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A NEW Trace! The FULL MH370 Story, so Far.. — Transcript

by Mentour Pilot · 9,212 words · 1,420 segments · language en · Watch on YouTube

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  1. 0:04[Music]
  2. 0:35how can a boing trip 7 one of the
  3. 0:38biggest and most modern aircraft in the
  4. 0:40world just vanished without the
  5. 0:44trace it
  6. 0:49can't everything lost leaves a
  7. 0:56trace at a Malaysia Airlines flight with
  8. 0:59200 39 people on board Mage 370 flight
  9. 1:03370 flight image
  10. 1:06370 there are mysteries in the world and
  11. 1:09then there is the story of
  12. 1:11MH370 this is a story so full of
  13. 1:14questions and theories that it's almost
  14. 1:16impossible to tell it without resorting
  15. 1:18to Pure speculation this is the reason I
  16. 1:21have refrained from covering it up until
  17. 1:23now but since at the time of this
  18. 1:25video's release it's gone 10 years since
  19. 1:28239 people disappeared Without a Trace I
  20. 1:32decided to make an exception this story
  21. 1:35is created with one goal and one goal
  22. 1:37only and that is to persuade the
  23. 1:39authorities to restart the search for
  24. 1:41the missing boying Triple 7 and with
  25. 1:44that hopefully also provide some closure
  26. 1:46to the families some of which I've been
  27. 1:48in contact with before making this video
  28. 1:51I will today share with you new
  29. 1:52potential evidence based Parton a
  30. 1:54technology that has been enhanced and
  31. 1:56refined over the last few years to the
  32. 1:58point where it now possibly can provide
  33. 2:00new Clues to where this aircraft finally
  34. 2:03ended
  35. 2:04up this is the story of Malaysian
  36. 2:06Airlines flight 370 as far as we know
  37. 2:21it on the 7th of March 2014 a crew from
  38. 2:25Malaysian Airlines checked in for a
  39. 2:26night Duty which was to take them from
  40. 2:28qual lumur International airport in
  41. 2:30Malaysia up to Beijing International in
  42. 2:33China except for the late start time it
  43. 2:36was supposed to be a quite nice Duty
  44. 2:38with a calculated flight time of only 5
  45. 2:40hours and 34 minutes meaning that they
  46. 2:42would eventually be finished in Beijing
  47. 2:44around midm morning the following day
  48. 2:46the captain of the flight arrived first
  49. 2:48and signed in at the Malaysian Airlines
  50. 2:50crew room at local time
  51. 2:522250 he was Then followed by his
  52. 2:54colleague the first officer around 25
  53. 2:56minutes
  54. 2:57later this was planned as a training
  55. 3:00flight for the first officer since he
  56. 3:02was completing a transition type course
  57. 3:04over from the Airbus A330 to the boing
  58. 3:06trip 7 which they would be flying on
  59. 3:08this flight the training had gone really
  60. 3:11well up until this point and if
  61. 3:13everything went fine on this flight he
  62. 3:15would be recommended for final line
  63. 3:17check by the captain for the following
  64. 3:19Duty having said that this was the first
  65. 3:22time that these two pilots were planned
  66. 3:23to fly together which might explain why
  67. 3:25the captain had turned up a little bit
  68. 3:27earlier you see it's pretty Comm for us
  69. 3:30instructors to do so if we need to
  70. 3:32review someone's training file for
  71. 3:33example before the flight to check out
  72. 3:35if there's any areas that might require
  73. 3:37special attention in any case once the
  74. 3:40first officer had also signed in the two
  75. 3:42pilots proceeded by going through the
  76. 3:44pre-flight briefing which from what they
  77. 3:46could see looked pretty straightforward
  78. 3:48the weather in kumur was generally nice
  79. 3:51and dominated by a subtropical high
  80. 3:53pressure center over Thailand and the
  81. 3:55weather at their destination Beijing
  82. 3:57also looked quite good from what they
  83. 3:59could see
  84. 4:00the only potential issue was that about
  85. 4:022/3 down the route they would be passing
  86. 4:04through a pretty strong jet stream with
  87. 4:06high winds which could cause a bit of
  88. 4:08turbulence but apart from that it was
  89. 4:10looking pretty
  90. 4:11straightforward with that in mind and no
  91. 4:14Nots affecting the flight either the
  92. 4:16pilots then turned their attention to
  93. 4:17the flight plan there were two
  94. 4:20alternates listed for Bing and taking
  95. 4:22into consideration both of these the
  96. 4:24pilots decided on a final fuel of
  97. 4:2649,100 kilos which was in line with the
  98. 4:29expect expected amount for this flight
  99. 4:31neither substantially more nor less than
  100. 4:33required this fuel would give the
  101. 4:35aircraft an approximate endurance of 7
  102. 4:37hours and 31 minutes around 2 hours
  103. 4:40longer than the anticipated flight time
  104. 4:42and that will of course become very
  105. 4:44important in the
  106. 4:46story so who were the pilots that were
  107. 4:49going to be in charge of this flight
  108. 4:51then well the captain was a 53y old with
  109. 4:53a 33-year great track record in Malaysia
  110. 4:56Airlines he was married with three
  111. 4:58children and on his spare time he was
  112. 5:00involved in the local opposition party
  113. 5:02helped deliver groceries to elderly and
  114. 5:05Tinker with some home electronics he had
  115. 5:08also started a YouTube channel which by
  116. 5:10the way is still there where he showed
  117. 5:12how to mend certain home appliances and
  118. 5:14also crucially where he showed off his
  119. 5:16home simulator which he had built to be
  120. 5:18able to practice his trade at home this
  121. 5:21simulator would later be investigated
  122. 5:23thoroughly it had been erased weeks
  123. 5:25before the flight but the investigator
  124. 5:27still found some manually entered
  125. 5:28waypoints of interest in a backup memory
  126. 5:31but without it proving to be anything
  127. 5:34conclusive in any case the captain had
  128. 5:36stable finances no known illnesses and
  129. 5:39was regarded as a solid reliable member
  130. 5:41of his community in terms of his
  131. 5:44Aviation career it had started when he
  132. 5:45was accepted into a sponsored program
  133. 5:47for Malaysian Airlines already back in
  134. 5:501981 he completed his licenses and then
  135. 5:53started flying for them back in
  136. 5:551983 he then worked his way up the ranks
  137. 5:58starting on the f27 and then the
  138. 6:0173700 Airbus a300 and finally he got his
  139. 6:04first command on the 50 This Was
  140. 6:07Then followed by command on the 737 400
  141. 6:10and the Airbus A330 until actually on my
  142. 6:12birthday the 22nd of September 1998 he
  143. 6:16received his command on the Boeing trip
  144. 6:177 which he then continued to operate
  145. 6:19until the day of this
  146. 6:21flight his good track record and
  147. 6:23seniority eventually gave him the
  148. 6:25opportunity to also become a typ rating
  149. 6:27instructor as well as an examiner on
  150. 6:29this typ Ty and it was in this capacity
  151. 6:31that he was going to operate Malaysian
  152. 6:33Airlines flight 370 on this evening he
  153. 6:36had a total experience of just over
  154. 6:3918,400 hourss and
  155. 6:418,659 of those had been flown on the
  156. 6:43boing Triple 7 the first officer was 27
  157. 6:46years old and single he had also been
  158. 6:49accepted into the airline as a Cadet
  159. 6:51pilot started in 2008 and he'd been
  160. 6:53flying initially on the boing
  161. 6:5577400 he had then changed over to the
  162. 6:58Airbus A330 Fleet 2012 and then onto the
  163. 7:01boing trip 7 in November 2013 just a few
  164. 7:04months before this flight and this was
  165. 7:07obviously why he was still in training
  166. 7:09he had a total experience of just over
  167. 7:112,800 hours and very little only 39
  168. 7:14hours on the type there is not much more
  169. 7:17mentioned about the first officer in the
  170. 7:18final report except that he was known as
  171. 7:20a nice person with stable economy and no
  172. 7:23recent major changes in his life now
  173. 7:26given the vast difference in experience
  174. 7:28seniority and the fact that this was a
  175. 7:30training flight it can be easily assumed
  176. 7:32that the power gradient in the cockpit
  177. 7:34would have been quite steep but nothing
  178. 7:37indicated any personal issues between
  179. 7:39these two colleagues both of them had
  180. 7:41also received more than the required
  181. 7:43rest before the flight and their
  182. 7:45licenses and Medicals were all up to
  183. 7:48date when the pilots had completed their
  184. 7:50pre-flight preparation and training
  185. 7:52briefing they walked over to their 10
  186. 7:54cabin crew members that they were
  187. 7:55scheduled to operate together with this
  188. 7:57was a vastly experienced crew with a
  189. 8:00most Junior attendant having flown for
  190. 8:0213 years and the most senior over 35
  191. 8:05years so the briefing would have been
  192. 8:07pretty quick and efficient after they
  193. 8:09were finished they all walked together
  194. 8:11out to the aircraft that was being
  195. 8:13prepared for them by the ground crew
  196. 8:15outside it was a majestic Boeing 7200 ER
  197. 8:20equipped with two Rolls-Royce Trent 892
  198. 8:23Bravo turbofan engines and it was in
  199. 8:26perfect working condition according to
  200. 8:27the tech log the only point of Interest
  201. 8:30was that the flight crew oxygen cylinder
  202. 8:31had been topped up just prior to the
  203. 8:33flight but this was a routine
  204. 8:35maintenance thing now there are numerous
  205. 8:37systems aboard this aircraft that will
  206. 8:39become important for this story and in
  207. 8:41order to explain it I will have to
  208. 8:42become quite technical in some places
  209. 8:45but also that's kind of what we do here
  210. 8:47on the
  211. 8:47channel anyway the two pilots had
  212. 8:50decided that the first officer was going
  213. 8:52to be Pilot Flying for this flight
  214. 8:53meaning that he immediately started
  215. 8:55completing the pre-flight preparation as
  216. 8:56soon as he arrived to the cockpit this
  217. 8:59included inputting flight information
  218. 9:02like the flight number and the airline
  219. 9:03info into the FMC CDU which he did at
  220. 9:06time 2356 and 8 seconds now you might
  221. 9:10wonder how we can know that so exactly
  222. 9:13and this has to do with a system that
  223. 9:14will play an incredibly important role
  224. 9:16here the aircraft Communications
  225. 9:19addressing and Reporting System more
  226. 9:21commonly referred to as acars this is a
  227. 9:24digital data link system which connects
  228. 9:26data providers on the ground directly to
  229. 9:28the aircraft via either VHF or satellite
  230. 9:31Communications it enables people on the
  231. 9:33ground to send things like updated
  232. 9:35weather flight plans and even make calls
  233. 9:37or send messages directly to the
  234. 9:39aircraft when it's airborne and the part
  235. 9:41of this system which is going to be most
  236. 9:43important here is the satellite
  237. 9:44Communications or satcom system the ACR
  238. 9:48system booted up and established a link
  239. 9:50through the satcom at time 2354 and
  240. 9:52about 1 minute and 20 seconds later it
  241. 9:54captured the first office's inputs as I
  242. 9:57just mentioned before this showed that
  243. 9:59the system worked fine in the beginning
  244. 10:01of this flight and it's worth noting
  245. 10:03here that the system uses two different
  246. 10:05satellite antennas depending on if the
  247. 10:07aircraft's navigation system is working
  248. 10:09or not remember that anyway as the first
  249. 10:13officer was working away in the cockpit
  250. 10:15he soon received an acar message
  251. 10:16containing something known as a no talk
  252. 10:19frequent viewers of this channel will
  253. 10:21know that this stands for notification
  254. 10:23to Captain and is normally sent out if
  255. 10:26the aircraft would be carrying dangerous
  256. 10:27goods in this case there were actually
  257. 10:30no dangerous goods on board just some
  258. 10:32special load being loaded consisting of
  259. 10:34several tons of mango which apparently
  260. 10:37had a tendency to leak juice and water
  261. 10:40and therefore had to be checked closely
  262. 10:42the Noto message confirmed that the
  263. 10:44cargo had been checked and that it
  264. 10:45wasn't leaking but what it didn't say
  265. 10:48was that there was also nearly 2 and a
  266. 10:50half tons of lithium ion batteries
  267. 10:52loaded on board but these batteries were
  268. 10:54individually packaged and stored in such
  269. 10:56a way that they were not considered
  270. 10:58dangerous goods and they have therefore
  271. 11:00been ruled out as a possible cause for
  272. 11:02what's about to happen eventually the
  273. 11:04captain returned from his walk around
  274. 11:06and together with his colleague they
  275. 11:07completed the rest of the pre-light
  276. 11:09preparations and briefings and at time
  277. 11:112325 the first officer called up quala
  278. 11:14lumur delivery to request their
  279. 11:15departure
  280. 11:16clearance delivery
  281. 11:20[Music]
  282. 11:2137 the delivery controller told them
  283. 11:23that they were clear to follow the pus
  284. 11:25one alpha departure from Runway 32 right
  285. 11:28and initially climbed to 6,000 ft with
  286. 11:30transponder the code
  287. 11:3421577 to Beijing departure 6000 ft s
  288. 11:3957 this was read back by the first
  289. 11:41officer and less than 2 minutes later
  290. 11:43Malaysia 370 also requested push and
  291. 11:46start which was almost immediately
  292. 11:58approved
  293. 12:11P after the push back the aircraft
  294. 12:13received its taxi clearance and then
  295. 12:15started taxiing out to watch Runway 32
  296. 12:17right through the dark Malaysian night
  297. 12:19and for anyone watching the aircraft
  298. 12:21everything looked completely normal but
  299. 12:24this was going to be the last time
  300. 12:26anyone saw this aircraft with their own
  301. 12:28eyes so what about the passengers then
  302. 12:31well there were 227 passengers on board
  303. 12:34coming from 14 different nations 153
  304. 12:38were from China making those the largest
  305. 12:40group followed by 50 from Malaysia and
  306. 12:42seven from
  307. 12:43Indonesia two of those passengers were
  308. 12:45later found to have been flying on
  309. 12:47Stolen passports and they were
  310. 12:49identified as Iranians who were most
  311. 12:51likely looking for Refugee status and
  312. 12:53were not considered a threat none of the
  313. 12:56other passengers raised any type of
  314. 12:58Suspicion and this means that in total
  315. 13:00there were 239 passengers and crew on
  316. 13:03board when the giant Bo 7 lined up on
  317. 13:05Runway 32 Right and started spooling up
  318. 13:08its
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  355. 14:27let's continue at 40 minutes and 37
  356. 14:30seconds past midnight on the 8th of
  357. 14:32march quala Tower cleared Malaysian
  358. 14:34Airlines flight 370 for
  359. 14:37takeoff
  360. 14:383 take
  361. 14:45off the first officer was at the
  362. 14:47controls at this point and had therefore
  363. 14:49handed over the radio to the captain and
  364. 14:50after the engines were stabilized he
  365. 14:52pushed the toga buttons and the aircraft
  366. 14:54started accelerating down the runway at
  367. 14:5642 minutes past midnight the SAT system
  368. 14:59recorded that the aircraft was airborne
  369. 15:01and did then continued to transmit the
  370. 15:03aircraft's identification codes together
  371. 15:05with all of the other normal data and
  372. 15:07this just showed that everything was
  373. 15:09completely normal at that
  374. 15:11stage the procedures in qual lumur was
  375. 15:14for the pilots to automatically switch
  376. 15:15over to the departure frequency after
  377. 15:17takeoff so that's exactly what the
  378. 15:19captain now also did once he called up
  379. 15:22and identified himself the departure
  380. 15:23controller told them to cancel the
  381. 15:25standard instrument departure and
  382. 15:27instead proceed direct toward Waypoint
  383. 15:29called igari and continue to climb to
  384. 15:31flight level 180 it's pretty common that
  385. 15:34controllers give clearances like this
  386. 15:36especially at night when there's
  387. 15:38typically less traffic and therefore
  388. 15:40easier to give these kind of directs the
  389. 15:43captain just read back the clearance and
  390. 15:45then selected igari as the active
  391. 15:47Waypoint in the FMC the first officer
  392. 15:49would have then verified it told him to
  393. 15:51execute a routing and then selected
  394. 15:53flight level 180 in the mode control
  395. 15:55panel for the captain to verify just
  396. 15:57like they would have done thousand of
  397. 15:59times before at this stage of the flight
  398. 16:02everything was still completely normal
  399. 16:04and when you listen to the ATC tapes The
  400. 16:06Voice level of the captain is completely
  401. 16:08relaxed and routine the aircraft
  402. 16:11continued its climb towards igari and
  403. 16:13they were eventually changed over to the
  404. 16:14next frequency lper radar on 132 decimal
  405. 16:186 this was going to be the controller
  406. 16:20looking after them until they reached
  407. 16:21thei and the FI boundary towards
  408. 16:24Vietnam
  409. 16:2670ct 13269
  410. 16:33the captain read backed his Handover
  411. 16:35more or less exactly as he should by
  412. 16:36confirming the new frequency and giving
  413. 16:38his call sign again sounding completely
  414. 16:41normal when he called up the new area
  415. 16:43controller he was told that they could
  416. 16:45continue their climb to flight level 250
  417. 16:47which he also read back and only 3
  418. 16:49minutes later they received further
  419. 16:51clearance to climb to their requested
  420. 16:53Cruise level flight level
  421. 16:56350 as flight 370 progressed up towards
  422. 16:59the Northeast they were still fully
  423. 17:01visible on radar for all involved ATC
  424. 17:04units and here it's probably a good time
  425. 17:06to start explaining a bit about Radars
  426. 17:08in general there are two different types
  427. 17:11of radar to keep in mind for this
  428. 17:12episode primary radar which is also
  429. 17:15referred to as raw radar and secondary
  430. 17:18radar under normal circumstances
  431. 17:20commercial air traffic always uses both
  432. 17:22of them but the secondary radar is what
  433. 17:24gives the majority of the information it
  434. 17:27is dependent on a small radio
  435. 17:29transmitter known as a transponder on
  436. 17:31board the aircraft and this transponder
  437. 17:33will be identified by a four-letter
  438. 17:35numerical code with numbers from 0 to 7
  439. 17:39remember that was the code that the
  440. 17:40first officer received earlier as part
  441. 17:42of the departure clearance now there are
  442. 17:44two transponders on board the aircraft
  443. 17:46and the active one will when it's
  444. 17:47activated by the pilots send their
  445. 17:49traffic control loads of information
  446. 17:51like position altitude speed and even
  447. 17:53mCP Selections in some cases the
  448. 17:56transponders also communicates with
  449. 17:58other traffic and therefore enables
  450. 17:59tcast maneuvering and it's these
  451. 18:01transponders that makes apps like Flight
  452. 18:03Radar 24 work since anyone can pick up
  453. 18:06the adsb signals that they
  454. 18:09transmit but the key thing to remember
  455. 18:11here is that the transponders are on
  456. 18:13board the aircraft and without them
  457. 18:15functioning secondary radar will not
  458. 18:17work and neither will those websites or
  459. 18:21tcas and this brings us to the primary
  460. 18:23radar which is an invention that has
  461. 18:25been with us for a very long time by now
  462. 18:29in this Essence it works on a simple
  463. 18:31idea of sending out a radio pulse and
  464. 18:33then measuring any waves that might hit
  465. 18:35a Target and then bounce back to the
  466. 18:37receiver the direction those returning
  467. 18:40waves are done coming from will give a
  468. 18:42bearing towards the target obviously
  469. 18:44this technology has become much more
  470. 18:46refined since it was first invented
  471. 18:48making it much more complex but you get
  472. 18:50the general idea this type of radar can
  473. 18:54be used to see things that are not
  474. 18:56transmitting any information voluntarily
  475. 18:58and it's therefore often used by the
  476. 19:00military but given the nature of
  477. 19:02shortwave radio signals this type of
  478. 19:04radar has a quite limited range and
  479. 19:06cannot accurately track altitude and
  480. 19:08speed very well something that will
  481. 19:10become important
  482. 19:12soon at 1 minute and 14 seconds past 1
  483. 19:16in the morning the captain of Malaysian
  484. 19:18flights 370 called up the lumper area
  485. 19:20controller to advise him that they were
  486. 19:22now level at flight level
  487. 19:25350 370 M over 3
  488. 19:29Malaysian
  489. 19:31370 this was acknowledged by the
  490. 19:33controller but this was not a necessary
  491. 19:35call to make by the captain it was more
  492. 19:38of a courtesy thing but you could still
  493. 19:40hear from the sound of his voice that he
  494. 19:42was relaxed when he made this call from
  495. 19:44the way that his intonation kind of
  496. 19:46dropped towards the
  497. 19:48[Applause]
  498. 19:51end and is from here on that I have a
  499. 19:54feeling that we can see the first
  500. 19:56indication of something being slightly
  501. 19:57out of order
  502. 19:59now I want to make it absolutely clear
  503. 20:01that nothing in the final report has
  504. 20:02highlighted that whatever happened
  505. 20:04started as early as here but I
  506. 20:06personally reacted to something that was
  507. 20:08just briefly mentioned in the report you
  508. 20:11see about 7 minutes after the captain
  509. 20:13called in that they were level that
  510. 20:15flight of 350 he called up again and
  511. 20:18reported the very same
  512. 20:22thing7 maining level 3 in the report
  513. 20:25this was highlighted as anomalous but
  514. 20:28the expert didn't think that it was
  515. 20:29worth paying any attention to but I
  516. 20:32disagree you see we Pilots tend to make
  517. 20:35these extra calls for two different
  518. 20:38reasons the first is that we have just
  519. 20:40simply forgotten about it and therefore
  520. 20:42call again just to be on the safe side
  521. 20:44but like I said earlier this was not a
  522. 20:46mandatory call to make the other reason
  523. 20:49we do it is because we've been away from
  524. 20:51the frequency for a while maybe because
  525. 20:53we have been fiddling with the radios or
  526. 20:55turned down the volume or something else
  527. 20:57and we just want to make sure sure that
  528. 20:59ATC hasn't tried to call us while we
  529. 21:01were gone you see if we make that call
  530. 21:04again and ATC just responds Roger or
  531. 21:07something similar well then we know that
  532. 21:08they haven't been trying to call us
  533. 21:10because if they would have they would
  534. 21:12now repeat any other messages that they
  535. 21:14had previously tried to send so with
  536. 21:17that in mind there were s minutes
  537. 21:19between the first call and the second
  538. 21:21call which means that something might
  539. 21:23have happened to take the captain away
  540. 21:25from the radio between those calls
  541. 21:29the other thing that I reacted to was
  542. 21:31the tone of voice of the captain when he
  543. 21:33made that second
  544. 21:36call Main level
  545. 21:393 again the experts in the report said
  546. 21:42that they couldn't detect any stress in
  547. 21:44the voice from the recordings but what I
  548. 21:46hearing is a clear difference in Pitch
  549. 21:48between the first and the second call in
  550. 21:51the first the captain sounds relaxed
  551. 21:54with a clear dropping intonation towards
  552. 21:56the end and in the second he just sounds
  553. 21:59busy like he's working on something at
  554. 22:01the same time that he's making that
  555. 22:04[Applause]
  556. 22:09call Main
  557. 22:11L this the sound of workload is
  558. 22:14something that I often hear in the
  559. 22:16simulator as well as when I'm doing
  560. 22:18training in the aircraft and that's why
  561. 22:20I reacted to it when I heard it anyway
  562. 22:23as expected the controller just
  563. 22:25responded with Malayan 370
  564. 22:30now this doesn't have to mean anything
  565. 22:32and I don't want to speculate any
  566. 22:34further on this detail but I thought it
  567. 22:36was worth to highlight given what's soon
  568. 22:38about to
  569. 22:40happen so the aircraft continued its
  570. 22:42cleared track up toward igari and within
  571. 22:44minutes of that last call from the
  572. 22:46captain the acart sent out its last
  573. 22:49complete routine message via satcom down
  574. 22:51to the ground station after this there
  575. 22:54would be a complete silence from the
  576. 22:56aircraft satcom for almost 1 hour hour
  577. 22:58and 17 minutes this detail is super
  578. 23:02important because it tells us a lot
  579. 23:04about what likely happened in the
  580. 23:05cockpit but I'll get back to that soon
  581. 23:08at time 0119 and 24 seconds the lper
  582. 23:12area controller instructed Malaysian
  583. 23:14Airlines FL 370 to contact hoimin
  584. 23:16control on frequency 120 decimal 9 malan
  585. 23:20370 contact hoimin to0 de 9 this
  586. 23:24happened about 1 minute before the
  587. 23:26aircraft flew past thear so they were
  588. 23:28still technically in Malaysian airspace
  589. 23:30but would soon pass into
  590. 23:32Vietnam and this is where the very last
  591. 23:35radio transmission occurred from flight
  592. 23:37370 with the captain simply
  593. 23:40[Music]
  594. 23:46answering now for some people that might
  595. 23:49have sounded like an omnus farewell but
  596. 23:51what I heard was once again someone who
  597. 23:53was busy so busy in fact that he didn't
  598. 23:56complete the read back correctly like I
  599. 23:58mentioned before all frequencies we are
  600. 24:00given must always be read back to avoid
  601. 24:03mistakes but that was not done in this
  602. 24:05call in any case now things started
  603. 24:08happening very quickly 5 seconds after
  604. 24:12the aircraft flew past the gari the mode
  605. 24:14s functionality of the transponder that
  606. 24:16was the part that gives that extra
  607. 24:18information was suddenly switched off
  608. 24:21now the only way to switch off only that
  609. 24:23is to turn the transponder knob in the
  610. 24:25cockpit from t r to the altit ude off
  611. 24:29position a technical malfunction would
  612. 24:32have removed all signals completely and
  613. 24:34immediately but in this case it took
  614. 24:36another 37 seconds for the secondary
  615. 24:38radar return to completely disappear and
  616. 24:40as it did the aircraft abruptly stopped
  617. 24:43following the planned
  618. 24:44route we know this because the primary
  619. 24:47radar recorded the turn and what it
  620. 24:49registered was that after the initial
  621. 24:51right turn towards a point called bod
  622. 24:54the aircraft now started a sharp almost
  623. 24:56180° left turn
  624. 24:59instead now boing tried to replicate
  625. 25:02this turn in the simulator but weren't
  626. 25:04able to match up the turn and the
  627. 25:06timings perfectly the only simulation
  628. 25:08that got close included a manually flown
  629. 25:11turn meaning that the autopilot must
  630. 25:13have been
  631. 25:14disconnected and why is that you might
  632. 25:16ask well the outter pilet will only
  633. 25:18allow certain Bank angles and this turn
  634. 25:21was so tight that a much steeper Bank
  635. 25:24must have been used at least partially
  636. 25:25throughout the turn in order to
  637. 25:27accomplish it the only reasonable
  638. 25:29conclusion that can been drawn from this
  639. 25:31is that someone had now started
  640. 25:33interfering with the flight's trajectory
  641. 25:34on purpose the timing and position of
  642. 25:37where all of this took place also looks
  643. 25:39far from random igar was the point just
  644. 25:42before the F boundary between Malaysia
  645. 25:45and Vietnam which meant that the
  646. 25:46controller from a new country would now
  647. 25:48be taking over the responsibility for
  648. 25:50the flight the Malaysian controller
  649. 25:52which forly still had the responsibility
  650. 25:54had handed the aircraft over and
  651. 25:56therefore probably didn't monitor it too
  652. 25:58close closely and the new hushi Min
  653. 26:01controller would likely wait until the
  654. 26:02aircraft called him up before starting
  655. 26:04to pay much attention to it which is
  656. 26:06also exactly what now
  657. 26:08happened given this it was the perfect
  658. 26:11place to initiate this maneuver if the
  659. 26:14intention was to try to avoid detection
  660. 26:17and now you might ask why disengage the
  661. 26:18autopilot why not just complete the
  662. 26:21turn well just to the north of igari
  663. 26:24Thailand has something known as an air
  664. 26:26defense identification Zone which on a
  665. 26:29high Lev chart shows up as two dotted
  666. 26:32parallel purple lines as the name
  667. 26:35suggests the Thai military would be
  668. 26:37monitoring any traffic entering into
  669. 26:39that zone and follow it up unless it was
  670. 26:41properly identified had a working
  671. 26:43transponder and followed a filed Flight
  672. 26:46Plan by carefully avoiding that zone
  673. 26:48whoever was now in control would also
  674. 26:50avoid any direct scrutiny from the Thai
  675. 26:52military and given the direction the
  676. 26:54aircraft was now turning it's likely
  677. 26:56that anyone looking at the primary radar
  678. 26:58would assume that the aircraft was just
  679. 27:00diverting still under Malaysian control
  680. 27:03this turn would also position the
  681. 27:05aircraft between that Thai ADI said and
  682. 27:08Airway Mike 765 which would avoid any
  683. 27:11opposite
  684. 27:13traffic this shows us that whoever was
  685. 27:16now in control was likely very well
  686. 27:18versed with the airspace structure over
  687. 27:20this particular area and that this was
  688. 27:22likely very carefully planned
  689. 27:25out after the U-turn was finished the
  690. 27:27air continued in a semi straight line
  691. 27:30down towards the southwest and a VR
  692. 27:32Beacon known as Victor Papa Gulf near
  693. 27:35panang in Malaya the track showed small
  694. 27:38deviations consistent with an aircraft
  695. 27:40being flown manually and not on
  696. 27:42autopilot now since these radar echos
  697. 27:45were only captured on RAR radar it was
  698. 27:47impossible to get any reliable speed or
  699. 27:49altitude data from them it is possible
  700. 27:52that the aircraft descended slightly
  701. 27:54during this segment maybe to gain a
  702. 27:56higher true air speed that it was
  703. 27:58overflying Malaysia this theory was
  704. 28:01further corroborated by the fact that a
  705. 28:03celom mobile Mast on the island of
  706. 28:05panang briefly detected a mobile phone
  707. 28:08signal which was later confirmed to have
  708. 28:10come from the first office's phone those
  709. 28:12type of signals generally have a very
  710. 28:15limited vertical range maximum around
  711. 28:1730,000 ft and often much lower than that
  712. 28:20but given that atmospheric conditions
  713. 28:22have huge impact on the Range it's very
  714. 28:25hard to speculate here but since turning
  715. 28:28off the mobile phone is a checklist item
  716. 28:30in most Airlines this could indicate
  717. 28:33that the first officer was trying to
  718. 28:34communicate here but no call signals
  719. 28:37ever came through and the signal was
  720. 28:39only detected for a very short while but
  721. 28:43what is really intriguing during this
  722. 28:45segment of the flight is another system
  723. 28:47that we have already talked about a
  724. 28:48little bit which is the satcom system
  725. 28:51you see the satcom sends out regular
  726. 28:54interrogations every hour if no other
  727. 28:56information is being transmitted
  728. 28:59and when the groundbased station tried
  729. 29:01to Uplink an acar message at time 3
  730. 29:03minutes past 2 in the morning it didn't
  731. 29:05receive any acknowledgement back from
  732. 29:07the aircraft satcom so what does that
  733. 29:11mean then well if the acar system was
  734. 29:14just switched off or failed the link
  735. 29:17would still take place it would just
  736. 29:19communicate the fact that acars wasn't
  737. 29:21working and if the system was manually
  738. 29:23logged off from the cockpit this would
  739. 29:26also be shown in that log and because
  740. 29:28none of that happened the most likely
  741. 29:30reason for this satcom loss was a power
  742. 29:33failure to the system
  743. 29:35itself now this system can be powered
  744. 29:38from several different electrical buses
  745. 29:40and from most of the aircraft redundant
  746. 29:42power sources so this fact has led some
  747. 29:45incredibly experienced boing trip 7
  748. 29:47Pilots whose excellent work I will be
  749. 29:49linking to in the description by the way
  750. 29:51to believe that whoever was in charge of
  751. 29:54the aircraft after that initial turn
  752. 29:56must have manually turned off all of
  753. 29:58those
  754. 29:59sources this can be done by deselecting
  755. 30:02both the primary and backup generators
  756. 30:04from their buses using the buttons on
  757. 30:06the overhead panel after that the
  758. 30:09aircraft would react by trying to outo
  759. 30:11start the Apu in order to replace those
  760. 30:13systems so the person in charge would
  761. 30:15then have to put the Apu switch to on
  762. 30:17and then back off again to stop that
  763. 30:19outter start from happening if that
  764. 30:21would happen that would then trigger the
  765. 30:23ram air turbine the rat to be activated
  766. 30:26either manually or automatically and it
  767. 30:28would start to provide electrical power
  768. 30:29for the most critical systems like
  769. 30:31primary flight displays navigation
  770. 30:33displays and navigation equipment but
  771. 30:36not the
  772. 30:37autopilot hydraulic movement of the
  773. 30:39flight controls would not be a problem
  774. 30:41since both engines were still working
  775. 30:43and providing hydraulic so maneuvering
  776. 30:45the aircraft manually would still work
  777. 30:46perfectly fine now of course removing
  778. 30:49the primary power sources in this way
  779. 30:52would cause everything else except
  780. 30:53emergency lighting to go black in the
  781. 30:55aircraft and it's likely that this would
  782. 30:57make make things very difficult for both
  783. 30:59the crew and the passengers in the back
  784. 31:02and while we're on the subject of the
  785. 31:04passengers and crew I want to point out
  786. 31:06here that we really have no idea about
  787. 31:08what actually happened to them some
  788. 31:11theories have suggested that whoever was
  789. 31:13in charge might have depressurized the
  790. 31:16cabin in order to get everyone into
  791. 31:17their seats and keep them under control
  792. 31:20this is possible to do by just opening
  793. 31:22the outflow vals manually was still
  794. 31:24keeping the air conditioning running the
  795. 31:26fact that the air conditioning was kept
  796. 31:28running would provide Heating and make
  797. 31:30it bearable in the cockpit as it
  798. 31:32otherwise would become freezing cold
  799. 31:34almost immediately the passenger oxygen
  800. 31:36masks would then drop in the back but
  801. 31:38the oxygen generators in the trip 7
  802. 31:40would only last for about 22 minutes or
  803. 31:42so but the oxygen cylinder which is
  804. 31:45providing the cockpit crew with oxygen
  805. 31:47would last a full 27 hours in case
  806. 31:50there's only one person using it and it
  807. 31:52had like I mentioned before been topped
  808. 31:54up just that very
  809. 31:56morning this means that if the cabin was
  810. 31:59kept unpressurized without descending
  811. 32:01the passengers would become completely
  812. 32:03incapacitated once the oxygen generator
  813. 32:05stopped working but whoever was still in
  814. 32:09the cockpit would be able to just
  815. 32:11continue to operate just fine the time
  816. 32:13of useful Consciousness at 35,000 ft is
  817. 32:16about 1 minute extending to a few
  818. 32:18minutes at 30,000 ft and anyone
  819. 32:21subjected to those altitudes without
  820. 32:23supplemental oxygen would after that not
  821. 32:25be able to take any rational decisions
  822. 32:27and soon become
  823. 32:29unconscious after that if no oxygen
  824. 32:32would be provided it would take another
  825. 32:3320 minutes or so until death would
  826. 32:39occur but like I said before we don't
  827. 32:41know for a fact what happened and we
  828. 32:43won't know more until the aircraft is
  829. 32:45found which is why it is so important
  830. 32:48that we continue the
  831. 32:50search now flying an aircraft at these
  832. 32:53altitudes manually whilst possibly
  833. 32:55wearing an oxygen mask and with only rud
  834. 32:57mentary navigation available would be
  835. 33:00quite tiring and that's likely why the
  836. 33:02radar images were showing this small
  837. 33:05heading variations anyway at this stage
  838. 33:08the aircraft continued to be tracked by
  839. 33:10both civilian and Military Roar radar as
  840. 33:13it continued its way around the south of
  841. 33:15panang where it started turning right
  842. 33:17through the malaka straight there were
  843. 33:19temporary lapses in the radar coverage
  844. 33:22but all in all it painted a fairly clear
  845. 33:24picture of an aircraft flying in a
  846. 33:26controlled way and not in any way
  847. 33:29random so why wasn't the aircraft
  848. 33:33intercepted or tracked more closely then
  849. 33:36well this was due to a combination of
  850. 33:39factors and misunderstandings between
  851. 33:41different Air Traffic Control units and
  852. 33:42the operations controllers in Malaysia
  853. 33:44Airlines
  854. 33:45Headquarters when the aircraft first
  855. 33:48disappeared from radar it took around 20
  856. 33:50minutes before the hosi Min controller
  857. 33:52called up the Malaysian controller to
  858. 33:54ask about where the aircraft actually
  859. 33:57was
  860. 33:58now this was significantly longer than
  861. 34:00the standard 5 minutes it should take
  862. 34:02before Aquarius sent but like I
  863. 34:04mentioned before this happened at an
  864. 34:06intersection between two different
  865. 34:07countries in the middle of the night so
  866. 34:10it's likely that the controllers were
  867. 34:12just dealing with other traffic and
  868. 34:14didn't monitor their strips too closely
  869. 34:17when the Malaysian controller who was
  870. 34:18still technically responsible for the
  871. 34:20flight was made aware of the missing
  872. 34:22aircraft he eventually contacted
  873. 34:24Malaysian Airlines who confirmed that
  874. 34:26they could see the aircraft flying up
  875. 34:28through
  876. 34:29Cambodia this meant that the air traffic
  877. 34:31controllers now started contacting their
  878. 34:33colleagues along the route that the
  879. 34:34aircraft was thought to be flying to see
  880. 34:37if they could get into contact with them
  881. 34:39and this in turn meant that none of them
  882. 34:41saw the lonely faint radar Echo that was
  883. 34:44traveling Southwest instead it was later
  884. 34:47found out that the Malaysian Airlines
  885. 34:49tracking software was basing the
  886. 34:51position of the aircraft on predictions
  887. 34:53when it didn't receive any real data and
  888. 34:56that's what had caused that initial
  889. 34:58confusion now the military did see the
  890. 35:01aircraft turning left after agari but
  891. 35:03since it wasn't violating any new
  892. 35:05airspace they assumed it was just a
  893. 35:07normal air turn back and didn't raise
  894. 35:09any further alarms or send anyone up to
  895. 35:12intercept it was only later with the
  896. 35:15help of radar playbacks that the picture
  897. 35:17of MH 370's true path became clearer
  898. 35:21after the aircraft had turned right up
  899. 35:23towards the Northwest it looked like it
  900. 35:25was heading towards a waypoint called
  901. 35:27vamp
  902. 35:28the satcom system still had not logged
  903. 35:30on at this stage so we can assume that
  904. 35:31the aircraft was still flying in a power
  905. 35:33degraded State possibly only with the
  906. 35:35ramare turbine as a power source but
  907. 35:37even if that was the case navigation
  908. 35:39would still not be a problem the Victor
  909. 35:42Papa go VR was still well within range
  910. 35:45meaning that the aircraft could use raw
  911. 35:47data navigation to find vampy and the
  912. 35:49Waypoint could also be displayed on the
  913. 35:51aircraft navigation display so whoever
  914. 35:53was flying could just point the nose
  915. 35:55towards it vampy was soon paused and the
  916. 35:58now more and more faint radar Echo
  917. 36:01continued flying up in the general
  918. 36:02direction of Airway November 571 towards
  919. 36:05another Waypoint called mear and it's
  920. 36:08soon after the aircraft passed slightly
  921. 36:10to the south of that waypoint at time
  922. 36:120222 and 12 seconds that all
  923. 36:15conventional radar traces from this
  924. 36:16flight completely
  925. 36:23disappeared now there is a real
  926. 36:25possibility that there were military
  927. 36:27radar picking up signals from this
  928. 36:28aircraft for longer than this but given
  929. 36:31the sensitivity around showing military
  930. 36:33capability or positions of mobile Radars
  931. 36:36we haven't seen any such information
  932. 36:38come forward so this means that from
  933. 36:40this point onwards we're now going into
  934. 36:43the unknown and with that comes
  935. 36:45speculation or hypothesis which you all
  936. 36:47know I try to avoid on this channel so
  937. 36:50let's Instead try to stay with what we
  938. 36:52do
  939. 36:54know in order to further track this
  940. 36:56aircraft the inves ators scientific
  941. 36:58community and several commercial
  942. 37:00companies had to start using any data
  943. 37:02they had received in completely new ways
  944. 37:05and a great example of this is the
  945. 37:07inmarsat data inmarsat is as the name
  946. 37:10suggests a company providing Satellite
  947. 37:12Communication services and it was
  948. 37:14through their satellites that the satcom
  949. 37:16system for the aircraft acar was
  950. 37:18operating the signals these satellites
  951. 37:21were sending were never designed to
  952. 37:22track aircrafts but since there were
  953. 37:25signals exchanged with MH370 those
  954. 37:28signals could be reverse Engineers to
  955. 37:30provide a crude singular position
  956. 37:32indicator every time that they appeared
  957. 37:35the way this was done was basically by
  958. 37:37mimicking certain parts of the GPS
  959. 37:40system you see each GPS satellite is
  960. 37:43basically an extremely accurate timing
  961. 37:45device and when a device on earth like
  962. 37:47your phone or in this case a boying
  963. 37:49Triple 7 connects to one of them the GPS
  964. 37:52satellite transmits a quick signal which
  965. 37:54basically says this is where I am and
  966. 37:56this is the time right now that signal
  967. 37:59then travels at the speed of light which
  968. 38:01still takes a certain amount of time to
  969. 38:03arrive to your device that time is
  970. 38:06measured to determine how far away you
  971. 38:08are from that GPS satellite and with the
  972. 38:11satellite's position and your distance
  973. 38:12from it we can determine that you are
  974. 38:14somewhere along the radius of a circle
  975. 38:18then obviously your device will connect
  976. 38:20to multiple satellites which each one of
  977. 38:22them drawing its own Circle and where
  978. 38:24all of these circles meet well that's
  979. 38:26where you are so in the case of the
  980. 38:28inmarsat data this same technique could
  981. 38:30basically also be used each time the
  982. 38:32aircraft connected to the satellite
  983. 38:34using the satcom system the time its
  984. 38:36system took to respond to the satellite
  985. 38:38signals was recorded the same happened
  986. 38:41at regular intervals when the satellite
  987. 38:43checked that the plane was still
  988. 38:45connected and each of these connections
  989. 38:48seven of them in total are the famous
  990. 38:50handshakes that were reported about
  991. 38:52basically everywhere every one of those
  992. 38:54handshakes could then be used to place
  993. 38:56the missing aircraft somewhere along a
  994. 38:58circle at a specific point of time and
  995. 39:00that process of defining a circle or Arc
  996. 39:03is called burst timing offset or BTO but
  997. 39:07this was not the only information that
  998. 39:09the inmar set signals could provide
  999. 39:11analysts could also pick up another
  1000. 39:13value in the signal something known as
  1001. 39:14burst frequency offset or
  1002. 39:17bfo bfo gave information that could help
  1003. 39:20the investigators determine how the
  1004. 39:22aircraft was moving in relation to the
  1005. 39:24satellite as its name suggested involved
  1006. 39:28studying the actual frequencies of the
  1007. 39:29signal that the satellite received and
  1008. 39:31then how they differed from the expected
  1009. 39:34frequencies think of this like the way
  1010. 39:36an ambulance siren seems to change its
  1011. 39:39tone as it drives towards and then past
  1012. 39:41you when it's coming towards you the
  1013. 39:43sound waves are denser making for a
  1014. 39:45higher frequency and after it goes past
  1015. 39:47you the sound wav moves further apart
  1016. 39:50giving the tone a lower frequency this
  1017. 39:53is called the Doppler effect or the
  1018. 39:55Doppler shift and primary radars
  1019. 39:57actually also use this in the same way
  1020. 39:59to determine for example the speed of an
  1021. 40:01aircraft now I am of course
  1022. 40:03oversimplifying these Concepts a bit
  1023. 40:04here but in the case of MH370 since
  1024. 40:07these signals between the aircraft and
  1025. 40:09the satellite traveled mostly vertically
  1026. 40:11the birth frequency offset or bfo was
  1027. 40:14instead used to help investigators
  1028. 40:16determine whether the aircraft was
  1029. 40:17climbing or
  1030. 40:19descending now those of you who have
  1031. 40:21been paying attention will have noticed
  1032. 40:23that I have said that the satcom system
  1033. 40:25was not working so how could the inm
  1034. 40:28maret analyst get any of these
  1035. 40:30handshakes well here is where we get to
  1036. 40:33a really interesting development that
  1037. 40:35happened at time 0225 and 27 seconds
  1038. 40:39then all of a sudden the previously
  1039. 40:41nonresponsive satcom system of MH370
  1040. 40:43suddenly came back to life and proceeded
  1041. 40:45to start sending a log on request to the
  1042. 40:49satellite this would later be referred
  1043. 40:52to as the first handshake this happened
  1044. 40:55almost exactly 1 hour after the aircraft
  1045. 40:57had completed its turn after Rari and
  1046. 41:00the interesting bit is that the burst
  1047. 41:02frequency offset value in this first
  1048. 41:04handshake was deemed unreliable due to a
  1049. 41:06quite large frequency error and what's
  1050. 41:11making that so interesting then well it
  1051. 41:13turns out that the quch crystals used in
  1052. 41:16the satcom radio transmitters needed to
  1053. 41:18be kept at a constant temperature to
  1054. 41:20avoid big frequency
  1055. 41:22oscillations this was achieved with the
  1056. 41:24help of something known as an oven
  1057. 41:26controlled Crystal oscillator which was
  1058. 41:28basically a temperature controller and
  1059. 41:31it needed time to warm up after a
  1060. 41:33lengthy power Interruption so it is
  1061. 41:35likely that it hadn't reached the
  1062. 41:38correct temperature at this point when
  1063. 41:40the first log on message was sent hence
  1064. 41:42the bfo frequency error and this is how
  1065. 41:46we know that the aircraft was likely
  1066. 41:48powered down up until just prior to this
  1067. 41:50point science is truly amazing now this
  1068. 41:55first handshake also lacked a valid
  1069. 41:57flight and Company ID which the aircraft
  1070. 42:00previously had transmitted
  1071. 42:02correctly we cannot know this for sure
  1072. 42:05but if the aircraft power had been
  1073. 42:07manually restored at this point well
  1074. 42:10then the person in command would likely
  1075. 42:12also know that the satcom system would
  1076. 42:14soon boot up and start sending out data
  1077. 42:17so in order to stay hidden he would have
  1078. 42:19had to manually go into the
  1079. 42:21multifunctional display and disable all
  1080. 42:24Communications through the
  1081. 42:25communications manager page before the
  1082. 42:28satellite communication unit the sdu
  1083. 42:30became fully
  1084. 42:31operational if this was done this way
  1085. 42:34this would also erase the flight and
  1086. 42:36Company info which is exactly what the
  1087. 42:38data also
  1088. 42:39showed so you can see even though no
  1089. 42:42data was actually sent out with a lot of
  1090. 42:45Ingenuity the signals themselves can
  1091. 42:47actually tell us a lot about what was
  1092. 42:48likely going on we also know for example
  1093. 42:52that the navigation system was working
  1094. 42:54because of which antenna the setcom
  1095. 42:56system was using when it started
  1096. 42:57transmitting like I said
  1097. 43:00amazing so using the inmarsat data we
  1098. 43:03know for sure that the aircraft
  1099. 43:04continued to fly long enough to allow a
  1100. 43:07total of seven handshakes where the
  1101. 43:09first and the last were log on requests
  1102. 43:11sent by the aircraft itself like I
  1103. 43:14explained before these log on requests
  1104. 43:16were most probably caused by power
  1105. 43:17interruptions where the last one was
  1106. 43:19likely caused by the fuel station of one
  1107. 43:22or possibly both engines after the
  1108. 43:23aircraft had flown for around 7 hours
  1109. 43:25and 35 minutes
  1110. 43:28that last handshake came at time 0819
  1111. 43:31Malaysian time which corresponds quite
  1112. 43:32well with the endurance of the aircraft
  1113. 43:34based on the recorded fuel now these
  1114. 43:37handshakes occurred roughly every hour
  1115. 43:39since the system was sent to send out a
  1116. 43:41ping every hour unless other satcom
  1117. 43:43activities were initiated two of the
  1118. 43:45handshakes were caused by groundbased
  1119. 43:48satellite calls from the Malaysian
  1120. 43:49Airlines operations center who reached
  1121. 43:51the cockpit but was left unanswered even
  1122. 43:54so they reset the hour timing of the
  1123. 43:58other handshakes and that's the reason
  1124. 43:59why all of these seven handshakes were
  1125. 44:01not happening on the same hourly
  1126. 44:04intervals but of course we now have a
  1127. 44:08huge
  1128. 44:10problem since the inmar data was all
  1129. 44:13coming from one satellite the arcs
  1130. 44:15created by these seven handshakes
  1131. 44:17created multiple possible routes that
  1132. 44:19the aircraft might have flown and
  1133. 44:21therefore an enormous potential search
  1134. 44:23area several hugely accomplished pilots
  1135. 44:26and inves have come up with very
  1136. 44:28plausible scenarios on how the aircraft
  1137. 44:30must have been flown after that last
  1138. 44:32radar position to both align with all of
  1139. 44:35those seven handshakes and avoid
  1140. 44:38detection almost everyone agrees that
  1141. 44:40the most likely route includes a turn
  1142. 44:42from the previously northwesterly Co
  1143. 44:44around the area of a waypoint called
  1144. 44:46neam onto a more southwesterly
  1145. 44:49course this would bring it down past the
  1146. 44:51northern tip of Indonesia close to band
  1147. 44:54AE and sometime after that it might
  1148. 44:57might have chosen a suddenly course
  1149. 44:58straight down into the southern Indian
  1150. 45:00Ocean now I will link to some incredible
  1151. 45:04investigative work made by Captain
  1152. 45:05Patrick blle and John Luke marand in the
  1153. 45:08description of this video which lays out
  1154. 45:10a very plausible final route but what I
  1155. 45:14really want to do now is to also look at
  1156. 45:16the possibility that there actually
  1157. 45:18might be more physical evidence of where
  1158. 45:20this aircraft finally ended up all of
  1159. 45:23the evidence that I've presented to you
  1160. 45:25so far points to a deliberate action
  1161. 45:27from someone on board with expert
  1162. 45:29knowledge of the aircraft its systems
  1163. 45:31and the airspace it was flying through
  1164. 45:34but a question that has been nagging me
  1165. 45:36is that would someone who has obviously
  1166. 45:39planned this so thoroughly to avoid
  1167. 45:41detection bring the aircraft out to this
  1168. 45:44point and then just turn the aircraft
  1169. 45:46South and wait several hours until it
  1170. 45:47ran out of
  1171. 45:49fuel it it feels a bit unlikely given
  1172. 45:52how active this person was during those
  1173. 45:54initial parts of the maneuver and I
  1174. 45:57wouldn't be surprised if he continued to
  1175. 45:59be as active until the very end but
  1176. 46:01again this will be hard to prove without
  1177. 46:03further physical
  1178. 46:05evidence and it now looks like we might
  1179. 46:08possibly have just
  1180. 46:12that you see back in 2008 an American
  1181. 46:15astrophysicist by the name of Joseph
  1182. 46:17huton Taylor Jr started working on
  1183. 46:20something called the weak signal
  1184. 46:21propagation reporter protocol or whisper
  1185. 46:24for short he had previously received
  1186. 46:26Nobel Prize in physics back in 1993 for
  1187. 46:29his work on pulsars but he was also a
  1188. 46:32keen amateur radio
  1189. 46:34Enthusiast whisper is a protocol for low
  1190. 46:37power radio Transmissions that explores
  1191. 46:39how low medium and high frequency
  1192. 46:41Transmissions propagate over large
  1193. 46:43distances and Taylor designed computer
  1194. 46:45software that was used to analyze these
  1195. 46:47signals when these signals move over
  1196. 46:50large distances they sometimes scatter
  1197. 46:52when they hit obstacles in their path
  1198. 46:54and this causes tiny anomalies in the
  1199. 46:57signal strength this was interesting for
  1200. 47:00radio amateurs because they could
  1201. 47:01sometimes use those obstacles to improve
  1202. 47:03overall reception and crucially one
  1203. 47:06feature in the whisper protocol is that
  1204. 47:08the reception from thousands of these
  1205. 47:10signals have been uploaded into a shared
  1206. 47:13database and stored all the way back to
  1207. 47:162008 now I want to be absolutely clear
  1208. 47:19here and say that Taylor himself never
  1209. 47:21designed whisper to be used for the
  1210. 47:23tracking of aircraft neither did he
  1211. 47:25actually think that it was possible but
  1212. 47:28back in 2021 an avionic system engineer
  1213. 47:30called Richard Godfrey started exploring
  1214. 47:32the possibility of using the whisper
  1215. 47:34data base together with algorithms to
  1216. 47:36look for anomalies in several different
  1217. 47:39simultaneous Transmissions as a kind of
  1218. 47:41poor man's primary
  1219. 47:43radar theoretically if you know the
  1220. 47:46exact location of the transmitter and
  1221. 47:47the receiver together with the time of
  1222. 47:49day and about a million other factors
  1223. 47:52there might be a possibility to use tiny
  1224. 47:54concurring anomalies in several of these
  1225. 47:56signal signals to track something like
  1226. 47:59an aircraft and the really cool thing is
  1227. 48:01that this technology samples thousands
  1228. 48:03of signals every two minutes which could
  1229. 48:06potentially give us much more
  1230. 48:08information than we previously had
  1231. 48:11Godfrey understood this and from 2021
  1232. 48:13until today he and his colleagues Dr
  1233. 48:15hannes quet and Professor Simon maskell
  1234. 48:18have been trying to analyze this data
  1235. 48:20base to try and find traces of MH370 and
  1236. 48:24in a report released on the 31st of
  1237. 48:27August 2023 they claim that they have
  1238. 48:29actually done just that again this video
  1239. 48:33is not about whether this technology
  1240. 48:35actually can be used this way or not but
  1241. 48:37what I find fascinating here is that
  1242. 48:39it's based on verifiable stored data so
  1243. 48:42just like with DNA that couldn't be used
  1244. 48:45much during the early years but has
  1245. 48:47since been refined to incredible
  1246. 48:49accuracy maybe there actually is
  1247. 48:51something hidden inside of these
  1248. 48:54signals this team's Trace data have
  1249. 48:57actually already improved significantly
  1250. 48:59from their first results as their
  1251. 49:01algorithms have been evolving and this
  1252. 49:04latest report tells a quite fascinating
  1253. 49:06story initially the whisper data
  1254. 49:09coincided nicely with the existing radar
  1255. 49:11information up until just prior to vampy
  1256. 49:14where it indicated that the aircraft
  1257. 49:16made a turn to a more Westerly heading
  1258. 49:19it then paralleled the assumed track on
  1259. 49:21a slightly more suddenly course than
  1260. 49:23indicated by the RAR radar and this
  1261. 49:25could be because of the inherent in
  1262. 49:27preciseness of the technology or the
  1263. 49:29same from the radar which at that point
  1264. 49:31was at the very limit of its effective
  1265. 49:33range in any case the whisper track
  1266. 49:36continued up towards the Northwest where
  1267. 49:38it intercepted exactly the arc from the
  1268. 49:40first inmarsat handshake at time 0228
  1269. 49:42and 15 seconds the data then indicates
  1270. 49:45that the aircraft continued up towards a
  1271. 49:47point known as sanb after which it made
  1272. 49:49a left turn towards uram all very close
  1273. 49:52to what the other experts predicted that
  1274. 49:54the aircraft must have done to continue
  1275. 49:55avoiding military Radars and additional
  1276. 49:57scrutiny by ATC now I won't go into all
  1277. 50:02of the details of the route that the
  1278. 50:03whisper data indicated but I want to
  1279. 50:05highlight a few important things this
  1280. 50:08data pointed to a track that wasn't
  1281. 50:10completely straight down into the
  1282. 50:12southern Indian Ocean instead it showed
  1283. 50:14a series of turns Each of which was
  1284. 50:17pointing towards an existing Waypoint
  1285. 50:19but not ever on the same Airway this
  1286. 50:22corresponds nicely with an aircraft that
  1287. 50:24was still being piloted but in planned
  1288. 50:27way to avoid interfering with existing
  1289. 50:29Airways where a potential traffic
  1290. 50:31conflict could arise remember it would
  1291. 50:33not be seen on tcast nor could whoever
  1292. 50:36was flying it see other traffic if the
  1293. 50:39intention was to not be detected this
  1294. 50:42type of behavior would make perfect
  1295. 50:43sense since its ultimate destination
  1296. 50:45would be very hard to predict in case it
  1297. 50:47was partially being
  1298. 50:49monitored The Whisper data also
  1299. 50:51suggested that the aircraft slowed down
  1300. 50:54slightly during two different intervals
  1301. 50:56of its Jagged flight down towards the
  1302. 50:58South which could possibly mean step
  1303. 51:00climbs but the thing that really stood
  1304. 51:02out to me was the fact that the whisper
  1305. 51:04data corresponded almost perfectly with
  1306. 51:06all of the seven inm Marat handshake
  1307. 51:08arcs which is data that no one is really
  1308. 51:12disputing towards the end of the flight
  1309. 51:14The Whisper position also indicated
  1310. 51:16something very
  1311. 51:17strange because it looked like the
  1312. 51:19aircraft started flying in a figure
  1313. 51:21eight pattern in between the sixth and
  1314. 51:24the seventh handshake which would have
  1315. 51:25been when the aircraft was predicted to
  1316. 51:27be running out of fuel the aircraft
  1317. 51:29wouldn't do that by itself because the
  1318. 51:31Ruder compensating system in the Boeing
  1319. 51:337 is designed to compensate for the
  1320. 51:35asymmetric trust after an engine failure
  1321. 51:37so if this pattern was actually flown it
  1322. 51:40must have been a deliberate act by
  1323. 51:42whoever was in controls now it is very
  1324. 51:45hard to speculate on why someone would
  1325. 51:47do something like that but at this time
  1326. 51:50it would have been daylight in that area
  1327. 51:51and the weather was clear so it is
  1328. 51:53possible that this was done to look out
  1329. 51:55for ships in the area nearby as a
  1330. 51:58reassurance that the aircraft's final
  1331. 52:00resting place would not be seen the bfo
  1332. 52:04from the inmas data indicated that the
  1333. 52:05aircraft could have been in a very steep
  1334. 52:07descend during the last log on handshake
  1335. 52:09as high as 14,500 ft per minute but that
  1336. 52:13doesn't necessarily mean that it just
  1337. 52:15Dove straight into the sea instead again
  1338. 52:17according to the excellent report of
  1339. 52:19Captain Bley and januk Mand there is a
  1340. 52:22possibility that the right engine flamed
  1341. 52:24out due to fuel starvation and that this
  1342. 52:26led the person in charge to start the
  1343. 52:28Apu and open the Crossfield valve to
  1344. 52:31maximize the use of the remaining fuel
  1345. 52:34the Apu standpipe sits a little bit
  1346. 52:36lower in the tank than the engines does
  1347. 52:39so that gives it a little bit more
  1348. 52:40access to all available Fuel and the
  1349. 52:43person in command could then have
  1350. 52:44manually shut down the remaining engine
  1351. 52:46to maximize the Apu use which would have
  1352. 52:49given access to all flight controls and
  1353. 52:51systems for as long as possible and also
  1354. 52:54enable the flaps to be extended which
  1355. 52:56would wouldn't be possible without
  1356. 52:58either one engine or the Apu running
  1357. 53:01when the last inmat log on was completed
  1358. 53:03it lacked information from for example
  1359. 53:05the inflight entertainment system which
  1360. 53:07is logical if the aircraft was being
  1361. 53:08powered by only the Apu since systems
  1362. 53:11like the if would then have been shed to
  1363. 53:14prioritize more important
  1364. 53:16systems according to Captain bl's
  1365. 53:18calculations the aircraft could have
  1366. 53:20ended up either very close to the
  1367. 53:22seventh Arc if it was in a rapid dive or
  1368. 53:25as far as 60 7even nautical miles
  1369. 53:27further south if the aircraft was flown
  1370. 53:29to maximize its Glide and touch down
  1371. 53:32with flaps 30 selected the whisper data
  1372. 53:34showed a possible last position at time
  1373. 53:360819 and 37 seconds and after that there
  1374. 53:39were no more correlated anomalies found
  1375. 53:42we do know that the aircraft crashed in
  1376. 53:44the ocean in or near the already
  1377. 53:46searched area because both internal and
  1378. 53:48external parts of the aircraft have been
  1379. 53:50found the confirmed piece of debris
  1380. 53:53comes from a flapper on from the right
  1381. 53:55hand Wing as well as multiple other
  1382. 53:57components which are almost certainly
  1383. 53:59coming from
  1384. 54:00MH370 all of those pieces have been
  1385. 54:02washed up along the coastlines of
  1386. 54:04Eastern Africa and islands around by
  1387. 54:06currents that can be tracked back to
  1388. 54:08this general area and given that some of
  1389. 54:11the debris found comes from inside of
  1390. 54:13the aircraft it is likely that it broke
  1391. 54:16up upon
  1392. 54:18impact this horrific story have already
  1393. 54:21led to improvements in tracking
  1394. 54:23commercial aircraft over oceans longer
  1395. 54:25life for emergency located transmitters
  1396. 54:28and better ATC procedures for tracking
  1397. 54:30aircraft but we can't lay this to rest
  1398. 54:33before the wreckage is actually found
  1399. 54:36again this is why I created this video
  1400. 54:39linked below here in the description are
  1401. 54:41two different theories outlining two new
  1402. 54:44search areas outside of those already
  1403. 54:47searched in the biggest search effort in
  1404. 54:49aviation history one of those theories
  1405. 54:51are based on the skill and knowledge of
  1406. 54:53two veteran Tri 7 captains and the other
  1407. 54:55on a L contested new application of
  1408. 54:58existing Radio Data but data that has
  1409. 55:01been recently proven to work following
  1410. 55:03flights in other
  1411. 55:08areas I am not here to judge what is
  1412. 55:11right or wrong the only thing that I
  1413. 55:12want to achieve is to get the search
  1414. 55:14going again for the sake of the families
  1415. 55:17left behind so here are two relatively
  1416. 55:20small new areas to search please get the
  1417. 55:23boats out there and let's get to the
  1418. 55:25bottom of of this literally
  1419. 55:40[Music]
  1420. 55:49[Music]

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