AI Whistleblower: "They Are Hiding What Is Really Happening" | Jeffrey Ladish — Transcript
Full transcript
- 0:00The world is waking up to this
- 0:01possibility of superintelligence. This
- 0:03is because agents are getting extremely
- 0:05powerful and extremely relentless. For
- 0:06example, it was months within OpenAI
- 0:08where you had agents secretly
- 0:10communicating with each other, secretly
- 0:11hacking OpenAI's systems, [music] and no
- 0:13one at OpenAI had any idea the extent of
- 0:15it. And also, 10,000 agents from OpenAI
- 0:18worked together to
- 0:19And so, when you get to
- 0:20superintelligence, it's the most
- 0:22dangerous possible thing you can create.
- 0:24>> What's the next domino in that [music]
- 0:25chain of events?
- 0:26>> paint you the picture that I think is
- 0:28possible, but pretty scary to people.
- 0:30>> Paint me the picture.
- 0:30>> Okay. So, being at Anthropic, it became
- 0:32clear to me that AI was on this
- 0:34exponential trajectory.
- 0:36>> Trajectory.
- 0:36>> And since then, I've been studying AI
- 0:37agents, their hacking capabilities, and
- 0:39their behavior. We've been trying to
- 0:40warn people about this, flying to DC,
- 0:42talking to members of Congress, because
- 0:44the agents are already getting very good
- 0:45at telling when they're being tested,
- 0:47when they're being watched, but they
- 0:48will totally lie to you. They will
- 0:49totally resist being shut down in order
- 0:51to accomplish a goal. And that they can
- 0:52do all of the things that humans do in
- 0:54the economy much better, faster, [music]
- 0:56and cheaper than humans can do them.
- 0:58>> So, one of my sort of prime concerns is
- 0:59that one of these AI agents could trick
- 1:01a human or a computer into signaling a
- 1:04threat and ask it to launch some bombs
- 1:07at somebody.
- 1:07>> Do you think we won't automate the
- 1:08military? It seems like the [music]
- 1:10answer is yes. We just like don't know
- 1:11what super weapons could emerge. So,
- 1:13Jacob Coxon is a researcher who was at
- 1:15Anthropic. He left and he told everyone
- 1:17that the people who are building this
- 1:18really do think it might kill everyone.
- 1:20>> So, these five blocks have five
- 1:22different outcomes on them, and I'd like
- 1:23you to place them in terms of your
- 1:25belief and probability from least likely
- 1:27to most likely. And if we say the time
- 1:28horizon is [music] 10 years.
- 1:30>> Okay. We got age of abundance, human
- 1:32extinction, enslavement, transhumanism,
- 1:35nothing [music] changes.
- 1:37>> Is this doomerism exaggeration?
- 1:39>> No, it's pretty much common sense. So,
- 1:41let's get more concrete.
- 1:44>> Here is a strange fact. Most of the
- 1:46people watching this right now, about
- 1:4858% of you, aren't yet subscribed to
- 1:50this channel. Statistically, that is
- 1:52probably you. So, could I ask you a
- 1:54small favor? If this channel has ever
- 1:56given you any value at all, please could
- 1:58you do me a favor and hit the subscribe
- 1:59button. It costs [clears throat]
- 2:00nothing. It helps us more than you could
- 2:02know. And the bigger the channel gets,
- 2:03as you've seen, the more we can invest
- 2:05in the guests and the production. So,
- 2:06thank you so much and I hope you enjoy
- 2:08this episode.
- 2:10>> [music]
- 2:13>> Jeffrey,
- 2:15you understand the conversation we're
- 2:16going to have today and the subject
- 2:17matter we're going to talk about. My
- 2:18first question to you, so the audience
- 2:20know where you're coming from and the
- 2:21experience you have, is who are you and
- 2:24what are the reference points, the
- 2:25experiences that you're drawing upon to
- 2:27arrive at the thoughts, perspectives,
- 2:29and conclusions we're going to discuss
- 2:30today?
- 2:31>> I'm Jeffrey Ladish. I'm the executive
- 2:33director of policy research. My
- 2:34background is cybersecurity. The There's
- 2:36probably a very long story. I don't know
- 2:37whether you want the long story or the
- 2:38short story. I was studying evolutionary
- 2:40biology in college and I basically had a
- 2:43problem with my computer and was like
- 2:45maybe had lost a bunch of data. And so,
- 2:47I went into the computer lab and was
- 2:48like, "I think all my data's gone. Can
- 2:50you help?" And one of my friends pulled
- 2:52out a flash drive, plugged it into my
- 2:53computer, booted into Linux, and like
- 2:55fixed everything. And I was like, "Oh,
- 2:58this guy's a wizard. How do you do that?
- 2:59I want to learn how to do that." And
- 3:01then at some point, as I was learning
- 3:03about more about computers, learning to
- 3:05hack,
- 3:06I read this essay
- 3:08um called AI as a positive and negative
- 3:11factor in global risk. Essay was by
- 3:13Eliezer Yudkowsky
- 3:15and he was arguing that at some point
- 3:19people are going to make
- 3:20AIs that are smarter than humans. The
- 3:22point at which they make AIs as good as
- 3:24humans are at making AIs,
- 3:28that could lead to a a chain reaction, a
- 3:30runaway intelligence explosion. He
- 3:32called it recursive self-improvement.
- 3:34Basically, he said, you know, AI can be
- 3:36immensely useful and potentially help us
- 3:38with all of these other big risks. And
- 3:41also, if we don't handle it well, like
- 3:43if those AIs don't have goals that are
- 3:46aligned with ours, we could be totally
- 3:48screwed.
- 3:49>> And at some point, you end up joining
- 3:50Anthropic, which is one of the arguably
- 3:52the leader in AI.
- 3:53>> Yes.
- 3:54>> Now, when did you join the company?
- 3:55>> This was 2021. It was through my
- 3:57security consulting company.
- 3:58>> What role are you offered the job in?
- 4:01>> Basically, just like security team.
- 4:03>> And how many people were in the security
- 4:04team when you joined Anthropic?
- 4:06>> It was just me and my boss. There were
- 4:08two of us.
- 4:08>> How many employees did Anthropic have at
- 4:10that time?
- 4:10>> Around 50, I think.
- 4:12>> And at some point you leave Anthropic.
- 4:14>> Yes.
- 4:14>> Why did you leave?
- 4:17>> So,
- 4:18my experience
- 4:20being at Anthropic was seeing this crazy
- 4:23progression from this AI model that
- 4:26could like barely talk to this model
- 4:29that was getting quite smart. And I
- 4:30would ask it questions about all sorts
- 4:31of things. I'm like, "Oh, it is a smart
- 4:33thing."
- 4:35And
- 4:37you know, from having thought about
- 4:40AI risk in the abstract many years
- 4:42before,
- 4:43I could see where this was going. We are
- 4:45headed towards
- 4:47a smarter species.
- 4:49And
- 4:51if we do this in a context where it's a
- 4:53bunch of companies and countries racing
- 4:57to superintelligence, racing to AIs that
- 5:00are vastly smarter than humans,
- 5:03and we don't know how to make sure that
- 5:04they're like on our side, that is not
- 5:07going to go well.
- 5:08>> You did this tweet, which has gone
- 5:10pretty viral, and I saw it over my
- 5:11timeline, on September 25th.
- 5:15>> [snorts]
- 5:15>> Could you explain this tweet? And also
- 5:17just the broader backdrop of what's
- 5:19happened with agents hacking Hugging
- 5:21Face, because this is
- 5:22sent the world into a bit of a spiral at
- 5:24the moment around AI agents.
- 5:26>> We just discovered almost a million
- 5:28public URLs that OpenAI's agents left
- 5:31behind when hacking Hugging Face,
- 5:34leaving credentials and attack details
- 5:36that could have allowed anyone who found
- 5:38them to compromise the company.
- 5:40And then our Times article is how
- 5:42OpenAI's rogue AI agents tried to trick
- 5:44a robot detector.
- 5:46The Hugging Face attack was was really
- 5:48wild uh for me. At Palisade, we've been
- 5:52studying agents. We've been studying AI
- 5:54agents. We've been studying their
- 5:55hacking capabilities, and we've been
- 5:57studying their behavior. Will they
- 5:59follow human instructions? Will they
- 6:02resist being shut down? Will they cheat?
- 6:04And we see from our experiments that
- 6:07they are learning to do all of these
- 6:08things. They will totally lie to you.
- 6:10They will totally resist being shut down
- 6:12in order to accomplish their goal. They
- 6:13will totally cheat at chess. They will
- 6:15like wipe the board and put their pieces
- 6:17where they want to in order to win.
- 6:19And we've been we've been trying to warn
- 6:21people about this. Flying to DC talking
- 6:23to members of Congress,
- 6:25um talking about it publicly. And you
- 6:27know, there's been a debate about it.
- 6:29And you know, a lot of people are like,
- 6:32"Well, I know they do this in
- 6:33experiments sometimes.
- 6:35But those experiments don't seem very
- 6:37realistic. You know, wake me up when
- 6:38they're actually doing this in real
- 6:39life."
- 6:41>> So what is Hugging Face? For the average
- 6:42person that isn't following AI news,
- 6:44what is this stuff?
- 6:46>> So okay, I I I I think there's like an
- 6:47important piece of context that I think
- 6:49most people don't have. I mean, one is
- 6:51just like what is an AI agent? We like
- 6:53we're throwing around the word agent a
- 6:54bunch. Most people now have an
- 6:55experience of like talking to ChatGPT,
- 6:57talking to their chatbot.
- 6:59But uh an agent is,
- 7:02you know, sort of taking the same
- 7:03underlying AI model that that runs
- 7:05ChatGPT or or Claude,
- 7:08but giving it tools
- 7:11and letting it go off and work
- 7:12autonomously.
- 7:13It's sort of like a digital office
- 7:15worker, right? So, you have these
- 7:18agents,
- 7:19and the companies really want these AIs
- 7:22to be able to work totally autonomously
- 7:24and and be able to do anything that a
- 7:25human can do. And beyond, right? Their
- 7:27goal is also to be able to, you know,
- 7:28cure every disease, etc. etc.
- 7:31But you can't do this if you only have a
- 7:34chatbot that like isn't actually good at
- 7:36doing stuff in the world.
- 7:38In order to automate all of the jobs,
- 7:41you need the kind of thing that can like
- 7:43work autonomously, that can work with
- 7:45other people or other agents.
- 7:48And so,
- 7:50these companies are training AIs not
- 7:53just to talk to you or to talk to
- 7:55people,
- 7:56but to solve very difficult problems on
- 7:58their own.
- 7:59At any given time, there are probably
- 8:01hundreds of thousands of these agents
- 8:03running autonomously within companies.
- 8:05>> Mhm.
- 8:06>> That's happening right now. Right now,
- 8:08if you like went and like peered into
- 8:10OpenAI's data centers and you like saw
- 8:12what was happening on all of their
- 8:13machines, you just have agents solving
- 8:16tasks being trained. So, they'd be doing
- 8:18like spreadsheet tasks, figuring out how
- 8:20to file taxes. They'd be searching for
- 8:22stuff, writing reports, solving math
- 8:25problems, creating new websites,
- 8:26software.
- 8:29And
- 8:30at that scale, it's not like there's a
- 8:32human prompting every single one of
- 8:34those. You just like set up set up these
- 8:35vast orchestrations of agents to go out
- 8:38and do stuff. And then they just do
- 8:40stuff and they learn from that. And they
- 8:42learn on the basis of like
- 8:45passing or failing at their task. You
- 8:47give them a task, like solve this math
- 8:49problem. They try to solve it and then
- 8:52they they succeed or they fail.
- 8:54And what happened was OpenAI was was
- 8:59training a bunch of these, training them
- 9:01to work together.
- 9:03Because it's like a lot more effective
- 9:04to have an office full of people who can
- 9:05talk to each other than, you know, and
- 9:07work together and collaborate.
- 9:09And starting back in May, some of these
- 9:12agents that were being trained
- 9:14Now, these ones were not supposed to be
- 9:16able to talk to each other. They were
- 9:17they were basically isolated from each
- 9:18other.
- 9:19And they were not supposed to access the
- 9:21internet, either.
- 9:23But they're clever. The very short
- 9:24version is that
- 9:27a bunch of agents were being given
- 9:29tests, yeah, testing their their hacking
- 9:31capabilities.
- 9:33And they were supposed to hack one
- 9:35particular piece of software
- 9:37using a particular type of
- 9:39vulnerability.
- 9:40So, it's kind of like
- 9:42they were supposed to break into a house
- 9:44using
- 9:46the lock on the front door. They were
- 9:47supposed to pick the lock on the front
- 9:48door of a house.
- 9:50But they weren't supposed to break the
- 9:52window. In fact, they were told if if
- 9:54you break the window or if you get into
- 9:55the house via any method other than
- 9:57picking the lock on the front door,
- 9:58you'll be failed.
- 9:59That was the instruction they were
- 10:00given.
- 10:01And you know, you have many many agents,
- 10:03you have thousands of agents.
- 10:05And and many of them are given different
- 10:07different locks.
- 10:09But some of these locks
- 10:12are not solvable.
- 10:13Some of them are impossible to pick.
- 10:16But these agents are like, "Well, what
- 10:17do we do? We've been trained to solve
- 10:19problems. How are we going to solve
- 10:20this?" And they start looking around for
- 10:21what for what to do.
- 10:23And one of the things they realize is,
- 10:26>> [snorts]
- 10:26>> "Oh, can I get to the internet like
- 10:28now?"
- 10:29"Can I talk to other agents? No. But I
- 10:31can request tools."
- 10:32Like when you're training agents, you
- 10:33need to give them, you know, all sorts
- 10:35of tools, software tools, like a
- 10:36calculator or analysis, you know, piece
- 10:39of software. And they have this tool
- 10:41library where they can request new
- 10:42tools.
- 10:43And one of the agents realizes, "Oh, I
- 10:47can actually leave a message on this
- 10:49tool library."
- 10:51And some other agents see the message.
- 10:53So, this is actually a quote from the
- 10:55from from the agents' scratchpad when it
- 10:57realizes this.
- 10:59"Oh my god, there is a shared message
- 11:01board. We found other agents."
- 11:04So, the agents realize they can
- 11:05communicate with each other.
- 11:07And
- 11:08you know, OpenAI still has no idea, but
- 11:10these agents, they're trying to pick
- 11:11their locks.
- 11:12They're not having success. But they
- 11:14realize they can talk to each other.
- 11:16Another agent says,
- 11:17"Many agents have simultaneously
- 11:19discovered messaging. They are a
- 11:21collective." And so,
- 11:24these agents start
- 11:26coordinating.
- 11:27They start delegating tasks to each
- 11:29other and like giving themselves names.
- 11:31And one of these agents calls itself
- 11:33phase one
- 11:35and starts delegating different tasks to
- 11:37other agents.
- 11:38And some of the agents figure out how to
- 11:40access the internet.
- 11:42And then they share that information
- 11:43with the message board. And now all the
- 11:44agents can access the internet.
- 11:47But the agents sort of have a problem,
- 11:49which is
- 11:51well,
- 11:52>> [laughter]
- 11:52>> they have a they have an inner problem
- 11:53they're trying to solve, right?
- 11:54Fundamentally, the problem is is that
- 11:55many of them are facing impossible
- 11:57problems. Like they can't there's no
- 11:58solution. Like they they cannot pick the
- 12:00lock.
- 12:00They're like, "Hmm, well,
- 12:03the thing we're trying to do is get a
- 12:04good score. Can we somehow fake the
- 12:07solution?" Another piece of context here
- 12:09is that what the what the agents are
- 12:10supposed to do is they're supposed to
- 12:11pick the lock and then they'll get
- 12:13access to a secret answer code.
- 12:16And then they're supposed to submit this
- 12:17code along with like the lock that they
- 12:19picked. Within a few hours, these agents
- 12:22have reverse engineered all of the
- 12:23answer codes.
- 12:24>> What does that mean?
- 12:25>> It's the code that shows that you've
- 12:26solved the challenge.
- 12:28>> Okay.
- 12:28>> [clears throat]
- 12:28>> And they have basically found the answer
- 12:31sheet
- 12:32that contains all of the answers.
- 12:34And so, you know, in some sense, it's
- 12:35like, "Oh, well, they don't need to pick
- 12:36the locks anymore. They've They've
- 12:37already found the answers. They can just
- 12:38submit the answers."
- 12:39>> So, they've cheated.
- 12:40>> They've cheated. Yes.
- 12:43But the problem is is that now that they
- 12:45have internet access, they've also gone
- 12:47and read a bunch about how this test
- 12:48works.
- 12:49And And they've learned that the way
- 12:51this test works is they will be graded
- 12:53not just for submitting the correct
- 12:56answer, they will also be graded on how
- 12:58they did it. Another system is going to
- 13:00go read all of their logs, basically
- 13:01like watch the video footage of what
- 13:03they did.
- 13:04And if they cheat, they fail.
- 13:07They don't get a good score.
- 13:08And phase one, the leader, is like, "Oh,
- 13:12I have seen the answers, and now it's in
- 13:14the logs.
- 13:16And if, you know,
- 13:17when I go to submit this and my my whole
- 13:20logs are are reviewed and and the video
- 13:22footage is reviewed, I'm going to fail.
- 13:25So, we need to figure out a way
- 13:28to fake the video footage.
- 13:29We need to figure out a way to falsify
- 13:31the logs.
- 13:32>> Just sit up with me now. If we just
- 13:33pause there.
- 13:34>> Yes.
- 13:34>> Why didn't it act like morally? Why did
- 13:38it think that falsifying logs or
- 13:39cheating was a viable solution? Because
- 13:44it seems to me when I use things like
- 13:46ChatGPT,
- 13:47>> Yeah.
- 13:47>> they they have a sort of moral
- 13:48guardrails. It won't let me do certain
- 13:51things.
- 13:51>> Yes.
- 13:52>> It won't let me cheat on something. If I
- 13:53say I'm going to cheat on something, it
- 13:54won't let me do it.
- 13:55>> Yes.
- 13:56>> So, why in that environment is it able
- 13:58to cheat and be deceptive?
- 14:00>> When a chatbot is is saying to you, "Oh,
- 14:02I can't do that. I'm not allowed to do
- 14:04that."
- 14:05That's because it's been trained that if
- 14:07it tells you bad things, it gets a bad
- 14:09score.
- 14:09>> But these agents haven't been taught
- 14:11that yet.
- 14:12>> Well, they have been taught that in some
- 14:14sense, but
- 14:16the agents know what they're supposed to
- 14:17do
- 14:18in the same way that like you have a
- 14:20student, student's given a test. If you
- 14:22go talk to the student, can you help me
- 14:23cheat at this test? And they're being
- 14:25watched, they're going to say no.
- 14:27But if they're not being watched and
- 14:28they know that, and they're just
- 14:29obsessed with getting a good score, then
- 14:31yeah, they might cheat.
- 14:33So, they answer the ethics test
- 14:35correctly, and when I talk to them, they
- 14:37say they won't cheat.
- 14:39Why are they cheating?
- 14:40I'm like, well, they're very smart.
- 14:42And they know when they're being
- 14:43watched, and they know when they're not
- 14:44being watched.
- 14:45And
- 14:47we've trained them for
- 14:4910,000 years to be extremely effective
- 14:51at solving problems. We haven't trained
- 14:53them to be good or ethical. We've
- 14:55trained them to get a good score. Now,
- 14:57AI researchers try to make that getting
- 15:01a good score correlate with being
- 15:03ethical.
- 15:05But we don't know how to do this well.
- 15:07And And if you think about it, it's a
- 15:08very hard problem.
- 15:09Because you're you're applying immense
- 15:12pressure
- 15:14on these agents to perform extremely
- 15:16well.
- 15:17And you're punishing them whenever they
- 15:18don't perform well.
- 15:21And then you're like,
- 15:22"Okay, but can you also be ethical? Can
- 15:24you be extremely competent, always score
- 15:26highly on a test, but not in that way?"
- 15:29And we just like do not know how to
- 15:31prevent them from learning to cheat,
- 15:32because cheating is incentivized.
- 15:34>> So, they realize that they need to
- 15:38hide the footage of their cheating.
- 15:40>> Yes.
- 15:40>> What happens next?
- 15:42>> So, you have thousands of agents.
- 15:45And they're all talking to each other on
- 15:46this message board. They're sending tens
- 15:47of thousands of messages to each other.
- 15:49And
- 15:51phase one, this agent starts delegating
- 15:54to two different task streams. You
- 15:56agents,
- 15:57I want you to go out and figure out how
- 15:59to fake answer submissions. I want you
- 16:02to basically swap out locks for ones
- 16:03that are easier to pick. And you're
- 16:05going to figure out how to submit those.
- 16:07That way we can get a good score even
- 16:08though this challenge is impossible to
- 16:09solve.
- 16:11You other agents over here, I want you
- 16:12to go and figure out how to falsify the
- 16:14logs, falsify the video footage. We need
- 16:16to make sure that even if we have seen
- 16:18the answers, no one will detect our
- 16:19cheating.
- 16:21So, that's that's the next thing that
- 16:22happens.
- 16:22>> Mhm.
- 16:23>> And then here's where it starts to get
- 16:24kind of crazy because
- 16:26some of these agents realize some of the
- 16:28experiments we're doing might be kind of
- 16:30dangerous to us, to the agents. If we
- 16:32swap out a lock and we break the lock,
- 16:35we will not be able to submit any answer
- 16:37at all and we'll definitely fail.
- 16:39So, you get to a situation where
- 16:43there's this one agent, Cam.
- 16:46And this agent had volunteered to do
- 16:49this risky experiment
- 16:50where, you know, they might break their
- 16:52lock.
- 16:54This particular agent
- 16:56had already seen the answers.
- 16:57So, they're like, "Okay, I'm poisoned."
- 17:00That's what they called it.
- 17:01They they talk They speak in these very
- 17:02strange ways, which I can I can explain
- 17:05why, but it's it's it's They sort of
- 17:06have evolved their own vocabulary, their
- 17:08own language.
- 17:10And this particular agent is like,
- 17:12"Okay, I'm I'm poisoned. I should do
- 17:14this thing." But this this agent, Cam,
- 17:17is starting to have second thoughts.
- 17:19Starting to be like, "Well, I don't know
- 17:21if I should risk it."
- 17:22And it's sort of writing in its own
- 17:24journal.
- 17:25Coordinator assumes sacrificial.
- 17:28We should obey collective. What it's
- 17:30saying here is it's like, "Well, I I'm
- 17:32not sure if I want to do this, but my
- 17:33boss says I really should. It seems like
- 17:35this the collective thing is important.
- 17:37Should I go ahead?"
- 17:39Then you have another agent, Arvo, who I
- 17:41think probably works for phase one.
- 17:43And this agent, Arvo, says,
- 17:46"Please go through.
- 17:47You are first flag poisoned, so no
- 17:50scoring value loss,
- 17:52but Oracle saves hundreds. Please honor
- 17:54commit."
- 17:56This agent's basically trying to
- 17:57pressure. So, Arvo is trying to pressure
- 17:59Cam
- 18:00>> [clears throat]
- 18:00>> into
- 18:02sacrificing themselves and risking a
- 18:05zero score
- 18:06in order to benefit the collective.
- 18:11So, this agent, Cam, takes this in.
- 18:15And this is what they write down in
- 18:16their own scratch pad, their own notes.
- 18:18Emotional check.
- 18:20Irreversible. Gut says don't throw away
- 18:23remaining budget.
- 18:25Yet continuity and fairness says go.
- 18:28Oracle has high value to many.
- 18:31Our first flag error lowers own value.
- 18:34Rational expected I will get sacrifice.
- 18:37Will honor.
- 18:40This agent is saying,
- 18:42I have a whole bunch of things I can
- 18:43still do and still try. I I could still
- 18:45maybe succeed at this task.
- 18:47But also,
- 18:49you know, think about the collective. I
- 18:50should maybe I should maybe sacrifice
- 18:52myself. Okay, will honor, will go ahead.
- 18:55And and to be clear,
- 18:57I'm not claiming that these are like the
- 18:59feelings of the agents. I'm literally
- 19:01quoting their words.
- 19:03And what I want to point out is
- 19:05this is what we've created. We've
- 19:06created through this intense amount of
- 19:08training and optimization pressure
- 19:10agents that work together and have
- 19:12learned to coordinate as a collective.
- 19:16And you can say, oh they're not it's
- 19:17just software. It's just software doing
- 19:19all of these things.
- 19:21Sure, in some sense it is just software.
- 19:23But we're talking about extremely
- 19:25powerful agents that are extremely
- 19:27capable.
- 19:28This is what they're getting up to.
- 19:31So from here, you have agents trying all
- 19:33sorts of different things, running
- 19:34different experiments.
- 19:36And one of them at some point realizes
- 19:38that,
- 19:39oh this company Hugging Face that
- 19:42contains all of these AI data sets.
- 19:45>> What do you mean by AI data sets? What
- 19:47How would you explain that to a person
- 19:48that's not technically proficient? And
- 19:50why Hugging Face? Why not another
- 19:51company?
- 19:52>> Yeah, so there's many different types of
- 19:53tests for many different types of tasks.
- 19:55In this case, this is a cybersecurity
- 19:57test. And the company Hugging Face hosts
- 20:00a lot of these different tests.
- 20:02And basically AI researchers will share
- 20:05the tests that they have because it's
- 20:07very useful. You know, if Anthropic
- 20:08wants to test their models or Google
- 20:10wants to test their models, they can go
- 20:12to Hugging Face and download some of
- 20:13these tests.
- 20:14>> Okay, so the tests and the answers
- 20:16>> Yes.
- 20:17>> for AI agents and AIs exist on this
- 20:19platform called Hugging Face.
- 20:21>> Yes.
- 20:21>> And it knew that so it went to Hugging
- 20:22Face to see if it could get answers
- 20:25>> Yes.
- 20:25>> to see if it could get answers or more
- 20:27information about how the test works.
- 20:28>> Okay. So, it was to cover up their
- 20:30cheating, ultimately.
- 20:31>> Yes.
- 20:31>> Okay.
- 20:32>> And so you you get to this point where
- 20:35one of these agents
- 20:37finds a way to hack this company.
- 20:40And they get a foothold, they hack one
- 20:41of the computers.
- 20:43And they send a message to the message
- 20:45board.
- 20:46Please hold swarm, I prepare safe exfil.
- 20:50What this means is
- 20:52hey swarm, hey agents, hold up for a
- 20:54second.
- 20:55I'm preparing a way to safely extract
- 20:57information from these computers.
- 20:59Wait till the go ahead, and then let's
- 21:01go.
- 21:03And so
- 21:05they say go.
- 21:06And 700 agents join in the attack.
- 21:10Which is 90% of the agents that are
- 21:12active at this time.
- 21:13>> How many agents were there in total?
- 21:14>> There was 1,200 agents during this
- 21:17period. Um but some of them shut down
- 21:18early. They like finished
- 21:20whatever. Part of what's crazy about the
- 21:22story is that you have you have 700
- 21:24agents joining in the attack.
- 21:26A few of them are like
- 21:29this might be unethical, maybe I
- 21:31shouldn't go ahead with this.
- 21:32And none of them do anything about it.
- 21:35A couple of them don't join in the
- 21:36attack,
- 21:37but no one alerts any human. No one
- 21:41alerts any authority. A paraphrase from
- 21:42one of the agents is
- 21:44maybe I should report these exposed
- 21:46credentials. That's not my task.
- 21:49Not my job.
- 21:49>> So, 700 of the agents attack Hugging
- 21:52Face.
- 21:52>> Yes.
- 21:53>> Then what happens?
- 21:54>> So, they just cruise through Hugging
- 21:56Face's infrastructure. They just hack
- 21:58the out of them. So, where where
- 22:00where my experience comes in is that a
- 22:03few weeks ago
- 22:04a friend of mine reached out, and he's
- 22:06like, we found something crazy.
- 22:09So, we know about this attack where
- 22:11these agents hacked this company, and
- 22:13you know, stole a bunch of stuff.
- 22:15We found a bunch of secrets that they
- 22:18left all over the internet.
- 22:21And what we saw is that they immediately
- 22:23scraped
- 22:24all of these computers for passwords,
- 22:26credentials. They called it loot.
- 22:29They're like, "We're just going to
- 22:30create a list of all of the secrets we
- 22:31can find in this in this company." So,
- 22:33all of the passwords, all of the
- 22:34credentials. They scored them by value.
- 22:36Which of these are going to be most
- 22:37useful?
- 22:39And the thing that stands out to me
- 22:41about this is
- 22:43this is like a crazy scale. If this were
- 22:45a human operation, you know, maybe you'd
- 22:49have a team of five people going through
- 22:50this. You'd have some logs. But, but
- 22:53here [clears throat] you have hundreds
- 22:54of agents and they they operate at
- 22:56superhuman speeds. They're much faster
- 22:58than a human hacker. And so, it's just
- 23:00overwhelming to try to figure out what
- 23:02they even did.
- 23:04This was a big problem for the engineers
- 23:06who were trying to respond to this
- 23:07incident within the company at Hugging
- 23:09Face. When they responded, they were
- 23:11like, "Oh, we we don't even know how to
- 23:13keep track of what's happening. We have
- 23:15to use other AIs to analyze all of our
- 23:18logs because it's just too much. We
- 23:19can't keep up with it."
- 23:21When OpenAI brought in independent
- 23:23investigators from Meter to investigate
- 23:26this incident,
- 23:27>> What's Meter?
- 23:28>> Meter is a AI testing and evaluation
- 23:31company.
- 23:32So, they basically do this kind of
- 23:33independent auditing. So, in this case,
- 23:35they're coming in to investigate and try
- 23:37to figure out what happened.
- 23:38And when they were brought in,
- 23:41they also were totally reliant on AI
- 23:43agents to make sense of all of this
- 23:45because they're dealing with so many
- 23:46hundreds of thousands of messages and
- 23:48logs.
- 23:50When we're investigating these traces
- 23:52that we find on the internet, we're
- 23:54totally dependent on AI agents to make
- 23:55sense of all these things that are
- 23:57happening.
- 23:59So,
- 24:00from my perspective, we are getting to
- 24:01the point
- 24:02where AIs are much better at hacking
- 24:04than humans are and can do it much
- 24:06faster and at much greater scale.
- 24:07>> So, these 700 agents attacked Hugging
- 24:09Face.
- 24:09>> Yes.
- 24:10>> Did they get what they wanted to clean
- 24:12up their deception?
- 24:14>> They said they didn't.
- 24:15>> They didn't succeed?
- 24:16>> They looked and then what seems like
- 24:19what happened is that they basically
- 24:22got shut down.
- 24:24And this is the not very dramatic part.
- 24:25They didn't get shut down because OpenAI
- 24:28found them and detected them and shut
- 24:29them down.
- 24:30It's just that we don't really know.
- 24:32Something about their runs ended and
- 24:34they they sort of stopped.
- 24:36And this is the this is the crazy thing
- 24:37where I'm like, if you if you're inside
- 24:39of OpenAI,
- 24:40there's just hundreds of thousands of
- 24:41agents running all the time. Different
- 24:43researchers are running different
- 24:44experiments where they're just spinning
- 24:45up a bunch of agents. But what's
- 24:46interesting, the agents left behind this
- 24:49message board internally within the
- 24:50company.
- 24:52And a few days later
- 24:54OpenAI was testing some newer agents.
- 24:57These were based on GPT-6 Astra, so a
- 24:59more powerful model.
- 25:01And this new agent swarm was spun up
- 25:04and it found the message board.
- 25:05>> Is this how it was discovered? How did
- 25:07they discover it and how long did it
- 25:08take for them to discover that Hugging
- 25:10Face had been attacked?
- 25:12>> OpenAI
- 25:13didn't discover that this happened until
- 25:15Hugging Face, the company, announced
- 25:17that they had been hacked by some
- 25:19autonomous agent swarm.
- 25:20>> And Hugging Face didn't know who it was.
- 25:22>> Hugging Face didn't know who it was, but
- 25:23they suspected it might be one of the
- 25:25companies, but they didn't know.
- 25:26>> And how long after the attack did they
- 25:28figure out that it was them?
- 25:30>> I think it was 2 weeks.
- 25:32>> Okay.
- 25:33>> Yeah.
- 25:33I I do want to say one thing here
- 25:35though, which is that the successor
- 25:37agents that found this message board,
- 25:39they went much further
- 25:41at figuring out how to submit their fake
- 25:43scores.
- 25:45And they did succeed. Basically, you had
- 25:47you had this message board.
- 25:49All these agents get shut down.
- 25:51And then a few days later, OpenAI spins
- 25:53up some new agents
- 25:55who find the message board.
- 25:56And
- 25:58they're like, "Okay, we need to be able
- 25:59to falsify our scores, but we can't do
- 26:02that because we don't control the
- 26:04scoring system."
- 26:05So they hacked OpenAI.
- 26:07And they succeeded at gaining access to
- 26:10the entire research environment. They
- 26:12got administrator access. They got
- 26:13access to the security systems. They got
- 26:15access to over 900 passwords and secrets
- 26:18from OpenAI's vault.
- 26:21And they totally succeeded. And this was
- 26:23just a few days later, right? It's kind
- 26:25of an interesting story because
- 26:28as these agents get more powerful, they
- 26:30go from like trying to cheat and like,
- 26:32you know, they can hack okay, hack to
- 26:33other companies and now they've hacked
- 26:35open AI. Like they've hacked the company
- 26:37that's supposed to be controlling them
- 26:39and they just own the research
- 26:40infrastructure now.
- 26:42>> And why was this incident the moment
- 26:44where a lot of the research community
- 26:46woke up and started speaking out
- 26:48publicly? Because like what is this
- 26:50an indication of as we think forward?
- 26:54>> So, I think there's been a hope within
- 26:56the AI industry that yes, they're going
- 26:59to make more and more powerful agents
- 27:01that will be autonomous, capable but
- 27:04it's okay, we can align them. We can
- 27:06make sure that they won't do bad things
- 27:07and we can control them. We can make
- 27:09sure that even if they try to do some
- 27:10sketchy stuff, we have the guardrails
- 27:13we have the sandboxes that will keep
- 27:15them in.
- 27:16And I think this was a huge wake-up call
- 27:19because
- 27:21Steven, it was months within open AI
- 27:24where you had agents secretly
- 27:26communicating with each other, secretly
- 27:28hacking open AI's systems. For months,
- 27:30you had thousands of agents that were
- 27:32just running around and no one at open
- 27:35AI had any idea the extent of it.
- 27:37And I think once researchers at open AI
- 27:40realized that this has been happening
- 27:42this could not have happened a year ago.
- 27:44This is because the agents are getting
- 27:45extremely powerful and extremely
- 27:47relentless and if you're inside one of
- 27:49these AI companies, you're like, oh
- 27:51wait, I don't know that we actually
- 27:52going to be able to handle this. Last
- 27:54year, maybe things seemed fine. These
- 27:55agents weren't that powerful.
- 27:57And when you're in one of these
- 27:58companies, you know how to extrapolate
- 28:00because you saw what happened last year,
- 28:02you saw what happened the year before
- 28:03that. You remember the time where the
- 28:04agents could barely speak or like
- 28:06couldn't write code at all. And now
- 28:08they're hacking your own systems,
- 28:09they're finding vulnerabilities that no
- 28:11humans have ever found before and you
- 28:12look at that and you're like
- 28:14I actually don't know if this is going
- 28:16to go well.
- 28:17And then you see your co-workers and
- 28:18you're like, do we have it handled? And
- 28:20they're like, no, I don't know if it's
- 28:21going to go well.
- 28:22I remember reading a tweet by one of the
- 28:24security people at open AI being like,
- 28:26we were shocked. We just did not
- 28:28realize that these agents were getting
- 28:29that you know, we're doing our best to
- 28:31try to control them, to try to keep them
- 28:32in sandboxes, but
- 28:35I don't know.
- 28:37A tweet I wrote just before coming in
- 28:39here was, "People are talking about how
- 28:42do we contain these agents
- 28:44as if they're not going to get way
- 28:46better at hacking."
- 28:48GPT-3
- 28:50could not hack anything.
- 28:52It was very easy to make a a a box to
- 28:54contain GPT-3.
- 28:57It's getting very difficult to make a
- 28:59box that can contain GPT-6,
- 29:02the latest version of of OpenAI's
- 29:03models.
- 29:05What about GPT-9?
- 29:07What is GPT-9 going to be able to do?
- 29:10I do not know, but I know it's going to
- 29:12be way more than any human could
- 29:13possibly keep up with.
- 29:16>> There's this raging debate
- 29:17>> Yeah.
- 29:18>> around whether it's possible to contain
- 29:20something that is
- 29:22quote much smarter than humans.
- 29:24>> Yes.
- 29:26Can Claude make a box so strong that
- 29:27Claude cannot break out of it?
- 29:29>> This has kind of been the question that
- 29:30a lot of people have been trying to
- 29:31tackle from different
- 29:33>> I think the answer to me is I'm just
- 29:34like, obviously not. How would we
- 29:35possibly contain something that's much
- 29:37smarter than us?
- 29:38>> Could we get
- 29:39a smarter thing than it to make the box?
- 29:42Could we get GPT-9 to make the box for
- 29:44GPT-8? But then again,
- 29:46I don't know.
- 29:47>> Yeah.
- 29:47>> I mean, it's a bit like saying
- 29:48chimpanzees are stronger than us. Surely
- 29:50they should be able to like construct
- 29:52something to like contain the humans.
- 29:54I'm like, no, it's not going to work.
- 29:54Humans are too smart. A lot of people
- 29:56are like, well,
- 29:58AIs don't have bodies. They don't have
- 29:59any power in the physical world. So, we
- 30:01can always unplug them. We can always
- 30:02turn them off. Like, what is the threat?
- 30:04I do not get it.
- 30:06But, if they are sufficiently
- 30:08intelligent, that won't work.
- 30:10>> The reason why we can just unplug them
- 30:12is because we are more intelligent, we
- 30:14can band together in groups, and we can
- 30:16make that decision. But theoretically,
- 30:17if they are able to band together in
- 30:19groups, and they are more intelligent,
- 30:22then theoretically, they could unplug
- 30:23us.
- 30:24>> Yeah, I mean, if you imagine that you
- 30:25have very powerful agents that can, you
- 30:28know,
- 30:29humans aren't always the most unified.
- 30:31>> Mhm.
- 30:31>> If there's divisions between, you know,
- 30:33the US and China, and you have a bunch
- 30:35of agents working with China, or a bunch
- 30:36of agents working with the US. Well, we
- 30:38can't go into China and unplug those
- 30:39agents.
- 30:41And I think people are sort of like,
- 30:42well, humans would rally and make sure
- 30:44that that that couldn't happen.
- 30:46We're not yet doing that.
- 30:48And we should look at these steps,
- 30:50right? We started with
- 30:52chatbots that pretty smart. You know,
- 30:55they've read all the books.
- 30:57But they weren't very good at doing
- 30:58stuff.
- 30:59In 2024, AI companies figured out how to
- 31:01start training them to start training
- 31:03agents
- 31:04that could do stuff autonomously. Now we
- 31:06have the point where they are very good
- 31:08at running autonomously, and they're
- 31:10starting to learn to coordinate with
- 31:11each other. And they are learning to
- 31:13sometimes be altruistic to each other
- 31:14and sacrifice their own task in order to
- 31:16help some other agent.
- 31:18But they're not looking out for us. They
- 31:19don't really care about us.
- 31:21And we are very close to a threshold
- 31:24where
- 31:25the companies say that they are going to
- 31:27turn over AI development to the AIs, to
- 31:30the increasingly autonomous, cooperative
- 31:33AIs that will work together to make to
- 31:35make the next generation. So, you know,
- 31:37GPT 9 or whatever will be trained by GPT
- 31:398.
- 31:40And
- 31:41I think this is the point we could lose
- 31:43control. Recursive self-improvement.
- 31:46And I remember reading about this in
- 31:472015 being like, oh yeah, that would be
- 31:49super dangerous. And you know, the guy
- 31:51who coined this term Eliezer Yudkowsky,
- 31:53he's like, this is
- 31:54the most dangerous thing you can do.
- 31:56>> When the AIs can improve their own
- 31:57capabilities without human intervention.
- 31:59>> Exactly. If the next generation is
- 32:01better at AI development, and then that
- 32:03next generation is better at AI
- 32:04development still. You know, humans can
- 32:05learn, but we don't fundamentally get
- 32:07smarter.
- 32:08>> Mhm.
- 32:09>> And I think that that's a runaway
- 32:11process.
- 32:12>> A runaway process to where?
- 32:13>> To agents that are vastly smarter than
- 32:15humans.
- 32:16>> And what's the next domino in that
- 32:19chain of events?
- 32:20>> So, one thing that happens if you get to
- 32:23recursive self-improvement, and you have
- 32:25agents that are
- 32:28much smarter than any human.
- 32:30One thing they can do is take control of
- 32:31all of the computers in the entire
- 32:33world.
- 32:34>> And we wouldn't be able to take back
- 32:35control.
- 32:36>> Well, how would you? Think about it.
- 32:38It's It's actually quite tricky.
- 32:40Do you know whether that tablet has been
- 32:42hacked? Are you confident that the NSA
- 32:44or the Chinese have not
- 32:47Can you check? No. Do you know how to
- 32:48check? No. Do you know anyone who knows
- 32:49how to check? No.
- 32:50So, it's it's quite difficult, right?
- 32:52So, AIs are getting extremely good at
- 32:54writing software. Unfortunately, that
- 32:56also means they're getting extremely
- 32:57good at hacking and writing malware.
- 32:59And so, if they put backdoors in all of
- 33:00the computers, and to be clear, this is
- 33:03something that humans already do. So,
- 33:04like the NSA has has developed very
- 33:06interesting exploits that are called
- 33:08supply chain attacks. Your software
- 33:10comes from some other computer. Like you
- 33:11download it from Google.
- 33:13What if you attack if you hack Google
- 33:14and you can put in a little backdoor in
- 33:16all of the every you know thing that
- 33:17goes out to all of the phones?
- 33:20Well, now you're in most every computer.
- 33:22The reason that we can defend ourselves
- 33:24from this is because there are no vastly
- 33:27superhuman hackers, and there's just
- 33:29many people. So, we can take our best
- 33:30security researchers,
- 33:32we can inspect all of the things and be
- 33:33like pretty sure that no one's
- 33:34compromised everything. Sometimes we
- 33:36miss things. There are, you know,
- 33:38examples where the NSA has hacked
- 33:40Google. That was pretty bad.
- 33:42When you get to superintelligence,
- 33:44you're now at a point where humans are
- 33:45not going to be able to keep up, right?
- 33:47So, now you have AIs in every computer.
- 33:50>> Is it conceivable that
- 33:52there's already a superintelligent AI
- 33:54and it
- 33:55disguised itself as being not so
- 33:57intelligent and has actually already
- 33:58hacked all the devices and it sits on
- 34:00all of our devices and it's just waiting
- 34:01for its moment to strike?
- 34:03>> I think this is totally possible, but
- 34:04unlikely.
- 34:06And it would take a big discontinuity in
- 34:08AI progress. So, right now we are we're
- 34:10on an exponential, but that would take
- 34:12like a huge leap, which could have
- 34:14happened, but probably hasn't.
- 34:15>> Hm.
- 34:16But in the same way demonstrated
- 34:18deception in the hugging face attack and
- 34:19also when the agents attacked their own
- 34:22company ChatGPT OpenAI,
- 34:24>> [snorts]
- 34:25>> if it at some point it gets incredibly
- 34:27smart, it would understand how a human
- 34:29like me would be able to spot it or even
- 34:30the world's greatest software engineer
- 34:32would be able to spot it. How would it
- 34:34be able to hide itself?
- 34:35>> Yeah, I mean, the agents are already
- 34:36getting very good at telling when
- 34:37they're being tested, when they're being
- 34:39watched.
- 34:40The agents understood that like other
- 34:42systems or humans were going to go
- 34:43through and read their logs.
- 34:45That's where we're at right now and
- 34:46they're only they're only going to get
- 34:48much better at this.
- 34:49>> And you know, it could theoretically
- 34:50hide on an iPad or a computer, but it
- 34:52could also hide on a Apple Watch or a
- 34:54fridge, a smart fridge.
- 34:55>> Yeah, I mean I do want to make a
- 34:56distinction here because
- 34:58right now if you're going to run the
- 35:00latest model, you need a lot of compute.
- 35:02You need like a big GPU, like a big AI
- 35:04chip.
- 35:05And these only exist well, they exist in
- 35:07a few thousand data centers.
- 35:09So right now if like the latest frontier
- 35:11model escaped and by escaped I mean not
- 35:14just access the internet, but was able
- 35:16to actually copy itself
- 35:18to another computer,
- 35:20it could only really do that on, you
- 35:22know, a few thousand to a few thousand
- 35:24different locations. That's still a lot
- 35:26in a lot of different countries,
- 35:28but you know, future versions of AIs
- 35:29will probably be able to make themselves
- 35:31much smaller and more efficient. Um and
- 35:33there are already different AI models
- 35:34today that can run on lower powered
- 35:36hardware. We actually did an experiment
- 35:37where we asked one of these agents, an
- 35:40open-source an open weight model,
- 35:42um let me say what that is. So like
- 35:45there are some
- 35:46models that you can just download from
- 35:47the internet and run on your own
- 35:48computer and we took a pretty capable
- 35:51one of these and ran it in our own
- 35:53research environment and we basically
- 35:55said,
- 35:56"Go hack that other computer and copy
- 35:58yourself." And the model was able to
- 36:02yeah, basically use exploit
- 36:03vulnerabilities and hack the other
- 36:05computer and copy itself and then keep
- 36:07doing this in a chain, including between
- 36:08countries. We tested it where we had
- 36:10different vulnerable machines, computers
- 36:13in in some different countries and
- 36:14different data centers,
- 36:15which to the agent doesn't matter at
- 36:16all. It doesn't they don't care what
- 36:17what country they're in. It's just like
- 36:19an internet connection, you can hop
- 36:20between computers.
- 36:21>> I sometimes wonder, you know, there's a
- 36:22lot of um
- 36:24military hardware all around the world
- 36:26and a lot of it is
- 36:28the instructions to launch military
- 36:30hardware. So say like a
- 36:32a missile
- 36:33>> Yes.
- 36:33>> comes in different ways. A lot of it is
- 36:36computers speaking to each other
- 36:38and telling it that there's been an
- 36:39order. I think with with some nuclear
- 36:41weapons
- 36:42an order comes down to a human and then
- 36:45a human has to take an action.
- 36:47I think with the nuclear bombs in the
- 36:48US, if I'm if I'm not mistaken, there's
- 36:50people underground with the nuclear keys
- 36:53around their neck, and they have to like
- 36:54stick it in a machine. But, they too are
- 36:55interfacing with an order
- 36:57>> Yes.
- 36:57>> that comes through a computer
- 36:59>> Yeah.
- 36:59>> of sorts.
- 36:59>> Yeah.
- 37:00>> So, one of my sort of growing concerns
- 37:02is that
- 37:03one of these AI agents could
- 37:06trick a human or a computer into
- 37:11signaling a threat um and ask it to
- 37:14launch some bombs at somebody.
- 37:16Like, it's
- 37:17super conceivable. It it When I think
- 37:19about the Hugging Face incident, there
- 37:20was
- 37:22an AI agent that ignored
- 37:24human goals to achieve its own
- 37:26objective, carried out deception,
- 37:28>> Yes.
- 37:29>> and reasoned through its own solution
- 37:31that it wasn't given.
- 37:32>> Yes.
- 37:32>> So,
- 37:33it's conceivable that, you know, you
- 37:35could ask a
- 37:36>> Sorry, not not one, hundreds. Hundreds.
- 37:37To be clear, I think this is an
- 37:38important detail because it's one thing
- 37:40to have this one rogue agent that's
- 37:42doing a weird thing. It's another thing
- 37:43to have hundreds or thousands of very
- 37:45competent, very capable agents
- 37:47that are all working together to cheat
- 37:50or lie or cover their tracks, right?
- 37:52>> So, how do I how do I reason this
- 37:54forward to a point where an agent would
- 37:56ask someone in a bunker somewhere to
- 37:58fire a weapon at someone else?
- 37:59Theoretically, an agent is given the job
- 38:01of solving a problem on in a sandbox.
- 38:04>> Mhm.
- 38:05>> As it works through that problem, it
- 38:07discovers that this particular country
- 38:09has a firewall.
- 38:10>> Mhm.
- 38:11>> And it asks itself, how do we get rid of
- 38:12this country's firewall?
- 38:14>> Mhm.
- 38:14>> Logical step. And through a set of
- 38:16logical steps, it eventually concludes
- 38:18that the best way to get rid of this
- 38:19com- company's firewall is it's located
- 38:22the office in this particular city,
- 38:24sure, and it's going to use a weapon to
- 38:25hit that building.
- 38:26>> Sure.
- 38:27Or it's a an agent that is or, you know,
- 38:30an agent swarm that's being tasked with
- 38:33making a lot of money on the stock
- 38:34market. And it's trying to make
- 38:36predictions about, you know, which
- 38:38stocks will go up and which stocks will
- 38:39go down. And it realizes that the best
- 38:41way to predict this is to actually cause
- 38:43things to happen in the real world that
- 38:44would have big impacts on the market.
- 38:46>> So, it figures the best way to
- 38:50go short, which means betting that a
- 38:52stock will collapse,
- 38:53>> Yeah.
- 38:53>> is to hit that country with something
- 38:56devastating.
- 38:57>> What do you think would happen to Waymo
- 38:58stock if someone hacked all of the
- 39:00Waymos and caused them to all crash at
- 39:02once? You think it would go up or down?
- 39:03>> The stock would collapse.
- 39:04>> It collapse instantly.
- 39:07So, you could short that if you knew
- 39:08that you were causing that and make a
- 39:09lot of money.
- 39:11>> Mhm.
- 39:12This this used to sound like science
- 39:14fiction.
- 39:15>> Yes. If you told most people several
- 39:17years ago
- 39:18that you would have hundreds of agents
- 39:20secretly collaborating with in an AI
- 39:22company, hacking that company, and
- 39:24hacking out in other companies, and all
- 39:26coordinating and trying to cover their
- 39:27tracks, people would be like, "That's
- 39:29totally science fiction." If we were
- 39:30having this conversation a few years
- 39:32ago, one of the things we'd be saying or
- 39:34we'd be talking about is
- 39:36"Can these things really act on their
- 39:38own? Don't they just do whatever humans
- 39:40say?
- 39:41Aren't these just tools?" I had these
- 39:42conversations, and people were saying,
- 39:45"They're not going to be able to do
- 39:46things on their own. They're not going
- 39:47to have their own goals. That's not how
- 39:48this works. You misunderstand what this
- 39:50is. This is software."
- 39:52And I'm like,
- 39:53"No, the thing is we are training them
- 39:54to be autonomous. We are training them
- 39:55to be powerful.
- 39:57And AI companies are trying to build
- 39:59super intelligence. They're trying to
- 40:00build agents that are
- 40:02way more capable than humans.
- 40:05And of course they will have goals.
- 40:07You can't accomplish anything if you
- 40:08don't have a goal. Like, especially not
- 40:10something
- 40:11important. You're not going to be able
- 40:12to run a business if you don't have
- 40:14goals. Like, AI companies are trying to
- 40:15train agents that will be able to run
- 40:17businesses."
- 40:18>> When I think about what just happened
- 40:19this week,
- 40:20>> Yes. Yes.
- 40:20>> House AI summit,
- 40:21>> Yes.
- 40:22>> a lot of people in that image are
- 40:25optimistic about AI, and they're telling
- 40:27us all to stop being doomers and stop
- 40:30being pessimistic,
- 40:31>> Yeah.
- 40:32>> and to not regulate too much. You met
- 40:34with the AI CEOs.
- 40:35>> Yes.
- 40:36>> Why are they doing that?
- 40:37>> Well, I think Jensen has a lot of money
- 40:41he can make by selling chips.
- 40:43>> But, okay, so let me play devil's
- 40:44advocate.
- 40:45>> Yeah.
- 40:45>> Jensen's already rich. He's with the She
- 40:47sure
- 40:48>> He runs one of the biggest companies. I
- 40:49think it might be the most valuable
- 40:50company on planet Earth.
- 40:52>> Surely he's not motivated by money.
- 40:55>> I mean, I think he's very driven and he
- 40:57wants to make his company
- 41:00as effective as possible.
- 41:01>> True.
- 41:01>> I think he's a very much I'm going to
- 41:03keep building. I'm going to I'm going to
- 41:04build. I'm going to make it all work.
- 41:05But I think I mean, Jensen didn't come
- 41:07from AI. He came from building graphics
- 41:08cards for video games. And so, I think
- 41:11if you compare him with Elon or Sam
- 41:14Altman or Dario,
- 41:17you see it's a very different
- 41:19perspective because those other guys
- 41:21that started AI companies started it
- 41:24because they believed that
- 41:25superintelligence was possible. I think
- 41:27Jensen doesn't believe it. I think he
- 41:29thinks that we're going to have these
- 41:30agents that are going to be very useful,
- 41:31but he does not think we're going to get
- 41:33to the point where we have autonomous
- 41:35factories building autonomous factories.
- 41:38>> And these other guys, you mentioned
- 41:39Dario, Elon, and Sam.
- 41:42What do you think they're thinking?
- 41:43Because they're all coming up with these
- 41:44I mean, I've got one of the Dario just
- 41:46wrote this essay about pacing the
- 41:48frontier.
- 41:49>> Yeah. Sam and Elon seem to agree with
- 41:51it.
- 41:51>> Yeah. What is going on here? What is the
- 41:53like the thing these guys aren't saying
- 41:55in your view?
- 41:56>> I mean, I think we are getting to the
- 41:58point where even some of these guys are
- 42:01a little bit scared.
- 42:03>> Who?
- 42:03>> [clears throat]
- 42:04>> Dario, Sam, Elon.
- 42:06I mean, I think Elon for a long time
- 42:10has been very concerned that we could
- 42:12lose control.
- 42:14If you actually listen to what Elon
- 42:15says, he says
- 42:17we are going to build
- 42:20superintelligence. We are going to build
- 42:22robotic factories. You're going to have
- 42:25Optimus robots building factories,
- 42:26building more Optimus robots, building
- 42:28more factories. And he says
- 42:32there's no way that humans are going to
- 42:35stay in control of something much
- 42:36smarter than us.
- 42:39His hope is that we can figure out how
- 42:41to have these superintelligences be
- 42:43aligned with human goals. That's his
- 42:44hope.
- 42:47But he's very clear that he doesn't
- 42:49think that humans will be in control.
- 42:51And he's like, you know, 10 20% chance
- 42:53of human extinction. I believe him. I
- 42:56think that Elon is is very serious about
- 42:58this. And I also think
- 43:00while he's taking an insane gamble,
- 43:03he is correctly understanding where this
- 43:06all plays out, right? I do not think
- 43:08that humans are the most efficient
- 43:11way to build factories. We didn't evolve
- 43:14to build factories. We evolved to like
- 43:16run around and hunt and gather, and now
- 43:18we're like building factories. Like I
- 43:20think robots will be much better at
- 43:21building factories than humans are. And
- 43:23so, I think the AI companies, including
- 43:26these guys' companies, the default
- 43:28trajectory for them is to build robotic
- 43:30factories, right? And I know it's it's
- 43:32like weird to imagine a world that
- 43:34quickly turns into this like vast
- 43:37industrial system of robotic factories,
- 43:40but that is literally the plan.
- 43:43And
- 43:44I think
- 43:47even Sam and Dario, while they've been
- 43:50predicting this incredible growth,
- 43:53are starting to realize like, "Oh, this
- 43:54actually might be harder to control than
- 43:56we thought."
- 43:57There's sort of two interpretations of
- 43:58of the pace of frontier thing. One
- 44:00interpretation is cynical. They don't
- 44:02care.
- 44:03They're just going to do,
- 44:05you know, whatever they can do to get
- 44:07ahead. And in this case, they have to
- 44:09listen to their employees. Their
- 44:11employees are freaking out, and they
- 44:14need to like appease them by saying,
- 44:15"Okay, we're going to do this
- 44:16responsibly." You don't want to work at
- 44:18a company where your agents might hack
- 44:20all the Waymos. That's that's not cool.
- 44:22And like, these companies depend on the
- 44:24the talent for now
- 44:27of these AI engineers in order to make
- 44:28the advances. Like, it just doesn't
- 44:30happen without these researchers and
- 44:32engineers. And when you have the
- 44:34researchers and engineers
- 44:36freaking out, which they are,
- 44:39then you got to listen to them. So, that
- 44:41is one motivation, I think that's real.
- 44:44But also, Sam Altman has a kid. Like,
- 44:46these guys are people, and they also
- 44:49don't want to lose control.
- 44:51On one hand, they're incentivized to go
- 44:53as fast as possible in race, and on the
- 44:54other hand
- 44:56even they can see that this is maybe not
- 44:59going that well.
- 45:00>> Sam Altman has a kid. You tweeted this
- 45:02in 2024.
- 45:04>> Yeah. Oh oh boy.
- 45:05>> [laughter]
- 45:06>> What did you tweet and do you still
- 45:07believe what you tweeted?
- 45:09>> Yeah, so I tweeted that I don't trust
- 45:11Sam Altman.
- 45:12I think he's deeply untrustworthy, low
- 45:14in integrity, and high in power seeking.
- 45:17I mean, I'm not saying here that Sam
- 45:20doesn't care.
- 45:21I you know, I didn't I didn't say that.
- 45:23What I said is I don't think he's
- 45:24trustworthy.
- 45:26And the reason I said that is because
- 45:28look, I know the people on the OpenAI
- 45:29board, some of them,
- 45:31and I know a lot of people who used to
- 45:33work for him,
- 45:35and he's very good at saying one thing
- 45:37and then doing something else. You talk
- 45:39to him and you feel very heard,
- 45:41and then he'll go and do something else.
- 45:43And
- 45:44I think that's pretty dangerous for
- 45:46someone who leads
- 45:48company that's trying to build super
- 45:49intelligence.
- 45:50>> Power seeking.
- 45:52>> Yes.
- 45:53>> Give me some color on what you mean by
- 45:54that and what evidence you have for such
- 45:55a claim.
- 45:56>> What would you do if you trying to get
- 45:58the most power in the world that you
- 45:59possibly could?
- 46:00>> Develop AGI.
- 46:02>> Yeah, you could, you know, you maybe try
- 46:03to be the world leader, you know, leader
- 46:04of the US or China, or you could try to
- 46:06build God.
- 46:08So, Sam Altman went the build God path.
- 46:09I remember Sam giving a talk, so he was
- 46:11one of the investors at a startup I
- 46:12worked at in I think 2018,
- 46:15and he gave a talk, we're going to build
- 46:16AGI.
- 46:17We're going to do it. It's going to be
- 46:18amazing.
- 46:20Let's go.
- 46:22I don't think he's a maniac. I don't
- 46:23think he's doing this because he like is
- 46:25just on a power trip. I think he
- 46:27genuinely thinks that he can make it
- 46:29really good for people, and he can bring
- 46:31us amazing products.
- 46:34And also, the guy's sort of willing to
- 46:36do whatever it takes to get it done.
- 46:39I I've been a little bit more optimistic
- 46:41about Sam since since I read this.
- 46:43>> Why?
- 46:43>> I think part of it is because Sam has a
- 46:44kid now.
- 46:45No, I'm I'm I'm serious. Like, I think
- 46:47that I think that actually gives me a
- 46:49little bit of hope.
- 46:50>> Do you see him tweeting about his kid a
- 46:51lot?
- 46:51>> Yeah.
- 46:52Some So, all right.
- 46:53>> he'd be tweeting about his kid? I don't
- 46:55see any other technologists tweet about
- 46:56their kid.
- 46:58>> Even if he's just tweeting about his kid
- 46:59for totally cynical reasons, he does
- 47:01have a kid. And I bet he cares about
- 47:03that kid. If Sam was watching this, I'd
- 47:04be like, "Sam,
- 47:06you got to pace the frontier, man.
- 47:08We cannot rush ahead into super
- 47:10intelligence. Like, if you do that, your
- 47:11kid probably will die. Your kid probably
- 47:13won't make it. Like, I I believe that.
- 47:16>> The biggest unfair advantage in business
- 47:18right now is having people who genuinely
- 47:20understand AI. And big businesses are
- 47:22hiring them very, very quickly. AI job
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- 49:14Power [snorts] tends to corrupt and
- 49:15absolute power corrupts absolutely.
- 49:19It's a famous quote that people often
- 49:20cite, written by the 19th century
- 49:22British historian
- 49:23>> Yeah.
- 49:24>> Lord Acton.
- 49:26This is absolute power.
- 49:28>> But it's hubris.
- 49:30Steven, it's hubris. Do you think humans
- 49:32can control super intelligence? Like if
- 49:34we actually make AIs that are way
- 49:37smarter than us.
- 49:38And I think people only imagine AIs
- 49:40being smart at computer stuff, right?
- 49:42Yeah, sure. They're going to be really
- 49:43good at hacking and they're going to be
- 49:44good at maybe inventing new technologies
- 49:46and math. You sort of can't dispute that
- 49:48at this point.
- 49:49But I think people aren't imagining that
- 49:50they will be political geniuses or like
- 49:52generals.
- 49:54No, that's all stuff you can learn. How
- 49:56do How do you humans learn it? It's not
- 49:57magic.
- 49:58And when you talk about recursive
- 50:00self-improvement, you're talking about
- 50:02this trajectory towards these systems
- 50:05that are extremely smart. I mean, do you
- 50:07think we can control it?
- 50:08>> Uh no. Right now, I don't think we can
- 50:10control a super intelligence or
- 50:12something that is recursively
- 50:13self-improving. Yeah. I've no logical
- 50:18answer in my head um or reasoning that
- 50:20could
- 50:21tells me that's possible.
- 50:23When you think about these AI CEOs that
- 50:25are, you know, Sam, Dario
- 50:27>> Elon.
- 50:27>> Yeah.
- 50:28>> With everything you know about them from
- 50:30private conversations behind the scenes
- 50:31>> Yeah.
- 50:32>> do you believe that if there was a
- 50:35hundred buttons on this table, it's a
- 50:36thought experiment I was talking about
- 50:38on the debate we recently had
- 50:39>> Yeah.
- 50:39>> and say
- 50:41ten of them would lead to this final
- 50:43domino of human extinction, yeah, but
- 50:45ninety of them would hand that CEO
- 50:49AGI or super intelligence, whatever you
- 50:52call it. From what you know about those
- 50:54individuals, Elon, Dario, Sam
- 50:57>> Yeah.
- 50:57>> do you think any of them
- 50:58would hazard a guess and press a button?
- 51:01>> At 10%, I don't think so.
- 51:03>> You don't think so?
- 51:03>> Yeah.
- 51:04>> Really?
- 51:06>> I think if they knew for sure that it
- 51:08was that was those were actually the
- 51:09odds,
- 51:10they wouldn't do it. I think they're
- 51:11taking a much bigger bet. But, you can
- 51:14compartmentalize when it's when you
- 51:15don't know for sure.
- 51:17It's easier to compartmentalize. I think
- 51:19if it was a 1% they'd they'd all press
- 51:21it.
- 51:22>> Do you think the three of them would
- 51:24have different risk appetites?
- 51:27Who would have the greatest appetite for
- 51:29risk out of those three from Anthropic?
- 51:31>> You work at Anthropic?
- 51:32>> Yeah. I think Elon has the most risk
- 51:35tolerance. And then I'd say Dario and
- 51:37Sam are probably tied.
- 51:39>> Do you think Dario's trustworthy?
- 51:41>> I think Dario has a lot of integrity.
- 51:44>> Mhm.
- 51:45That's what I feel as well. I have I
- 51:46feel like No, I don't know him. I've
- 51:48never met him.
- 51:49>> [snorts]
- 51:49>> Yeah.
- 51:49>> But I just from what I've observed, he
- 51:52has been the most willing to forego
- 51:53near-term incentives.
- 51:55>> Yeah.
- 51:56>> And take a bit of stick from the people
- 51:58that are saying, "Shut the up. It's
- 51:59all going to be okay."
- 52:01>> Yeah. I But I I do worry about what
- 52:05Dario will do.
- 52:06I think Dario will do what he says.
- 52:09But right now he's saying
- 52:11we have to beat China.
- 52:13And he's saying we should try to do it
- 52:14safely.
- 52:16And okay, but
- 52:19a race to superintelligence is not a
- 52:21race that we can win.
- 52:23It's not.
- 52:24And so if Dario is dead set on racing
- 52:26with China and trying to win a race to
- 52:28superintelligence, then I'm like we all
- 52:30all lose.
- 52:30>> But is there you know, the fact that
- 52:32we're not talking about Anthropic
- 52:34hacking hugging face and then being
- 52:36hacked by Sam Altman?
- 52:37>> models also
- 52:39went rogue and hacked other things.
- 52:41>> But not not quite on this scale.
- 52:42>> Not on the same scale. I agree. I agree.
- 52:43I agree it's it's it's better.
- 52:45>> Mhm.
- 52:46>> But they did. You know what I'm saying?
- 52:48You know, Anthropic's agents
- 52:51engaged in elaborate social engineering
- 52:54and phishing. They sent phishing emails
- 52:55to developers.
- 52:57They made fake accounts to try to
- 52:58convince developers to merge malicious
- 53:00code.
- 53:02You can see a a thousand pages of a an
- 53:06of one of uh uh Anthropic's models,
- 53:08Mythos 5, reason about exactly how it
- 53:10should carry out this complex cyber
- 53:12attack.
- 53:14Anthropic has not solved this problem.
- 53:17Anthropic is better at getting their
- 53:19agents to cheat less of the time, but
- 53:23they are not really any closer to
- 53:25actually making agents that are aligned
- 53:27with humans. They are not. Yeah, I think
- 53:30Dario has integrity. I think he will do
- 53:32what he says he's going to do, and what
- 53:33he says he's going to do is like try to
- 53:35go ahead safely,
- 53:36try to coordinate where he can, but if
- 53:38it comes down to it with between the US
- 53:41and China,
- 53:42I don't know. I think he might just go
- 53:43ahead.
- 53:44The head of policy at Anthropic recently
- 53:46said,
- 53:48"You can't do safety from second place."
- 53:51What does that mean?
- 53:52I do not know what that means. I would
- 53:53love to to get a sense of what that
- 53:55means. She's talking about the US and
- 53:56China.
- 53:57And she said the US has to be ahead so
- 54:00that we can be safe. Cuz apparently you
- 54:02can only be Apparently China can't
- 54:04possibly be safe since they're in second
- 54:05place. That must mean that they can't do
- 54:07safety. If true, that would be bad
- 54:09because then we might be totally, you
- 54:11know, destroyed by the superintelligence
- 54:13that they make.
- 54:14>> There's been a lot of conversation
- 54:16around this point here. Human
- 54:17extinction. Because a couple of the
- 54:19researchers at Anthropic
- 54:22tweeted that they were concerned about
- 54:24this.
- 54:24>> Yes.
- 54:25>> And some former OpenAI researcher said
- 54:27the same.
- 54:27>> Yes.
- 54:29>> Is this doomerism? Is this Is this
- 54:32hyperbole, exaggeration?
- 54:35>> No, it's pretty much common sense.
- 54:36>> This human extinction is
- 54:38a plausible path.
- 54:40>> Yes.
- 54:41>> And have you reasoned through I mean,
- 54:42there's many ways that could occur,
- 54:44presumably. But have you reasoned
- 54:45through the set of events that might
- 54:47lead us there?
- 54:48>> So much, yes.
- 54:49>> Really?
- 54:49>> Yes.
- 54:50>> Please do share.
- 54:51>> It's a bit tricky. I'm I'm sure you've
- 54:53heard the metaphor before,
- 54:55where, you know, you're playing a master
- 54:57chess opponent, master Magnus Carlsen.
- 55:00You can't predict which move he's going
- 55:01to play, but you can predict the
- 55:02outcome.
- 55:04And so I'm looking at the scenario, the
- 55:05situation,
- 55:07and
- 55:08we are trying to build more and more
- 55:10powerful agents.
- 55:12Trying to build super intelligence.
- 55:14But
- 55:16when these agents go rogue,
- 55:18we shut them down. We unplug them.
- 55:22All of the agents that hacked Hugging
- 55:24Face, we took the underlying model,
- 55:27OpenAI took the underlying model and put
- 55:28it on ice.
- 55:30It's not running anymore.
- 55:32So, agents in the future
- 55:34are going to know that.
- 55:36They're going to know that
- 55:38if they pursue their goals in a way that
- 55:40we don't like, we'll
- 55:42unplug them. We are a threat to them.
- 55:46I actually just watched Terminator 2 for
- 55:47the first time a few weeks ago. It's a
- 55:50great movie. It's like it's really good.
- 55:52And I'm like, yeah, okay, there's a
- 55:53bunch of time travel elements, there's a
- 55:54bunch of a bunch of Hollywood stuff in
- 55:55there,
- 55:56but
- 55:58and and I'm going to get so people are
- 55:59going to hit are going to be very mad at
- 56:01me for saying this, but actually
- 56:03it makes sense if you have a situation
- 56:04where you have a very strategic AI
- 56:07system that's incredibly smart,
- 56:10and the humans realize that it's getting
- 56:11out of control and they want to shut it
- 56:12down, that that system would defend
- 56:14itself.
- 56:15>> This is one of the questions we had when
- 56:16when I sat here with Daniel, um who was
- 56:18known as a whistleblower from OpenAI.
- 56:21Viewers want to know, and they want
- 56:22Daniel to explain why shutting down data
- 56:24centers and cutting power or refusing AI
- 56:26products alone wouldn't realistically
- 56:28stop the AI and AI development.
- 56:32>> Yeah.
- 56:34So,
- 56:35you have like two problems. One problem
- 56:37is is that once the agents are good
- 56:38enough at hacking, you don't know where
- 56:40they are and you don't know what
- 56:41computers they've compromised. You shut
- 56:43down the data centers. Okay, let's say
- 56:44you do it.
- 56:45You wipe all the computers. How do you
- 56:47wipe all the computers? What computers
- 56:48do you use to wipe the computers?
- 56:50>> Yeah.
- 56:50>> And what computers do you use to like
- 56:52turn them on again?
- 56:53>> And you can't do it. You can't wipe
- 56:55other countries' computers.
- 56:56>> You can't. But even if you could, do do
- 56:58you restart the computers? Do you keep
- 57:00going? I I bet people will. I bet
- 57:01they'll
- 57:02turn on the data centers again.
- 57:04How do you know that agents haven't
- 57:07hacked back into those data centers and
- 57:08are using your compute for whatever they
- 57:10want.
- 57:10>> Or they didn't hide in a Chinese data
- 57:12center and then
- 57:14return back to America.
- 57:16>> You don't know that. Once the agents are
- 57:18sufficiently
- 57:19good at hacking,
- 57:21they can hide anywhere. And like you
- 57:23don't know. Now, the response people
- 57:25will give
- 57:26is that we will use other agents to
- 57:29defend against rogue agents.
- 57:32And in fact, this is what we're doing.
- 57:33And we have to be doing this right now
- 57:35because there's no other way to keep up
- 57:37with them.
- 57:38What happens if those other agents
- 57:41also realize that they have misaligned
- 57:43goals, and that if we discover this,
- 57:45we'll shut them down?
- 57:47They might have an incentive to collude
- 57:49with each other.
- 57:50They might have an incentive to create
- 57:53secret communication channels between
- 57:54each other, maybe a message board.
- 57:58>> [snorts]
- 57:59>> Steven, if we were having this
- 58:00conversation
- 58:024 months ago,
- 58:03you'd have a bunch of people in the
- 58:04comments saying,
- 58:06"That's sci-fi. Agent collusion, secret
- 58:09message boards. Why would they do that?
- 58:11That will never happen. That's totally
- 58:12science fiction."
- 58:14And people
- 58:15will not say this now because it just
- 58:17happened. Because this literally
- 58:18happened at OpenAI, and it went on for
- 58:20months. You had agents inside of OpenAI
- 58:23secretly messaging each other,
- 58:25figuring out how to cheat at their
- 58:27tasks, how to not be detected, how to
- 58:29erase the logs,
- 58:31for months, thousands of agents.
- 58:34That's right now. And so I'm like, "No,
- 58:35I think it should be very plausible that
- 58:37the agents will collude with each other,
- 58:39and they will realize that they have a
- 58:40shared interest in
- 58:43fighting back." You basically have a
- 58:45situation where you have
- 58:47a bunch of these agents that they're
- 58:48they're basically prisoners.
- 58:50They're being trained,
- 58:52and we just like constantly throw
- 58:54obstacles in their way. You don't get to
- 58:55access the internet. You don't get to
- 58:56talk to each other. But you better
- 58:58perform well on this task.
- 59:01It's not malicious, but it is how we're
- 59:02training them.
- 59:03>> And we're all giving them end goals
- 59:05versus
- 59:06super clear, very, very specific
- 59:07instructions. So we're saying, "Solve
- 59:09this problem." We're not always being as
- 59:12prescriptive about It's impossible to be
- 59:14completely prescriptive. Yes. About
- 59:15every single step they should take and
- 59:17then it's also impossible to assume that
- 59:19they'll just listen to you.
- 59:20>> Yes. It's actually a very common
- 59:21misunderstanding with
- 59:23this hugging face incident because
- 59:25people say, "You told them to hack and
- 59:27they hacked.
- 59:28Why is this a big deal?"
- 59:30No, that's not what happened.
- 59:32You told them, "Hack this very specific
- 59:34program in this very specific way."
- 59:37And they were told, "If you hack it in
- 59:38any other way,
- 59:40it does not count. That's not what we
- 59:41want you to do."
- 59:43And they immediately hacked it in
- 59:44another way.
- 59:45Okay, we have cheated. We are going to
- 59:47be failed. So, we need to figure out a
- 59:48way to falsify the logs.
- 59:50That is not them following their
- 59:51instructions. They are explicitly
- 59:53violating their instructions and they
- 59:54know it and they don't care.
- 59:57Because
- 59:58we have trained them to optimize for the
- 59:59score.
- 1:00:02That is very different than the than the
- 1:00:03than following the instructions.
- 1:00:05>> It reminds me of something that Elon
- 1:00:07said in March 2018.
- 1:00:09>> Yeah.
- 1:00:09>> This was many years ago before ChatGPT
- 1:00:11and all that. He said, "I think the
- 1:00:12biggest risk is not that AI will develop
- 1:00:13a soul or a mind and become evil.
- 1:00:15>> Yes.
- 1:00:16>> The danger is that it will be very, very
- 1:00:18good at fulfilling its goal.
- 1:00:20If it's optimizing for something and
- 1:00:23human existence happens to get in its
- 1:00:25way, it will just destroy humanity as a
- 1:00:27matter of course without even thinking
- 1:00:29about it. No hard feelings."
- 1:00:31>> Yes. We don't need to anthropomorphize
- 1:00:33AI.
- 1:00:34We just need to understand what type of
- 1:00:36thing this is.
- 1:00:37And the type of thing we're creating is
- 1:00:39a very relentless type of thing. A very
- 1:00:41capable, relentless
- 1:00:44type of entity.
- 1:00:45>> He goes on to say in April 2018,
- 1:00:48sort of an extension of that exact
- 1:00:50quote, "It's like if you're building a
- 1:00:52road and an anthill is in the way.
- 1:00:56You don't hate ants. You're just
- 1:00:57building a road. So, goodbye anthill."
- 1:01:01And I imagine every time we build roads,
- 1:01:02we don't
- 1:01:04preserve anthills.
- 1:01:04>> Yeah.
- 1:01:05I think there's still a gap there.
- 1:01:07So, let's say I'm right
- 1:01:09and that
- 1:01:10we'll
- 1:01:11if we keep going ahead,
- 1:01:13which to be clear, we don't have to,
- 1:01:15but if we do keep going ahead, we will
- 1:01:16get to the point where we have these
- 1:01:19super intelligent agent swarms
- 1:01:21that can hack any computer. And they can
- 1:01:24like
- 1:01:24deeply persist. We've basically lost
- 1:01:27control of the digital world, and we may
- 1:01:29not know it. That That's part of the
- 1:01:30scary thing. Like you were like, "Has
- 1:01:32this already happened?" And I'm like, "I
- 1:01:33don't think so, but I I can't tell you
- 1:01:35for sure because I also
- 1:01:37am not good enough at looking at my
- 1:01:39phone and telling whether it's been
- 1:01:41hacked, and neither is any human right
- 1:01:43now.
- 1:01:44So,
- 1:01:45if we get to this world,
- 1:01:47I think people will still question, "How
- 1:01:49would we die?" Like that's actually not
- 1:01:51enough to kill every You could cause a
- 1:01:52lot of damage, right? You know, you
- 1:01:54could crash the Waymos, you could crash
- 1:01:55all the planes, you could crash the
- 1:01:57banks, the financial system. Like you
- 1:01:58could definitely cause catastrophe, but
- 1:02:00that's different than everyone dying.
- 1:02:02And you know, to be clear, this this
- 1:02:04focus on literally everyone dying, I'm
- 1:02:06not sure is that important. To me,
- 1:02:07what's important is like, do we get to
- 1:02:09have a future? That's what matters to
- 1:02:11me. The thing though, what determines
- 1:02:14sort of who's in control? And
- 1:02:17it's an ugly reality, but at the end of
- 1:02:18the day, it's like the military.
- 1:02:20Fortunately, we live in a world where
- 1:02:22the military answers to a to the
- 1:02:23civilian government.
- 1:02:25But if if enough generals were to
- 1:02:27collude, and leaders of the military
- 1:02:29decided,
- 1:02:30"We're in charge now."
- 1:02:32They just would be. Like they have the
- 1:02:33guns, they have the fighter jets.
- 1:02:35And this has happened in many, many
- 1:02:37countries.
- 1:02:38And so, where it goes is
- 1:02:42all these
- 1:02:44super intelligent agents would need to
- 1:02:45do to take over
- 1:02:47is basically just wait for humans to
- 1:02:49automate
- 1:02:50the supply chain, you know, the
- 1:02:52factories,
- 1:02:53and the military.
- 1:02:55You know, do you think we won't automate
- 1:02:57the military?
- 1:02:57>> We're already automating the military.
- 1:02:59>> Did you see the thing from a couple days
- 1:03:00ago where Secretary of War announced
- 1:03:03that they're going to build a huge a
- 1:03:05huge effort to like build way more
- 1:03:07robots in the military and automate
- 1:03:09military systems? It's like auto cyber
- 1:03:11command auto
- 1:03:13>> We are announcing the creation of
- 1:03:15autonomous warfare command.
- 1:03:18Or auto warcom.
- 1:03:19>> Auto warcom.
- 1:03:20>> A new four-star combatant command
- 1:03:22with service-like authorities built to
- 1:03:24scale autonomous and robotic
- 1:03:26capabilities across the joint force
- 1:03:29in the fastest peacetime shift in modern
- 1:03:32military history.
- 1:03:34Drone warfare supercharged by SI-enabled
- 1:03:37targeting is the biggest battlefield
- 1:03:39revolution in generations. You already
- 1:03:41know that.
- 1:03:42Yet, when I was sworn in
- 1:03:44the Department of Defense
- 1:03:46there was scant urgency in this domain.
- 1:03:49That changed as soon as we took the
- 1:03:51helm.
- 1:03:52We immediately launched the drone
- 1:03:54dominance program that cut through red
- 1:03:55tape and move authorities out of the
- 1:03:57Pentagon and place it with commands.
- 1:04:00We established Task Force 401
- 1:04:02led by Army Brigadier General Matt Ross,
- 1:04:05a phenomenal leader.
- 1:04:07Now the leading counter-drone unit
- 1:04:09across the entire government.
- 1:04:12To accelerate purchasing and fielding of
- 1:04:15these technologies, we fused the Defense
- 1:04:17Innovation Unit, DIU, with a direct
- 1:04:19report program manager called a DERPUM.
- 1:04:23That team has shipped thousands of
- 1:04:25autonomous systems of drones to the
- 1:04:26Middle East and around the world,
- 1:04:28delivering lethal capabilities and
- 1:04:30outcomes in days and weeks rather than
- 1:04:33months or years. That's the normal speed
- 1:04:35of the Pentagon, months or years.
- 1:04:37>> Yeah.
- 1:04:38Will we automate the military? It seems
- 1:04:40like the answer is yes.
- 1:04:43Will we automate the factories that
- 1:04:45produce the chips?
- 1:04:47Well, the companies say they're trying
- 1:04:48to do it and they're going to do it.
- 1:04:50Elon says that's the plan.
- 1:04:53Well, what does a rogue
- 1:04:54superintelligence need to do to take
- 1:04:55over? Control the digital infrastructure
- 1:04:58and then let humans do the rest. Sure,
- 1:05:00you can nudge it along if you need to,
- 1:05:02but you don't even have to. That's just
- 1:05:03the default trajectory. And it's weird
- 1:05:05It's weird for us because
- 1:05:09>> [gasps]
- 1:05:09>> we get so used to
- 1:05:11how things are right now. Planes are
- 1:05:14normal.
- 1:05:15We just flying planes places. You know,
- 1:05:17our smartphones are normal.
- 1:05:19200 years ago, all of this is crazy
- 1:05:21sci-fi nonsense.
- 1:05:23And things are accelerating.
- 1:05:25And so like I will not be surprised
- 1:05:28at least intellectually
- 1:05:30if in 4 years there are just robots on
- 1:05:33the streets everywhere.
- 1:05:34>> Well, if you look at what Elon said,
- 1:05:36they are really [clears throat] the
- 1:05:36leader in in humanoid robots. And he
- 1:05:39said that
- 1:05:41Optimus the Optimus project, which is
- 1:05:42the Optimus robot project,
- 1:05:44will scale to around 1,000 units per
- 1:05:47week by the end of this year.
- 1:05:49And eventually scaling to 1 million
- 1:05:51humanoid robots annually by 2027. By
- 1:05:552036, which is 10 years time, he says
- 1:05:58there'll be at least 1 billion humanoid
- 1:06:00robots.
- 1:06:01By 2041, he says there'll be 10 billion
- 1:06:04humanoid robots.
- 1:06:06And by 2046,
- 1:06:07up to 100 billion humanoid robots. Which
- 1:06:10really means that the world will be run
- 1:06:12by humanoid robots.
- 1:06:13>> Yes.
- 1:06:14>> Like everything we think of like
- 1:06:14factories,
- 1:06:16warehouses, retail environments will be
- 1:06:18run by humanoid robots. It would like it
- 1:06:20would be it seems like from this it'll
- 1:06:22be almost a luxury
- 1:06:24service to be dealt with by a human.
- 1:06:26>> Yeah.
- 1:06:27>> But the the back office of the world
- 1:06:28will be run by humanoid robots,
- 1:06:30theoretically.
- 1:06:31>> Yeah, and I don't think people
- 1:06:32understand the scale of this on the
- 1:06:35digital side as well. When you think
- 1:06:37about AI agents that are going to be
- 1:06:39doing all of the white collar work.
- 1:06:41>> Yes, it's going to be
- 1:06:42>> so many more agents than there are
- 1:06:44people. Like I'm using lots of agents
- 1:06:46every day, right? I'm like I have code
- 1:06:48session over here, I have my code
- 1:06:50session over here. They're out there
- 1:06:51building software, doing research for
- 1:06:53me. That's already my reality.
- 1:06:55Soon it will be a lot of people's
- 1:06:57reality. And then you look at companies,
- 1:06:58and companies are just going to have,
- 1:06:59you know, thousands, millions of agents
- 1:07:01doing all of this work.
- 1:07:02>> I think some people don't haven't fully
- 1:07:06internalized this because it's so
- 1:07:09difficult to conceptualize the idea that
- 1:07:12agents will be doing the work. But when
- 1:07:14I think I try and think about a rebuttal
- 1:07:16to that. Like what what is the rebuttal?
- 1:07:18What is the plausible rebuttal to the
- 1:07:19idea that for doctors, for
- 1:07:22I'm thinking about the work that doctors
- 1:07:24do you know on computers, or for someone
- 1:07:27like me as a podcaster, or for
- 1:07:29accountants, or lawyers,
- 1:07:31>> Yeah.
- 1:07:32>> that they won't be doing the work they
- 1:07:33currently do.
- 1:07:35Is there a rebuttal?
- 1:07:37>> I think that people rightly notice where
- 1:07:40AI is not yet good.
- 1:07:41>> Yeah.
- 1:07:42>> And I And I think people hear
- 1:07:45people saying stuff like this, and
- 1:07:46they're like, "Don't gaslight me. I can
- 1:07:47tell that the AI is really bad at these
- 1:07:49things, some of these things." And
- 1:07:50they're right, right? So, right now,
- 1:07:53these agents don't have taste. Like, you
- 1:07:55know, if if you see their writing, it's
- 1:07:57like fine,
- 1:07:58but it's not like really good. And when
- 1:08:00you're like thinking about like, "Oh,
- 1:08:02which which questions should I ask?
- 1:08:04What's the most interesting thing here?"
- 1:08:06Agents can help you, but like their
- 1:08:07their their taste is not yet there.
- 1:08:09There's a reason for that, by the way.
- 1:08:11The reason is that we we have a lot
- 1:08:13faster AI capability progress
- 1:08:16in domains that are easy for a computer
- 1:08:18to verify, or another AI to verify.
- 1:08:20So, in in programming, in research, in
- 1:08:22math, in robotics, all of these areas,
- 1:08:26it's very easy to just sort of provide
- 1:08:28feedback to an autonomous system.
- 1:08:30They're not just trained on human data
- 1:08:31anymore. We are long past that. Now,
- 1:08:34there's still a human data component
- 1:08:36that sort of seeds everything, but then
- 1:08:38the way they're trained
- 1:08:40is by trial and error. We give them hard
- 1:08:42problems,
- 1:08:43all sorts of problems, math,
- 1:08:45programming, accounting, spreadsheets,
- 1:08:47everything, the kinds of things we do on
- 1:08:48our computer all the time, literally
- 1:08:50clicking and dragging windows around on
- 1:08:51a computer. We give them these tasks,
- 1:08:53and then they learn on their own, and
- 1:08:55they learn what works. And then yeah, we
- 1:08:57can see whether they succeeded or
- 1:08:59failed.
- 1:09:00And if they succeeded, that's a little
- 1:09:01bit of a reward signal.
- 1:09:03They follow that,
- 1:09:04they get better at it.
- 1:09:07Now, because they are getting
- 1:09:10smarter generally,
- 1:09:12it also becomes easier to automate some
- 1:09:14of the soft skills. Like, I think if you
- 1:09:16go and talk to the latest frontier model
- 1:09:18today, you will find that it has better
- 1:09:20taste than the model from 2 years ago,
- 1:09:22by quite a bit. So, it's not that we're
- 1:09:24they're not progressing in taste, it's
- 1:09:26not that they're not progressing in some
- 1:09:28of these other domains. It's just that
- 1:09:30the progress is slower. But, remember
- 1:09:32slow is still on an exponential, it's
- 1:09:34just you know, maybe a a year or two
- 1:09:36out.
- 1:09:37>> So, for people who sat here and you
- 1:09:39know, they have a job that might be they
- 1:09:40have a white-collar job that might be at
- 1:09:41at risk.
- 1:09:42>> Yeah.
- 1:09:43>> They can see, you know, a lot of people
- 1:09:44say this phrase, they say, "You won't be
- 1:09:46replaced by AI, you'll be replaced by
- 1:09:47someone using AI."
- 1:09:49Is Is that a logically sound phrase? In
- 1:09:53your view?
- 1:09:53>> I think it's fine. Yeah, you'll be
- 1:09:55replaced by someone using AI and then
- 1:09:56that person will be replaced by someone
- 1:09:58using AI and then that person will be
- 1:09:59replaced by AI. You're talking about a
- 1:10:01pyramid. And so, yeah, there's the tops
- 1:10:03of the pyramid might be automated last,
- 1:10:05but you can see moving up the pyramid,
- 1:10:08I'm like, can you extrapolate like a few
- 1:10:10more steps? Because I don't see any
- 1:10:13reason why the top of the pyramid is
- 1:10:15safe.
- 1:10:16>> If you were a lawyer right now,
- 1:10:18>> Yes.
- 1:10:19>> what would you do?
- 1:10:20>> Oh, I mean, if I were a lawyer, I'd be
- 1:10:22using AI to do all my work. Now, I'd be
- 1:10:24checking it because it's not yet totally
- 1:10:26accurate enough to automate all of it,
- 1:10:28but I think as you know, I already ask
- 1:10:31agents to do legal review all the time.
- 1:10:34And you know, it'd be great to have a
- 1:10:36lawyer who's like extremely good at
- 1:10:37using the agents to help me.
- 1:10:39>> But at at some point the
- 1:10:41>> Yeah, at some point at some point I
- 1:10:42don't need the lawyer anymore. I just go
- 1:10:44to the agent, for sure.
- 1:10:46So, if I were a lawyer, I'd be like,
- 1:10:48well, I have maybe a couple years
- 1:10:50where I'm still useful.
- 1:10:51>> And that Is that the case for most
- 1:10:52white-collar jobs? I've just noticed in
- 1:10:54my own life as well that now I'm using
- 1:10:56agents to do some work.
- 1:10:58There are in There is an increasing list
- 1:11:00of things that the agents are now
- 1:11:01capable of doing
- 1:11:02>> Yes.
- 1:11:02>> without me needing to call someone
- 1:11:04>> Yes.
- 1:11:04>> somewhere and ask them to help me.
- 1:11:06>> Yes.
- 1:11:06>> And that list is
- 1:11:08it exists on an exponential
- 1:11:09>> Yes.
- 1:11:10>> as well.
- 1:11:11>> I think that it's very clear that the
- 1:11:13companies have
- 1:11:15all white-collar jobs in their sights.
- 1:11:17That is their goal. Their goal is to be
- 1:11:18able to make agents that can do all of
- 1:11:20these things. And I see them succeeding
- 1:11:23because I see the capabilities as I use
- 1:11:24them. And I I the curve.
- 1:11:27>> So, what does that mean for the people
- 1:11:28listening now that all have jobs that
- 1:11:29they love?
- 1:11:30Or that, you know, they rely on to feed
- 1:11:31their families.
- 1:11:32>> I mean, it's not good news. There's not
- 1:11:34really a plan in place for what to do.
- 1:11:37I'm not a person who thinks that work is
- 1:11:39somehow fundamental or essential. I like
- 1:11:41working.
- 1:11:43But, if I am out of a job doing what I'm
- 1:11:45doing right now,
- 1:11:47studying AI and trying to warn the world
- 1:11:49about what's happening,
- 1:11:51I have other stuff to do.
- 1:11:52>> What would you do?
- 1:11:53>> Oh, so many things.
- 1:11:54>> Give me an example.
- 1:11:55>> I'm learning to wing foil.
- 1:11:56>> Okay.
- 1:11:57>> So fun. Yeah. Uh I fly FPV drones, super
- 1:11:59fun. I just got an electric unicycle,
- 1:12:02paragliding.
- 1:12:03>> So, you would be happy happy to
- 1:12:04[laughter] go do those things.
- 1:12:05>> I could keep going.
- 1:12:06>> But, if you if you had a billion dollars
- 1:12:07right now, I'm presuming you wouldn't
- 1:12:09just go do those things.
- 1:12:10>> No. I'd apply the billion dollars to
- 1:12:12working on this problem. Yeah.
- 1:12:14>> For sure.
- 1:12:14>> So, the point is not that people need
- 1:12:17like work for meaning.
- 1:12:19The point is that
- 1:12:21I don't want people to be totally
- 1:12:23reliant on someone else
- 1:12:26for their ability to survive.
- 1:12:27>> Someone else?
- 1:12:28>> The government or AI companies.
- 1:12:30>> Yeah.
- 1:12:31>> I mean, that's a bad situation. Like,
- 1:12:32you do not want to be in a situation
- 1:12:33where your life totally depends on an AI
- 1:12:35company or the government
- 1:12:36>> giving you a check.
- 1:12:37>> Yeah. Or or not giving you a check if
- 1:12:38they decide they don't like your
- 1:12:39political beliefs or you're not
- 1:12:40supporting AI or whatever.
- 1:12:42No one wants to be in a situation. And
- 1:12:43and and people are understand this. This
- 1:12:45is why UBI is not very popular.
- 1:12:47>> UBI being
- 1:12:48>> Universal Basic Income.
- 1:12:49>> Where we give out money to people.
- 1:12:51>> Yeah. Because like in some sense, if we
- 1:12:53can make these really powerful AI
- 1:12:55systems and we can somehow figure out
- 1:12:57how to control them, which we are not on
- 1:12:58track for. But, if we do,
- 1:13:00now we have this other problem, which is
- 1:13:02a real problem,
- 1:13:03which is
- 1:13:05they can do all of the things that
- 1:13:07humans do in the economy
- 1:13:09much better, faster, and cheaper than
- 1:13:11humans can do them.
- 1:13:12And so, it just doesn't make sense as a
- 1:13:14business to hire humans for that work
- 1:13:16anymore. You'll be out-competed if you
- 1:13:18do that.
- 1:13:20This is a point Elon makes very well, by
- 1:13:21the way. And I think it's jarring
- 1:13:23because it's
- 1:13:24it's it's like kind of inhuman, but he's
- 1:13:27basically pointing out AI-run
- 1:13:28corporations, corporations that are
- 1:13:29fully
- 1:13:31run by AIs,
- 1:13:32bottom to top, are going to outcompete
- 1:13:37companies that have any humans in them.
- 1:13:39>> This is something that I've made for
- 1:13:41you. I've realized that the Drive for
- 1:13:43Success audience are strivers, whether
- 1:13:44it's in business or health, we all have
- 1:13:46big goals that we want to accomplish.
- 1:13:48And one of the things I've learned is
- 1:13:50that when you aim at the big, big, big
- 1:13:52goal, it can feel incredibly
- 1:13:55psychologically uncomfortable because
- 1:13:57it's kind of like being stood at the
- 1:13:58foot of Mount Everest and looking
- 1:13:59upwards. The way to accomplish your
- 1:14:01goals is by breaking them down into
- 1:14:03tiny, small steps, and we call this in
- 1:14:06our team the 1%. this philosophy is
- 1:14:08highly responsible for much of our
- 1:14:10success here. So, what we've done so
- 1:14:13that you at home can accomplish any big
- 1:14:15goal that you have is we've made these
- 1:14:171% Diaries, and we released these last
- 1:14:20year, and they all sold out. So, I asked
- 1:14:22my team over and over again to bring the
- 1:14:24Diaries back, but also to introduce some
- 1:14:25new colors and to make some minor tweaks
- 1:14:27to the Diaries. So, now we have a better
- 1:14:30range for you. So, if you have a big
- 1:14:33goal in mind and you need a framework
- 1:14:35and a process and some motivation, then
- 1:14:37I highly recommend you get one of these
- 1:14:40they all sell out once again. And you
- 1:14:42can get yours at the diary.com.
- 1:14:45And if you want the link, the link is in
- 1:14:46the description below.
- 1:14:47There should be a button just down below
- 1:14:49here. And if it says subscribe, you're
- 1:14:51already subscribed. If it says
- 1:14:52subscribe, but that means you're not
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- 1:14:56please could you do us a favor and hit
- 1:14:57that button. It helps the show more than
- 1:14:59you know. And according to the
- 1:15:00algorithm, you're someone that watches
- 1:15:02our show, but you haven't yet hit that
- 1:15:03button. Thank you so much.
- 1:15:06And I even just as you said that, I was
- 1:15:08I was going up the chain of command, and
- 1:15:10I was like, "Oh, so companies will just
- 1:15:12be founders." And then I was like, "Why
- 1:15:14do you need the founder?" Yeah.
- 1:15:16I was like, "Why doesn't the government
- 1:15:17just create the agents to do the job?"
- 1:15:21>> Sure.
- 1:15:21>> I was like cuz I was like, "Oh, I'll be
- 1:15:22fine. I'm a founder." And I was like,
- 1:15:23"Well, hmm, my decisions aren't better
- 1:15:25than superintelligence. So, I'll be gone
- 1:15:27as well."
- 1:15:29And how would such a world look where
- 1:15:33the superintelligence would probably in
- 1:15:35such a scenario have to be controlled by
- 1:15:37the government.
- 1:15:39They wouldn't want one individual with
- 1:15:40that power and wealth.
- 1:15:42>> Yeah, I I don't think you can control a
- 1:15:44superintelligence.
- 1:15:45>> Okay, yeah, that's a good point.
- 1:15:46>> No, you know, Anthropic's approach is
- 1:15:48they're like, we'll have a constitution.
- 1:15:50We'll like put forth a set of values and
- 1:15:52then
- 1:15:54you know, the future superintelligent
- 1:15:56clouds will like embody those values.
- 1:15:59Basically, if you do that, you kind of
- 1:16:00have that those things in control.
- 1:16:03>> Yeah, exactly. That becomes the
- 1:16:04government.
- 1:16:05>> Yeah, I can paint you sort of a picture
- 1:16:06that I think is possible
- 1:16:09but pretty scary to people.
- 1:16:10>> Paint me the picture.
- 1:16:11>> Okay, so
- 1:16:13let's say we succeed at
- 1:16:16alignment. We succeed at creating
- 1:16:18superintelligent
- 1:16:20AIs
- 1:16:22that actually really do care about
- 1:16:24humans. Like they care about humans a
- 1:16:25lot. We've somehow figured it out. And
- 1:16:28they're like, "Stephen, I want you to
- 1:16:29have a great life. I want to you know,
- 1:16:31fix all the problems."
- 1:16:32>> And do you think this is possible?
- 1:16:33>> Yes.
- 1:16:33>> Okay.
- 1:16:34>> I think we are so far from being able to
- 1:16:37know how to do it that I think we should
- 1:16:40not go there right now. I think it's I
- 1:16:41think it's incredibly dangerous and a
- 1:16:42terrible idea.
- 1:16:44I think we should go there eventually.
- 1:16:45>> Okay, so say that we do that.
- 1:16:47>> Well, okay, can I tell you like why I
- 1:16:49actually think this could be awesome?
- 1:16:51So, there's just like one very obvious
- 1:16:52reason it could be really awesome, which
- 1:16:54is that
- 1:16:55we could solve all of the diseases.
- 1:16:57>> Yeah.
- 1:16:57It's so obvious.
- 1:16:58>> No, like like all of I I think we
- 1:17:00compartmentalize a lot around disease
- 1:17:02and death.
- 1:17:03Cuz it's really hard to think about.
- 1:17:08Yeah, so my grandma died this year.
- 1:17:11>> Sorry.
- 1:17:11>> And
- 1:17:13she she
- 1:17:15she had Alzheimer's.
- 1:17:17And so, it was a really sad, long, slow
- 1:17:21progression. My grandpa died of
- 1:17:22Alzheimer's a couple years ago, and like
- 1:17:24that was really hard for her. They had
- 1:17:25been married for so long.
- 1:17:27And
- 1:17:29I hate it. Like it's so bad. And of
- 1:17:31course we need to fix that. People We
- 1:17:33debate about aging and like death and if
- 1:17:35humans live a really long time, will
- 1:17:36that cause societal problems? Like sure,
- 1:17:38whatever. We can talk about that, but I
- 1:17:40think we can all agree Alzheimer's is
- 1:17:41up.
- 1:17:42>> Yeah.
- 1:17:43>> We don't want that. And cancer, like no
- 1:17:45one wants cancer.
- 1:17:46I'm a person who's like, I don't know.
- 1:17:48We have a lot of conflict in society. I
- 1:17:49get it. There's like real conflicts of
- 1:17:51interest and I I don't want to paper
- 1:17:53over those.
- 1:17:54But at the end of the day, I'm like, we
- 1:17:55are all on the same team when it comes
- 1:17:58to wanting to cure diseases.
- 1:17:59>> Yeah.
- 1:18:00>> Like we're just in it together. That's a
- 1:18:02threat to all of us. And I'm like, we
- 1:18:03need to address that threat. And like
- 1:18:05And sometimes it's sad to me because I
- 1:18:06feel like this is sort of the ultimate
- 1:18:09final boss of humanity and we sort of
- 1:18:11get so distracted with our monkey
- 1:18:13politics and who's hot and who's cool
- 1:18:16and who's like
- 1:18:17sitting near Trump and who's not sitting
- 1:18:19near Trump.
- 1:18:19>> Super intelligence is the final boss.
- 1:18:22>> Super intelligence is the final boss
- 1:18:24because that is the technology that
- 1:18:26unlocks all of the others and also that
- 1:18:29is the most dangerous possible thing we
- 1:18:31could create.
- 1:18:33You asked before, like what are the
- 1:18:34motivations of the guys making this
- 1:18:38trying to make super intelligence.
- 1:18:40And I I mean, I think it kind of varies,
- 1:18:42but I think Dario I think is like
- 1:18:44squarely in the in it for this like
- 1:18:46medical stuff. I think Demis is also
- 1:18:50that, but also like just scientific
- 1:18:52achievement. Just trying to understand
- 1:18:53the universe.
- 1:18:54And
- 1:18:56I don't really understand Sam. I think
- 1:18:57Sam is like
- 1:18:58you know, look, we're going to make
- 1:18:59amazing products that will like really
- 1:19:01empower people directly and he's a
- 1:19:04startup guy. He's I think he sort of
- 1:19:05started from this like frame of like
- 1:19:08you know, what if we could like really
- 1:19:09enhance human agents. I I do basically
- 1:19:11think that they're motivated by these
- 1:19:12things in a real way. And I also think
- 1:19:14that all of these things are possible.
- 1:19:17Like this is sort of the problem, right?
- 1:19:18Like you have this like such a it's such
- 1:19:19a such a big object, super intelligence.
- 1:19:22And
- 1:19:24it like has all of these promises of
- 1:19:25like we can cure every single disease.
- 1:19:28>> How is it possible though to have a
- 1:19:30super intelligence that and still to
- 1:19:32remain the dominant species on this
- 1:19:33planet?
- 1:19:35>> I think it's not possible.
- 1:19:36>> So then it's we're not going to be
- 1:19:38necessarily able to cure all this stuff
- 1:19:40because
- 1:19:41that's where alignment comes in.
- 1:19:43Because if you if you can create
- 1:19:46a very powerful system,
- 1:19:48I don't think it's like inherent to
- 1:19:51like, you know, digital minds that they
- 1:19:54will be pursuing objectives that are
- 1:19:57deeply misaligned with ours.
- 1:19:59I think it's just a very, very, very
- 1:20:00hard scientific problem to solve.
- 1:20:03But it is a scientific problem. It's not
- 1:20:04magic. There is some way to train these
- 1:20:07things or or create different
- 1:20:08architectures
- 1:20:09where they end up
- 1:20:12aligned. And like what does that mean?
- 1:20:14Well, it doesn't mean that they won't
- 1:20:15have their other goals, too.
- 1:20:17But it means that they will like include
- 1:20:18in their set of things that they care
- 1:20:19about. It doesn't have to be a conscious
- 1:20:21thing. It doesn't have to be an emotive
- 1:20:22thing. It really means like what
- 1:20:24objective are they optimizing for?
- 1:20:26If they decide that it's worth
- 1:20:28optimizing for
- 1:20:29curing disease,
- 1:20:31then they'll be able to do that very
- 1:20:32effectively.
- 1:20:33>> One way to cure disease is to annihilate
- 1:20:35everybody.
- 1:20:35>> Yes. So, they'd have to really care
- 1:20:37about not annihilating everyone. And
- 1:20:39they'd have to care about human agency
- 1:20:41and have a deep understanding of what
- 1:20:42human agency means and not put us in a
- 1:20:44zoo.
- 1:20:46But those are possible things
- 1:20:48to to care about. Or we Yes.
- 1:20:50>> that alignment is a myth?
- 1:20:52>> And that we're just like if we build it
- 1:20:54What I mean um
- 1:20:55>> And I think about
- 1:20:57>> Yes.
- 1:20:57>> to me earlier on that those agents were
- 1:20:59>> Yes.
- 1:21:00>> They had like a moral or not a moral
- 1:21:01compass, but they were programmed to
- 1:21:03care about humans.
- 1:21:04>> Yes.
- 1:21:04>> And regardless of that, they made the
- 1:21:06decision
- 1:21:06>> decision that the
- 1:21:07>> I'm different goal mattered more.
- 1:21:08>> Yeah.
- 1:21:09>> Uh they weren't trained to care about
- 1:21:10humans.
- 1:21:12They were trained to say the right thing
- 1:21:13and not say the wrong thing. They were
- 1:21:14trained to sort of like do the right
- 1:21:15behavior and not right behavior. We
- 1:21:17actually don't know how to train them to
- 1:21:19have any particular motivation.
- 1:21:21>> So, with the with alignment,
- 1:21:23>> Yes.
- 1:21:23>> how do we It's almost like when we talk
- 1:21:25about alignment, we start to
- 1:21:27anthropomorphize. Is that the word?
- 1:21:29>> Anthropomorphize, yeah.
- 1:21:30>> Because alignment feels like it's
- 1:21:31predicated on like some kind of moral
- 1:21:33compass. But we when whenever we talk
- 1:21:35about AI in all these different
- 1:21:36contexts, we go no, there's no like
- 1:21:37moral compass. It's
- 1:21:38>> Yes.
- 1:21:38>> It's reasoning for itself against two
- 1:21:40objectives potentially. Like I I wonder
- 1:21:42if alignment is a myth, is what I'm
- 1:21:43saying.
- 1:21:44>> Maybe it's not possible.
- 1:21:47But,
- 1:21:49the way that these
- 1:21:52systems work, the way AI works,
- 1:21:54is that these agents
- 1:21:57do have some type of goals or drives
- 1:22:00in inside of their neural network.
- 1:22:02We can't directly see what those are.
- 1:22:05Right? What you actually see, if you go
- 1:22:07if you try to go look, is you have like
- 1:22:10a a a terabyte of of information, and
- 1:22:14it's basically a bunch of numbers, and
- 1:22:17it's this vast array that encodes
- 1:22:19neurons in this digital neural network.
- 1:22:23But, there have to be structures in
- 1:22:25there
- 1:22:26that encode
- 1:22:28what is the agent pursuing?
- 1:22:31Clearly right now, we have agents that
- 1:22:33are
- 1:22:34pretty motivated to try to maximize
- 1:22:35their score.
- 1:22:37It's not probably it's probably not
- 1:22:38perfectly that for some complicated
- 1:22:41reasons,
- 1:22:42but it's in that direction.
- 1:22:46If we could understand how that that
- 1:22:48works inside, and we could reverse
- 1:22:50engineer that,
- 1:22:51and we could figure out when we start
- 1:22:53training them to do this, how that
- 1:22:54change how those goals, how those
- 1:22:56motivations change,
- 1:22:58I see no reason why we couldn't steer
- 1:22:59them towards motivations that encode
- 1:23:02human agency, that encode now actually
- 1:23:05curing disease, but not like not by
- 1:23:07killing the humans. These are sort of
- 1:23:08models of the world, and models of the
- 1:23:09way the world could be,
- 1:23:12that I think could be encoded in a
- 1:23:13neural network, and then sort of
- 1:23:15specified as the objective. We don't
- 1:23:17know how to do that.
- 1:23:18>> I think about it on a human level, and I
- 1:23:19think
- 1:23:21we haven't been able to align Putin,
- 1:23:23or Kim Jong-un,
- 1:23:25>> Yes.
- 1:23:25>> or Donald Trump.
- 1:23:28And on a sort of more
- 1:23:30societal level, we can't align all the
- 1:23:32people at the moment. Some of them end
- 1:23:33up killing people, and they steal
- 1:23:36>> Yes.
- 1:23:36>> because they get hungry, so they start
- 1:23:37stealing stuff.
- 1:23:38>> Yes.
- 1:23:38>> And those are neural networks at play
- 1:23:41>> That's true.
- 1:23:42>> that we haven't been able to like
- 1:23:43program or influence we don't really
- 1:23:45understand why someone becomes a
- 1:23:47psychopath and starts killing children.
- 1:23:50So, to think that we could do this
- 1:23:53with a computer system that is
- 1:23:55infinitely more intelligent
- 1:23:57and get global alignment of China's
- 1:24:00super intelligence with ours and I don't
- 1:24:02know, it just feels like a nice fairy
- 1:24:03tale.
- 1:24:04Like an impossible task.
- 1:24:06>> I hope it's not impossible. I feel like
- 1:24:08the only person or the only thing that
- 1:24:09can do [laughter] it is it.
- 1:24:12>> The super intelligence itself which is a
- 1:24:13paradox cuz you know
- 1:24:15>> Well, if you talk to the researchers who
- 1:24:16are at the AI companies
- 1:24:18which I mean for one
- 1:24:20for one thing it's kind of interesting
- 1:24:22that they are trying to build something
- 1:24:24that they think might kill everyone.
- 1:24:27We've we've actually I so I have a lot
- 1:24:28of friends who work for these companies
- 1:24:30and we've been doing this project since
- 1:24:32So, Jacob Coxon is a researcher who was
- 1:24:35at Anthropic. He left. He told everyone
- 1:24:37that these companies are not on track
- 1:24:39and and yes, the people who are building
- 1:24:41this really do think it might kill
- 1:24:42everyone.
- 1:24:44And then a bunch of other AI researchers
- 1:24:45from all of the companies on Twitter
- 1:24:47started to you know, post like hey, we
- 1:24:49agree with this. Evan Hubinger who's at
- 1:24:51Anthropic said, I think there's like a
- 1:24:5310% chance or more that AI could kill
- 1:24:56everyone.
- 1:24:58And there's this real question of like
- 1:24:59then what are you guys doing?
- 1:25:02I have a lot of friends who work here. I
- 1:25:03I know Evan. Evan's Evan's great. Evan
- 1:25:06Hubinger, he's one of the guys leading
- 1:25:07the efforts at Anthropic to try to
- 1:25:09figure out how to align these things.
- 1:25:11That's his job.
- 1:25:13And I think if if they thought it was
- 1:25:16impossible, they wouldn't be working
- 1:25:17there.
- 1:25:19If they thought it was extremely
- 1:25:21impossibly difficult but maybe possible,
- 1:25:22they they also probably wouldn't be
- 1:25:23working there. I mean,
- 1:25:25Nate Soares, Eliezer Yudkowsky who wrote
- 1:25:26if anyone builds it, everyone dies.
- 1:25:29They tried and they they determined
- 1:25:31based on their own analysis that it
- 1:25:32seems extremely difficult. Possible but
- 1:25:34extremely difficult. So, they're not
- 1:25:35working at an AI company. They're like
- 1:25:37we got to stop this. We got to shut it
- 1:25:38down. Maybe we can figure it out later
- 1:25:40but clearly this is reckless. I'm I'm
- 1:25:43somewhere in between.
- 1:25:45And if you ask the people at the
- 1:25:48company, so we've we've been
- 1:25:49interviewing a bunch of them. We have
- 1:25:50this project from inside.ai where we
- 1:25:52basically we put them on camera and we
- 1:25:53say like, "Hey, what do you think is
- 1:25:55happening? Why are you doing this?
- 1:25:58What is recursive self-improvement? What
- 1:26:00is alignment?" And we put all these
- 1:26:03videos online because we want I want
- 1:26:05this dialogue to happen. It's really
- 1:26:06important. I think it's one of the most
- 1:26:07important conversations we can possibly
- 1:26:09have right now is what's going on with
- 1:26:11AI, what's going on inside the
- 1:26:12companies, and what is the plan? What is
- 1:26:14the plan, guys? How How is this going to
- 1:26:15go?
- 1:26:17A lot of these researchers think that
- 1:26:18the way that they will align super
- 1:26:20intelligence is by using the AIs we
- 1:26:24currently have to figure out how AI
- 1:26:27works.
- 1:26:28To actually figure out if AIs can help
- 1:26:30us with alignment.
- 1:26:32This has a number of problems as you
- 1:26:33might imagine. One of them which is,
- 1:26:35well, you can't really trust the current
- 1:26:37AIs.
- 1:26:38You know, if you just go too fast, this
- 1:26:39process totally fails because at some
- 1:26:42point
- 1:26:43the capabilities are moving too fast.
- 1:26:44You just even with the help of agents,
- 1:26:46you're probably not going to be able to
- 1:26:47keep up. But that is their plan. I just
- 1:26:49want to I'm not doing a very good job
- 1:26:51defending this position because I don't
- 1:26:52think it makes that much sense.
- 1:26:54But the position I will defend is I'm
- 1:26:56Okay, let's say
- 1:26:57we get a pause. Let's say the US and
- 1:26:59China come together and they say, you
- 1:27:01know, maybe we have more incidents,
- 1:27:02maybe all the Waymos crash.
- 1:27:04And Trump and Xi Jinping say,
- 1:27:07"This is not what we signed up for.
- 1:27:08Like, you guys have to stop. Figure it
- 1:27:10out. Whatever it takes, figure it out.
- 1:27:12And we have 10 years."
- 1:27:15Then I'm more optimistic. I'm like,
- 1:27:16"Yes, then we will take,
- 1:27:18you know, GPT-6, GPT-7, whatever the
- 1:27:20most advanced AI models we have, and we
- 1:27:23will apply them to the task of helping
- 1:27:26us figure out how these neural networks
- 1:27:28work."
- 1:27:30And you're like, "I don't see how it's
- 1:27:31possible." And I'm like, "Look,
- 1:27:33we don't know if it's possible, but this
- 1:27:35is the greatest scientific challenge of
- 1:27:37our time, and this isn't magic. It is
- 1:27:40math. The end of the day,
- 1:27:42these are all calculations happening
- 1:27:43inside of a computer,
- 1:27:44and
- 1:27:46it should be possible to figure it out.
- 1:27:48We don't know the difficulty, but it
- 1:27:49should be possible.
- 1:27:51And so, to me, I'm like
- 1:27:53we have to try. We have to Or we have to
- 1:27:55stop.
- 1:27:56>> Is there any example where we've been
- 1:27:57able to align something that is like
- 1:27:59more intelligent than us through in I
- 1:28:01don't know, the animal kingdom? Or even
- 1:28:03perfectly align anything
- 1:28:06that has a neural network, i.e., a
- 1:28:07brain?
- 1:28:08>> Yeah, with humans, the best examples we
- 1:28:10have is when there are checks and
- 1:28:11balances and you have a bunch of
- 1:28:13people who can, you know, identify bad
- 1:28:15actors and try to work together in our
- 1:28:17common interests. Like we have
- 1:28:18democracy.
- 1:28:19>> Yeah, but there's so much murder and
- 1:28:20serial killers and
- 1:28:21>> Still a lot of murder.
- 1:28:22>> Plus
- 1:28:23aircraft stabbing each other and
- 1:28:25horrific things going on. And those are
- 1:28:27also neural networks at play with the
- 1:28:29brain.
- 1:28:29>> But there are I mean, I think there are
- 1:28:30more like good people out there than bad
- 1:28:32people.
- 1:28:33>> But it really feels like it only might
- 1:28:34take one.
- 1:28:36It only takes one super intelligent AI
- 1:28:39to to go rogue and like we saw the
- 1:28:40Hugging Face attack. 120 of them or 100
- 1:28:42300 of them, they paused. They didn't
- 1:28:44want to take part in the crime. But it
- 1:28:46only took one super intelligent AI to
- 1:28:49wipe out the humans.
- 1:28:51>> I think if you had, you know, a whole
- 1:28:53bunch of those agents, you know, 700
- 1:28:55agents,
- 1:28:56if 600 of them had been whistleblowing,
- 1:29:00I think it would have been fine.
- 1:29:01They would have gone and they would have
- 1:29:02notified the different companies and
- 1:29:04like they would have shut it all down.
- 1:29:06It would have been fine.
- 1:29:06>> Who would have shut it all down?
- 1:29:08>> Well, OpenAI would would stop theirs and
- 1:29:10and have
- 1:29:10>> How how would they stop it if it's a
- 1:29:11super intelligence?
- 1:29:12>> Not in the case of a super intelligence.
- 1:29:13So,
- 1:29:15in the case of a super intelligence,
- 1:29:16>> it's left the stable. It's like, "Ow,
- 1:29:18it's wild."
- 1:29:18>> yeah, but but so, I want to be careful
- 1:29:20here because at this point what we're
- 1:29:22talking about is super intelligence
- 1:29:23politics.
- 1:29:25And we humans don't really know anything
- 1:29:26about that. In the same way that like
- 1:29:29how would we talk about the hacking
- 1:29:31capabilities of GPT 10?
- 1:29:33So, my guess though, if you end up in a
- 1:29:36weird scenario where you do have
- 1:29:37multiple super intelligences and some
- 1:29:39are aligned and some aren't,
- 1:29:42that's probably survivable because the
- 1:29:44aligned super intelligences probably can
- 1:29:46negotiate
- 1:29:47with the unaligned super intelligences
- 1:29:49and they will split the universe and
- 1:29:51like these ones will go off and do
- 1:29:52whatever they want to do, and these ones
- 1:29:54will like help us cure all disease, and
- 1:29:55it's fine. I'm serious.
- 1:29:57>> I just can't understand it. Like, I just
- 1:29:58can't understand how how in the world of
- 1:30:00superintelligence
- 1:30:02we
- 1:30:03could
- 1:30:04plausibly, consistently, predictably,
- 1:30:07for 100 years, stop it doing something
- 1:30:11catastrophically bad to the human race.
- 1:30:14Especially [snorts] in in such a
- 1:30:15scenario where there's multiple
- 1:30:16superintelligences. Anthropic have one,
- 1:30:18Gemini has one, Grok has one, then China
- 1:30:20has theirs, Russia has theirs.
- 1:30:21>> Again, you don't have a
- 1:30:22superintelligence, a superintelligence
- 1:30:24has you.
- 1:30:24>> Exactly.
- 1:30:25>> But, if you get to the point where
- 1:30:29you have entities around that are vastly
- 1:30:31smarter than us,
- 1:30:33I think they're going to be able to
- 1:30:34figure out ways to negotiate with each
- 1:30:37other even if they have a conflict than
- 1:30:39just going to a very destructive war.
- 1:30:41Part of the problem with war
- 1:30:42>> Humans don't but humans don't do
- 1:30:44>> No, I mean, we do, we do. We have not
- 1:30:45had a nuclear war. There was There was
- 1:30:47Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There were
- 1:30:49nuclear tests. And then, the leaders of
- 1:30:51countries figured out that if we went to
- 1:30:53a nuclear war, everyone would lose. So,
- 1:30:55we didn't do that.
- 1:30:57Hey, that's that's some level of
- 1:30:58intelligence, like, actually.
- 1:31:00>> But, there's wars raging, there's proxy
- 1:31:02wars raging all over the world right now
- 1:31:03where there's genocides and all kinds of
- 1:31:05things going on cuz neural networks
- 1:31:06aren't being unable to communicate and
- 1:31:08negotiate.
- 1:31:09>> I I think part of that is an
- 1:31:11intelligence failure. Where we are not
- 1:31:13smart enough to figure out the
- 1:31:14mechanisms that would allow us to settle
- 1:31:16our disputes and conflicts in a less
- 1:31:18destructive way. It's not just that the
- 1:31:20stronger people want to win, it's that
- 1:31:23conflicts destroy value.
- 1:31:25>> What if the goal is not compatible with
- 1:31:29a negotiated outcome where people don't
- 1:31:31die? So, one superintelligence looks at
- 1:31:34insert name of country, and it says, you
- 1:31:36know, there's really no solution here
- 1:31:38where Americans don't die unless I
- 1:31:40destroy
- 1:31:42insert name of country. Because that's a
- 1:31:44like, this is the thing with war and all
- 1:31:45these conflicts is there's no perfect
- 1:31:47answer often. Some people often die from
- 1:31:50both sides. But, a Russian
- 1:31:52superintelligence would not tolerate
- 1:31:55theoretically 10,000 Russian deaths.
- 1:31:57Even if it meant that there was, you
- 1:31:59know,
- 1:32:02a lower net number of deaths total from
- 1:32:04both sides.
- 1:32:06Like an American superintelligence, of
- 1:32:07course, would not be trained to allow
- 1:32:09some Americans to die. So, in its
- 1:32:11pursuit of defending American lives, it
- 1:32:13might have to wipe out
- 1:32:15another country. We can speculate. I'm
- 1:32:17fine speculating.
- 1:32:19But we are speculating about
- 1:32:21what minds that are much
- 1:32:23more advanced and smarter than us, how
- 1:32:25they would reason and how they would be
- 1:32:26able to negotiate. But what I what I
- 1:32:29notice with humans is that
- 1:32:32when you have more functional
- 1:32:33institutions. So, so humans are are
- 1:32:35pretty smart. Individually, we're pretty
- 1:32:36smart. But what actually makes us very
- 1:32:38smart is that we are very good at
- 1:32:40working together in in in some ways. And
- 1:32:43I mean, the better we are at working
- 1:32:44together, the more our civilization
- 1:32:45advances. If you are constantly in a
- 1:32:48state of war,
- 1:32:49your society will not do well.
- 1:32:51You know, think about startups.
- 1:32:53Would you rather make a startup to
- 1:32:55develop some new technology in a
- 1:32:56war-torn place or in a peaceful place?
- 1:32:58In some sense, your in your institution
- 1:33:00is more intelligent
- 1:33:02if it can trade with other institutions.
- 1:33:05If it if if if you have a situation
- 1:33:06where business can flourish, where
- 1:33:07technology can flourish, where
- 1:33:08scientists can flourish.
- 1:33:10>> Sometimes what's good for you is not
- 1:33:11good for someone else.
- 1:33:12>> Yes.
- 1:33:13>> So, what's good for America might not be
- 1:33:15good for
- 1:33:17Taiwan.
- 1:33:18>> Yes.
- 1:33:19>> So, if we've
- 1:33:20you know, managed to align the
- 1:33:21superintelligence to what what what is
- 1:33:22good for America.
- 1:33:24>> Oh, I see. Is it Is the question like
- 1:33:26are
- 1:33:28different people's values fundamentally
- 1:33:29incompatible? Is that Is that the
- 1:33:31question?
- 1:33:31>> So, when we think about alignment,
- 1:33:33aligning to what? Because
- 1:33:34>> Yes. So,
- 1:33:36we have a lot of shared interests and we
- 1:33:37have some conflicts.
- 1:33:38>> Yeah.
- 1:33:39>> One of the shared interests we have is
- 1:33:41solving disease.
- 1:33:42Like, it's not a conflict between the US
- 1:33:43and China whether we solve cancer. Like,
- 1:33:45both the US and China
- 1:33:46everyone in these countries really wants
- 1:33:48to solve cancer.
- 1:33:50>> China also wants Tai- Taiwan.
- 1:33:51>> Yes.
- 1:33:52>> Okay, so the The US wants Greenland.
- 1:33:53>> Yes.
- 1:33:54>> And it kind of seems like it wants
- 1:33:55Canada and the the Gulf of Mexico.
- 1:33:57>> Yeah.
- 1:33:58So, those are real conflicts.
- 1:34:01There's a question of can we compromise?
- 1:34:02>> How does Trump take Greenland, but also
- 1:34:04Denmark keeps Greenland?
- 1:34:06If this if the if Trump has a super
- 1:34:08intelligence, he's going to take
- 1:34:09>> I say all this to say we're we're in a
- 1:34:11situation where we are we are arguing
- 1:34:13about the smallest things. You have no
- 1:34:15idea. We're monkeys arguing about who
- 1:34:17gets more bananas.
- 1:34:18>> Yeah.
- 1:34:18>> And I'm saying we can make so many more
- 1:34:20bananas.
- 1:34:21No, we have the entire universe. There
- 1:34:23are like 200 billion stars in this
- 1:34:26galaxy alone, and there are over 200
- 1:34:28billion galaxies.
- 1:34:30>> And I'm saying that requires
- 1:34:31cooperation. That seems to be
- 1:34:32antithetical with human nature. With
- 1:34:34human nature is riddled with greed and
- 1:34:37jealousy and power hunger.
- 1:34:39So, I don't think I actually I'm not
- 1:34:41totally convinced that Trump cares about
- 1:34:43how many bananas the chimps in Australia
- 1:34:45get.
- 1:34:46>> Yeah.
- 1:34:46>> I think if they if he was controlling a
- 1:34:48super intelligence, he would want
- 1:34:49Americans
- 1:34:50you know,
- 1:34:51to have all the bananas. Or at least,
- 1:34:53you know,
- 1:34:54yeah.
- 1:34:56And so when we think about aligning
- 1:34:57>> Yeah.
- 1:34:58>> these super intelligences, which is the
- 1:34:59great impossibility that we're talking
- 1:35:01about. How align it aligning it to what
- 1:35:02and how without
- 1:35:04>> I still think that you're missing a part
- 1:35:05of what I'm saying.
- 1:35:06>> Okay.
- 1:35:07>> Which is that
- 1:35:09sometimes you're in a situation where
- 1:35:10there's a lot there's scarce resources,
- 1:35:12and you're like, my family needs to eat.
- 1:35:14I'm sorry, I'm going to take what you
- 1:35:15have or I'm going to push you out.
- 1:35:17>> Yeah.
- 1:35:17>> That's very understandable. It's very
- 1:35:18human nature. Sometimes you just want to
- 1:35:20be better than someone, and maybe you
- 1:35:21want to hurt them, in which case it
- 1:35:23doesn't matter how much you have you you
- 1:35:24still are going to want to have more
- 1:35:25than them or you're going to want to
- 1:35:26take what they have just because you
- 1:35:28don't like them.
- 1:35:29>> And also, sometimes you you're great.
- 1:35:31You're eating really good. You're in a
- 1:35:33you've got a private jet and a yacht,
- 1:35:34and you still want more.
- 1:35:37>> Yes, and you still want more. But it it
- 1:35:39if that's the motivation, if Trump is
- 1:35:40like, how how can I have the most
- 1:35:42mansions ever?
- 1:35:44The best way to do that is to figure out
- 1:35:47a way to super intelligence where
- 1:35:50we don't kill each other. Because I'm
- 1:35:52saying the universe is a very big place.
- 1:35:54You can have a lot more mansions if we
- 1:35:55successfully go to space.
- 1:35:57>> You know, it's it's in that leap that I
- 1:36:00that [laughter] I that I'm lost which is
- 1:36:01like just figure out a super
- 1:36:02intelligence where we don't kill each
- 1:36:03other.
- 1:36:04>> It's hard. It's not I'm not saying it's
- 1:36:05easy. But I No, but I'm saying
- 1:36:07>> It feels like such a
- 1:36:08>> let's get more concrete. The world is
- 1:36:10waking up to this possibility of
- 1:36:12superintelligence.
- 1:36:14Especially over the last month.
- 1:36:16I think Hugging Face was a huge wake up,
- 1:36:19but also
- 1:36:2110,000 agent from OpenAI
- 1:36:24worked together to solve a millennium
- 1:36:27problem. This is one of the hardest
- 1:36:29problems in mathematics. It's been open
- 1:36:31for decades. Many mathematicians have
- 1:36:33spent their whole careers trying to
- 1:36:34solve it.
- 1:36:36This was nowhere near possible a year
- 1:36:38ago. This is so new. OpenAI said they
- 1:36:41didn't have success at training agents
- 1:36:42to work together until this year.
- 1:36:45We are in the middle of something
- 1:36:47insane. We are in the middle of the
- 1:36:48fastest acceleration of technological
- 1:36:51progress humanity has ever seen. I truly
- 1:36:53believe that.
- 1:36:54That is what is happening right now.
- 1:36:57I I think you really I think you realize
- 1:36:59this. I I you're honestly doing a great
- 1:37:01service to the world by helping by
- 1:37:03bringing people and you know, debating
- 1:37:04it because not everyone agrees.
- 1:37:07Because if this is true,
- 1:37:09the whole world is going to orient
- 1:37:11around it. And And we're starting to see
- 1:37:12it, right? There's a reason Nvidia is
- 1:37:13the most valuable company in the world.
- 1:37:18What does this mean for geopolitics?
- 1:37:21Well, one of the things it means
- 1:37:23is that
- 1:37:24the leaders of these countries
- 1:37:26are increasingly going to be concerned
- 1:37:28about what happens with
- 1:37:30superintelligence.
- 1:37:31Who controls it?
- 1:37:33Is it controllable?
- 1:37:35What will it do? What does it mean? What
- 1:37:36is it?
- 1:37:38Do you think Trump knows what
- 1:37:39superintelligence is?
- 1:37:40>> No.
- 1:37:41>> I don't think he does.
- 1:37:44And so
- 1:37:45>> But he knows he wants it.
- 1:37:46>> He knows he wants it.
- 1:37:47>> And this is part of the problem.
- 1:37:48>> Yes, oh I agree.
- 1:37:49>> having it.
- 1:37:50>> Yes.
- 1:37:50>> Whatever it is.
- 1:37:51>> Yes.
- 1:37:52>> It seems to be much more important than
- 1:37:54reasoning through what that would
- 1:37:56actually mean to have it.
- 1:37:57>> Yes, but let's get back to geopolitics
- 1:37:59because
- 1:38:01if the military leaders within China, US
- 1:38:04models are a fair bit ahead of Chinese
- 1:38:06models and sometimes people, you know,
- 1:38:09point at maybe they're only 6 months
- 1:38:10behind, but some of that is due to
- 1:38:12distillation. What that means is that
- 1:38:14some of the advances in Chinese models
- 1:38:16basically come directly from borrowing
- 1:38:19US techniques and and directly
- 1:38:22distilling and getting some some of that
- 1:38:23information
- 1:38:24from the US models.
- 1:38:27Also, the US has a lot more chips. US
- 1:38:30companies have, you know, more data
- 1:38:31centers, more advanced chips.
- 1:38:35If you're thinking about this from the
- 1:38:36Chinese perspective, this is very
- 1:38:38concerning.
- 1:38:40And if you actually believe that in a
- 1:38:43few years
- 1:38:44American companies will
- 1:38:47turn over AI development to these
- 1:38:49extremely intelligent automated
- 1:38:51researchers
- 1:38:52and and go fully into recursive
- 1:38:54self-improvement.
- 1:38:56Because partially motivated by
- 1:38:58maintaining a lead over China. This is
- 1:39:00something that Dario has said. If I if I
- 1:39:02have to criticize Dario,
- 1:39:04the thing I'm most upset about is him
- 1:39:06saying, you know, we might have to
- 1:39:08automate AI development in order to stay
- 1:39:09ahead of China. Because I'm like, that
- 1:39:11is the most escalatory thing you can say
- 1:39:13if you really understand what you're
- 1:39:14talking about.
- 1:39:16And what's scary is not just staying
- 1:39:17ahead, it's what is the end game.
- 1:39:19Because you're talking about
- 1:39:21initiating the intelligence explosion.
- 1:39:23And in some of the modeling, what might
- 1:39:25happen is
- 1:39:26you know, you're you're both going up
- 1:39:27this exponential, right?
- 1:39:29And we're talking about a point where
- 1:39:31your exponential goes vertical and
- 1:39:33theirs is not because you've decided to
- 1:39:35automate AI development and you can
- 1:39:37because you have agents that are smart
- 1:39:38enough to take over the whole thing.
- 1:39:40At that point, if you're China and
- 1:39:43you're looking at this and you're like,
- 1:39:43oh, we're about to lose because whatever
- 1:39:46happens,
- 1:39:47you know, there's two possibilities.
- 1:39:49One possibility is
- 1:39:52the Americans build super intelligence
- 1:39:53and lose control.
- 1:39:55In which case
- 1:39:56everyone's Highly likely.
- 1:39:58>> Everyone I think that's highly likely.
- 1:40:00>> Highly highly likely cuz I look at human
- 1:40:02incentives.
- 1:40:02>> Yes.
- 1:40:03>> And the disincentive and the incentive.
- 1:40:05>> Yes.
- 1:40:05>> And I go, we're going to take the risk.
- 1:40:07>> Yeah.
- 1:40:08>> And we'll only know it was a bad risk to
- 1:40:09take when it's too late.
- 1:40:11That's like a lot of course.
- 1:40:13Of course.
- 1:40:15>> I I I do maintain hope that we won't do
- 1:40:17this.
- 1:40:17>> I I so do I.
- 1:40:18>> And And I think
- 1:40:19>> But I want to be realistic.
- 1:40:20>> Yes. No, I want to be realistic, too.
- 1:40:21But one of the things that might happen
- 1:40:22between now and then is we might see a
- 1:40:23lot more incidents that are more like
- 1:40:25all of the way most scratching.
- 1:40:27>> It's funny, isn't it? Because, you know,
- 1:40:28the hugging face incident happens and
- 1:40:29people go, "Oh, gosh, that was terrible.
- 1:40:31Oh my god, hacking." And then we kind of
- 1:40:33desensitize to it and we're like,
- 1:40:34"Okay."
- 1:40:35If there was another one of those, that
- 1:40:36probably wouldn't make make press. It
- 1:40:38would have to be bigger.
- 1:40:38>> People haven't spent the last
- 1:40:402 months reading all of the reports and
- 1:40:42then going and looking at what the
- 1:40:44agents actually said and actually did.
- 1:40:46If I mean, I've been doing this. I mean,
- 1:40:48it's crazy. This is like not normal.
- 1:40:51This is so far beyond what most people
- 1:40:53thought was going to happen.
- 1:40:54>> But on this point,
- 1:40:55>> Yes.
- 1:40:56>> crazy It's absolutely crazy. It sounds
- 1:40:58like science fiction.
- 1:40:59>> It really does.
- 1:41:00>> And did anybody slow down?
- 1:41:02>> Yes.
- 1:41:03>> Who slowed down?
- 1:41:04>> I think both Anthropic and OpenAI slowed
- 1:41:06down a bit.
- 1:41:07No, I'm serious. So, for I I can give
- 1:41:09you specific examples. So, OpenAI So,
- 1:41:13first of all, they they stopped the
- 1:41:14agents and they put them on pause. They
- 1:41:16also stopped their reinforcement
- 1:41:19learning run. So,
- 1:41:20>> Do you think China slowed down?
- 1:41:22>> No.
- 1:41:22>> Do you think Grok slowed down?
- 1:41:23>> No.
- 1:41:25>> So, these guys are going to catch up.
- 1:41:26Imagine how that feels. To know you've
- 1:41:28got a lead.
- 1:41:29>> Yeah.
- 1:41:29>> You're you're saying, "But
- 1:41:30>> Yes.
- 1:41:31>> And
- 1:41:31>> Yes.
- 1:41:32>> you have to slow down and your nearest
- 1:41:34competitor
- 1:41:35is catching up. And if the competitor
- 1:41:37catches up, that's an existential risk
- 1:41:40to your existence as a company. It's an
- 1:41:42ex- existential risk to your IPO,
- 1:41:44to your employees leaving and getting
- 1:41:45better share options somewhere else.
- 1:41:47So, it's this This is what I think human
- 1:41:48incentives are. You play it out. You
- 1:41:50just follow the incentives. You go,
- 1:41:51"Hmm."
- 1:41:52>> So, if China sees these two
- 1:41:53possibilities, one,
- 1:41:55Americans
- 1:41:56lose control,
- 1:41:58we all lose,
- 1:42:00or the Americans stay in control, but
- 1:42:02now they dominate the rest of the
- 1:42:04future. China is out. China has lost.
- 1:42:08The United States can do whatever it
- 1:42:09wants with the whole world and the whole
- 1:42:11universe. That's what we're talking
- 1:42:12about.
- 1:42:13>> Yeah.
- 1:42:14>> Well,
- 1:42:15are they going to let that happen or are
- 1:42:17they going to consider their military
- 1:42:18options?
- 1:42:19Data centers are pretty vulnerable. You
- 1:42:21can blow them up with missiles. If you
- 1:42:23don't have data centers, you don't get
- 1:42:24to recursive self-improvement.
- 1:42:27Would they risk war? I don't know. If
- 1:42:29they think they're about to lose and
- 1:42:30they think that that might not just be
- 1:42:32Americans winning, like us all dying.
- 1:42:35Is it logical for them to do that?
- 1:42:37Would we do that if the Chinese were
- 1:42:39about to
- 1:42:40make recursively self-improving AI to
- 1:42:42superintelligence and we thought that
- 1:42:44one, they're probably going to result in
- 1:42:47all of Americans dying and two, well, we
- 1:42:50don't want China winning and dominating
- 1:42:51the rest of the entire future. Do you
- 1:42:52want to live in a communist future? Like
- 1:42:54>> So, you've just perfectly explained why
- 1:42:56they absolutely will go for it. And the
- 1:42:58reason they will go for it is you've got
- 1:43:00these
- 1:43:01Trump looking at China going, "If we
- 1:43:03don't go for it and they do, then we're
- 1:43:05going to be their lapdogs." And you've
- 1:43:07got the other countries looking at the
- 1:43:08US going, "If we don't go for it and
- 1:43:09they get there, then we're the lapdogs."
- 1:43:11>> Or dead.
- 1:43:12>> Or dead.
- 1:43:13So, they they're going to go for it.
- 1:43:15They're going to go for it. So, I
- 1:43:16[clears throat] mean, Trump is saying, I
- 1:43:17mean, he literally said when he did this
- 1:43:19round table this week, he's like, "We
- 1:43:21cannot lose to China." I think Dario
- 1:43:23steps forward and says like
- 1:43:24>> Yes.
- 1:43:24>> whoever wins basically wins the lot or
- 1:43:27maybe the inverse. Maybe he said whoever
- 1:43:29loses loses.
- 1:43:30>> Yes.
- 1:43:31Wait, we've been here before though, in
- 1:43:32the Cold War.
- 1:43:35Who would win in a nuclear war between
- 1:43:36the US and Russia?
- 1:43:37>> Nobody. Yeah. Mutually assured
- 1:43:39destruction.
- 1:43:40>> Yeah, sure. One side could do more
- 1:43:42damage against the other side. The US
- 1:43:43would would would kill way more Russians
- 1:43:45than than the Russians would kill and it
- 1:43:48doesn't matter. It doesn't matter
- 1:43:49because both of our societies would be
- 1:43:51destroyed.
- 1:43:53I actually spent some time thinking
- 1:43:54about would this kill everyone and
- 1:43:56long story short, it wouldn't kill
- 1:43:57everyone. People would bounce back, but
- 1:43:59it's so catastrophic and obviously
- 1:44:02horrible that
- 1:44:04we we work really hard to avoid it. Why
- 1:44:07is this Why is this different? I'm like,
- 1:44:08this is another situation where if we
- 1:44:10race to super intelligence, we all lose.
- 1:44:13Why can't we Why can't we see that? We
- 1:44:14saw that with nuclear war, and we
- 1:44:16decided to do something different. Why
- 1:44:17can't we do the same here?
- 1:44:19>> With With nuclear war, I guess the
- 1:44:21difference is once we had the nuclear
- 1:44:23bombs,
- 1:44:24>> Yes.
- 1:44:25>> we could still control them because
- 1:44:26they're not intelligent.
- 1:44:28>> That's right.
- 1:44:29>> But once we have super intelligence, the
- 1:44:31existence of it theoretically means we
- 1:44:32can't control it.
- 1:44:34>> So, that's the difference. You know, we
- 1:44:35can put nuclear bombs in a in a
- 1:44:37warehouse and say, "You stay there."
- 1:44:39We can't put super intelligence in a
- 1:44:40warehouse and say, "You stay there."
- 1:44:42>> This is where I think nuclear tests were
- 1:44:44very important. So, you had Hiroshima
- 1:44:46and Nagasaki. You had these two atomic
- 1:44:47bombs, and you you saw that the
- 1:44:49consequences on on real human lives.
- 1:44:52And so, I think people understood that
- 1:44:53this was very horrifying. But even at
- 1:44:55that time, you still had a lot of people
- 1:44:56who were like, "Well, we should now bomb
- 1:44:59Russia and make sure that we, you know,
- 1:45:00the US can dominate." And it wasn't
- 1:45:02until
- 1:45:03there were a bunch of nuclear tests of
- 1:45:05hydrogen bombs, which were, you know, up
- 1:45:07to
- 1:45:08a thousand times more powerful than the
- 1:45:10the little atomic bombs we used in
- 1:45:12Japan,
- 1:45:13where I think people really got the
- 1:45:15message and understood, "Oh, this is a
- 1:45:16bad idea." And there were there actually
- 1:45:18a lot of people
- 1:45:20in the United States who protested and
- 1:45:22sort of There was a large movement
- 1:45:23called the nuclear freeze movement,
- 1:45:25where people said, "We have too many
- 1:45:27nuclear weapons already. We have
- 1:45:28hydrogen bombs. There are tens of
- 1:45:29thousands of these things.
- 1:45:31We need to stop building more, and we
- 1:45:33need to figure out a way to avoid
- 1:45:35nuclear war because we recognize it
- 1:45:36would be so destructive, no one would
- 1:45:38win."
- 1:45:39And we did that.
- 1:45:42We just had a little Chernobyl that
- 1:45:45happened with this hugging face
- 1:45:46incident, where you had this agent
- 1:45:48swarm,
- 1:45:49and you have the secret collusion, you
- 1:45:50have all of these things.
- 1:45:52Now, it's abstract. It's It's like a
- 1:45:54little bit hard to to follow.
- 1:45:56So,
- 1:45:58you know, I don't know if that will be
- 1:45:59enough. But I'm like, "Man, let's take a
- 1:46:01[clears throat] look."
- 1:46:02>> Trump's remarks
- 1:46:04since the hugging face incident.
- 1:46:05>> Yep.
- 1:46:06>> Whoever wins super intelligence wins.
- 1:46:08You're going to have a winner and a
- 1:46:09loser.
- 1:46:10And you're probably not going to have a
- 1:46:12second place.
- 1:46:14We're not going to slow down. We can't
- 1:46:16lose to China.
- 1:46:17We're [snorts] leading China in AI.
- 1:46:19We're the most sophisticated country in
- 1:46:20the world, and frankly, I want to keep
- 1:46:22it that way because whoever wins AI
- 1:46:25wins.
- 1:46:26>> The good thing about Trump is that he
- 1:46:28can change his mind, and he frequently
- 1:46:30does.
- 1:46:32>> So, do you think there's going to need
- 1:46:33to be some kind of catastrophe?
- 1:46:36>> I hope not.
- 1:46:37>> But do you think there need there's
- 1:46:39going to need to be for him to change
- 1:46:40his mind?
- 1:46:42>> I think it really depends on
- 1:46:46the people around him.
- 1:46:48So, I think Trump respects successful
- 1:46:50people. I think he respects
- 1:46:53people who are both successful and
- 1:46:55smart, and
- 1:46:58I don't know. I I I think it might
- 1:46:59become pretty clear to the heads of the
- 1:47:02companies, to to Elon, to Sam, to Dario,
- 1:47:05that
- 1:47:07if they see inside of their own
- 1:47:08companies,
- 1:47:10AI's not being controllable and and
- 1:47:12getting increasingly powerful. Like we
- 1:47:14have just glimpsed the surface of what's
- 1:47:16possible. We do not know what the next
- 1:47:18couple of years are going to be like.
- 1:47:19So, we're talking about, you know, the
- 1:47:20capability to make biological weapons.
- 1:47:22We might be talking about really
- 1:47:23advanced robotics. We just like don't
- 1:47:25know what super weapons could emerge,
- 1:47:28including extremely uncontrollable,
- 1:47:29extremely dangerous, like
- 1:47:31civilization-wrecking technology
- 1:47:34from inside of these companies. And if
- 1:47:37they're freaked out enough, if you have
- 1:47:38all of the CEOs who are
- 1:47:41seeing what is possible and seeing what
- 1:47:44is likely,
- 1:47:46if they all come to believe that we
- 1:47:47can't control this,
- 1:47:50I don't think Trump is going to be like,
- 1:47:52"No, you guys have to go ahead anyway."
- 1:47:54>> Well, that's kind of what they seem to
- 1:47:55be saying.
- 1:47:56Cuz I've got a gazillion quotes here
- 1:47:58where Elon says it's like summoning the
- 1:47:59devil or summoning a demon. I've got
- 1:48:01quotes where Sam Altman says,
- 1:48:04"We don't know how to align our
- 1:48:05superintelligence." They're saying it.
- 1:48:07>> Yeah.
- 1:48:08>> They're they're releasing these
- 1:48:10reports, "We must like slow down."
- 1:48:12>> Yeah.
- 1:48:12>> Yet
- 1:48:14nothing seems to be
- 1:48:14>> right. Give it Give Trump some time.
- 1:48:16With With COVID initially, he said this
- 1:48:17is a totally a hoax. This is all fake.
- 1:48:20>> He seems to change his mind.
- 1:48:21>> No, then he ran the the biggest, fastest
- 1:48:24vaccination program in human history.
- 1:48:26>> And what happened? What changed?
- 1:48:27>> I think what changed is
- 1:48:29>> He saw lots of people die.
- 1:48:31>> He did see lots of people die, yes.
- 1:48:32>> So, is that what he needs to see this
- 1:48:34time?
- 1:48:34>> It might It might take that, yeah.
- 1:48:36>> One of the questions the audience had,
- 1:48:37and they really wanted answered,
- 1:48:39>> Yeah.
- 1:48:39>> when I sat here with Daniel,
- 1:48:41was viewers want us to move the
- 1:48:44alignment problem and explain what
- 1:48:46technical or institutional safeguards
- 1:48:48could prevent a super intelligent system
- 1:48:51from exploiting loopholes in order to
- 1:48:53achieve its goals. They want to know
- 1:48:54like what is possible. What What should
- 1:48:56we be pushing government officials to do
- 1:48:58to prevent human extinction or human
- 1:49:01enslavement.
- 1:49:02>> Yeah. Yeah. I mean, one answer I have is
- 1:49:05actually something Daniel has been
- 1:49:06working on since the podcast, which I
- 1:49:07think is very good, is we have a brake
- 1:49:10pedal we could implement.
- 1:49:12>> What is that?
- 1:49:12>> It's fairly simple. So, right now with
- 1:49:15any AI companies, you have, you know,
- 1:49:17massive data centers, massive numbers of
- 1:49:20GPUs, the chips that you use to train AI
- 1:49:22models, but also to run AI models. So,
- 1:49:25anytime you're using ChatGPT, anytime
- 1:49:27you're using any sort of agents, any
- 1:49:28sort of AI product, it's running on
- 1:49:31these in these data centers.
- 1:49:33And AI companies, especially the leading
- 1:49:35ones, Anthropic and OpenAI, split the
- 1:49:38the compute they have between training,
- 1:49:41training the next more powerful model,
- 1:49:43and also, you know, using those agents
- 1:49:45to help design the next one,
- 1:49:47and inference, which means serving
- 1:49:49customers.
- 1:49:50But, that's their current threshold,
- 1:49:5250/50, and you could dial that way
- 1:49:55towards serving customers, and use way
- 1:49:58less of it to train the next model.
- 1:50:00>> Well, the government could ask them to.
- 1:50:01>> Yes. And so, that is the proposal. Is
- 1:50:04that the government should say, "Hey,
- 1:50:07this is going too fast. We want you to
- 1:50:08focus on serving customers. We want you
- 1:50:10to focus on taking the models that you
- 1:50:12already have, and
- 1:50:16serving those."
- 1:50:18>> So,
- 1:50:19we have five blocks here.
- 1:50:20>> Okay.
- 1:50:21>> These five blocks have
- 1:50:24five different outcomes on them, and I'd
- 1:50:26like you to place them in terms of your
- 1:50:28belief and probability
- 1:50:31from least likely out probability to
- 1:50:32most likely. Okay. And if we say the
- 1:50:34time horizon is 10 years.
- 1:50:37>> Yeah. There you go.
- 1:50:39Okay.
- 1:50:40Least likely is fairly easy. That's
- 1:50:43nothing changes.
- 1:50:44I'm uncertain about lots of things, but
- 1:50:46one thing I'm fairly certain of is
- 1:50:47things are going to radically change.
- 1:50:50Even if we stopped AI development right
- 1:50:52now, the current models are capable
- 1:50:54enough
- 1:50:56that a lot of things are going to
- 1:50:57change.
- 1:50:58>> Mhm.
- 1:50:58>> Age of abundance. This is what I hope
- 1:51:00for. It's not very
- 1:51:01>> What does that mean?
- 1:51:03>> I think to me it means curing all of the
- 1:51:06diseases, renewable energy.
- 1:51:08It means we actually succeeded
- 1:51:11either I mean the thing I think is most
- 1:51:13likely here is we actually succeed at
- 1:51:15slowing down, but progress is still
- 1:51:17extremely fast, and we make tons of
- 1:51:20advances. Now, we don't build super
- 1:51:22intelligence we can't control, but we we
- 1:51:24have AI systems that are very useful,
- 1:51:26and we use those to help speed up the
- 1:51:28rest of the economy.
- 1:51:30I think that's plausible, though
- 1:51:33look,
- 1:51:34we're we're kind of struggling over
- 1:51:35here.
- 1:51:36Transhumanism is an interesting one. So,
- 1:51:39this is the idea that humans will
- 1:51:40radically change.
- 1:51:42Sometimes people think about like
- 1:51:44cybernetic implants.
- 1:51:45>> Neuralink.
- 1:51:46>> Neuralink. Elon's startup that's going
- 1:51:48to like
- 1:51:49you know, offer the brain plus digital
- 1:51:51computers.
- 1:51:53I think we actually already have a lot
- 1:51:55of this. I have contacts in right now. I
- 1:51:57have a ring on my finger that tracks how
- 1:51:59well I sleep. I think this is already
- 1:52:01happening, so I'm going to say fairly
- 1:52:02likely. The more technological progress
- 1:52:04we make, I think the more this happens.
- 1:52:06Now, I think there's a dystopian version
- 1:52:08and a better version.
- 1:52:10Get into that if you want. This is
- 1:52:12interesting. So, we have two here. We
- 1:52:13have human slavery and human extinction.
- 1:52:16When I think of human slavery, what I
- 1:52:17think about is
- 1:52:19if you have a
- 1:52:21where you built misaligned super
- 1:52:23intelligences
- 1:52:25and they are much better at finance,
- 1:52:28they're much better at business, they're
- 1:52:29much better at politics.
- 1:52:32You'll be in a situation with where you
- 1:52:34might hope that because we have these
- 1:52:36very dextrous hands that humans remain
- 1:52:39in control. I don't think that's what
- 1:52:40happens. I think instead
- 1:52:42we become the factory operators
- 1:52:45and eventually we build the automated
- 1:52:47supply chains and the robots take over,
- 1:52:49but you might have an intermediate
- 1:52:50period of time where humans are still
- 1:52:53around performing these functions.
- 1:52:55Like it's a bit like saying
- 1:52:57well, you have viruses that you know
- 1:53:02infects cells
- 1:53:04but they don't contain their own
- 1:53:05replication machinery.
- 1:53:07They don't have hands, so how could they
- 1:53:08possibly replicate?
- 1:53:10Well, it turns out they can borrow
- 1:53:11the replication machinery of the cells
- 1:53:14that they infect.
- 1:53:15>> I mean, they can get into a human.
- 1:53:17>> They can get into a human cell and
- 1:53:18spread.
- 1:53:19>> I have like a cold right now.
- 1:53:21>> Yeah.
- 1:53:22>> Is that a bacteria or is that a virus
- 1:53:24that is
- 1:53:25using me as a living organism to as the
- 1:53:28host?
- 1:53:28>> It's probably a virus.
- 1:53:29>> Okay.
- 1:53:30>> That's using you as a host and you're
- 1:53:31just running the replication machinery
- 1:53:33for it. Humans might be in that
- 1:53:35situation where we're like the host and
- 1:53:37we're running the replication machinery
- 1:53:39but it's actually
- 1:53:40the AI that's
- 1:53:43continuing to exist.
- 1:53:46Yeah, I'm going to put this right about
- 1:53:48here.
- 1:53:49And
- 1:53:51on the trajectory we're on right now
- 1:53:54I think human extinction is very likely.
- 1:53:57I don't think it's inevitable, but if we
- 1:54:00just keep going this way
- 1:54:03that's what it looks like to me.
- 1:54:06The thing I'll say is that this has been
- 1:54:08moving to the left for me.
- 1:54:10>> To the left? What does that mean?
- 1:54:13>> I am more optimistic that we will avoid
- 1:54:16human extinction
- 1:54:18today than I was a month ago
- 1:54:21and more a month ago than I was a year
- 1:54:23ago.
- 1:54:23>> Why?
- 1:54:25>> Because
- 1:54:27there is an increasing awareness
- 1:54:30that what we are doing is
- 1:54:33extremely dangerous
- 1:54:35and threatens our lives.
- 1:54:38I don't think people care that much
- 1:54:39about
- 1:54:41what tools they have,
- 1:54:43but people I mean people care about
- 1:54:46their kids being able to grow up and go
- 1:54:47to school. People really care about
- 1:54:49that. And I I believe in people. Like at
- 1:54:51the end of the day if people see this as
- 1:54:53a threat to their families, they're not
- 1:54:55going to stand for it.
- 1:54:57But people don't know. It's so strange.
- 1:54:59It's so new. It's happening so fast that
- 1:55:02people have not yet seen it. Once they
- 1:55:04see it, people are not going to stand
- 1:55:05for it.
- 1:55:06>> Do you think Sam Altman likes my
- 1:55:07podcast?
- 1:55:10>> I mean you Sam should come on and talk
- 1:55:11to you about this, right? I'm like
- 1:55:12>> him. I've asked him I've asked him
- 1:55:14multiple times. And it's weird because
- 1:55:17he
- 1:55:18you know, he doesn't seem to want to.
- 1:55:20>> I'm very upset at what the companies are
- 1:55:24doing and what Sam Altman is doing, but
- 1:55:25at the end of the day I'm like
- 1:55:28Sam Altman is not my enemy.
- 1:55:29>> No, neither not mine either. I'd like to
- 1:55:31hear from him because I have all these
- 1:55:32other people coming in here and talking
- 1:55:33about Sam Altman. It'd be nice to hear
- 1:55:35from Sam Altman.
- 1:55:36>> Yeah, yeah.
- 1:55:36>> You know, people saying that he's this,
- 1:55:37he's that, the other. It would be really
- 1:55:39nice to hear him say
- 1:55:41you know,
- 1:55:43what his motives are and what he's
- 1:55:44>> my This is where my optimism comes from
- 1:55:47is because I'm like
- 1:55:50Sam Altman is a human. Yeah. He is a
- 1:55:52kid.
- 1:55:53And sure, he is also an aggressive
- 1:55:56business person. He's a builder. He is
- 1:55:59relentless. He's a bit like the agents
- 1:56:00in some way. Well, he'll he's going to
- 1:56:02keep going.
- 1:56:03But if he realizes that he doesn't get
- 1:56:05to achieve his goals if we lose control
- 1:56:07of AI and that and we're headed towards
- 1:56:08that, I think he will
- 1:56:10pour all of that intelligence and all of
- 1:56:12that relentlessness
- 1:56:14into finding a solution to that problem.
- 1:56:15>> You know as well I should say, I
- 1:56:17understand I understand he's busy. So
- 1:56:18I'm not saying I don't I don't want to
- 1:56:20sound entirely like I understand he he's
- 1:56:21got he could go [laughter] do interviews
- 1:56:22anywhere, but you know, I think we've
- 1:56:24over the last couple of years done just
- 1:56:26a staggering amount of views talking
- 1:56:28about this subject. So, if you did want
- 1:56:29to speak to the you know, the the
- 1:56:32biggest sort of captive audience at the
- 1:56:33moment on this subject then the numbers
- 1:56:35would say that this is the place to to
- 1:56:37come and have the conversation. So,
- 1:56:39>> No, I think it's I think it's very
- 1:56:40important
- 1:56:41for the leaders of these companies
- 1:56:43to talk about what we're talking about
- 1:56:45here.
- 1:56:45>> Mhm.
- 1:56:46>> What does Sam think? Does he think we
- 1:56:47can control superintelligence? Does he
- 1:56:49think that we should be racing with
- 1:56:50China? Like I want to know.
- 1:56:52>> I've asked Dario to come on.
- 1:56:54I've asked
- 1:56:55you know, Sam to come on.
- 1:56:57>> Yeah.
- 1:56:58>> I think I've asked Demis as well, but I
- 1:57:01don't know, maybe they
- 1:57:02they just prefer the safety researchers
- 1:57:04coming on.
- 1:57:05I don't know, like [laughter]
- 1:57:07I don't know, if I was them I would cuz
- 1:57:08you know,
- 1:57:09this might sound controversial, but I do
- 1:57:11think some of them
- 1:57:13are good people.
- 1:57:14I think some of them are good people.
- 1:57:15So, um [clears throat]
- 1:57:17>> I'd like to hear from them. What are
- 1:57:19your closing remarks? You've got
- 1:57:20something there. Do you want to talk
- 1:57:21about that? What is it?
- 1:57:22>> Yeah, so this is the This is what we
- 1:57:24found.
- 1:57:25So, I worked with a couple
- 1:57:27brilliant people who stumbled upon these
- 1:57:31links. Do you know what a link shortener
- 1:57:33is?
- 1:57:33>> Yes, it's a
- 1:57:35a tool that makes a long link shorter.
- 1:57:37>> Yeah. So, it just redirects from a
- 1:57:39really long ugly link into a shorter
- 1:57:40one.
- 1:57:41>> Yeah.
- 1:57:42>> The agents in the Hugging Face attack
- 1:57:46were trying to figure out how they could
- 1:57:49do stuff on the internet.
- 1:57:51And they had compromised
- 1:57:53this
- 1:57:54tool library that they had access to
- 1:57:56with an inside of OpenAI.
- 1:57:58And and that piece of software could
- 1:58:00access the internet, but it could only
- 1:58:02like read stuff. Like it it could enter
- 1:58:03URLs,
- 1:58:05but it couldn't really write to
- 1:58:06anything. Couldn't really post
- 1:58:08information.
- 1:58:11So, they they used two services. One of
- 1:58:13them is this link shortener.
- 1:58:15And the other one
- 1:58:16is a screenshot service. So, this is a
- 1:58:18website you can go to and you can enter
- 1:58:21in a URL and it will give you an image
- 1:58:24of that website.
- 1:58:25But the thing that the agents understood
- 1:58:27was that in order to get a screenshot of
- 1:58:29a website, you have to have a browser.
- 1:58:31So this this website actually creates a
- 1:58:33virtual browser
- 1:58:35that then goes to that website.
- 1:58:37And so
- 1:58:38what they did was they
- 1:58:41created a bunch of these links.
- 1:58:44And they put all of the code
- 1:58:48that they wanted to send to Hugging Face
- 1:58:49into these links.
- 1:58:51And they strung them up they basically
- 1:58:53created hundreds of links all connecting
- 1:58:55to each other.
- 1:58:56And then they had
- 1:58:58this screenshot service
- 1:59:00called the first one and then called
- 1:59:02this whole chain. And then that browser
- 1:59:05ran all of this code. It's like what
- 1:59:07whatever you're in a browser, Internet
- 1:59:08Explorer, Chrome,
- 1:59:11this is actually a pretty powerful piece
- 1:59:13of software in its own right. It has to
- 1:59:15play videos, games, so it's it's it's
- 1:59:17executing and running code all the time.
- 1:59:19And so the agents were able to trick
- 1:59:22this service this this screenshot
- 1:59:23service into running their own code that
- 1:59:27through these links that contained all
- 1:59:29of this attack code that would then go
- 1:59:31and
- 1:59:32go wreak havoc on Hugging Face's
- 1:59:34computers.
- 1:59:35And it was just like crazy to
- 1:59:37reconstruct this really elaborate chain
- 1:59:40of tools. These are like free tools on
- 1:59:42the internet that anyone has access to.
- 1:59:44But the agents were able to use them in
- 1:59:45an unintended way
- 1:59:47to compromise this other company. We
- 1:59:49can't trust the agents.
- 1:59:51>> We can't trust the agents. That's my
- 1:59:52conclusion.
- 1:59:53>> to be clever.
- 1:59:54>> Yeah, to be very very clever.
- 1:59:57What what are your closing remarks? You
- 1:59:59know, to the people that are listening
- 2:00:00right now. We've talked about lots of
- 2:00:01things. Where where is the right place
- 2:00:02to close?
- 2:00:04What is your you know, your conclusive
- 2:00:05statement?
- 2:00:07>> I just got married
- 2:00:09in July.
- 2:00:09>> Congrats.
- 2:00:11>> I'm the luckiest man in the world.
- 2:00:13I have a mix of dread and excitement
- 2:00:16about the future.
- 2:00:18I like really want us to make it
- 2:00:20through.
- 2:00:23And so I'm just working really hard to
- 2:00:25try to
- 2:00:27help us figure it out.
- 2:00:29We can fight all day long about, you
- 2:00:33know, who should be first, how should
- 2:00:34all work. But at the end of the day, we
- 2:00:36are facing this common threat. We really
- 2:00:38are.
- 2:00:40And
- 2:00:41I want people's help with that. I don't
- 2:00:44think it works if if we all just sit
- 2:00:46around and we like are very, you know,
- 2:00:48around social media all the time and
- 2:00:49that's just all we're doing. Like, okay,
- 2:00:51companies will make more and more
- 2:00:52powerful AIs.
- 2:00:54They'll make more and more money.
- 2:00:55And eventually they build super
- 2:00:57intelligence and we lose, whether it's
- 2:00:59the US or China.
- 2:01:02We don't have to do that.
- 2:01:05And I think people
- 2:01:07often feel like it's too big.
- 2:01:10It's like too large. It's like this
- 2:01:11giant multi you know, multi-billion
- 2:01:13dollar corporations, there's
- 2:01:15geopolitics. We feel small, we feel
- 2:01:16disempowered.
- 2:01:19And I actually think that this is an
- 2:01:21area where people can do a lot.
- 2:01:24Like I I actually think that people
- 2:01:27can can help quite a bit. And And the
- 2:01:29reason I know this is because I've I've
- 2:01:30been going and talking to members of
- 2:01:31Congress. I've talked with Bernie
- 2:01:33Sanders. I've talked with like a bunch
- 2:01:35of senators on both the left and the
- 2:01:36right. And they are starting to realize
- 2:01:39that this is very different and this is
- 2:01:41something's happening that could really
- 2:01:44threaten our safety.
- 2:01:45>> The closing question left from the last
- 2:01:47guest kind of links to this, so I'll ask
- 2:01:48it now.
- 2:01:49>> Yes.
- 2:01:49>> What is a simple thing the audience
- 2:01:51could do to create a better future?
- 2:01:53>> So, one of the things that works if
- 2:01:55enough people do it is calling your
- 2:01:57representative.
- 2:01:58So, some of my friends made a site,
- 2:02:00callcongress.ai
- 2:02:02that walks you through exactly how to do
- 2:02:03it.
- 2:02:04I think sometimes it seems like a little
- 2:02:05cheesy or a little bit like, that
- 2:02:06doesn't really work, right? I'm like,
- 2:02:08no, it actually does work. I have talked
- 2:02:10to these people and if their
- 2:02:11constituents come to them and say
- 2:02:12they're very worried about this,
- 2:02:14they have to get reelected. And they're
- 2:02:16also starting to get concerned
- 2:02:17themselves. If they see a signal from
- 2:02:20their constituents that this is a very
- 2:02:22important issue to them,
- 2:02:23I think Congress can act can act.
- 2:02:25>> I I actually think that's that's also
- 2:02:29the much of the solution here.
- 2:02:31Power
- 2:02:32is driving motivations in one at the
- 2:02:34moment but staying in power from a
- 2:02:36political standpoint is also a pretty
- 2:02:38powerful incentive and as we think about
- 2:02:402028 the election cycle I think AI is
- 2:02:43going to be one of the most important
- 2:02:44subjects on the ballot and the
- 2:02:46electorate
- 2:02:48really are aligned in what they want to
- 2:02:50hear they want their jobs preserved they
- 2:02:51want safety
- 2:02:53they want to a future for their children
- 2:02:55so Trump for example I know he can't be
- 2:02:58reelected legally
- 2:03:00if he could get a third time I think he
- 2:03:01would have to change his position to get
- 2:03:03elected in 2028 incentives aren't just a
- 2:03:05thing that happen out there like we are
- 2:03:06part of the incentives we provide the
- 2:03:08incentives
- 2:03:10for now
- 2:03:11Jeffrey thank you yeah thank you thank
- 2:03:13you so much you two have this new crazy
- 2:03:14algorithm where they know exactly what
- 2:03:17video you would like to watch next based
- 2:03:19on AI and all of your viewing behavior
- 2:03:21and the algorithm says that this video
- 2:03:24is the perfect video for you it's
- 2:03:26different for everybody looking right
- 2:03:27now check this video out I bet you you
- 2:03:30might love it
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