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At war with Donald Rumsfeld — Transcript

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0:00welcome to uncommon knowledge I'm Peter
0:01Robinson born in 1932 in a Chicago
0:04suburb Donald Henry Rumsfeld has served
0:07as a pilot in the United States Navy as
0:09a member of Congress from Illinois as
0:11ambassador to Nato under President Nixon
0:14as white house chief of staff and then
0:16Secretary of Defense the youngest
0:18Secretary of Defense in history under
0:20President Ford as chief executive
0:22officer and chairman of the
0:23pharmaceutical Corporation GD surland
0:25company and as Secretary of Defense once
0:28again and this time as the old oldest
0:30Secretary of Defense in history under
0:32President George W bush now chairman of
0:34the Rumsfeld Foundation Mr Rumsfeld is
0:37author of the new book known and unknown
0:40which as we sit here taping today is
0:43number one on the New York Times
0:45bestseller list would that be the first
0:47good item you've ever received in the
0:49New York Times don't you know it's
0:50driving them
0:52crazy the proceeds from this book go to
0:55whom they go to the Troops and their
0:57families and to the children and uh to
1:00the wounded and to the children of the
1:03Fallen you have a book here of some 800
1:06Pages It quotes extensively from
1:09memoranda and other documents if I
1:12reading a paragraph say hm I wonder what
1:15the wider context was what do I do you
1:17can go to a website we've digitized a
1:20major fraction of my archive and uh it's
1:23Rumsfeld dcom and you can go and go from
1:27the quote to the end note right to the
1:30document and read the entire document
1:32that's in there these are documents that
1:35for many cases I wrote other people
1:36wrote and and what they do is they tell
1:39the story they they explain what how
1:41decisions are made what was going on
1:43what was the back and forth uh and I
1:46think they a person seriously interested
1:49in government and history will be able
1:51to go in there and actually Come Away
1:53with a sense of of the complexity of the
1:56issues and the decisions this
1:58is the title of the book is known and
2:01unknown and this of course comes from
2:02your remarks which instantly became
2:04famous at one of your press conferences
2:06well you go ahead and explain what you
2:07said well I basically said the truth
2:10that there are there are known knowns
2:11the things we know we know there are
2:13known unknowns the things we know we
2:16don't know but there are also unknown
2:18unknowns the things we don't know we
2:20don't know right and they're The
2:21Dangerous Ones they're the ones that can
2:23get you and what one of the aspects of
2:25the book I found striking is that so
2:27much of
2:28it the terrorist attack of 911 is
2:31unprecedented the notion on November
2:3410th that terrorists might fly airliners
2:37into buildings was an unknown unknown it
2:40simply wasn't in anyone's Consciousness
2:42it wasn't a thought much of the book is
2:45is groping toward what can we know what
2:47should we be worrying about and watching
2:49large organizations cope with that known
2:52and unknown let me quote you Mr
2:55secretary I remember observing to those
2:57with me early that afternoon you're in
2:59the Pentagon
3:00an airplane has struck on 911 I remember
3:03observing to those with me early that
3:04afternoon that America's prior history
3:07in responding to terrorism had not been
3:10effective and you and you you put down
3:13here a litany letting Libya's muamar
3:15Gaddafi offer his role in the 1988
3:17bombing of PanAm flight 103 the First
3:20World Trade Center attack in 1993 the
3:22plotted assassination of George HW Bush
3:24by Iraqi agents the same year America's
3:26Retreat Under Fire Mogadishu in 93 the
3:29cobart tower bombing in Saudi Arabia in
3:3096 the East Africa attacks on the east
3:33African embassies in 98 the 2000 attack
3:35on the USS Cole you name there are
3:38terrorist attacks that took place from
3:39every during every Administration from
3:41Ronald Reagan to Bill Clinton it's not a
3:42partisan comment it's a comment about
3:45the United States and its and it's what
3:47its level of consci why was the record
3:49so appalling until that moment on
3:52911 well it didn't happen all at once in
3:56most of it was outside the United States
3:59and in no
4:00was anything like 3,000 people killed
4:02innocent men women and
4:04children um it it it's the old story
4:08about frogs in a in a water and and uh
4:13if you turn the heat up just a little
4:14bit at a time they end up dying but they
4:18never jump out right whereas if they
4:20jump in something hot they'll jump out
4:22and uh this happened over a sustained
4:25period of time uh we got adjusted to the
4:29changes in temperature if you will and
4:31and uh it was to our uh great Misfortune
4:36that that we we had a failure of
4:38imagination we didn't anticipate that
4:40what we might have anticipated
4:42Afghanistan we attacked on October 7th
4:45this is just weeks after 911 and by
4:47December
4:4816th you're able to make the first of
4:50your many visits to Afghanistan to a
4:52liberated Afghanistan as you
4:55say from Grant from at least Grant on
4:59the military forces of the United States
5:01have depended on mass and
5:04material and in Afghanistan you and
5:08those working with you planned and
5:10executed the projection of power halfway
5:13across the globe overturned a sitting
5:15govern we'll talk in a moment as we must
5:17about things that went wrong but it's
5:19worth noting that this was an
5:21astonishing operation how did you how
5:23did the Pentagon pull that off when it
5:25ran against so much of the grain of of
5:28American Military
5:30ition I think a lot of credit goes to
5:33General Franks uh to Dell Dy General
5:37Daly who was head of the Special Forces
5:39people to George Tennant uh because of
5:42this very close relationship that was
5:45developed between our special forces our
5:47combatant commander and the Central
5:49Intelligence Agency and U because we had
5:53the advantage of some militias on the
5:55ground the Northern Alliance uh forces
5:58that had been fighting the Taliban for
5:59years and been notably unsuccessful MH
6:02and uh the combination of all of that
6:06creatively leveraged everything that
6:08needed to be leveraged for success and
6:11um I I don't think there ever was a time
6:14when a major military operation used
6:17Special Forces as the spear point where
6:19where they were what was used to
6:22accomplish it and it was thanks to the
6:24Northern Alliance and and and they they
6:26did a lot to win but it was the
6:28combination of our Air Force our Naval
6:30power and the ability to put people on
6:33the ground Special Operations people who
6:35could use laser pointers on the talibon
6:37on the al-Qaeda and bring in air power
6:40uh to uh to move them out and then the
6:42militias to occupy the ground and how
6:44did the speed the agility The lethality
6:47of that attack in Afghanistan
6:49conditioned thinking about Iraq oh I
6:51don't know that it did you didn't no
6:53notably different situation we didn't
6:55have the uh indigenous forces like the
6:57Northern Alliance or the paston tribe on
6:59the south the militias on the south that
7:01helped um Saddam Hussein had a
7:04formidable sized Army uh which was not
7:07the case with the Taliban they had an
7:09army but it was not anything like Saddam
7:12Hussein's quite different circumstance I
7:15mean it was much more conventional the
7:17uh Iraq effort Baghdad Falls three weeks
7:20after the invasion couple of days later
7:23looting
7:24begins uh things looting didn't begin a
7:27couple of days later as soon as any
7:29portion of the country was Was Defeated
7:32looting began began changting in Baghdad
7:35excuse me from one regime to another
7:38regime and there's a period of disorder
7:41if you go to World War II and look at
7:42what happened in Germany it was it was
7:45savry the the eluding and and disorder
7:47that took place so can you as a
7:50Layman what's the what's a kind of
7:52concise summary of what went wrong from
7:56the B fall of Baghdad until the surge in
7:582007
8:00can can you summarize what what would a
8:02student say a college student well if if
8:04you read the book a student would read
8:06the book and and you would see on the
8:08book and on the website all kinds of
8:10discussion of just that to start with
8:13Saddam Hussein released something like a
8:15100,000 people from his
8:17prisons second the sunnis that were
8:20going to lose control of the country to
8:21the Shia uh in terms of majority right
8:24um immediately began trying to form a
8:27party of return to take back
8:30government uh Saddam Hussein called for
8:32Jihad and and brought in a bunch of
8:35jihadists from s through Syria through
8:38Iran through North Africa and other
8:40countries neighboring countries and the
8:43sunnis uh were concerned about the way
8:46things were going and and Al-Qaeda got
8:49in there and began its process of
8:51working with the sunnis and at least for
8:53a period until the Awakening in 2006 um
8:57early 2006 that began
9:00um the the Insurgency grew which had not
9:03been fully predicted by the intelligence
9:05Community uh let me quote you again
9:06known and unknown quote while the
9:09attraction of foreign jihadists to the
9:11conflict in Iraq was possible the fact
9:14is that our intelligence agencies failed
9:16to warn of the possibility we would
9:19discover more gaps in intelligence it
9:21turned out the Iraqi infrastructure was
9:23not in serviceable condition it turned
9:26out that the Iraqi Army did not remain
9:28in whole unit capable of being used for
9:30reconstruction it turned out that the
9:32Iraqi police was not a trustworthy
9:35professional force close
9:37quote
9:39wmds this
9:42litany here's where are these kinds of
9:46intelligence failures to be expected
9:47because intelligence is a very hard
9:49uncertain business or was this a failure
9:52that that uh within your wide range of
9:56experience in the federal government lay
9:57outside the norm how do you how how do
9:59you assess this well I've been around uh
10:02this business of National Security
10:04things for quite a while and uh and I I
10:07do discuss it in the book first of all
10:08it's a very tough job intelligence
10:11gathering uh second you're dealing with
10:13closed
10:14societies um and and third things
10:19change and some are not knowable you
10:22just don't know them now um we probably
10:26could have had a better read on the
10:28infrastructure than we did I mean that's
10:30something that Saddam Hussein had been
10:33denying the infrastructure and it was
10:35much more fragile they electric grid and
10:37things like that maybe that might have
10:40been knowable um how the Insurgency
10:43would evolve I don't think was knowable
10:45and George kenet Tennant talks about
10:46this in his book uh and and said if they
10:49thought that was a big problem they
10:50would have put it in the executive
10:51summary and they didn't and right now
10:54but I've seen intelligence shortfalls
10:56like that throughout my career over you
10:58know decades um why because it's tough
11:02it's tough work it it isn't you can't
11:04expect that you're going to have perfect
11:06information and and uh which is I
11:09suppose why Eisenhower said the plan is
11:11nothing planning is everything and uh if
11:14you know that you have to plan and it
11:16can be very valuable planning but when
11:18you make first contact with the Enemy
11:20the plan goes out and you begin to adapt
11:22and and adjust to the the things that
11:24the enemy has a brain and he starts
11:26doing things differently so you
11:30everyone said you didn't feel let down
11:31by the CIA no I didn't at all uh uh I
11:35mean it's a tough business so but later
11:37comes it's easy to blame and criticize
11:40and all that everyone's got 20 2020
11:42hindsight no I think they have a darn
11:44tough job and generally they do a pretty
11:46good job okay now however later on we've
11:49got again I'll quote you known and
11:52unknown after a few in the CIA alleged
11:55that some policy officials had
11:56politicized intelligence in 20 2004 I
12:00have to say I found this one of the most
12:02staggering assertions in the book in
12:042004 I Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld I
12:06asked not to receive my daily oral
12:08briefings from the
12:10CIA the Central Intelligence Agency had
12:13become so unreliable as a political
12:16matter that the secretary of defense of
12:19the United States said keep them away
12:20from me there this was being reflected
12:23in the Press Daniel Dresner in the New
12:24York New Republic 2003 quote the CIA is
12:27an open revolt against the White House
12:30first first of all first of all in
12:32answer to your suggestion
12:34there Studies have been made and there
12:37is absolutely no truth to the and I
12:40think it was the 911 Commission that
12:42looked at this uh Larry silberman's
12:43commission well the Rob sber commission
12:46whatever yeah and there's no truth to
12:48the idea that that um um the
12:52administration the Bush Administration
12:53tried to politicize the intelligence I
12:56don't think there's anyone who will say
12:58that
13:00anything about it right and the CIA was
13:02accusing the administration they no when
13:05you say the CIA some person in the CIA
13:09was saying things like that but I mean
13:11you could find some person in the state
13:12department or the defense department or
13:13in the CIA or anywhere in the Congress
13:15it will say almost anything and they
13:17tend not to be the people at the top
13:19levels uh but but the short answer is
13:22that the independent commission found
13:24that was not the case now just to
13:26correct the record I had a terrific CIA
13:30briefer and uh it went on fine and then
13:34they changed that person to another
13:36person and I had nothing against that
13:39person but I started reading in the
13:40paper that PE somebody in the CIA was
13:44leaking to the press the either the
13:46questions that were being asked by Bush
13:48Administration officials not me as it
13:50turned out but others uh the questions
13:52they were asking or the questions they
13:54were not asking and I said to myself gee
13:58I'm not sure that's a good idea for for
14:01them to be doing that therefore I think
14:02what I'll do is I'll read the CIA
14:05materials every day and not have a
14:07briefer if if they're going to go back
14:09and Report who's asking what and then
14:11they're going to leak it to the Press I
14:12don't want anything to do with it I
14:14think maybe I'll just get read the
14:16materials and have someone on my staff
14:19ask the questions that I if I there are
14:20questions I think they ought to ask okay
14:23weapons of mass destruction you the
14:26notion that the Bush Administration
14:27politicized intelligence
14:30nonsense no evidence absolutely false no
14:33one has a shred of evidence to suggest
14:35that that's the case Larry Silverman has
14:36has said in fact I interviewed Larry
14:38Silberman judge Silberman who was a
14:40Silberman of the Silberman Rob
14:41commission and he said that is a slander
14:43all right Carl Ro in his Memoir says
14:47that perhaps his bitterest regret is
14:50failing to go on the offensive against
14:53the charge that they had politicized the
14:57intelligence this whole notion Bush lied
14:59people died that he lied us into the war
15:02and Carl Ro says that over in the white
15:05house they made the decision they
15:07weren't going to go into it it would
15:09look defensive and Carl Ro is exactly
15:11right well that's the question was this
15:13a terrible mistake it was it was it was
15:15a mistake on everyone's part and it's a
15:17shame so the president of the United
15:19stat in retrospect the president of the
15:21United States needed needed to carry the
15:24American people with him M through those
15:26charges all right no unknown we've
15:29already talked about the way CIA some
15:30that CIA were leaking quote news stories
15:35known and unknown repeated the widely
15:37believed Canard that the state
15:39department had been cut out of postwar
15:40planning the stories bore the
15:42unmistakable Fingerprints of Powell's
15:45top Aids close quote mhm you've got CIA
15:49leaking to such an extent that you're
15:52protecting yourself against being
15:54implicated in these leaks you've got the
15:57Secretary of State's top AIDS leaking
16:00I can't know where they it looked like
16:02it was it sure looked like it to you
16:04yeah
16:06well this looks like a and I told my
16:09people we will not leak it's not
16:10professional it's not fair to the
16:12president it's not fair to the administ
16:13how does that work how does it work do
16:16you as Secretary of St of of Defense get
16:18on the of course there are deep
16:19historical and institutional reasons why
16:21defense and state are at odds and have
16:23been under various different secretaries
16:24go cap Weinberger GE it goes way back
16:26right but do you get on the phone and
16:28say
16:30colon what the heck is going on you did
16:32I did it in
16:33person mhm all right without
16:36satisfaction I kept on all right um and
16:40I don't suggest that col po was doing it
16:43no no but but you his top eight all
16:46right just the
16:48feeling this is no surprise to you the
16:51war is not going as expected the
16:54president is defensive before this
16:57notion that he lied people died and the
16:59administration itself appears to be in
17:02in disarray
17:04people uh I'm trying to grasp here just
17:08I'm thinking again of this I'm thinking
17:09of the Princeton senior as you were in
17:121954 when Adalie Stevenson gave that
17:14speech that so inspired you what is the
17:16lesson here what is the lesson here I
17:18think there are a lot of lessons here I
17:20think I think that for one thing it's
17:22it's about time that we recognize that
17:24the institutions we're dealing with uh
17:27were fashioned in the 19 1940s the late
17:301940s in the Truman Administration m i
17:32mean that's where National Security
17:34Council is Cia National Security Council
17:36the old usia all of those mechanisms
17:40were designed at at the inflection point
17:43between the end of World War II in the
17:45beginning of the Cold War we're now in
17:47the information age we're now in the
17:4821st century they've served us
17:50reasonably well for 50 years it's time
17:53it seems to me to have another Hoover
17:55Commission like existed and and get
17:57bipartisan group of people to sit down
17:58look at these things same thing with the
18:00international institutions the United
18:01Nations NATO the World Bank the IMF all
18:04of those were fashioned in the same
18:06period after World War II um two more
18:10personalities here that you write about
18:12one Paul Brer who was head of the
18:14Coalition provisional Authority and you
18:17take after him for moving slowly
18:19particularly with regard to giving
18:21authority to Iraqis themselves you I'm
18:23quoting known and unknown most troubling
18:25was that Bremer proved reluctant to seed
18:27any significant authority to the Rocky's
18:29close
18:30quote Fred Barnes of the Weekly Standard
18:32who likes you and enjoys this book and
18:35wrote a wonderful review of the book
18:36included though his feeling that I don't
18:39know I'm quoting Fred Barnes Bremer
18:41created the Iraqi governing Council to
18:44advise him in May 2004 a year after
18:47brema arrived the igc names ayad alawi
18:49prime minister in 2005 this is less than
18:52two years after he rise there's a
18:53full-fledged Iraqi Parliament quote Fred
18:55Barnes that strikes me as a reasonably
18:57fast transition close quote
18:59mhm well I'm first of all let's say this
19:02about Jerry Bremer now he's an able
19:04person he was willing to take on that
19:06tough job and a lot of good things
19:08happened under his tenure at CPA at the
19:11Coalition provisional Authority there is
19:13no question but that we differed as to
19:15the PACE at which things would happen
19:17and if you look in my book I discuss the
19:19fact that most of the things I say about
19:21Bremer's Pace came out of Bremer's
19:25book I use his own words he was very
19:27reluctant to give it Authority he didn't
19:29think they could manage Authority very
19:31well he said that in his book uh my
19:34attitude was and I know the state
19:36department didn't agreed with Bremer
19:38they wanted to go at a slower Pace uh
19:41they connected for some reason the idea
19:44of a legitimacy of the government with a
19:47slower Pace my attitude was that you
19:49gain legitimacy by how well you perform
19:52and if you don't perform well you get
19:54changed and uh so so I I try to discuss
19:58it in a a analytical way and and there
20:01were differences I also think there was
20:03a let the in in this person in my
20:05reading you're extremely
20:08respectful I want for pretty nearly
20:10everybody except Nelson Rockefeller and
20:11there you little you didn't get along
20:14well with Nelson Rockefeller that's a
20:15separate program in other words you're
20:17not out there slanging people goodness
20:19no this is a book that I intend for
20:22people to to better understand
20:24government and and and the history of
20:26what actually took place which is why
20:28there are hundreds of documents on the
20:30website that support what's in this book
20:32one more one more person National
20:34Security adviser condalisa rice quoting
20:37you known and unknown rice seemed to
20:39believe that it was a personal
20:40shortcoming on her part if she had to
20:43ask the president to resolve an inter
20:45agency difference close quote now I
20:49believe it's plausible on the evidence
20:51just of this conversation to say over
20:53there at the Pentagon we have a tough
20:56smart hardworking Secretary of Defense
20:59we have a capable person in Iraq in the
21:01person of Paul Bremer and Coen Powell is
21:04a seasoned veteran and a patriot and the
21:07three of these people disagree on very
21:09important matters why doesn't the
21:12National Security advisor say fellas
21:14we're going to Camp David or we're going
21:15to the situation room and we're going to
21:18have this discussion in front of the
21:19president of the United
21:21States um the
21:24the I don't know why it didn't happen um
21:28it would have been better in retrospect
21:30had it
21:31happened they're all honorable people uh
21:35it may very well be that what Ki rice
21:37was the way she was managing it was
21:39exactly what the president
21:41wanted I don't know I know she had a
21:43very close relationship with the
21:45president and that was one of her
21:46strengths that that he had a lot of
21:48confidence in her uh and and she dealt
21:51with him every day hours every day and
21:54uh we didn't we were out running
21:55departments and doing what we do colan
21:58and and totally different sets of
22:00responsibilities but but from where I
22:03was sitting my impression is that when I
22:06met with the president it seemed to me
22:07he was perfectly willing to make
22:08decisions if you served him up and there
22:10were different opinions he'd say well
22:12let's do this instead of that and that
22:13he was he was very comfortable making
22:15decisions okay but some things just
22:17didn't get served up to him that way
22:19well last last question I promise about
22:21the notion of the function of the
22:23administration how decisions got made
22:25and let me ask it in the guise of giving
22:27you two quotations from no and unknown I
22:30don't I hardly need to keep holding this
22:31up since you're already number one on
22:33the New York Times bestseller list but
22:34I'll do it I'll do
22:36it an August 2002 Memo from you to cond
22:40Lisa Rice that you excerpt in this book
22:42and that is undoubtedly in full on your
22:43website quote you to cond Lisa Rice it
22:46sometimes happens that a matter
22:48mentioned at an NSC meeting is said to
22:49have been decided because it elicited no
22:52objection that is not a good practice
22:54close quote also from known and
22:57unknown
22:59you in your own words while President
23:01Bush and I had many discussions about
23:03war preparations I do not recall his
23:05ever asking me if I thought going to war
23:07with Iraq was the right decision not one
23:09person in NC meetings at which I was
23:12present stated or hinted that they were
23:14opposed to the decision I took it that
23:17bush assumed as I did that each of us
23:19had reached the same conclusion so you
23:22really let Kandi have it because
23:24important decisions weren't discussed
23:26weren't it made explicitly and yet the
23:28president of the we're just assuming I
23:30didn't lety have it at all I said look
23:32when whoever's doing the minutes of
23:34these meetings it would be a mistake to
23:37assume something was agreed to unless it
23:40was raised as an issue and discussed and
23:42agreed to simply because something was
23:45mentioned and then not commented on
23:48ought not to be taken as a scent that is
23:50what the first thing means right the
23:52second thing is disconnected from that
23:54and it basically was people have
23:56suggested that that uh certain people in
23:59the NSE were for the war or against the
24:01War I never heard anyone in the NC
24:04Express an opinion for or against it and
24:06I don't remember the president asking
24:07Coen poell or coni rice or the vice
24:09president or me here's the question
24:12here's the question yeah Lord knows I'm
24:15not challenging you on the facts I'm
24:16trying to understand I'm trying I'm
24:17groping for lessons here would it have
24:19been better if the president had asked I
24:23guess what I'm saying is in these
24:25decisions where is the president of the
24:26United States why is he permitting this
24:28jostling to take for there wasn't
24:29jostling well between you and Co and
24:31Powell and Paul Bremer well there are
24:33always differences of opinion that's
24:35there's nothing wrong that was a
24:36perfectly acceptable happened as you
24:37said between Kissinger and Bill Rogers
24:39or Kissinger and slesinger and Schultz
24:42and binsky and Vance but there's nothing
24:45wrong with that having differences of
24:46opinion you'd expect that in in a
24:49National Security Council the thing
24:51though is to have those discussions and
24:53have them presented in a way that's
24:54orderly and then have them decided to
24:56the extent they drift they tend to be
24:59fought out in the Press by people two
25:01and three and four layers down and to
25:04the extent something can be uh
25:06crystallized and and brought to the
25:08president and decided then people salute
25:10and say fine from the from the westwing
25:12back to the Pentagon
25:15um 24 years or yeah 24 years and some
25:18months after your first Tour of Duty at
25:19the Pentagon you return and this is pre
25:22911 I'm stepping us back to before
25:27911 you take it as your mission to
25:30produce defense transformation this is
25:32the term of Art and you quote I didn't
25:34take it as my mission the president gave
25:36a speech in the campaign at the Citadel
25:39he said precisely what he wanted when he
25:41asked me to come into the Pentagon he
25:42said that's what I want you to do you
25:45accepted the commission from the
25:46president exactly now you're talking and
25:48we've got uh we've got I'm quoting from
25:51the speech the president speech our
25:53heavy forces must be lighter our light
25:54forces must be more lethal all must be
25:57easier to deploy
25:59how this starts before 911 but you in
26:02office for some six years how much
26:04progress were you able to make oh
26:06enormous enormous describe that I would
26:08be happy
26:10to just if if there nothing else
26:13happened movement from The Division army
26:16structure to the combat Brigade The
26:19Brigade combat teams is enormous and it
26:22enables our country to do things we
26:24couldn't even begin to do Under The
26:26Division make me as a Layman understand
26:27why able to to move around and and
26:30almost interchange as as
26:33replaceable uh elements that are fully
26:36capable that are much smaller rather
26:39than you if you wanted a um something
26:41anything smaller than a division you had
26:43to take it out of a division and then
26:45take the logistics and all the sport
26:47capability with it which leaves the rest
26:49of it useless right so it it is enormous
26:52what Pete scho General scho maker did
26:55second
26:56uh the
26:59growing use of and capability of uavs
27:03unmanned aerial vehicles are not an
27:06accident we put beef behind that and we
27:09increase the number and capabilities of
27:12those weapon systems enormously and
27:15today as a result we have a capability
27:17that that we didn't even begin to have
27:19we'd gone through eight or 10 years
27:21where the defense department had been
27:22drawn down in the intelligence Community
27:25I should also add that I mean we
27:27criticize the intelligence Comm
27:28they' had their budgets reduced and and
27:30that called the bathtub the end of the
27:32Cold War oh we can relax it's the end of
27:35History let's draw down and and then
27:37comes 911 and what do we have to deal
27:39with we have to deal with what we were
27:40left with what had happened in the
27:42preceding decade during the draw down
27:45now Third special forces when I came in
27:49we immediately began strengthening our
27:51special forces increasing the numbers
27:54adjusting the assignments they have and
27:56taking some of their lower tier
27:58assignments and assigning them to the
27:59regular forces conventional forces we
28:02increase their uh equipment and and
28:05enormously we increase their authorities
28:08enormously and and here we are in a
28:10world the 21st century and you did that
28:12fast because by Afghanistan which
28:14happens right away it's months after you
28:17take office by Afghanistan you've got
28:18units on the ground that have obviously
28:21had an enormous amount of of of of room
28:24for making their own decisions their own
28:25maneuver calling and air strikes and so
28:27forth but but the today the special
28:29forces of the United States of America
28:31are enormously capable and and represent
28:34an a
28:35a significant asset for our country The
28:39Surge last big topic for which we'll
28:42have time
28:45alas what does it say about the Pentagon
28:47again what's the lesson here that the
28:50surge is developed pretty
28:53largely Frederick Kagan who's at the
28:55American Enterprise Institute Jack Kane
28:57who then as a
28:59retired uh Army Chief of Staff retire
29:03excuse me Vice Chief of Staff he's
29:05retired from the Pentagon what does it
29:07say that the surge with the which the
29:09president of the United States announces
29:10in January 2007 has to come from outside
29:14the Pentagon well
29:17um we surged if you will increased by
29:20some 5 10 15,000 troops several times
29:23earlier the question is why did what the
29:26president did and God bless him for
29:28doing it uh have the effect it had and I
29:31think there are several answers to that
29:32question mhm I was a latecomer to The
29:35Surge uh skeptical or well I was working
29:39with the military people and we talked
29:42and there was no one who was
29:43recommending that in in in coming up the
29:46chain of command in the second half of
29:512006 I was const you go to the website
29:54you'll see memo after memo where I say
29:56to people do we need more troops do we
29:58we need fewer troops do we should the
29:59troops be doing something differently
30:01asking these questions over and over
30:03again now no one was recommending that
30:06we surge coming up in the military
30:09chain the Hadley and crouch in the white
30:13house uh Steve Hadley was National SEC
30:16National Security adviser and Crouch was
30:17the deputy began this process and and I
30:22will tell you why it worked I I have
30:24thought about it a great deal and I and
30:26I must say I have enormous respect for
30:28President Bush deciding to do what he
30:29did but the reason it surging didn't
30:33help earlier and did help in the last
30:36half of 2006 and early 2007 is this
30:40essentially first of all it's not just
30:42the number of troops it's what they're
30:43doing what is their role on the ground
30:46and I think that the military commander
30:49uh Petraeus fashioned a role that made
30:52sense for that moment second solder for
30:55some reason went quiet
30:58don't we don't know why no stopped
31:00making Mischief third malak's government
31:03was maturing and he demonstrated it by
31:05going into the South and actually going
31:07after some of the dissidents which was a
31:10a good sign fourth Petraeus had been in
31:13charge of organizing and training and
31:15equipping the Iraqi security forces and
31:17we'd gotten up to over 300,000 I think
31:20is the number by the time of you got to
31:23late 2006 they were then for the first
31:26time really in a position
31:28to cooperate with our military and help
31:30out
31:31MH then there is something that's
31:36um not metaphysical but uh
31:40psychological the center of gravity by
31:42then had migrated almost away from
31:45Iraq towards the United
31:48States the Harry Reid the Senate
31:50Majority Leader said we've lost the war
31:52right oh I see the C and the Congress
31:55was about ready to cut the funds off
31:57right so you
32:00had before I go to that go back one
32:03other thing I should didn't mention was
32:04there was an awaking among the sunnis
32:06they got tired of the al-Qaeda the
32:08al-Qaeda were raping their families they
32:10were they were taking their businesses
32:12and the the sunnis started saying well
32:14we can have a role in the new Iraq and
32:17we're tired of al-Qaeda we don't want
32:19them so that added to all of these other
32:21things that came together to make the
32:23surge work now what else happened when
32:26the president boldly did what he did
32:28and uh Jack announces the surge in in
32:31January Jack Keane did have a role in it
32:33um there's no question about that and
32:36but what what happened was it galvanized
32:38opinion in the United States here was a
32:40president who wasn't looking for a way
32:41out he was looking for a way to win and
32:44that told the people in the country like
32:46magnetic particles oh gosh there's a
32:49leader there right and and and that made
32:51the ones who were like Biden wanted to
32:53divide the uh country of Iraq up into
32:56three parts and and and what's his name
32:59Reed said we've lost it also galvanized
33:03opinion in Iraq if you think about it
33:06remember magnetic particles and you use
33:07a magnet right all of a sudden things
33:09started pointing so if you if you if
33:11people don't know what's going to happen
33:14in Iraq should they be supporting the
33:16the government of Iraq well well if if
33:19if if they're not going to win if if the
33:22United States is going to pull out why
33:24should they and then the President Bush
33:26comes out and says bye golly we're going
33:28to put more troops in and we're going to
33:29win this thing and all the magnetic
33:31particles started pointing towards the
33:33Malak government let me this it had a
33:35very positive psychological effect this
33:37is this strikes me as a very important
33:39question I'm not sure I can formulate it
33:41very tightly or well but the question is
33:45so the surge in your view was not a
33:47matter of finally getting it right oh no
33:51all kinds of so the count let me just
33:52put it to you in a counterfactual last
33:54last last point on the surge if David
33:57Petrus had been commander on the ground
33:58from the
34:00get-go what would have been
34:02different well we might not have had the
34:04Iraqi Security Forces trained and equip
34:06as well as they were because that's what
34:08he was first he was a division leader
34:10and he did a very good job then he
34:11trained and equipped now I don't know
34:13the answer to that question that's a
34:15road we didn't go down but but the idea
34:17that that uh you know if you if if you
34:20have a hammer everything's a nail so
34:22there's certain people say oh more
34:23troops that's the answer it wasn't the
34:25answer there were lots of things that
34:27came together together uh to to make
34:29that work and I think it is a a i
34:32discuss it in the book at some length I
34:34think that the documentation I've
34:35supplied on the website supports that
34:38and I think it was a a brilliant act by
34:40President George W bush and he deserves
34:42a lot of credit for it all right last
34:44question we're running out of time darn
34:46it
34:48um again in the nature of a lesson New
34:52York Times Friday this past Friday as we
34:55sit here speaking has a story on the
34:57speech that Secretary of Defense your
34:59immediate successor Robert Gates gave at
35:01West Point and I have not had a chance
35:03to read it carefully
35:06um fact well okay okay no no I don't
35:08doubt it let me just let's let's see if
35:11if you don't want to touch this question
35:13then we'll set it aside but let me ask
35:14the question it's just a quotation from
35:16The New York Times quote defense
35:18secretary Robert M Gates bluntly told an
35:20audience of West Point Cadets on Friday
35:22that it would be unwise for the United
35:24States to fight another War like Iraq or
35:26Afghanistan now it quotes secretary
35:28gates in my opinion any future defense
35:31secretary who advises the president to
35:33again send a big American land Army into
35:35Asia or the Middle East or Africa should
35:37have his head examined close quote yeah
35:40how do you that any secretary that did
35:43advise him to do
35:44that fair enough for an opener um second
35:48I think secretary Gates is doing
35:50generally a good job third uh I I don't
35:54know what the article said or what first
35:56of all you haven't read the
35:58newspaper doesn't make it so the the
36:02reality is that I don't believe we have
36:05the ability in our country and I wrote a
36:07thing called guidelines for using
36:08military force in March of 01 and it's
36:12on the website and in it I say there are
36:14certain things we are not capable of
36:16doing and we have to have a a reasonable
36:20assessment of what we can do and what we
36:22can't do militarily and I don't believe
36:25we can Nation build I I just don't think
36:27we can do it we don't the cultures are
36:29different around the world uh the
36:31histories are different the
36:32circumstances are different and uh you
36:35don't want to create
36:37dependencies uh on on the part of other
36:39people um we can encourage them we can
36:42wish them well we can give them a chance
36:44and I think Afghanistan and Iraqi people
36:46have a chance at having reasonably good
36:49Futures as they mo move towards
36:51representative systems of government and
36:53could even be a model in the region
36:55actually I said that but um I I don't
36:58know anyone who's suggesting putting
37:00large forces in those countries all
37:02right thinking they can they can Nation
37:05build for them because I don't believe
37:06we can let me flip the question this
37:07truly will be the last question it is a
37:09question about the United States and
37:11what we're capable of as a question of
37:14political will in our
37:16institutions Korean War 33,000 deaths
37:20and an ambiguous outcome the peninsula
37:22is divided to this day Vietnam 55,000
37:26American deaths and we
37:28lost Iraq fewer than 5,000 deaths every
37:33one of them to be regretted obviously
37:35but by historical standards that's a
37:37small number we projected our power
37:40halfway across the world and within a
37:42matter of single digit number of years
37:44there is a new government that has a
37:47chance that is now Democratic and has a
37:49chance of making a go at it as a
37:52democratic Nation I would argue that by
37:55historical standards there's a pretty
37:56good case to be made that that
37:58represents a stunning success and yet
38:02you go on and get interviewed about know
38:05and Unknown by Andrea Mitchell and John
38:07everybody is treating you like a some
38:11sort of villain how come where's the
38:14hostility why does the nation fail to
38:16appreciate what took
38:18place well I'm not a
38:21psychiatrist so I can't tell you what's
38:24in the minds of the people who interview
38:26me uh um I think if anyone goes into the
38:30website and looks at what actually took
38:33place what were the decisions what were
38:35the arguments what were the issues what
38:36were the pros and cons they'll learn uh
38:40that much of the narrative that's out
38:42there uh is quite different from what
38:45actually happened by the people who were
38:46there and and were involved in it and I
38:49think that's a useful thing I also think
38:51that you need time to pass over things
38:54to get perspective uh and and it uh
38:58we're
38:58fighting and have been the first Wars of
39:02the 21st
39:03century I mean it wasn't even television
39:05in World War II right what are we doing
39:08today we've got Facebook and Twitter and
39:1024-hour news and emails and Sony video
39:14camps everything happens like this and I
39:17don't think the uh the inner gyroscopes
39:21of people have adjusted to the glut of
39:24information the the a lie trips around
39:27the world three or four times while the
39:29truth is still getting his boots on as
39:31as Mark Twain said I think right and and
39:34what does that mean well it means that
39:35when somebody writes in Newsweek that
39:37that somebody flushed a Quran down the
39:39toilet even though it never
39:42happened riots occur in three cities and
39:45people are killed and Weeks Later
39:47Newsweek writes oh if there was any
39:49portion of our article that was
39:51inacurate we're sorry the problem is the
39:53people are already dead that they're
39:55sorry for now how do you deal with that
39:58well we'll figure out a way as a people
40:01we'll figure out a way uh but we haven't
40:04yet and we're still adjusting to it this
40:07this enormous flood of information and
40:09and glut that's that's honest at every
40:11moment a lot of it which is not true a
40:13lot of it just comes up and and it to
40:16get rebutted would would take full time
40:18to rebutt it we'll figure out a way
40:20secretary Donald Rumsfeld author of The
40:22New York Times number one besteller
40:25known and unknown thank thank you thank
40:28you for uncommon knowledge I'm Peter
40:30Robinson thanks for joining
40:34us

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