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"Abortion: The Philosophical Arguments" – ND Vita Institute 2020 — Transcript

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0:00All right.
0:05Welcome to our Notre Dame Vita Institute
0:072020 webinar series.
0:09I'm Carter Snead, the director of the
0:11DeNicola Center for Ethics and Culture,
0:13professor of law, and concurrent
0:15professor of political science here at
0:16the University of Notre Dame.
0:18The mission of the DeNicola Center for
0:19Ethics and Culture is to share the
0:21richness of the Catholic moral and
0:22intellectual tradition through teaching,
0:24research, and public engagement both on
0:27campus at Notre Dame and as Notre Dame
0:30in the wider public square.
0:32The Vita Institute is our flagship
0:34offering of culture of life initiatives,
0:37and we're delighted to have you join us
0:38for this week's presentations.
0:41This webinar series will provide you
0:42with a small taste of our week-long Vita
0:45Institute intellectual formation program
0:47that each summer since 2010 has brought
0:50pro-life leaders from around the world
0:52to the campus of the University of Notre
0:53Dame to study the fundamentals of the
0:55life issues with world-renowned scholars
0:58across a wide range of disciplines,
1:00including social sciences, biology,
1:02philosophy, theology, law,
1:05communications, and counseling.
1:08Our full Vita Institute program includes
1:10more than 20 presentations covering the
1:13full spectrum of topics essential to
1:15building a culture of life, including
1:17such important issues as racial
1:19inequality, disability, adoption,
1:22euthanasia and assisted suicide, public
1:24health policy, integral human
1:26development, and more.
1:28In this week's condensed series of
1:30presentations, we'll highlight issues
1:32surrounding the beginning of life and
1:34then widen our conversation to address
1:36the equal human dignity that we all
1:37share.
1:39In addition to this week's series, we're
1:40preparing a panel discussion to explore
1:43how the core principles and goods at the
1:44heart of a culture of life movement,
1:46namely unconditional love, radical
1:49hospitality, solidarity, and the respect
1:52for the intrinsic equal value of every
1:53human being, how these principles are
1:56generative of a commitment to fight
1:58unjust racial discrimination and to
2:00accompany our brothers and sisters of
2:02color in their continuing struggle for
2:04you for genuine equality.
2:07We'll share details and registration
2:08information about this future panel in
2:11upcoming weeks.
2:13So, let's go ahead and begin what will
2:15prove to be an exciting week of learning
2:16and conversation together, we hope. A
2:18bit about tonight's format. Our speaker
2:21pre-recorded his talk to ensure the best
2:23possible quality and internet
2:25connection.
2:26We'll watch the presentation together,
2:28and then at the end, the speaker will
2:29join us for live Q&A.
2:32During the talk, those of you who logged
2:34into the Zoom webinar are welcome to
2:35pose your questions in the chat box, and
2:38we'll select representative questions
2:40for him to answer.
2:42Tonight's presenter is a long-time
2:43friend of the Vita Institute, Professor
2:45Francis Beckwith.
2:47Francis Beckwith is a Professor of
2:48Philosophy and Church-State Studies at
2:50Baylor University, where he also serves
2:52as Associate Director of the Graduate
2:53Program in Philosophy and Resident
2:56Scholar in Baylor's Institute for
2:57Studies of Religion.
2:59He also teaches courses in Medical
3:01Humanities, Political Science, Religion,
3:03and Church-State Studies.
3:05He received his MJS from Washington
3:07University School of Law in St. Louis,
3:10and his MA and PhD in Philosophy from
3:12Fordham University.
3:14Professor Beckwith is the author of over
3:16100 academic articles, book chapters,
3:18reference entries, and reviews.
3:21Among his nearly 20 books are Never
3:23Doubt Thomas: The Catholic Aquinas as
3:25Evangelical and Protestant from Baylor
3:28University Press,
3:29Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case
3:32Against Abortion Choice from Cambridge
3:34University Press,
3:35and Taking Rights Seriously: Law,
3:37Politics, and the Reasonableness of
3:39Faith, also from Cambridge University
3:41Press.
3:43And now, we're delighted to present
3:44Francis J. Beckwith speaking on
3:47Abortion: The Philosophical Arguments.
4:10All right, without further ado,
4:12I will begin. Well, welcome everybody.
4:14It's uh
4:15I was going to say it's terrific to be
4:17here, but actually I am not there or
4:19wherever you're at. I'm here at home in
4:21Waco, Texas and
4:24uh my task uh
4:25this evening, at least this evening for
4:27you, is to discuss the question of
4:31abortion in terms of the philosophical
4:33arguments. Uh most people that are
4:36involved with the pro-life movement, who
4:37are in the trenches, who are working
4:40with women in crisis pregnancies,
4:43uh typically uh deal with individuals
4:47that raise kind of common sense
4:49questions about abortion. Like, is the
4:52is this fetus alive? Is the embryo a
4:55member of the human family? What I want
4:57to do
4:58in this lecture is to introduce you to
5:01ways in which certain philosophers,
5:05although agreeing with the pro-life
5:07position that the fetus is a human
5:10being, deny that it had it has moral
5:12status.
5:13To some of you that language is going to
5:15sound odd or strange, but it's the way
5:18in which people that are in bioethics
5:20and in philosophy, who know all the
5:23science,
5:24want to defend and support abortion
5:27rights. So, uh the title of of this talk
5:30is abortion, uh the philosophical
5:33arguments. And uh before I I get into
5:36the arguments, I I want to give you an
5:39idea of
5:41how philosophers candidly speak about
5:45abortion. Uh at least those that are
5:47supportive of abortion rights. And I
5:49want to begin with a quote from from
5:52David Boonin. David is a friend of mine
5:54who teaches at the University of
5:55Colorado, Boulder,
5:57and is a strong proponent of abortion
5:59rights, and has published two books
6:02defending abortion rights. One called a
6:04defense of abortion, and a most recent
6:07one called Beyond Roe.
6:09What I'm going to read to you is from
6:10the beginning of his book, A Defense of
6:13Abortion. It's from the introduction, or
6:15I think the
6:16uh the fore- maybe the the preface, uh
6:19but it's in the very early part of the
6:20book.
6:22He writes, "On the desk in my office,
6:24where most of this book was written and
6:25revised, there are several pictures of
6:27my son Eli. In one, he is gleefully
6:30dancing on the sand along the Gulf of
6:32Mexico, the cool ocean breeze wreaking
6:34havoc with his wispy hair.
6:36In the top drawer of my desk, I keep
6:38another picture of Eli. The picture was
6:40taken September 7th, 1993,
6:4324 weeks before he was born.
6:46The sonogram image is murky, but it
6:49reveals clearly enough a small head
6:51tilted back slightly, and an arm raised
6:53up and bent, with the hand pointing back
6:56toward the face, and the thumb extended
6:58toward the mouth. There is no doubt in
7:00my mind that this picture, too, shows
7:02the same little boy at a very early
7:04stage in his physical development. And
7:06there is no question that the position I
7:09defend in this book entails it would
7:11have been morally permissible to end his
7:14life at this point." Unquote.
7:18What is David saying here? He's saying,
7:21"I agree with pro-lifers that my unborn
7:25son Eli
7:27was
7:29a human being, and of course is a human
7:31being.
7:32But he says, "The position I going to
7:35defend in this book says it would have
7:36been permissible
7:38to kill him,
7:39or to take his life."
7:41What we're going to do is go over the
7:43arguments of philosophers like Boonin
7:48who defend positions like like David's
7:51position and how to respond to those
7:54arguments. We clearly don't have enough
7:55time to go over
7:58the wide variety of arguments, but what
8:00I want to do is kind of give you a
8:01general sense of the arguments uh
8:04under two general categories.
8:06So,
8:07um
8:08let's begin. Okay, so let's begin
8:12discussing uh abortion, the
8:14philosophical arguments. Let me first
8:16begin with the definition of abortion.
8:19Uh the procured or spontaneous premature
8:22termination of pregnancy unlike
8:24spontaneous abortion or miscarriage,
8:26procured abortion is intended to
8:28terminate a pregnancy. Its moral and
8:30legal permissibility depends on the
8:32nature of the unborn,
8:34the mother the mother's bodily rights
8:36and or how the law ought to address
8:39controversial matters of life and death.
8:42I begin with the definition because it's
8:44important that we define our terms even
8:47about a term or a word that we often
8:50use, but it it there is a difference
8:52between intending the death of an unborn
8:56human being
8:57uh versus
9:00uh
9:01the sort of uh
9:03activities that occur that may
9:05unintentionally result in the uh the
9:08death of an unborn child or in those
9:10cases in which nature takes its course
9:13uh in
9:14in miscarriage.
9:16Now, before we get into the
9:18philosophical arguments, I want to say
9:20it just a few things about how
9:22philosophy can be helpful
9:24uh to pro-life advocates in responding
9:26to popular arguments.
9:28So, what what do I mean by popular
9:31arguments? It's those arguments that one
9:33often hears in the media, social media,
9:37perhaps in arguments with relatives or
9:39those that engage you if you're involved
9:43with crisis pregnancy or questions if
9:46you're a professor,
9:48uh let's say outside of philosophy that
9:50a student may ask. Uh
9:52these
9:53arguments,
9:54I believe,
9:56commit a fatal mistake and that they all
9:59tend to beg the question. Now, now what
10:02does it mean to to beg the question? It
10:03means to assume what you're trying to
10:05prove. So, for example, if I were to
10:07say, "The Lakers are the best team." and
10:09you asked me, "Why do you think that?"
10:12and I said, "Because no team is better."
10:14I've not really said anything new. I've
10:16simply reasserted what I've already
10:18believed. Or to use an example from an
10:21old French movie that I saw years ago,
10:23there are three three thieves arguing
10:25about who is to
10:28uh distribute or who's to receive the
10:30proper distribution of diamonds that
10:32they had stolen and and one of them
10:34says, um
10:36"I get two diamonds and each one of you
10:38get one each." He goes, "Well, why do
10:39you have
10:41Why do you get two diamonds?" "I'm in
10:42charge." "Well, why are you in charge?"
10:44"Well, I have the most diamonds." You've
10:45not said anything new. You've just
10:47simply reasserted uh in different
10:49language. So, in popular debate you
10:52often hear comments like, "Don't like
10:54abortion, don't have one."
10:56Or you're a man and you can't get
10:59pregnant, therefore you shouldn't talk
11:00about abortion. Or if abortion
11:03becomes illegal, only rich women will be
11:05able to get abortions or no one knows
11:09when life begins. These are kind of
11:10typical popular arguments that one
11:12hears. Let you let me go through each
11:14one quickly um
11:16to show you how they beg the question.
11:18Uh
11:19suppose somebody says, "Don't like
11:21abortion, uh don't have one." Well, um
11:26that assumes that abortion is itself a
11:28matter of discretion or taste. We would
11:31never use that kind of language of let's
11:34say over an issue of great controversy.
11:36If somebody were to say, "We're not
11:38great controversy, but let's say a moral
11:40issue over which a vast majority of
11:41people agree." Supposing somebody says,
11:44"Uh well, don't don't like climate
11:46change, then don't litter."
11:48Right? If somebody said that,
11:51you would
11:53you would say, um
11:54"Well, you're missing the whole point of
11:57Or Or let me put it this way. I guess a
11:58better way of saying it would be if you
12:00don't like
12:01activism
12:03about climate change, then don't
12:05litter." Or something along those lines.
12:08The person
12:09would would be mystified by by that
12:11answer. Why? Because the issue of
12:13climate change or any other moral
12:16or question has to do with whether it's
12:19in fact the right thing to do.
12:22We don't say this about spousal abuse.
12:24Nobody says, "Well, if you don't like
12:27spousal abuse, then don't engage in it."
12:29That would be That would be foolish,
12:32right? We would think, "Well, that
12:33person truly doesn't understand why
12:35somebody may have a strong views on the
12:38wrongness of spousal abuse." Now, that
12:40doesn't resolve the question of
12:42abortion, but it gets us to think or to
12:46or the person that we're dealing with to
12:48understand that the debate about
12:49abortion is whether the unborn human
12:52person or the unborn human being is in
12:54fact one of us, whether it is a a member
12:57of the human community. So, if it is one
12:59of us, whether you like it or not is not
13:01relevant to its rightness or wrongness.
13:04Uh
13:05but if it isn't one of us, then why even
13:08make an argument? It It doesn't matter,
13:10right? Uh the other um
13:13popular argument, "You're a man and you
13:14can't get pregnant." Uh that's
13:17completely irrelevant to the question of
13:19whether the unborn human being is one of
13:22us.
13:23Uh as you know, my first name is
13:25Francis, and when I was a little kid, it
13:27was sometimes I was sometimes told that
13:30I had a girl's name. And
13:33actually several decades after that,
13:35after I published my first book on
13:37abortion, I was on a radio program
13:40where I was pitted against
13:42somebody from the National Organization
13:44for Women who began her comments
13:48by saying that this is very claim, she
13:51says, you're a man.
13:53You can't get pregnant. Therefore, you
13:55shouldn't talk about abortion, and I
13:56immediately responded because she didn't
13:59she didn't have any
14:01video um
14:03uh video of me or any
14:05awareness of my appearance.
14:07I asked her whether how she knew that I
14:09was a man.
14:10I said, after all, my name is Francis
14:12and my spouse's name is Frankie. Which
14:15is which is true, and uh
14:17she was
14:19uh
14:19perplexed by this. She said, well,
14:21you're a man. You You have a You have a
14:23deep voice. And I I said, well, so does
14:25Brenda Vaccaro. Uh
14:27Yeah,
14:28and then I asked her, look, if you were
14:30at a bookstore and you picked my book up
14:32and you wanted to assess its quality,
14:35whether the arguments worked, what would
14:37be the first thing that you would do?
14:38You You You would ask is
14:40what's the gender of the author? No, you
14:42would ask are the arguments good, which
14:44is the right thing to do. And I would do
14:47that for you as well. I wouldn't dismiss
14:48your views simply because of your gender
14:51or your race or anything of that sort.
14:53It's the quality of the case you make.
14:55And and what she was doing is she
14:59she was trying in some way to sort of
15:01dodge
15:03dodge the issue. She was trying to move
15:05away from the central question, what is
15:08the nature of the unborn, which I
15:11believe is doing all the work in the
15:12abortion debate.
15:15Third argument, again
15:17real quick, if abortion becomes illegal,
15:20only rich women will be able to get
15:22abortions. Again, this begs the
15:23question. If the
15:26unborn
15:27uh
15:28human being is in fact a member of the
15:31moral community, it's fully one of us,
15:35then it would be odd to say that because
15:37rich people can acquire
15:41the means by which to
15:43kill those members of the human
15:45community, whereas poor people can't,
15:47therefore poor people should be given
15:50the same right or the same opportunity.
15:53It's an odd thing to say that uh the the
15:57vices of the rich become virtues because
15:59the poor don't have them. Now, the
16:02question is whether the unborn human
16:04being is one of us. If it is one of us,
16:06then the argument is
16:09doesn't make any sense. Um it's it's
16:12irrelevant. Um
16:14or it's beside the point.
16:16Uh
16:17but if it isn't one of us, you don't
16:19really need the argument, right? Just
16:21simply make the case the unborn human
16:23being is not one of us, therefore it is
16:25perfectly permissible uh to kill it
16:27without justification. And finally, uh
16:30no one knows when life begins. Um that
16:34thinking actually finds its way uh in
16:37the uh majority opinion of Roe v. Wade.
16:40And there uh Justice Blackmun says,
16:43"When those who are experts in
16:46uh medicine and philosophy and theology
16:48can't agree on when life begins, the
16:50court at this point in the development
16:52of man's knowledge should not
16:54speculate." I It's my sort of my
16:56paraphrase of what he says said in that
16:58opinion. Uh but it Ordinarily, when
17:00people say this, they they think it's
17:03really a kind of mystery about what we
17:05know about embryology. And we know an
17:07awful lot about embryology. We know in
17:09fact um
17:11hu- when human life begins and uh
17:14we know about its development and the
17:17sorts of attributes that
17:21come into being as the unborn human
17:24being matures.
17:26So the question of when life begins
17:29is not really in dispute. What's in
17:31dispute is when does human life acquire
17:35moral status?
17:37But setting aside that that question,
17:39the question we'll be dealing with when
17:41we go over the philosophers in a moment.
17:45This
17:46if you think about it, the idea that it
17:48is permissible to act when you don't
17:51know
17:53whether
17:54the thing that you are destroying has
17:58moral status
17:59is negligence. I mean imagine for
18:01example,
18:02you know, you're you're hunting. I'm not
18:05a hunter, but
18:06I'm sure some of you are. Supposing
18:09you're out hunting and there's a
18:10rustling in the bush out in the wherever
18:14you're hunting,
18:16the wilderness somewhere, and you think
18:18it's
18:19an one of the animal the types of
18:22animals that that that you're out there
18:24um
18:26trying to uh
18:28to shoot and
18:31you shoot and it turns out to be one of
18:32your hunting
18:33buddies and he's injured and imagine
18:37you defended it later on by saying,
18:39"Well, I didn't know whether it was
18:41him." Right? You That would be a a crazy
18:43defense, right? It would mean that you
18:45acted with in a way that was outrageous,
18:49right? So the idea that not knowing when
18:52life begins could be a justification for
18:54abortion
18:55seems seems rather silly.
18:59All right, those are the the sort of
19:00popular arguments. I want to move now on
19:03to the philosophers. How do the
19:05philosophers argue uh
19:08for abortion rights? And
19:11oh, excuse me, I hit the wrong button.
19:14There are two philosophical approaches
19:17to abortion rights. One approach
19:20is
19:21I put them in the general category
19:23bodily rights theories.
19:25And the folks that make these arguments
19:27argue that abortions permissibility is
19:30based on the pregnant woman's bodily
19:32rights even if
19:34the unborn is a person.
19:36They maintain that consent to sex does
19:38not entail consent to pregnancy, a
19:41condition that requires that the woman's
19:43body provide the unborn with shelter and
19:45sustenance. So, this first type of
19:48argument
19:50basically makes the case
19:53that
19:54personhood or claims that personhood is
19:58irrelevant. That is, they're willing to
20:00say, "Look,
20:01um
20:02I agree with pro-lifers. I concede to
20:04you that the unborn human being is in
20:06fact a member of the moral community and
20:08has moral status, but abortion is still
20:10permitted."
20:12The second type of argument is a is
20:14sometimes called or the second category
20:16is sometimes referred to as decisive
20:19moment theories.
20:21And there the person is arguing that
20:24abortions permissibility depends on the
20:26nature of the unborn.
20:29If and only if the unborn is a person,
20:31then abortion is almost always
20:33unjustified. Therefore, there is however
20:35a disagreement as to when the unborn
20:38becomes a person.
20:40So, there there are two general types of
20:42arguments that philosophers use. The
20:43first concedes for the sake of argument
20:47that pro-lifers are correct about the
20:49unborn's personhood, and the second
20:50category of argument says, "Look, we
20:54agree with pro-lifers that the unborn
20:56human being is in fact a human being,
20:59but it is not developed to a point at
21:02which it is entitled to moral status."
21:05And And I want to do now is to go over
21:08an example of each type of argument and
21:10how one may respond to that type of
21:13argument.
21:14So, first uh example
21:17uh or the first type of argument or
21:19first example of a bodily rights
21:21argument is the one offered by Judith
21:23Jarvis Thomson
21:25in an article called The Defense of
21:27Abortion, which was published in 1971 in
21:30a journal called Philosophy and Public
21:32Affairs.
21:33And
21:34it is probably the most republished
21:37article in philosophy. Uh not because
21:41most philosophers agree with Thomson's
21:43argument, actually many don't, even
21:44pro-choice philosophers, but because the
21:47argument she gives is so
21:50uh novel and in some ways so outrageous
21:54that it really gets your attention, and
21:56it should get your attention, and it's
21:58something that pro-lifers should be
22:00prepared to defend.
22:03The core of her argument uh is actually
22:05a series of illustrations she uses
22:08outside of the context of abortion to
22:10show that
22:12even if an individual is a human person,
22:15you may be entitled to act in a way that
22:17results in its death.
22:19Uh some of these illustrations include
22:22um
22:24uh
22:25you're living in a um you're in a small
22:28house and there's this child that's
22:31growing that if you don't shoot it and
22:33kill it, it will crush you. Uh another
22:36illustration is
22:37uh you live in a world in which there
22:40are these things called people seeds
22:42that may uh find their way through your
22:45window and embed themselves in your
22:47upholstery
22:49uh or um carpet, and uh they
22:55develop into people pods, and if you
22:58don't do something to make sure they
23:01don't enter your home, you'd be stuck
23:03with all these,
23:05you know, human beings that you're going
23:06to have to take care of. Uh it's okay,
23:09she says, to
23:11uh destroy the
23:12the people seeds, right? And these are
23:14all attempts to try to show that uh that
23:18uh people are entitled to protect
23:21themselves from the intrusion of others,
23:24even if that may result in the death of
23:27that other person. So, again, she's
23:29conceding for the sake of argument the
23:31pro-life view of the human being.
23:35Now, the most famous illustration she
23:37uses is the argument from the
23:40unconscious violinist. So, I'm going to
23:43uh read you from her article this
23:46illustration. She says, "You wake up in
23:48the morning and find yourself
23:50back-to-back, excuse me, you wake up in
23:52the morning and find yourself
23:54back-to-back in bed with an unconscious
23:57violinist.
23:58A famous unconscious violinist. He has
24:01been found to have a fatal kidney
24:02ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers
24:04has canvassed all the available medical
24:07records and found that you alone have
24:09the right blood type to help.
24:11They have therefore kidnapped you,
24:14and last night the violinist's
24:16circulatory system was plugged into
24:18yours, so that your kidneys can be used
24:21to extract poisons from his blood as
24:24well as your own.
24:25The director of the hospital now tells
24:27you, "Look, we're sorry the Society of
24:29Music Lovers did this to you. We would
24:32never have permitted it if we had known,
24:33but still they did it. And the violinist
24:35now is plugged into you. To unplug you
24:38would be to kill him. But never mind,
24:41it's only for 9 months.
24:43By then he will have recovered from his
24:45ailment and can safely be unplugged from
24:47you.
24:48Is it morally incumbent on you to accede
24:50to this situation? No doubt it would be
24:52very nice of you if you did, a great
24:54kindness.
24:55But do you have to accede to it? What if
24:57it were not 9 months, but 9 years or
25:00still longer? What if the director of
25:02the hospital says, "Tough luck. I agree,
25:05but you've now got to stay in bed with
25:07the violinist plugged into you for the
25:09rest of your life."
25:11Because remember this, all persons have
25:13a right to life and violinists are
25:15persons. Granted, you have a right to
25:17decide what happens in and to your body,
25:19but a person's right to life outweighs
25:21your right to decide what happens in and
25:23to your body. So, you cannot ever
25:27be unplugged from him. I imagine that
25:29you would regard this
25:31as outrageous.
25:34So, that's the story.
25:38Now, to give you a kind of um
25:41vision of what she means,
25:44um
25:44you look on
25:46I think it's on on your left, uh you see
25:49the
25:50unborn human being and the mother,
25:53person with rights, person with rights,
25:54and then there's
25:56uh
25:57uh
25:58un uh the that's you on the on the
26:01right, uh or me or whomever you want it
26:03to be,
26:04and on the left is the famous
26:08unconscious violinist. And so, what she
26:11says is, "Look,
26:13as just as you can unplug yourself from
26:16the violinist without violating the
26:19moral rights of the violinist, even
26:21though the violinist is in fact a
26:22person,
26:24the pregnant woman can unplug, if you
26:27will, the unborn child
26:29um
26:30from her, even though the unborn child,
26:34for the sake of argument, is in fact,
26:36as she puts it or as as we put it, uh a
26:40full-fledged member of the human
26:42community.
26:44So, how do we respond to this argument?
26:48Well, uh there are different there are
26:50different ways that we can uh we can
26:52respond to the argument. I'll give you
26:53kind of three general or four general
26:55responses.
26:57Uh
26:59One response is the what I call the
27:03deadbeat dad objection. That is um
27:08uh
27:10the
27:11uh
27:12If you think about our laws on
27:16um
27:17uh parental obligation. So, imagine
27:20for example, there is a couple
27:23they engage in intimate relations, the
27:26woman gets pregnant, and supposing
27:28when they engaged in intimate relations,
27:30they used all sorts of birth control
27:33because they had no intention of having
27:34the child. So, thus both the
27:39male and the female
27:41we know that they have not consented,
27:43right? Uh but imagine the woman gets
27:45pregnant anyways.
27:47And
27:49uh she decides
27:51to have the child. She has a change of
27:53heart, and she goes to the uh
27:56the gentleman who has sired the child
27:58and says, "Look, I'm decided to have the
28:01child." And he says, "Look, I didn't
28:02intend to do this. I
28:04I used contraception. I was
28:09I did everything right.
28:11Uh and yet
28:12you're going to have the child, and
28:14you're going to saddle me with
28:16uh child support."
28:18And supposing he's a mechanic, and he uh
28:23uh
28:24let's say, you know, engages in because
28:26he's a mechanic,
28:27uh physical labor, right? So, you're
28:29you're talking about 18 years of let's
28:33say 20% of his physical labor being
28:36removed from him or the the uh financial
28:39remuneration
28:40removed from him in order to take care
28:42of this child to which he did not
28:44consent. And so,
28:46if Thompson is right about the
28:49obligation that parents have to their
28:51children, that there has to be explicit
28:54consent,
28:55what would follow from that is that we
28:57should, as a matter of law, not
29:01force deadbeat dads to provide child
29:04support. And I think that's
29:06counterintuitive and most people, in
29:08fact most of my students, that's just
29:09enough for them to reject this argument.
29:13The second kind of response,
29:16uh,
29:17is is a little bit detached from the
29:19question of pregnancy, but it has to do
29:21with
29:22the obligations
29:23that
29:25we have as human beings to which we
29:28don't consent that seem to be
29:30fundamental to who we are and how we
29:34ought to act in relation to those that
29:36are closest to us.
29:38So,
29:39as a matter of illustration, think about
29:42let's say you're see let's say you see
29:44me walking across the campus at Notre
29:47Dame. And by the way, I can't wait to
29:49get back to walking across the campus at
29:51Notre Dame.
29:52Uh, imagine you see me walking across
29:54the campus at Notre Dame and you and you
29:56see two elderly homeless people asking
30:00me
30:01for change.
30:03And I decline and let's say you turn to
30:06your friend and you say, "You know, look
30:07at Beckwith's a real cheapskate. He
30:09didn't give the homeless people money."
30:11And then somebody else, let's say your
30:12friend says, "Well, maybe he gave more
30:15yesterday or he gave some earlier today.
30:18Uh,
30:19you shouldn't judge him." Oh, okay.
30:21Yeah, that's a good point. But supposing
30:23the third person walks up and says, "Oh,
30:24you don't understand. Those are
30:26Beckwith's parents."
30:28At that point, you would probably think,
30:31"Well, that guy's a real bastard,
30:33right?"
30:34I mean, you would say, "Wow, how can he
30:36do that to his own parents?"
30:39And supposing I overheard you and I
30:42said, "Well, I didn't ask to be born or
30:44I didn't consent for them to bring me
30:45up." Or you would think that that's just
30:48a crazy way to think about
30:51obligations
30:53that seem to be fundamental to who we
30:56are as human beings. And to reduce every
30:59obligation to consent to some sort of
31:01contractual relationship,
31:03I mean, it seems to be almost inhumane.
31:06And I think at the end of the day what
31:07Thompson is suggesting is a kind of
31:11contractual way of thinking about
31:12obligations. And that just seems to most
31:15people
31:16to be
31:17not an adequate account of how we should
31:20interact with those that we have a
31:22special relationship to. And
31:24I have a special relationship
31:27or I had, my parents have both passed
31:28away, but I had a special relationship
31:30to them that I did don't have to other
31:33elderly people in my community.
31:35The third objection
31:37is what some of us call the
31:40responsibility objection. And basically
31:42that objection goes like this, that we
31:44have a responsibility
31:46for those that we put
31:48in
31:50places of danger or peril.
31:53So, there's a idea in tort law
31:57or a tort called
31:59attractive nuisance. So, what's an
32:00attractive nuisance? So, imagine
32:03I have
32:06a pool in my backyard. I don't, but
32:07imagine I did and I decided not to put a
32:10fence around it
32:11because I, you know, don't believe in
32:13fences. I'm anti-fence and and I, you
32:18know, have all sorts of moral objections
32:19about putting a fence up. And lo and
32:22behold, some 4-year-old child wanders
32:25into my backyard and falls into the pool
32:28and drowns.
32:29Under
32:31tort law,
32:32what I did by not putting up a fence and
32:35by building a pool,
32:37I created an attractive nuisance. I
32:39created something that attracted
32:41somebody that doesn't have the full
32:45competence to be able to make a
32:48judgement about what in fact is harmful
32:51to them. And I think you can analogize
32:54from that when it comes to pregnancy
32:57that the
32:58man and woman who engage in intimate
33:00contact know in fact
33:03the intrinsic purpose of their
33:07uh reproductive powers that they could
33:10very well bring into being
33:12a def- a defenseless, vulnerable
33:16human person whose natural environment
33:19is the womb.
33:21Uh
33:23and in in that case, they have a special
33:25responsibility
33:27that arises from the both the nature of
33:29the act, the nature of the being,
33:32and the peril in which they place it as
33:36a consequence of their activity. And the
33:39fourth objection is what I call the
33:41disproportionate remedy objection. So,
33:44what would what I mean by
33:45disproportionate remedy? Well, it means
33:47that the um
33:49the way in which you want to resolve a
33:51dispute is far beyond what is necessary
33:56to relieve the person that has been
33:57harmed from the burden. So, uh in this
34:00case, let's assume for the sake of
34:02argument that Thompson
34:04uh is correct that um
34:07that this is a burden that a woman has a
34:10right to eliminate.
34:13But, what's the remedy? The remedy is to
34:16kill or to engage in an act that not
34:20just merely removes the unborn child
34:22from the womb, but actually
34:24destroys it by means that are gruesome.
34:29And so,
34:31if it would be as if I found myself
34:33Imagine I found myself um
34:36let's say in the middle of the ocean
34:38with somebody on a on a small boat and
34:40we realize uh that uh there's only
34:43enough food uh for uh one of us to
34:47survive. Um
34:49and supposing I discovered that I was
34:51unjustly put there.
34:53You know, I was kidnapped and put there.
34:55It It It wouldn't follow from that
34:58that
34:59uh that therefore I am entitled to all
35:02the food, right? And that this person
35:04would die as a consequence, right? Uh uh
35:08it may very well be that in some
35:09instances
35:11uh doing the right thing means that one
35:14ought to take on a burden because the
35:16the remedy
35:18is so draconian and so unjust to the
35:21other individual
35:23that is it is simply not justified.
35:27Uh there's actually a famous uh case uh
35:30I think it was a um might have been a
35:31federal district court case uh that uh
35:33the late John Noonan talks about um
35:37in uh one of his essays on on abortion.
35:41He uh talks about this case in which
35:43there a family or a couple invites a
35:46friend over uh and while he's there uh a
35:50great snowstorm or blizzard occurs and
35:53they said after dinner and after he had
35:56talked to them late into the evening he
35:57said they said, "Well, you know, it's
35:58time to go." And he said, "Well, I I I
36:00can't go out in the blizzard. I The only
36:03means of transportation I have is is to
36:05walk home and I and I could I could
36:07die." Well, it turns out they forced him
36:09out of the home and uh he actually wound
36:13up getting frostbite and I believe lost
36:16some of his fingers and toes and it
36:19turns out he wound up suing them and and
36:22and and he won in court. So, uh Noonan
36:25uses that as an illustration that
36:27sometimes,
36:28given the circumstances in which one
36:31finds oneself, that is if one acts in a
36:33way to invite one into a position of
36:36vulnerability or a position in which if
36:38they are
36:40um ejected, they will be vulnerable,
36:42that one is in fact one in fact has an
36:44obligation not to eject that individual.
36:48So, that's Thomson's argument. So, let's
36:51move on to
36:52the decisive moment arguments. And here
36:56I want to focus on an argument offered
36:58by the late Mary Anne Warren.
37:01She published an article in 1973 in a
37:03journal called The Monist. It's actually
37:05a very prestigious
37:07uh philosophy journal, one just as
37:09prestigious as uh the other one that we
37:13looked at, that Thomson published her
37:15article, Philosophy and Public Affairs.
37:18Uh, so these both these articles had uh
37:20a large influence in the academic world.
37:23Warren's article's called On the Moral
37:25and Legal Status of Abortion Rights.
37:28And she takes the position that
37:31pro-lifers are correct.
37:33Unborn
37:35fetuses,
37:36embryos,
37:37zygotes,
37:39are in fact
37:41human beings. But they lack moral
37:44status, they are not persons. So, she
37:46makes a distinction between
37:49being
37:50a human being in the genetic sense
37:54and being human in the moral sense. And
37:58in the moral sense, she uses a
37:59shorthand, the term person.
38:02So, Warren maintains not all human
38:05beings are persons. Now, how does she
38:08argue for this view?
38:10Well, let's define what she means by a
38:13human in the genetic sense and
38:16more uh with greater detail what she
38:18means by human in the moral sense.
38:21Well, she means by human in the genetic
38:23sense
38:25a human being
38:26is just a member of the species Homo
38:29sapiens.
38:30Whether a being is a member of a given
38:31species can be determined scientifically
38:34by an examination of the chromosomes in
38:36the cells of living organisms. A fetus
38:39conceived by human parents
38:40is certainly a human being.
38:43So, she agrees with pro-lifers in that
38:45regard.
38:46On the other hand
38:48she wants to say that the fetus is not a
38:50human being in in the moral sense. So,
38:52what does she mean by in the moral
38:54sense?
38:55A being is called a person
38:58or a a called a person such a human
39:00being
39:02is a conscious and rational being, a
39:04moral agent who possesses some traits or
39:07qualities like consciousness, reasoning,
39:09self-awareness, self-control, capacity
39:12to communicate, etc. All of us are
39:15persons
39:17moral agents and holders of rights, but
39:19fetuses, embryos
39:21babies. That's right, you heard babies.
39:23She actually believes that newborns are
39:25not human persons or not persons, though
39:28human beings, and the extremely senile
39:31or brain-damaged are not.
39:34Now
39:36um to make her point she says, you know,
39:39there could be non-human persons. And
39:41here I have up on the PowerPoint some
39:43non-human persons from fiction uh
39:46Worf from Star Trek, Thor from Marvel
39:49Comics, E.T. and the alien from Alien,
39:53and they are all
39:55rational agents, they're conscious, they
39:57can communicate and yet they're not
40:00human beings. And so she argues, look,
40:03um
40:04we know that there could be human there
40:07could be persons that are not human
40:08beings, why can't there be
40:10uh human beings that are not persons?
40:13And she says, the reason why we believe
40:15people like Thor and um
40:18ET and Worf and the alien are
40:23are persons is because we have criteria
40:25and she
40:26suggests the criteria that I alluded to
40:30uh a few moments ago and I'll just go
40:33through them uh briefly again.
40:35Consciousness,
40:37the capacity to feel pain and enjoy
40:38happiness, reasoning, the capacity to
40:41solve
40:42new and relatively complex problems, mo-
40:45self-motivated activity, relatively
40:47independent activity, capacity to
40:49communicate by whatever means, messages
40:51of an indefinitely variety indefinite
40:54variety of types, and the presence of
40:57self-awareness.
40:59Now, some pro-lifers may say, "Well,
41:04what about the fact that the fetus is a
41:07has the potential, right? It has
41:09the potential to have consciousness and
41:11reasoning and self-motivated activity,
41:13capacity to communicate, and in the
41:15presence of self-awareness."
41:17Well, she she thinks that um
41:21she thinks that
41:24a potential person is no more an actual
41:27person than your somatic cells are
41:29actual persons, even though each of
41:31those is theoretically a potential
41:33person.
41:34And to make this point she gives us a a
41:36kind of science fiction example
41:39and I'm going to read to you from her
41:42article in which she uh articulates this
41:45illustration. She says,
41:47"Suppose that our that there's a space
41:49explorer and he falls into the hands of
41:51an alien culture whose scientists decide
41:53to create a few hundred thousand or more
41:57human beings by breaking his body into
41:58component cells and using these to
42:01create fully developed human beings with
42:03of course his genetic code. We may
42:06imagine that each of these newly created
42:08men will have all of the original man's
42:09abilities, skills, knowledge, and so on.
42:12And also have an individual
42:14self-concept.
42:15In short, that each of them will be a
42:17bonafide, though hardly unique, person.
42:20Imagine that the whole project will take
42:22only seconds, and its chances of success
42:25are extremely high, and that our
42:26explorer knows all of this, and also
42:28knows that these people will be treated
42:30fairly.
42:31I maintain that in such a situation, he
42:34would be he would have every right to
42:36escape if he could, and thus to deprive
42:38all of these potential people of their
42:40potential lives. For his right to life
42:42outweighs all of theirs together, in
42:44spite of the fact that they are all
42:46genetically human, all innocent, all
42:48have a high
42:49very high probability of becoming people
42:51very soon, if only he refrains from
42:53acting.
42:55So, that's her response to the the the
42:57potential
42:59uh reply on the part of those that may
43:02oppose abortion. Now, in a few minutes,
43:04I'm going to give you a response to this
43:07understanding of potential. I think
43:09Warren does not understand what
43:12potential actually means when we're
43:13talking about um
43:16living organisms. So, for example, uh
43:20supposing I have an oak tree in my
43:21backyard, if I chop it down,
43:25I can make a desk out of it. So, there's
43:26a sense in which my
43:28oak tree is a potential desk. But, it's
43:31not a potential desk in the same way in
43:33which the acorn and the sapling are
43:36potential oak trees. They're actually
43:38the same sort of thing, and this is why
43:40I think her illustration fails. The
43:41somatic cells in your body are not
43:44intrinsically ordered to mature in a way
43:47to acquire characteristics that are
43:50perfections of its nature. It's not the
43:52nature of a somatic cell to develop
43:55these characteristics, to have
43:56consciousness, rationality, and so
43:57forth. But, it is
44:00the nature of the unborn human being to
44:03do that. And I'm going to give you a few
44:06examples in order to
44:08uh solidify that point. So let's
44:10critique then
44:13Warren's argument. So
44:16first um
44:18critique is first part of the critique
44:21is that the personhood arguments like
44:23Warren's cannot account for clear-cut
44:25cases. So for example, when you're
44:27sleeping, comatose, or unconscious
44:29in those states you're not exhibiting
44:31any of the characteristics the attribute
44:33she attributes to personhood, right? Um
44:36if you go into surgery and you're given
44:38general anesthesia
44:41uh
44:42you can you can do nothing you're in the
44:45you're in the same position uh as uh a
44:49very early embryo, right? You you just
44:51simply are not going to respond, right?
44:53To any kind of
44:55stimulation and neither are you going to
44:58uh engage in those activities that we
45:01attribute
45:02to fully healthy, mature
45:05human persons. Now, someone like Warren
45:07can respond, well, these humans had a
45:08past whereas fetuses don't. That is
45:12somebody who's comatose or sleeping
45:16you know
45:16they had
45:18you know
45:19you know who they were, right? They
45:20could be
45:22as it in the next illustration I'm going
45:24to go over they could be your Uncle Jed,
45:26right?
45:27And you know Uncle Jed whereas a fetus
45:29had no past. I don't think by the way
45:32that that that that that that response
45:34works and in order to show you why that
45:36doesn't work, I'm going to give you uh
45:39uh three Uncle Jed stories. So supposing
45:42you have an Uncle Jed like in the
45:43Beverly Hillbillies, one of my favorite
45:45shows as a kid while growing up, one of
45:47the most underrated sitcoms by the way
45:49ever.
45:51Uncle Jed supposing he's driving with
45:54Ellie Mae, Jethro, and Granny and they
45:56get in a car accident uh the other three
45:59are fine but Uncle Jed
46:02is injured badly. He goes into a coma
46:04and while he's in the coma,
46:08the doctor tells you, "Look, Uncle Jed's
46:09going to come out of it, but he's going
46:11to lose some abilities and some
46:13memories."
46:15Is Uncle Jed a person while in the coma?
46:19Well, I mean, you'd say, "Yeah, sure."
46:21You know, we want Uncle Jed to come out
46:23of it, right? Even though he may not
46:25have retained or he may may not be able
46:28to recall all his memories and he may
46:30lose some abilities, but he is after all
46:32Uncle Jed.
46:34Now though, supposing Uncle Jed, same
46:36scenario, goes into a coma
46:39and will come out of it
46:41having lost all his abilities and
46:44memories and set etc. And you know this
46:46while he's in the coma.
46:48So, in this scenario, in Uncle Jed two
46:52Uncle Uncle Jed story two
46:55while in the coma, he's in the same
46:57exact position of the standard fetus.
47:00That is
47:01you know he's going to come out of it
47:04and yet the doctor says, "Look
47:06it may take a couple of years, but he
47:08could get it all back."
47:10Right?
47:11In fact,
47:13he'll be in the coma for 9 months and
47:16you may have to hire someone to help
47:19rehabilitate him, but that's fine. You
47:20guys have a a lot of money. You struck
47:23gold or Texas tea black gold as they
47:26call it as the opening song says. And
47:30so, is it okay to kill Uncle Jed in the
47:32second scenario?
47:34It seems to me no, it isn't okay and yet
47:37he's in the same position as the
47:39standard fetus.
47:41Now, imagine a third Uncle Jed story.
47:43Let's compare him to Uncle
47:46Herb. Uncle Herb, let's say, is in
47:50exact same position as Uncle Jed except
47:52for and they both would say were injured
47:54in the same accident. They're side by
47:57side in the same hospital room,
48:00and you're told Uncle Herb is going to
48:02come out um
48:05uh
48:06uh uh of the coma just like Uncle Jed on
48:09the exact same day, but Uncle Herb's
48:11going to have
48:13uh
48:13everything
48:15in his life that had been in his life
48:18that Uncle Jed is going to come out
48:20having lost. But Uncle Jed's going to
48:22could have
48:23possibly, with the right rehabilitation,
48:25regain it all, but Uncle Herb won't have
48:28to go into rehabilitation. He's just
48:29going to get it
48:31back all at once. I mean, it seems to me
48:33to to to say that it's morally okay to
48:35kill Uncle Jed,
48:37but not Uncle Herb
48:39Uncle Herb based on such thin gruel
48:43seems to be a mistaken way to think
48:46about the sanctity
48:47uh
48:49of moral life and the status of both
48:50Uncle Jed and Uncle Herb.
48:54Now, let me go over some other problems
48:55with
48:56um
48:58with these personhood arguments. And
49:00here I want to uh give you uh
49:03uh give you two kinds of uh criticisms.
49:07One is, again, I mean, philosophers are
49:09are I mean, we do this a lot, and I
49:11apologize if you're tired of the
49:12fictional science fiction stories, uh
49:15but uh they really help, I think, to
49:18sort of illustrate or to draw out those
49:20principles that are contested. So, I'm
49:23going to give you my fictional case, and
49:26the purpose of the fictional story is to
49:29show you uh
49:32uh why the Mary Ann Warren type argument
49:36or the personhood type argument cannot
49:39account for the wrongness of creating
49:41brainless children and why potential
49:44matters. And so, it this comes from an
49:47article I have coming out almost any day
49:50now in the Journal of Medicine and
49:52Philosophy, Uh I've used similar
49:54illustrations in some of my other
49:56writings, but the one I'm going to
49:57present to you
49:59this evening is is going to appear in
50:02this article in the Journal of Medicine
50:04and Philosophy, which I I co-authored
50:06with one of my former students, Alison
50:08Thort.
50:09It goes like this. Dr. X is a By the
50:13way, his name is Eugene X, like
50:15eugenics. So, doc So, Dr. Eugene X
50:19is a mad scientist who has opened up a
50:21research facility. We'll call it X
50:23Laboratories.
50:25For the purposes of creating cloned
50:27embryos that will be harvested so that
50:29children and adults in need of
50:30transplants may use the embryos' organs
50:33for spare parts after the embryos have
50:35matured.
50:36Very early in the embryo's development,
50:38Dr. X orders his minions to block the
50:41embryo's neural tubes, as in the in the
50:44unintentional case of an anencephalic
50:46child, so that their higher brain
50:48functions never arise. Thanks to
50:50advanced technology, the embryos
50:52continue to develop into fetuses and are
50:54then transplanted or transported to
50:57suspended animation tanks in which they
50:59may become infants, children, or mature
51:01adults with all their organs intact,
51:03higher brain functions accepted.
51:06On the pro-life view, the embryos were
51:08wronged when Dr. X
51:10his minions blocked their neural tubes
51:12early in their development, long before
51:14they could exhibit any of the
51:15characteristics that Warren
51:18and others claim
51:19impart personhood to them.
51:21Now, imagine that a group of anti-X
51:24radicals breaks into the laboratory.
51:27Excuse me, laboratory. It sounds more
51:29sinister.
51:31Breaks into the laboratory or laboratory
51:33and make off with
51:35make makes off with some of the embryos.
51:38The radicals take the embryos to another
51:41laboratory. There, several scientist
51:44allies inject a substance into the
51:46embryos that can reverse the effects of
51:47neural tube blockage.
51:49The treatment accomplishes its end and
51:51embry- and the embryos are then
51:53implanted in the natural wombs of
51:56several female volunteers who
51:57subsequently adopt the children after
51:59they are born. If one believes
52:02that the taking and the healing of the
52:04damaged embryos was an act of justice,
52:07then one harbors intuitions consistent
52:10with the pro-life view.
52:11That to intentionally disrupt the
52:13perfections to which a rational animal
52:14is ordered is in fact a harm.
52:17But if that is the case, then elective
52:19abortion is prima facie immoral.
52:22So, the purpose of this illustration is
52:24to show that
52:26what makes the difference here
52:28is the nature of
52:31the unborn child. That's what makes it
52:33wrong
52:34to create brainless children. And under
52:36Warren's account,
52:37it doesn't seem possible to make that
52:40kind of judgment.
52:41Now, the other problem with Warren's
52:42account is they cannot it cannot
52:45it cannot
52:46uh account for human equality.
52:49Now, what what do I mean by that? Well,
52:51the powers that Warren and others
52:54attribute to personhood such as
52:56rationality, ability to communicate,
52:59have a self-concept and so forth are
53:01found along a continuum in all human
53:04beings.
53:06If that's the case, then there is no
53:08basis for human equality. No longer can
53:10we appeal to the shared nature that we
53:13have, the one thing that sort of
53:16equalizes all of us despite the fact
53:18that we all have differing degrees of
53:20abilities and talents
53:22and so forth.
53:23But if you say what makes you a valuable
53:27being with moral status are those
53:29abilities, then why not say that
53:32people who are more intelligent should
53:33have more rights or people that, let's
53:35say, are less talented or people that
53:38are suffering from particular
53:40disabilities should have fewer rights
53:43than those that say uh have higher brain
53:45functions or or let's say are more
53:49mobile or more mobile let's say those
53:51that are disabled based on immobility,
53:54right? So, once we start
53:57making distinctions between human beings
54:00based on these characteristics that
54:03Warren and others single out as being
54:05decisive for moral status, then there's
54:07really
54:09no basis for equality. Now,
54:12even people that
54:14support the pro-choice position or those
54:17that are support abortion choice as I
54:19call it in my book uh defending life,
54:23admit that this is a problem. Uh 12
54:26years ago in the Journal of Ethics, um
54:29Jeff McMahon, a very uh
54:33renowned philosopher who's written uh
54:35many books and articles on the issues
54:37concerning life and death, said this in
54:40an article that appeared in the Journal
54:42of Ethics.
54:44In an article entitled Challenge to
54:46Human Equality, he says,
54:48"All this leaves me profoundly
54:50uncomfortable.
54:52It seems virtually unthinkable to
54:54abandon our egalitarian commitments or
54:57even to accept that they might be
54:58justified only in some indirect way. For
55:01example, because it is for the best all
55:03things considered to treat all people as
55:05equals and to inculcate the belief that
55:08all are indeed
55:10one another's moral equals even though
55:12in reality they are not. It is hard to
55:14avoid the sense that our egalitarian
55:17commitments rest on distressingly
55:21insecure
55:22foundations."
55:24Unquote. So, what McMahon is is
55:26admitting here is that that his view,
55:28the view that he uh
55:31actually assesses and wrestles with
55:35in this article, uh
55:38seems to be inconsistent with the
55:41intuitions that virtually we all have
55:43about human equality. And those are
55:45intuitions by the way that were nurtured
55:47in a culture that was deeply influenced
55:50by religious traditions that claim that
55:54human beings were made in the image of
55:55God. I have no doubt that that played a
55:58large part in even in the secular
56:01understandings
56:02of equality.
56:04So I'm going to say
56:06a few more very brief things about
56:08the personhood arguments. I want to just
56:12very quickly talk about what is
56:14sometimes called the problem of marginal
56:16cases. And and and and here I'm going to
56:20again use two illustrations uh
56:23to show that the pro-life view
56:26best accounts for these the problem of
56:29marginal cases. Well, what's what's the
56:31problem of marginal cases? Well, here
56:33I'm going to quote from uh
56:35uh Tom Beauchamp and James Childress who
56:38published actually over 40 years ago a
56:41book called The Principles of Biomedical
56:42Ethics, which is now in its seventh
56:44edition. It's the most uh widely used a
56:47book in bioethics uh
56:50uh
56:51in in universities and colleges. And
56:53this is what what what what Beauchamp
56:55and Childress say. They note that quote
56:56a worrisome feature of this theory that
56:59is
57:01they're dealing with a theory similar to
57:03Warren's uh
57:05in in the in in their book. A worrisome
57:08feature of this theory is that infants,
57:10the senile elderly, persons with a
57:12severe mental disability, and others who
57:15we generally view as having a secure
57:17moral status lack the cognitive
57:19capacities required to attain moral
57:21status.
57:24Why is this called Why is this
57:26considered a problem? Well, the pro-life
57:30advocate
57:32Well, let me let me just before I I give
57:33you the pro-life advocate's response,
57:36the reason why they think it's a problem
57:38is that
57:40if some of these individuals
57:43lack,
57:44let's say the current abilities had by
57:48non-human animals, let's say you have
57:51somebody that suffers from
57:53uh
57:54senility to such a degree that their
57:58cognitive powers are lower than, let's
58:00say, a high-level um
58:02chimpanzee,
58:04uh
58:05why can't Beauchamp and Childress raise
58:08the question? They don't defend this,
58:09but they just simply raise the question,
58:11well, why can't if we can experiment on
58:12the chimpanzee for medical purposes or
58:15for medical research, why can't we do
58:17that for the person that's suffering
58:19from severe
58:21senility?
58:22Uh
58:23I think the pro-life view
58:25uh
58:26uh does the best job of adequately
58:28accounting for why it would be
58:31impermissible
58:32to do that, to experiment on the human
58:35being. And uh so with regard to marginal
58:39cases, the pro-life advocate argues that
58:42a mentally disabled human being has
58:44greater moral status than a mentally
58:46comparable healthy non-human animal. For
58:49on the pro-life view,
58:51the former's state is a tragic
58:54consequence of illness or accident
58:56impeding her human flourishing, to which
58:58she is still ordered as a rational
59:00animal. Whereas the non-human animal is
59:02exactly as it should be given its
59:05nature. So, to draw this out, I want to
59:07give you two examples. The first is the
59:09case of the Hansburger.
59:12So, let's say you order uh
59:14uh
59:15a hamburger at McDonald's, but instead
59:17you are served a Hansburger made from
59:19the remains of Hans, a patient in a
59:21persistent vegetative state. If in the
59:23PVS, Hans was mentally comparable or
59:26inferior to a standard cow,
59:28why not indulge in a Hans burger?
59:30The pro-life view can provide an answer.
59:32Hans has greater moral status than the
59:34cow, regardless of his mental
59:37capacities, because of the kind of thing
59:39Hans is.
59:42Second example, the case of Sudie and
59:44Susie and Fido.
59:47The case of Susie and Fido. Imagine you
59:50are driving and a negligent father lets
59:52his infant child Susie wander into the
59:54street and the family dog Fido runs
59:56after the child. You are driving too
59:58fast to brake,
1:00:00and thus you have to either go right or
1:00:02left to avoid hitting one or the other.
1:00:03If you go right, you kill Susie. If you
1:00:05go left, you kill Fido. Most everyone
1:00:08would say that you should go left, even
1:00:09if Susie's cognitive life, degree of
1:00:11sentience, and agential capacities are
1:00:14less sophisticated than Fido's. In fact,
1:00:16most everyone would say you should go
1:00:18left, even if
1:00:19Susie's mental capacities were such
1:00:21that, for whatever reason, they would
1:00:23never surpass Fido's. By the way, these
1:00:26two illustrations I
1:00:28developed from examples found in book by
1:00:33uh
1:00:34uh
1:00:35Christopher Kaczor, professor of
1:00:37philosophy at Loyola Marymount.
1:00:40So,
1:00:42let's
1:00:43uh
1:00:44conclude.
1:00:46So, the view that I've been calling the
1:00:48pro-life view throughout this lecture
1:00:52is what philosophers call the substance
1:00:55view of persons, and it is the
1:00:57philosophical basis of the pro-life
1:00:59view. And I'm just going to conclude
1:01:01with five
1:01:03aspects of or five attributes of
1:01:07uh
1:01:08the substance view.
1:01:11Uh
1:01:11According to the substance view, a
1:01:13person is what you are, not what you do.
1:01:18This is why it's wrong to uh
1:01:22uh
1:01:24create brainless children, right? It's
1:01:26It's not It's not that you're disrupting
1:01:30beings that are acting
1:01:33like persons uh in terms of mature
1:01:36abilities, you're interfere interfering
1:01:39with the natural development of a being
1:01:41that is entitled to those powers.
1:01:43Organisms like human beings are complete
1:01:46wholes, not a mere collection of parts
1:01:48like an artifact. That is, when the
1:01:50embryo is developing, it's not like
1:01:52adding parts like you're adding, let's
1:01:55say, slices to create a pizza, right?
1:01:58It's a whole being already that is
1:02:00simply developing itself. Substances
1:02:03have intrinsic potentials given what
1:02:05they are,
1:02:06just like the oak tree, excuse me, the
1:02:09sapling has intrinsic potential to
1:02:11acquire the characteristics of the oak
1:02:13tree, the uh unborn human being has the
1:02:16intrinsic potential to uh become a
1:02:19mature version of itself, to acquire
1:02:21those characteristics
1:02:23uh that are perfection of its nature.
1:02:25Substances undergo change and yet remain
1:02:28identical to themselves. That is,
1:02:30uh when you acquire these
1:02:32characteristics
1:02:34in your de- during your development, you
1:02:35don't become something else, you simply
1:02:36become a mature version of yourself. And
1:02:39finally, it is a perfectionist
1:02:41understanding of human personhood.
1:02:43That is, it sees the maturation of a
1:02:45human being's ultimate capacities as
1:02:48perfections of its nature. This is why,
1:02:51for example,
1:02:52if you see uh uh if you encounter a
1:02:55human being that has lost his sight, you
1:02:58say that the human being is blind and
1:03:00you understand that the human being
1:03:02lacks something that it ought to have.
1:03:04But when you walk past a stone, you
1:03:06don't say, "Oh, the stone is blind."
1:03:09Because it's not the sort of thing that
1:03:11by nature can see.
1:03:14So, before I go uh
1:03:17and uh entertain your questions in
1:03:19person, uh I want to recommend uh
1:03:23three books uh that have been authored
1:03:25by pro-life philosophers who uh defend
1:03:29the substantiality of persons. Uh one of
1:03:32them is authored by me. It's called
1:03:33Defending Life.
1:03:35And the other two are authored by
1:03:37Christopher Kaczor, The Ethics of
1:03:39Abortion. He's uh somebody that I
1:03:42mentioned just a few moments ago. And
1:03:44Patrick Lee, who's a professor of
1:03:45philosophy at Franciscan University. Um
1:03:50And I actually think
1:03:52their two books are better than mine, if
1:03:53I had to if I had if I say if I can say
1:03:55so myself. So, thank you very much and
1:03:58God bless you. And I look forward to
1:03:59interacting with you
1:04:01um over Zoom.
1:04:09Okay. Uh
1:04:12That's That was a great lecture. I now
1:04:14see live and in-person Frank Beckwith,
1:04:16not robot Frank Beckwith that we just
1:04:18watched for the last 65 minutes. It's
1:04:21nice to see you live and in-person,
1:04:22although you look very similar to the
1:04:23way you looked before, similar
1:04:24background, similar outfit. I I tried to
1:04:27make it as authentic as possible. It's
1:04:29You did a great job. Congratulations.
1:04:31Um so, I have some questions for you.
1:04:33We've had a lot of great questions from
1:04:35our audience.
1:04:36Uh and the staff and I and you yourself
1:04:38even looked at these and we culled some
1:04:40and sort of synthesized them in a way to
1:04:42try to capture the sense of multiple
1:04:45questions, right? So, I'm just going to
1:04:47go ahead and launch right into the
1:04:48questions. The first question, which you
1:04:49hear frequently, and again, a lot of
1:04:50these questions you addressed in your
1:04:52remarks, but maybe you could sharpen
1:04:54your uh and and and make a direct uh
1:04:56response to these questions. The first
1:04:58question is, how do we If people We live
1:05:00in a pluralistic society, we live in a
1:05:02country of 300 whatever it is million
1:05:04people. People disagree very strongly
1:05:06about fundamental questions. How can we
1:05:09adopt one theory of personhood, one
1:05:12theory of life, uh and impose it on
1:05:14people that disagree strongly about it.
1:05:17And some people even will will go will
1:05:19say and adopt a theory of life that's
1:05:21religiously based in nature. It's a
1:05:23Catholic vision or something like that.
1:05:25What would you say in response to that
1:05:26argument?
1:05:27Well, Carter, let me uh let me first
1:05:29address the second part of your
1:05:30question, the issue of the religious
1:05:33nature or quality of the pro-life
1:05:35position. To be sure,
1:05:38most advocates of the pro-life view,
1:05:41most people that
1:05:43identify as pro-life typically
1:05:46believe because they have been tutored
1:05:49within a particular faith and their
1:05:51views on abortion are, as I say in in my
1:05:54book, tightly tethered to their
1:05:56theological tradition. Uh but having
1:05:58said that,
1:06:00you you notice that the arguments that I
1:06:02gave in
1:06:04uh in the lecture, and I do so in the
1:06:06book, and this is also true of Chris's
1:06:08book as well as Pat's book, we offer
1:06:11arguments that are philosophical
1:06:12arguments. They clearly are informed by
1:06:15and influenced by our theological
1:06:17commitments,
1:06:18but they but they stand alone. It's very
1:06:21similar to the way in which, let's say,
1:06:22someone may want to argue
1:06:25uh
1:06:26for, let's say, give an argument for
1:06:27God's existence that's philosophical.
1:06:30Uh that doesn't have Many times has
1:06:33nothing to do with the devotional life
1:06:35that one may have or the commitment to
1:06:37belief in God that one has based on
1:06:39faith. So, uh the case that that that
1:06:43I'm making and and virtually all
1:06:44pro-lifers make uh
1:06:46ultimately relies on a um
1:06:49a uh a philosophical way of reasoning.
1:06:53Now,
1:06:54I've got to shut off my other computer,
1:06:55which is making an annoying sound.
1:06:58Pardon me.
1:06:59Uh
1:07:00the other question you raised about
1:07:02pluralism.
1:07:04Now,
1:07:05when somebody raises that question,
1:07:08they're I think assuming that
1:07:11you can actually have a government or a
1:07:13society that can remain neutral on the
1:07:16question of who and what we are. I mean,
1:07:18if you think about it in Roe v. Wade,
1:07:20something you'll be talking about uh I
1:07:22think in a day or two, uh we had there's
1:07:25that famous passage that I mentioned in
1:07:27my lecture from Blackmun where he says,
1:07:29you know, all these people disagree
1:07:30about when life begins, so the court at
1:07:32this point in the uh development of
1:07:34man's knowledge is not in the position
1:07:36to speculate.
1:07:37Well, it turns out though, he winds up
1:07:40saying that abortion is permitted under
1:07:42the law for virtually the entirety of
1:07:46pregnancy. Well, that seems to be
1:07:49claiming that the law in fact
1:07:52is asserting uh who and who is not a
1:07:55member of the human community, and
1:07:57that's hardly neutral.
1:07:59And so, I think at the end of the day,
1:08:01uh
1:08:03even though the claim is that the
1:08:05government ought to remain neutral on
1:08:06these on these moral questions,
1:08:08including abortion, uh it turns out that
1:08:11it has to at some point uh
1:08:15come down on one side or another. I
1:08:17mean, I think
1:08:18it's really interesting how and this is
1:08:21something I been kind of thinking about
1:08:23over the past couple of years. Is it
1:08:25really possible for
1:08:28a society or government to be perfectly
1:08:31neutral on these ultimate questions? And
1:08:33I think, for example, going back to uh a
1:08:36very famous Supreme Court decision,
1:08:38Griswold v. Connecticut, where the
1:08:39Supreme Court said that uh contraception
1:08:43or the purchasing and use of
1:08:44contraception is protected under the uh
1:08:48right to privacy in the Constitution.
1:08:50The court winds up using this argument
1:08:53that says that
1:08:55uh on matters like this, they're you
1:08:57know, they're deeply personal and
1:08:58important to married couples, the state
1:09:00should restrain itself from making these
1:09:03kinds of judgments. That was 1965 and
1:09:05within 50 years we went from this is a
1:09:09private personal thing that people
1:09:12you know should uh
1:09:13you know have the right to make
1:09:14judgments in their private life to the
1:09:16federal government uh through uh the the
1:09:20uh
1:09:22contraceptive mandate out of the
1:09:24Affordable Care Act that
1:09:27privately owned or closely held family
1:09:29businesses have to provide it. So I mean
1:09:32it's interesting how even what begins as
1:09:35a kind of neutrality, it's almost as if
1:09:38politics can't uh
1:09:41that politics abhors a vacuum that
1:09:43ultimately
1:09:44what you're going to see is what
1:09:46generally the government believes is
1:09:47good.
1:09:49Thanks. Uh the next question next two
1:09:51questions I'll ask them together because
1:09:53we want to be respectful of people's
1:09:55time um and they both relate to the same
1:09:58puzzles and difficulties that emerge
1:10:00from the unique uh interweaving of the
1:10:03lives of the mother and unborn child and
1:10:05the unique burdens on the mother and the
1:10:07unique effects on the unborn child of
1:10:09actions taken by the mother. So let's
1:10:11take the first question um and you talk
1:10:13about it in your remarks maybe just a
1:10:15just a recapitulate briefly
1:10:17you know frequently in public policy
1:10:19people try to make arguments according
1:10:21to the hardest cases. And so what we
1:10:23frequently encounter in the public
1:10:24square on the issue of of of abortion is
1:10:26the is the is the rape case, right? This
1:10:28is obviously Judith Jarvis Thomson large
1:10:30framing question. What in an in a in a
1:10:33in a concise way how would you both
1:10:35substantively but also tonally and and
1:10:38kind of humanly respond to a person who
1:10:41says if a woman is raped it's it's it's
1:10:43an unjust burden to require her to go
1:10:46through the pains of pregnancy
1:10:48and and childbirth given the the the
1:10:51terrible violation of of the rape which
1:10:53conceived the child. That's that's one.
1:10:55And then two is again picking up a
1:10:56little bit on your last kind of trolley
1:10:58problem series of questions.
1:11:00What about a genuine vital conflict
1:11:02where the baby
1:11:04is going to the mother is going to die
1:11:06unless you intentionally and directly
1:11:08kill the unborn child
1:11:10and of course if you do that the unborn
1:11:11child is going to die. Can you tell us
1:11:13how to think about those problems and
1:11:15how to argue about them in a humane and
1:11:17loving way in the public square? Yeah, I
1:11:19I think that the rape incest counter to
1:11:23the pro-life position I think is in some
1:11:25ways the most difficult kind of question
1:11:29to get and it's difficult not because as
1:11:31a philosopher I couldn't come up with I
1:11:34think a philosophically sound argument
1:11:36to respond but I do think it comes from
1:11:38a place that all of us at some point in
1:11:41our lives has been at a place in which
1:11:44we've seen people very close to us
1:11:47suffer sometimes
1:11:50in case sometimes obviously involving
1:11:52rape and and we we know of cases of
1:11:56incest
1:11:57whether they've occurred in our own
1:11:59families but we know about them and
1:12:00we've in some cases some of us have
1:12:03counselled people in those situations.
1:12:04So
1:12:06I think when it comes to answering that
1:12:08question I think it's important that the
1:12:10pro-lifer acknowledge the difficulty of
1:12:12it.
1:12:14On the other hand when talking about it
1:12:17let's say in the context of our public
1:12:21life I think it's important to ask the
1:12:24person that raises the question
1:12:27something like this and I've I've used
1:12:29this on a couple of occasions in public
1:12:32debates as well as private conversations
1:12:34with with with folks that have that have
1:12:37brought this up and I ask them if there
1:12:40were no cases of rape or incest would
1:12:42you still be for abortion rights?
1:12:45And you know it's usually I get a a
1:12:48pause and
1:12:50every time the person says yes and then
1:12:52I I say, "Well, then
1:12:55why bring it up? It's not relevant to
1:12:57establishing the correctness of your
1:12:59viewpoint." Now, I'm not suggesting
1:13:01that's the right way to,
1:13:03let's say, respond to somebody who
1:13:06brings it up, let's say, concerning
1:13:08their own child or a friend. That's a
1:13:11That's a different context, one that is,
1:13:13I think, more suited for somebody
1:13:16who has a different skill set than
1:13:19someone like myself who's a philosopher,
1:13:21right? I think so You think there you
1:13:23have to consult individuals that are
1:13:25well-versed in counseling and
1:13:27psychology. But I think as a matter of
1:13:30of sort of public discussion, I think
1:13:32it's important to simply draw the person
1:13:35back to what I think is the real
1:13:39question that's doing the work, who and
1:13:40what are we, and can we know it? And I
1:13:43think the way you do that is you simply
1:13:45raise the
1:13:46the hypothetical. If there were no
1:13:48cases, would you be Would you be for
1:13:49abortion?
1:13:51Yeah, and then finally, the genuine
1:13:53vital conflict, which in which there's a
1:13:55zero-sum conflict between mother and
1:13:57child.
1:13:58That That's a That's That's a Again, a
1:14:00very difficult question. I actually
1:14:01think this question is is more difficult
1:14:05than the first one, at least
1:14:06philosophically. I mean, so I think the
1:14:08first one in terms of just emotions and
1:14:12sensitivity, I think the first one is is
1:14:14more difficult. This one, I think, is
1:14:16more difficult because it involves uh
1:14:20having to make a judgment that if you
1:14:23don't act I mean, supposing you have a
1:14:25case, and today, thank thanks to the
1:14:27advances of medical technology, we have
1:14:29very few cases like this.
1:14:32Uh but it wasn't unusual
1:14:34uh prior to modern medicine to have
1:14:36cases where uh a physician had to uh uh
1:14:42perform what is called I I forget the
1:14:44exact term for it. Uh uh craniot-
1:14:48I think.
1:14:49Craniotomy. And uh I think there are
1:14:52different ways to think about that. Uh
1:14:54one way to think about it and is is to
1:14:59uh it it is is to is to is to point out
1:15:02that uh that one is in fact uh
1:15:08doing the best that one can. That is,
1:15:10given the situation, you can either
1:15:13permit to
1:15:14individuals to die or
1:15:17it this is almost going to sound like
1:15:19sophistry to some people. Uh that all
1:15:22you're doing is trying to reshape the
1:15:23skull, but you are not actually trying
1:15:26to kill the child. Pro-lifers themselves
1:15:29have deep disagreements in how to handle
1:15:31this kind of situation. But, having said
1:15:35that, it's important to remember
1:15:37that
1:15:39this kind of dilemma that one faces in
1:15:42this very narrow, very rare kind of case
1:15:45is something that we face in every other
1:15:48aspect of life. That is, we may have
1:15:51cases where
1:15:53we are not sure exactly what to do. But,
1:15:57it doesn't follow from that therefore it
1:16:00is right to in cases in which that
1:16:02dilemma isn't present to intentionally
1:16:05kill an innocent person
1:16:08uh when another life isn't at stake. So,
1:16:11you brought up um you mentioned very
1:16:13briefly the trolley problem in
1:16:15philosophy. Uh there is this uh problem
1:16:18actually I think it was Philippa Foot
1:16:20who first brought it up. A
1:16:21British philosopher in the mid-20th
1:16:24century. Uh imagine
1:16:26uh there's a trolley moving down a track
1:16:28and there's uh uh
1:16:31there's a lever and you're standing by
1:16:32the lever and you look out and you see
1:16:34the the the there's the track divides if
1:16:37if if the if the if it the trolley
1:16:39continues on in its own and you don't do
1:16:40anything, five people are run over. But
1:16:43if you move the lever, uh it moves to
1:16:45the other track and two people are run
1:16:47over.
1:16:48And it's a sort of thing I bring up in
1:16:50my classes to sort of get students to um
1:16:54to sort of draw out the moral
1:16:55intuitions. And and virtually everyone
1:16:57says pull the lever. But if you change
1:16:59it if you change the story to something
1:17:01like this, supposing there is um a an
1:17:04overweight gentleman who is uh standing
1:17:07on a bridge above the lever and you see
1:17:10the the situation in the distance and
1:17:12the only thing you can do to move uh the
1:17:16uh uh the trolley to the track with two
1:17:19is to push the gentleman over so he
1:17:21lands on the lever. He dies and you've
1:17:24you've actually saved five lives and
1:17:26maybe three have died three have died.
1:17:28And virtually all my students say no,
1:17:30you don't intentionally push the guy. So
1:17:33there is a sense in which people
1:17:35the sort of the physical movement of
1:17:37touching another person uh carries with
1:17:40it certain uh
1:17:42uh
1:17:42moral connotation that just simply
1:17:45pulling lever doesn't. Um but but having
1:17:47said that though, I do think we have to
1:17:49remember that these difficult cases
1:17:52don't in and of themselves
1:17:55inform us on what to do in those cases
1:17:57in which you are talking about a
1:17:58perfectly healthy unborn human being.
1:18:01Right. And and just
1:18:03one final point before we sign off. I
1:18:04mean, in the American law of homicide,
1:18:07we have principles of justification,
1:18:08necessity, excuse. There are instances
1:18:10in which a person can intentionally in
1:18:13our law justifiably kill another person
1:18:16uh postnatal person uh under certain
1:18:19circumstances. So the law has has
1:18:21suppleness and flexibility to deal with
1:18:23that. I'll be talking about that on
1:18:24Wednesday. That doesn't mean that we
1:18:25should abandon homicide laws, Right.
1:18:27That's right. right? So, uh thank you so
1:18:30much, Frank, for your great lecture and
1:18:32for the for spending time with us this
1:18:34evening in in in the question period.
1:18:37Very thought-provoking as usual.
1:18:39Um if you guys want to hear more from
1:18:41Frank or to learn more about his work,
1:18:43go to his website, uh
1:18:44francisbeckwith.com.
1:18:47Um and uh and Frank again is a is a
1:18:49permanent fixture of the Vita Institute
1:18:51here at Notre Dame and our satellite
1:18:52Vita Institutes as well.
1:18:54Thank you, Carter.
1:18:55Thanks very much, Frank. We'd like to
1:18:56thank all of our staff and benefactors
1:18:58who made this evening possible.
1:19:00Um but we're going to have more time
1:19:02later in the week to give
1:19:03uh a more special uh granular thanks to
1:19:06the various people who played a very
1:19:08significant role in in bringing the
1:19:10virtual Vita to you. So, we'll wait on
1:19:12that. We want to be respectful of folks'
1:19:14time. It's 9:20.
1:19:15Um so, please tune in tomorrow night at
1:19:178:00 p.m. Eastern time when you will
1:19:20hear from uh Father Nick Austriaco. Uh
1:19:23Dr. Father Nick Austriaco has two PhDs,
1:19:25one in molecular biology from MIT, one
1:19:28in moral theology from Freiburg. Um
1:19:30he'll be talking about when as a
1:19:32biological matter we can say that the
1:19:34life of the living human organism
1:19:35begins. Obviously essential to our
1:19:38reasoning building on what uh Frank uh
1:19:41laid out for us this evening in his
1:19:42great talk. So, uh please uh join us
1:19:45tomorrow night. Thank you so much for
1:19:46all of your participation. We're honored
1:19:49and humbled by it. We see uh we had
1:19:50about 500 people participating this
1:19:52evening. We're honored and humbled by
1:19:54that.
1:19:55And uh and until tomorrow night, please
1:19:57take care of yourselves and take care of
1:19:59each other. Good night.

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