YouTube2Text

Chiến lược cân bằng quyền lực của Việt Nam trước Mỹ và Trung Quốc — Transcript

by Á Lục Ký · 3,404 words · 289 segments · language en · Watch on YouTube

Full transcript

  1. 0:05[Music]
  2. 0:10Hello everyone. Welcome to the Asian Chronicles program. In September
  3. 0:152023, a US presidential plane landed at Noi
  4. 0:19Bai Airport. He was welcomed with the highest protocol, and within hours, the two countries
  5. 0:24announced the upgrading of their relationship to the highest level in Vietnam's entire diplomatic system
  6. 0:28. Less than three months later, on the same runway, another presidential plane
  7. 0:32landed, this time carrying the Chinese president. He was also welcomed with
  8. 0:37equally grand protocol. But this time the story is much more sophisticated because the relationship between
  9. 0:42the two countries had already been at the highest level for 15 years, so this wasn't an upgrade
  10. 0:46, but a ceremony to deepen that relationship with a
  11. 0:51completely new diplomatic concept. The two most fiercely competing superpowers in the world
  12. 0:55arrived in the same capital, demanded special treatment, and left satisfied. The question is:
  13. 1:01how can a country that has just forged a close relationship with Beijing's rival still
  14. 1:05receive a red carpet welcome from Beijing just months later?
  15. 1:11This is not a diplomatic coincidence or a stroke of luck; it
  16. 1:15is the result of a strategy officially known as "bamboo diplomacy,"
  17. 1:20a school of thought developed over decades by the late General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong
  18. 1:24. This image has three layers of meaning, each addressing
  19. 1:29a part of the problem. The core is the unchanging principles of independence and
  20. 1:33sovereignty. The sturdy trunk represents internal strength, from the economy to national defense. And the flexible branches
  21. 1:38represent the skillful handling of each partner. To put it more simply
  22. 1:42, this is the strategy of a country geographically close to a giant superpower
  23. 1:47, yet needing Western markets and technology for development, and therefore
  24. 1:52unable and unwilling to stake its entire future on a single side.
  25. 1:56To understand why this strategy worked so effectively, we need to go back to
  26. 2:01the very night Vietnam learned a very costly lesson when they tried the opposite
  27. 2:06. [music]
  28. 2:11Let's look more closely at what actually happened during those two visits. Because the details
  29. 2:16are there, not in the handshakes in front of the cameras. With the US President,
  30. 2:21the negotiations focused almost entirely on semiconductor technology,
  31. 2:25supply chains, and innovation. Areas that Vietnam desperately needs to upgrade
  32. 2:29its economy. More importantly, the Vietnamese side requested a specific principle
  33. 2:34and a joint statement: that the two countries committed to respecting
  34. 2:39each other's political systems. In other words, this was a single sentence, but it carried immense significance. It was
  35. 2:43a direct reassurance to Beijing that the new relationship with Washington was not
  36. 2:48aimed at building a military alliance against China. Three months
  37. 2:51later, when welcoming the Chinese President, Vietnam faced a
  38. 2:55much more difficult challenge. China wants Vietnam to participate in the concept of a community of
  39. 2:59shared destiny. A core phrase in Beijing's foreign policy, often
  40. 3:04used with countries considered very closely aligned with China,
  41. 3:09would be a blunt refusal. However, full acceptance
  42. 3:13could lead the West to believe that Vietnam has fully aligned itself with
  43. 3:17Beijing's sphere of influence. According to Dr. Alexander Vuvin, a professor at
  44. 3:23the Daniel Kinou Center for Asia-Pacific Security Studies in Hawaii,
  45. 3:28Vietnam's approach to this issue is subtle. They accept the concept but
  46. 3:32use a much more neutral Vietnamese translation. The term "community
  47. 3:36of shared future" carries strategic significance, rather than a
  48. 3:40more literal and binding translation. Just a few words different, but that's how a
  49. 3:44much smaller nation maintains its flexibility and avoids being bound,
  50. 3:49while still saving face for its larger partner. It's important to clarify a key point here
  51. 3:53to avoid misunderstandings. For the US, this truly represents a first-ever leap
  52. 3:58to the highest level of relations. For China, the relationship was already at
  53. 4:03that level. Since 2008, Vietnam's task with Beijing should
  54. 4:08n't be to upgrade the relationship, but rather to subtly renew it with a different conceptual framework.
  55. 4:13In other words, Vietnam had to exert two very different kinds of diplomatic effort
  56. 4:16in the same year. One side needed a real breakthrough, the
  57. 4:20other only required a formal yet calculated gesture.
  58. 4:25[Music]
  59. 4:31[Music]
  60. 4:35[Music]
  61. 4:37The reason both superpowers value Vietnam so highly is not just its
  62. 4:43geographical location. For many years, multinational corporations have been pushing a strategy
  63. 4:48that the business world calls China-China, meaning moving
  64. 4:51part of their production lines out of China to avoid risks, tariffs, and
  65. 4:56geopolitical tensions. And Vietnam is one of the destinations that has benefited most
  66. 5:00from this trend. This makes Vietnam an increasingly
  67. 5:04important link in the global supply chain. And an important link always
  68. 5:09has its own bargaining power, regardless of population size or land area.
  69. 5:13But the deepest reason why Vietnam cannot choose sides, even if it wanted to,
  70. 5:18lies in the very structure of its economy; the majority of raw materials and components for
  71. 5:23producing Vietnam's exports come from China. Meanwhile, the
  72. 5:27largest consumer markets for those very products are the US and Europe. To put it simply
  73. 5:32, if Vietnam turns its back on China, factories will lack the raw
  74. 5:35materials to operate. If it turns its back on the US and Europe, the goods produced will go unsold
  75. 5:40, disrupting the balance. Therefore, it's not simply a matter of shrewd choice, but
  76. 5:45a matter of survival for an entire economy caught between two ends of the same
  77. 5:49supply chain. According to Derek Grossman, a
  78. 5:54senior defense analyst at the US-based Rent Corporation,
  79. 5:59this cleverness has created a reverse effect compared to what is commonly
  80. 6:04thought about smaller countries in the competition between superpowers. Instead of Vietnam
  81. 6:08having to beg for protection from one side, both Washington and Beijing
  82. 6:13have to proactively seek ways to appease Hanoi to gain influence. To put it simply
  83. 6:18, Vietnam has transformed its geographically disadvantageous position, sandwiched between superpowers,
  84. 6:23into a real bargaining chip. Looking at these two visits side-by-side,
  85. 6:28a clear underlying logic emerges. With the US, Vietnam clearly states that we cooperate
  86. 6:33on economic and technological matters, not militarily against anyone. With China, Vietnam
  87. 6:38clearly states that we respect your position, but in
  88. 6:42our own words, this is a flexible approach implemented in practice, not
  89. 6:46an abstract slogan. But the ability to satisfy both sides simultaneously
  90. 6:50is not a coincidence or a stroke of luck. It stems from a
  91. 6:55very costly lesson that Vietnam paid for nearly half a century ago when they
  92. 6:59tried the opposite. [music]
  93. 7:08To understand why Vietnam today avoids choosing sides at all costs, we need to go
  94. 7:13back to the period immediately after the country's reunification. In 1975, in the context of
  95. 7:20the still intense Cold War, the leadership at that time chose a path
  96. 7:24completely different from today, leaning heavily towards the socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union
  97. 7:28. The culmination of this choice was the signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the
  98. 7:34Soviet Union in October 1978 [music], which brought Vietnam firmly into the orbit of
  99. 7:41the Soviet military and economic alliance. The price of that choice came quickly. Just
  100. 7:46one year later, in 1979, the border war in the North broke out with
  101. 7:52China, draining national resources and creating a prolonged and unstable security environment
  102. 7:57. At the same time, leaning completely toward one side left Vietnam diplomatically isolated
  103. 8:02from most of the rest of the world, especially the West and many
  104. 8:07countries in the region. The cumulative consequence was a severe socio-economic crisis
  105. 8:12that lasted for a decade. 1980 saw hyperinflation to the point where many
  106. 8:17families had to share every single potato during the lean season. To put it bluntly
  107. 8:22, this is a concrete image of the price a nation pays when
  108. 8:26it stakes its entire fate on a single superpower and allows that superpower to determine
  109. 8:31who its friends and enemies are. That lesson was so profound that it shaped
  110. 8:37all subsequent foreign policy thinking. The Sixth Party Congress in December 1986
  111. 8:45is often cited as the starting point of the reform process, but the
  112. 8:49truly pivotal document for diplomacy was Resolution No. 13 of the Politburo,
  113. 8:53issued in May 1988. For the first time, the concept of national interest
  114. 9:00was placed in the supreme position, replacing the ideological struggle that had
  115. 9:04previously dominated all decisions. In other words, this was the moment when Vietnam...
  116. 9:08The question officially shifted from which side the country belonged to to a much more pragmatic one
  117. 9:12: What benefit does this relationship bring to the nation? Looking further ahead, this change
  118. 9:17is not merely a foreign policy adjustment, but a shift in
  119. 9:21governing philosophy from viewing international relations as an ideological battle to be
  120. 9:25won to viewing it as a chessboard of self-interest, where each move must
  121. 9:32be weighed against its contribution to the survival and development of the nation
  122. 9:37. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s made this lesson even more
  123. 9:44urgent, as Vietnam's biggest source of aid and security umbrella disappeared
  124. 9:49almost overnight. Facing the risk of complete strategic disorientation
  125. 9:53, Vietnam was forced to normalize relations with both China officially in
  126. 9:58November 1991 and the United States officially on
  127. 10:04May 11, 1995. That same year, Vietnam joined the Association of
  128. 10:09Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), creating a multilateral buffer zone to avoid being
  129. 10:13isolated from major powers. From these setbacks, a
  130. 10:17more profound shift in thinking gradually emerged, not just a change in policy,
  131. 10:22but a change in how Vietnam defined who was a friend and who was an enemy on the world map
  132. 10:27.
  133. 10:32So, after escaping those months of isolation,
  134. 10:36how did Vietnam change its perspective on who was a friend and who was an enemy? This new way of thinking was
  135. 10:41clearly defined in the 9th Central Committee Resolution of 2003
  136. 10:47and subsequently refined in Resolution No. 28 of 2013 on the strategy
  137. 10:53for national defense in the new situation. Instead of classifying countries by political ideology
  138. 10:57as during the war, Vietnam shifted to a
  139. 11:01much more pragmatic concept: partners and adversaries. A partner is any country that
  140. 11:06respects independence, sovereignty, and engages in equal, mutually beneficial cooperation. An adversary is
  141. 11:11any power that acts against Vietnam's independence and territorial integrity. The
  142. 11:16most important, and often overlooked, aspect of this classification is its
  143. 11:21acceptance of reciprocal transformation. A partner country can still have
  144. 11:25conflicting interests, and a tense relationship can still find
  145. 11:29common ground for cooperation. Simply put, Vietnam no longer views the world in
  146. 11:34black and white, but rather examines issues in detail. This explains why
  147. 11:39Vietnam can simultaneously engage in extensive economic cooperation with China while resolutely defending
  148. 11:43its maritime sovereignty against China without considering it a conflict
  149. 11:47. To realize this thinking, Vietnam has built a
  150. 11:51three-tiered system for ranking diplomatic relations: comprehensive partnership, strategic partnership
  151. 11:55, and the highest level, comprehensive strategic partnership. Imagine
  152. 11:59this system as a staircase. The higher you go, the greater the level of political trust and the depth of cooperation in
  153. 12:04security, economics, and technology. But no tier comes with a
  154. 12:08binding military alliance commitment. The highest tier was first established
  155. 12:12with China in 2008, then gradually expanded to include Russia, India, and South Korea
  156. 12:19. But most notably, a detail that even many
  157. 12:23close news followers have overlooked, is the explosive pace of expansion between
  158. 12:292023 and 2026. In just about three years, Vietnam established
  159. 12:36top-level relations with the US, Japan, Australia, France, Malaysia, New Zealand,
  160. 12:44Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, the UK, and most recently, the entire
  161. 12:50European Union in January 2026, bringing the total to 15 partners, according to
  162. 12:57domestic media reports, by early
  163. 13:012026. In other words, this is not a static policy announced
  164. 13:06once and then abandoned, but a deliberately accelerated strategy. This coincides
  165. 13:10with the most intense period of US-China competition. Alongside
  166. 13:15this system of partnerships, Vietnam also has another pillar that keeps the entire strategy from
  167. 13:19faltering: its defense policy, officially announced in the
  168. 13:232019 Defense White Paper, often abbreviated as the
  169. 13:2840 policy, one principle, four prohibitions, including: not participating in military alliances, not aligning
  170. 13:34with one country against another, not allowing foreign countries to establish military bases
  171. 13:38on Vietnamese territory, and not using force or threatening to use force
  172. 13:43in international relations. But the most noteworthy detail, and also the least known, is...
  173. 13:47The most noteworthy aspect lies in the first part, which leaves open the possibility of considering
  174. 13:52developing appropriate defense relations depending on the specific situation. In
  175. 13:57other words, this is the loophole that this policy leaves for itself: a
  176. 14:01firm commitment in principle, but still with enough room for flexibility
  177. 14:06if core interests are truly threatened. But this rapid and seemingly perfect
  178. 14:10expansion raises a question that many international scholars
  179. 14:15are closely following: Is a strategy that pleases almost everyone
  180. 14:19truly sustainable, or is it merely a delaying tactic, with a much more difficult choice
  181. 14:24awaiting ahead?
  182. 14:31International relations researchers view this success in two
  183. 14:36rather different ways, and both perspectives are worth considering. On one side, Dr. Le
  184. 14:41Hong Hiep, a senior research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (
  185. 14:46Isias Yusof Ishak Institute) in Singapore, calls this a successful model of a
  186. 14:53comprehensive risk prevention strategy. According to him, the key point is not Vietnam's
  187. 14:58skillful use of diplomatic language, but rather its simultaneous development of
  188. 15:03genuine self-reliance, diversification of security partners, expansion of
  189. 15:08trade agreements, and development of a domestic defense industry. In other words,
  190. 15:12from this perspective, bamboo diplomacy only holds true because behind
  191. 15:17it lies a genuinely growing economy and defense capability, not
  192. 15:23just a mere negotiation technique. On the other hand, analyst
  193. 15:26Jackson Lopez at the Louis Institute in Australia issues a
  194. 15:31much sharper warning. According to him, this strategy is betting on the assumption that
  195. 15:35trade and diplomatic concessions can offset
  196. 15:39core security threats, and that assumption may be wrong in an era where
  197. 15:44trade is increasingly weaponized by tariffs and sanctions. He uses the analogy
  198. 15:49of bamboo to argue this. The older a bamboo tree gets, the more brittle it becomes
  199. 15:55, its trunk weakening in the face of strong winds. To put it simply,
  200. 16:00this argument doesn't deny that strategic [music] has been successful in the past,
  201. 16:04but rather questions whether it remains effective when pressure to choose sides
  202. 16:09increases simultaneously from both sides, making the true cost of not choosing sides clearer
  203. 16:14. Let's look at a specific situation. In early
  204. 16:192022 at the UN General Assembly, countries were asked to vote on
  205. 16:24a series of resolutions related to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Vietnam
  206. 16:29abstained from voting on several resolutions and voted against suspending
  207. 16:33Russia's membership in the Human Rights Council. Professor Carl Teer at the
  208. 16:39Australian Defence College [music] of the University of New South Wales assessed this as a move
  209. 16:44that cost Vietnam international prestige, as many Western countries that had previously
  210. 16:48supported Vietnam's stance on the South China Sea now felt Vietnam was not on
  211. 16:52their side on an issue they considered a fundamental principle of international law
  212. 16:57. However, on the opposing side of this debate, Professor Teer himself noted
  213. 17:02that the choice did not stem from ideology but from a very pragmatic calculation
  214. 17:06. Traditional defense relations with Russia remained crucial in
  215. 17:11maintaining the combat readiness of the Vietnamese military, given
  216. 17:16the lack of a suitable alternative in the short term. In other words,
  217. 17:20Vietnam accepted sacrificing some prestige with the West to protect another
  218. 17:25security interest that it considered more urgent at the time. Looking at the broader picture... This
  219. 17:30is why many observers believe that judging bamboo diplomacy solely
  220. 17:36by its success or failure is insufficient. A more accurate question is perhaps:
  221. 17:42at each specific moment, what interests is Vietnam prioritizing and
  222. 17:48what price is it willing to pay to protect those interests?
  223. 17:54[music]
  224. 17:56Vietnam is not the only country in the region striving to maintain a
  225. 18:00balanced distance from superpowers, but the ways other countries do this
  226. 18:03vary greatly, and that difference helps to clarify why Vietnam's model is
  227. 18:08unique. Indonesia pursues a principle known as independence and proactiveness
  228. 18:13dating back to President Sukano's time. The similarity is that both countries reject
  229. 18:18rigid military alliances. But the core difference lies in their geographical location.
  230. 18:22Indonesia is an archipelago nation, not sharing a land border
  231. 18:27with China, so the pressure for survival and security is not as severe as in Vietnam.
  232. 18:31Vietnam shares a land border with China and has
  233. 18:36direct territorial disputes at sea. In other words, Indonesia has more room to experiment
  234. 18:41, while Vietnam has almost no room for error. Singapore, on the other hand, has chosen a
  235. 18:46different path, which academics call risk mitigation through institutions.
  236. 18:51This island nation maximizes economic benefits from the Chinese market while simultaneously
  237. 18:55allowing the US military access and rotational deployment at some bases
  238. 19:00under a memorandum signed in 1990. This is the biggest difference compared
  239. 19:06to Vietnam, where the "four no's" policy completely excludes the possibility of foreign
  240. 19:10military bases. Malaysia has chosen a quieter approach, often
  241. 19:15downplaying the severity of clashes with Chinese coast guard vessels at
  242. 19:19sea to maintain smooth economic relations, much more discreetly than Vietnam
  243. 19:24, which is generally more open and assertive in asserting its sovereignty both on
  244. 19:28the ground and on the international legal front. But the picture would be incomplete
  245. 19:33if we only looked at the successful countries. Thailand also has a
  246. 19:37long tradition of diplomacy, likened to a bamboo bending with the wind. But this is an
  247. 19:42important difference to clarify. Thailand maintains flexibility by leaning
  248. 19:46toward the prevailing power at any given time, rather than
  249. 19:50maintaining a uniform distance from all sides like Vietnam. After the
  250. 19:552014 military coup, facing Western sanctions, Thailand
  251. 20:01quickly shifted to strengthening economic and defense cooperation with Beijing
  252. 20:04. This shows that superficial neutrality can be very easily broken when
  253. 20:09internal political interests are directly threatened.
  254. 20:12Two other cases further illustrate the cost of
  255. 20:16Sri Lanka's failed balancing strategy due to its weak financial structure and difficult-to-control loans
  256. 20:21. Ultimately, ceding control of the strategic port of Hanto to
  257. 20:26China for decades resulted in the loss of a significant portion of national autonomy.
  258. 20:31Myanmar, after a military coup that left it almost completely isolated by the US and Europe,
  259. 20:37was forced to rely on the veto power of Russia and China
  260. 20:41in the UN Security Council, and its arms supply from these two countries
  261. 20:46no longer provided much room for independence. So what has helped Vietnam,
  262. 20:50at least until now, avoid the fate of Sri Lanka or Myanmar?
  263. 20:55According to the general analysis of many researchers, the key difference lies in
  264. 20:59the fact that Vietnam has proactively interwoven genuine economic interests with the West through
  265. 21:04a series of free trade agreements, rather than relying solely on
  266. 21:07conditional loans or aid. A regional survey published in
  267. 21:132026 by the Isaac Institute for Music showed that, on average across
  268. 21:20Southeast Asia, 50% of respondents said they would lean
  269. 21:26towards China if forced to choose sides, compared to 48% who would choose the US. This figure is
  270. 21:32for the entire region. It is important to clarify this because it is easy to misunderstand the situation specifically with
  271. 21:38Vietnam. A previous survey by the same institute published in 2024 showed
  272. 21:45a different picture: 79% of Vietnamese respondents leaned towards the US,
  273. 21:51while only 21% chose China, a
  274. 21:55much larger disparity than the regional average. This once again shows that Vietnamese [music]
  275. 22:00is operating in its own balanced way, not entirely conforming to the
  276. 22:04general trend of the bloc.
  277. 22:11Let's go back to the image at the beginning of the program. Two private jets on the
  278. 22:15same runway, less than three months apart, each carrying one of the two
  279. 22:19most powerful leaders in the world right now. Hopefully, you saw
  280. 22:24that image in a different light. It wasn't the luck of a small nation sandwiched
  281. 22:28between two giants, but the result of a learning process spanning nearly
  282. 22:32half a century. It began with the very high price paid for choosing to take
  283. 22:37sides. But can a flexible branch continue to thrive in an
  284. 22:41increasingly polarized world? That remains a question that even the most knowledgeable scholars
  285. 22:45on Vietnam dare not answer definitively. Perhaps the answer...
  286. 22:49It won't come from Hanoi, but from how much patience Washington and Beijing have left
  287. 22:55with a bamboo pole that refuses to lean completely in either direction. See
  288. 22:59you again in the next broadcast of Asia Chronicle.
  289. 23:05[music]

About this transcript

This page contains the full transcript of Chiến lược cân bằng quyền lực của Việt Nam trước Mỹ và Trung Quốc by Á Lục Ký, generated from the public captions YouTube serves with the video. The transcript has 3,404 words across 289 segments, with the original timestamps preserved so you can click any line to jump to that moment in the embedded player.

What you can do with it

Use the transcript to take notes, quote the speaker, build a study guide, generate a summary with ChatGPT or Claude via the YouTube Summary tool, or export it as a timed subtitle file with YouTube to SRT. You can also re-open it in the transcriber to choose a caption track available on the video.

Free YouTube transcript tool

YouTube2Text is a free YouTube transcript generator — no signup, no daily limit. Paste any YouTube link and get the full transcript instantly, with timestamps, click-to-jump, caption language selection, AI prompts for ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini, and exports to TXT, SRT, VTT, or Markdown.