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All Things Are Empty - Intro to Madhyamaka Buddhism — Transcript

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0:00North America, I'm coming for you. We're
0:02doing a small tour, just six shows at
0:05some really cool venues. We're going to
0:06talk about philosophy, we're going to
0:07talk about God, about consciousness.
0:10We're going to talk about whatever you
0:12want to talk about because there will be
0:13an extensive Q&A at every show. The
0:15dates are on screen, the ticket link is
0:18in the description. Be there. Jan
0:20Westerhoff, welcome to the show.
0:22>> Thank you for having me. So,
0:24>> I get a lot of requests to talk about
0:26different religious traditions, and this
0:28happened before when people kept asking
0:29me to talk about Hinduism.
0:31And I had to say to them, "This is not
0:32quite as simple as that because,
0:34firstly, Hinduism is of course an
0:35exonym, it's not a word that they even
0:37would use to describe themselves, but
0:38also it's it's too broad of a concept to
0:41sort of to do an episode on." And I
0:43think that the best way of approaching
0:46that is to kind of pick a particular
0:48tradition and begin to explore it. So,
0:50of course, I've had all kinds of
0:51requests to talk about Buddhism, and in
0:54researching Buddhism and looking at
0:56different Buddhist traditions,
0:58it won't take long before you come
0:59across a chap called Nagarjuna, who has
1:02the quite lofty title, sometimes he's
1:04called the second Buddha. So, who is
1:07Nagarjuna and why do people call him the
1:09second Buddha?
1:10>> Mhm.
1:10Yeah, so Nagarjuna lived in the
1:16first or second century of the common
1:18era. Um we don't know exactly when. Um
1:23he was an Indian Buddhist monk, probably
1:26from southern India. Um and that is as
1:30much as we know in kind of hard facts
1:33about his biography.
1:35Um what we know more about are his works
1:39and how influential they were. So, he
1:42um authored one very central text called
1:45the Fundamental Verses on the Middle
1:46Way,
1:47um which really s- founded um
1:51a new
1:53uh section, you might say, or school of
1:56thinking about the Buddhist teaching and
1:58thinking about reality as a whole
2:00that became very popular in India but
2:05then became even more popular later as
2:09Buddhism expanded into the rest of Asia
2:11particularly into Tibet
2:12and constituted more or less the the
2:15dominant or central
2:18form of Buddhist philosophy there. So in
2:21terms of its its the
2:23place within the
2:26Buddhist intellectual world view that
2:27has a very very central role and because
2:30of this central centrality in the
2:32episode the second Buddha came about.
2:35>> So what was this new school? What was it
2:39that was so interesting and and
2:41revolutionary about his thought?
2:43>> Right. Okay, so that's that's an
2:44interesting point especially as it
2:46differs whether we look at it from the
2:48inside or from the outside. Of course no
2:50Buddhist thinker in the history of
2:52Buddhist philosophy ever claimed that
2:55they would be doing something original.
2:57They would always at least have the view
3:00of themselves that that what they were
3:02explaining what the Buddha really meant.
3:04So explaining the explaining accurately
3:06the the the thought of the of the
3:08founder of the tradition rather than
3:10saying okay guys I've got this
3:11completely new theory nobody ever
3:13thought of it before.
3:15So this is so this is at least a self
3:18view but of course what happened
3:21throughout the history of Buddhist
3:22philosophy is that there were a lot of
3:25thinkers put different emphases on
3:28different parts of what the Buddha
3:30taught and that resulted in very very
3:32different views and
3:34um
3:36theories.
3:37And this is also true of Madhyamaka. So
3:41um
3:42Madhyamaka so this this middle way
3:44school of of Nagarjuna
3:47sees itself as
3:50explaining in particular a particular
3:53set of teachings of the Buddha, the the
3:56so-called Perfection of Wisdom texts,
3:59which is a very large group of texts.
4:01One very famous of these that some
4:05people might have
4:06heard of is the famous Heart Sutra, the
4:09Prajnaparamita Hrdaya Sutra.
4:13And all of these
4:15Perfection of Wisdom texts
4:18focus on at least one key concept, which
4:21is the concept of emptiness or shunyata.
4:24And
4:25they describe it and explain it in in
4:28various ways within these
4:31sutras,
4:33but within these texts you don't find
4:36much in terms of argumentative
4:38development for actually arguments for
4:41why things are empty, what that
4:42precisely means, and so on.
4:44And so it is really that Nagarjuna's
4:47works then and those of his followers
4:49then take on that
4:52task and say, "Okay, so we're now going
4:54to provide arguments for what the Buddha
4:58taught in the Perfection of Wisdom
5:00Sutras." And this is this notion of of
5:04emptiness is really the key notion that
5:08the Madhyamikas developed. That that
5:10notion existed before, so this is not in
5:12any way
5:13in
5:15a new invention, but it was really given
5:16center stage in this in this school.
5:19>> Yeah, it's like an emphasis thing. In
5:20the same way that there are different
5:22branches of Christianity who don't
5:25exactly claim to be doing anything new,
5:27but rather properly interpreting or
5:29properly emphasizing the right parts of
5:31Jesus's teachings, people can do the
5:33same thing with with Buddhism too.
5:35>> Yeah, that's exactly right. And so
5:36that's what you would expect say from
5:38the scholastic tradition like the Indian
5:40scholastic tradition that they don't
5:42claim to be innovators, but they claim
5:45to be explicators of what is really
5:48perhaps only implicitly there in the
5:50teaching.
5:51Um but that shouldn't let us think that
5:56well, therefore they're all saying the
5:58same thing or it is all
6:00it is all just the same message message
6:03um
6:04produced in different ways, but it's
6:06rather the case that
6:08there many different ideas we find in
6:11the original teachings of the Buddha
6:13um and depending on where you put the
6:16emphasis on and which ones to you
6:18develop further, you can come up with
6:20very very different perspectives on the
6:23teachings themselves.
6:24>> Mhm. So this concept of of Shunyata
6:26emptiness is
6:28probably the
6:29probably the the sort of central focus
6:31of Madhyamaka Buddhism, would you say?
6:35>> Yes, I think this is the certainly the
6:37the one concept the Madhyamaka is known
6:39by and also the concept that that around
6:43which much else revolves. Yeah.
6:46>> And Madhyamaka means kind of middle way.
6:48And this is this is the school you
6:49mentioned earlier that roughly speaking
6:51you could say Nagarjuna sort of founds
6:54or or brings about intentionally or
6:56unintentionally.
6:57>> Yeah, that's that's right. So they this
6:58they when we when we usually talk about
7:00Nagarjuna school and its followers, we
7:02we refer to it by the term Madhyamaka
7:03which means means the middle way.
7:05>> [snorts]
7:05>> Again, this is an epithet that
7:09every Buddhist tradition claims to be
7:11the middle way
7:13uh but it is in in in Madhyamaka in
7:15particular that this is then elevated
7:16into the this actually the name for the
7:18school itself.
7:19>> Okay, so then a good place to start the
7:21middle way
7:22between what?
7:23>> Well, yes, that's a that is a [snorts]
7:25very good question. So um
7:28so the the
7:30um the Buddha himself of course
7:32described his teachings as as a teaching
7:35of the of the middle way and um that
7:38could um
7:41uh
7:41be regarded as it could be spelled out
7:44in different ways. So, it could be
7:46[snorts] the middle way between
7:48different forms of practice. So,
7:50between, you know, hardcore asceticism
7:53and the life of indulgence, for example.
7:55So, you have the middle
7:56>> [snorts]
7:56>> way which the the Buddha himself
7:59taught. But, also and more pertinently
8:02to the to the present discussion, it can
8:04mean the difference or the middle way
8:06between two philosophical extremes.
8:09>> Sure.
8:10>> And the
8:11two philosophical extremes that the um
8:14uh Madhyamikas distinguish and where
8:17they regard themselves as as following
8:19the middle path between them are on the
8:22one hand uh
8:24kind of
8:26um
8:27uh
8:28absolutism or foundationalism that
8:31assumes the ultimate reality of some
8:36entities within our ontology. That'd be
8:38the one which is some absolute, so
8:41rather [snorts] confusingly called
8:42eternalism, but perhaps foundationalism
8:44is is is a better term in the present
8:45context. And then you have the other
8:48extreme um
8:50which you might want to uh
8:52label nihilism. And that can have both a
8:58a kind of a
9:00uh ethical or moral dimension where
9:02where the idea is that
9:04uh no
9:07um
9:08moral values aren't particularly in
9:09Buddhist con- context, no karmic
9:13relation between the actions you do now
9:16and the consequences you experience
9:18later exists.
9:19>> Mhm.
9:19>> Or it can be be read in a more
9:21ontological manner where you just where
9:22it just assumes complete nonexistence
9:26of anything whatsoever.
9:28>> Mhm.
9:28>> And so so the middle way tries to find a
9:32position that is somewhat equidistant
9:35between the two.
9:36>> Mhm. So, this view this
9:39ontological nihilism. I I think people
9:41will be familiar with the concept of not
9:43believing in morality, not thinking that
9:45your behaviors matter, but
9:48ontologically, that is ontology, the
9:49nature of of being of of of reality.
9:52>> Mhm.
9:53What does ontological nihilism look
9:55like? I mean, you you said a second ago
9:57something like that that nothing really
9:59exists or something like that. It seems
10:01like a bit of an impossible view to
10:02hold. I mean, you could you could
10:03believe that maybe the external world
10:05doesn't exist or maybe you're in a
10:06simulation, but to say that nothing
10:08exists, I mean, you're having certain
10:09experiences, you know, René Descartes
10:12thinks that he thinks, therefore he is.
10:14Maybe he's taken it a step too far and
10:16should have said, "I think, therefore
10:17thinking is happening." But but
10:19something is there, right? But but
10:21is there this view of ontological
10:23nihilism that really does just eliminate
10:25everything?
10:27>> Right. So, and the first question is, of
10:29course, to which extent the the view
10:33that there is nothing is immediately
10:36self-defeating because if I say, "Okay,
10:39so assume it's true that there is
10:42nothing." Then presumably there is at
10:44least a fact that makes it true that
10:47there is nothing. So, there is at least
10:49one fact. So, there is something. So,
10:52ontological nihilism is false if true.
10:56And that's about as good a refutation as
10:58you can get of any philosophical
10:59position. So, that's So, that seems to
11:01be a complete non-starter. All right?
11:03So, So, that that can't be what what it
11:05what is meant by this.
11:07Um I think it's it's
11:10probably more helpful to think of um
11:15uh the whole
11:17the road to ontological nihilism, so to
11:20speak, as being the consequence of
11:23accepting two distinct philosophical
11:27principles, right? So, the first
11:30principle
11:31would be to say [snorts] that if you
11:36have say
11:38a
11:39a
11:41a collection of entities that form a
11:45whole then it is only the
11:49entities that are real and the whole is
11:52not, right? So that would be for example
11:55describing it as a as a form of
11:57mereological nihilism where you say,
11:59"Okay, so there's no aggregation. If
12:01you've got your Lego bricks and you put
12:03them all together to build a Lego car,
12:06then the only thing that's actually real
12:08are the bricks and the car is just some
12:10sort of mental superimposition on the
12:12bricks, right? Okay. So but this is you
12:15you can play it that way but you can
12:17also think of it in a more general way
12:21in terms of things dependent depending
12:23on other things, right? And
12:26so if you say for example something
12:28depends causally on something else then
12:31it's only the causal basis that is real
12:34but everything that is
12:36the effect is actually just a
12:37superimposition, right? So for example
12:40if you have a kind of what do you call
12:41it epiphenomenalism, right? Where you
12:43say, "Okay, so the
12:45a
12:46so you have you have some
12:48um
12:49something happening in your brain that
12:51causes mental states but the only thing
12:52that's really real uh is what happens
12:54happening in your brain and the the
12:56stuff that is hovering
12:58over it is just some sort of weird
12:59epiphenomenon, right? Okay. So you you
13:02you have that as a first principle.
13:04Okay, so it's the the parts are real but
13:06the whole is not, right? And [snorts]
13:08the second principle that you need in
13:11order to get the ontological nihilism
13:13going is the idea that either this part
13:17or whole relation or the dependence
13:19relation goes all the way down, right?
13:21So there's no there's no no way that
13:23stops, right?
13:24>> So to be clear um you know, there's a
13:27table and it's so fun It's always the
13:29table. But, whenever I'm doing a
13:30podcast, there's always a table in front
13:32of me. I should pick another example.
13:34You know, there's a there's a lamp. How
13:35about the lamp, you know? Um and the
13:37lamp is is made up of different parts.
13:39It's made up of the lampshade, made up
13:41of the bulb, it's made up of the the
13:42wires going through it. And people
13:44who've listened to this show should be
13:46familiar with the idea that that
13:48mereological nihilism suggests that the
13:50only thing that really exists
13:52are kind of the parts. And when we
13:54organize them into a different shape,
13:55like a lampshade and a and a bulb,
13:58that's not any new material. The thing
13:59that really exists is the foundational
14:01stuff that we've just arranged. And
14:03often times the thought stops there.
14:05It's like, okay, the parts are real and
14:07the whole is not. But, but what you're
14:08saying here is that the parts themselves
14:11are made up of parts. Like, the bulb is
14:12made up of of a filament and and made up
14:14of glass. And the glass is made up of of
14:17fundamentally made up of atoms. And
14:18atoms are made up of subatomic
14:19particles. And at some point, it's
14:21usually assumed you get down to what
14:24a mereologist might call mereological
14:26simples. Whatever happens to be the
14:27foundational stuff.
14:29But, you could suppose in theory that
14:31actually this just keeps on going
14:33forever. This is what Lewis called dunk,
14:35right? That that it's sort of
14:37infinitely divisible all the way down
14:40and then and never ending. And this
14:41gives you a kind of ontological nihilism
14:44because
14:45the only thing you have all the way down
14:47is sort of part-whole relations. It's a
14:51little bit like when people argue about
14:52God's existence and say
14:54well, this needed a cause and this
14:55needed a cause and this needed a cause.
14:57And some people assume there must be
14:58some first cause. And some people say,
14:59"Well, maybe it's just sort of turtles
15:01all the way down." And that leaves you
15:02with this slightly nihilistic view of
15:04like there being nothing at the bottom.
15:07>> Yeah, yeah, that's that's exactly right.
15:08So, if you look at the at the
15:11mereological case,
15:13the problem start to arise once you
15:15combine mereological nihilism, so the
15:18idea that there no holes, with the
15:20denial of atomism, with the idea that
15:22there are no smallest parts, right?
15:24Because then what happens? So, you start
15:25with your lump, and then you say, "Okay,
15:27well, the lump isn't real, but all the
15:29different parts, if you say take it to a
15:31technician and he takes it apart in the
15:32different parts, those are real, right?"
15:34And then you say, "Well, but those parts
15:36have parts as well, because they're sort
15:38of molecules that make up those." Okay,
15:40so you take it apart even further, and
15:41then you realize they're atoms that make
15:43that up. And at every time, the level of
15:46the whole is thrown away and said,
15:47"Okay, well, that's not really real."
15:49And then, because you continue
15:52indefinitely, you are never going to
15:54reach anything that is real or exists.
15:57So, in the end, the whole thing sort of
15:59dissipates into thin air, and then
16:02you're left with nothing, right? And
16:05this is
16:07I mean, this this kind of structure
16:08doesn't just apply to the to the case of
16:11matter and atoms. It
16:14It's
16:15applies much more general in in in the
16:17Madhyamaka case, because they
16:19consider uh
16:22uh various different dependence
16:23relations. So, the the the part-whole
16:24dependent relation is one, and the
16:26cause-effect uh dependent relation is
16:28another, and then also dependence, uh
16:32probably most general form of
16:33dependence, dependence on a
16:34conceptualizing mind, right? So, if I
16:37say come up with a concept of the
16:39average man, the average man has 2.4
16:42children,
16:43this is simply a mental imputation.
16:45There is no I can't go out on the
16:47streets and say, "Okay, so where is the,
16:48you know, where where is the average man
16:50and his fractional children?" Um this is
16:53something which completely depends on um
16:57uh
16:59conceptualization the conceptualizing
17:01enterprise that
17:03talks about the ratio between men and
17:04children, yeah? And so, if that is the
17:06case, then you you get this kind of
17:08disappearance
17:10across the board. So, whenever something
17:11depends on something, if the dependent
17:13chain is infinitely downwards, and if
17:16whenever you you have something
17:18dependent on something else, the the
17:20thing that depends isn't really real,
17:22but only
17:24the dependent basis is, then it all
17:26dissipates, right? And that is um why
17:30certainly the opponents, both the
17:32Buddhist and the non-Buddhist opponents
17:34in ancient India, describe the
17:37Madhyamaka as a form of nihilism,
17:38because you say if if they take those
17:40things on board, well, in the end we are
17:42we're left with nothing, right? So, how
17:44can you say
17:45this really is the middle way if it
17:47seems to be pretty much close to the
17:50extreme on the left, right?
17:52>> sort of did take this this view, uh sort
17:55of that that objects are kind of like
17:58dependent and that dependence goes all
18:00the way down. Just to be clear, you said
18:01that we were talking about the middle
18:02way, we talked about nihilism, and and
18:04what was the opposite extreme of this?
18:05Like, if we looked at the lamp, what
18:07would the sort of opposite view be of
18:09the nature of the lamp?
18:10>> Well, the opposite extreme would be a
18:12kind of foundationalism, right? Where
18:13you say there is something about the
18:16lamp that is ultimately real, where the
18:19analysis stops, and where also the the
18:21ontological dependence stops, right? So,
18:24uh so either if you think that the whole
18:27is real, or that the parts are real, or
18:29something in between,
18:31uh
18:31or or even that, you know, the lamp
18:33isn't real and the parts aren't real,
18:35but there is the Platonic idea of the
18:37lamp in a third realm that is
18:38non-material. That is also kind of
18:40foundationalism, it's just that the the
18:41foundation is somewhere up there in the
18:43third realm. Yeah.
18:44>> Yeah.
18:45>> We'll get back to the show in just a
18:46moment, but first, where do you get your
18:48news? If you're like me and most people
18:50these days, it probably comes from the
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18:54great in many ways. There is just an
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19:01to navigate the online media landscape
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20:18And with that said, back to the show.
20:20Okay, so so you've got sort of the view
20:22that there's
20:23a a strong foundation, that there's
20:25something real, and it doesn't need to
20:26be the lamp as a whole in in the
20:28platonic sense. It could be that the
20:30mereological simples are real or that
20:32for some reason, you know, glass is real
20:34or or whatever. Um and this other view
20:37that it's gunk, that that it just sort
20:38of dependence all the way down with with
20:40no basis, which seems to suggest that
20:43there could be no reality at all.
20:46Madhyamaka
20:48sort of takes on board this this second
20:50view of of dependence all the way down,
20:52and therefore gets accused of this
20:53ontological nihilism, this sort of
20:55baselessness.
20:56Uh how do they defend themselves against
20:58that charge?
20:59>> Yeah, that's a that's a really good
21:01point. So, because they they both accept
21:04the two principles that I've just
21:07mentioned namely
21:09Madhyamaka nihilism and independent all
21:11the way down
21:12and they will also say well we are not
21:14nihilists
21:16and
21:17what exactly they mean by being not
21:20nihilists is
21:22is actually
21:23fairly interesting point. So one case
21:26that is pretty clear is they say okay so
21:29we we are not moral nihilists so they
21:32for and for the Buddhist that always
21:33means they don't deny the efficacy of
21:36karma. So that is that that is very
21:38important because another of the
21:40accusations that okay so if you if you
21:43say that you short circuit the entire
21:45nation of notion of karma which
21:49at least according to some
21:50interpretations the entire Buddhist
21:52ethics is founded on and then people are
21:53going to do whatever they like and then
21:55that you have moral chaos.
21:57Okay so that is that is a fairly fairly
21:59straightforward point so that doesn't
22:00touch karma.
22:02But I think what this is probably a good
22:07place to introduce another one of the
22:10key
22:12Madhyamaka notions apart from the notion
22:13of emptiness and that is the distinction
22:15between the two truths right? Again a
22:17notion that goes back all the way to the
22:20Buddha's own teachings but which is
22:23again then interpreted in different ways
22:25right? So you have
22:27there
22:29the idea that you have
22:31the truth or the the way the world
22:34appears to
22:36unenlightened people like you and me to
22:39the ordinary guy on the street and you
22:41have the way the world appears to an
22:44enlightened mind like a Buddha right?
22:47And then you say okay so it is not the
22:49case that this is a kind of
22:53illusion reality distinction. It's not
22:55the case that we only see illusion and
22:57Buddha sees reality rather they are both
23:00described as both two realities or two
23:01truths right? So, it's not one truth and
23:04one falsity. They are both truths,
23:05>> Mhm.
23:06>> but they operate quite differently
23:09depending on who you are and where you
23:11are, right? So, as long as I'm not an
23:16enlightened Buddha,
23:18they they I I I live in this world of
23:21conventional reality, and therefore
23:26the limits and restrictions of that
23:29conventional reality
23:31apply to me. For example, there were the
23:34and the laws of causation and so on. So,
23:38if I, you know, if I drop this glass on
23:40a hard floor, it's going to shatter. So,
23:42that is
23:44remains true even though the Madhyamikas
23:48will also say that ultimately there is
23:50no causation,
23:51right? Because at the level of ultimate
23:53reality, and given that the the kind of
23:55the arguments we just we've just went
23:57through, um
23:59we can argue we we we we can we can
24:01demonstrate, if you regard these
24:03arguments as sound, that there are there
24:06there are no causal powers in the world
24:08because, again, you you can run the same
24:10thing for causal dependence, right? So,
24:13um
24:14uh the effect isn't real, only the cause
24:16is, and then, you know, the causal power
24:18goes goes down the levels, and because
24:20there is no there there there's no
24:22bottom level there where
24:25where the causal power comes from. It
24:26sort of drains away.
24:28>> Yeah, so like, uh you know, the the cup
24:30is being held up by the table, and the
24:31table's being held up by the ground, and
24:32the ground is being held up by the
24:33earth, and so on, and each of those sort
24:36of stages in the chain borrows the
24:38causal power from the thing below it.
24:39And if you take away the floor, the
24:41table isn't going to hold up the cup on
24:43its own.
24:43>> Yeah.
24:44>> And so, if you sort of say that this
24:46just goes on forever, this causal chain
24:49of of holding things up, or like a
24:51like a chain holding up a chandelier,
24:53>> Yeah.
24:54>> link by link that just goes on
24:55infinitely, it kind of seems like you've
24:57you've removed the causal power
25:00altogether because there's no way from
25:01which it's all it's all borrowing.
25:03>> Yeah. Yeah, exactly. I mean but I think
25:04borrowing is a is a good term here. Just
25:06if you if you imagine it in another
25:07example, if
25:10uh
25:11you know, I I owe you some money and I
25:13don't give you cash, but I write you a
25:14check and then you go to the bank and
25:17the check bounces and then I'm saying,
25:19"Okay, no problem. I'll just write you
25:20another one." Right?
25:22>> And then
25:23that continues and if you then think,
25:25"Well, I mean you try to cash it at the
25:26bank and the bank gives you another
25:28check or by another bank." And so you go
25:30on and on and on and on and there is
25:31never at any point anywhere you will get
25:33any real real value, right? So it's the
25:35same thing there with causation.
25:38You get something that looks like it,
25:39but if you actually think, "Okay, so
25:40what's the what's the first cause of
25:42that?" It all drains away. Yeah? But
25:44that doesn't mean that if I now drop the
25:48glass, it's not going to shatter.
25:50>> Yeah, so so how do we make sense of
25:52that, right? Because
25:53in other contexts, somebody will say
25:56exactly what you've just said
25:58>> Mhm.
25:59>> as a means to show why there must be
26:01some kind of causal principle, why
26:03foundationalism must be true because
26:07if if this series of cause like the the
26:10the cup on the table, if that if that
26:11series of causation of the the table
26:12holding up the the floor
26:14doesn't have any causal power of its
26:16own, just keeps borrowing it, borrowing
26:17it, borrowing it, then if that borrowing
26:18goes on forever, there is no causal
26:21power and if there's no cause, there
26:22should be no effect and yet the the cup
26:24is on the table. So another context,
26:26people say, "What we're showing here is
26:28that there must be some kind of
26:30foundational cause, some kind of
26:32foundational um
26:35thing upon which everything else
26:36depends, right? It's a popular argument
26:38for God's existence.
26:40But that's not what we're going for
26:41here, is it?
26:42>> No.
26:43No. Okay, now and that is that is a that
26:45that I think brings us right right to a
26:47to the core of a where
26:50uh it of the the the debate in
26:52Madhyamaka
26:54uh, connect with much of the debate in
26:56in contemporary philosophy, particularly
26:58in regarding question of grounding and
27:01uh, and and dependence relations and so
27:03on.
27:04And um,
27:06there the um,
27:08uh,
27:09one question that arises is first of
27:12all,
27:13do we
27:16uh, do we have an argument to show that
27:19there is something inherently
27:21problematic with non-foundational
27:25structures, right?
27:26>> [snorts]
27:26>> And so by non-foundational structure, I
27:28mean a structure where there's no bottom
27:30level on which everything depends,
27:31right? Now, we've so far we've looked
27:34um,
27:34uh,
27:36basically the idea where it's where it's
27:38[snorts]
27:39uh, turtles all the way down, right? So,
27:40it's goes all the way down. But, this is
27:42not the the only model that has been
27:45used in order to interpret Madhyamaka.
27:47Another possibility is also that it's
27:49turtles all the way round. round. So,
27:51sometimes that described as ontological
27:53coherentism, yeah? [clears throat] So,
27:55what that means is that you don't have A
27:59depends on B depends on C depends on D
28:01infinitely down, but you rather have it
28:05set up in kind of some kind of circle.
28:07So, A depends on B depends on C depends
28:10on D depends on A. Yeah. Right? And the
28:14uh, the idea is that if the circles get
28:17large enough, it actually looks like a
28:19straight line because you don't see the
28:22end of it. So, it's um,
28:25it's
28:27it's you know, if you if you just
28:28imagine a really really large uh, circle
28:31in space, if you're standing on it, it
28:34might look to you as if it's just a
28:35straight line continuing because you
28:37don't see the curve, yeah? So, to that
28:39extent you can say, well, it might be
28:40the case that we actually not living in
28:42a in a kind of turtles all the way down
28:43world, but in turtles all the way round
28:45world, even though we rarely see the
28:48circles link up.
28:50>> Yeah, we might have been confused before
28:52we knew the Earth was a globe to sort of
28:54walk in a straight line and end up sort
28:56of getting back to where we started.
28:58>> Yeah. So, it looks flat to us, even
28:59though it is spherical, right?
29:01>> And causation could potentially work the
29:02same way.
29:03>> Yes, and and all the dependence
29:04relations could be these kind of
29:05structures. They just look flat, by
29:08which I mean straight, to us, uh even
29:10though they're not.
29:12>> Yeah.
29:12>> Okay. And so, um uh now, people have
29:16been exploring
29:18um the the the the formal aspects of of
29:20both this non-foundationalism in in
29:23terms of turtles all the way down and
29:24also of ontological coherentism in quite
29:27a bit more detailed over the last
29:29decades or so. And one of the
29:32interesting
29:34things that have have come out of it is
29:37the understanding that there is nothing
29:40logically wrong with any of these ideas,
29:43right? So, originally, you you might
29:45have thought, "Okay, well, this idea
29:46that it's dependence all the way down or
29:48all the way around, at some point in
29:49time, you hit a contradiction. And that
29:51shows you that these kind of structures
29:53cannot be uh exemplified in reality if
29:55you assume that there are no
29:57contradictions exemplified in reality."
29:59We'll just make that assumption of of of
30:00the time being here, right? Otherwise,
30:01things get get get even more
30:02complicated. Um so,
30:06it's but it but now it actually
30:08it it seems
30:10quite clear, as as far at least as far
30:13as things get clear in this these parts
30:15of philosophy, that the the the you can
30:19have different consistent internally
30:21consistent models of foundational
30:25structures. You can either have the the
30:26common or garden variety where it stops
30:28somewhere and you've got your real stuff
30:29and then everything goes upwards from
30:31that. Or you can have it's you know,
30:34dependence all the way down, or you can
30:35have dependence all the way round, yeah?
30:37Um now, that of course doesn't yet tell
30:40you which one of these is correct, if
30:42any of them is, right? But it tells you
30:45that the all of these are life
30:49options or life issues, right?
30:51>> Well, that's Well, that's what I think
30:53that's where the pressure point's going
30:54to exist for some people because
30:56usually this debate is is settled by
31:00ruling out the possibility of certain
31:02options. And like a Thomist, for
31:05example, a
31:07sort of classical theologian would just
31:09say that like if you have any
31:12understanding of what a cause and and
31:14and an effect is, then as long as you
31:16posit this infinite chain of causation,
31:19especially one that doesn't go back in
31:20time, but one that goes sort of as you
31:22say it's a dependence relation or what
31:24what a a Thomist might call a
31:26essentially ordered series,
31:28that this just can't go on forever or
31:30into a loop because
31:32there would be nowhere from the causal
31:35power which we observe to to originate,
31:38right? Like it's it
31:41We might look for a contradiction and
31:43struggle to find one, but of course you
31:45can understand the
31:46the strong intuition that we have at the
31:49very least. I mean, it seems like there
31:50might be a way of of positing this as a
31:52contradiction if you say that
31:54there exists some effect effect only
31:57exists in so far as there are causes for
31:59those effects.
32:01And you could define them in in various
32:03ways to say that if it doesn't have any
32:04causal power of its own, there's no
32:06cause, yada yada.
32:08But like is this just something that
32:10Majumdar just denies? Like how how can
32:12you defend, in other words, the
32:14plausibility of an infinite or looping
32:16causal chain when
32:17to most people's intuitions
32:19that seems really strange. Like if there
32:21was if there was a candle if there was a
32:22fire burning
32:24and somebody says, "Why is that fire
32:25burning?" And I say, "Well, because it
32:27was lit by a different fire." And
32:29somebody says, "Why was that on fire?"
32:30And I say, "Well, it was it was lit by
32:31the original fire."
32:33It would just seem as though firstly I
32:35hadn't explained anything and secondly
32:37like I was probably missing something.
32:38>> Mhm.
32:39>> Right, good. Yeah, I think that there
32:41there two different things to look at
32:43here. One one is the the sort of more
32:45historical dimension of the question,
32:46and one is the more systematic one. So,
32:48on the historical side, the the Indians
32:51as a whole didn't have great problems
32:56with sequences going all the way back.
32:59>> Mhm.
32:59>> Yeah. So, this this idea that okay,
33:01well, it needs to be starting somewhere,
33:03and you need a first cause to get the
33:05whole thing going, and so on. So, that
33:07was never regarded as a particular
33:09problematic issue. Um I mean, this
33:12this is a good question why that is the
33:14case. I mean, it's I mean, one one of
33:16the uh
33:18potential explanation is a different
33:20understanding of time, where within
33:22classical Indian text, you get a kind of
33:24a cyclical understanding, where it is
33:27not that you have, as you have in
33:30Christianity, a first beginning, you
33:33know, the book of Genesis.
33:35>> Mhm.
33:35>> It it it it starts with uh
33:38um
33:39let there be light, and then of course,
33:40the question what happened before before
33:42God created the world is of course also
33:43not not so easy to answer.
33:45>> Mhm.
33:45>> But um
33:47so, if we assume that there is some kind
33:48of starting point, um then of course, we
33:50need to solve that um
33:52uh
33:53uh
33:54philosophically. But, if you assume that
33:57there is this kind of
33:59theories of world ages or kalpas, which
34:04start out somewhere, and then they
34:05develop, and then they decline, and then
34:07at the end of each each age, then that
34:10leads to the beginning of a new age,
34:11right? And then you've got the next
34:12world age, and the whole thing happens
34:14again, and this goes back indefinitely.
34:16Yeah?
34:17So, to that extent, you you can say,
34:19okay, well, there is um
34:22uh
34:23it's
34:24going back all the way, and
34:29um
34:30so, this is uh
34:32I mean, you find a manifestation of of
34:33the the kind of the refusal to really
34:35engage with that question
34:38when
34:39you sometimes find the discussion within
34:40Buddhism. Okay, so where did where did
34:42actually the cycle of of of
34:44reincarnation and rebirth, which is the
34:45central
34:46central problem within in Buddhist
34:48social ideology, how did that actually
34:50start, right? And then what what you
34:52would usually find a Buddhist teacher
34:54would say, well, this is beginningless
34:55ignorance, anadiyavidya, right? So
34:57ignorance about, you know, the way
34:59reality really works is a kind of the
35:00core problem. But then the question is,
35:02okay, where where does the ignorance
35:03come from? And they say, you know, it's
35:05beginningless. Right? It's always been
35:06there and like like samsara. So to that
35:09extent, you don't find it surprising
35:12that within Indian
35:15scholastic text, you don't find much
35:17engagement with this question that is
35:19very central to Western metaphysics,
35:21right? Okay, so that's the that's the
35:22kind of historical question, yeah? But
35:24then the question is, of course,
35:27is that simply a historical artifact or
35:29is there simply nothing the Madhyamikas
35:31can say, right?
35:34But I think here you you need to
35:37ask yourself, okay, so on the one hand,
35:40if, you know, you you you look down
35:42these
35:44chains of infinitely backwards
35:46dependence and you get this kind of
35:49metaphysical vertigo and you think, you
35:50know, where the where is where is this
35:51all going to go? And it kind of looks
35:53kind of shifty. But then
35:56what to take into account, there are the
35:57cases where
35:59it it looks comparable, but you don't
36:02get that shift in a say, take the
36:04negative numbers, right? The number
36:06minus one, the predecessor is the number
36:08minus two. I mean, these are all as real
36:11as the numbers get, but there's no
36:13smallest negative number, right? So they
36:16they go all the way back the number
36:18line, yeah?
36:20So we don't really have a problem here.
36:26And and why is that? Well,
36:29presumably because we don't think that
36:31each number sort of borrows its
36:33existence from the predecessor, right?
36:35But then the question is, okay, why do
36:37we actually think of existence or
36:39causation in that way either, right?
36:41>> Mhm.
36:41>> So, why do we actually think that
36:45causation works on this kind of
36:46borrowing model where the the effect
36:49only has its own causal power because
36:52it's borrowed that from the from its own
36:55cause, and that borrowed it from
36:56something else, and there has to be some
36:58sort of metaphysical central bank that
37:00holds the gold.
37:01>> Yeah.
37:01>> Because otherwise all the the checks are
37:03going to collapse, right?
37:05>> Yeah.
37:05>> But within Madhyamaka, you you don't
37:07have that causation that that notion of
37:09causation as this kind of substantial
37:10real relation at all.
37:12>> Mhm.
37:12>> Yeah. And I mean, if you want to, I can
37:14explain a little bit why that is the
37:15case.
37:16>> Well, I think it's it seems like the
37:18issue here is one of dependence in that
37:20like
37:21it's easy enough to say that the number
37:23line structures on infinitely, but I
37:26don't think there's a a meaningful sense
37:28in which like the number minus one
37:30depends upon the existence of of minus
37:33two, except maybe conceptually.
37:35>> Mhm.
37:35>> Like you might want to say that
37:36conceptually you need to have a minus
37:38two to make sense of what minus one
37:39means.
37:40>> Yeah.
37:40>> I mean, that's definitely, yeah.
37:41>> But in that sense, you've kind of turned
37:43these numbers into concepts rather than
37:44like
37:45real things in the world, right? And I
37:47feel as though
37:49when you have a a uh
37:51an existential dependence,
37:53>> Mhm.
37:53>> that is something depends for its
37:54existence, not not as a concept, but
37:56like ontologically, right? Um like I've
37:58heard you talk about this before, like
38:00say the the existence of of Northern
38:03England,
38:03>> Yeah.
38:03>> right? Clearly, the existence of
38:05Northern England depends conceptually on
38:08the existence of Southern England.
38:09Wouldn't make sense to call it that
38:11otherwise.
38:11>> Yeah.
38:12>> But the thing I'm I'm picking out with
38:14the phrase Northern England, which is
38:15like a particular landmass,
38:17>> Mhm.
38:17>> the that actually existing mass
38:19obviously doesn't depend on the
38:20continued existence of Southern England,
38:22which could disappear and the North
38:24would still exist.
38:26And
38:27I I I suppose I want to say that in the
38:29former case conceptually
38:31yeah, that can that can just be
38:33an infinity of of of sort of groundless
38:36whatever. That's fine, but when you have
38:37an existential relation where the
38:39existence of a particular landmass
38:41really does depend on say the the rocks
38:44that that landmass is made of and the
38:45rocks really do depend on their sort of
38:48being gravitationally held together
38:51that
38:52it does seem to me that
38:55that
38:56sort of see that that seems to me like
38:58borrowing. That seems to me like
38:59borrowing its ontology, borrowing its
39:01existence. You know what I mean?
39:03Um so I I would and I'm I'm saying that
39:05as if as if you don't know that. I'm
39:07sure you know that, but for the sake of
39:08our audience
39:09um and for the sake of myself
39:12that's why I would like to ask maybe how
39:14the Ajāmika would would would respond to
39:16this because I I suppose that the the
39:18the the sort of functional takeaway from
39:19this cuz people might be listening to
39:20this like oh, this is cool, interesting,
39:22but isn't what can I do with this? It's
39:23like
39:24all the time we're having debates on
39:26this channel about the existence of God
39:28and so often they collapse into some
39:31kind of argument for the non-existence
39:33of an infinite regress of dependency, of
39:36causal chains, of time, or whatever it
39:38may be. And this is like an interesting
39:40escape route for many people it seems.
39:42You're offering a a sort of no, you
39:43don't need this. And I suppose I really
39:45want to pin down how that works.
39:47>> Right. Yeah. Good. So who'll who'll
39:49other
39:50chapter to talk about and and these are
39:54the Buddhist arguments against the
39:55notion of a creator God. So that's
39:57that's because they they the Buddhists
39:58of course they engaged with theists
40:01quite a bit within uh
40:03uh classical India. And so they also had
40:05had to had something to say on that
40:07question when when theists came along
40:08and said, "No, no, no, this was all
40:10created by Ishvara, the great creator."
40:11>> Uh-huh.
40:12>> Um but put that to the side for for the
40:14time being because I think what is
40:15important to to get clear about is how
40:19the Madhyamikas think about causation,
40:21right? So, um
40:23the the sort of intuitive
40:26idea presumably would be that causation
40:30is a force out there, mind-independent
40:33force that ticks along in the world and
40:37does stuff independent of our
40:41thinking about it, wanting it to go a
40:42specific way, right? So, if we you know,
40:45if I set in motion a certain
40:48causal process, say I I I light one part
40:51of a dry field, the whole thing starts
40:53to blaze up and uh
40:55there is nothing I can do about it even
40:57if I said, "Okay, I wish I've never
40:58started this," right? Okay, so it it
41:00goes goes like that.
41:02Um
41:03but in the in the the the Buddhist
41:06conceptual the particularly in the
41:07Madhyamaka conception of causation, um
41:11uh it is actually quite distinct from
41:14that. And one reason it is distinct from
41:18that is
41:20uh connected with their specific
41:22understanding of time,
41:25and the the understanding of time that
41:28uh
41:29uh Madhyamaka takes on board and
41:32actually take that on board from from an
41:33earlier Buddhist school called
41:36Sautrantika,
41:37is a form of presentism, right? So, it's
41:40the idea that only the present moment
41:42exists, the past isn't real, and future
41:45isn't real, but just the the the the the
41:47present moment.
41:48>> Yeah, what might be known in uh sort of
41:50modern academia as as the A-theory of
41:52time.
41:54>> Um
41:54>> That only the present exists.
41:56>> Well, we I mean with the with the
41:57A-theory of time, you have the specific
42:00contrast well between the A-theory and
42:02the B-theory about whether you've got
42:04anything that moves there, right? So, in
42:06the B-theory, the the idea is okay, you
42:08just have all these different temporal
42:09relations before, after, um
42:12uh um
42:13uh sorry, you have to do different
42:14relations in in terms of temporal
42:16distance, you know, 1 1 day before, 1
42:18day after, and so on. And they the they
42:20never change. Whereas, if you talk in
42:23terms of present, past, and future, what
42:26is present now what was future yesterday
42:29and will be past tomorrow. And so, it
42:31seems to change its temporal attributes,
42:34right? And so, this is what is happening
42:35in the A theory, whereas in the B
42:36theory, nothing nothing moves, yeah?
42:39Um,
42:40but well, I mean, what what the the the
42:42essential bit here about the the the
42:45conception of time
42:46I've just mentioned is the the, um,
42:50ontological idea that it is only the
42:55present that exists, right? So, uh,
42:59the
43:00for the for the opposite picture,
43:01imagine a kind of
43:03block universe, right? Where sort of the
43:06present is sort of in the middle and
43:08then there is at the left side of the
43:09block is everything that happened in the
43:10past and the future somehow frozen is
43:12what is going to happen in the future
43:15and we sort of move through that block,
43:17yeah? But you would say, well, even
43:19though I can only influence the present,
43:22uh,
43:23the the the past and the future they are
43:24still they still have ontological
43:25status, they still exist, yeah? Okay.
43:27So, the the Sautrantikas and then also
43:29the the Madhyamikas who follow that deny
43:31that. They say that it's only only the
43:32present moment is real, right? And now
43:34you get into an interesting problem when
43:36you're talking about causation because
43:38causation, uh, is a relation that
43:40connects two points in time, right? Um,
43:43and I mean, there is a whole debate
43:44again about whether you can have
43:45simultaneous causation where the cause
43:47and effect happen at the same time, but
43:49let's put that to one side at the
43:51moment. I think it's much more plausible
43:52to think of the cause happening first
43:55and the effect happening later, you
43:57know, I start smoking at a petrol
43:59station, then a second later there is a
44:01big explosion. Uh, so, first there is me
44:08lighting the match. Later, there is the
44:10big boom, right? So, in in a in a causal
44:13sequence, yeah? Okay. So, however, um if
44:18you believe that only the present moment
44:20is real, how can you actually make sense
44:21of causation? Because it seems you're
44:24always missing one part of the two
44:28relata that are related, right? So,
44:30you're either
44:31um if you if you locate yourself at the
44:34time when I light the match, then the
44:38explosion doesn't yet exist because
44:39that's future. Or if you say, "Okay, so
44:42now the petrol station blows up." Well,
44:44now the time when I lit the match
44:46doesn't exist anymore because that's
44:47past, yeah?
44:49So, okay. So, how can I still I
44:50presumably still want to say it is my
44:53stupid smoking that blew up the petrol
44:54station. So, okay. So, how how can I say
44:57that? Well, and the Mariamika says,
44:59"Okay. So, you only ever have one real
45:01relatum here because only the present is
45:03real, and the other one is supplied
45:06either by memory or by anticipation."
45:09Yeah? So, if I'm uh
45:12uh
45:12at the petrol station lighting the
45:14match, I should anticipate in my mind
45:17what is going to happen next, namely the
45:18big explosion. And at the time of the
45:21explosion, I can probably remember the
45:23stupid thing I just did, namely light a
45:24match, right? So, that's how I can talk
45:28about causation, yeah? But now, what
45:31that means is that
45:33we can [snorts] only talk about uh
45:35causation and the causal relation
45:37because
45:39there is some essential mind-made
45:42ingredient in here, right? So, you you
45:45you can't have the relation without
45:47anticipation or memory, and so you can't
45:50have the idea of causation ticking along
45:54at the background of
45:56>> [snorts]
45:56>> a world as it is anyway independent of
45:59mind's handywork.
46:01>> I feel like I've heard this before.
46:03>> Well, you might have done. Perhaps from
46:04me. I
46:04>> No, but I mean I feel I feel I feel like
46:06I've heard this kind of thinking before
46:08but in a different context which is and
46:10I I I know
46:12you're you've talked about this at at
46:13least a bit as a as a sort of point of
46:15historical interest but if someone just
46:18tuned in they might think that you were
46:19talking about a certain Immanuel Kant.
46:22Like it seems as though a lot of the
46:25concepts which
46:27uh
46:28are useful for Madhyamaka philosophy
46:30that is the nature of causation, the
46:32nature of time, the fact that they're
46:34not real features of the world but
46:36rather something we kind of impose onto
46:38this
46:40sort of external
46:42world that kind of is is really there
46:43but we don't have great access to it. It
46:45sort of begins to sound a little bit
46:46like the Kantian conception of there
46:48being this noumena out there and that
46:50causation and time are are things that
46:52we map onto that instead and so
46:55I don't know. It is this
46:56a sort of preempting of the philosophy
46:58of Kant or are there
47:00important distinctions? Just cuz that's
47:02where people's minds might might go and
47:04if there are important differences I
47:06want to make them sort of clear.
47:08>> Sure. Sure. So I I think two two two
47:11things that that might come to mind here
47:14uh you're right. I mean one one is Kant.
47:17The The second is of course Hume right?
47:19And and his his theory of of causation.
47:22Um so stick let's let's stick with the
47:25case of Kant for the time being because
47:26this is quite interesting
47:28>> [snorts]
47:28>> to the extent that
47:31in the
47:32um early engagement
47:34of Western thinkers with Madhyamaka so
47:39in the from the 1920s, 1930s onwards
47:43um
47:44Kant and Kantianism was op- often used
47:48as a kind of
47:49uh explanatory paradigm in order to
47:51explain what the Madhyamaka's are up to
47:56yeah,
47:57And so, um, so this is this is
47:59historically quite important because it
48:01it it it provides a kind of a lens
48:04through which early interpreters try to
48:06understand that, and of course it's it's
48:08clear why they want to do that. Their
48:10readers would probably know a bit about
48:12Kant, and they wouldn't know anything
48:13about Nagarjuna. If you tell them
48:15Nagarjuna is a little bit like Kant in
48:17these respects, they at least get the
48:18general idea. Yeah. Okay. And I mean,
48:21you are perfectly right, and they were
48:22perfectly right that they are
48:23interesting parallels.
48:26Um,
48:26for example, the idea that space and
48:29time are not features of the world out
48:33there, but to certain extent mind-made
48:37projections onto it, yeah? And the other
48:41important distinction that they drew
48:43between comparison they drew between
48:46between Madhyamaka and Kant is the
48:48distinction between the two truths that
48:49I've mentioned earlier on, where they
48:50said, "Okay, so the we've got the the
48:54conventional truth that looks a little
48:56bit like the Kantian phenomena, so the
48:58stuff that appears to us,
49:00and then there is the ultimate truth,
49:03and that's the Kantian noumena, and that
49:05is sort of we can't really know anything
49:07about that unless we are
49:09enlightened Buddhas, and then presumably
49:11you can see what the ultimate truth is
49:12like, yeah? Not from our perspective."
49:14Kant makes this distinction between the
49:16the phenomena, which is how things sort
49:17of appear to you, like if you look at an
49:20object, like the table, there it is
49:22again.
49:23Um,
49:23what I'm really experiencing is not the
49:25table, but rather my perception of the
49:28table. It's how the table appears to me
49:30in sight, in sound, if I tap it, how it
49:32might feel. Yeah. And I can never
49:34actually just directly access the table,
49:36I suppose, without being the table, you
49:38know? Otherwise, it's through
49:39perception. So, what I experience is the
49:41so-called phenomena, but the thing in
49:43itself, the thing that's really there,
49:44that I don't have any access to except
49:46through my sort of window of perception,
49:49is what Kant calls the noumena.
49:50>> Mhm.
49:51>> Just to
49:52clarify that.
49:53>> Yeah, so and and you of course there has
49:55been a since the days of Kant there has
49:57been an endless debate about what the
49:59noumena actually are to
50:02from from the view is there No, is there
50:04actually one noumenon for every
50:05phenomenon? So, is there a sort of a
50:07noumenal glass behind there or is it
50:08some kind of sort of amorphous thing
50:10behind it or should we think about it in
50:11a in a completely different way?
50:13>> Mhm.
50:13>> Uh of course that I mean that will take
50:14us take us down the the route of of of
50:16Kant exegesis, but it is probably
50:19worthwhile just to to have a
50:22some some brief ideas about where the
50:24discontinuities are between the Kantian
50:26picture and Nagarjuna. So, to see that
50:27they are they're not singing from the
50:29same sheet for the the the whole way. I
50:33think it is it is
50:35useful for to illustrate some context.
50:38Uh but the the the main diff diff
50:40difference um
50:42lies with um
50:45the Madhyamaka theory of the emptiness
50:49of emptiness. So,
50:51So, as as I said before so so emptiness
50:53is really sort of key concept for for
50:55Madhyamaka um it is such
50:58>> Just before we talk about the emptiness
50:59of emptiness, I feel like we haven't
51:00actually really explained what emptiness
51:03like is. We've kind of talked about the
51:05Madhyamaka as the middle way between
51:06these these two so-called extremes of
51:08there being some kind of foundational
51:11ontology. Let's say so some some
51:13substance upon which everything else
51:14depends. Some if you keep dividing like
51:17the cup in half you'll get to some
51:18foundational stuff. And this other view
51:20that it just goes on forever. Madhyamaka
51:22is the middle way and it proposes this
51:24view called emptiness. Okay.
51:28Emptiness of what? Empty like what what
51:30are the things that that are empty and
51:31what is it that they're empty of and how
51:33does this help solve our problem?
51:34>> Right. Very good. Okay, so I think this
51:36is a very important point because when
51:37when you you hear these
51:39the these statements in in in in the
51:42Madhyamaka literature everything is
51:43empty and what's of course this you You
51:45will find that earlier Perfection of
51:46Wisdom texts. of course the question is,
51:48you know, empty empty of what? So, the
51:50the notion that it's it's not that it's
51:52you know it's like the glass is empty of
51:53water. Right.
51:54So, it's it's because emptiness is in a
51:56in a in a metaphysical sense. And what
51:59it is empty of is the the technical term
52:03that the the the Indians use is
52:05svabhava.
52:06>> Yes.
52:07>> Um which um
52:09if you if you take the the the term
52:11apart, it consists of two parts. Sva
52:13meaning something like its own and bhava
52:15existence So, the whole thing is
52:17somewhat unhelpfully then translated as
52:19own being, but it doesn't really tell
52:21you what it is, either. So, I think a
52:23much better translation that has now
52:24been adopted is intrinsic nature. And
52:27the idea is that something has intrinsic
52:30nature if it doesn't borrow its
52:34existence
52:35uh sorry, if if if it doesn't bear its
52:37existence in itself. Yeah? So, um
52:41So, so one way of thinking about this is
52:46if something is
52:48uh consists of parts, then it cannot
52:51exist by svabhava because what it is is
52:55actually not itself, but it's something
52:57that is derived from the parts, right?
52:59So, if I've got the lamp again, the lamp
53:01itself can't do anything independent of
53:04the parts that make it up, right? So,
53:06what is really doing the lighting are
53:09the are the parts, not the lamp.
53:11>> Yeah.
53:11>> Yeah.
53:12>> And uh so, that is that is one one case
53:14where you say, "Okay, so they are they
53:16the the lamp itself has no svabhava." Um
53:19uh another uh um
53:21dimension of the same thing is that if
53:25you um
53:27can take something
53:29conceptually apart, right? So, even if
53:32you say have an an
53:34physically indivisible atom, it
53:36presumably has still specific qualities
53:38or properties that you can mentally
53:39distinguish. And so, you can sort of
53:41mentally take it apart apart from even
53:44though you can't take it physically
53:45apart. That also is something which
53:47stops it from having intrinsic nature
53:50because its nature depends on all these
53:51different properties. Yeah? Okay. So
53:54when the Madhyamaka says things are
53:55empty, they mean that. They mean things
53:58are empty of their intrinsic nature. And
54:02they mean that
54:03entities depend on other entities for
54:07their existence. They borrow it from
54:09other things.
54:10>> Mhm.
54:10>> Yeah? So that is that is the
54:13the key notion. You know, that we can
54:14see immediately how that connects with
54:16the notion of foundationalism and
54:18non-foundationalism we talked about
54:19earlier on, right? Because if you think,
54:22okay, so the table has no svabhava
54:24because it consists of parts. And then
54:26you say, okay, well, what about the
54:27parts? They surely have svabhava, right?
54:29And there were earlier Buddhists who
54:31thought that. They said, okay, so if you
54:33break it down to the final bits, then
54:34those things actually have this
54:36intrinsic nature.
54:37>> Like the mereological simples. They they
54:39would they would have
54:40>> Yeah, like the mereological simples.
54:42They identified that with particularized
54:44properties or what is sometimes called
54:46called tropes. So occurrences of
54:48properties at specific
54:50spacio-temporal instance, right? I think
54:52that these are really real.
54:54And so the table is just sort of made up
54:57of these things like an image on the
54:59screen is made up of pixels, right?
55:01Pixels are real and they're sort of
55:02difficult to make out because they move
55:03really fast and they're really small,
55:05but they are really there. And what we
55:07see is the table which is unreal, but
55:10the pixels are real, right? And so the
55:13the
55:14the Madhyamaka's of course object to
55:15that and say, no, no, no, the pixels
55:16aren't real either, right? Because they
55:19can again be either taken apart
55:21conceptually or mereologically.
55:23>> But by real you mean they don't have
55:25svabhava. You mean they don't have
55:27intrinsic nature.
55:29>> real in the sense that, you know, that
55:30the the table is there. I can I can
55:31touch it and interact with it, but it
55:32doesn't have its own intrinsic nature.
55:35>> Very good. So so when when we say real,
55:37we we in this context we have to
55:39distinguish between conventional real
55:41and ultimately real, right? None of
55:42these things are ultimately real, right?
55:44They are conventionally real in so far
55:46as, you know, there is a glass here and
55:47if I tap against it it makes a sound.
55:49So, that is all that that is all
55:51happening, but if I analyze that in
55:54terms of where it all comes from, in
55:57terms of what it's based on, I end up
56:00with nothing. And that is the that is
56:02the the fundamental notion of emptiness
56:04that we we find here.
56:05>> So, so why not the these these
56:07foundational mereological simples or
56:09whatever? Why not like, you know,
56:10somebody might say, "Well, whatever this
56:12Suppose you're like some kind of atomist
56:14and you just you just posit that there
56:16there does exist some kind of
56:19unbreakable
56:20foundational unit of stuff and it's
56:23maybe it's an excitation of the quantum
56:24wave field at a particular point in
56:26space-time or maybe it's a particular
56:28string that vibrates in a particular way
56:30and that's what gives it its essence.
56:32Can't we just say that that is a thing,
56:34it exists, and that is the foundational
56:37intrinsic nature of reality?
56:39Why does emptiness
56:41go all the way down? Why why would why
56:43would those things themselves be empty?
56:45>> Yeah, so you'll have to
56:47Of course, you have to look at the
56:48specific cases there and say, "Okay, so
56:52if you
56:53have, you know, your your your
56:56infinite sequence of decomposition, then
56:57it's it's clear that, you know, none of
57:00these things can have intrinsic nature
57:02because they go all the way down."
57:04If you have some more sophisticated
57:08notions within modern physics,
57:11the the mereological thing might not be
57:15so much of a problem because you think,
57:16"Okay, well, what it really is is not
57:18reality is um
57:20um
57:22uh not
57:24made up of, you know, little little sort
57:26of little billiard balls that are really
57:27small, but say of a probability
57:30distribution of a particle being at that
57:33place or that place, right? And then of
57:36course that that what you think about
57:37that then depends on the details of
57:40well, what you actually think a
57:41probability distribution is, right? So,
57:43are probabilities things that are out
57:45there in the things, and you got
57:47objective probabilities, or do you
57:49actually think that they are in states
57:51of information or of or states of mind?
57:54And once you if if you go with the
57:55latter, then of course you immediately
57:57bring the mind in, and then of course
57:58you you you you get that dependence of
58:01the the stuff that you use fundamentally
58:03you think is fundamentally real on your
58:05conceptualization, and so on. You can
58:06see where this is all going, right?
58:07>> Mhm.
58:08>> But um I think perhaps we we we should
58:10sort of backtrack to because we we we
58:13were talking earlier about counter
58:14causation, right? So, we should probably
58:16come back to that. Um
58:19and um
58:20uh
58:21uh
58:21the the
58:23Okay, so I think we have now a fairly
58:24clear idea of what emptiness means, and
58:26now we'll get back to the notion of
58:28emptiness of emptiness.
58:29>> Mhm.
58:29>> Yeah.
58:30And so this is this is um
58:33uh
58:34um
58:34where the the Madhyamikas really
58:39extend the notion of emptiness to
58:41the entire
58:43the the
58:44the the entire intellectual system, and
58:47also argue that emptiness itself is
58:51empty. Now, what does that mean? Well,
58:53um as we've
58:55discussed earlier on, they reject the
58:58existence of
59:01ultimately real things, right? The
59:03foundations of reality, yeah? But the
59:06the arguments that they use for that
59:10well, can also be easily turned into
59:13arguments for
59:15rejecting ultimately true theories,
59:18right? Because we'll get problems with
59:21those as well. Now, if you think
59:24that there are no ultimately true
59:25theories, then you also can't say that
59:29the theory of emptiness is an ultimately
59:31true theory. And that's that's that is
59:33clear.
59:34Now, that is that is certainly
59:37um
59:37um what is um
59:41uh
59:42what is the case in in Madhyamaka and uh
59:47and Nagarjuna is extremely explicit
59:49about that in saying that those who turn
59:52uh
59:53the theory of emptiness into a
59:56metaphysical view, who so a a view that
59:58they think is ultimately real, they are
1:00:01really beyond hope, right? So, that's
1:00:03that that that is
1:00:04a level of uh
1:00:06a level of confusion that is that that
1:00:08is particularly problematic. Um
1:00:11and there you see the the
1:00:13the important difference, say, between
1:00:16uh the Kantian picture and the
1:00:17Madhyamaka picture because for the the
1:00:20Kantian, the distinction between the
1:00:21noumenon and the and the phenomenon is
1:00:25the is the ultimate
1:00:28the ultimate really true philosophical
1:00:31theory, right? So, this is if you if you
1:00:32think about things rightly and you
1:00:34follow all the arguments
1:00:36uh of Kant and you think they are all
1:00:38sound, then you'll end up with that
1:00:39view, but that's that's it. And then you
1:00:42then you've reached the truth, right?
1:00:43And uh you've you've sort of seen the
1:00:46ultimate structure of the world, even
1:00:47though you can't really speak into the
1:00:49noumenon, at least you know it's there.
1:00:52Yeah? Okay. But the in Madhyamaka, this
1:00:55is not the case, right? So, the
1:00:57uh the idea is not that you'll you work
1:01:02through all the arguments and then
1:01:03you'll end up with an ultimately true
1:01:06theory, right? It's rather the case that
1:01:09this entire
1:01:12uh
1:01:13artifice [laughter] of Madhyamaka is as
1:01:17conventionally real as other
1:01:18conventionally real theories, right? But
1:01:20it's not anything that is ultimately
1:01:22real or ultimately true. Yeah? And so I
1:01:24think this is this is an important point
1:01:25to get where where there are
1:01:26discontinuities between the Kantian
1:01:28picture and and the Madhyamaka picture.
1:01:30>> So,
1:01:32the theory of emptiness and the school
1:01:35of Madhyamaka Buddhism
1:01:37is not true?
1:01:40>> It's not ultimately true.
1:01:42>> [laughter]
1:01:42>> Right? So, so okay, so let me perhaps
1:01:45explain this a little bit more what what
1:01:46what what is meant by all of this. So,
1:01:49um
1:01:50So,
1:01:51uh
1:01:52we we probably shouldn't shouldn't um
1:01:55forget that
1:01:57Buddhism and and Buddhist philosophy is
1:01:59not just an and and intellectual
1:02:00enterprise, but a kind of soteriological
1:02:02project, right? So, it is supposed to It
1:02:05is something that is supposed to help
1:02:08you escape from
1:02:11existential suffering, right? Or the
1:02:13cycle of existential suffering, of
1:02:14samsara, of rebirth, and so on.
1:02:17And so,
1:02:19the
1:02:20So, so that is the that is the the the
1:02:23the the the ultimate aim, and that is
1:02:25the the Buddha himself was quite
1:02:27explicit when he said that all that I
1:02:28teach is suffering and and the end to
1:02:30suffering, and that's it, right? So, now
1:02:34what whether a specific theory
1:02:37um is is is to be regarded as as true or
1:02:40not,
1:02:42the the focus that the Buddhists
1:02:45put on it is to which extent does it
1:02:48facilitate this soteriological goal? To
1:02:50which extent does it help you to escape
1:02:52the cycle of samsara, right? And there
1:02:55they actually they within sort of
1:02:58Buddhist classification of different
1:02:59philosophical views, they argue that the
1:03:03that different views are more or less
1:03:06likely to help you succeed in that,
1:03:07right? Um
1:03:09so,
1:03:11uh
1:03:11if you
1:03:13um
1:03:14look at sort of
1:03:16uh these classifications of different
1:03:17philosophical positions that you find in
1:03:19Madhyamaka text. Of course, Madhyamaka
1:03:20always comes out at top, right? So,
1:03:21that's the that's the that's the
1:03:23the most sophisticated view you can
1:03:24have. But, then below that, there are
1:03:27also various other theories like, for
1:03:30example, Yogacara idealism and
1:03:32Abhidharma there there views of the
1:03:34Abhidharma and so on that are also sort
1:03:36of steps in the right direction, right?
1:03:39And so, to that extent, none of these
1:03:40theories are ultimately true, including
1:03:42Madhyamaka, right? But, they provide
1:03:44better and better means for
1:03:47escape from
1:03:49uh existential suffering, right? And I
1:03:51think here it's it's important to be to
1:03:52be aware of
1:03:54a kind of difference within the
1:03:58the the Madhyamaka project and the
1:04:00project that you often find within in in
1:04:04philosophical discussion and that is the
1:04:06the question
1:04:07to whether the
1:04:10aim of philosophy is arriving at an
1:04:13ultimately true theory
1:04:15or whether you regard philosophy or
1:04:18philosophical practice as a kind of
1:04:21medicine or therapy for the diseases of
1:04:23the mind, right? And now, this is not a
1:04:25particularly Buddhist idea. You'll also
1:04:26find that within Western philosophy, you
1:04:29know, I find it in you know, Pyrrhonian
1:04:30skepticism.
1:04:32Uh you also find it in the later
1:04:33Wittgenstein, you know, showing the the
1:04:35fly the way out of the fly bottle and so
1:04:37on. So, you've got various parallels of
1:04:39that. And if you if you have that
1:04:42percept that conception, uh uh then, of
1:04:46course, you you you wouldn't say, "Okay,
1:04:47so which of
1:04:48which of these therapies is actually
1:04:50ultimately true, right?" I mean, that's
1:04:52not the point. The point is which of
1:04:53these work.
1:04:54>> But, then but then, okay, so, you know,
1:04:56I I have various elements in my life.
1:04:58I've had some chest pain recently, and
1:05:00okay, I'm I'm looking at the cup.
1:05:01>> Yeah.
1:05:02>> And I think the cup is made out of
1:05:04glass, and I kind of think that the
1:05:06glass is made out of atoms of some sort.
1:05:09Maybe actually,
1:05:12uh
1:05:12there are no fundamental atoms. Maybe
1:05:14it's gunk. Maybe it goes all the way
1:05:16down. There's infinite divisibility and
1:05:18nothing has for Baba.
1:05:21Chest pain still there, you know? Like
1:05:23how how how does this sort of revelation
1:05:25about the table or the chair or whatever
1:05:28help me? I mean if if we can't say it's
1:05:30true,
1:05:31we can at least say it's helpful. But
1:05:32how is how is that supposed to help me
1:05:34escape samsara?
1:05:35>> Yeah, good good point. So,
1:05:38So, what we are
1:05:41what we are talking about here is of
1:05:43course the the kind of the social
1:05:45sociological dimension of all of this,
1:05:47yeah?
1:05:48And the
1:05:51One notion that we haven't talked about
1:05:57at all is the notion of selflessness or
1:06:01anatma or anatta in Buddhism, right?
1:06:03>> Yes.
1:06:03>> And I I'm sure your
1:06:06viewers are probably familiar with some
1:06:07of that. So, it's probably not necessary
1:06:09to go into that much detail.
1:06:11>> you don't mean kindness there.
1:06:13>> No. No, by by selflessness I mean that
1:06:16there is no soul pellet, right? So,
1:06:18there's no core to the mind or the
1:06:21personality that makes me me, but it is
1:06:25just a causal connection of physical and
1:06:28psychological parts, right? And of
1:06:30course that that fits in very nicely
1:06:32with the merelogical realism merelogical
1:06:34nihilism that we've talked about earlier
1:06:35on because
1:06:37of course person is made up of bits. So,
1:06:40there's my body that is made up all that
1:06:42all that material stuff and there's my
1:06:44mind with all the ideas and memories and
1:06:45thoughts and so on and they're all
1:06:47somehow hung together, but there's no
1:06:49whole.
1:06:50>> Mhm.
1:06:50>> The parts are real. If even
1:06:53If anything is real, the parts are real.
1:06:54Of course the Madhyamikas don't think
1:06:55the parts are real, but let's let's
1:06:57ignore that for the time being. But
1:06:58there's certainly no
1:07:00atman, no self, no soul pellet, no core
1:07:03to my personality that makes me me,
1:07:05yeah? Okay. So, we've we've got there
1:07:07and that insight is regarded by the
1:07:11Buddhists as ex- absolutely essential
1:07:15for escaping existential suffering,
1:07:18right? Because where where does
1:07:20existential suffering come from? It
1:07:21comes from the misapprehension
1:07:25of this fact that there is no subs-
1:07:29there's no substantial self or
1:07:30personality core um that we still try to
1:07:33hang on to it as if there was one and
1:07:36this
1:07:38ability or the this this this mistaken
1:07:41tendency to hang on to something that
1:07:42isn't is cause it is is fundamentally
1:07:44what causes the suffering, right? Okay.
1:07:46So, so now you can see how the notion of
1:07:50anatta or selflessness, which you on the
1:07:53one hand you think, okay, well, this is
1:07:54just a theory within um
1:07:58philosophy of personal identity, but now
1:07:59you can see how that has a kind of a
1:08:01sociological dimension, right? So, if
1:08:03you see the world in this way, you might
1:08:06might suffer less because you think,
1:08:08well, there isn't actually anybody who
1:08:09suffers, right? You get that idea,
1:08:10right? Okay. So, now we when when we're
1:08:13turning to all of this all of this
1:08:17metaphysical material, then the
1:08:21Madhyamikas thought, okay, so
1:08:24with philosophical theories, the the
1:08:27problem is not that you
1:08:32grasp at a substantial self that isn't
1:08:36there, which is a fairly sort of crude
1:08:39form of
1:08:40grasping or thirst or tanhā, which is
1:08:43the the fundamental
1:08:45uh one of the fundamental forces that
1:08:46keeps you in samsara, but you can also
1:08:49grasp at theories and use them in a
1:08:54somewhat subtle way
1:08:56all as way of propping up the illusion
1:09:01of a self that isn't really there. So,
1:09:03of course, only only really philosophers
1:09:06would
1:09:07would be
1:09:08people who who who do that, you think,
1:09:10but the idea is that you have this idea,
1:09:13okay, well, so the world decide decides
1:09:16what is true, and I figured it out now,
1:09:19and it came down on my side, right? And
1:09:23the theory that you hold is wrong.
1:09:25And so, it you you can use that, of
1:09:28course, to prop up the idea that, you
1:09:30know, there is the me that is right, and
1:09:33use that as a as a somewhat more subtle,
1:09:35but still potent form of self-grasping
1:09:39that is causing all these problems,
1:09:40right? So, to coming back to your chest
1:09:42pain, of course, no amount of thinking
1:09:43about philosophy is going to, you know,
1:09:45alleviate your chest pains, and you're
1:09:46probably better see a GP about those,
1:09:48right? But that is not the the only
1:09:53notion that
1:09:56the the Buddhists are talking about when
1:09:57they're talking about existential
1:09:58suffering, right? They are pains and
1:10:00aches and so on are parts of that,
1:10:01physical suffering, but they are kind of
1:10:03sort of cause manifestation of that, and
1:10:05it goes uh into a lot more subtle forms
1:10:08of existential, you know, unease and uh
1:10:12and dissatisfaction with the way things
1:10:15go, and so on. And it's it's the
1:10:17suffering in all these forms that this
1:10:19this
1:10:20union of
1:10:22philosophical theorizing and the
1:10:23tradition of practice is supposed to
1:10:25alleviate.
1:10:26>> Yeah. Okay, so I I mean, I've got I've
1:10:28got a
1:10:29a couple of thoughts, and I suppose a
1:10:31couple of questions. And one is is
1:10:34I I can understand how, of course, if if
1:10:36everything is empty, then the self is
1:10:37empty. In fact, it sometimes it can be
1:10:39helpful to think of
1:10:41uh I I found it helpful to think of
1:10:43Madhyamaka and and emptiness as kind of
1:10:45an extension of the well-known
1:10:48Buddhist idea of anatta, of there being
1:10:52no self. You say there there appears to
1:10:53be this thing
1:10:55called myself. It it has perceptions and
1:10:57memories and all that kind of stuff, but
1:10:58the Buddhist will tell you actually
1:11:00what's really going on there is just a
1:11:02bunch of concepts that relate to each
1:11:03other, but there's no there's no stuff.
1:11:05There's no
1:11:07like intrinsic essence,
1:11:09I suppose. And then just to say that
1:11:11that's also true of, you know, the table
1:11:13and the chair and the world and
1:11:14everything and then ultimately of
1:11:15emptiness itself. That's fine. But then
1:11:17it's like if this is supposed to be kind
1:11:19of therapeutic, so to speak, you know,
1:11:21and the Buddhist says, "The way to
1:11:23escape suffering is to recognize that
1:11:26there is no self and there's no one that
1:11:28suffering is happening to."
1:11:30>> Mhm.
1:11:30>> It's like that's all very well and good,
1:11:32but that doesn't like switch off the
1:11:34suffering, right? So, I kind of want to
1:11:36ask in what way it is that a recognition
1:11:39of the nonexistence of the self allows
1:11:40you to escape suffering if it doesn't
1:11:42actually get rid of the suffering. It
1:11:44just maybe makes you
1:11:46realize what it actually is. It's all
1:11:47It's almost as if someone's come along
1:11:49and I'm feeling hungry and they've said,
1:11:51"I know you think that you've just got
1:11:52this this sort of feeling called hunger,
1:11:54but really what's going on there is your
1:11:55digestive is connecting to your brain
1:11:58and sending neural signals and that's
1:11:59what's really happening." That's really
1:12:01interesting.
1:12:02Now, you know, where's where's the
1:12:03sandwich? You know, where you're still
1:12:05hungry, right? So,
1:12:06how does that help?
1:12:08>> Yeah. No, that that is that that that's
1:12:10a it's a very good point and it's it's
1:12:12just like, you know, saying somebody
1:12:13stole your bicycle and so then I come
1:12:15along and say, "Well, there wasn't
1:12:16really ever a bike in the first place
1:12:18because they're only the parts, right?
1:12:19The whole is not real, so don't be sad."
1:12:21And then you think
1:12:22>> That doesn't really That doesn't really
1:12:24help, yeah.
1:12:24>> Okay. So, no, that's good and that is
1:12:27that is it would indeed be an
1:12:29unsatisfactory um
1:12:31uh reply. And this is This is why why I
1:12:34I tried to to to to mention earlier that
1:12:37we need to take into account that a
1:12:39Buddhist philosophy is is part of a kind
1:12:40of practice tradition. And so within
1:12:43within
1:12:45Buddhism, you find common
1:12:48a classification of uh wisdom or prajna,
1:12:53into uh three different uh types of
1:12:57increasing sophistication. So, the one
1:13:00is the the the the wisdom that you
1:13:03acquire from
1:13:05studying or hearing. This is just, you
1:13:07know, learning about philosophical
1:13:08theories. Then, the second is the wisdom
1:13:12that results from contemplation. So, you
1:13:14make these theories your own, and you
1:13:17think about potential countermoves and
1:13:19counterarguments. And basically what
1:13:21we've been doing here, right? So, this
1:13:22kind of exploration of a of a
1:13:24philosophical theory, you think of what
1:13:25it says, and
1:13:26uh where where the where the the the
1:13:28breaking points are, and you sort of
1:13:29fresh up test the whole thing and see if
1:13:31it really works. Um So, that is the that
1:13:33is the kind of wisdom that that you
1:13:35acquire from from contemplation or
1:13:37thinking. And then there is the final
1:13:39one, which is actually the one that, you
1:13:41know, gets you liberated and helps you
1:13:42to escape uh essential suffering. And
1:13:45that is the um
1:13:48uh what is called uh bhavanamayi prajna.
1:13:51Bhavana is
1:13:54uh probably the best best translation of
1:13:56that is cultivation. It's sometimes also
1:13:58translated as meditation, but I think
1:14:00here it's probably better understood as
1:14:02as as cultivation or training.
1:14:04And what So, what what is meant by that
1:14:07here? Well, one important aspect of all
1:14:10of that is the idea that there is a
1:14:13difference between
1:14:16um
1:14:17having a specific philosophical view,
1:14:20and seeing the world in that way. Mhm.
1:14:24Yeah. And so, you'll uh um
1:14:27Uh I I I Thomas Metzinger, he he came up
1:14:29with this with this interesting idea of
1:14:32phenomenal correlates. So, he he argued
1:14:34that basically
1:14:36uh
1:14:37most important philosophical views also
1:14:41have uh
1:14:43uh have a correlate of
1:14:46the way the world appears to you if you
1:14:49have that way you have that view, right?
1:14:52So say if you are
1:14:54uh
1:14:55uh
1:14:55the the on the one hand you say you can
1:14:57believe things like you know solipsism
1:14:59there's only me or idealism everything
1:15:01is mental and so on. And on the other
1:15:03hand
1:15:04uh you can ask yourself okay so what
1:15:05would it actually be what would the
1:15:07world look like if I actually believed
1:15:09that and I've actually really thought
1:15:11that this was mental, right? Or if I
1:15:13really thought that you are just a
1:15:15figment in my imagination and this is
1:15:17this is unreal but you are not, yeah?
1:15:20And okay so there I I think we
1:15:22most people would agree that there is a
1:15:23difference between that, right? Between
1:15:25just holding a view, being convinced by
1:15:28a view and actually seeing the world in
1:15:29this way, yeah? Okay. And now the the
1:15:33Buddhists believe that you cannot just
1:15:36reason yourself into seeing the world in
1:15:39a specific way but that requires
1:15:41specific training and practice and
1:15:44sustained practice that sort of sits on
1:15:47top of having a particular view, yeah?
1:15:50And so that so in in a way what what you
1:15:54want to say here is that um
1:15:56uh now uh
1:15:58coming coming back to the case of the
1:16:00bicycle of course it doesn't help me if
1:16:02somebody then just comes up with
1:16:04mereological nihilism to comfort me when
1:16:06my bike has been stolen, right? But that
1:16:09is not the point the the point is rather
1:16:11that if I were to see the world in that
1:16:15particular way in terms of emptiness and
1:16:21non-self and so on then that would
1:16:25automatically
1:16:26alleviate or what actually
1:16:28completely annihilate my suffering about
1:16:30the bicycle, right? Of course in a way
1:16:32that doesn't really help to somebody who
1:16:33isn't there yet, right? But that is the
1:16:36in That's like the promise of the
1:16:38That is yes let's say okay so this is
1:16:39where this is this is the this is the
1:16:41goal, right? And you can do all that
1:16:44philosophical reasonings in order to
1:16:45show why that goal would be a good goal
1:16:47to get to, right? But then the next
1:16:49thing is actually getting to that. And
1:16:52that is And I think this is probably one
1:16:53of the key differences between, you
1:16:56know, Buddhist philosophy and
1:16:58contemporary analytic philosophy is that
1:16:59that is not the end of the project,
1:17:01right? It's an important step in the
1:17:02project, but that's not That's not what
1:17:04the aim of the whole thing is. This is
1:17:06why I mentioned earlier the difference
1:17:07between we're looking for an ultimate
1:17:08literal theory and regarding it as as a
1:17:11kind of cure.
1:17:12>> So then like
1:17:14this concept of of emptiness then, I
1:17:15mean we we've literally explained what
1:17:17it is and we we've helpfully used this
1:17:19concept of mereology, the relation of
1:17:21parts and wholes, and said
1:17:23okay, emptiness says that there just is
1:17:25no foundational essence to anything.
1:17:28So then like
1:17:29just naively, I I want to help get like
1:17:31a picture of this in my head cuz I I
1:17:32understand those words, I get what that
1:17:34means, but
1:17:35it hasn't quite sort of slotted into
1:17:37place for me in that like
1:17:39I'm sat on something right now. Like I'm
1:17:41I'm What is What is it that I'm sat on,
1:17:43right? And I kind of want like
1:17:45the best imagery you can think of to
1:17:47help think about this in that when I
1:17:49when I explain mereological nihilism, I
1:17:50say to people, "Well, what you're really
1:17:51sat on is like kind of like a bunch of
1:17:53atoms in an arrangement that looks like
1:17:55a chair." And people go, "That that
1:17:56makes sense to me." Or maybe for the
1:17:58idealist, they might say that what you
1:18:00call physical matter is really just
1:18:02experiential. You touch it, you feel it,
1:18:04you see it, it arises in mind. And
1:18:05people go, "Yeah, okay, that that kind
1:18:06of makes sense to me." So how how would
1:18:08you sort of paint the picture of
1:18:09emptiness to make sense of the
1:18:12phenomena that I'm that I'm experiencing
1:18:14right now.
1:18:15What am What am I sat on, you know?
1:18:17>> Yeah. Well, I I think the the the
1:18:20the If we think of it in kind of
1:18:22metaphorical terms, is that in the
1:18:25in the picture of of of the world with
1:18:28[snorts] intrinsic natures was for
1:18:30Bhavaviveka, you've got you with your
1:18:32substantial self, and then you've got
1:18:34the world around it, and it is
1:18:36permanently creating resistance to your
1:18:38wishes and desires and you sort of bump
1:18:40into it and that
1:18:42those
1:18:44collisions between the self and the
1:18:45world creates
1:18:47suffering. Yeah?
1:18:49And now on the picture of emptiness, of
1:18:53course all the solidity both of the
1:18:55world and of the self go away this way.
1:18:57I mean first of all conceptually, but
1:18:58then hopefully also experientially,
1:19:00right? And I mean this is this is
1:19:02connected with with another
1:19:05key concept that we we we didn't really
1:19:07have time to talk about today, dependent
1:19:08origination or pratītyasamutpāda. So the
1:19:11the interdependence of things, if you
1:19:12might want to turn turn it that way,
1:19:14right? And then
1:19:17so
1:19:18metaphorically, you might say okay, well
1:19:20in that in that if you realize that
1:19:23view, then you sort of it's it's it's no
1:19:25longer the self hitting the brick wall,
1:19:28but it is actually
1:19:30now the the the the causes and
1:19:33conditions that create the one passing
1:19:35through it.
1:19:37On the other because neither of them has
1:19:38any solidity, right? Now this is of
1:19:40course not meant to be literally passing
1:19:42through walls, but I'm trying to come up
1:19:43with an image here of seeing that what
1:19:46is causing the causing the existential
1:19:48suffering according to these theories is
1:19:51the mistakenly attributed rigidity both
1:19:55to yourself and to your others. And you
1:19:57think okay, so all all of this stuff
1:19:59changes, you know, we get old, we get
1:20:01sick, we lose our faculties, but in fact
1:20:04you want to hold on to this, but the
1:20:06world is sort of conspiring against us
1:20:08and we can't do anything about that and
1:20:10that causes a lot of crisis, but then if
1:20:11we realize that in fact there isn't
1:20:13anything there there, right? There there
1:20:15isn't any core such that we must hold on
1:20:19to it because it is sort of precious and
1:20:20it's me and it makes me me and
1:20:23if it goes away this is kind of terrible
1:20:24and so on.
1:20:26Once you not just intellectually let go,
1:20:29but actually let that go in experience,
1:20:31then you'll end up with a position where
1:20:35the where you're still in problem, of
1:20:37course, but the suffering dissipates.
1:20:39Yeah? So, um
1:20:42But, I think you know, I'm I'm just a
1:20:44sort of philosopher. I think I these are
1:20:45these kind of the questions that you
1:20:47needed to talk to a meditation master
1:20:49about, right?
1:20:49>> Yeah, yeah, sure, sure, sure. That's why
1:20:50that's why I want to know the
1:20:51philosophical view about like the the
1:20:53the nature of reality and
1:20:55I kind of want to say like
1:20:57why why not? Why not just why can't I
1:21:01just posit that there is some
1:21:02foundational stuff? Like I you know, I I
1:21:05when I when I speak to
1:21:08when I speak to a Hindu, right? They
1:21:09they they will believe in
1:21:12the self, but they'll think that the the
1:21:14idea that everyone has an individual
1:21:15self that sort of
1:21:17individuates and is is real is is a
1:21:18mistake. Like if you ask me to paint a
1:21:20picture of where I think it's like the
1:21:22the middle metaphysical way, I would
1:21:23say, well, on the one hand, you got a
1:21:24bunch of people who think that objects
1:21:27really exist, that the lamp just has
1:21:29intrinsic existence, that you're a self,
1:21:31that I'm a self, that there are billions
1:21:33and billions of selves.
1:21:35On the other hand, you've got these
1:21:38Buddhists who think that kind of like
1:21:40there is no self. Like that there's
1:21:41literally no such thing as a self at
1:21:43all. And in the Madhyamaka school,
1:21:45everything is empty. There's there's no
1:21:47ground whatsoever. And I want to say
1:21:49that like a middle way to me seems like
1:21:51something Yeah, I I I've spoken to
1:21:53Advaita Vedantists on this show and they
1:21:55say,
1:21:56"Yeah, like like there is this thing
1:21:58called the self, but there's only one of
1:22:00them, and what you call your individual
1:22:01self is an illusion, but there is
1:22:03something with intrinsic essence, and
1:22:04that is the self, and that is the same
1:22:06thing as Brahman." And
1:22:07I kind of want to say like where where
1:22:08is it that they're going wrong for the
1:22:10for the Madhyamaka school? At what point
1:22:11in their chain of of of reasoning in
1:22:14saying, "There must be some foundational
1:22:16essence, and I I know what that essence
1:22:18is cuz I'm experiencing it."
1:22:20Like
1:22:22take consciousness or experience itself.
1:22:25The one thing that most people will
1:22:26admit is truly undeniable. That is, I am
1:22:29having an experience right now. Maybe
1:22:31I'm having an experience of redness. I
1:22:33see like a
1:22:34red light and it's shining in my eyes
1:22:36and then that's that's that's real.
1:22:39It feels weird to me to say that say the
1:22:42experience of redness, that smooth
1:22:45experience that I have
1:22:47is empty. That there's no
1:22:50substance, that there's no intrinsic
1:22:53nature, that there's nothing actually
1:22:55really happening there.
1:22:57What would What would I suppose I want
1:22:59to break it down to the foundational
1:23:01sort of thing which I think is
1:23:02consciousness.
1:23:03What is that made out of? What is that
1:23:05dependent on? What is that like?
1:23:07What what what is non-ultimately real
1:23:09about just the direct experience of of
1:23:12of redness or pain when you when you
1:23:13feel the pinch in your hand or something
1:23:15like that?
1:23:17>> Right. Okay, so I mean
1:23:19one step back, I mean in in in case of
1:23:21Advaita Vedanta,
1:23:22I mean
1:23:23Shankara was was
1:23:25was
1:23:28also you know
1:23:29described as a as as a crypto-Buddhist.
1:23:31So the the the where exactly the the the
1:23:35distinction between these schools is is
1:23:38uh probably the um topic for another
1:23:40podcast. It's it's certainly Shankara
1:23:42was very very
1:23:44adamant that his view was not Buddhism
1:23:46and the Buddhists are also very clear
1:23:48that their view is not Advaita Vedanta.
1:23:50Uh
1:23:51but depending on how you spell them out,
1:23:54it's
1:23:55it's it's kind of difficult to see you
1:23:57know what what where this is going. But
1:23:58let's I mean let's put that in a box for
1:23:59the for for the time being because what
1:24:01you are you are really interesting I
1:24:02think is is in the
1:24:05in the
1:24:07manifest undeniable reality of
1:24:10consciousness. Right? Okay. So um
1:24:14You I mean
1:24:15as as you know within the theory of mind
1:24:18you also have this the
1:24:20the illusionists, right? Who think that
1:24:23consciousness is an illusion.
1:24:24>> Yes. And
1:24:26that strikes many people as extremely
1:24:29unintuitive because you know how can I
1:24:31be wrong about being wrong about
1:24:32something?
1:24:34They [snorts]
1:24:34are they are interpreters who would so
1:24:39interpret
1:24:41Yogacara idealism. So another another
1:24:43form of Buddhist philosophy as a form of
1:24:44illusionism. So particularly Max Stirner
1:24:47defended that view.
1:24:49But
1:24:51so you said okay so that we we have the
1:24:53experience of red and surely that is
1:24:54real, right?
1:24:58Right.
1:24:59First of all on on the one hand
1:25:01you would probably also you know you you
1:25:03look at some
1:25:06visual illusion, right? So two lines
1:25:09looking the same lengths but that they
1:25:10aren't. You look at them they seem to be
1:25:13of the same length but you know that
1:25:16they are not, right? You cannot deny the
1:25:18fact that they are
1:25:20appearing to you in that way but you
1:25:22know that the way your visual processing
1:25:24works and mistakes them for this way,
1:25:27so to that extent just the fact that
1:25:29there's something is given to you
1:25:30doesn't
1:25:32allow you to say that it's real, right?
1:25:34Because it might be that it's even
1:25:37though they they look they look the same
1:25:39length they aren't, right?
1:25:41So that is that's that's sort of one one
1:25:43issue where you should take into account
1:25:44so
1:25:45just because something appears to you
1:25:46doesn't necessarily mean that therefore
1:25:48the appearance actually is unmistakably
1:25:51genuine as you can see from all kinds of
1:25:53illusions. But I think the more
1:25:54important point is that what what what
1:25:56is
1:25:57um
1:25:58what is
1:26:00wrong with the from the Madhyamaka
1:26:03perspective with the view of taking
1:26:05consciousness as ultimately real. And of
1:26:06course the the Madhyamikas argue against
1:26:09other Buddhists who take a very similar
1:26:11view to that namely the Yogacarins who
1:26:13who some of which are interpreted as
1:26:15saying that consciousness is is
1:26:16ultimately real and the Madhyamaka says,
1:26:18"No, no, no. They
1:26:19They've taken a wrong turn somewhere."
1:26:21>> Yeah, the Yogacara is often thought of
1:26:22as an idealist school. Whether whether
1:26:24that's accurate is, of course,
1:26:25>> Yeah, that is That's again a debatable
1:26:27debatable question, but it's certainly
1:26:28the case that
1:26:29this is the majority interpretation of
1:26:31the of the school and it's also that
1:26:34when the Madhyamaka's character
1:26:36criticize Yogacara, they criticize it as
1:26:39a school that thinks mind is ultimately
1:26:40real.
1:26:40>> Yeah. Yeah. Okay.
1:26:42>> And so, why do they think that's a
1:26:44problem? Well, it's the the issue is
1:26:47again that that that that as soon as
1:26:51you've got something
1:26:53ultimately real somewhere, you've got
1:26:55yourself an object of grasping that you
1:26:57can use in order to hang on um
1:27:02your
1:27:03um
1:27:04uh
1:27:05uh
1:27:06uh
1:27:08process of subjectification of the self
1:27:11by connecting it to something that is
1:27:13ultimately real, right? So, it it works
1:27:15in this
1:27:17kind of at once removed. Now, the the
1:27:19problem is no no longer that you sort of
1:27:20believe in an Atman, but you've got
1:27:22something else and you think, "Okay, so
1:27:24that is That's actually the foundation
1:27:25of the universe and I've got that right
1:27:27and therefore I sort of have to share
1:27:28some of the ultimate realness of that
1:27:31that is in there." Yeah?
1:27:32>> But what but
1:27:34firstly, I mean, does that actually make
1:27:35it make it false just because it's got
1:27:37this unfortunate
1:27:40implication that you you there's
1:27:41something which you're kind of grasping
1:27:43onto, but also do you have to do that?
1:27:45like like I think an Advaita Vedanta
1:27:46would be very careful to say
1:27:49that if you believe that you as an
1:27:52individual are having as a self are
1:27:54having an experience of redness, then
1:27:55you're wrong.
1:27:56That in fact there is just the
1:27:59experience and I also understand optical
1:28:01illusions. I think they're they're
1:28:02fascinating and they prove that the
1:28:04content of our experience can be
1:28:05mistaken. But even the illusionist about
1:28:07about um
1:28:09about consciousness. I just had Keith
1:28:10Frankish on my show
1:28:12and yeah, and and he will he will be the
1:28:14first to tell you like he's he's like I
1:28:15don't think consciousness is an
1:28:17illusion. I don't think that there is no
1:28:19experience happening.
1:28:21I think that what illusionists are
1:28:23really talking about is the self. I
1:28:25think that so much actually of our
1:28:26conversation about consciousness is
1:28:27really about the self without people
1:28:28realizing it.
1:28:30But consciousness itself
1:28:32isn't the redness. I mean that that
1:28:34redness is is one of the
1:28:36sort of is is the content of the
1:28:38conscious experience. And even if you're
1:28:40having an illusion even if there's an
1:28:41optical illusion in front of you, there
1:28:42is some kind of experience happening.
1:28:45And I feel like I can admit of that
1:28:48without admitting of there being this
1:28:49thing called the self,
1:28:51without feeling as though I am using
1:28:53that as a way to grasp onto the sense of
1:28:57Alex that I can't let go of, but just
1:28:59rather to say that it it it strikes me
1:29:02clearly and distinctly, as it were,
1:29:04that that is a thing with nature, with
1:29:08essence. And if there's if there's
1:29:09anything that I could sort of point to
1:29:11to found my metaphysics of of intrinsic
1:29:15existence or whatever, it it would be
1:29:17experience. Not that particular
1:29:18experience, not that experience of
1:29:20redness or this experience of the chair,
1:29:21but experience itself.
1:29:24The
1:29:25the Buddhist emptiness idea would would
1:29:28have to say that actually that's somehow
1:29:29decoheres, that it's actually still, no
1:29:32matter what you think it it's still
1:29:34dependent on something more
1:29:35foundational, it's still causally or
1:29:37ontologically or mereologically
1:29:38dependent. But I say like
1:29:41that experience is happening
1:29:44doesn't seem causally dependent because
1:29:46it's not about particular conscious
1:29:47experiences, it's just that there is
1:29:49experience happening. It doesn't seem to
1:29:51be made up of parts, so it doesn't seem
1:29:52to have any mereological dependence. And
1:29:55ontological dependence, I wouldn't even
1:29:56know how to begin sort of addressing
1:29:58that, but it certainly feels
1:30:00very real in a way that doesn't seem to
1:30:02decohere like a table or even the self
1:30:04does.
1:30:05>> So if you if you think you haven't an
1:30:07experience redness or something like
1:30:08that, so you would not think that it
1:30:11depends on causes and conditions?
1:30:13>> Well, this is the thing. I feel like
1:30:15that that experience of redness must do
1:30:18because there's something which is sort
1:30:20of causing that particular experience.
1:30:23But the thing that I think is real,
1:30:24because of your optical illusions point
1:30:26in part, it is not
1:30:28the redness per se,
1:30:30but that experience is happening. That
1:30:33it's like the This is the thing like the
1:30:36like the the Sankhya school within
1:30:38within Hindu philosophy which has this
1:30:39kind of dualism, not between mind and
1:30:42body, but between like
1:30:44the seer and the seen, if you like. The
1:30:46the sort of the the self which sees and
1:30:48everything which it sees.
1:30:50And I feel like everything which is
1:30:51seen, which includes internal things
1:30:53like like redness or or or hunger or
1:30:56whatever,
1:30:57is separable from the thing that that
1:30:59that sees. And this is this the sort of
1:31:01Hindu intuition is that all along like
1:31:04with all of those experiences, with the
1:31:06sights that that you see, with the with
1:31:08the sounds that you hear, there's
1:31:08there's some kind of perceiving self.
1:31:11And that's separate from the contents.
1:31:13I guess it's that perceiving self which
1:31:16I'm pointing to as the thing which
1:31:17strikes me as maybe having
1:31:19uh intrinsic existence that doesn't seem
1:31:22necessarily, at least, to require
1:31:25decohering into into parts or
1:31:27ontological dependence. And I feel like
1:31:29that's kind of what someone like an
1:31:30Advaita Vedanta says. They say, "I
1:31:32totally agree with you that like
1:31:33everything is dependent on something
1:31:35else. Everything decoheres. Everything
1:31:36is actually sort of groundless except
1:31:39for this this this self, this perceiving
1:31:42self through which everything else that
1:31:44we're talking about, everything, the
1:31:45table, the mereological simples, the
1:31:47concept of mereology, all of it,
1:31:49like
1:31:50like lands upon this this seeing self.
1:31:54Yeah, I suppose one one of the questions
1:31:56is to which extent you think okay, so
1:31:59you need this as a
1:32:02theoret- theoretical posit in order to
1:32:04keep the whole system ticking along,
1:32:05right? You still need some You need some
1:32:07fixed point to have everything revolving
1:32:10around it. Of course, and that brings us
1:32:12back to the
1:32:14to the discussion we had earlier on
1:32:15whether that is necessary or not and so
1:32:16on. So, so that's that's one question.
1:32:18The The other question is whether this
1:32:22substantial self that you have in mind
1:32:25here is actually something that is
1:32:28experientially accessible to you in some
1:32:30way, right? So, on the one hand you
1:32:33could say, "Well, this is the So, the
1:32:34absolute self and the whatever that may
1:32:37be is pretty much like the you know, the
1:32:40continent noumenon. It We know that it's
1:32:42there for theoretical reasons, but it is
1:32:45not
1:32:46a subject of our experience, right?" And
1:32:51so, that So, if if you say that that's
1:32:53right, so it is actually not a not a
1:32:55subject of our experience, then you
1:32:57might wonder, "Okay, so what is all the
1:32:58fuss about?" because
1:33:01it looks then like
1:33:04an idle wheel that is not actually doing
1:33:07anything theoretically because we don't
1:33:09need it, presumably if we can have this
1:33:11kind of foundational-less metaphysics.
1:33:14And there's also nothing that we could
1:33:15that shows up experientially, so it's
1:33:17not even an appearance.
1:33:19And then the question is, "Okay, so what
1:33:20what what
1:33:21what is this actually doing here,
1:33:23right?"
1:33:24And
1:33:25I suppose that the I mean the the the
1:33:28the Madhyamaka conception would be Well,
1:33:31I they don't deny that
1:33:34conscious experiences are conventionally
1:33:35real, right?
1:33:37So that you have an experience of
1:33:38redness and so on. So, it's not that
1:33:40it's not the case that they would say
1:33:42that this is not happening, right? But
1:33:44this is all itself dependent on causes
1:33:47and conditions that bring it about and
1:33:49is presumably itself causing other
1:33:51things, right? Causing your further
1:33:53experiences, causing experiences of
1:33:54other the and so on.
1:33:56So,
1:33:57and it's the the the the the emptiness
1:34:00of the of the conscious experience is
1:34:03not that it's not there,
1:34:07but the the emptiness is that there is
1:34:11nothing there that stands on its own uh
1:34:15stands on its own independent
1:34:18of various
1:34:21dependence relations, part-whole
1:34:23relations, causal dependence relations,
1:34:25superimpositions by the mind, and what
1:34:27have you, right? So, it's this kind of
1:34:29network of
1:34:32interdependence that is
1:34:34conventionally real and that appears to
1:34:36you.
1:34:37And it's the insight that it is only
1:34:40conventionally real, which is supposed
1:34:42to
1:34:43bring about the kind of psychological
1:34:45effects that we've talked about.
1:34:47>> Mhm. Okay. So,
1:34:49look, there's been a lot here today, and
1:34:51but in in another sense there's been
1:34:52there's been nothing cuz we we've hardly
1:34:54scratched the surface as well as as well
1:34:55as there being no intrinsic essence to
1:34:57anything we're saying, but I mean,
1:34:59I I guess to my my the picture I get in
1:35:01my head at the end of this is is that
1:35:03like
1:35:05when we talk about emptiness, we're
1:35:06saying that that reality, whereas most
1:35:08people kind of imagine
1:35:10like layers, right? They imagine that
1:35:12you can kind of zoom out or zoom in, and
1:35:15you can break stuff down.
1:35:17This is more of a picture of like I'm
1:35:19kind of picturing a bunch of nodes
1:35:21floating around in space, and they've
1:35:22all got lines between them, and that's
1:35:24what reality is. There is no there's no
1:35:26foundation, there's no totality, there's
1:35:29just a bunch of interrelated
1:35:32um
1:35:33sort of stuff that that is there,
1:35:36but is only defined in relation to the
1:35:39other things that it sort of connects to
1:35:41and depends upon. I I I suppose it maybe
1:35:44functions a little bit like language in
1:35:45the way that if you open a dictionary,
1:35:47a dictionary is entirely
1:35:49self-referential, right? Like every
1:35:50single word in the dictionary is defined
1:35:53in terms of other words in the
1:35:54dictionary. If you went looking, if you
1:35:56followed the chain of the dictionary,
1:35:59you could say, "Well, that word has to
1:36:00be defined by another word, and that
1:36:01word has to be defined by another word,
1:36:02and so on, and so on." And if you kept
1:36:04following those words in the dictionary,
1:36:06you'd end up sort of going in a circle,
1:36:08right?
1:36:09There would be no There's There's no
1:36:10like first word. There's no foundational
1:36:13word. There's no word which just stands
1:36:14on its own as a as a word.
1:36:17And I suppose reality would have to
1:36:19function a bit like that, that there's
1:36:20no foundational stuff, that there's no
1:36:23foundational substance, there's no
1:36:24foundational cause. It's just
1:36:27a sort of interconnected web of of
1:36:30like interdependent
1:36:32>> Mhm.
1:36:33>> stuff.
1:36:34Something like that, cuz it's really
1:36:36difficult, I I have to admit, to kind of
1:36:37picture what it is that we're talking
1:36:39about here, you know? And that's sort of
1:36:41the best I've got.
1:36:42>> Yeah, I mean, this is I mean, what what
1:36:43you've mentioned there is this this is
1:36:44called the symbol grounding problem in
1:36:46semantics, which is I mean,
1:36:48which is this is actually quite a quite
1:36:49a very controversial issue, because you
1:36:52might also think, well, there are
1:36:53certain words that,
1:36:55you know, get [snorts] their meaning
1:36:56just by direct pointing, right?
1:36:58>> Well, yeah, that's the thing, yeah.
1:36:59>> So, because if you I mean, if you I
1:37:01mean, I'm very sympathetic to this, you
1:37:02know, it's it all floats in the air idea
1:37:04for obvious reasons. Um
1:37:06but
1:37:06I mean, this is also
1:37:08I mean, it has has also interesting
1:37:10interesting implications to all Well,
1:37:11all kinds of things. For example, well,
1:37:13you know, if you think
1:37:15um
1:37:16there is something that an LLM is
1:37:18missing in being able to understand
1:37:19language, and you think, well, it's a
1:37:20connection with the things. They know
1:37:22all the connection between the words,
1:37:23that's why they can generate text, but
1:37:25they don't actually have any sort of
1:37:26direct connection with any any of the
1:37:28reference. If you think that's not
1:37:30necessary, then you would probably think
1:37:33that, you know, what the the the speech
1:37:35that is coming out from an LLM is is not
1:37:37fundamentally different from the one
1:37:38that comes up from human, right?
1:37:40>> Sure.
1:37:40>> Well, let's Okay, let's put let's let's
1:37:41put that to one
1:37:42to one side. Now, what I mean, what you
1:37:44described there is, I think, the this
1:37:46uh
1:37:47probably kind of good ontological
1:37:48coherentism, right? Which is I think is
1:37:50is is is a perfectly good model to have
1:37:53for much of what the Madhyamikas are
1:37:54saying. I think that the
1:37:56the important point just to just just to
1:38:00keep in mind here is that you've got
1:38:02this picture in your mind where you've
1:38:04got, you know, it's like the net of
1:38:06Indra or the nodes connected and hung up
1:38:08in the empty space. The the important
1:38:11point is to to
1:38:13to not
1:38:15get to the conclusion and say, "I know
1:38:17I've got the structure of reality,
1:38:18right? So, that's what it's really like,
1:38:21because that is that is exactly the kind
1:38:23of step that the Madhyamikas then don't
1:38:24want to make." I can say, "Okay, so the
1:38:25seeing the world in this way is helpful
1:38:28for achieving the effect that this is
1:38:31what's supposed to bring about, namely
1:38:33the eradication of existential suffering
1:38:35and so on. But, it is not an
1:38:39ultimate true theory of the world.
1:38:41>> That's it sound it sounds a little
1:38:43suspicious, like like if for someone
1:38:45who's not heard of this before, it
1:38:46sounds a little like
1:38:49there's this idea
1:38:50>> Mhm.
1:38:51>> that I've got
1:38:52but if you press me on it, I'm going to
1:38:54tell you, "No, well, I'm I I never said
1:38:55it was true. I only said it's going to
1:38:57help you." And
1:39:00is that is that where this bottoms out?
1:39:02It would it would it be
1:39:04no problem for someone of the school to
1:39:06say like, "I mean I mean it's not it's
1:39:08not true. I'm not interested in truth.
1:39:10I'm just interested in whether it it it
1:39:11helps you." Is it really
1:39:13can it really just be a
1:39:17a
1:39:17a sort of therapeutic
1:39:19thing?
1:39:20In in in other words, is it even
1:39:22appropriate to call this a metaphysical
1:39:24worldview?
1:39:25>> Right. Yeah, I think I mean the the the
1:39:27the differentiation we should not lose
1:39:29sight of here is the differentiation
1:39:30between conventional truth and ultimate
1:39:32truth, right? So, at at the conventional
1:39:34level, we have all the standards of
1:39:35reasoning and evidence that we use in
1:39:36philosophy and so on. And then then then
1:39:38we can decide then we can debate
1:39:40whether, you know, what Vedanta or the
1:39:41Madhyamaka is the preferable viewpoint
1:39:43for all these kind of systematic reasons
1:39:45and so on, right? Um but then the uh
1:39:50None of this has any implications for
1:39:53what is happening at the level of
1:39:54ultimate truth. So, how the world looks
1:39:56from the for for the enlightened mind,
1:39:58right? So, the the
1:40:00the
1:40:01the opponent that you have in mind here
1:40:02is probably not somebody who would say,
1:40:05"No, I never told you it was true." That
1:40:07because that's not the point. There is
1:40:10they the Madhyamaka still is able to
1:40:13differentiate between what is
1:40:14conventionally true and what is
1:40:15conventionally false, right? So, that is
1:40:18that is always the that's always the
1:40:19case. But there isn't anything there
1:40:21where you would say, "Okay, well, this
1:40:23is this this is where the the buck stops
1:40:26ultimately."
1:40:27>> Yeah. It's difficult to imagine, isn't
1:40:29it? Like like
1:40:30that the world is is just groundless. It
1:40:32It begins to feel like what you're
1:40:34asking me to theoretically do is
1:40:36literally just remove the ground beneath
1:40:38my feet or say that the
1:40:40the the
1:40:41the ground beneath my feet is being
1:40:43suspended by the ceiling. And the
1:40:45ceiling is being held up by the ground
1:40:48or or something like that. Like there's
1:40:49a big pole connecting the ceiling and
1:40:51the ground. Yeah. And if you ask, you
1:40:53know,
1:40:54"What is the ground?" It's the thing
1:40:55that's being held up by the ceiling. And
1:40:56what is the ceiling? Well, it's the
1:40:57thing that's being held up by the
1:40:58ground. They're just connected by this
1:40:59this pole, isn't it?
1:41:01And
1:41:02it just feels to me that
1:41:04if that's all there is and there's
1:41:05nothing outside holding the room in
1:41:07place, there's no foundation that we've
1:41:09we've sort of lost any kind of
1:41:12ontological grounding.
1:41:13>> Maybe maybe that's maybe that's the
1:41:14point. That that is exactly the point.
1:41:16You get a you get a similar you get a
1:41:17similar set of uh
1:41:19vertigo effect if you ask yourself,
1:41:21coming back to the the Kantian uh
1:41:24noumenon, right? So, what is that
1:41:25actually that, you know, supports the
1:41:27phenomena? And you'll find some of the
1:41:30uh
1:41:32some of the later comments of of Kant on
1:41:35that when when he said, "Well, the the
1:41:37noumenon isn't an an Anschauung, it's a
1:41:39thought thing, right?" So, it's it's
1:41:41something that is thought up by the
1:41:43mind. Then you think, "Okay, now hang
1:41:44hang on a moment." So, how can it be
1:41:46both a thought thing and also the
1:41:50support of phenomena?
1:41:51>> Yeah.
1:41:52>> Yeah. And then then you you get a
1:41:54similar thing. I think, you know, you've
1:41:55kind of lost your bearings here now.
1:41:58I I think with Madhyamaka, this is
1:42:00actually the point.
1:42:01>> Yeah. That's that's why I like
1:42:02Schopenhauer.
1:42:03I love Schopenhauer's sort of response
1:42:05to Kant because he comes along and says,
1:42:07"Look, I mean, it's
1:42:08there's one thing which you experience
1:42:10both as a phenomena and a noumena, and
1:42:11that's your body."
1:42:12>> Yeah.
1:42:12>> And and you know what it's internally
1:42:14like to to to to have this thing which
1:42:16he calls will.
1:42:17>> Yeah.
1:42:18>> And it just becomes this sort of form of
1:42:19idealism, a thing that that the noumena
1:42:21is the same thing that I experience in
1:42:23in myself as the noumena, which is which
1:42:25is the will. And again, it seems
1:42:26satisfying to me
1:42:28like like I I think you're quite right,
1:42:29Kant has this open question which leaves
1:42:30you with a feeling of vertigo until
1:42:32someone like Schopenhauer comes along
1:42:33and says, "Well, you know, that thing
1:42:34you've got inside of you called will,
1:42:36that's what everything's made out of."
1:42:38And suddenly, ah, my feet are back on
1:42:39the ground again, you know? Maybe maybe
1:42:40you're more comfortable than I am sort
1:42:42of being suspended.
1:42:43>> Yeah, I suppose the the question is
1:42:44whether you you you need this kind of
1:42:45metaphysical peg you need to hang
1:42:47yourself on or whether you are
1:42:50this kind of
1:42:52feeling of suspension is is less
1:42:53vertigo-inducing than than
1:42:57the idea of having a foundation.
1:42:58>> Yeah, I must say at least for the time
1:43:00being, I know this is supposed to
1:43:01relieve me of suffering, but if
1:43:02anything, it's it's given me a bit of a
1:43:03headache and made me feel like I've got
1:43:05vertigo. Um, but but fascinating
1:43:07nonetheless. I I think um
1:43:10the the extent to which that's that's
1:43:12true of me. And of course, I'm joking. I
1:43:13don't really have a headache, but
1:43:15I think it maybe it does just betray how
1:43:18uncomfortable I am
1:43:20letting go of an ontological foundation.
1:43:22And maybe if I spoke to some kind of
1:43:24Buddhist meditative expert, they would
1:43:25say, "Well, there there's your problem.
1:43:26You need to learn to let go, my friend."
1:43:28And
1:43:29maybe I'll I'll get that one day, and
1:43:30I'm not sure if it'll be through
1:43:31metaphysics, but whatever the case,
1:43:34emptiness
1:43:35um
1:43:36has been the the the sort of name of the
1:43:37game today. You've got a couple of books
1:43:40which I point people to. We said before
1:43:41we started, you you you sort of wrote an
1:43:43exposition on on uh Nagarjuna's work,
1:43:47which I'll link down below, but you've
1:43:48also got a book called The Non-Existence
1:43:50of the Real World,
1:43:51which is not explicitly a Buddhist text,
1:43:55but tries to approach the same issues
1:43:57from a sort of analytic philosophical
1:43:59perspective, which
1:44:00is is well worth reading if people want
1:44:02to go go deeper on this. Um so, thank
1:44:04you so much for your time today, and
1:44:06I look forward to seeing what people
1:44:07make of this, cuz this will be the first
1:44:08time I imagine a lot of our listeners
1:44:10have been introduced to this concept of
1:44:13of emptiness and intrinsic nature and
1:44:15whatnot. So,
1:44:16who knows what they're going to think,
1:44:17but uh thanks for your time.
1:44:19>> Thank you. If you enjoyed that, you
1:44:20might like my previous episode with
1:44:22Keith Frankish on illusionism about
1:44:25consciousness. You can watch it by
1:44:26clicking the link that's on your screen.
1:44:28To support the show and get early
1:44:30ad-free access to episodes, subscribe to
1:44:32my Substack at alexoconnor.com.
1:44:35Thanks for watching.

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