Chiến lược cân bằng quyền lực của Việt Nam trước Mỹ và Trung Quốc — Transcript
Full transcript
- 0:05[Music]
- 0:10Hello everyone. Welcome to the Asian Chronicles program. In September
- 0:152023, a US presidential plane landed at Noi
- 0:19Bai Airport. He was welcomed with the highest protocol, and within hours, the two countries
- 0:24announced the upgrading of their relationship to the highest level in Vietnam's entire diplomatic system
- 0:28. Less than three months later, on the same runway, another presidential plane
- 0:32landed, this time carrying the Chinese president. He was also welcomed with
- 0:37equally grand protocol. But this time the story is much more sophisticated because the relationship between
- 0:42the two countries had already been at the highest level for 15 years, so this wasn't an upgrade
- 0:46, but a ceremony to deepen that relationship with a
- 0:51completely new diplomatic concept. The two most fiercely competing superpowers in the world
- 0:55arrived in the same capital, demanded special treatment, and left satisfied. The question is:
- 1:01how can a country that has just forged a close relationship with Beijing's rival still
- 1:05receive a red carpet welcome from Beijing just months later?
- 1:11This is not a diplomatic coincidence or a stroke of luck; it
- 1:15is the result of a strategy officially known as "bamboo diplomacy,"
- 1:20a school of thought developed over decades by the late General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong
- 1:24. This image has three layers of meaning, each addressing
- 1:29a part of the problem. The core is the unchanging principles of independence and
- 1:33sovereignty. The sturdy trunk represents internal strength, from the economy to national defense. And the flexible branches
- 1:38represent the skillful handling of each partner. To put it more simply
- 1:42, this is the strategy of a country geographically close to a giant superpower
- 1:47, yet needing Western markets and technology for development, and therefore
- 1:52unable and unwilling to stake its entire future on a single side.
- 1:56To understand why this strategy worked so effectively, we need to go back to
- 2:01the very night Vietnam learned a very costly lesson when they tried the opposite
- 2:06. [music]
- 2:11Let's look more closely at what actually happened during those two visits. Because the details
- 2:16are there, not in the handshakes in front of the cameras. With the US President,
- 2:21the negotiations focused almost entirely on semiconductor technology,
- 2:25supply chains, and innovation. Areas that Vietnam desperately needs to upgrade
- 2:29its economy. More importantly, the Vietnamese side requested a specific principle
- 2:34and a joint statement: that the two countries committed to respecting
- 2:39each other's political systems. In other words, this was a single sentence, but it carried immense significance. It was
- 2:43a direct reassurance to Beijing that the new relationship with Washington was not
- 2:48aimed at building a military alliance against China. Three months
- 2:51later, when welcoming the Chinese President, Vietnam faced a
- 2:55much more difficult challenge. China wants Vietnam to participate in the concept of a community of
- 2:59shared destiny. A core phrase in Beijing's foreign policy, often
- 3:04used with countries considered very closely aligned with China,
- 3:09would be a blunt refusal. However, full acceptance
- 3:13could lead the West to believe that Vietnam has fully aligned itself with
- 3:17Beijing's sphere of influence. According to Dr. Alexander Vuvin, a professor at
- 3:23the Daniel Kinou Center for Asia-Pacific Security Studies in Hawaii,
- 3:28Vietnam's approach to this issue is subtle. They accept the concept but
- 3:32use a much more neutral Vietnamese translation. The term "community
- 3:36of shared future" carries strategic significance, rather than a
- 3:40more literal and binding translation. Just a few words different, but that's how a
- 3:44much smaller nation maintains its flexibility and avoids being bound,
- 3:49while still saving face for its larger partner. It's important to clarify a key point here
- 3:53to avoid misunderstandings. For the US, this truly represents a first-ever leap
- 3:58to the highest level of relations. For China, the relationship was already at
- 4:03that level. Since 2008, Vietnam's task with Beijing should
- 4:08n't be to upgrade the relationship, but rather to subtly renew it with a different conceptual framework.
- 4:13In other words, Vietnam had to exert two very different kinds of diplomatic effort
- 4:16in the same year. One side needed a real breakthrough, the
- 4:20other only required a formal yet calculated gesture.
- 4:25[Music]
- 4:31[Music]
- 4:35[Music]
- 4:37The reason both superpowers value Vietnam so highly is not just its
- 4:43geographical location. For many years, multinational corporations have been pushing a strategy
- 4:48that the business world calls China-China, meaning moving
- 4:51part of their production lines out of China to avoid risks, tariffs, and
- 4:56geopolitical tensions. And Vietnam is one of the destinations that has benefited most
- 5:00from this trend. This makes Vietnam an increasingly
- 5:04important link in the global supply chain. And an important link always
- 5:09has its own bargaining power, regardless of population size or land area.
- 5:13But the deepest reason why Vietnam cannot choose sides, even if it wanted to,
- 5:18lies in the very structure of its economy; the majority of raw materials and components for
- 5:23producing Vietnam's exports come from China. Meanwhile, the
- 5:27largest consumer markets for those very products are the US and Europe. To put it simply
- 5:32, if Vietnam turns its back on China, factories will lack the raw
- 5:35materials to operate. If it turns its back on the US and Europe, the goods produced will go unsold
- 5:40, disrupting the balance. Therefore, it's not simply a matter of shrewd choice, but
- 5:45a matter of survival for an entire economy caught between two ends of the same
- 5:49supply chain. According to Derek Grossman, a
- 5:54senior defense analyst at the US-based Rent Corporation,
- 5:59this cleverness has created a reverse effect compared to what is commonly
- 6:04thought about smaller countries in the competition between superpowers. Instead of Vietnam
- 6:08having to beg for protection from one side, both Washington and Beijing
- 6:13have to proactively seek ways to appease Hanoi to gain influence. To put it simply
- 6:18, Vietnam has transformed its geographically disadvantageous position, sandwiched between superpowers,
- 6:23into a real bargaining chip. Looking at these two visits side-by-side,
- 6:28a clear underlying logic emerges. With the US, Vietnam clearly states that we cooperate
- 6:33on economic and technological matters, not militarily against anyone. With China, Vietnam
- 6:38clearly states that we respect your position, but in
- 6:42our own words, this is a flexible approach implemented in practice, not
- 6:46an abstract slogan. But the ability to satisfy both sides simultaneously
- 6:50is not a coincidence or a stroke of luck. It stems from a
- 6:55very costly lesson that Vietnam paid for nearly half a century ago when they
- 6:59tried the opposite. [music]
- 7:08To understand why Vietnam today avoids choosing sides at all costs, we need to go
- 7:13back to the period immediately after the country's reunification. In 1975, in the context of
- 7:20the still intense Cold War, the leadership at that time chose a path
- 7:24completely different from today, leaning heavily towards the socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union
- 7:28. The culmination of this choice was the signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the
- 7:34Soviet Union in October 1978 [music], which brought Vietnam firmly into the orbit of
- 7:41the Soviet military and economic alliance. The price of that choice came quickly. Just
- 7:46one year later, in 1979, the border war in the North broke out with
- 7:52China, draining national resources and creating a prolonged and unstable security environment
- 7:57. At the same time, leaning completely toward one side left Vietnam diplomatically isolated
- 8:02from most of the rest of the world, especially the West and many
- 8:07countries in the region. The cumulative consequence was a severe socio-economic crisis
- 8:12that lasted for a decade. 1980 saw hyperinflation to the point where many
- 8:17families had to share every single potato during the lean season. To put it bluntly
- 8:22, this is a concrete image of the price a nation pays when
- 8:26it stakes its entire fate on a single superpower and allows that superpower to determine
- 8:31who its friends and enemies are. That lesson was so profound that it shaped
- 8:37all subsequent foreign policy thinking. The Sixth Party Congress in December 1986
- 8:45is often cited as the starting point of the reform process, but the
- 8:49truly pivotal document for diplomacy was Resolution No. 13 of the Politburo,
- 8:53issued in May 1988. For the first time, the concept of national interest
- 9:00was placed in the supreme position, replacing the ideological struggle that had
- 9:04previously dominated all decisions. In other words, this was the moment when Vietnam...
- 9:08The question officially shifted from which side the country belonged to to a much more pragmatic one
- 9:12: What benefit does this relationship bring to the nation? Looking further ahead, this change
- 9:17is not merely a foreign policy adjustment, but a shift in
- 9:21governing philosophy from viewing international relations as an ideological battle to be
- 9:25won to viewing it as a chessboard of self-interest, where each move must
- 9:32be weighed against its contribution to the survival and development of the nation
- 9:37. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s made this lesson even more
- 9:44urgent, as Vietnam's biggest source of aid and security umbrella disappeared
- 9:49almost overnight. Facing the risk of complete strategic disorientation
- 9:53, Vietnam was forced to normalize relations with both China officially in
- 9:58November 1991 and the United States officially on
- 10:04May 11, 1995. That same year, Vietnam joined the Association of
- 10:09Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), creating a multilateral buffer zone to avoid being
- 10:13isolated from major powers. From these setbacks, a
- 10:17more profound shift in thinking gradually emerged, not just a change in policy,
- 10:22but a change in how Vietnam defined who was a friend and who was an enemy on the world map
- 10:27.
- 10:32So, after escaping those months of isolation,
- 10:36how did Vietnam change its perspective on who was a friend and who was an enemy? This new way of thinking was
- 10:41clearly defined in the 9th Central Committee Resolution of 2003
- 10:47and subsequently refined in Resolution No. 28 of 2013 on the strategy
- 10:53for national defense in the new situation. Instead of classifying countries by political ideology
- 10:57as during the war, Vietnam shifted to a
- 11:01much more pragmatic concept: partners and adversaries. A partner is any country that
- 11:06respects independence, sovereignty, and engages in equal, mutually beneficial cooperation. An adversary is
- 11:11any power that acts against Vietnam's independence and territorial integrity. The
- 11:16most important, and often overlooked, aspect of this classification is its
- 11:21acceptance of reciprocal transformation. A partner country can still have
- 11:25conflicting interests, and a tense relationship can still find
- 11:29common ground for cooperation. Simply put, Vietnam no longer views the world in
- 11:34black and white, but rather examines issues in detail. This explains why
- 11:39Vietnam can simultaneously engage in extensive economic cooperation with China while resolutely defending
- 11:43its maritime sovereignty against China without considering it a conflict
- 11:47. To realize this thinking, Vietnam has built a
- 11:51three-tiered system for ranking diplomatic relations: comprehensive partnership, strategic partnership
- 11:55, and the highest level, comprehensive strategic partnership. Imagine
- 11:59this system as a staircase. The higher you go, the greater the level of political trust and the depth of cooperation in
- 12:04security, economics, and technology. But no tier comes with a
- 12:08binding military alliance commitment. The highest tier was first established
- 12:12with China in 2008, then gradually expanded to include Russia, India, and South Korea
- 12:19. But most notably, a detail that even many
- 12:23close news followers have overlooked, is the explosive pace of expansion between
- 12:292023 and 2026. In just about three years, Vietnam established
- 12:36top-level relations with the US, Japan, Australia, France, Malaysia, New Zealand,
- 12:44Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, the UK, and most recently, the entire
- 12:50European Union in January 2026, bringing the total to 15 partners, according to
- 12:57domestic media reports, by early
- 13:012026. In other words, this is not a static policy announced
- 13:06once and then abandoned, but a deliberately accelerated strategy. This coincides
- 13:10with the most intense period of US-China competition. Alongside
- 13:15this system of partnerships, Vietnam also has another pillar that keeps the entire strategy from
- 13:19faltering: its defense policy, officially announced in the
- 13:232019 Defense White Paper, often abbreviated as the
- 13:2840 policy, one principle, four prohibitions, including: not participating in military alliances, not aligning
- 13:34with one country against another, not allowing foreign countries to establish military bases
- 13:38on Vietnamese territory, and not using force or threatening to use force
- 13:43in international relations. But the most noteworthy detail, and also the least known, is...
- 13:47The most noteworthy aspect lies in the first part, which leaves open the possibility of considering
- 13:52developing appropriate defense relations depending on the specific situation. In
- 13:57other words, this is the loophole that this policy leaves for itself: a
- 14:01firm commitment in principle, but still with enough room for flexibility
- 14:06if core interests are truly threatened. But this rapid and seemingly perfect
- 14:10expansion raises a question that many international scholars
- 14:15are closely following: Is a strategy that pleases almost everyone
- 14:19truly sustainable, or is it merely a delaying tactic, with a much more difficult choice
- 14:24awaiting ahead?
- 14:31International relations researchers view this success in two
- 14:36rather different ways, and both perspectives are worth considering. On one side, Dr. Le
- 14:41Hong Hiep, a senior research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (
- 14:46Isias Yusof Ishak Institute) in Singapore, calls this a successful model of a
- 14:53comprehensive risk prevention strategy. According to him, the key point is not Vietnam's
- 14:58skillful use of diplomatic language, but rather its simultaneous development of
- 15:03genuine self-reliance, diversification of security partners, expansion of
- 15:08trade agreements, and development of a domestic defense industry. In other words,
- 15:12from this perspective, bamboo diplomacy only holds true because behind
- 15:17it lies a genuinely growing economy and defense capability, not
- 15:23just a mere negotiation technique. On the other hand, analyst
- 15:26Jackson Lopez at the Louis Institute in Australia issues a
- 15:31much sharper warning. According to him, this strategy is betting on the assumption that
- 15:35trade and diplomatic concessions can offset
- 15:39core security threats, and that assumption may be wrong in an era where
- 15:44trade is increasingly weaponized by tariffs and sanctions. He uses the analogy
- 15:49of bamboo to argue this. The older a bamboo tree gets, the more brittle it becomes
- 15:55, its trunk weakening in the face of strong winds. To put it simply,
- 16:00this argument doesn't deny that strategic [music] has been successful in the past,
- 16:04but rather questions whether it remains effective when pressure to choose sides
- 16:09increases simultaneously from both sides, making the true cost of not choosing sides clearer
- 16:14. Let's look at a specific situation. In early
- 16:192022 at the UN General Assembly, countries were asked to vote on
- 16:24a series of resolutions related to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Vietnam
- 16:29abstained from voting on several resolutions and voted against suspending
- 16:33Russia's membership in the Human Rights Council. Professor Carl Teer at the
- 16:39Australian Defence College [music] of the University of New South Wales assessed this as a move
- 16:44that cost Vietnam international prestige, as many Western countries that had previously
- 16:48supported Vietnam's stance on the South China Sea now felt Vietnam was not on
- 16:52their side on an issue they considered a fundamental principle of international law
- 16:57. However, on the opposing side of this debate, Professor Teer himself noted
- 17:02that the choice did not stem from ideology but from a very pragmatic calculation
- 17:06. Traditional defense relations with Russia remained crucial in
- 17:11maintaining the combat readiness of the Vietnamese military, given
- 17:16the lack of a suitable alternative in the short term. In other words,
- 17:20Vietnam accepted sacrificing some prestige with the West to protect another
- 17:25security interest that it considered more urgent at the time. Looking at the broader picture... This
- 17:30is why many observers believe that judging bamboo diplomacy solely
- 17:36by its success or failure is insufficient. A more accurate question is perhaps:
- 17:42at each specific moment, what interests is Vietnam prioritizing and
- 17:48what price is it willing to pay to protect those interests?
- 17:54[music]
- 17:56Vietnam is not the only country in the region striving to maintain a
- 18:00balanced distance from superpowers, but the ways other countries do this
- 18:03vary greatly, and that difference helps to clarify why Vietnam's model is
- 18:08unique. Indonesia pursues a principle known as independence and proactiveness
- 18:13dating back to President Sukano's time. The similarity is that both countries reject
- 18:18rigid military alliances. But the core difference lies in their geographical location.
- 18:22Indonesia is an archipelago nation, not sharing a land border
- 18:27with China, so the pressure for survival and security is not as severe as in Vietnam.
- 18:31Vietnam shares a land border with China and has
- 18:36direct territorial disputes at sea. In other words, Indonesia has more room to experiment
- 18:41, while Vietnam has almost no room for error. Singapore, on the other hand, has chosen a
- 18:46different path, which academics call risk mitigation through institutions.
- 18:51This island nation maximizes economic benefits from the Chinese market while simultaneously
- 18:55allowing the US military access and rotational deployment at some bases
- 19:00under a memorandum signed in 1990. This is the biggest difference compared
- 19:06to Vietnam, where the "four no's" policy completely excludes the possibility of foreign
- 19:10military bases. Malaysia has chosen a quieter approach, often
- 19:15downplaying the severity of clashes with Chinese coast guard vessels at
- 19:19sea to maintain smooth economic relations, much more discreetly than Vietnam
- 19:24, which is generally more open and assertive in asserting its sovereignty both on
- 19:28the ground and on the international legal front. But the picture would be incomplete
- 19:33if we only looked at the successful countries. Thailand also has a
- 19:37long tradition of diplomacy, likened to a bamboo bending with the wind. But this is an
- 19:42important difference to clarify. Thailand maintains flexibility by leaning
- 19:46toward the prevailing power at any given time, rather than
- 19:50maintaining a uniform distance from all sides like Vietnam. After the
- 19:552014 military coup, facing Western sanctions, Thailand
- 20:01quickly shifted to strengthening economic and defense cooperation with Beijing
- 20:04. This shows that superficial neutrality can be very easily broken when
- 20:09internal political interests are directly threatened.
- 20:12Two other cases further illustrate the cost of
- 20:16Sri Lanka's failed balancing strategy due to its weak financial structure and difficult-to-control loans
- 20:21. Ultimately, ceding control of the strategic port of Hanto to
- 20:26China for decades resulted in the loss of a significant portion of national autonomy.
- 20:31Myanmar, after a military coup that left it almost completely isolated by the US and Europe,
- 20:37was forced to rely on the veto power of Russia and China
- 20:41in the UN Security Council, and its arms supply from these two countries
- 20:46no longer provided much room for independence. So what has helped Vietnam,
- 20:50at least until now, avoid the fate of Sri Lanka or Myanmar?
- 20:55According to the general analysis of many researchers, the key difference lies in
- 20:59the fact that Vietnam has proactively interwoven genuine economic interests with the West through
- 21:04a series of free trade agreements, rather than relying solely on
- 21:07conditional loans or aid. A regional survey published in
- 21:132026 by the Isaac Institute for Music showed that, on average across
- 21:20Southeast Asia, 50% of respondents said they would lean
- 21:26towards China if forced to choose sides, compared to 48% who would choose the US. This figure is
- 21:32for the entire region. It is important to clarify this because it is easy to misunderstand the situation specifically with
- 21:38Vietnam. A previous survey by the same institute published in 2024 showed
- 21:45a different picture: 79% of Vietnamese respondents leaned towards the US,
- 21:51while only 21% chose China, a
- 21:55much larger disparity than the regional average. This once again shows that Vietnamese [music]
- 22:00is operating in its own balanced way, not entirely conforming to the
- 22:04general trend of the bloc.
- 22:11Let's go back to the image at the beginning of the program. Two private jets on the
- 22:15same runway, less than three months apart, each carrying one of the two
- 22:19most powerful leaders in the world right now. Hopefully, you saw
- 22:24that image in a different light. It wasn't the luck of a small nation sandwiched
- 22:28between two giants, but the result of a learning process spanning nearly
- 22:32half a century. It began with the very high price paid for choosing to take
- 22:37sides. But can a flexible branch continue to thrive in an
- 22:41increasingly polarized world? That remains a question that even the most knowledgeable scholars
- 22:45on Vietnam dare not answer definitively. Perhaps the answer...
- 22:49It won't come from Hanoi, but from how much patience Washington and Beijing have left
- 22:55with a bamboo pole that refuses to lean completely in either direction. See
- 22:59you again in the next broadcast of Asia Chronicle.
- 23:05[music]
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