
5:33out i mean
5:34you never seen such stuff i mean i i've
5:37invented everything i've thought of
5:39everything and everything else of that
5:40kind
5:41but uh it has been a distinct pleasure
5:45and seven times to the united states
5:48senators enough and i'm
5:50delighted to have an additional year
5:52here to see if we can straighten out a
5:53few things
5:55for one uh i commend admiral gaiman
5:58in your committee uh for example i was
6:02only reading last night
6:04old unsafe and costly
6:07the london economist why it's time to
6:10scuttle the shuttle
6:12and that's exactly what you recommend
6:15that the
6:16shuttle be scuttled however
6:19i'm sort of intrigued with the finding
6:22of a culture
6:25as a navy board of inquiry as an admiral
6:30you would immediately find
6:32responsibility
6:34and whoever was captain of that ship
6:36would be cash aired
6:39i don't find that in the report the
6:41fixing
6:42of responsibility that intrigues me
6:47uh if you were the coach of a football
6:50team they'd buy up the contract
6:52i haven't lost seven members of the team
6:56and and let me get right to the point i
7:00think this committee
7:02and the whole blooming setup is
7:05part of the culture i've been on here as
7:08a distinguished
7:09chairman just commented for years since
7:11we've had a space committee
7:14never have i heard anything about being
7:16unsafe
7:17i'll never forget when the challenger uh
7:20went down
7:22uh i talked to him out there at martin
7:24thai call
7:26if i remember the name it was an allen
7:28mcdonald
7:30and he said we told them at the cape it
7:33was unsafe
7:35with those old rings particularly the
7:37cold around there and they were taken
7:40too great a risk and he said there we
7:44all were great
7:45all gathered together in the hearing
7:48room there at martinsville called up
7:50there in iowa
7:51and uh when the challenger blasted off
7:55jimmy said there she goes and henry said
7:58like a piece of cake
8:00and then all of a sudden she blew and
8:02everyone
8:04in the room knew why
8:07i said mr mcdonald would you come and
8:10tell the committee that
8:12he said i'd be glad to they headed him
8:14off and he never testified
8:18now we thought after the rogers
8:20committee had
8:21gotten into it the commission that
8:23they'd cleaned it up
8:26and i don't find it's
8:29of course we you didn't find it's been
8:31cleaned up on anything else like that
8:34and we had came with an
8:37independent safety office but the
8:40independent safety office
8:42within uh nasa itself has not worked
8:46we've lost
8:47seven astronauts so rather than part of
8:51the culture that you get up here on the
8:53hill oh blue
8:54we're going to get them we're going to
8:55get that but we're going to be back up
8:56in space
8:58we're not going to get up there until we
9:00get a decent shuttle
9:02and it's certified safe by others than
9:05in nasa
9:06in my opinion i would hope that we
9:09had learned the lesson here because we
9:12the ones put the pressure on
9:15mr o'keefe i know we all had worked with
9:17him on the appropriations committee and
9:20when he got appointed that booming space
9:23station was
9:24uh or is i think about 40
9:28billion or 20 billion uh that's right
9:31that's about 20 billion over budget
9:33and about only 40 complete so when we
9:37had the head of the
9:38office of management and budget go over
9:40there we were all concerned about money
9:43we weren't concerned about safety so we
9:45we part of the culture right up here on
9:47this
9:48committee and and rather than praising
9:50each other how sourly
9:52the and it has been a very sorry you all
9:55have really done
9:56a way better job than i thought uh was
9:59going to
10:00uh happen and get done uh you all have
10:03really worked hard and
10:05you've got a very comprehensive report
10:08except the actual fixing of the
10:10responsibility
10:12thank you mr chairman thank you senator
10:14hollings and
10:16obviously i would ask my colleagues to
10:18make their comments as briefly
10:20as possible since we would like to hear
10:22from the witnesses senator hutchison
10:25thank you senator mccain mr chairman uh
10:28first i do want to to commend
10:31the report the uh open investigation
10:35that was done
10:36uh i thank you admiral gaiman for doing
10:38a great job and i thank you
10:40administrator o'keefe for letting him do
10:42a great job
10:43that says a lot and it was very
10:45different from the challenger experience
10:48and uh so we appreciate that so now we
10:51have
10:51a blueprint uh of where to go
10:54uh one of the most important things in
10:56your report concludes
10:58that the present shuttle is not
11:00inherently unsafe
11:02but it does call for a massive
11:04recertification process to ensure flight
11:06safety
11:07i will look to administrator o'keeffe
11:09for his
11:10commitment to the project of
11:13recertifying
11:14shuttles before they go back in the air
11:17the report is a devastating
11:19attack on nasa's procedure and lines of
11:22communication
11:23i hope that the administrator regards
11:26this report as a blueprint for change
11:28and i hope that it is acknowledged that
11:30there could never again be business as
11:32usual
11:33at nasa you cannot have your most
11:36innovative research your most
11:38technologically advanced
11:40challenge done with a bureaucratic
11:42mentality
11:43this doesn't mean you open the treasury
11:45but it means you lock your vision
11:47on a few very big goals and you do them
11:51right faster better cheaper should be
11:54thrown
11:54in the wastebasket when senator nelson
11:57and i
11:58particularly along with the whole
11:59committee asked
12:01questions of previous administrators are
12:04we sacrificing safety
12:07we always got the answer absolutely not
12:09safety is the first priority
12:12now we need to make sure that we have
12:15the vision
12:16the scientific background and the total
12:19change in the bureaucracy at nasa from
12:22the very top to the very bottom
12:25in line with the recommendations of the
12:27report
12:28thank you thank you mr chairman senator
12:30lautenberg
12:32thanks very much mr chairman i i will
12:35be brief and i ask consent that my full
12:38statement be included in the record
12:41i would just like to make uh a couple of
12:44quick points uh and uh
12:47my my hats off to admiral gaiman i knew
12:50mr o'keefe
12:51for the very tough task that you took on
12:54and
12:54and the outcome that is described in
12:57your report i think is
12:58understandable and will have an effect
13:01on how we think about things in the
13:02future and i i would
13:05i hope that we will learn enough
13:08directly about the safety requirement
13:10so that something as terrible has
13:12happened
13:13uh with in this in the columbia
13:16tragedy will never happen again but i
13:18would go to something of
13:20principle and uh make a note of the fact
13:23that
13:24the privatization program uh that we see
13:27in government
13:27almost began with nasa and when we see
13:30that
13:31that we have some eighteen hundred
13:33people i believe the number is
13:35uh who are overseeing private
13:38uh contractors in the multiple thousands
13:42whether or not
13:43there is enough ability enough
13:46structure to make sure that they're
13:48doing what they have to do and
13:50and i'll close with this when on page
13:53109 of your report uh admiral heyman
13:56uh the major annual savings resulting
13:58from this space flight
14:00operations contract which in 1996 were
14:02touted to be some 500 million to a
14:04billion a year
14:05by the early 2000s have not materialized
14:08and i just highlight that because it
14:12throughout that paragraph it talks to
14:15the lack of success
14:16and achieving the cost efficiencies and
14:20what is it that and permitted
14:23the costs to be overrun and still
14:27this terrible thing to take place and i
14:30hope mr chairman that we'll find out
14:32about the relationship of
14:33the private side of this of the the uh
14:37force and uh what impact it had and i
14:40thank you very much and
14:41congratulate you again for the excellent
14:43work you've done
14:44senator sununu thank you mr chairman
14:47i i simply want to thank um admiral
14:50gaiman and administrator o'keefe
14:52for their work and uh and reiterate
14:56chairman mccain's emphasis on the level
14:59of cooperation that was provided
15:01the service of the members of the board
15:03i can't imagine
15:05an emotionally or or physically more
15:07difficult
15:09task than the one that we gave to you
15:12and we owe a great deal of thanks of
15:15course to the board members but also to
15:16the staff the staff at nasa
15:18and the staff on the board that
15:20performed a lot of the more difficult
15:22tasks
15:23and probably spent at least as much time
15:25as the board members themselves so we're
15:26very grateful for your service
15:28and very appreciative of the work
15:31senator wyden thank you mr chairman i
15:34think
15:34you mr chairman senator hollings have
15:37both
15:38put your hands on the central question
15:40and that's
15:41looking again at nasa's mission and
15:44my view is that you cannot resolve the
15:47issue about nasa's basic mission
15:50without looking carefully and fresh
15:53and in a fresh way at the direction of
15:55the manned space program
15:57and towards that end mr chairman and
16:00colleagues i'd like to
16:01make a modest proposal this morning i
16:04believe that within
16:0590 days or at most six months
16:09nasa should prepare and furnish this
16:12committee
16:13a cost-benefit analysis on the manned
16:16space
16:17program but i would like to learn and
16:19what i think would be helpful to all of
16:21us in the senate
16:22is to learn more precisely what can
16:26be accomplished with manned space flight
16:29and at what price
16:30and what cannot once this information
16:33would be made available to the committee
16:36then we're in a position
16:38i think for the first time in a long
16:40time to look carefully
16:42at how manned space flight fits in to
16:45nasa's future
16:47and what can be accomplished with
16:49unmanned
16:50space flight that would also achieve the
16:53scientific discoveries that have been
16:56envisaged
16:57for the agency for some time there are
16:59other issues that i'm going to want to
17:01explore but i intend to ask
17:03the administrator about whether he would
17:06prepare a cost-benefit
17:07analysis quickly for the senate
17:11on the manned space flight program the
17:13other areas that i want to explore
17:16particularly how this time we would
17:19ensure
17:20compliance with the admiral's fine
17:22recommendations
17:24i think if you look historically at this
17:26issue
17:27after the last tragedy many of the same
17:30recommendations were made that admiral
17:32gaiman
17:33is making now and clearly many of them
17:36were not
17:36followed up on i know that the
17:38administrator
17:40sean o'keefe feels strongly about this
17:42as well and i intend to ask some
17:44questions about how
17:46it's going to be different this time and
17:48the recommendations
17:50will be followed up on but i thank you
17:52mr chairman senator hollings for
17:53convening this hearing
17:55i think the country wanted us to do this
17:57quickly and you all have
17:59have done that and i think senator burns
18:02thank you mr chairman and i'll just
18:04submit my
18:05um
18:08my um my statement for the record i just
18:11like to um
18:12that objection just offer a small
18:15com comment i i like the chairman
18:18appreciate the work that
18:20the director has done and this and this
18:22board has done
18:24it took a a great deal of uh
18:27of courage to release the port that you
18:29did it needed released
18:32and it took a look at the inside of us
18:34and we're going to have to re-examine
18:36just exactly what we found in there
18:40it's me i i think we now have to
18:42redirect our
18:43our our focus now on the vision and the
18:46r d
18:46and and that goes along with nasa we
18:49know that going into space will always
18:51be
18:51risky at best and um
18:55and so that work must go on i think we
18:58knew we will now
18:58look at different areas of of uh
19:02a more moderate way to enter space and
19:05to move cargo i think we'll take another
19:07look now at reusables and unmanned
19:10uh i think in our probes uh our unmanned
19:13probes into the
19:15further out in space is will be a very
19:17important part of this nation
19:20and so we have a lot of work ahead of us
19:23but again i want to congratulate you and
19:26and senator hollings
19:29it may just seem like a year to you
19:34but we'll miss you thank you mr chairman
19:38senator nelson mr chairman i want to
19:41thank you for calling this hearing today
19:45uh thank you for your leadership
19:48in the oversight role that is
19:52uh by this committee as we proceed and
19:56thank to both of you gentlemen
19:59for uh the extraordinary leadership that
20:02you have offered
20:04uh admiral gaiman i particularly want to
20:06commend you
20:07who i've worked with over the course of
20:10the past several months
20:12having read a lot of your interviews
20:15having talked to your very professional
20:17staff
20:19talk to the members of your board i
20:22i think you have done an excellent work
20:25product
20:28i expected what you came out
20:32and talked about the decision-making
20:35being influenced by the culture and we
20:38need
20:39very much to attend to that
20:43what i did not expect but was
20:46pleasantly surprised in your report that
20:48you addressed head on
20:50the question of the funding and how
20:53over time i can draw my own conclusions
20:58as i have railed in this committee on
21:01several occasions that you can't do
21:03space flight on the cheap
21:06that there are just too many things in a
21:09risky
21:11business that have got to be attended to
21:13and particularly
21:15when safety is overlooked because money
21:17is siphoned off
21:19of the space shuttle program to put it
21:21onto something else
21:23which has occurred over the past decade
21:26and so thank you for bringing up that
21:29aspect
21:30and mr chairman i will close by saying
21:33again thank you for the oversight
21:36hearings and i think
21:37this is going to be extremely important
21:40that in our oversight capacity
21:44that although we can't lead the space
21:48program
21:48that has to go all the way to the top to
21:50the white house
21:53we can certainly let as senator
21:55hutchinson has already said
21:57our expressions of concern
22:01be known of what
22:04is adequately funding the program so
22:07that
22:07safety is not sacrificed
22:10like it has been we went through this
22:12drill
22:1317 years ago and safety was going to be
22:17number one
22:18and it was for about two or three years
22:21and then the hard reality set in
22:24of siphoning the money off of relegating
22:27the safety considerations because of the
22:30day-to-day
22:31financial decisions they were being
22:34relegated to the back seat so thank you
22:36mr chairman
22:37thank you senator brownback thank you mr
22:39chairman
22:41on february 1 this country certainly
22:43suffered in the world suffered a
22:44terrible and tragic loss on the shuttle
22:46columbian or crude
22:48the seven astronauts that were explorers
22:50and they wished to serve their countries
22:51and they did just that
22:53well certainly saddened by the events
22:54that took place in that faithful day
22:56fateful day however we're true to this
22:59country's resolve we've been determined
23:00to find and correct a cause and move
23:02forward and see what that is what this
23:04hearing is about today
23:06i believe it is imperative that america
23:08remains at the forefront of space
23:10exploration and discovery and it's our
23:12job here in congress to take this report
23:14move forward expeditiously and getting
23:17america back into say
23:18in space safely aboard an american
23:21vehicle
23:22i'm committed to authoring and working
23:24on reauthorizing a bill for nasa during
23:27this congress
23:28and use this report to provide some of
23:30the guidelines for that bill
23:32also pleased to see that the board
23:34recognizes the importance of a vision
23:36for america's future in manned space
23:38exploration
23:39and i believe it's time for us to step
23:42back and to really
23:43review that and to establish that vision
23:46and i'm hopeful we can see created a
23:48presidential commission on the future of
23:50space exploration
23:52to establish a common vision for space
23:55exploration by america
23:56i've held several subcommittee hearings
23:58over the last few months
24:00with not only nasa but other federal
24:02officials but also
24:03the private sector companies and
24:04entrepreneurs in an effort to ascertain
24:07what america's vision for future space
24:09space exploration should be
24:12in all these hearings one thing has
24:14stood clear americans continue to
24:16support human space flight and
24:18exploration
24:19we cannot allow ourselves to give up and
24:21turn our backs on exploring space and
24:23the universe because we have suffered
24:25loss of life
24:26those are the risk we acknowledge and
24:28accept for the opportunity to improve
24:30the quality of life here on earth and
24:32beyond
24:34we are tasked today with moving forward
24:35to ensure america's return to flight
24:37i'm anxious to hear what nasa's response
24:40is to the board's report
24:42but i'm also very interested in where
24:43they plan to go from here with
24:45america's vision and space exploration
24:48thank you mr chairman for holding the
24:49hearing
24:50senator bro thank you mr chairman and uh
24:55let me join with all of our colleagues
24:58on the committee who i think have a
25:02universal agreement on the quality of
25:05the work that was done
25:06admiral after this great tragedy and the
25:09cooperation
25:10mr o'keefe that nasa had the role that
25:14nasa played in working out this very
25:17detailed
25:18investigation of a very tragic set of
25:20circumstances
25:22and it indeed is very tragic and is very
25:24very high profile
25:25if you think that every year we lose
25:27about 40 000 american lives on accidents
25:30every
25:31year on our nation's highways this is an
25:34accident involving seven real american
25:37heroes
25:38but it really speaks to the essence of
25:40what america is all about
25:42in the sense the quest for conquering
25:43outer space is really something that
25:47affects every american very deeply when
25:49you see something so visible
25:51as a shuttle tragedy that occurred
25:55so i have a number of questions about
25:57the recommendations and the culture that
25:59admiral you talked about and how we
26:01changed that but
26:03let me just say now that the report i
26:05think is
26:06well done and the cooperation i think
26:09that was exhibited
26:10is also to be commended now thank you
26:12both
26:13senator snow thank you mr chairman and
26:16thank you for holding
26:17uh this hearing so promptly and
26:19responsibly
26:20and i certainly want to welcome admiral
26:22gaiman and administrator o'keefe here
26:25uh this morning this report as
26:27everybody's indicated is about moving
26:29forward but the question is how we do so
26:31in a manner that honors
26:32the memories of those brave astronauts
26:35who lost their lives and to prevent a
26:36reoccurrence of this
26:38tragedy from occurring in the future
26:41this report does i think represent a
26:44giant leap
26:45forward and understanding that which
26:46needs to be fixed
26:48i think the question is the change that
26:50needs to occur
26:51in the implementation of that change and
26:54admiral gaiman i want to congratulate
26:55you
26:56and the board for your extraordinary
26:58efforts
26:59that you invested in developing this
27:02report
27:03but also i think reaching beyond
27:06and not just ascertaining the last thing
27:09that
27:10occurred but also understanding the
27:12whole system and patterns of failures
27:15in shortcomings i think that that is
27:17essential
27:18for understanding the complete picture
27:21in order to address uh the inequities
27:24and also
27:25the failures overall i would also say
27:28that we know
27:30that this is as you indicated admiral
27:32gaiman
27:33complex systems always fail in complex
27:36ways
27:37so obviously the solution is going to be
27:39equally complicated
27:40i think what becomes abundantly clear in
27:43this whole process
27:45is that the execution and the
27:47perpetuation
27:49of comprehensive changes must occur
27:53in order for the manned space flight
27:55program to continue
27:56in order to save lives in the future
28:00and i think we were all shocked by the
28:03revelations of the shortcomings of
28:06miscommunications obviously
28:10the bureaucratic misfirings and
28:13i think as a result we have to know
28:17how and what must be done but more
28:19importantly
28:20is establishing a perpetuity of
28:22vigilance and making sure that these
28:24things are
28:25implemented for the long haul in the
28:27longevity that is going to require
28:30we cannot allow our outrage or concern
28:33to atrophy
28:35you know we have seen past reports
28:38many of which were overlooked and that
28:41cannot occur
28:42again in this instance and so when the
28:44spotlight is
28:46off i would hope uh that we will be able
28:50to be assured
28:52that what has been recommended in this
28:54report is going to go forward
28:56it's not a question just depending on
28:58previous successes however tenuous to
29:00predict future success
29:02the question is how do we create a
29:04permanent management structure
29:06that will enable nasa to succeed in the
29:09future with this program
29:11and i know we have a lot of remarkable
29:12people at nasa and i know with your
29:14leadership
29:15administrator o'keefe and your
29:17extraordinary work at the board admiral
29:19gaiman
29:19that it is possible and that when we
29:22look back at this time
29:23of tragic loss that we can view it as a
29:26turning point in the history of
29:28america's manned space flight program
29:30thank you mr chairman senator noah
29:34thank you very much mr chairman i wish
29:36to commend administrator o'keefe
29:39and admiral gaiman for this careful
29:42candid and courageous report thank you
29:45very much
29:46i ask that the complete statement is
29:48made part of the record without
29:49objection
29:50welcome to the witnesses we'll begin
29:52with you administrator o'keeffe thank
29:54you for appearing today thank you mr
29:57chairman
29:57uh i have a statement i'd like to submit
30:02for the record if you would and i'll
30:03briefly summarize
30:04and if you pull a microphone a little
30:06closer
30:08is that resonating a little better
30:12over our 45 years as a agency
30:15when nasa was founded in 1958
30:18we have found in the course of that
30:20history
30:22that our time has been defined by the
30:25great successes
30:26and the great failures in each of these
30:29defining moments
30:31our strength and resolve as
30:32professionals has been tested to be sure
30:36and this is one of the seminal moments
30:38in our history
30:40it is defined by a failure
30:44on february the 1st we pledge to the
30:46families
30:48of the columbia 7 that we would find the
30:51problem
30:53fix it and return exploration objectives
30:56that their loved ones dedicated their
30:57lives to
31:00the columbia accident investigation
31:01board's report completes the first of
31:03these commitments
31:05and we are indebted to admiral gaiman
31:08and his board members
31:09for their exceptional public servants
31:11and extraordinary diligence
31:13in this difficult task we wanted
31:16an unvarnished answer and we got it
31:22as we begin to fulfill the second
31:24commitment to the families to fix the
31:26problem
31:28our first step critical first step
31:32is to accept the findings comply with
31:36the recommendations
31:37and embrace this report there is no
31:40equivocation on that pledge
31:43this report as many of you observed is a
31:46blueprint
31:48it's a road map to achieve that second
31:50objective
31:52now in the course of the proceedings of
31:54this investigation the board has given
31:55us an extraordinary head start
31:58by their candor their openness and the
32:00release of findings and recommendations
32:02during the course of the investigation
32:04this has all been conducted in a very
32:06open setting
32:09and they have telegraphed all along the
32:11way in the course of their public
32:12hearings commentary
32:14exactly what their findings were as they
32:17found them
32:17and moved forward and we've been
32:19listening
32:22so we've gotten a start thanks to their
32:24good work and
32:25the manner in which they conducted it in
32:27developing an implementation plan
32:31and the implementation plan will be
32:32released here later this week
32:36with the intent to be updated all the
32:39time on the findings and recommendations
32:41and you'll see that in this
32:42initial effort at it
32:45and divided into two primary categories
32:48the 29 recommendations
32:50of the columbia accent investigation
32:52board
32:53and then a second approach which is
32:55raising the bar to a standard higher
32:57than that
32:58and we will include in that category
33:00everything and anything
33:02that's going to improve this process as
33:05well as the
33:06the capabilities and the hardware itself
33:10as we work through these recommendations
33:13we have to choose
33:14options to implement them very wisely in
33:17order to be fully compliant with those
33:19recommendations and we've got to
33:22continually improve and upgrade the plan
33:24itself to incorporate
33:25every aspect we find along the way in
33:28our implementation effort and any
33:31other observation from wherever it may
33:33come
33:34that needs to be addressed as we work
33:36our way through that
33:37in our commitment to fix the problem
33:41the report covers hardware failures and
33:44human failures
33:46and how our culture needs to change to
33:48mitigate against succumbing
33:50to failures of both kind
33:55we must go forward and resolve to follow
33:58this blueprint and do it
33:59in a way that is our very best effort to
34:01make this a stronger organization
34:03there is no question about that it will
34:06require
34:07all of us in the agency not just the
34:09human space flight effort
34:10not any one center not any one program
34:13all of us at nasa to recognize this is
34:16an institutional set of findings
34:18that has application to everything we do
34:21and that's a profound set of
34:22recommendations we wanted that
34:24unvarnished assessment
34:26and we got it
34:29it's a very different nasa today than it
34:32was on february 1st
34:34our lives are forever changed by this
34:37tragic event
34:39but not nearly to the extent that the
34:42lives of the columbia families have been
34:43changed
34:44for the rest of their time
34:49in taking inspiration from their
34:50approach we must be as resolute
34:52and courageous in our efforts as they
34:54have been in working through this
34:55tragedy
34:57and committing ourselves to accepting
35:00these right
35:00these findings complying with these
35:02recommendations and embracing this
35:04report
35:05we know that how we respond in the days
35:07weeks and months ahead
35:09will matter as much as what we decide to
35:11do
35:12and whether it be a lasting change that
35:15will withstand
35:16the years from now i think has been
35:18observed by so many here as well
35:23we must also resolve that definition
35:26and be definitive in our acceptance of
35:28our failures and
35:29following through on our commitment to
35:31the families to fix the problem
35:33and return to the exploration objectives
35:35their loved ones dedicated their lives
35:37to
35:38and in that effort we know we've got a
35:40lot of work ahead of us
35:42and we've accepted that thank you mr
35:44chairman
35:46thank you very much admiral gaiman and
35:48uh i want to
35:50extend not only our appreciation to you
35:51but all members of your commission for
35:54the outstanding work they did
35:55welcome thank you mr chairman good
35:58morning mr chairman
35:59uh i'll just say a very few comments
36:02and uh ask that my my opening statement
36:05be entered for the record
36:06without objection i thank the committee
36:11for their compliments
36:12to the board this morning and on behalf
36:13of the board uh
36:15i i accept your compliments and i also
36:18know that the members of this committee
36:21share the feelings of the board that the
36:23price
36:24this nation paid on the first of
36:26february
36:27was so dear that it demands now that we
36:30do our parts
36:32to do everything possible to ensure that
36:34an accident like this
36:35never happens again i would like to
36:38return the compliment to the congress
36:42as the congress is aware we were not a
36:45presidential
36:46appointed commission
36:50but due to your oversight
36:53guidance and cooperation with this board
36:56the issue of our pedigree was removed
37:00from the table early on
37:02and all the comments around the town
37:06this week are about the merits of the
37:09report
37:10and not the process by how the report
37:12was written and
37:14uh the congress shares
37:17in the credit for turning that situation
37:19into a very positive situation and i
37:21thank every member of this committee
37:23for assisting us i also would like to
37:25join in thanking the
37:27my 12 colleagues who essentially gave up
37:30seven months of their life to do this
37:31report
37:32and the over 100 full-time investigators
37:35and the thousands of nasa engineers and
37:37scientists
37:38who helped us with this project
37:42when i appeared before you on the 14th
37:44of may of this year
37:45i made a commitment that our report
37:47would put this accident into context
37:50there are many contexts of course
37:52there's the context of history
37:55of budgets of management
37:59the context of what previous reviews of
38:01nasa have told us
38:03and the context of the our nation's
38:06vision
38:07about human space travel i believe that
38:10our report
38:10satisfies that requirement and has put
38:13this accident
38:14into all these contexts first of all of
38:17course we did establish
38:19the physical cause of this accident the
38:21foam did it
38:22and by the way for those of you who have
38:24never actually seen
38:25one of these objects i brought it along
38:28this
38:29object sitting on the floor over beside
38:31me here this is the famous
38:33left bipod ramp uh
38:36made out of the actual foam and the
38:38little black line is approximately where
38:40the fracture occurred
38:42uh that caused that caused this accident
38:44so if you've never seen one this is what
38:46one looks like thank you tom
38:49the board was very deliberate in coming
38:52to the conclusion
38:53that the foam did it and
38:56the time that it took us to come to that
38:59conclusion
39:00allowed us to look rather
39:02introspectively and
39:04intrusively into management at nasa
39:08while we were working on the physical
39:10cause we had many other people that were
39:12looking
39:12at how nasa did their business
39:14particularly the
39:16space shuttle program and we had to ask
39:19ourselves
39:20if the foam did it was this a legitimate
39:24surprise
39:25a new event that caught everybody by
39:28surprise
39:29or if not what is the history behind
39:33attempts to understand and fix this
39:36event
39:37if it was not a legitimate surprise what
39:40we found of course was that this was not
39:42a surprise
39:44nasa had experienced this foam coming
39:46off many times in the past
39:48and then when we got into the issue of
39:50learning how they dealt with this
39:52in a scientific and engineering point of
39:55view
39:56we got into the business about how the
39:59shuttle program
40:00handles unknowns how they handle risk
40:04how they provide for research and
40:06development to understand the processes
40:09that they're dealing with
40:10and how they learn as an institution
40:14we were concerned with what we found
40:17and that is really what about half of
40:19our report is about what we found
40:23being concerned with what we found we
40:25then embarked upon two paths of
40:27investigation
40:28simultaneously the first path was an
40:31academic review of how high-risk
40:35operations ought to be conducted and
40:38judged
40:39and simultaneously we conducted a review
40:42to see whether or not there were
40:45practical
40:46instances where high risk enterprises
40:50around the united states
40:51are being managed reliably successfully
40:54in other areas and we found plenty of
40:58cases
40:59where people deal with high-risk
41:01technology and high-risk enterprises
41:03and do so successfully we took
41:06kind of a menu or a recipe from the
41:09academic review
41:10and a some some examples from the best
41:13safety practices around the country
41:16put them together in a template and then
41:18judged nasa's
41:21space shuttle program by that template
41:23and found it to be wanting
41:26our report then documents extensively in
41:29detail
41:30each of the issues that we are concerned
41:32about along with documentary evidence
41:35interviews statements
41:40pieces of paper reports that support
41:43our conclusion and also our report we
41:47feel concludes with specific
41:50actionable recommendations to make this
41:52shuttle operations
41:54more safe i'll conclude mr chairman by
41:59adding one comment because it was
42:01brought up by the members several times
42:03and that is the issue of accountability
42:07the board does not feel that
42:10there is that people should not be held
42:13accountable for their actions
42:15the board does believe in accountability
42:18and we believe very strongly
42:22that we have included in our report
42:25plenty of documentary evidence to
42:28support
42:29accountability if the proper authorities
42:33want to hold people accountable
42:35it's all in the report we decided long
42:38ago
42:39made it public and i have defended the
42:41position before this committee before
42:43that we were not going to make those
42:45judgments but we put it all in the
42:47report
42:47it's all there if somebody the
42:50administrator of nasa or
42:51or this committee wants to find out
42:53whose performance was not up to
42:55not up to standard it's all in the
42:57report and it should be fairly easy to
42:59sort that out
43:00we just elected that that in order to
43:03pursue
43:04the issues that we wanted to pursue we
43:07would
43:08be better off if we let the proper
43:10authorities take care of accountability
43:11and it
43:12and and we did not come to the judgments
43:14but we put all the stuff in the report
43:16thank you mr chairman i'm pleased to be
43:18here and ready to answer any questions
43:20thank you admiral uh mr o'keefe it's a
43:23perfect segue into my first question
43:26accountability culture
43:29needs to be fixed how and when and what
43:31accountability do you expect to
43:35enforce here in light of admiral
43:37gaiman's statement that there's ample
43:40evidence of individuals as well
43:44as institutions that
43:47should be held accountable yes sir no i
43:49think as i mentioned in the opening
43:51statement
43:52the manner in which the board conducted
43:53its activities
43:55uh was so open so clear in terms of
43:58their approach to it and again the
43:59approach we used of releasing all the
44:01information that supported that
44:02investigative activity uh has led to
44:05this result
44:06and it's pretty clear in terms of what's
44:07involved here we've been acting on that
44:09as we've moved through
44:11uh the shuttle program management team
44:12is a completely new
44:14team today started from the program
44:16manager all the way through all the key
44:19players 14 of 15 of the senior folks are
44:22apt
44:22completely new folks uh in their
44:25capacities just in the last couple of
44:26months
44:27seems to me that's half of
44:28accountability mr o'keefe have you held
44:31others accountable
44:33yes sir as we've worked our way through
44:35this there are a range of other
44:36participants in this and i think what
44:37you see is a management team in place
44:39that's different today
44:41than it was a year ago to be sure and
44:43certainly very different than it was
44:44seven months ago
44:45does that mean that those who are
44:47replaced are accountable
44:49the folks who are in positions today
44:51will lead in the future and be
44:52accountable for this activity those who
44:54are not there
44:55i think you can draw the conclusion from
44:56that
45:02when do you expect this culture to be
45:05fixed
45:07i think admiral gaiman and the board
45:09observed in the report this is going to
45:11be a long
45:12long haul there's no question about it
45:15again the first step has got to be
45:16without equivocation
45:18that we accept the findings we'll comply
45:20with the recommendations and we'll
45:22embrace this report
45:23that's the first critical step in moving
45:25towards the role
45:27of i think a full acceptance of a
45:29culture change
45:31and in doing so i think that's going to
45:32take time we've got to be very
45:34consistent in that message we've got to
45:35be very consistent the direction we're
45:36going to go
45:38and any equivocation to that point i
45:41think is going to falter that effort
45:43so we've got to be on the long haul
45:45proceeding in that direction but i fully
45:47anticipate we will see
45:49the beginnings of that change within six
45:50months to a year to be sure
45:53and uh we've begun that process as
45:56immediately as the day the report
45:58released to assure that everyone
45:59understands there is no equivocation on
46:02accepting these findings
46:03complying with these recommendations and
46:05embracing this report
46:07admiral gaiman would you describe how
46:09congressional earmarks and nasa's
46:11transfer of funding from the shuttle
46:13program to other programs
46:15and the declining nasa budget affected
46:17the
46:18space shuttle operations and safety
46:22i certainly will and we included in our
46:25report
46:27the plain facts of the matter just so
46:29that anybody who wants to do the
46:31research can come to
46:32come to the conclusion that over a
46:34period of about a decade the buying
46:36power purchasing power the shuttle
46:38program has been reduced by over 40
46:40percent
46:41really though what has happened in the
46:43board's opinion
46:44is the very insidious the
46:48powerful but nearly invisible force
46:51of dissatisfaction the dissatisfaction
46:55among several administrations
46:58dissatisfaction
46:59among several committees of congress and
47:01even the administrator of nasa
47:04on the extremely expensive
47:07cost of operating the shuttle it costs
47:09much more to operate the shuttle than
47:11everybody
47:11will ever admit and uh over the years
47:16what has happened is that
47:19for one reason or another people have
47:22tried to
47:23ring money out of the shuttle program in
47:24order to pay for other projects
47:27nasa has essentially been operating
47:28under a flat budget by a flat top line
47:31in order to do other things there has
47:34been a
47:35steady consistent attempt to ring money
47:38out of the shuttle program
47:40some of it legitimately by efficiency
47:42and effectiveness but nevertheless
47:45since the shuttle program is so
47:47expensive there have been efforts to
47:49squeeze money out of the shuttle program
47:53it is the board's opinion that the
47:56effect of this
47:58is that for a number of years
48:02after the challenger accident the
48:05management scheme of the shuttle program
48:08has been changed to a to a very vertical
48:12scheme in which the program manager
48:16over a period of years has now had
48:18become responsible
48:20for schedules manifests
48:23costs budgets personnel assignments
48:26technical specifications and
48:28requirements the waivers to technical
48:30specifications and requirements
48:32and safety and because
48:36people were naturally trying to get
48:37money out of this very expensive program
48:39the program manager began to make trades
48:43in that trade space and he began to
48:45trade
48:46things like research and development
48:48into why foam comes off
48:51for measures to make the schedule he
48:54began to make trades like that
48:56and the board was very concerned that
48:58that was too much power
49:00in one person's hands if it is your goal
49:03to know who to blame if something goes
49:05wrong
49:06having a scheme in which all of that
49:08responsibility is placed in the program
49:10manager's hands
49:11is a really good scheme if you want to
49:13know who to blame
49:14but if you want to operate safely our
49:17study of both the theory and the
49:18academics and the best business
49:20practices
49:21indicates you need to separate the
49:22engineering and the safety from the guy
49:24who's responsible for the cost and
49:26schedule
49:26because inevitably they're going to
49:29fight with
49:30each other and you're going to get a
49:31conflict and a person who is being
49:33hammered over cost and schedule is going
49:35to trade
49:36safety and engineering in order to
49:38achieve cost and schedule
49:39and congressional earmarks congressional
49:42earmarks
49:43uh uh do a couple of things
49:47one thing they do is they they over they
49:50they give an overinflated
49:53number of the total value of nasa's
49:55budget
49:56because they make there might be 400 or
49:59500 million dollars worth of earmarks
50:01but that's not really nasa's money to
50:02spend because they can't move it around
50:05the administrator loses his flexibility
50:07he can't buy more safety and all that
50:09stuff probably most of the earmarks
50:12that we looked at are are actually ads
50:15most of them but not all
50:16were ads but even if they were ads it it
50:19makes the nasa budget look bigger than
50:21it is
50:21and it reduces the administrators
50:23flexibility for moving money around
50:25senator hollings admiral gaiman
50:29mr o'keefe appointed you did you find
50:31him accountable
50:33i did find him accountable and i did
50:35find him to be cooperative and i
50:37found him to take full responsibility
50:39for everything that happened on his
50:40watch
50:42and by that to answer you what you find
50:44him responsible for this
50:47disaster let's call it
50:51i find that leadership
50:54all leaders including mr o'keefe
50:57including the congress including the
50:58white house
51:00are responsible for the conditions that
51:02they set for
51:03and and that set for the conditions of
51:05the performance of their organization
51:08almost everything that we complain about
51:10every management trait
51:13every uh communications problem
51:16every engineering problem that we
51:18complain about in this report
51:20was set in motion between five and 15
51:23years ago
51:25so that didn't happen on his watch it
51:28didn't happen on his watch
51:30that's correct almost all of these
51:31traits that we're talking about
51:33are the are traits that happened from
51:36two
51:36to five years after the challenger
51:38accident that is
51:40right after the challenge accident as
51:42senator nelson had indicated
51:44all the energy and zeal and village
51:46vigilance associated with
51:48the tragedy causes everybody to do their
51:50job really well
51:52let me give you a case in point uh the
51:55the uh the management of the human space
51:57flight program
51:58which we used to be in washington dc in
52:00the mid 90s was shifted back down to
52:03the j to houston again and mr o'keefe
52:06brought it back up to washington
52:07as rogers had recommended that's an
52:09example of how we kind of migrated away
52:11from the rogers recommendation admiral i
52:13understand but you've taken over a ship
52:15as a navy animal
52:16time and again perhaps at a different
52:19rank and
52:21you didn't put off what happened 15
52:24years ago to the ship
52:25and 10 years ago to the ship i'm not
52:28trying to embarrass anybody we're all
52:30friends but i'm trying to break past
52:33this
52:34culture finding and fix responsibility
52:38and you have categorically said you
52:40didn't
52:41attempt to do that fix responsibility
52:43you got enough facts
52:46where it would indicate it didn't hold
52:48them up the standard now
52:50uh mr o'keefe has made a very
52:51categorical
52:53and convincing statement about uh we've
52:56got the message
52:57and everything else that mr o'keefe
53:00right after this occurred
53:04chairman mccain and myself were informed
53:07immediately that they had tried their
53:09best to take images
53:11take pictures of the uh damage
53:14done or the shuttle in flight and uh
53:18i think it was two perhaps three times
53:21uh the
53:22that is the defense department was ready
53:24to do it
53:25uh but that it was a formality about
53:28requesting it
53:30and the uh request was made and then was
53:34canceled
53:35in fact i understand that uh linda hamm
53:38the chairman of the
53:39management team was responsible she
53:42consulted with ralph
53:44rowe the manager of the space shuttle
53:47vehicle engineering office and that
53:52the imagery requests haven't been made
53:55to the defense department was cancelled
53:59by none other than linda ham
54:02who's now been just reassigned over to
54:05houston
54:06in another office and of all things
54:08where you say i get it
54:10we gonna do it the categorically we're
54:12gonna take every issue we're gonna do
54:13everything
54:14we put mr rowe as number two at the
54:17safety office
54:18that doesn't indicate to me that you got
54:20it
54:22officer um again the approach we've
54:26taken here
54:27is to completely designate
54:30for the management effort the folks who
54:32are prepared to lead in the time ahead
54:35and in dealing with the range of
54:38folks who participated in this activity
54:40and clearly the report
54:42lays it out as does admiral gaiman's
54:44commentary i think the approach we've
54:46got to take is put
54:48the best judgment to picking the
54:49leadership team for the program
54:51management office
54:52as well as all the efforts we're engaged
54:54in here in washington and across the
54:56centers
54:56towards this activity and picking the
54:58best people to do that that's who's in
55:00place today this is the best leadership
55:01there
55:02and that's the approach we've taken to
55:04this and that certainly is uh is a
55:07measure of accountability on that point
55:09there is no question and i appreciate
55:10admiral gaiman's
55:12observation i am personally accountable
55:13for this i view this as my personal
55:15responsibility
55:16i serve at the pleasure of the president
55:18at which point he decides that is no
55:20longer
55:20his pleasure i'm certainly ready to
55:22adhere to that and my
55:23obligation between now and the time he
55:25may reach that decision
55:27is do my level best to assure that we
55:30accept these findings comply with these
55:32recommendations and embrace this report
55:34and we intend to do just that but that's
55:36the best you can do is take mr ralph
55:38rowe
55:39who failed in safety he said i don't
55:41want the pictures i don't want to find
55:43out about the safety at all
55:44in fact we all saw this on tv they kept
55:47dissembling and
55:49i forget that fellow widamore and
55:50everything else like that we found
55:52all kind of defensiveness we we
55:55mentioned this last february when we had
55:57the hearing
55:59and now we find out having got it and
56:01gonna do this and gonna do that
56:03because i think with senator hanoi
56:06and senator stevens and myself were the
56:08only three
56:09here at the time of the challenger we
56:12heard us all this
56:13before so there's no education in the
56:16second kick of a mule i mean i'm finding
56:18out
56:19and listening to the same thing i
56:21listened to 17 years ago
56:23and we've lost seven astronauts now uh
56:28they talk about an accident but it was
56:30an avoidable accident
56:31you talk about failures but that was an
56:34avoidable failure
56:36and here to make sure that we don't have
56:39that same failure again you take the man
56:41who failed in safety and appoint them to
56:43number two in the safety office
56:45well sir no i'd just be to be
56:47technically clear about this he
56:48that's not the position it's assuming
56:50here we've set up and we're creating as
56:52of this
56:53time next month is a engineering and
56:56safety center
56:57which will perform at least at minimum
56:59among these recommendations of the 29
57:02trend analysis in other words be removed
57:05from the operational conduct of the
57:06activity
57:07and look at what the prior trends would
57:09be to see if we can identify
57:10those cases in which we have missed
57:13things and we clearly missed the foam on
57:15this one
57:16that's the point that's raised in this
57:18report very clearly there were seven
57:19instances
57:20and had we conducted that trend analysis
57:23independent of the operational
57:24imperatives
57:25of flying the shuttle we might have
57:27caught it and that's what this new
57:29organization is going to do and in that
57:30regard we're trying to assemble
57:32engineers who will be removed from that
57:33operational activity and be able to step
57:35back with a fresh set of eyes
57:37who are knowledgeable about the
57:39mechanics of this process
57:41and at the langley research center
57:42organize all those disciplines among
57:45structures and aerospace engineers
57:47in order to look at those observable
57:49trends and see if we can identify what
57:51that next instance might be
57:53and you need the folks who've got the
57:54experience to do that and in my judgment
57:57to borrow a page from verna von braun
58:00when you make a mistake you become that
58:02much more valuable the next time around
58:03to seeing
58:04exactly where that'll never be repeated
58:06again and there are this great value in
58:08some of that
58:09and it's something we'll certainly test
58:11and let the measure of what we do
58:14be the final conclusion of your
58:17assessment on this as opposed to what we
58:18say
58:19if we follow through and what we're
58:20saying we're going to do let that be the
58:22measure of proof and in that regard
58:23senator
58:24i view that as a very high standard we
58:26need to meet
58:29senator sununu
58:33thank you uh administrator keith
58:37o'keefe could you talk a little bit
58:39about the um
58:40the return to flight team uh the makeup
58:42of the team
58:43um the timeline that they're gonna
58:45operate under and what you think their
58:48biggest challenges will be
58:49in uh and getting the job done uh before
58:53we can even entertain the idea of the
58:54shuttle returning to space yes sir no
58:56thank you very much for the question
58:57um the return to flight team is composed
59:01uh and led by colonel jim halsell who's
59:04a
59:04air force colonel and a uh an astronaut
59:07of four different flights previously
59:11he is slated to be the commander of the
59:13sts-120 flight which is six flights
59:16after
59:16the return to flight activity had been
59:18slated before the accident
59:20so he has a very very strong vested
59:22interest making sure we get this right
59:24uh he's ably assisted by a very
59:26extensive team
59:27throughout the uh the four space flight
59:30centers
59:31uh johnson uh marshall kennedy
59:34and stennis in the effort in order to
59:37assure that we have
59:38pulled together all 29 of these
59:40recommendations as well as
59:42again the raise the bar objectives that
59:44we've established and it'll be
59:45included in this report which we're uh
59:48be releasing here later this week early
59:50next
59:51which encompasses and covers all of
59:53those recommendations plus all the
59:54observations and every other issue
59:57that we have come across to raise the
59:59bar raise the standard
1:00:00that we're anticipating before we return
1:00:02to flight that's overseen by
1:00:05a an internal senior management team of
1:00:09bill reedy who is also
1:00:10a veteran astronaut who is the associate
1:00:12administrator for space flight
1:00:14and michael greenfield who is a uh
1:00:17the associate deputy administrator for
1:00:19technical programs
1:00:20and they're managing across the entire
1:00:22agency so we we gather
1:00:24all of the information from the other
1:00:26six centers that are not space flight
1:00:28related
1:00:29in dealing with this particular set of
1:00:30objectives there's a range of
1:00:31capabilities we have
1:00:33across the agency all of which will be
1:00:35brought to bear and employed
1:00:36and there isn't any ambiguity i think
1:00:39among the leadership of the agency this
1:00:40is
1:00:41all of our agency objective finally the
1:00:44the oversight of our activities will be
1:00:47reviewed by
1:00:48a external panel led by tom stafford
1:00:51a veteran apollo and gemini astronaut
1:00:54and dick covey who was the pilot
1:00:56on the flight immediately after
1:00:57challenger in september of 1988
1:01:00and 25 other experts in the fields of
1:01:02engineering
1:01:03uh of uh management change of culture
1:01:06change academics industry folks the full
1:01:10range and a background of management as
1:01:12well as technical expertise
1:01:14to assure that we have implemented these
1:01:16recommendations and that we have
1:01:17selected options that are compliant
1:01:20and will make this a agency stronger all
1:01:22those folks are external
1:01:24experts in that regard they have already
1:01:26met once they've got the the framework
1:01:28of the implementation plan they'll meet
1:01:30again early next week
1:01:32and they'll be working through this all
1:01:33the way through that time and beyond
1:01:35our return to flight efforts so we've
1:01:37got this at three different uh
1:01:39levels in order to assure that we are
1:01:41not uh singing ourselves to sleep on any
1:01:43individual
1:01:44uh solution here or picking our favorite
1:01:47option
1:01:48at the expense of what may be a better
1:01:49approach will their focus be
1:01:52on the 15 or so return to flight
1:01:54recommendations or are they going to
1:01:56have
1:01:56a a broader um
1:01:59task of looking at the all 29
1:02:02recommendations plus the ones that
1:02:04in your words would would raise the bar
1:02:06for nasa yes sir the entire
1:02:09package everything and we certainly you
1:02:11know i mean taking the board's
1:02:13statements absolutely literally it says
1:02:16it these 15 must be implemented prior to
1:02:18that time
1:02:19and we take that as being a a fact a
1:02:21finding
1:02:22that we are not going to dispute and
1:02:24will certainly move towards but nothing
1:02:25is being done
1:02:27on those 15 at the expense of all the
1:02:29others that are engaged in there because
1:02:30we may find and we certainly have
1:02:32dealt with a number of different uh
1:02:35aspects
1:02:36during the course this aiding this
1:02:37investigation that we believe
1:02:40rise to that same kind of standard of
1:02:42the 15 as well that we will be
1:02:43implementing prior to return flight
1:02:45admiral gaiman you talk about in the
1:02:48report i think is pretty clear about
1:02:50identifying a causal relationship
1:02:53between the foam
1:02:55striking the leading edge of the wing
1:02:57and that leading to the accident
1:02:59and just following this through the
1:03:02press
1:03:02and and through the the work of the uh
1:03:06the board it's clear that a lot of
1:03:08technical effort went into
1:03:10assessing uh that the cause of the
1:03:13accident
1:03:14my question however is where
1:03:18are the greatest uncertainties i mean we
1:03:20can't know everything about the accident
1:03:22so where in the the mind of the board
1:03:24collective mind of the border the
1:03:26greatest
1:03:26uncertainties with regard to the
1:03:30physical causes of the accident or the
1:03:33the physical findings of of how uh
1:03:36the the shuttle came down
1:03:39well the board the board deliberated
1:03:41long and hard and we had quite a
1:03:43wrestling match over the
1:03:45words that we we would use to describe
1:03:47the physical cause
1:03:49by that i mean we could have used words
1:03:51like
1:03:52all the evidence supports that the foam
1:03:54did it or the most probable cause is the
1:03:57foam did it
1:03:58we elected not to do that we elected to
1:04:00say the phone did it
1:04:01and that is based on overwhelming uh
1:04:04confirming evidence multiple different
1:04:06avenues of investigation all of which
1:04:08point to the same thing
1:04:10we do not have a picture of a leading
1:04:13edge system with a hole in it
1:04:16uh that would have been nice that would
1:04:17have been confirmation that the foam did
1:04:19it
1:04:19we don't have any such a thing as that
1:04:21but we are absolutely
1:04:23positively convinced without beyond a
1:04:25shadow of a doubt
1:04:26of the physical cause of this accident
1:04:28and and there's no doubt in her mind
1:04:30whatsoever
1:04:32we were we were concerned though that in
1:04:34order for us to reach that conclusion
1:04:36we had to do some physical tests and
1:04:38conduct some tests that we thought nasa
1:04:39should have been doing
1:04:40all along there's no element of the
1:04:44system or the technical work that you
1:04:46did
1:04:46that frustrated the board members
1:04:50again absent a picture but were there
1:04:52any other areas of
1:04:54technical investigation where you had to
1:04:56walk away saying we we don't have all
1:04:58the information we would like about
1:05:00the nature of the failure damage inside
1:05:04the wing
1:05:05the way that the the the shuttle
1:05:07eventually came apart no uncertainties
1:05:09there
1:05:09only one uh just one and that is that in
1:05:12its it's in our report
1:05:14there's a nice little chart in there
1:05:16that shows the roll and yaw moments
1:05:18that are reconstructed from the from the
1:05:21very extensive
1:05:23uh data data recorders which are on
1:05:25board the shuttle
1:05:26and uh both of the roll and yaw moments
1:05:29show
1:05:29show the shuttle left wing losing lift
1:05:33due to damage and the role in the aw
1:05:36starting in one direction and then for
1:05:38some reason the
1:05:39the uh the uh one of them
1:05:43the role moment reverses and uh
1:05:47uh and and we can't explain why that
1:05:50happens it probably it's probably due to
1:05:52a deformation of the wing of some
1:05:54some sort but of the hundreds of pieces
1:05:56of technical data that we looked at
1:05:58all of which point to a hole in the left
1:06:00leading edge
1:06:01that's the only one that we can't
1:06:03absolutely scientifically explain
1:06:06mr chairman can i add just one point
1:06:08very quickly the approach that the board
1:06:10took that i found to be
1:06:12very impressive was they never fell in
1:06:14love with one
1:06:15scenario they by by process of
1:06:18elimination worked their way through a
1:06:19fall tree analysis that included
1:06:21every possible permutation and then
1:06:23closed those avenues
1:06:25to reach the conclusions they did so
1:06:28we're as informed by the things that
1:06:30they examined that have nothing to do
1:06:31with this accident and their judgment
1:06:34as we are about the things that they
1:06:35claim do have a specific uh
1:06:38contribution because there are a number
1:06:40of things they found
1:06:41that are they're equally problematic
1:06:44on some future activity unless we
1:06:46correct it and so this is a very
1:06:48thorough extremely extensive
1:06:50investigation that i believe in our
1:06:5245-year history has never been conducted
1:06:54to this depth
1:06:55ever and so it has uncovered a number of
1:06:58things that
1:06:59are extremely helpful in our pursuit of
1:07:01the returned flight which is then
1:07:03informed that
1:07:04raise the bar a set of standards of
1:07:06where we intend to go
1:07:07in our pursuit of return to flight when
1:07:10we're fit to fly thanks very much mr
1:07:15chairman
1:07:15and uh i start by uh saying to our
1:07:18friend and colleague senator hollings
1:07:21that
1:07:22your commentary this morning just
1:07:25confirms that
1:07:26we we listen and listen carefully add
1:07:29good things
1:07:30say and just because you're out here
1:07:32doesn't mean that you have to go quiet
1:07:34and just
1:07:35remember that uh and uh to you mr
1:07:38chairman for holding uh this
1:07:40this hearing uh and the uh hearings that
1:07:44we've uh
1:07:44traditionally had here and have been
1:07:47very informative and and very open and
1:07:50admirable game and i commend you i
1:07:52haven't had a chance to fully read
1:07:54your report but it's sprinkled with a
1:07:58candor
1:07:59that we rarely see in reports
1:08:02to government because there's always a
1:08:05program to make sure that we don't
1:08:07offend this party or that party
1:08:09and i think that you went right to it
1:08:12and
1:08:13uh how that particular how this
1:08:15particular
1:08:16tragic accident happened is critical
1:08:19because of the loss of life
1:08:21and the loss of confidence and all of
1:08:23those things but more importantly
1:08:26is how did we get there in the first
1:08:28place
1:08:29and when i look at your the executive
1:08:31summary of
1:08:32your report and you say that
1:08:36the organizational causes of the
1:08:38accident are rooted in the space shuttle
1:08:39programs
1:08:40history and culture that means there are
1:08:42things been going on for a long time at
1:08:44least you felt so
1:08:45and so did your colleagues on on the
1:08:47report who approved this
1:08:48this statement the fact of the matter is
1:08:51that in some ways
1:08:53it was the tragedy waiting to happen
1:08:57because uh i i see in reports
1:09:00and mr chairman i want to submit a uh a
1:09:03report that comes from
1:09:05the international federation of
1:09:07professional technical
1:09:09engineers uh it's their report on the
1:09:11effectiveness of nasa's workforce and
1:09:13contractor policies and i think there
1:09:15are
1:09:16there's something to be learned from
1:09:17this and i again asked
1:09:19the request that this be included uh in
1:09:22the
1:09:22in the record one of the objection one
1:09:25of the things that they noted
1:09:26in their report was that uh
1:09:31when uh a previous administrator and i i
1:09:34can't be delicate here and it's not in
1:09:37criticism it's just the
1:09:38information that i look at it daniel
1:09:41gold nasa's administrator from 1992-2001
1:09:45appointed and directed to cut nasa's
1:09:48budget and bring fiscal discipline
1:09:51uh of the business world to the nation's
1:09:53premier of science
1:09:55uh the agency was then put under a
1:09:57management
1:09:58uh plan called fbc faster
1:10:02better cheaper and i wonder
1:10:05if you'd make a comment about
1:10:09the availability of resource
1:10:12did the 1700 nasa employees have the
1:10:16capacity and i mentioned this is my
1:10:18in my comments earlier to supervise 18
1:10:21000
1:10:21contractor workers was there
1:10:26any failure in your view
1:10:29that lay heavily at the doorstep of the
1:10:32contractors
1:10:33to provide the kinds of service that
1:10:36might have averted this catastrophe
1:10:40thank you senator the the board found
1:10:44uh and we looked at this extraordinarily
1:10:47hard we interviewed hundreds of people
1:10:50we walked the shop floors
1:10:51of all the centers all over the country
1:10:54where
1:10:55component components are made and we did
1:10:58not
1:10:58find absolutely cases where the
1:11:00contractors were taking shortcuts or
1:11:03were cheating
1:11:04or weren't doing their job well we
1:11:06didn't find any cases like that
1:11:08the board did fine however and it's in
1:11:12our report
1:11:13that the the uh the management level
1:11:17that is the vertical level
1:11:20that the program has decided to
1:11:23contract to seem to us to be a little
1:11:28too high
1:11:29by that i mean it appeared to us that
1:11:32they were contracting out management
1:11:34functions
1:11:35they were they were almost to the point
1:11:37where they were contracting out
1:11:38government functions
1:11:41and it and it appeared to us that we
1:11:43didn't find anything wrong
1:11:45i mean we didn't find anybody doing
1:11:46anything wrong in that case
1:11:48but what we found was then was that when
1:11:50the government had to make a decision
1:11:52they no longer had the technical
1:11:54expertise because the function that they
1:11:56were supposed to be supervising was
1:11:58being done by a contractor
1:11:59and you if you look at the mission
1:12:01management team decision making
1:12:03you see them consulting people that are
1:12:06experts on whether or not this is a
1:12:07problem
1:12:08and they're all contractors and there
1:12:10doesn't seem to be a government person
1:12:12who has the technical knowledge anymore
1:12:14because they contracted it all out
1:12:16so we didn't find any wrong doing i
1:12:19understand but we did find
1:12:21that perhaps in our it did appear to us
1:12:23that
1:12:24the government had uh because so many of
1:12:28the oversight functions were being done
1:12:30by contractors
1:12:31the expertise goes with the function and
1:12:34we found that the us government uh
1:12:35was short was seem to be to be
1:12:37shortchanged
1:12:39so if there isn't blame and
1:12:42i understand very clearly what you said
1:12:45then uh
1:12:46structure certainly was one of the
1:12:48problems and i assume therefore
1:12:51is a continuing or might be a continuing
1:12:54problem the question is
1:12:56whether or not we're prepared to devote
1:12:58the resources
1:12:59to building this organization's capacity
1:13:03to the point that it needs to go on
1:13:06these
1:13:06relatively dangerous missions we know
1:13:09they're dangerous
1:13:10and we try our best to protect uh
1:13:12everybody involved with the program but
1:13:15is there an is there enough resource
1:13:19senator mccain's question about
1:13:22what what earmarks do well it robs the
1:13:25camp
1:13:25the program of its appropriate funds
1:13:29to get this job done mr o'keefe how do
1:13:32you what do you
1:13:32what do you think about the resource on
1:13:34this
1:13:37uh again it is a a very subjective
1:13:41matter
1:13:42and it is one that uh that's why we
1:13:44hired you
1:13:45yes sir i fully understand and and
1:13:48my judgment on it is that we have the
1:13:50resources necessary to continue
1:13:52operations uh in a way that is
1:13:54responsible the points that admiral
1:13:56gaiman has raised
1:13:58i think has been echoed in a uh
1:14:00congressional budget office report that
1:14:02if you permit me mr chairman i'll submit
1:14:04for the record as well released just
1:14:05last month
1:14:06that compares this effort and the
1:14:08resources and the way it's conducted
1:14:10relative to other
1:14:12major what they refer to as
1:14:13technologically complex tasks
1:14:15performed similarly at other agencies
1:14:18and departments across the federal
1:14:19government and find
1:14:20no remarkable distinctions in that
1:14:22regard having said that
1:14:24the observations again the depth of this
1:14:26investigation is deeper than
1:14:28any i have ever been involved in in my
1:14:30public service time
1:14:32and as a consequence the observations of
1:14:35the board and the findings of the board
1:14:37are going to inform us as we go through
1:14:40the
1:14:41examination of the space flight
1:14:43operations contract which comes up for
1:14:45renewal in a year
1:14:46in order to figure out exactly how we
1:14:48change that alteration
1:14:50based on the the findings
1:14:52recommendations and basic views
1:14:54expressed in this report there's a lot
1:14:56to be learned from that
1:14:57and while the the surface coverage even
1:15:00from cbo says not a lot of comparability
1:15:03difference between
1:15:04other major systems integration programs
1:15:06that's not good enough as far as we're
1:15:08concerned
1:15:08because the findings of this board are
1:15:11fact and we
1:15:12intend to run that to ground to find out
1:15:14how we alter the contractual
1:15:15arrangements as well as our own conduct
1:15:17in order to do this stronger in a better
1:15:19way
1:15:20thank you thank you senator hutchinson
1:15:24thank you mr chairman uh mr o'keefe were
1:15:27you ever advised
1:15:29or aware during the columbia mission
1:15:31that there was
1:15:32a serious problem or any problem from
1:15:35the foam strike on liftoff
1:15:38no
1:15:42i'd like to pursue the issue of
1:15:45resources again
1:15:47mr o'keefe you had a scientific advisory
1:15:51board that
1:15:52you asked to come together and determine
1:15:55what the resources of nasa should cover
1:15:59what should be the mission you've got
1:16:01the report back
1:16:04i would ask you if you think you have
1:16:06the resources
1:16:07to implement that re report
1:16:10and establish a vision that not only
1:16:14is scientifically viable but that the
1:16:17american people
1:16:19can see the necessity
1:16:23to continue yes ma'am the the very
1:16:26specific
1:16:26uh review that we asked and i think
1:16:28you're referring to
1:16:30is the scientific prioritization to be
1:16:32conducted aboard the international space
1:16:33station
1:16:34that was conducted last summer and early
1:16:36fall
1:16:37we have in fact assessed that the
1:16:40prioritization
1:16:40is the scientific objective uh agenda
1:16:43that we will pursue on international
1:16:45space station and the funds necessary to
1:16:48conduct that activity is contained in
1:16:49the president's budget that's before the
1:16:51congress pending now
1:16:52uh to pursue that through for fiscal
1:16:54year 2004 through
1:16:562008 as a projection so that clearly is
1:16:59our
1:17:00intent we're going to follow that
1:17:01prioritization that's what the findings
1:17:03of the uh
1:17:04of that scientific group was and
1:17:06representing all the disciplines of what
1:17:08could be conducted on international
1:17:09space station
1:17:10and proceed from there to the larger
1:17:12question you posed though i think the
1:17:13issue that we've tried to
1:17:15to codify and as part of this year's
1:17:16strategic plan it was released along
1:17:18with the budget as well
1:17:20is an effort to be very selective about
1:17:22the areas we intend to pursue
1:17:24and apply those resources as extensively
1:17:27as need be in order to do an
1:17:28extraordinary job in those areas
1:17:30and then for those areas that don't fit
1:17:32within the category
1:17:33of our three primary mission areas that
1:17:36we simply
1:17:37not attempt to do them you know
1:17:40passingly but not just not elect not to
1:17:42do them at all
1:17:43and instead be very selective about what
1:17:44we do and i think the budget and the
1:17:46strategy that's before you
1:17:47is our attempt to try to pursue that
1:17:49certainly things changed
1:17:51on the first february and that's what we
1:17:53need to assess and go back and continue
1:17:54to relook this
1:17:56relative to the board's findings and the
1:17:58approach that we intend to take
1:17:59so if i could summarize you think that
1:18:01you have set the priorities
1:18:02and you have the resources necessary to
1:18:06accomplish those top priorities and
1:18:09leave the ones at the bottom
1:18:11by the wayside in the scientific
1:18:13objectives the answer is yes
1:18:14and again in terms of our performance of
1:18:16those activities we're going to be
1:18:18guided by
1:18:18other additional views that the board
1:18:20may have found here as we go through
1:18:22this
1:18:22to upgrade update and improve this
1:18:25approach towards it but in terms of the
1:18:27science priorities
1:18:28i think you're exactly right that effort
1:18:30a year ago was
1:18:31the first time we'd ever had a
1:18:32prioritization set that began with the
1:18:34number one
1:18:35and moved progressively through two
1:18:37three four and five
1:18:38prior that everything was the number one
1:18:40priority which therefore meant nothing
1:18:42was a priority
1:18:43uh i'd like to ask admiral gaiman um
1:18:46it's clear from your report um that
1:18:50there was insufficient resource and that
1:18:53nasa was stretched too thin
1:18:56to achieve its multiple goals
1:19:00do you believe that the agency is
1:19:04more budget driven than mission driven
1:19:07in the past not going forward obviously
1:19:09because
1:19:10we're indicating that there is going to
1:19:13be a change but
1:19:14do you think it was too budget-driven
1:19:17rather than mission driven we
1:19:20we believe that the uh budgets had a lot
1:19:23to do
1:19:24with what happened with how the
1:19:27management system morphed over the years
1:19:31and we believe that budgets are one of
1:19:34the constraints on the program yes
1:19:36ma'am for example uh i was just looking
1:19:39through the
1:19:40report i was going to try and find the
1:19:41quote the page to you normally i'm
1:19:43like a bible preacher i can quote the
1:19:45page that everything is i couldn't find
1:19:46it
1:19:47there's a little uh sidebar in there
1:19:49which talks about the shuttle upgrade
1:19:50program
1:19:52uh the shuttle upgrade program is
1:19:54essentially unfunded
1:19:55uh there's a recommendation in here that
1:19:58if you're going to fly this shuttle
1:20:00beyond about 2010 you should completely
1:20:03re-qualify or re-certify
1:20:05the shuttle that'd be very expensive
1:20:07proposition
1:20:08not funded we suggest that we need to
1:20:12re-establish the independent technical
1:20:14review authority or re-establish the
1:20:16position of
1:20:16engineers as being independent from the
1:20:19program so engineers can do engineering
1:20:21work
1:20:21independent from the program and then
1:20:23you when you ask for an engineering
1:20:24program
1:20:25an engineering evaluation or an
1:20:27engineering decision
1:20:28you're getting an evaluation from people
1:20:31who don't care
1:20:32anything about this the schedule for
1:20:34example or the
1:20:35need to make a launch that requires
1:20:38a a couple hundred people or a couple
1:20:40thousand people to be
1:20:41funded from some
1:20:45which is currently not funded because
1:20:47now everything is charged against one of
1:20:48the programs
1:20:49so budgets are a big are a big issue yes
1:20:52ma'am
1:20:53let me just ask administrator o'keeffe
1:20:55in my last
1:20:56couple of seconds he's talked about
1:21:00the the upgrading of the shuttles
1:21:04and the recertification of shuttles
1:21:06which you have said
1:21:07you're committed to to doing and
1:21:10uh we also have the new space orbital
1:21:13vehicle that
1:21:17will replace the shuttle and i would
1:21:19like to ask you
1:21:20if you think you said you have the
1:21:22resources to do your high priorities
1:21:24have you taken into account the
1:21:26upgrading of the shuttles
1:21:28and do you have any attention of
1:21:32speeding up the process of the space
1:21:34orbital vehicle that would replace the
1:21:36shuttles
1:21:36yes ma'am two out of three of those
1:21:39again our discussion a moment ago was on
1:21:40the science priorities but as it
1:21:42pertains to the three specific items
1:21:44he's mentioned again
1:21:46those now are findings and therefore
1:21:47they're treated as fact
1:21:49and the other three issues two of them
1:21:52there are resources set aside whether
1:21:55they're sufficient or not is something
1:21:56we've got to evaluate
1:21:58for the upgrading of the shuttle there
1:22:00is a service life extension program
1:22:02budget line item that's in the budget
1:22:04the president presented to
1:22:05the congress on february the third we
1:22:07have to assess exactly what those
1:22:09upgrades
1:22:10are that need to comply specifically
1:22:12with these findings
1:22:13and whether that comports exactly or
1:22:14whether additional resources are
1:22:16necessary
1:22:16is something that time will tell in the
1:22:19second area the
1:22:20the in terms of the independent
1:22:22technical authority admiral gaming is
1:22:23exactly right well that takes 200 or 2
1:22:26000
1:22:26additional engineers don't know yet
1:22:28we're going to have to assess all those
1:22:29options
1:22:30and indeed he's right that's not
1:22:32something we anticipated that's not
1:22:34something that's contained in this
1:22:35budget but we intend to do it and we'll
1:22:37assess what those resource requirements
1:22:38are
1:22:39as we work our way through this um so
1:22:42the approach with and
1:22:43as far as the orbital space plane is
1:22:44concerned the there is an additional
1:22:46amount in there's amounts in the budget
1:22:48before the congress now that was
1:22:50proposed in
1:22:512004 the initial funding was agreed to
1:22:54by the congress
1:22:56um as part of the president's uh
1:22:58amendment in november of last year to
1:23:00last year's budget not enough to
1:23:02increase
1:23:03the that's exactly right and i was just
1:23:05about to say that you're exactly right
1:23:06the issue of accelerating its delivery
1:23:08is something we
1:23:09we need to look at and the issue is not
1:23:11so much of how much
1:23:13more it will cost but how much more
1:23:15resources you need earlier
1:23:16in order to achieve that and that's
1:23:18something we've really got to assess now
1:23:20and make a determination uh of whether
1:23:22that is in the best interest
1:23:24uh overall to pursue that particular
1:23:26approach but we're working that
1:23:27diligently i've got some answers on
1:23:29what it would take to accelerate this
1:23:30for an earlier delivery
1:23:32of whatever ultimate design uh would
1:23:35come out of this competitive effort that
1:23:37we're pursuing right now
1:23:38thank you mr chairman thank you senator
1:23:40appreciate it very much
1:23:41thank you uh mr chairman uh let me begin
1:23:44uh
1:23:45administrator o'keefe with this question
1:23:46of
1:23:48my sense that you really can't define
1:23:50nasa's
1:23:52mission now without getting on top of
1:23:54the question
1:23:55of man's space flight and i think
1:23:58we're about to start a whole array of
1:24:02commissions and studies and the like and
1:24:04i would like to ask you
1:24:06whether you could furnish us within 90
1:24:09days
1:24:10or at most six months a
1:24:13solid cost-benefit analysis
1:24:16with respect to manned space flight
1:24:19because
1:24:19i think that's what the congress really
1:24:22needs
1:24:23and i know that what i get asked all the
1:24:26time and certainly there are a lot of
1:24:27critics that say look they give the bulk
1:24:28of the money
1:24:30to man programs but most of the research
1:24:32seems to come from
1:24:33areas that aren't manned what's your
1:24:35reaction to the proposal i've made this
1:24:37morning
1:24:38that you give this committee a solid
1:24:41cost-benefit analysis
1:24:43on manned space flight within 90 days or
1:24:46at most
1:24:46six months it's a very intriguing idea
1:24:49i'll give it my best shot
1:24:50i think that's a very thoughtful way to
1:24:53go about approaching it and i'll do my
1:24:54very best to provide such a document
1:24:57and an analysis that would demonstrate
1:24:58that that's a that's a step forward i
1:25:00think improving this two things i would
1:25:02observe as well though that
1:25:04uh just to get the the to be clear on
1:25:06the facts
1:25:07a third of the budget is really
1:25:09dedicated towards space flight
1:25:11activities
1:25:12of which 25 percent is shuttle uh
1:25:15additional amounts are for international
1:25:17space station
1:25:18and then the other two thirds is towards
1:25:20earth science
1:25:21space science all the things that are
1:25:23not specifically related to space flight
1:25:25activities so
1:25:26it it already is skewed heavily towards
1:25:30uh activities by a factor of roughly two
1:25:31to one uh the kinds of functions that
1:25:34are performed
1:25:34uh by robotic and distant means
1:25:38so that's an approach the other thing
1:25:39we've got to really assess here
1:25:41and again in in pursuit i think
1:25:42earnestly to answer the question the
1:25:44very thoughtful proposal you've put
1:25:46forward
1:25:46on how to conduct such an analysis we've
1:25:49got to find some way to
1:25:51factor in what is the cognitive skills
1:25:54that human beings bring to the occasion
1:25:56in these cases there are some things you
1:25:58simply can't do without a human
1:26:00intervention
1:26:01and we've got to be selective in the
1:26:02cases in which
1:26:04we expose humans to those risks
1:26:08and that's essentially what i think
1:26:09you're posing and it's a very
1:26:11interesting way to go about doing it
1:26:12i'll give it my best shots
1:26:13chairman i would just like to follow up
1:26:15with you and senator hollings i i've
1:26:16made the proposal but
1:26:18obviously i'd very much like to do it
1:26:20within the bipartisan approach you
1:26:22followed in this
1:26:23in this committee but to me that is the
1:26:25bottom line we have
1:26:26got to get a cost benefit analysis with
1:26:30respect to what is done
1:26:31in the manned versus unmanned area and
1:26:34i'll be following that up and look
1:26:36forward to talking to my colleagues
1:26:37about it second question admiral gaiman
1:26:39if i might
1:26:40involves the compliance issue i think
1:26:42senator hollings touched on this
1:26:44i mean the whole history here is tragedy
1:26:47and recommendations made and then
1:26:50somehow
1:26:51they don't get followed i like your
1:26:53recommendations with respect to how
1:26:56it could be different this time and to
1:26:58bring about compliance i mean for
1:27:00example i mean just
1:27:01on a kind of basic level i mean we could
1:27:03ask administrator o'keefe to come on in
1:27:05here every 90 days
1:27:07and basically say look this is what
1:27:09we've done in the last
1:27:10you know 90 days uh i want to give you a
1:27:13crack at
1:27:15how you'd approach it but what i i think
1:27:18you want to do and the dedicated people
1:27:20who staff this effort want to do is make
1:27:22sure we're not sitting here
1:27:23in the face of another tragedy and your
1:27:25thoughts with respect on how to make
1:27:26sure
1:27:27that there's compliance this time i
1:27:29think would be another area i'm
1:27:31interested in
1:27:31thank you senator as i indicated my
1:27:33opening remarks uh
1:27:34i agree with your concern and and as i
1:27:37said in our opening remarks
1:27:39i think we owe it we owe it to the
1:27:41memory of the
1:27:42seven heroes who died to make sure that
1:27:44we do everything we can to
1:27:46to prevent this accident from happening
1:27:48again
1:27:49the history of nasa which we studied
1:27:52very carefully in our
1:27:54and documented in our report indicates
1:27:56that
1:27:58that nasa like any other big bureaucracy
1:28:01responds to the forces that are acting
1:28:03on it and unfortunately over a period of
1:28:05long long period of time budget
1:28:09schedule cost forces became very
1:28:12important
1:28:12to nasa and they started to they started
1:28:14to affect the program
1:28:16the question about how to prevent this
1:28:17from happening again is a is a very
1:28:19intriguing one
1:28:21the board has spent some time scratching
1:28:23their heads about it
1:28:26a couple we have a couple of examples
1:28:27that have worked well in the past
1:28:29in the case of the challenger accident
1:28:30you may recall that the rogers
1:28:32commission
1:28:33required that nasa redesigned the uh
1:28:36solid rocket booster joints
1:28:38and and o-rings it wasn't just the
1:28:40o-rings it was the whole joint
1:28:42and they also recommended that an
1:28:44oversight committee be established to
1:28:46supervise that a non-nasa oversight
1:28:49committee
1:28:50and that oversight committee was in
1:28:51existence for for almost three years
1:28:54and they disapprove the first couple of
1:28:57nasa redesign efforts
1:28:59uh you could appoint some kind of a
1:29:02of a panel or a committee uh to advise
1:29:05the congress
1:29:06as to whether or not these management uh
1:29:10and and uh step steps have been taken
1:29:13and whether or not they're really
1:29:14working and
1:29:15and all that sort of stuff there is a
1:29:17precedent for that
1:29:19there is uh and i think the members of
1:29:22this committee are very much
1:29:23aware there is a congressionally
1:29:25appointed
1:29:26or congressionally created oversight
1:29:29panel already in existence called the
1:29:31asap
1:29:32aerospace safety advisory panel created
1:29:34by congress
1:29:36you might want to charge them with some
1:29:38duties and responsibilities or maybe
1:29:40reformat them reformulate the membership
1:29:44to get at the issues that you're
1:29:45concerned about uh
1:29:47admiral if i if i might because i know
1:29:49i'm just about to run out of time i want
1:29:52your opinion on one other area
1:29:54the technical engineering authority that
1:29:57you
1:29:58have talked about strikes me as a way
1:30:02to bring about some of the independence
1:30:04and oversight that's important i would
1:30:06like to hear
1:30:07your thoughts on sort of the nuts and
1:30:09bolts of how that would work and also
1:30:12yours administrator o'keefe whether you
1:30:14accept the recommendation
1:30:16and in effect how something like this
1:30:18would work i mean the the first thing
1:30:19that strikes me is if
1:30:20nasa puts up the money for it then you
1:30:23say to yourself how does that
1:30:25facilitate the kind of independence that
1:30:27you're talking about
1:30:28but given the fact that you put great
1:30:30weight on this technical engineering
1:30:32authority tell us
1:30:34how you think it would work and i'd like
1:30:37both of your reactions
1:30:38i know my light is on but i'd like the
1:30:40reaction of both you gentlemen on that
1:30:43senator uh thank you for that question
1:30:45that question probably gets to the
1:30:47most important recommendation and
1:30:50probably the core
1:30:51of our of our report and that is that
1:30:55we have found that over the years that
1:30:58a legitimate system of checks and
1:31:01balances
1:31:02has been lost in nasa in which there are
1:31:05independent and resourceful and robust
1:31:08agencies that kind of check up on each
1:31:10other within within nasa
1:31:12we don't the board does not feel that we
1:31:14need to create another entity or an
1:31:16anti-nasa or something like that
1:31:19but what's happened is this this
1:31:21independent robust
1:31:22system of checks and balances has been
1:31:24lost and it's been lost
1:31:26in the name of efficiency and
1:31:27effectiveness and all that kind of stuff
1:31:29but nevertheless it's been lost
1:31:32and the manifestations of that are
1:31:34really what our report is all about
1:31:36all the emails that didn't get acted on
1:31:39and the
1:31:40and the uh the the inability of
1:31:42engineers to affect
1:31:44things and the overwhelming power of
1:31:46informal chains of command by people in
1:31:48the program and things like that
1:31:50all those things are fixed if you create
1:31:54an engineering world in which engineers
1:31:56can have a robust
1:31:58and honest difference of opinion and use
1:32:01and you don't do management by view
1:32:02graphs you use technical papers instead
1:32:04of
1:32:05view graphs and overheads and all those
1:32:07bad things we talked about
1:32:09what this what this organization would
1:32:11do what we think the
1:32:12key ingredient to the success of this
1:32:16scheme
1:32:17is that this organization must in fact
1:32:20own a function by that i mean simply
1:32:24creating an organization that sits
1:32:26on the sideline in and uh kibbutz's or
1:32:30or second guesses other people is not
1:32:32good enough
1:32:33these our suggestion is that this
1:32:35organization actually has to own part of
1:32:37the process
1:32:38in the part of the process we suggest is
1:32:41that they have to own the technical
1:32:42requirements and specifications
1:32:44and all waivers to them now that implies
1:32:48that they have to understand those
1:32:49technical requirements and
1:32:50specifications i have to understand why
1:32:52they're there
1:32:54if anybody wants a waiver to them they
1:32:55have to understand the rationale for the
1:32:57waiver
1:32:58and if they don't want to grant the
1:32:59waiver they have to understand why
1:33:00they're not granting it
1:33:01so that's that suggests an engineering
1:33:04enterprise of some size
1:33:06um uh it used to be that way long long
1:33:09time ago
1:33:10and that really gets to the core that
1:33:12really gets the core of our
1:33:13recommendation because
1:33:15many half 60 percent of all the ills
1:33:18that we list in our report are
1:33:20immediately fixed because of
1:33:22of of this enterprise that we recommend
1:33:25it can be within nasa we
1:33:27we don't necessarily suggest it has to
1:33:28be outside of nasa
1:33:32i'm sorry the request was that i respond
1:33:36as well
1:33:36the short answer is
1:33:39it's a finding and therefore it's a fact
1:33:42it's a recommendation so therefore we're
1:33:44going to comply with it
1:33:45no further debate on that issue and what
1:33:47admiral gaiman and his colleagues on the
1:33:49board have pointed to
1:33:51is a organizational characteristic that
1:33:53i recognized from my
1:33:55defense department experience years ago
1:33:57particularly the navy department
1:33:58experience which is to have a
1:34:00severability between
1:34:01that institutional force which owns and
1:34:04and
1:34:05kind of takes control of specifications
1:34:07and engineering
1:34:08requirements and those that are faced
1:34:11with the
1:34:12program operational considerations of
1:34:15cost and schedule and
1:34:16all the other factors go into the day in
1:34:19and day out kinds of work
1:34:20and make a very clear severability of
1:34:22those functions got the message
1:34:24that's a clear recommendation we're
1:34:25going to sort through the options of
1:34:27what is the best approach to do it
1:34:29and again the oversight function that we
1:34:32have
1:34:33uh put in motion is the stafford covey
1:34:35team of tom stafford and dick covey and
1:34:37his 25
1:34:38their 25 colleagues in all these
1:34:41different disciplines of management
1:34:42engineering technical change
1:34:44organization change
1:34:46culture change all those different
1:34:47experts will then be
1:34:49the judge of whether we've picked the
1:34:51appropriate option to do that
1:34:53and we will not proceed until such time
1:34:55as we're satisfied
1:34:56that we have selected an option that is
1:34:58not only compliant
1:34:59but really does follow through on the
1:35:01the point that's being raised here
1:35:03final observation is i i concur
1:35:05wholeheartedly in admiral gaiman's view
1:35:07that there is a statutory board in place
1:35:09right now the congress
1:35:11enacted 30 years ago after the apollo
1:35:13fire
1:35:14the asap the panel that is focused on
1:35:17these
1:35:17you know safety objectives i think the
1:35:19charge that i'm hearing here
1:35:21and as well as the approach that needed
1:35:22taken is take that statutory oversight
1:35:25function
1:35:26and reinvigorate it and we'll we'll have
1:35:29to kind of concentrate on
1:35:30what the right ways are to do that and
1:35:32certainly would appreciate your support
1:35:34and help in that pursuit as well
1:35:36senator brownback thank you mr chairman
1:35:38thank you gentlemen for being here today
1:35:40uh admiral gaiman in the report it's
1:35:43replete about there's a need for a
1:35:44change of culture
1:35:46and i think there was one news account
1:35:47that put it accurately that
1:35:49technology is easy people are difficult
1:35:53how do you how do you change a culture
1:35:55at an institution
1:35:57without changing the people involved
1:36:00and this seems to me that if you're
1:36:03talking about a
1:36:04cultural issue here you're not talking
1:36:07about moving boxes or organizational
1:36:09charts around you're talking about
1:36:11changing hold mentalities and whole
1:36:13attitudes
1:36:14and that seems to me that you're you are
1:36:18talking about
1:36:19major wholesale changes in personnel
1:36:22within the nasa system is that accurate
1:36:26senator we we anguished over this issue
1:36:30for a considerable amount of time
1:36:32and we also did not we did not start our
1:36:35investigation
1:36:36with this with this position we kind of
1:36:39came to it
1:36:40and i think that in order to answer your
1:36:42question directly i have to
1:36:44i have to make it clear that the board
1:36:48made a clear distinction between
1:36:50management
1:36:52problems and management fixes and
1:36:55culture
1:36:55we in our minds in our framework we view
1:36:58these two things as two separate things
1:37:01management can easily be fixed by wiring
1:37:03diagrams and changing rules and
1:37:05regulations
1:37:06and moving people around and changing
1:37:07functions and and all that stuff
1:37:09but the cultural issues are more
1:37:11difficult to get at
1:37:12much more difficult that we had a little
1:37:15saying that you can
1:37:16you can fix a management problem by
1:37:17reorganizing but you can't fix a
1:37:19cultural problem by reorganizing
1:37:21cultural problems are going to have to
1:37:22be driven bad culture there's good
1:37:25culture too by the way there's a culture
1:37:26of safety and a culture of honesty and a
1:37:28culture of openness and all those kinds
1:37:30of things
1:37:30which needs to be reinforced but bad
1:37:33cultural traits which we tried to
1:37:35list specifically in our report so we
1:37:37weren't just waving our arms and beating
1:37:39our breasts here
1:37:41need to be driven out of the system by
1:37:42active proactive leadership
1:37:45and not just leadership from the
1:37:46administrator he can't do it alone it's
1:37:48going to take
1:37:50he can affect probably two levels below
1:37:52him and then the people below him can
1:37:53affect two levels below them but
1:37:55it's going to have to take active
1:37:57leadership on
1:37:58on behalf of several layers of
1:38:00management in order to get at this
1:38:02problem and it can't be done in a few
1:38:04days or a few months
1:38:05and therefore we did not make it a
1:38:06return to flight a return to flight
1:38:08thing
1:38:09uh let me because my times will be
1:38:11limited on this
1:38:13don't isn't what you're describing
1:38:14though that you're going to have to make
1:38:16major personnel changes to
1:38:18change those attitudes uh culture you
1:38:20you can
1:38:21up and down through the organization uh
1:38:24my experience
1:38:24has been that you can change the
1:38:26behavior of people you can't change the
1:38:28attitude of people but you can change
1:38:29your behaviors
1:38:30i would suggest to mr o'keefe that after
1:38:32trying as hard as he can and repeating
1:38:34the message over and over again if
1:38:35there's somebody out there who doesn't
1:38:37get it he has to be replaced
1:38:38and quickly mr o'keefe
1:38:42looking at the comprehensive list of
1:38:44recommendations there in chapter 11 it's
1:38:46it takes me back a little bit the return
1:38:49to flight requirements are extensive
1:38:52how long do you think those would take
1:38:53to get implemented at what cost there
1:38:58are 15 very specific recommendations
1:39:00that must be implemented you're exactly
1:39:01right
1:39:02prior to any return to flight activity
1:39:05and the answer is
1:39:06it will occur when we've determined we
1:39:08are fit to fly
1:39:10because not just those 15 but anything
1:39:12else we determine
1:39:14that falls into the category of issues
1:39:16which would otherwise
1:39:17compromise successful mission
1:39:20accomplishment
1:39:22is going to have to be accomplished that
1:39:24bar has to be that much higher it can't
1:39:26be just those 15.
1:39:27no time frame then you don't you don't
1:39:29you can't establish any time frame i
1:39:30think you've said that in other
1:39:31interviews what about the cost
1:39:34uh again we have to assess that because
1:39:36it really turns on
1:39:37which options we select to implement
1:39:39each of those particularly those 15
1:39:41and then all the other recommendations
1:39:42as well and the other things we've
1:39:44included in the in the uh
1:39:46raise the bar kind of inputs area so as
1:39:49we work through with the stafford covey
1:39:51team
1:39:51exactly what options we're going to
1:39:53choose that will then
1:39:54yield a price tag which will give us a
1:39:57better
1:39:58judgment of exactly what that's going to
1:39:59take let me build on that if i could and
1:40:01this is i think along line with what
1:40:02senator wyden was saying
1:40:04as you appraise that there's going to be
1:40:06a cost associated with that i i
1:40:08hope you also look at it and question
1:40:10whether it would be just
1:40:11a better thing to invest in a different
1:40:13technology
1:40:15if at some point we look at that sooner
1:40:18rather than later maybe even much sooner
1:40:20we ground the shuttle and go to a
1:40:21different system if the cost of
1:40:23implementing this
1:40:25is is so high relative to going to a new
1:40:28technology
1:40:29or a new system and i i would hope that
1:40:31as you appraise this that
1:40:32you look at this is the amount of time
1:40:34it would take us to get the shuttle back
1:40:35to flight this is how much it would cost
1:40:38are we throwing good money after bad
1:40:41there's there's a fair
1:40:42feeling that this is an older technology
1:40:45it's a complex technology that we may
1:40:47just be at a point
1:40:48it's time to say shuttle the shovel
1:40:53scuttle the shuttle uh and we move uh
1:40:56move on to the next technology and i
1:40:58hope you will be making that appraisal
1:40:59rather than just saying well
1:41:00we're on this line and we're gonna go go
1:41:03that track
1:41:04yes sir as we as you review the
1:41:06implementation plan which again will be
1:41:09released late this week early next and
1:41:12you
1:41:13that's going to continue to inform the
1:41:14debate of what the scope and magnitude
1:41:17of return the flight's going to require
1:41:19i'm certain we're going to have a
1:41:21spirited debate in terms of
1:41:23what exactly that will entail what it'll
1:41:25cost what the trade-offs are
1:41:27and again we intend to be under multiple
1:41:29levels of oversight review in that
1:41:31process
1:41:32when i and i can assure you congress is
1:41:33going to be looking at that question
1:41:35how much time what's this cost is it
1:41:37just time to go to a new technology
1:41:39which i have to tell you my leaning is
1:41:41just clearly that that's the way we
1:41:43should be going at this time
1:41:44there's two major disasters it's a
1:41:46complex system it's an older design
1:41:48every year this is 30 year old design
1:41:50that we're into now
1:41:54the i i just can't help but think that
1:41:56we would do much
1:41:57better and it may also be a cultural
1:41:59issue when you go at a new technology we
1:42:01can bring a new team in
1:42:03to design where we're going to next and
1:42:06that new team will have a different
1:42:08cultural or you're going to be able to
1:42:09shape the attitude of that culture i
1:42:11think cultures are critically important
1:42:14i think it is to the country i think it
1:42:16is to institutions i know it is in my
1:42:18office
1:42:19and this may be the answer to both the
1:42:22cultural and the uh the technology
1:42:24senator you've asked me to keep an open
1:42:25mind i just asked that you do the same
1:42:27as we work our way through this
1:42:28implementation plan my plea would be
1:42:30let's all keep an open mind in terms of
1:42:32where the options need to go
1:42:34that's fair enough i hope you also will
1:42:36think about creating this presidential
1:42:38commission on the future of space
1:42:39exploration the congress can do that but
1:42:41that's
1:42:42really an executive branch function and
1:42:44the report noted that we lack a
1:42:46comprehensive and engaging vision
1:42:49uh way i've been looking at seeing as
1:42:51we're we're stuck
1:42:52mentally in low space orbit our thinking
1:42:55is
1:42:56and uh i just i think you need to get
1:42:59and i think the country wants to engage
1:43:01in a discussion on what's our vision for
1:43:02space it's not just
1:43:04nasa it also involves i mean it's
1:43:06discovering exploration but it's also
1:43:08commercial and military to engage that
1:43:10broader discussion of where are we going
1:43:12as a country here because i think i
1:43:13think the country wants to go but
1:43:15they they need that they need that
1:43:17vision that really unites and uh
1:43:20and says this risk is uh
1:43:23it's worth it this this cost is worth so
1:43:26i hope you'll consider that
1:43:27that uh a presidential level commission
1:43:29to work with establishing that
1:43:32i know there are difficulties with it
1:43:34and there's not a simple answer but a
1:43:36division really is a critical thing to
1:43:38unite a country
1:43:40i'll be cheering the hearing the rest of
1:43:42the way uh out and uh
1:43:44who's uh senator nelson
1:43:47is next up sorry about that
1:43:52thank you mr chairman
1:43:56gentlemen everybody up here
1:43:59wants this program to be successful
1:44:05and so i'm going to ask some very
1:44:08specific questions we we have heard
1:44:12the admiral say in his excellent report
1:44:16he has stated buying power
1:44:20has been reduced 40 over the last 10
1:44:24years the admiral has said here today
1:44:27uh that money has been squeezed out of
1:44:29the shuttle program and i'm doing exact
1:44:31quotes from what you said admiral
1:44:35you talked about how the program manager
1:44:37had made trades
1:44:39on the cost how looking ahead that you
1:44:43should separate
1:44:44engineering and safety from the cost and
1:44:46schedule
1:44:47part of the evaluation
1:44:50and that you you talked about
1:44:55all leaders are responsible for the
1:44:58results
1:44:59the administrator the white house the
1:45:02congress
1:45:03you specifically stated that so
1:45:06realizing that that
1:45:08has been part of the problem
1:45:12in the past now i want to ask some very
1:45:14specific questions mr administrator as
1:45:17we go forward
1:45:18this is not partisan the space program
1:45:22is not partisan
1:45:25a lot of these questions have been
1:45:26addressed by senator hutchison
1:45:29as well i would like to know
1:45:34if you have had discussions
1:45:38you or any of your immediate people
1:45:41with the white house omb
1:45:45is part of the white house about the
1:45:48increased
1:45:49expenditures that you're going to come
1:45:52to the congress
1:45:53to ask for we are
1:45:57pursuing an interagency discussion
1:46:01on the larger u.s space exploration
1:46:04objectives
1:46:05the result of that will yield a very
1:46:07specific answer to your question
1:46:09that will be manifest in a request from
1:46:12the president
1:46:13uh in whatever period of time that takes
1:46:15it's a request for supplemental that
1:46:17you're talking about
1:46:18no sir i'm not specifying exactly what
1:46:20form it will take whether it's an
1:46:22amendment or a supplemental or part of a
1:46:23regular budget request
1:46:25all that's being vetted now well as the
1:46:28admiral said
1:46:29the leadership problems involved
1:46:32everybody is in the past
1:46:34so if we're going to fix
1:46:37this problem the congress
1:46:40is going to have to help you and the
1:46:43white house fix the problem
1:46:44so we're going to need to know how much
1:46:48we're going to have to help you to fix
1:46:50the problem so
1:46:52can you give us any kind of idea what
1:46:54we're talking about because right now
1:46:56decisions are being made in the uh
1:46:58appropriation subcommittee on the o4
1:47:00budget
1:47:01indeed and that process is underway and
1:47:04as soon as we can get an answer that's
1:47:06that's precisely what i have an
1:47:08obligation to come back to you and your
1:47:09colleagues to deliver
1:47:10yes sir okay you said you had ongoing
1:47:12discussions have you had
1:47:14ongoing discussions in the range of a
1:47:16billion and a half dollars
1:47:18of return to fight flight additional
1:47:20monies we've had ongoing discussions i
1:47:23really don't want to get into the what
1:47:24what the current state of play is or
1:47:26what the numbers might be
1:47:27because they really run the gamut i
1:47:29think again as i i mentioned
1:47:31in response to senator brownback's
1:47:34commentary
1:47:35the cost of this is going to depend on
1:47:36which options we choose there are 29
1:47:38recommendations
1:47:40and a whole range of raise the bar
1:47:44objectives we're going to have to do so
1:47:45each of those options going to have a
1:47:47price tag
1:47:47and the answer to that very specific
1:47:49question will come from
1:47:51the total of how much it takes on the
1:47:54options you select for all 29 of those
1:47:56and every other issue contained in the
1:47:59raise the bar inputs that are equally
1:48:02important in our judgment
1:48:03so i can't give an answer to that until
1:48:05we can do that math
1:48:07mr administrator you have heard me be
1:48:10very critical
1:48:11of past administrations
1:48:14both parties uh on the way
1:48:18that they use budgetary sleight of hand
1:48:21uh uh over the years
1:48:25to get us into the fiscal condition that
1:48:28we are finding where
1:48:29nasa has not given the specific money
1:48:34directed at safety you've heard me talk
1:48:38about how
1:48:40the space shuttle budget and the
1:48:43space station budget were lumped
1:48:45together back in the 90s
1:48:48and then money was transferred around
1:48:52now it is very much the responsibility
1:48:56of the congress as we look at your
1:49:00budgets
1:49:00to know specifically what has happened
1:49:03now for example
1:49:04maybe you can share this with us of
1:49:07course as
1:49:08admiral gaiman said not only have the
1:49:11budgets been flat
1:49:13with regard to the space shuttle
1:49:17the budgets have actually in real buying
1:49:19power has been a 40 percent drop
1:49:21over uh 10 years and indeed
1:49:25where i see the difference in what the
1:49:28administration
1:49:30has requested in 03 for the space
1:49:34shuttle roughly
1:49:353.2 billion dollars you would think it
1:49:39was an increase
1:49:39going to the 04 request of 3.9
1:49:43but in fact the institutional account
1:49:46which includes a lot of the
1:49:48infrastructure that was
1:49:501.2 billion in the past is zeroed out
1:49:54so a number of those institutional costs
1:49:57including things like
1:49:58infrastructure are part of that
1:50:02additional funding increase so where is
1:50:05the increase in your 04 request
1:50:09specifically gets at the problem of
1:50:11safety and safety upgrades
1:50:14there is a budget line item within the
1:50:16shuttle program
1:50:17for a service life extension program and
1:50:20of that
1:50:21we have to identify the prioritization
1:50:24that's underway
1:50:25that was started before the accident
1:50:29to begin to work through exactly what is
1:50:31the prioritization of selection of those
1:50:33upgrades and their timely implementation
1:50:36so the answer to the the question is
1:50:38that's the funding stream that's there
1:50:40it's not one year it's in 0-4 and each
1:50:43successive year thereafter
1:50:45there's a continuing funding stream that
1:50:47follows thereafter
1:50:48and as a consequence this is an enduring
1:50:50program that we intend to put
1:50:52specificity to which upgrade implemented
1:50:55at which time based on which
1:50:56prioritization set and again informed by
1:50:58a lot of what we will learn
1:51:00as we implement these findings and
1:51:02recommendations
1:51:04okay i see my time is up senator bro
1:51:10thank you very much mr chairman and once
1:51:12again
1:51:13thank you admiral for a very fine report
1:51:17and also thank you mr o'keefe for the
1:51:19cooperative effort that you've shown in
1:51:21producing this report
1:51:22i'll just ask you with regard to the
1:51:24lockheed martin facility and miss you
1:51:27down in new orleans
1:51:28what kind of cooperation did you get
1:51:30admiral and working with them
1:51:32and finding out what they did and and
1:51:34everything else
1:51:36senator we got we got outstanding
1:51:37cooperation at michoud
1:51:39and in particular uh we did a lot of
1:51:42work down there
1:51:43because we we and
1:51:46and the workforce at michoud wanted to
1:51:48understand the properties of foam better
1:51:50than had been understood in the past uh
1:51:53and therefore we we asked them how to go
1:51:56about that and they
1:51:57they worked right alongside us in
1:51:59conducting devising and conducting
1:52:01various
1:52:01experiments and and uh certainly that
1:52:04the
1:52:05the best uh commentary i can get
1:52:09i can give you is is the very
1:52:12uh the the is the
1:52:15the dissection of the already built
1:52:17bipod ramps that we did
1:52:19uh this this showed
1:52:23some problems inside those bipod ramps
1:52:25that were unknown
1:52:26beforehand and it took considerable
1:52:28amount of courage on those
1:52:30people to to help us do that did the
1:52:33separating of the foam from the external
1:52:35fuel tanks become an acceptable risk of
1:52:38nasa it it the categorization
1:52:41of separation of foam
1:52:45changed over the years it migrated from
1:52:47a very very serious category
1:52:50to a category that was not so serious
1:52:53until it absolutely disappeared off the
1:52:54radar scope altogether
1:52:56and and yet it was the same it was the
1:52:58same physical event
1:53:00and that is a that's a mistake it seems
1:53:03to me
1:53:03that we've had the separation of the
1:53:07foam
1:53:08from the very beginning that we've had
1:53:11separation of foam the first
1:53:13known incident was back in 1983.
1:53:16the most recent incident other than this
1:53:19tragic accident was
1:53:21only three months before this final
1:53:23accident
1:53:24and your report points out that photos
1:53:26exist of foam
1:53:28separating for 65 of the 79 missions
1:53:32for which we had imaging that was
1:53:34available
1:53:35and then the own oh the regulations
1:53:39of nasa on external tank debris limits
1:53:43said very clearly that no debris shall
1:53:46emanate
1:53:47from the critical zone of the external
1:53:49tank on the launch pad
1:53:51or drilling ascent except for such
1:53:54material which may result from normal
1:53:56thermal protection systems recession
1:53:59due to ascent heating
1:54:02so we've had foam separation from the
1:54:05very beginning
1:54:07throughout numerous launches 65 of 75
1:54:11that we saw
1:54:11pictures of and as recent as three
1:54:14months before this incident
1:54:16plus a regulation of nasa itself that
1:54:19says no
1:54:20debris separation is acceptable and
1:54:22should be allowed
1:54:25and yet we were still launching
1:54:28shuttle missions knowing that this was
1:54:31continuing
1:54:32knowing that we had a regulation that
1:54:34said don't allow this to happen
1:54:36to me that seems like a monumental
1:54:38breakdown
1:54:40can you comment on that yes sir and and
1:54:43it's it gets to the core of our
1:54:44recommendation to have an independent
1:54:46technical
1:54:47authority uh the the adjudication of
1:54:51whether or not
1:54:52the foam anomaly should be treated as a
1:54:55show stopper or not
1:54:56is uh is made by a board a board of
1:55:00of engineers and managers at the space
1:55:02shuttle program office
1:55:04and the chairman of that board is the
1:55:05space shuttle program manager
1:55:08so what we have is a case where the
1:55:10program manager who has
1:55:12pressures on him for cost and schedule
1:55:14and manifests and
1:55:16lots lots of other things having to
1:55:18determine
1:55:19whether or not this anomaly which is now
1:55:21before the board for adjudication
1:55:23whether or not he should make a big
1:55:25administrative deal out of this or
1:55:26make a small deal out of it he knows
1:55:29that if he makes a big deal out of it it
1:55:30might jeopardize or slow down
1:55:33future launches he also knows that if he
1:55:35doesn't understand why this is happening
1:55:37it'll cost a couple million dollars to
1:55:39do some research and development a
1:55:40couple million dollars that he doesn't
1:55:41have
1:55:42find out why foam is doing this and what
1:55:44are the properties of it and how to fix
1:55:46it and so this this one person who's got
1:55:48all these pressures on him is making
1:55:49these decisions and we found that to be
1:55:51not
1:55:51not a good system i'm not sure how an
1:55:54outside board is going to help you
1:55:55on on this particular
1:55:59degree of investigation or supervision
1:56:03because we already knew it was happening
1:56:06we have a rule that says no debris shall
1:56:08separate
1:56:08or shed and we have numeral
1:56:12instances of launches where this was
1:56:15occurring
1:56:17it was despite a rule that said don't
1:56:18let it happen it was happening and we
1:56:20were continuing to launch vehicles
1:56:21knowing it was happening and outside
1:56:22board's going to tell us the same thing
1:56:24we already know
1:56:25mr o'keefe was it a matter of cost
1:56:28i mean we have a regulation that says it
1:56:30should not happen
1:56:32it was happening and we were still
1:56:34launching knowing that it was happening
1:56:36as much as three months before this
1:56:38launch is the reason that we was allowed
1:56:41to continue
1:56:42a cost reason or was it simply people
1:56:45ignoring the regulations and ignoring
1:56:47what was happening
1:56:49i don't discount anything that admiral
1:56:51gaiman has offered here is again i think
1:56:52there's a those are all contributing
1:56:54factors but i think there are two
1:56:55overriding reasons why this happened
1:56:59first one is we the rule that you cite
1:57:02properly exactly
1:57:03very precisely that we set is viewed
1:57:06in the agency and within the shuttle
1:57:09program as a
1:57:10goal here's why a goal not a requirement
1:57:13not a hard fast
1:57:15specification and that's a fool's errand
1:57:17heading down the road
1:57:18towards saying well we'd like to achieve
1:57:20this because that means we regularly
1:57:22rationalize
1:57:23why we would waive something we view as
1:57:26a goal
1:57:26not as a requirement as a specification
1:57:28and that's a big mistake
1:57:30so we've really got to look back so
1:57:31that's the first issue is we really have
1:57:33to make that rule
1:57:34as firm as you just described it to have
1:57:37folks understand what is what is it
1:57:38that's in
1:57:39in violet that you simply cannot uh
1:57:42transcend
1:57:43and where are those cases in which
1:57:45there's a desired objective that we have
1:57:46to continue to achieve and find a way to
1:57:48get there
1:57:49or else simply define this as a goal
1:57:51that's not achievable the second case is
1:57:53what we're dealing with here is human
1:57:54nature
1:57:57it is like everything else in life when
1:57:59you see something repetitively
1:58:02it begins to fuel a rationalization of
1:58:05why that's not a problem
1:58:07that's the cultural problem yes sir and
1:58:09it's it it is it is among the two issues
1:58:11a more i mean they go hand in hand but i
1:58:13think they have to be viewed compatibly
1:58:15and that human tendency we shouldn't be
1:58:18surprised to see in engineers when we
1:58:19see it in everyday life
1:58:22we all know anytime you walk down a
1:58:24metropolitan
1:58:25street anytime there is a homeless
1:58:29person sitting inside of a doorway
1:58:32there are some number of people who are
1:58:34stunned by the fact that people walk by
1:58:36with
1:58:36absolutely no cognizance of the fact
1:58:39that's going on
1:58:40and have ignored it
1:58:43if we were for if anybody came from a
1:58:46south pacific paradise island and walk
1:58:48down that same street they'd be aghast
1:58:50at seeing how humanity is being treated
1:58:52and would be amazed by how it is we as a
1:58:55people could tolerate that
1:58:57and so it's that first occasion in which
1:58:59you see it that raises that interest
1:59:01level
1:59:02we shouldn't be surprised when engineers
1:59:04act just like the rest of people do
1:59:06when they see something repetitively
1:59:08they begin to rationalize
1:59:10and begin to look at things and assume
1:59:12what it is they think they know about it
1:59:14and in every other instance and here's
1:59:16the big mistake and admiral gaiman and
1:59:17the board
1:59:18pointed to this very very clearly this
1:59:20human nature said
1:59:22if nothing happened previously it
1:59:24probably won't happen again in the
1:59:25future
1:59:25that's the wrong direction it ought to
1:59:27go in the opposite approach
1:59:29which they have said repetitively in
1:59:31this report which is we've got to prove
1:59:33that it's safe
1:59:34not prove that it's not and that's a
1:59:36point that really has to be driven home
1:59:38and as a consequence we really have to
1:59:39take that same mindset
1:59:41and understand that while this is a
1:59:42human nature human characteristic
1:59:45that when we see things repetitively
1:59:48that we take it for granted
1:59:49or begin to make assumptions or whatever
1:59:51else it simply can't be tolerated here
1:59:54because the stakes are too high well we
1:59:57all know what happens when we assume
1:59:59yes sir and we do it in every discipline
2:00:03every single discipline in every walk of
2:00:05life there are assumptions that are
2:00:07considered to be in violent and we've
2:00:08got to go back and question what those
2:00:10assumptions are
2:00:11that's a real tough order and it's one
2:00:13that's going to take us a lot of time
2:00:14and discipline
2:00:18admiral gaiman and administrator o'keefe
2:00:20thank you for your testimony this
2:00:22morning
2:00:23i was thinking as i was sitting here
2:00:25having read recently about the december
2:00:2717th
2:00:271903 59 second flight by the wright
2:00:31brothers at kitty hawk
2:00:33and in the 100 years since we have had
2:00:37all manners of tragedy and exhilaration
2:00:40and success and
2:00:42especially the space program it seems to
2:00:44me is the one aspect of
2:00:46going from leaving the ground to walking
2:00:49on the moon
2:00:50the one aspect of walking on the edge of
2:00:52the envelope of technology
2:00:54and science and one would expect that
2:00:56there will always be
2:00:58those who who suffer the consequences of
2:01:02tragedy in those circumstances but
2:01:06these tragedies that have occurred this
2:01:08one especially and the investigation you
2:01:10have
2:01:11uh completed tells uh tell us that there
2:01:14are certain things that
2:01:15that can and should and must be done to
2:01:17prevent
2:01:18this from happening again i mean the
2:01:20fact that we're dealing on the edge of
2:01:21the envelope in science and technology
2:01:23does not in any way excuse
2:01:24tragedies that could have been prevented
2:01:26and those heroes as you
2:01:28described them and this our country
2:01:30understands them to be in
2:01:32that space in the space shuttle uh uh
2:01:35should expect should have expected then
2:01:37and certainly the future astronauts
2:01:39should expect everything
2:01:40possible is being done to provide for
2:01:43their safety
2:01:44i want to ask you just about two issues
2:01:47quickly and
2:01:47let me say first of all admiral gaiman i
2:01:50i'm not a scientist or
2:01:52i don't have the technical ability
2:01:54perhaps to have fully digested
2:01:56everything that your report
2:01:58includes but it seems to me you have
2:02:00done a massively thorough job
2:02:02and administrator o'keefe you have i
2:02:05think
2:02:06been a very stand-up administrator here
2:02:08in these circumstances
2:02:09i raised questions immediately about the
2:02:13proposition of whether nasa could create
2:02:16its own investigative board reporting to
2:02:19nasa
2:02:19others raise the same questions you
2:02:21responded immediately by
2:02:23changing the board's charter removing
2:02:25references the requirement that the
2:02:27nasa oversee and review the board's
2:02:29investigation and so on i think the
2:02:30result of that
2:02:32administrator o'keeffe gives us a report
2:02:34that does have true independence and i
2:02:36think you're
2:02:37working with it the way you have has
2:02:38been admirable and i appreciate that
2:02:40leadership
2:02:41i want to ask you two things thank you
2:02:43one the
2:02:45the requirement
2:02:50of the mission management team meetings
2:02:52every day during a shuttle flight
2:02:54those nasa regulations required such
2:02:57meetings every day and
2:02:58my understanding is from your report it
2:03:00occurred those meetings occurred only
2:03:02five times during the 16-day mission
2:03:04and that discussions uh regarding the
2:03:07risks of the foam strike and the need
2:03:09for additional imagery
2:03:10um the the
2:03:14the requests for imagery did not surface
2:03:16at all at these
2:03:17meetings that were held so 15 of these
2:03:20or 16 these meetings should have been
2:03:21held i guess
2:03:23and uh five of them were held and at the
2:03:25five that were held
2:03:27no discussions were developed in those
2:03:29meetings with respect to the
2:03:31request for imagery despite the fact
2:03:33that beneath
2:03:34all of that these discussions were
2:03:36occurring
2:03:37can you describe that perhaps both of
2:03:40you describe that for me
2:03:41is that part of the culture issue or
2:03:43part of the assumption issue that never
2:03:45came to the attention of those who
2:03:46should have been attending to it
2:03:48if i'll start off by saying that uh
2:03:52the characterization is is correct that
2:03:54you made they held five mmt meetings in
2:03:56the 16 day
2:03:57in the 16 day flight they're required to
2:03:59meet every day we went back to the three
2:04:01previous missions
2:04:03and counted up the number of times the
2:04:05mmt met
2:04:06and guess what they don't meet every day
2:04:08they've been meeting every third day
2:04:10for as long back as we could find
2:04:11records and and
2:04:13this is this is an example of culture at
2:04:17work
2:04:17what happens is you got a regulations
2:04:19you got to do it this way
2:04:20uh over a period of years and years and
2:04:22years you kind of atrophy to where you
2:04:24do it this way you're violating your own
2:04:26rules and regulations
2:04:28and now you're sending all kinds of
2:04:29informal messages through the system
2:04:31that it's okay to violate your rules and
2:04:33regulations and the top
2:04:35level managers are doing it we don't
2:04:37need to meet every day we can meet every
2:04:39third day it's good enough
2:04:40uh emails are good enough and we're not
2:04:44sure
2:04:44what emails count for i mean is our
2:04:46emails official communications or not
2:04:48and so
2:04:49and so this is this is a classic case so
2:04:52i wouldn't blame
2:04:53the fact that there were only five
2:04:55meetings on this mission
2:04:57as being causative in other words that's
2:04:59the way they've been doing it for years
2:05:00so there's nothing different about it
2:05:03now
2:05:04now we we made we made the point in our
2:05:06report that these meetings were very
2:05:08short that someone were 30 minutes long
2:05:10longest one was about 50 minutes long
2:05:12and if they had really had met every day
2:05:14maybe they would have inquired into some
2:05:16of the more minute details of what was
2:05:18going on in the subject of imagery might
2:05:20have come up
2:05:22pure speculation
2:05:26this report very clearly indicates that
2:05:29the rules and regulations that we have
2:05:31promulgated over the years
2:05:32are treated much the same way as
2:05:34stoplights in naples
2:05:35their advisory that's not
2:05:39tolerable we cannot have that
2:05:42we've got to go back and really look at
2:05:44what those operational procedures call
2:05:46for and put in motion
2:05:48that which we believe and that's part of
2:05:50the the recommendations
2:05:52that's part of our raise the bar input
2:05:54standards that we really have to
2:05:55implement
2:05:56and have a very clear understanding
2:05:59of how those operational rules will be
2:06:02promulgated
2:06:03and followed as we go through this
2:06:05because the intent behind the mmt
2:06:07i think is a good one which is to
2:06:08coordinate views and positions
2:06:11inputs and then serve it up for decision
2:06:14making
2:06:15well there was an awful lot of stray
2:06:17voltage is what this report indicates
2:06:20of lots of communication going on but to
2:06:22no particular point
2:06:23in some cases or to no particular
2:06:26decision-making alternative
2:06:28that's a failure really to understand
2:06:30the purpose of the rules and over time i
2:06:32think as
2:06:33as the chairman of the board uh observe
2:06:36as well as all of his members
2:06:37that over time if these things are
2:06:39viewed as advisory what's the point
2:06:41why are they there and that's something
2:06:43we've really got to take back as a
2:06:44strong
2:06:45indictment of the culture and we've got
2:06:46to correct it and administrator o'keefe
2:06:48the
2:06:49reason i asked this specific question is
2:06:51the mission management team meetings
2:06:53i don't know much about this at all
2:06:55except that my assumption would be that
2:06:57mission management means just what it
2:06:59sounds like
2:07:01managing the entire mission and the fact
2:07:03that it didn't meet
2:07:04not only in this shuttle flight per
2:07:06regulation every day but in other
2:07:08shuttle flights as well
2:07:09but more than that the fact that when it
2:07:11did meet it did not have the information
2:07:13flowing up to it
2:07:15of questions being raised in the
2:07:17organization about
2:07:18the question of whether they should have
2:07:20additional imagery to determine
2:07:21whether this foam had caused some damage
2:07:24to the wing
2:07:25i mean that that's an organizational
2:07:27issue it seems to me
2:07:28a structural issue of very significant
2:07:31importance to to the future operations
2:07:34of nasa and
2:07:35it's an important process question that
2:07:37must be resolved no question
2:07:38and i i wanted to ask just briefly a
2:07:41question about the
2:07:43next generation launch vehicle the
2:07:45return to flight for
2:07:47this shuttle one hopes will occur at
2:07:50some point when we have satisfied all of
2:07:52these issues and there's there's much
2:07:53work to be done
2:07:54but my understanding is that the next
2:07:56generation launch vehicle is meant to
2:07:58complement rather than replace the
2:08:00shuttle
2:08:00and as i read the investigative report
2:08:03uh what
2:08:04what you are saying admiral gaiman is
2:08:06that this shuttle vehicle is yesterday's
2:08:08technology
2:08:10it needs to be replaced rather than uh
2:08:13to have some other vehicle complimented
2:08:15at some point
2:08:16can and this gets back to i think the
2:08:18question that
2:08:19my colleague senator nelson was asking
2:08:21as well i mean all of that costs an
2:08:22enormous amount of money replacing
2:08:24this launch vehicle completely will be a
2:08:27significant
2:08:28capital requirement will it not uh when
2:08:31we go back to
2:08:32return to flight with the space shuttle
2:08:36uh will you by that time have made a
2:08:38decision about what your next generation
2:08:40launch vehicle is going to be and
2:08:41whether it's going to fully replace it
2:08:43in a certain time period or whether
2:08:44you're going to continue to try to
2:08:45complement it as your current
2:08:47plans would would indicate yes sir now
2:08:49the short answer is yes indeed by the
2:08:51time we return to flight we really have
2:08:53to have an answer to those questions
2:08:54we're in the process right now
2:08:56very hard of trying to resolve precisely
2:08:58what the composition of this will be
2:09:01using is the baseline the the integrates
2:09:03based transportation plan that we have
2:09:05presented to the congress
2:09:06as part of this year's budget and was
2:09:08endorsed last year as part of the
2:09:09president's amendment in november
2:09:11i'd ask admiral gaiman to comment though
2:09:13on the the characterization of this
2:09:15particular finding because i read it a
2:09:16little differently
2:09:18uh and so rather than have us go through
2:09:21mutual interpretations here
2:09:22let's ask the oracle to render exactly
2:09:25what was the intent behind the words
2:09:26that are used here in terms of
2:09:28chapter nine and where we should be
2:09:30going the uh
2:09:32after we'd studied this uh system uh
2:09:35in such great detail the board felt that
2:09:37we owed it
2:09:38to the public and to the united states
2:09:40into the nation
2:09:41to editorialize a little bit on the on
2:09:44the safety and
2:09:45the longevity in the lifespan of the
2:09:47shuttle as as we know it
2:09:48uh in chapter nine week we opine that
2:09:52the board was surprised and disappointed
2:09:54to find ourselves at tooth out here we
2:09:56are
2:09:562003 and we don't even have a
2:09:59replacement vehicle
2:10:01on the drawing boards i mean we're still
2:10:02debating uh
2:10:04we're having a debate about the
2:10:05replacement vehicle the board
2:10:08the board found that the shuttle is not
2:10:11inherently unsafe
2:10:12it can be operated for another another
2:10:17number of years if the recommendations
2:10:19of this
2:10:20board are are followed through on but
2:10:23the board finds that
2:10:26operating it for another 20 years or
2:10:29something is beyond our
2:10:30beyond the scope of our imaginations and
2:10:33that uh
2:10:34sometime uh in a period of something
2:10:37like 10 years from now if you're going
2:10:39to operate it more than about 10 years
2:10:41you have to
2:10:41fully recertify and fully re-qualify the
2:10:43vehicle which would be extraordinarily
2:10:45expensive
2:10:47from what i understand your answer to be
2:10:49you
2:10:51if you were an astronaut and if the
2:10:53recommendations of the board were
2:10:54followed you would not have
2:10:56difficulty joining the crew and flying
2:10:58the shuttle and that's absolutely
2:10:59correct
2:11:00you would flight yourself that's correct
2:11:02i expect you won't get the opportunity
2:11:03unless i asked
2:11:09fortunately that was not a finding in
2:11:10recommendation which we intend to accept
2:11:13and comply with so as a consequence this
2:11:15is a debatable point and i think he
2:11:17wants to
2:11:18head back to his sailboat well
2:11:21this is obviously deadly serious
2:11:23business and and
2:11:24the work you have done has been long and
2:11:26labored and but i think you've you've
2:11:28accomplished
2:11:29much with it and i think that the
2:11:31chairman has done a real service for
2:11:33this committee in the
2:11:34and for the senate in calling this
2:11:36hearing today at this time and
2:11:38you've done some significant benefit i
2:11:40think for this country in its space
2:11:42program and your testimony and the work
2:11:44you've done prior to it
2:11:45let me just make one final comment and
2:11:47say that i i
2:11:49i come from north dakota i mean i don't
2:11:51have i don't have a
2:11:52space launch pad in the middle of my
2:11:54state i as
2:11:55does florida texas i but but i really
2:11:58believe a society that stops exploring
2:12:00stops progressing
2:12:02i think space exploration has been very
2:12:04important for this country i wanted to
2:12:06succeed i wanted to continue i think the
2:12:08benefits are very substantial
2:12:10but it will only succeed and continue if
2:12:13if we understand that these tragedies
2:12:16require an enormous amount of work
2:12:19to understand what has happened and
2:12:20prevent it from happening again
2:12:22again we're operating on the edge of the
2:12:24envelope of knowledge here
2:12:26and and some wonderful men and women
2:12:28heroes in my judgment
2:12:29one of whom served with us here in the
2:12:31senate senator glenn
2:12:32uh have uh have been the pioneers in
2:12:35space travel but i
2:12:36i really think we're just at the
2:12:37beginning phase of understanding
2:12:39what the rest of our universe is and and
2:12:42how to explore it and the benefits it
2:12:44can provide for us so
2:12:45let me again thank the chairman who had
2:12:47to depart
2:12:48um all right and senator nelson has a
2:12:52final question and then he will close
2:12:53out the hearings
2:12:54if i could just quickly observe on your
2:12:56point i i think you've got it
2:12:57spot on i mean we are really in the
2:12:59equivalency here in space exploration
2:13:01of the age of sale we have really just
2:13:04gotten started as
2:13:05a as a as humankind has pursued this
2:13:08approach it is very early in this
2:13:10process
2:13:11and we've got a long way to go in the
2:13:13expanse to what we
2:13:14could conquer by this really is uh just
2:13:18unimaginable in its expanse and so as a
2:13:21consequence i think
2:13:22exactly the way you've characterized
2:13:23this is precisely the way i look at it
2:13:25this is a
2:13:26daunting challenge and we're very at the
2:13:28very beginning of it
2:13:30it's a tremendous responsibility is one
2:13:32we take very seriously thank you very
2:13:33much senator nelson thank you sir
2:13:35senator dorgan i want to pick up on your
2:13:38question
2:13:38about the next generation vehicle
2:13:43uh mr o'keefe you and i have talked many
2:13:46times both privately
2:13:48and publicly about
2:13:51uh how you could get some more money
2:13:55with regard to this next generation
2:13:57vehicle
2:13:59and one of the things we have discussed
2:14:02is
2:14:03that other agencies of the federal
2:14:05government
2:14:06could share in the expense of developing
2:14:09the technologies that nasa
2:14:12would oversee the research and
2:14:13development
2:14:15because those technologies would be of
2:14:17value to other agencies
2:14:20would you share with the committee
2:14:23what is happening there
2:14:26from a financial perspective in the
2:14:28future
2:14:30well uh the current ongoing effort we
2:14:33have underway for example
2:14:35on the x-37 technology demonstrator
2:14:38is a good example of the kind of
2:14:41arrangement
2:14:42in which there are advantages that may
2:14:45be derived for multiple
2:14:48purposes and so as a consequence nasa
2:14:50and the defense department
2:14:52air force particularly are really
2:14:54examining exactly
2:14:55where that approach is going we are
2:14:58uh financing with them
2:15:01the uh overall expense related to
2:15:05um the launch and test
2:15:08phase of that particular technology
2:15:10demonstrator
2:15:12the orbital space plane which is again
2:15:14the follow-on effort that
2:15:15senator dorgan referred to we are right
2:15:18now in the process
2:15:19of inviting the industry to respond to
2:15:22the
2:15:23requirements which again can be
2:15:25summarized in one page
2:15:27this is what we want it to do and here
2:15:28are the capabilities we need
2:15:30and there are a number of different
2:15:31technologies that are
2:15:33accented if you will that may have great
2:15:36application
2:15:37for where the defense department may go
2:15:39on that and we are engaging in
2:15:40discussions with them but at this
2:15:42present time
2:15:43on the orbital space plane the objective
2:15:44is that we get about the process of
2:15:47finding
2:15:48a complementary asset that is crew
2:15:51transfer of vehicle in its orientation
2:15:53that the board observed in chapter nine
2:15:56is the kind of thing we need to do
2:15:58as expeditiously as possible and we're
2:15:59now in the process of trying to figure
2:16:01out
2:16:02how do you define expeditious how
2:16:03quickly can it be done what's it going
2:16:04to look like
2:16:06and the industry is actively playing in
2:16:08that and working through
2:16:09that particular contractual effort
2:16:11that's being engaged right now
2:16:13so we should have an answer that in very
2:16:14short order do you expect
2:16:16that in a net outflow of dollars from
2:16:19nasa that that will require additional
2:16:22money to be budgeted in nasa
2:16:25uh it heavily depends on uh
2:16:29how soon we want to see delivery of the
2:16:31asset and as i mentioned
2:16:32uh in response to senator hudson's
2:16:34comment uh the amount that we have
2:16:37included
2:16:38in the the nasa budget now before the
2:16:40congress
2:16:41and the five-year stream certainly is a
2:16:44resource
2:16:44allocation for an orbital space plane
2:16:48it will not be sufficient to cover
2:16:52any delivery date we may desire to the
2:16:54extent we want to accelerate that
2:16:56it isn't going to require more in
2:16:58aggregate it may require more
2:17:00up front and that's part of what we've
2:17:02got to sort through now but
2:17:04again very thoughtful questions
2:17:06commentary
2:17:07and direction that you've given us at
2:17:09previous hearings and along with other
2:17:11of your colleagues prompted us to go
2:17:13back and look at that trade study figure
2:17:15out what it's going to take in order to
2:17:16accelerate this
2:17:17what are the the approaches we would use
2:17:19in that regard and in no instance
2:17:22have we made the requirements negotiable
2:17:24we've made those the fixed constant
2:17:26and everything else around it the
2:17:28variables we may want to consider in
2:17:30terms of accelerating its
2:17:32delivery or whatever approach you'd use
2:17:34for crew transfer versus crew rescue
2:17:36and the like in what time frame so that
2:17:40we can be expecting it would you expect
2:17:42to come
2:17:42to the congress for that kind of request
2:17:46uh to the extent that a request is
2:17:47required it will be at the point in
2:17:49which the president determines that
2:17:51that's necessary
2:17:52and that's exactly when it'll be
2:17:53delivered and is your answer the
2:17:56same then with regard to the additional
2:17:59expenses that will be required for the
2:18:01return to
2:18:02flight um again those are those are more
2:18:06dependent
2:18:06and i've i've got to serve up to
2:18:10i think all within our administration
2:18:13a clear understanding of the options we
2:18:16choose for the 29 recommendations
2:18:18and the raise the bar inputs that are
2:18:20going to be equally important
2:18:22and make a determination of how much we
2:18:24need in order to implement
2:18:26the options we've chosen and that is
2:18:29going to again
2:18:30be a fulsome debate within the
2:18:32administration and we're in the midst of
2:18:33that
2:18:34now all right i will just merely close
2:18:37out
2:18:38my comments and the considerable
2:18:42fine hearing that we've had and thank
2:18:44you all both
2:18:46by saying
2:18:50you've read the gaming report the gaming
2:18:54report
2:18:54said that the cost cutting in the past
2:18:58has been part of the problem that's what
2:19:00i said i was pleasantly surprised
2:19:04in seeing in the report because i didn't
2:19:06anticipate that admiral gaiman's
2:19:08board was going to address uh cost
2:19:13it is part of the problem and they have
2:19:16identified it
2:19:17and the long and short of it is over
2:19:19four administrations and this is
2:19:21bipartisan
2:19:23both parties that
2:19:27nasa has been
2:19:30to use my word starved
2:19:34of funds and it has
2:19:37always been that office of management in
2:19:40the budget
2:19:42that has said nyet to nasa
2:19:48i think everybody inc
2:19:52including the members of this committee
2:19:54that want as senator dorgan so
2:19:57eloquently said to see our space program
2:20:00continue to be robust and fulfill that
2:20:03desire
2:20:04of this nation to explore
2:20:08needs to know that you're going to be in
2:20:10there
2:20:12fighting in the internal fights in the
2:20:14administration with omb
2:20:16in the white house to make sure that the
2:20:18monies are there
2:20:20for nasa yes sir
2:20:25that answer is good enough for me thank
2:20:28you sir
2:20:30admiral gaiman again you've done a great
2:20:32service to the country
2:20:34an enormous service we thank you from
2:20:37the bottom of our heart
2:20:39no other questions from the committee
2:20:42the committee is adjourned
2:20:43thank you
2:21:10okay
2:21:24cheers
2:21:38hello
2:21:42i love it
2:22:06okay
2:22:20um
2:22:48oh
2:23:00in a moment ken starr and floyd abrams
2:23:02on campaign finance
2:23:04mexican president vicente fox and a
2:23:06hearing on college football and
2:23:08anti-trust issues
2:23:18on tomorrow's washington journal guests
2:23:20listed on your screen will discuss
2:23:22u.s policy towards iran

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This page contains the full transcript of Columbia Accident Report Hearing, Senate Science Committee, September 3, 2003 by Space SPAN (Space Policy and News), generated from the public captions YouTube serves with the video. The transcript has 22,367 words across 4,028 segments, with the original timestamps preserved so you can click any line to jump to that moment in the embedded player.

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