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Anwar Gargash: Caught in the Middle of the Iran War | Foreign Affairs Interview — Transcript

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0:00I'm Dan Curts Failen and this is the
0:02foreign affairs interview.
0:06>> We do need peace but I think also we
0:09need peace that will last. We don't need
0:12uh you know sort of a patchup job where
0:16suddenly within 3 months, 4 months, 5
0:19months we have another outbreak. I think
0:21we need something with more permanency
0:24and for that to happen you really have
0:26to have substantive discussions and you
0:29have to have them at different levels.
0:31>> From what we know, Iran's neighbors,
0:34even those long at odds with the Islamic
0:36Republic were opposed to the war that
0:38started last February. Yet, it is those
0:40Middle Eastern states that have paid
0:41some of the highest costs. As their
0:44governments grapple with the
0:45consequences of a war that is still far
0:47from settled, they are also struggling
0:48to understand and to shape a new Middle
0:51Eastern order. But there's little
0:53consensus about what that order should
0:54be or what it should mean for
0:56relationships with the United States and
0:58China, for future economic models, or
1:00for the Israeli Palestinian issue. Anoir
1:03Gargosh is one of the region's most
1:05experienced diplomats and foreign policy
1:06makers. He long served as the minister
1:09of state foreign affairs in the United
1:10Arab Emirates and is now diplomatic
1:12adviser to the UAE's president. Gargos
1:15joined me on Monday, September 21st to
1:17discuss the war in Iran and where it may
1:19end, his country's rift with Saudi
1:21Arabia and its approach to Israel, Gaza,
1:23Sudan, and more, and what a new better
1:25Middle Eastern order might look like.
1:38Anoir, thanks for doing this.
1:39>> Thank you. Thank you very much. Such a
1:41pleasure. I
1:42>> I want to start with um what may seem
1:44like a simple-mindedly straightforward
1:46question, but one that I think reflects
1:48just how hard it's become to understand
1:50the most basic dynamics of the war in
1:52Iran and the situation in in the Middle
1:54East right now. How do you characterize
1:56the current state of the conflict and
1:58who as we sit here today has the
2:00advantage, if we can say? Well, I think
2:01it's uh no war, no peace right now. It's
2:06uh better than war and uh definitely not
2:11good as as a permanent uh peace. I don't
2:14think anybody has the advantage right
2:17now. I mean uh each party is uh
2:21basically
2:23uh in what you would characterize as
2:25this new war, no peace situation. So
2:27there are areas of pressure and then
2:30there are areas where uh
2:34where basically each party sees that it
2:36has certain cards to play along uh the
2:40way but we definitely see a situation uh
2:44that can actually be protracted unless
2:47we have a breakthrough somewhere uh down
2:49the road.
2:50There's a view that you hear both with
2:52regard to the Trump administration and
2:53to the leadership of Thran that
2:55continuation of this no war no peace
2:57situation if we can call it that is the
3:00best option for both parties that uh
3:03this is sustainable.
3:04>> I I I disagree. I mean I disagree. I
3:07think uh it's it's not sustainable for
3:11both parties and it's not sustainable uh
3:14for the region. We do need peace but I
3:17think also we need peace that will last.
3:20We don't need uh you know sort of a
3:23patchup job where suddenly within 3
3:26months, 4 months, 5 months we have
3:28another outbreak. I think we need
3:30something with more permanency and for
3:33that to happen you really have to have
3:36substantive discussions and you have to
3:38have them at different levels. I mean
3:40the American Iranian level is one
3:44important level but I think also uh from
3:48our vantage point in the Gulf these
3:51discussions at the Gulf or individual
3:54Gulf countries or the Gulf as a group
3:56with Iran is extremely important and
3:59that actually leads also to uh let's say
4:03more uh understandings in several key uh
4:07issues around us you know I in issues
4:11that surround Lebanon, issues that
4:12surround Israel and Gaza. It's it's
4:15connected, but I see that the crux of
4:18the matter is more in the Gulf, more
4:21centered there and then the others are
4:23also important. So substantive
4:26discussion is extremely important and
4:28substantive discussion means it should
4:31really uh address many of let's say the
4:35transactional issues about funds and
4:38about ships and about straits and stuff
4:43like that but I think ultimately it
4:45should al also address issues that are
4:48about confidence building or the
4:50beginning let's say of confidence
4:51building non-belligerance
4:54uh ISS issues of how can we actually out
4:57of this the wreckage of the moment
4:59create something a little bit more
5:01permanent. I think that's extremely
5:02important.
5:03>> I want to pick up that question of what
5:05a permanent settlement or new regional
5:07order might look like, but just to
5:08linger on your interactions or your view
5:10of the the the new Iranian leadership.
5:13Very interested in your assessment of
5:14how this leadership differs from the
5:17leadership as you experienced before.
5:18The UAE has gone through cycles of
5:21engagement and and tension with with
5:23Iran over the last uh last many years.
5:26How is this leadership different and
5:27what as you assess their uh their theory
5:30of victory, their view of how they want
5:32to proceed from here? Uh what does that
5:34look like from from where you sit?
5:36>> Well, I think there is a a sense of uh
5:39of continuity, but then there is also a
5:41sense uh of discontinuity. Let me start
5:44with the discontinuity. I think for 37
5:47years in from 1989
5:50until the death of Ayatal Ali Ki you had
5:55a central figure an arbittor for a
5:59system and Ali Kami was uh you know the
6:03person who would decide who will be the
6:06final decision maker uh in all matters
6:10in Iran whether it was social direction
6:12whether it was issues of war and peace
6:15whether it was economic issues and so on
6:18so forth. I think whatever we say there
6:21is a discontinuity here because after 37
6:25years of this old powerful cleric uh we
6:29do have now a gap and that gap actually
6:34is now in transition. So you have
6:37different groups like always. I think
6:39this is what has characterized the
6:41Iranian political system uh
6:44revolutionary system since 1979.
6:47So clearly this is crystallizing right
6:50now and I think it'll take time for
6:53that. It's extremely difficult to
6:56imagine you know that sort of order and
7:00centrality of the last 37 years to be
7:04sort of recreated within months. So uh
7:07that would be my view. So definitely a
7:10sense of discontinuity
7:14and but also there is a certain
7:15continuity
7:16>> and with a more fractured leadership
7:17that is arguing about basic questions. I
7:21don't know about fractured but I know
7:23that this is more a leadership that is
7:27trying to sort of fill you know let's
7:31say uh a big shoe that was left a vacuum
7:35and so on so forth. So I think we're
7:37still in that uh in that process and as
7:40usual I mean the players are more or
7:43less the same factions here you know
7:46people who want Iran to open up within
7:49the system and people who see that the
7:52issue of an Iran that is more let's say
7:56anti-American and more revolutionary etc
7:59are also part of it. I think the the
8:02other important distinction is that the
8:05change you know that has been uh
8:08discussed by various various Iran
8:11observers of a more emphasis on the
8:14revolutionary guard or the military at
8:16the expense of the theological part of
8:19the regime. I think this is already
8:21taking place. This is something that uh
8:24a lot of Iran watchers have expected to
8:27happen in the next decade. I think
8:29because of the war because of also of
8:32the death of Italy we can see that this
8:36is accelerated is that revolutionary
8:39guard and military leadership with its
8:41newfound influence
8:43as
8:45the Iran watcher view is that it's more
8:47intent on it's more comfortable with a
8:50sustained no war no peace scenario that
8:52it's less likely to compromise that it's
8:56more intent on maintaining control over
8:57the straight of Hormoon Is is that is
8:59that how you see it?
9:01>> Not necessarily. I think partly yes, but
9:04not necessarily because I think the
9:05important part for them right now is to
9:09sort of navigate this very difficult
9:12period. So of course when you try and
9:14navigate a difficult period there is a
9:17tendency to try and and sort of circle
9:20the wagon. So I think the circling the
9:22wagon that we see right now is not
9:25necessarily just institutional but it is
9:28also part uh circumstantial
9:31uh so to speak. Again this is not the
9:35final sort of how the new Iran will
9:39operate. I think we are still in
9:41transition and we have to see and again
9:43I mean this is expected after 37 years
9:46of of the control that you have.
9:49>> The UAE and the rest of your your
9:51neighbors in the Gulf have also been
9:53navigating a very challenging situation
9:56since since February 28th. All the
9:58reporting suggests that you do not want
10:00this war. You did not were not
10:02especially consulted. Did not recommend
10:04it to either the the US or to Israel.
10:07But there's been also an interesting
10:08range of responses from uh different
10:10Gulf actors, many of whom have slightly
10:13different interests but have also seen a
10:14different path out of the situation. As
10:16you go back to to February and and look
10:20at the the arc of this conflict, what
10:22has driven the UAE response and why has
10:24that differed from the Saudi response or
10:26Qatar or some of the others around?
10:28Well, I I'll take you back a little bit
10:30uh earlier in with the fall of Saddam
10:33Hussein 2003 2004.
10:36I think for us this is a sort of vital
10:39point here because again what we saw is
10:43a whole change of geostrategic shifts in
10:46the region as a result of the fall of
10:49the Ba'ist regime in Iraq. So one of the
10:53things I consider very important is that
10:56usually you have a huge event like the
10:59current war it takes years for you to
11:02really understand the full let's say
11:05impact of such an event taking that into
11:09account from the fall of Saddam to the
11:11rise of ISIS which was also very much
11:14related to the fall of Saddam you had a
11:17gap of around close to 10 years. So
11:19again the effect of a major conflict you
11:23will see for many many years. I thought
11:27that with the Hamas attack on uh Israeli
11:32settlements and the ensuing war that the
11:35region will actually go through major
11:38geostrategic changes and we will have to
11:41deal with a lot of these uh changes.
11:44Paul of Assadah being diminished and so
11:47on so forth. But I think we the region
11:50did not have time enough to sort of chew
11:54on the effects of that war and suddenly
11:58we're in a second war. So we have I
12:00think a double impact there of a
12:02continuous war that started from the 7th
12:04of October. I think from that
12:06perspective, the UAE was genuinely
12:10concerned and our messaging to all our
12:14friends in Washington, other places was
12:17against this war. Uh because we
12:20understood from our previous experiences
12:24that this is going to take a long time.
12:27This will be very complicated and the
12:29after effects uh will be have to be
12:31dealt with for many many years. And I
12:33think this is what has transpired. Now
12:36we did not have what I would say early
12:39warning that there will be a war. I mean
12:41but our political readout was very
12:44clear. I mean once we found that there
12:47was a huge gap in the discussions in the
12:49nuclear discussions between Iran and the
12:52United States. Uh these gaps were not
12:54going to be uh bridged and our
12:58expectation that there will be a
12:59conflict. When this conflict started, I
13:03think we expected that there will be an
13:06Iranian attack on us and on other Gulf
13:09countries, but we did not really expect
13:12an attack of this sort of breadth and
13:15this sort of tenacity. And I think we
13:18were lucky in a sense that we were
13:20ready. We've been ready for a long time.
13:23We have a battleh hardardened military
13:26that has you know seen action in
13:28Afghanistan, in Yemen, in Kosovo
13:32as as a peacekeeping force and in many
13:35many other areas and we had actually
13:37started building our uh our missile and
13:41drone defense capacity. So I think for
13:44the UAE and then I'll talk perhaps about
13:46other countries but for the UAE I think
13:49establishing deterrence was extremely
13:51important. I mean establishing
13:52deterrence is not a goal in of itself.
13:57Establishing deterrence is an important
14:00element that now today is leading us to
14:04greater let's say opportunities with
14:06diplomacy and I think this has been very
14:08very important. Now
14:10>> can I just go going back to to your
14:12surprise at the
14:14>> the the the breadth and intensity of the
14:16Iranian response. What do you think you
14:18missed in your assessments before the
14:20war? And how did that change the way you
14:22respond? Did you respond more
14:23aggressively against the Iranians
14:25because of that response that had
14:26surprised you?
14:27>> No, I think I think you know the the
14:28idea of being succumbed to 3,300
14:32missiles and drones. This was a huge
14:35huge attack on us in many ways. But I
14:38think this was a plan. I mean the plan
14:40was if Iran is facing an American and
14:45Israeli attack, what is the plan? The
14:48plan was to see the Gulf perhaps as the
14:51weakest link and to uh sort of pressure
14:55the Gulf and pressure let's say uh
14:58global supplies and the result will be
15:01more pressure then on Washington and the
15:03Israelis to stop the war. I think this
15:05was part of a calculated strategy. I
15:08think in the UAE's case, we were able to
15:11address this attack. 95%
15:14of these missiles and drones were at
15:16civilian infrastructure, but our rate at
15:19intercepting these was also in the upper
15:2290s. So, we did very well, but again, it
15:25disrupts a country that's never really
15:28faced this sort of attack. Now, for us,
15:31I think the deterrence factor is
15:33important to the diplomacy factor. It's
15:37not an independent goal. And I think
15:39today, for example, as we are opening
15:42channels with the Iranians, I think the
15:44deterrence factor helps us uh achieve
15:47the diplomacy that we want.
15:48>> And you feel good about where deterrence
15:50is at this point?
15:51>> I think we are getting better at it. But
15:54as I said, this is a region that can't
15:56stay in a no peace zone. We do need to
16:00move forward. Other than that, a comment
16:02perhaps on the other Gulf countries.
16:04Each Gulf country has its own
16:06calculations. Each Gulf country has its
16:08own calculations. Uh a country as big
16:12and wide as Saudi Arabia, which is, you
16:14know, the size of Western Europe, uh has
16:17a different threat perception. Countries
16:20that have no, let's say, venue to the
16:24Indian Ocean closed within the Gulf,
16:27such as Qatar or Bahrain or Kuwait or
16:30Iraq. They have a different also
16:33perception there. I think what was
16:34missing and uh we failed miserably
16:38within uh the GCC was what I would call
16:41a collective political security
16:43response. There was a lot of support
16:46within the GCC on the logistic side, the
16:49economic side. But I think the failure
16:52is the GCC was unable to collectively
16:56fashion a response at the political or
16:59the military level. It was more or less
17:02more of bilateral cooperation, national
17:05positions of trying to sort of thwart
17:08the sort of threat that we have seen.
17:10>> You talk about the channels that are
17:11opening with the Iranians. There were
17:13supposed to be, I believe last week, a
17:15meeting, an Oman burker meeting about
17:17the future of the strait that the the
17:19UAE was going to be part of. That didn't
17:21happen for reasons that that have been
17:24um speculated about. I'm curious what
17:26you think the future of that that
17:28channel is and also how you see an
17:29acceptable outcome for the strait. There
17:32seem to be a lot of signs that many
17:34other Gulf actors and certainly the
17:35Iranians are comfortable with some kind
17:38of you know new status quo that does
17:40involve something like management and
17:42some fees in the strait. Is that an
17:44acceptable outcome and a plausible
17:45outcome from UAE's perspective?
17:46>> I think the UE's perspective is more
17:48tied to international law. So we have a
17:52state that's been governed by
17:53international law for hundreds of years.
17:56And for hundreds of years, you've seen
17:59during, you know, the Portuguese being
18:01in the Gulf or the British being in the
18:03Gulf or the Dutch being in the Gulf or
18:06let's say more modern times of uh
18:08British and American influence. Iran
18:11being a central power, less central
18:12power prior to that, the trait has been
18:15functioning mainly as uh an open
18:19waterway for energy and trade etc. I
18:22think that's where it should be. And in
18:24many ways I think the Iranians are using
18:27the strait more as a negotiating
18:30position. And I think we have
18:32collectively to come and understand that
18:34the strait has an impact on the global
18:37economy as much as it affects let's say
18:40Iran and the Arab Gulf states. It also
18:43affects uh you know European countries,
18:46Asian countries, the far east etc. I
18:50think collectively it'll be a precedent
18:53if straits are basically controlled by
18:56countries that want to change this sort
18:59of status quo and I think this is also
19:01indicative right now of uh the
19:04international system actually unable to
19:08basically protect you know sets of rules
19:12that have governed this system for many
19:15many years. So clearly if you have this
19:17issue where a state or two think they
19:20can control the strait then what about
19:22pabl mandib and what about the straight
19:24of malaga etc. So the position is no the
19:28straits have to go back to the status
19:31quo anti would argue that the Iranians
19:34are using the strait more as a
19:36negotiating
19:38uh position for when these negotiations
19:41take place with the United States. That
19:44would be my argument on it.
19:45>> I I understand the principled uh
19:47position there. It's just striking when
19:49you hear other Gulf leaders talk and
19:52even some leaders from powers outside
19:54the Gulf. You hear a lot of attempts to
19:56kind of uh bargain around this that
19:58there there's a kind of um uh slippage
20:00in that position that does seem like
20:02it's like I said a new precedent. That's
20:04>> but I think I think I think also it's
20:06sort of self-explanation for countries
20:09not basically standing up for what they
20:12should stand up on in terms of the
20:14international law etc because again I
20:16mean these straits like other straits in
20:18the in in the world are critical really
20:21for international trade as we know it if
20:24they become tomorrow a political
20:26bargaining chip. our region, our world
20:29is full of crisis and you never know
20:31when the next time uh these uh streets
20:34or other streets will be used as a
20:36bargaining chip.
20:37>> You said very clearly here and you've
20:39said before that the UAE was opposed to
20:41the war before it started and I think
20:43this was the right the right timing for
20:44this war. From a US perspective, I think
20:46it's pretty hard to see where we are now
20:48at least as anything but a failure. You
20:50say the long-term repercussions are hard
20:52to predict, but certainly in the short
20:53term, it does seem to be in a better
20:54position than it was uh at some point.
20:57How do you understand the US endgame
20:58now? And as you talk to your American
21:01counterparts and think about further US
21:03action, what should the US the US
21:05position be? What what are US options?
21:06Well,
21:06>> I think I think the the first thing I
21:09want to say is this war actually makes
21:12the US position in the Gulf more
21:14important, not less important.
21:17Even countries that are basically at the
21:20receiving end of Iranian let's say
21:24missiles and drones understand that they
21:26need America more today not less. So I
21:30think this is also
21:31>> there is a certain irony in that
21:33definitely there's an irony but I think
21:35that you know I mean you need the United
21:37States I think the argument that has
21:40been mentioned well America is not going
21:43to be there to defend you. I think this
21:46has already been taken care of in the
21:48last decade or so. We understand that
21:51ultimately uh American boots and
21:53American power is not going to defend
21:57the region. American boots and American
21:59power will look after American
22:01interests. But we understand that the
22:04starting point and I think this is for a
22:07country the size of the UAE starting
22:09point is to build your own threshold
22:12which is your own capacity to defend
22:15yourself. And I think the UAE has proven
22:18that even a country our size can do
22:20that. But then again to do that you need
22:23also to work out your diplomacy because
22:27you can't just take a posture that is
22:30military. You have to actually talk to
22:32the Iranians, talk to others, etc. I
22:35think the third layer is basically these
22:37contacts. It is re really American
22:40equipment, American training. And if you
22:42don't get the American equipment, what
22:44sort of layer can you get from an East
22:47Asian country like Korea for example, or
22:50what can you get from uh another
22:53country? I mean again you saw in during
22:56this war the Israelis for example
22:58introduced the Iron Dawn to help and
23:02support us. We didn't request it but the
23:04Israelis also understood that this is a
23:07very important relationship for them and
23:09for that also very grateful.
23:11>> To linger on the US for a moment the
23:14centrality is about air defense systems
23:16and weapons and intelligence less than
23:19it is about the US presence. is that
23:20that's the change from what you might
23:22have thought 15 years ago.
23:24>> Not not necessarily because if I view
23:27the trajectory of UAE US relationships
23:32for example today in the 1970s 80s that
23:36relationship was really about energy and
23:39oil. Today that relationship is much
23:41wider. You know we've got in the UAE
23:4460,000 Americans living in the UAE. This
23:47is a huge community that is actually
23:50part of a very multi-nationality
23:53population within the UE. We've got
23:56trade at about $30 billion with the
23:59United States. We've got investments in
24:01the United States at about $1.6
24:04trillion. That's only the UAE that I'm
24:07talking about there. So the American
24:10interest in the region I think should
24:12not be viewed with the prism of the 70s
24:15and 80s which was a very much sort of
24:18energy and security defense prism. Today
24:22this is an important relationship and I
24:24think one of the ironies really of uh of
24:28this war is how central the Gulf is. You
24:31know, I mean, the the sort of
24:33interconnectedness of the international
24:35economy that many people thought that
24:38the Gulf was more important 40 years
24:41ago, but then again, people now are
24:44discovering no that this part of the
24:46world is very much interconnected with
24:49everything else. It has an effect on
24:52inflation. It has an effect on energy.
24:55It has an effect on food prices etc. I
24:58think the world is very much changed. So
25:00I think it's not the issue of just us
25:04depending on let's say American
25:06equipment and American political clout
25:09and so on so forth. I think at the same
25:12time America has vital interests in the
25:15region today and many of these vital
25:17interests affect how the American
25:19economy is performing. I'm sure like
25:22other regions in the world too but it's
25:24definitely this region is also part of
25:26that. I think a large part of it is has
25:29to do also uh with the globalization
25:32that we have seen in the international
25:34system over so many years and I think
25:37this is interconnectedness is very much
25:39part of the scene.
25:40>> Are you reassessing the value of having
25:43US military bases in the UAE?
25:45>> No, I think this is essential. I think
25:49uh not only us but to many Gulf
25:53officials that I've spoken to uh they
25:56understand some of the challenges of
26:00having a US military base in their
26:02country but I think the war and the
26:05Iranian attack has made that more
26:08important not less important and this is
26:10one of the ironies or what I would say
26:12one of the failures really of the
26:14Iranian strategy you know to think that
26:18basically by targeting the bases they
26:21are able to make these bases uh
26:24redundant in terms of our strategic
26:27thinking. But it's not the case.
26:28>> I mean it it does seem it doesn't seem
26:30crazy to say that the bases neither
26:34deterred the Iranians from attacking you
26:36became more of a of a target than they
26:38did a deterrent. Is that but what's the
26:40what does that miss?
26:41>> Not not really. I mean to a certain
26:43extent the bases are target but if you
26:46look at the the the the size of the
26:49Iranian attack only 5% of that attack
26:53was really targeted at military
26:55installations 95% of the attack was
26:59really to attack economic infrastructure
27:02because the whole idea was to try and
27:04hit the economic infrastructure and
27:07create that sort of pressure that will
27:10ricochet on Washington and Washington
27:13will look at that
27:14>> using the bases of pretext but
27:15>> using the basis as a pretext. I mean the
27:17numbers speak louder than words. I'm and
27:21this is not only the case in the UE but
27:23this is the case also in other Gulf
27:25countries like Kuwait and other
27:27>> um you talked about the the reasons why
27:29a no war no peace scenario is is is not
27:32a good or stable one. If you're being
27:34optimistic what's a plausible uh outcome
27:38that would end this war in the in the
27:39near term? What's if if we're being
27:41optimistic here, what does that look
27:42like?
27:42>> Well, I think to start with, I think we
27:45are uh in a sort of protracted crisis.
27:50So, I will not say that this is going to
27:52be a short-term crisis. It'll take some
27:55time for us before we disentangle, you
27:59know, what are the key positions here.
28:01So, I think the first thing is we've got
28:03to look at this crisis as a protracted
28:05one. And usually to resolve protracted
28:08crisis, you do really need to deescalate
28:12and work more on diplomacy. But I don't
28:15think there are quick answers for the
28:18reasons that you mentioned also with
28:20regards to the transition in Iran. I
28:24think also we will see an Iranian system
28:27that will not be very stable for a
28:29while. not necessarily a change within
28:31it but I think this is quite usual in a
28:35sense where you have 37 years of the
28:38stability of
28:40don't expect that that that same
28:42stability is going to sort of continue
28:46straight away so I think we have to also
28:48deal with that I think these are
28:51important points because if we take
28:53these into account saying that Iran is
28:56in transition and at the same time. This
28:59is a crisis that will actually take some
29:02time. I think once we say these once we
29:05we sort of digest these items, it
29:09becomes clear that the pace of dealing
29:12with the issue differs. So the idea
29:15basically is let's not concede very
29:18quickly. Let us discuss and open more
29:22channels and so on so forth. I think at
29:25this stage right now we still have
29:27maximalist demands and for us to sort of
29:31break up these maximalist demands it'll
29:34take some time. So that I that is the
29:36sort of framework that I'm thinking
29:39through.
29:39>> Do is the Iranian nuclear program a
29:42front of mind threat to you right now or
29:43is it a point where
29:44>> Definitely definitely it definitely is.
29:47I mean the Iranian nuclear program I
29:50think is the important part here of of
29:53everything that takes place. I think
29:56currently for example you know looking
29:58at and then lead me to the nuclear
30:01program looking at missiles looking at
30:04drones etc. I think every country has to
30:08think twice before choosing a military
30:12path because everybody is vulnerable
30:13today. Even if you're winning a war,
30:15your civilian infrastructures are very
30:19much targeted at any chance, even with a
30:22party that is losing the war. I would
30:25say today that the nuclear program
30:28remains at the heart of these
30:30negotiations and in my opinion that is
30:33where the negotiations ultimately will
30:35lead to back to. So the straight of
30:39Hormos issue I think the Iranians are
30:41using it as a negotiating position but
30:45ultimately they will have to come to the
30:48bigger negotiations. I mean that that is
30:50in my opinion inevitable.
30:52>> We'll return to my conversation with
30:54Anmar Gargosh after a short break.
31:05You mentioned the assistance that you've
31:07gotten from Israel since the the war
31:09started. This was another irony of this
31:11war is that one of the other central
31:13parties in this war, the fighting with
31:14the US, the Israelis.
31:16You you've said, and this is I think
31:18diverges from what some of the other
31:20Gulf leaders have said, that Israel will
31:23become more central and a bigger player
31:25and a more important relationship for
31:26the UAE going forward. Why is that? And
31:29how do you envision what what do you
31:30want out of that relationship? How do
31:31you envision that that relationship
31:32developing?
31:33>> Well, I I feel uh part of the sort of
31:40failure of the Iranian strategy. Let's
31:42let us say there are several failures
31:45here. I think number one and perhaps
31:47some of them were already worked out
31:49earlier but it was a riskreward sort of
31:52calculation. I feel number one is the
31:55issue of trust between Iran and the Gulf
31:58countries was broken clearly and uh I
32:02I've identified in several talks that
32:06there is a difference between trust and
32:08relations. I think the relations with
32:09Iran will come back but it'll be more
32:12functional. You have to rebuild trust
32:14etc. And this is very important because
32:17you've never really seen a direct
32:19Iranian confrontation with the with its
32:22southern neighbors. This is a new
32:24phenomenon where a lot of red lines were
32:27crossed. So I think this is part of it.
32:29The second thing as I mentioned the US
32:31actually becomes more central, more
32:33important and this is a clear product of
32:36this. But I think on the Israeli side I
32:39would say that many countries in the
32:41region are going to hedge their bets. I
32:44think this is very very natural that
32:48countries will hedge their bets.
32:50Contacts that were clogged for a while
32:54with Israel will be opened again.
32:56Whether it is political contacts or
32:58whether it is contacts that have a sort
33:01of military acquisition type of thing.
33:05>> Does that include the Saudis? Do you
33:06think normalization will
33:07>> I mean I I don't want to name any single
33:09country but I think that this will be
33:11the general feeling. the hedging will be
33:14very important. But I think for us who
33:16uh we have a a formal relationship with
33:18Israel and as we see that this is an
33:22important relationship because we see
33:24it's an important part of a different
33:26Middle East to be honest and we paid a
33:28heavy price for it. It hasn't been an
33:31easier relationship for us in terms of
33:34Arab public opinion and in terms of how
33:36this relationship has been
33:38characterized. But we've been pragmatic
33:40and we said, you know, I mean, we really
33:42have to see a different region. And in
33:44order for us to see a different region,
33:47the Palestinians are talking to the
33:48Israelis, the Egyptians and Jordanians
33:51and others have formal agreements. Why
33:53not us, you know? So, I think we've been
33:55very practical.
33:56>> Is is it a relationship of trust at this
33:58point? That you cross that threshold to
33:59use your
34:00>> Well, I I think it's a very important
34:01relationship. I mean the issue of is it
34:04trust or no? It depends because Israel
34:06also is a political system that is
34:09evolving. We have our areas of
34:11contention over how they've conducted
34:14their the war in Gaza. We have our areas
34:17of contention also and disagreements on
34:20their plans for example in the in the
34:23West Bank etc. But I think on the other
34:25hand we have to see a different Middle
34:27East and I think we have stuck now six
34:30years with this relationship. During
34:33this war as I said there were actually
34:36two wars the way that we see it. There's
34:38an American Israeli war against Iran and
34:41then there is a war of Iran against the
34:45Gulf countries. So there have been two
34:47wars and we've been trying to sort of
34:49separate the two from each other at
34:51least conceptually if not practically.
34:54So again we
34:55>> the implication being to the message of
34:58the Iranians don't don't blame us for a
35:00war that others
35:02>> Exactly. Exactly. And I think not only
35:03that, I think a lot of the the sympathy
35:06that the Iranians would have gained in
35:09confronting the first war did not
35:12translate because they took on the Gulf
35:15countries which were not part of it. And
35:17in fact, many of them were mediators and
35:19many of them, you know, like Arman and
35:21Qatar were trying to mediate, trying to
35:24sort of find ways out, etc. And I think
35:26this was a a problem. Mhm. The formal
35:30relationship between the UA and Israel
35:31started sixishious years ago and that
35:34was very much about preventing formal
35:37annexation of the West Bank by by the
35:39Israeli government. That was a priority
35:41of of your government at the time.
35:43>> There has been a lot happening in the
35:46West Bank that suggests something
35:47approaching deacto annexation. Even if
35:50that's that's not formal. As you've
35:52watched those events, do you worry that
35:55it's going to approach a point where you
35:56would have to reevaluate that
35:57relationship? Or to put it differently,
35:58is there anything short of formal
35:59annexation that would cause you to
36:01downgrade those ties?
36:02>> No, I think it it gives us uh I mean,
36:04Israel is going through an election. We
36:06have to wait and see what transpires.
36:09But I think we have a lot of uh well
36:12maybe clout is a big word but I think
36:15our voice matters when it comes to many
36:18of the Israeli parties today because
36:20they consider this also as an important
36:23relationship uh to them. I think we've
36:25leveraged that relationship successfully
36:29in many areas. is one of the areas that
36:31we've leveraged it and the sort of
36:33humanitarian support that we have been
36:35pushing through uh through Gaza. We are
36:37now close to $4 billion of aid that the
36:41UEE sent to Gaza. $4 billion is a big
36:44amount and I think we would have not
36:46been able to do that size of aid except
36:49by leveraging the relationship with
36:51Israel. Today we are also emerging as
36:54one of the major players in terms of
36:57pushing the uh President Trump's plan
37:00also for for Gaza and at the same time I
37:02think our voice is important when it
37:04comes to issues in in the West Bank etc.
37:08I have to come and say here we are of
37:10course constrained. Where are we
37:12constrained? We're constrained number
37:14one by who rules Israel and what he
37:18thinks is essential policy, national
37:21policy for Israel. This is an area where
37:24you know your ability to influence that
37:27stops there. For example, I think we're
37:29also constrained in a sense that on the
37:32political side, we're very much part of
37:34the Arab consensus on an independent
37:37Palestinian state and a two-state
37:40solution. Perhaps we're a little bit
37:41more vocal on the issue of the reform of
37:45the Palestinian Authority because we
37:47feel that the Palestinian Authority with
37:51its historical legitimacy within the
37:53Palestinian people has to reform itself
37:56in order for it to be the player that it
37:58should ultimately be in in many ways,
38:01>> including with new with new leadership
38:03of the
38:04>> Yes. Yes. And so what really transpires
38:06is a complicated picture. It's not a
38:08picture where DOE really will come and
38:11say well I'm going to reassess I'm going
38:13to do this and that. I think we have
38:15been playing a major important role in
38:20uh various developments and I mean this
38:23time last year she Abdullah bin Zed's
38:26our foreign minister's meeting with
38:29prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu
38:32was critical in Israel Israel accepting
38:35the 20point plan and you know I mean he
38:39really took uh NDE took a big gamble at
38:43the time where Netanyahu was basically
38:46barged by all the criticism from
38:48everywhere. But we took that gamble and
38:51that was one of the key meetings that
38:54basically supported the Israelis
38:57accepting the plan ultimately ending the
39:00war in Gaza and and recovering all the
39:03hostages that were with Hamas.
39:06Notwithstanding the vision reflected in
39:08the 20point plan and the continuing
39:10rhetorical support for the two-state
39:12solution in Arab capitals and in
39:14Washington and in European capitals and
39:17elsewhere. It does seem hard to imagine
39:20how we're going to see any progress
39:22towards an independent Palestinian state
39:24in the near term given Israeli politics,
39:27given the divided Palestinian politics,
39:29given what's happening on the ground in
39:30West Bank and Gaza. Is there a reason to
39:33be less pessimistic than that? No, it's
39:35very difficult to imagine it. But I
39:37think it is extremely poant also when uh
39:40you hear well what is the alternative?
39:44What is the alternative really to that
39:46sort of vision? There is no alternative
39:48to that sort of vision. So I think we
39:50need to keep working on this. I think
39:53the fact that we have the Abrahamic
39:55Accords uh is interesting because you
39:58hear also a lot of Israelis hearing
40:01openly an Arab voice of reason, Arab
40:04voice of compromise from the UAE. Not
40:07only that, but you also see a lot of
40:09Arabs, Arabs of pre948
40:13that actually uh we talk to, they talk
40:16to our ambassador and very much welcome
40:19how the UE is actually engaging because
40:22they feel that they're somehow left out
40:24of whatever is going on.
40:25>> You mentioned the divisions within the
40:28the GCC, within the Gulf countries. At
40:31the center of that has been your
40:33tensions with Saudi Arabia over the last
40:34few years. that has clearly hobbled the
40:37Gulf's common response and the kind of
40:39um of collective response that you you
40:42noted would have been useful in the
40:44early days of this war and perhaps can
40:45still come together. Maybe just to to go
40:47back to the fundamentals of this, how do
40:49you explain the the rift between UA and
40:52Saudi? I mean that you can talk about it
40:54as a regional hegeimon that sees it its
40:56place being threatened. You can talk
40:57about the UAE's economic model being
41:00kind of um uh eaten away at a bit by the
41:02Saudi competition. But I'm I'm curious
41:05for your your explanation of of where
41:07that comes from and then what that's
41:09meant as you've tried to forge this
41:11common response and against the
41:12>> I would I would rather concentrate on
41:16our view of our relationship with Saudi
41:18Arabia. I think we see that our security
41:21is very much interconnected. I can't see
41:24really a UAE that is stable without a
41:28Saudi Arabia that's stable. You know, we
41:30have a land border. we have this sort of
41:34connectedness that our security is one
41:37and the same. So I look at it from that
41:40perspective. I think our economies are
41:43very much also interconnected. There is
41:45of course a big degree of competition
41:48between the UAE which has been an open
41:51economy for a very long time and the
41:53Saudis also through their vision 23 30
41:57to try also and and change that economy.
41:59So our view is to try and emphasize that
42:04this is not a zero- sum game. We can
42:07both do well and in fact if Saudi Arabia
42:10does well, we will do better and vice
42:13versa and including other Gulf
42:14countries. So I think our relationship
42:17today is not in its best form. But I
42:20think both countries are working very
42:22hard in order to maintain you know the
42:26sort of areas of disagreement and to
42:29limit these areas of disagreement
42:31because I think soon we will be able to
42:34understand that complimentarity
42:37for between us and cooperation is more
42:40important than let's say competition.
42:43Competition is important but competition
42:45within bounds. So the OE's view today is
42:49really about managing let's say the
42:52state of relations with Saudi Arabia
42:54making sure that this state of relation
42:57is within the certain confines of
43:01cooperation etc because we know that at
43:04some stage we will be able to address
43:06this uh this rift because it's not in
43:09the interest of Saudi Arabia and it's
43:10definitely not in our interest and it's
43:12not in the interest of the region. The
43:14Saudis are the main reason why Emirati
43:18forces are no longer backing the efforts
43:20in Yemen the way you long were as you
43:21watch the escalation of hostilities
43:23between the Houthis and Saudi over the
43:26last several days seems to be continuing
43:27as we speak. What do you worry about in
43:29terms of regional repercussions of that?
43:31And do you see any formula not involving
43:34a major use of of US force or major
43:36regional response that will get the
43:39Houthi threat back to at least where it
43:40was a few a few months ago?
43:42>> Yeah. Well, we came into Yemen basically
43:45to support Saudi Arabia. And we came
43:47into Yemen to support Saudi Arabia out
43:49of understanding that our security is
43:53interconnected. And I think our forces
43:55in Yemen performed with valor and
43:58performed very well uh during that
44:01period and stayed there for a long time.
44:03And then we had this rift and we decided
44:07that when the Saudis wanted us to leave,
44:09we decided to leave because the we were
44:12not going to be in a position where we
44:15will be confronting our allies for many
44:18years and our neighbor and I think this
44:21was the right decision to take. It
44:24wasn't an easy decision but it was the
44:26right decision. Today I think nothing
44:29changes. We are concerned. Whenever we
44:32hear that the Houthis have targeted
44:35Saudi Arabia, we are very much concerned
44:38and uh our sympathy is with the security
44:42of Saudi Arabia. But where are the areas
44:44here that we are definitely concerned? I
44:47think one area is definitely if Babel
44:50Menddev is being used again as a lever
44:52of pressure the same way that the
44:54straight of hormones is uh is being used
44:57>> which appears to be the case today
44:59>> which might be at some stage. I mean the
45:00Houthies now are talking about just
45:03targeting Saudi shipping but again you
45:06don't know how the crisis will develop
45:08and will they really stick to that
45:11position or not but I think at this
45:13stage right now this is a war that's
45:15taken I don't know 10 11 years now and
45:18there has to be a political outcome here
45:22a political outcome that has to be
45:25Yemended driven and has to take into
45:27account also of course Saudi Arabia's
45:30security interests because of the border
45:33and and so on so forth. So I think this
45:35is where we need to move really the
45:37understanding that this can go on for a
45:40long time and that this is the time
45:42really to address the core questions
45:45that had to be addressed 10 years ago.
45:48Some of them are to do with Yemen
45:50itself. What sort of country do the
45:52Yemenes want? Is it a federal entity?
45:56Etc. etc. and how whatever happens in
45:59Yemen will also not affect Saudi Arabia
46:02and how can Yemen also be an independent
46:05party, not really an appendage to
46:08Iranian policy.
46:10>> Another place where the these regional
46:12tensions have played out is of course
46:14Sudan. You and your colleagues have
46:16strenuously denied the accusations from
46:19the Sudin uh armed forces and and
46:22various UN experts about Emirati arms
46:24and money going to the RSF, the rapid
46:26security forces in Iran. Let me just
46:28read a line written in FA by Tony Lake,
46:30former national uh American nationality
46:32adviser, just to give people a sense of
46:34what the what the charges are. Um he
46:36wrote, "The outside actor that bears the
46:37most responsibility for the starvation
46:39and ethnic cleansing, however, is the
46:41United Arab Emirates. As the RSF
46:43perpetrates genocidal attacks on
46:44civilians in Darur and other regions,
46:47Abu Dhabi is delivering arms to the
46:48militia. Without getting into the full
46:51you've you've you've made the case
46:53elsewhere, but I'm curious as you look
46:55at Sudan and you know the kind of it's
46:58less in the headlines, but the
46:59humanitarian stakes and cost of that are
47:00are immense as are the regional security
47:02implications. What can the UAE be doing
47:04to put pressure on the RSF spec
47:06especially to try to bring that word to
47:08the end? What's the path there?
47:09>> Well, let me take you back a little bit.
47:11I think Sudan has had historically a
47:14problem with military rule and uh
47:17there's always been a recoccurrence of
47:20the military ruling and then there is a
47:22popular uprising. The last uprising
47:25basically you know ended the Basher
47:28dictatorship. I think the first mistake
47:31was when the two generals who are the
47:34waring generals today overthrew the
47:36civilian government. I mean I look back
47:38at that specific instance and I say it
47:42was a big failure of the international
47:44community including the UAE and others
47:47of not really calling a coup a coup at
47:49the time and I think this created an
47:52unstable situation where the two
47:55generals had to fight it out. I think
47:57until that moment DOE had good relations
48:02with both parties and with many of the
48:04civilian parties and we used our offices
48:07also to try and get them together to try
48:09and get a solution etc. Today in my
48:12opinion there are I don't know what's
48:14the number but there are about 12
48:16countries that are uh sending weapons to
48:19Sudan today but I think the usually the
48:22sort of military propaganda focuses more
48:25on the UAE. So sometimes we feel that
48:29there are 12 countries you can name but
48:31somehow you're just naming one country
48:34but in reality in the position is also
48:37evolved as we saw that this is a
48:40neverending war as we saw that this is a
48:43war that will not end in a term of a
48:46victorious party and a vanquished party.
48:49As we look at the history of Sudan of
48:52continuous civil wars and uh you know
48:55mismanaged military dictatorships etc. I
48:59think we've moved really and our
49:00position is more articulated within the
49:03quartet which includes the United
49:05States, US, Saudi Arabia and Egypt and
49:08definitely the European Union is very
49:10close and the African Union to that
49:12position. The position here is
49:14important. Number one is ceasefire right
49:18now. I think you have to end the war
49:21right now. Now the party who is against
49:24ending the war right now is General
49:26Borhan the SF because for two reasons. I
49:30think number one is he believes that he
49:34can win and because I think he wants
49:36also to be president and for him perhaps
49:39this is the sort of price that you have
49:42to accept that I'll end the war if you
49:44make me a president and I think this is
49:46something that is a problem. The second
49:48part is open unfettered humanitarian
49:53support. I mean the OE already has
49:55commitments that are close to 78 $800
49:58million for humanitarian Sudan and we
50:02have a problem pumping all of this
50:04humanitarian aid there. But I think the
50:06third thing is very important. The third
50:08thing is Sudan has to see a civilian
50:12transition because clearly the two
50:14generals have lost really the legitimacy
50:17to rule Sudan. We have to go back to the
50:21civilian transition. After the Berlin
50:24conference a few months ago, the
50:26civilian track is becoming much more
50:30prominent and I think it is gaining
50:33ground in many ways. So again, this is
50:36really the UE position. It has evolved
50:38from a position where we tried to
50:41reconcile the two generals to a position
50:45where we were closer perhaps to the RSF.
50:48But with the sort of tragedies that we
50:51saw Darur and post Darur, it has shifted
50:54really to a position of seeing civilian
50:57transition as the only way out in Sudan.
50:59>> Do you have unique leverage or is there
51:01something you can uniquely bring to this
51:03especially with the RSF that that can
51:05contribute to that transition? I think
51:07many countries have leverage. I we have
51:10leverage. Many of the other regional
51:11powers have leverage today. But
51:14ultimately uh the decision to stop the
51:17war is with General Bhan. I think he has
51:20to take that first step and say, you
51:23know what, I'm going to stop the war
51:25right now. But I think he has political
51:27ambitions that are basically
51:29undermining.
51:30>> And the RSF would respond to that
51:31favorably in your view?
51:32>> I Well, the RSF has already said that
51:34many times. But again, I think
51:36ultimately if today at the end of a war
51:39in Sudan, you have a reinstatement of a
51:42military dictatorship, you you're really
51:45uh putting the seeds for another
51:48populist uprising against them. So why
51:50should you go through two stages when
51:52you can already work out a transition
51:55that the civilians will actually uh have
51:58to lead that transition? because they
52:01were leading it and they were thwarted
52:02by the military uh coup that uh was led
52:06by the two generals who are fighting it
52:07out right now.
52:08>> Um to close I want to get back to your
52:10vision of the future of the region and
52:12the the future regional order. One
52:14effort to try to shape this has come
52:16from uh has been really Saudi leapact
52:19which involves Saudi uh Turkey and and
52:22Pakistan a kind of collective defense
52:23arrangement. How do you how do you see
52:24that? Do you see it as a kind of um
52:26constructive step? I think the the
52:28future of the region is uh in my opinion
52:33after the Yemen war. I've always
52:35described our policy from the Yemen war
52:38to the start of the Iranian attack on on
52:41us and on the rest of the Gulf. I said
52:43our policy is geoeconomic and I think
52:45the future of the region is basically in
52:49prioritizing geoeconomic policies. So
52:52really what did we do between 19 I don't
52:56know uh 1718 to 2026 we emphasized
53:02really uh our economy we emphasized uh
53:07we we signed 38 free trade agreements
53:10for example we opened up and liberalized
53:13a lot of our laws within the UAE we
53:17changed a lot of the economic
53:20restrictions that you had on any economy
53:22and the UAE had very little and made the
53:25UAE more competitive. We've invested
53:27heavily, for example, in technology and
53:31artificial intelligence and at the end
53:33of the Biden administration, we had a
53:35huge breakthrough with the United States
53:38uh that has also put a lot of our
53:41investments in AI as part of our let's
53:44say insurance for the future. We've used
53:47that also to work with the French on AI
53:50cluster. We're using that to discuss
53:53with the Germans and and others. So the
53:57first thing I would say is the future of
53:59the region is basically in prioritizing
54:04the economy and prioritizing technology
54:06>> and is that model under threat just
54:08given the security risks right now?
54:09>> No, I I don't think it is under threat.
54:11I think in fact this is what the UE's
54:14calling card is and this is why the UEE
54:17is influential in the region because
54:19people can see that DOE is successful by
54:23emphasizing that and although we've
54:25discussed during this uh podcast all the
54:29challenges we have what we're really
54:31trying to do is deal with these
54:33challenges but our basically uh
54:36instructions our leadership instructions
54:39to all our ministries and sectors etc.
54:43is to emphasize the economy, emphasize
54:45opportunity, emphasize technology. I
54:48mean why would two two million plus
54:51Arabs come and live in the UE
54:53Palestinians and Syrians and Egyptians
54:56and others? Because you create
54:58opportunity, you create a successful
55:01Arab state and Arab model. So I think
55:03beyond all that that's how the future
55:05should look like a future that is very
55:08much different from the past. I mean
55:10again we spoke about Israel and our
55:13relations with Israel. People only look
55:15at the sort of political security side.
55:17A large part of it also has to do with
55:19technology. A large part of it has to do
55:22with it. I think this is where we see
55:24the future. The future we see is less
55:27politics, less war, less confrontation
55:31and more geoeconomics where we come and
55:34say it's not a zero- sum game. If we do
55:36well, we will all do uh better. That's
55:39that's really our message.
55:41>> I'm interested in how you see the role
55:42of China in that scenario. There's been
55:44a lot of reporting that China has given
55:46some assistance to Iran during this war.
55:49You were, I believe, in China, at least
55:50your your president was in China
55:52recently for a visit. How do you see the
55:54Chinese role
55:55>> and and what is um uh what are your
55:59discussions with the Chinese about about
56:00moving towards that order, especially
56:02when it comes to Chinese influence over
56:04Iran? Well, I think I think the Chinese
56:07are still less political in our region
56:10and I think the Chinese are more let's
56:12say economic and commercial in our
56:15region. So, China has in my opinion two
56:19sets of relationships. It has old
56:22relationships and new relationships. Old
56:25relationships are with state centric
56:27economies and new relationships are with
56:30countries like the UAE where you know we
56:33I don't know the figure is about hundred
56:36billion dollars of trade with China for
56:38example. So China is in a way
56:40understands that the future of Chinese
56:43relationship in the area is its new
56:46relationship. But again I mean China
56:48also looks at the crisis from a prism of
56:52China US relationship in many ways. So
56:55there are different consider
56:56considerations right now but I still
56:59don't see a very political China in our
57:01region in many ways. So we're pressing
57:04ahead with a lot of commercial
57:06relationships with China. China is our
57:10largest trading partner as it is with
57:13many many other countries in the world.
57:15I think this also leads you two basic
57:17issues within the view that we have in
57:20the UAE. One thing is our president
57:23believes she Muhammad bin Zed clearly
57:24believes in what I would call strategic
57:27autonomy. The idea that this is a
57:29changing international system. Our
57:31relationship with the United States is a
57:33cornerstone of how we do things. Our
57:37relations in the region have to be
57:39managed. But we also have to have an
57:41Asia policy with China and Korea and
57:44others. So he's very much there. And if
57:47you look at for example what we have
57:50done with Africa today, we have about
57:53150 billion invested in Africa dollars
57:56and we have a trade of overund million
57:59dollars with Africa. Again we saw an
58:01opportunity. We took a risk. But the
58:02whole idea is this is a world that you
58:06want to sort of keep your core
58:08relationships. make sure that these core
58:11relationships are for areas where you
58:14need to develop them. For example,
58:17technology and AI and others and secure
58:19them, but at the same time, you have to
58:21be al also open towards other
58:24opportunities as you move forward.
58:25>> Would you like to see China playing a
58:27more forceful political role in in
58:30managing some of the security threats so
58:31we can get to that?
58:32>> Well, definitely. I mean if China can
58:34really help on the issue of the maritime
58:38security of the state of armos and lean
58:41on that matter it doesn't have to be you
58:44know a military presence but I think
58:46it's very welcome because China benefits
58:49from Babel Mandev it benefits from this
58:51rate of armas so definitely any sort of
58:54Chinese let's say influence towards
58:58securing what I would call international
59:00law and in in our case this is very
59:03important. If China can also impress on
59:05Iran on a political also solution, it's
59:08very very welcome.
59:10>> C can you say anything about the
59:11conversations that have taken place
59:12between your government and the Chinese
59:14government? I I I would I would rather
59:16not but I think uh the Chinese know our
59:19view and uh they respect our view and uh
59:24definitely as I said China has an
59:26interest really in upholding let's say
59:29the sort of freedom of navigation within
59:32these streets it uh not only on the
59:34principle of international law but
59:36practically also in for its own benefit
59:40>> thank you so much for doing this today
59:41both laying out very clearly your
59:43analysis of a very complicated situation
59:45now, but also uh holding to that vision
59:48of what a future order might look like.
59:49I hope we can pick up that conversation
59:51once we're through this current crisis
59:53whenever that is. But for now, thank you
59:54so much for doing this.
59:55>> Thank you very much. Thank you.
1:00:02>> Thank you for listening. You can find
1:00:04the articles that we discussed on
1:00:05today's show at foreignairs.com.
1:00:07This episode of the foreign affairs
1:00:09interview was produced by Rachel Pal,
1:00:11Adelaide Parker, and Kesh theor with
1:00:13audio engineering by Todd Joerger and
1:00:15original music by Robin Hilton. Special
1:00:17thanks as well to Arena Hogan. Make sure
1:00:20you subscribe to the show wherever you
1:00:21listen to podcasts. And if you like what
1:00:23you heard, please take a minute to rate
1:00:25and review it. We release a new show
1:00:27every Thursday. Thanks again for tuning
1:00:29in.

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