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Church Committee Hearings CIA William Colby 1975 — Transcript

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0:00The senators seemed unimpressed. Perhaps
0:03it was because they already knew too
0:05much. Each senator arriving with a fat
0:08orangecoled notebook crammed with
0:10classified material about the CIA, all
0:13marked top secret. After 5 months of
0:17closed-d dooror investigation of talking
0:19in private with intelligence agents and
0:21officials, most of the senators now
0:23agree with chairman Frank Church that
0:26the CIA has indeed been a rogue elephant
0:29out of control. So the testimony of
0:32Colby didn't allay the suspicions. The
0:36hearings took place in the historic
0:38Senate caucus room scene of the dramatic
0:40Watergate investigation just two years
0:42ago. The press was back in great numbers
0:46today, but not the public. There were in
0:48fact no long lines, and the seats
0:51reserved for the audience were at times
0:53only 2/3 filled. As someone said, after
0:57what has happened in this country during
0:59the past 2 years, there are no more
1:01future shocks. But whether there are
1:04shocks or not, today's open hearing did
1:07focus major attention on the way the CIA
1:10has gone about its business in the
1:12United States. Subject today concerns
1:15CIA's involvement in the development of
1:17bacterological warfare materials with
1:19the army's biological laboratory at Fort
1:21Dietrich, CIA's retention of a of an
1:24amount of shellfish toxin, and CIA's use
1:28and investigation of various chemicals
1:30and drugs. The relationship between the
1:32CIA and the Army Biological Laboratory
1:34at Fort Dietrich as an activity
1:37requiring further investigation surfaced
1:39in late April of this year. It resulted
1:41from information provided by a CIA CIA
1:44officer not directly associated with the
1:47project in response to my repeated
1:49directives that all past activities
1:51which might now be considered
1:52questionable be brought to the attention
1:54of agency management. Information
1:57provided by him and by two other
1:58officers aware of the project indicated
2:01that the project at Fort Dietrich
2:03involved the development of
2:04bacterological warfare agents, some
2:06lethal, and associated delivery systems
2:09suitable for clandestine use. A search
2:11was made for any records or other
2:13information available on the project.
2:15This search produced information about
2:17the basic agreement between the army and
2:19the CIA relating to the project and some
2:22limited records covering its activities
2:24from its beginning in 1952 to its
2:27termination in 1970.
2:30In the course of the investigation,
2:32CIA's laboratory storage facilities were
2:34searched and about 11 g, a little less
2:37than half an ounce, of shellfish toxin
2:40and 8 mg of cobra venom were discovered
2:43in a little used vaulted store room in
2:46an agency
2:47building. A major early requirement of
2:50the agency was to find a replacement for
2:52the standard cyanide LP pill issued to
2:54agents in hazardous situations during
2:56World War II. This was the basis on
2:59which eventually we discovered the tox
3:02shellfish toxin. The only application of
3:06this toxin was in the U2 flight over the
3:08USSR in May 1960 during which Gary P
3:12carried such a device car concealed in a
3:14silver dollar. In the P case, the
3:17grooves of the of the the drill were
3:20filled with shellfish toxin. He
3:22obviously did not use it and was not
3:24instructed to do so. It was offered to
3:27him to provide him with an option. The
3:29powers flight was the only time we are
3:31aware that the toxin was provided for
3:33operational use. Although the Lill was
3:36made available for earlier flights, the
3:39primary agency interest was in the
3:41development of dissemination devices to
3:43be used with standard chemicals off the
3:45cell shell. Various dissemination
3:48devices such as a fountain pen dart
3:50launcher and an edggin headbolt designed
3:52to release when heat appeared to be
3:54peculiarly suited for agent for
3:57clandestine use. Available records do
4:00not indicate that all specific items
4:02were developed exclusively for the CIA
4:04as work on similar devices was also done
4:06for the army. At the time the toxin was
4:09found, the officer responsible for the
4:11project in 1970 stated that he had no
4:14recollection as to how it got there. On
4:16the 30th of June, discussions were held
4:18with a retired agency officer who had
4:20provided the initial lead. This man, who
4:23had been the GS-15 branch chief in 1970,
4:26stated that the toxin had in fact been
4:28moved from Fort Dietrich and stored in
4:30the laboratory. This was done on the
4:32basis of his own decision after
4:34conversations with the responsible
4:36project officer. He further stated that
4:39he made this decision based on the fact
4:40that the cost and difficulty of
4:43isolating the shellfish toxin were so
4:45great that it simply made no sense to
4:47destroy it, particularly when there
4:49would be no future source of such toxin.
4:52The current branch chief believes this
4:54explanation is correct, but still does
4:56not recall the actual act of receiving
4:58the material from Fort Dietrich. Both of
5:01these middle-grade officers agree that
5:03no, no one, including their immediate
5:05superior, was told of the retention of
5:08the shellfish toxin. If that amount of
5:12shellfish toxin were administered
5:16orally, which is one of
5:18the least efficient ways for
5:21administering it in terms of its
5:26lethality, that quantity was sufficient
5:29to kill at
5:30least 14,000
5:36people if it were administered uh with
5:38the sophisticated
5:40uh equipment that was found in the
5:43laboratory. That quantity would be
5:46sufficient to kill a great many
5:48[Music]
5:49more. Estimates vary upwards into the
5:52hundreds of thousands.
5:58Now my first question is
6:03why did the
6:05agency
6:07prepare a shellfish
6:12toxin for which there is no practical
6:16antidote which attacks
6:19the nervous system and brings on death
6:23very quickly.
6:26Why did the agency prepare
6:29toxins of this character in quantities
6:34sufficient to
6:35kill many thousands of people? What was
6:38the need for that in the first place
6:41long before the presidential order came
6:43down to destroy this material? I think
6:45the uh the first uh part of the answer
6:48to that question, Mr. chairman is the
6:50the fact that the L pill which was
6:53developed and during World War II does
6:56take some time to work and is
6:58particularly agonizing to the subject
7:00who uses it. Uh the some of the people
7:04who would be natural uh requesters of
7:07such a capability for their own
7:10protection and the protection of their
7:11fellow agents really would not want to
7:14face that kind of a fate. But if they
7:16could be given an instantaneous one,
7:19they would uh accept that. And that was
7:22the thought process behind developing
7:24the capability. Now I cannot explain why
7:28that quantity was developed except that
7:31this was a collaboration that we were
7:33engaged in with the United States Army.
7:36Uh and we did develop this particular
7:39weapon, you might say, as a possible for
7:42possible use. Now when CIA retained the
7:45amount that it did, it obviously did it
7:51improperly this quantity.
7:57um and
7:59the various devices
8:03for administering the toxin that were
8:06found in the laboratory.
8:10certainly make it clear
8:13that purely defensive uses were not
8:20um what the agency
8:23uh had had was limited to in any way.
8:26There were definite offensive uses. In
8:28fact, there were dart guns. You
8:29mentioned suicides.
8:31Well, I I I don't think a suicide is
8:34usually accomplished with a
8:36dart, particularly a gun that can can uh
8:40place the dart in a human target in such
8:43a way that he doesn't even know that
8:44he's been hit. There's no question about
8:47it. It was also for offensive reasons.
8:49No question. Have you brought with you
8:52um some of those devices which would
8:55have enabled the CIA to use this poison
8:58for We have indeed. for killing people.
9:06[Music]
9:14Don't Don't point it at me.
9:19I wonder if if you roll that over a
9:22little or roll it over.
9:30[Music]
9:33Does does this does this pistol fire the
9:37dart? Yes, it does, Mr. Chairman. The uh
9:40that the round thing at the top is
9:43obviously the sight. The rest of it is
9:45what is practically a uh a normal 45,
9:49although it's it's special. It, however,
9:52it works by electricity. There's a
9:54battery in the handle and it fires a
9:57small dart. So that when it fires, it
9:59fires silently.
10:02Almost silently.
10:03Yes. Very little. Very What range does
10:06it have? It's 100 m. 100 m. 100 m. 100 m
10:11I believe. About about 100 yards. 100
10:13meters. About 100 meters range.
10:17and the dart itself when it strikes the
10:19the the uh
10:21target.
10:23Um does the target know that he's about
10:26he's been hit and about to die? That
10:28depends, Mr. Chairman, on the particular
10:30dart used. There are different kinds of
10:32these fleshets that were used in in
10:35various weapon system and a special one
10:38was developed which potentially would be
10:40able to uh enter the target without
10:43perception.
10:45without perception. Right. And did you
10:47find such such darts in the library in
10:50in the laboratory? We did.
10:59Yes.
11:01[Music]
11:03Isn't it true too that
11:05um the the
11:09effort not only involved designing a gun
11:13that
11:13could strike a human
11:16target without knowledge of the person
11:20who'd been
11:21struck but also the toxin itself would
11:24not appear in the autopsy?
11:26Well, there there was an attempt or the
11:28dart. Yes. so that there was no no way
11:31of perceiving that the uh the target was
11:34hit.
11:36As a murder instrument, that's about as
11:38efficient as you can get, isn't it? It
11:40it is a weapon, a very serious weapon.
11:44This record seems to disclose an
11:46additional concession, namely uh the
11:48lack of
11:49accountability. So that we not only have
11:51a secret agency but we have an agency
11:54which about which there's some question
11:57as to its accountability to the
11:59authority of the president or to the
12:01authority of the national security
12:03council. Um the record seems to disclose
12:07uh that there is no presidential or
12:10security council order in the first
12:12place directing the uh CIA to establish
12:16this program at all.
12:19Secondly, there appears to be no report
12:21by the CIA to higher authority of the
12:25existence of these toxins or biological
12:28weapons.
12:30Thirdly, there seems to be no evidence
12:32that those in charge of the CIA inquired
12:36of subordinates as to the existence of
12:39toxins or biological
12:42weapons, or that following the
12:44presidential order decreeing the
12:46destruction of such toxins that any
12:49formal order went forth within the CIA
12:53to require their destruction.
12:56Moreover, the record seems to uh support
12:59the notion that it was only by chance
13:02that the leadership of the CIA became
13:05aware some years later of even the
13:07existence of these uh lethal toxins
13:11which were in violation of a direct
13:14presidential order. In short, the
13:17records a mess and we may never know
13:20just exactly what happened. No one has
13:23interviewed Got Lee as to why he
13:24destroyed the material or what they
13:26contain the records. No, I I we have not
13:29interviewed him as to the reason. Do you
13:31know what material what documents he
13:33destroyed? We're very unsure as to the
13:36total. We do not have an inventory of
13:37them. Do you think they might have said
13:39who it was authorized the formulation or
13:42the retention of this stuff? Do you have
13:43any reason to think it might or might
13:44not contain that information? In this
13:47case, I I doubt that it would have very
13:49much because this uh case indic from the
13:52evidence we have at hand. Does it say
13:54anything have any reason to think that
13:56it might say how, if at all, this
13:58material was used in an aggressive way
14:00against someone to kill someone? Well,
14:02there may well be some of that in in the
14:05when was the when was the documentation
14:07destroyed? In
14:091973. And it didn't happen to be
14:12destroyed at the same time those tapes
14:151972 1972 1972 when in 1972 in November
14:19I believe it was in November of 72. Do
14:22you have any idea what volume of records
14:24were destroyed? I do not know. You know
14:27who authorized the destruction if
14:28anyone? As I said there was a memorandum
14:30of agreement between the the director
14:33and and Mr. Gotautle at that time and
14:35the director at that time was Mr. Helms.
14:38Mr. Helms is here in this room, I
14:40believe, Mr. Chairman, and I take it
14:41we'll have an opportunity to hear from
14:43him. Helms will be u will be our witness
14:45at tomorrow morning's hearings. I
14:47believe he's the lead off witness.
14:50Uh I won't prolong my opportunity to
14:54examine the witness much longer. Mr.
14:56Chairman, I understand we're going to
14:57try to operate under the 10-minute rule.
14:59May I ask you only this other question
15:02then? In general, Mr. Kby, you've heard
15:04of the doctrine of plausible
15:06deniability. Yes. and I've rejected it.
15:08Uh now, Senator, I say that uh we cannot
15:12depend upon that anymore. The question I
15:14was going to put to you is that a phrase
15:16of art in the intelligence community,
15:18does it have a a separate significance
15:20that you understand? It was a rationale
15:23used in earlier years. If the United
15:26States could deny something and not be
15:30uh clearly demonstrated as as having uh
15:33said something falsely, then the United
15:35States could do so. In the case of
15:37assassinations, in the case of uh any
15:40other of domestic surveillance, in the
15:43case of the formulation of poisons,
15:45under that previous rationale, would the
15:48doctrine of plausible deniability have
15:50led the agency to destroy records to
15:53conceal evidence or to compartmentalize
15:55to the point where it would be un a
15:57committee such as this later would have
15:59been unable to establish what really
16:01happened. I think the plausible denial
16:03concept was used in in the sense of
16:05international diplomatic relationships
16:07that Are you saying by that that it
16:09would not have applied to the
16:10formulation of toxic materials? I would
16:12not say that it didn't have anything to
16:14do with it at all, but I think that the
16:15basic rationale for the doctrine of
16:17plausible denial was so that our nation
16:20could deny something and not be uh and
16:23not be tagged. Colby, can you be
16:25absolutely sure that there aren't other
16:28vaults containing poison somewhere in
16:31this town or in this country or in our
16:33possession some in some part of the
16:35world? I can't be absolutely sure. No,
16:38Senator, I we obviously are are
16:40conducting such investigations and have
16:42issued such orders as are possible, but
16:44I cannot be absolutely sure that some
16:47officer somewhere has not sequestered
16:49something. Could you as concisely as
16:52possible state for the committee your
16:54understanding of the practice of
16:56compartmentization?
16:58Well, the compartmentation uh practice
17:01is merely the the strict application of
17:03the need to know principle. If uh an
17:07employee in the intelligence business
17:09needs to know something in order to do
17:11his job, then he has a right to the
17:13information. But if he does not need to
17:16know that particular information, he
17:18does not have a right to to the
17:19information. And uh if the information
17:23is one which is which is required for
17:26large numbers of employees, then large
17:28numbers of employees will be allowed to
17:30know it. If the if the particular
17:33activity is a very sensitive matter and
17:35only a very few employees need to know
17:37it, then it will be known to only a very
17:40few employees. We make a particular
17:42effort to keep the ident identities of
17:45our sources and some of our more
17:48complicated technical systems restricted
17:51very sharply in the in the to the people
17:53who actually need to work on them and
17:56many of the rest of the people in the
17:57agency know nothing about them. Does
17:59that need to know principle apply in
18:01cases of sensitivity to the director of
18:03central intelligence? Certainly not. It
18:05does not with one exception. Now, I do
18:08not believe I need to know the name of
18:10an agent in some foreign country who's
18:12serving us at the risk of his life. I
18:14know he's there. I know what kind of a
18:17person he is, but I do not know to need
18:19to know his actual name. And I have kept
18:21that out of my my knowledge because I
18:24travel and I don't want to know that
18:26kind of a thing. But that's the only
18:27area that uh I would apply it to. I I am
18:30responsible for everything that happens
18:32in the agency. I need to know everything
18:34that happens in the agency.
18:38We've spoken rather extensively here
18:43about apparent lack of clear lines of
18:46control and authority running downward
18:49and clear lines of responsibility and
18:51accountability running upward.
18:54To the best of your
18:57knowledge, has there been
18:59any
19:01pervasive
19:03non-compliance in the matter of orders
19:05from directives to the president or
19:07orders from the
19:09DCI on the part of
19:12subordinates? In other words, has this
19:14uh reached greater proportion than might
19:17even have uh been revealed here as a
19:21result of our discovery of
19:25A very I think significant in instance
19:28of of insubordination if
19:32indeed it has been pervasive isn't there
19:35need for much tighter controls at the
19:40top. Senator Tower I believe that uh we
19:44are really we have in CIA a very tight
19:48discipline. I'm not saying it's total
19:50obviously it did not work in this case
19:53but I think with the people scattered
19:55around the world doing very sensitive
19:57work doing highly compartmented work uh
20:00there has been indeed a very high sense
20:02of discipline in the organization and a
20:04high sense of compliance to the the
20:06regulations and the rules and the
20:08directives of the organization and I
20:10think that the leadership of the
20:12organization has always felt very much
20:16subject to direct presidential control
20:18and uh responsive to it. So you would
20:21say actually that this instance uh is an
20:24exception to the rule that ordinarily
20:26the discipline has been good that the
20:28that the control has worked and the
20:31accountability has worked in the way
20:32that it should according to proper
20:35cardinals of good administration in the
20:37uh in the business in which we are in
20:40the intelligence and covert operations.
20:43I think there have been very few cases
20:46in which the agency has or its employees
20:49have done something that they should not
20:50have. And in many of the cases which we
20:53now question, we find that that those
20:55activities were approved by the uh by
20:59the appropriate authorities at that time
21:01that the sense of discipline within the
21:03organization seemed to be quite tight.
21:07Senator Goldwater.
21:09Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I only have one
21:11question, Mr. Kobe, but I have a short
21:14statement I'd like to make to you.
21:16Criticism and analysis are important
21:19ingredients in making our democracy
21:21work. However, we are now approaching
21:23the point where both are being abused to
21:25the point of
21:27self-destruction. I submit we must get
21:29out of the morass of doubt and pessimism
21:31into which we have sunk. We must not let
21:34the quarrels of the past interfere with
21:36building for the future. A tidal wave of
21:39criticism has swept over the
21:41intelligence community of our country,
21:43much of which is mistaken or
21:45unwarranted. The damage is severe. If
21:48continued, its survival is
21:50uncertain. Before this committee have
21:53appeared men of the CIA, both on active
21:55duty and retired, all have been
21:57impressive because of the dedication and
22:00loyalty. Nothing we have heard detracts
22:02from the reputation of the CIA as a
22:04highly competent organization. The men
22:07and women of the CIA are doing a great
22:09job under very trying conditions. And I
22:13say to them, as our nation gets back on
22:16course, I I believe there will be change
22:18for the better and ask you to hold on
22:21until that happens. You are never more
22:23needed by this country than right now.
22:26And as one American, I'm proud of you.
22:29To those young people who may be looking
22:30for careers and who have a desire for
22:33public service, I can think of no better
22:36way to serve your nation than as an
22:38intelligence officer. Many skills are
22:40required to keep the CIA a useful and
22:43productive
22:44organization. Continuity is vital to
22:47America. Now, Mr. Kobe, Senator Gwater,
22:51if I may, on behalf of our employees,
22:53thank you for that statement. They are
22:55under a lot of pressure these days and
22:57they will appreciate that. Well the
22:59question I have to ask you have other
23:02countries developed bacterial warfare
23:05ability? Oh certainly uh senator we that
23:08is one aspect of bacterological warfare
23:11that the president's directive in 1969
23:13and 70 tells CIA to continue and that is
23:16to follow the activities of other
23:18nations that we will see the
23:21capabilities and activities of other
23:23nations in this field and we have some
23:25officers who do follow this uh abro
23:28these activities abroad and they are
23:31quite uh quite general. There are some
23:33very very dubious areas where we're just
23:36not sure of what the actual capabilities
23:39are in some respects. But we do follow
23:41it indeed and there is extensive effort
23:43done by by other nations in this line.
23:46But you are now prevented from No, we
23:50can follow the foreign ones. There is no
23:51problem. Follow them. But can you do
23:53anything to offset them? Well, I think
23:55the defense uh the defense of against
23:58those possible things is a matter for
24:00the Department of Defense. Senator, you
24:02feel you're safe in that field? Well, I
24:04think in collaboration with the
24:06Department of Defense and advising the
24:08Department of Defense of foreign
24:10developments in this area, uh we are
24:12giving them the basis for developing
24:14such defensive efforts as we need. Thank
24:17you. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.
24:18Thank you, Senator
24:20Gar. Senator
24:22Morgan. Mr. Chairman, Mr.
24:26Kobe, since this is the first public
24:29hearing of this committee, I think we
24:32should note that
24:33uh we feel and I certainly feel that the
24:37role played by the Central Intelligence
24:39Agency is a very vital one and a very
24:43important one.
24:44I think the fact that you quoted from
24:47President Kennedy who said that quite
24:49often our
24:51uh failures are
24:53trumpeted and our successes go
24:56unheralded is appropriate
24:58here. This committee has been told by
25:02witnesses that had the Central
25:04Intelligence Agency existed prior to
25:06World War
25:07II, Pearl Harbor might never have
25:10happened. or if it had happened the loss
25:14of in deaths and property might have
25:17been much less. So I want you to know
25:20that we do recognize the role of the
25:22Central Intelligence
25:24Agency. We recognize the fact that we in
25:27this country must be able to know in
25:31advance what our potential adversaries
25:34and potential
25:35enemies may be planning so that we can
25:38cope with them. So I do think that that
25:41it is important. I believe Mr. Kobe most
25:44of the questions have been asked except
25:47that fairly the reference reference was
25:50made to the presidential order and we
25:54alluded to what was in fact I think the
25:57press release concerning the
25:59presidential order. But as I read the
26:02presidential order, I find that the
26:06United this statement, the United States
26:09bacterological and biological programs
26:12will be confined to research and
26:14development for defensive purposes,
26:17immunization, safety measures, etc.
26:21This does not preclude research into
26:23those offensive aspects of
26:26bacteriological biological agents
26:28necessary to determine what defensive
26:32measures are required. Now earlier you
26:35stated you thought it might have been
26:36the mentality of those who made the
26:38decision to keep these toxins that they
26:41might be needed in order to develop
26:44defensive weapons. Do you think if that
26:46was their thinking that it uh would be
26:49in keeping with the presidential order
26:51as I just read it to you? Well, we
26:53looked at that. I think that you might
26:55be able to make a case for that. Uh
26:57Senator, if you were uh actively
26:59involved and had responsibilities for
27:01these defensive measures, but uh as I
27:03think the chairman pointed out, the
27:05quantities uh maintained by CIA are
27:09difficult to defend under that
27:11direction. What was your position with
27:12the CIA at that time, Mr. told me uh in
27:161970 I was on on detached service. I was
27:19uh I was assigned to the Department of
27:22State in Vietnam. Then you had nothing
27:24to do with retaining these toxins? No, I
27:27had nothing. And uh you knew nothing
27:29about them until you made the until we
27:32discovered it this uh in in May. I uh I
27:36would commend you, Mr. Kobe, again for
27:40taking these steps to determine what has
27:42happened.
27:43Uh, I think most men in the CIA as well
27:47as those in the Internal Revenue Service
27:50and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
27:52are dedicated public officials and want
27:55to do what is
27:56right. And I think your method of asking
27:59for any known violations has been
28:01helpful to this committee and I would
28:04commend it, Mr. chairman to the Internal
28:07Revenue Service to the end that they
28:10might ask their field agents if they
28:12know of known violations uh in this area
28:15and I would commend it also to the
28:17director of the Federal Bureau of
28:18Investigation.
28:20Senator Gold Warden mentioned and I
28:23believe the presidential order directed
28:25the CIA to continue to maintain
28:28surveillent
28:29surveillance of the bacterological and
28:31biological warfare capabilities of other
28:34states. You say you have done that? We
28:36do. So yes, senator. Are you in a
28:38position to tell this committee whether
28:40or not other states and especially
28:42potential adversaries or enemies now
28:44have stockpiles of such toxins? I don't
28:47think I can say much about stockpiles,
28:49but I do know that there are uh
28:52installations which appear to us to be
28:55experimental stations of some sort.
28:58Thank you, Mr. Co. Uh with the in the
29:00chemical field certainly there are
29:01stockpiles. We are aware of that also.
29:03Thank you.
29:05[Applause]
29:09I have no question. Thank you, Senator.
29:12Senator
29:14Matias. Thank you, Mr.
29:18Chairman, Mr.
29:21KBY, some of America's greatest
29:24victories and some of America's greatest
29:28defeats have represented failures of
29:33intelligence. Trenton and
29:36Antidum, Pearl Harbor, I think all
29:40illustrate uh the vital necessity of
29:44intelligence.
29:46A year ago, just almost exactly a year
29:49ago, when Senator Mansfield and I
29:51introduced the legislation which has
29:54resulted in this investigation, we had
29:57that very much in mind. We wanted to be
29:59sure
30:01that we had the best intelligence system
30:06which was available.
30:09But I think we also had in mind John
30:11Adams
30:13warning that a frequent recurrence to
30:16the principles of the
30:18constitution is absolutely necessary to
30:22preserve the advantages of
30:24liberty and to maintain a free
30:26government.
30:32I think the discovery of this
30:36toxin raises
30:39u some interesting questions which are
30:43within the purview of this investigation
30:45and which I think have to be answered uh
30:49before this committee completes its work
30:51and makes its recommendations to the
30:54congress. Uh, for
30:56example, I accept your statement that
30:59this toxin was never used except in the
31:03one instance that you've
31:06described. But
31:08I then have to ask you this, if you had
31:11used the
31:13toxin, what provision of the
31:16constitution would have afforded
31:19authority to do so?
31:22Well, I think uh CIA's operations are
31:25certainly overseas operations. Uh they
31:28fall under the National Security Act of
31:321947 and they fall consequently under
31:35the provisions of the Constitution that
31:38call for the the National Defense and
31:40the Foreign Relations of the United
31:41States.
31:44But the use of a toxin of this sort is
31:46of course a use of force. Wouldn't you
31:48agree? It's a weapon. It's a weapon.
31:50It's a use of
31:52force and
31:55um normally if force is to be
32:00employed against another nation uh
32:03congressional approval is
32:05uh required. Isn't that true? Well, I
32:08think we're now uh in the midst of the
32:10War Powers Act, Senator, and uh this
32:14activity of course preceded that.
32:18Yes, it did pre precede it.
32:21And but what occurs to me here is that
32:25we have an
32:27illustration the use of
32:30force in the relations of the United
32:32States with other powers in the world or
32:35at least the potential use of force.
32:37It's as you say, it's never been used in
32:39this instance.
32:43um which differs only a
32:46degree from
32:48uh covert operations in
32:51Laos or other examples that we could
32:55think of.
32:57And so it seems to me that the discovery
32:59of this
33:01toxin raises very fundamental questions
33:04about
33:05the relationship to the covert
33:08activities of any intelligence agency be
33:10it the CIA or the FBI or or
33:14others with the constitutional process
33:17by which this government uh is
33:21conducted and I would think Mr. chairman
33:24that there is no responsibility greater
33:27upon
33:28us than to define that
33:31relationship as accurately as possible
33:34before the close of these hearings.
33:36Thank you. It is of course uh uh
33:38contained within the amendment to the
33:41foreign assistant act passed last
33:43December which uh now requires that any
33:46activity of CIA other than intelligence
33:48gathering abroad shall be uh found to be
33:52important to the national security by
33:54the president and shall be reported to
33:56the appropriate committees and that
33:57includes six committees of the congress
33:59at this time. This is a statutory
34:01provision which we are in compliance
34:03with and and let me say Mr. Kobe, I I I
34:07agree with you. Let me say that this
34:08imposes responsibilities on the Congress
34:11that I don't think we've always
34:12discharged very well. Uh I I can recall
34:16members of Congress who uh uh
34:20recoiled from responsibility of knowing
34:24what was happening. Members of Congress
34:26who said, "Don't tell me. I don't want
34:28to know." I think that is an indictment
34:31of the
34:32Congress just as severe as any
34:34indictment which is labeled against any
34:37of the intelligence community. I
34:39wouldn't call it an indictment of the
34:40Congress, Senator. I think it rather
34:42reflected the general atmosphere and
34:44political atmosphere toward intelligence
34:47that uh that was the traditional
34:49approach and I think we Americans are
34:51changing that and this this act is a is
34:54an example of that change as is this
34:56committee. I think you're more uh
34:59generous than I'm inclined to be. I
35:02can't be that permissive. I don't think
35:04climate will excuse what is really a
35:07derelction of duty. And if there had not
35:09been that derelction of duty, perhaps we
35:11wouldn't be here today.
35:14I must say, Senator Matias, that I agree
35:16fully that we have been victimized by
35:19excessive secrecy, not only with respect
35:22to the failure of the Congress in the
35:24past to exercise proper surveillance
35:26over intelligence activities uh but
35:29also
35:31uh excessive secrecy has created this
35:35kind of mischief within the executive
35:37branch. Here we have a case where the
35:39very methods of secrecy
35:43uh concealed for five
35:45years an act of insubordination within
35:48the CIA
35:51uh that came to light only by the happen
35:55stance that Mr. Colby, the present
35:57director, asked the agency if they
35:59please wouldn't tell him what's been
36:02going on that's
36:03wrong. And as a result, somebody knowing
36:07something about this gave him a
36:12tip. As a result of which he then
36:14conducted an investigation that led to
36:16these disclos disclosures. So I believe
36:18that the internal
36:20uh
36:21workings uh within the agency itself are
36:25uh a matter that we must look at very
36:27closely to be sure that this kind of
36:29thing doesn't happen again if it can be
36:32prevented.
36:34uh excessive secrecy may have victimized
36:37this agency as well as the Congress.

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