世界は中国を選んだのか?アメリカを上回った好感度の裏側を徹底解説【マイキー佐野 経済学】 — Transcript
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- 0:02China only looks decent by comparison;
- 0:04China’s appeal and soft power are not
- 0:06the conclusion.
- 0:09>> Yes, hello, this is Mikey. I'm filming
- 0:11for YouTube again today.
- 0:12>> Please, go ahead.
- 0:13>> Thank you.
- 0:14>> Today, I'm doing a personal segment
- 0:16where I ask Mikey about things that
- 0:18caught my attention in the news or the
- 0:20economy, and what struck me was that
- 0:22America's favorability rating has
- 0:24dropped below China's. Seeing that
- 0:26China has a higher favorability rating
- 0:28—well, my personal impression is that
- 0:30China shouldn't have such a high
- 0:32favorability rating. With recent issues
- 0:36like U.S. tariffs and conflicts, and
- 0:38since this channel values a neutral
- 0:40perspective, I wanted to ask about that
- 0:42. To start with the conclusion, it's
- 0:47not that China's favorability has risen
- 0:49, but rather that America's
- 0:50favorability has simply fallen. For
- 0:52example, there are articles like this
- 0:53one. China surpasses America in global
- 0:56favorability. What on earth happened?
- 0:59That was the first one, and the next
- 1:01one says that according to a survey of
- 1:04countries, China and President Xi
- 1:05Jinping are viewed more favorably than
- 1:08America and President Trump, or rather,
- 1:10that Xi himself has surpassed President
- 1:12Trump. However, this is a survey by the
- 1:16Pew Research Center. What is happening
- 1:19right now is that America's soft power
- 1:21is in a state of significant decline.
- 1:24America has supported the international
- 1:26order with this soft power since World
- 1:28War II, but the point is that this
- 1:30influence is waning. The content
- 1:32released by Pew Research shows that
- 1:34China's relative exposure is expanding
- 1:36internationally, right? It is a fact
- 1:37that this is a turning point, but the
- 1:39question is what is actually going on.
- 1:41If you only look at this article, you
- 1:42might wonder what it's talking about,
- 1:44so I will explain that. Well, to begin
- 1:45with, I think it's important to
- 1:47understand that "soft power" has two
- 1:49distinct functions. The first is hard
- 1:51power. The second is soft power. Hard
- 1:53power is often referred to as coercion
- 1:55or inducement—that is, forcing or
- 1:57enticing others—while soft power is
- 2:00about attraction. This concept of soft
- 2:03power, which encompasses things like
- 2:05culture, academics, and diplomacy, was
- 2:08introduced by international political
- 2:10scientist Joseph Nye Jr. in the 1990s
- 2:12and has since been widely used around
- 2:15the world. These terms, soft power and
- 2:18hard power, have only been around for
- 2:20less than 30 years, and when we look at
- 2:23the structure of why soft power is
- 2:25declining, we can see this based on a
- 2:27study conducted across 36 countries.
- 2:30For the first time, China has overtaken
- 2:32the US in terms of favorability.
- 2:34Another study was conducted across 25
- 2:36countries, and the results showed that
- 2:38China is viewed more favorably than the
- 2:40United States. For example, there are
- 2:42even records showing that in countries
- 2:44like Canada, the UK, France, and
- 2:46Australia, trust in President Xi
- 2:48Jinping actually exceeds trust in
- 2:50President Trump. However, regarding
- 2:52this finding, it's not that China did
- 2:55something to improve its own intrinsic
- 2:57appeal. Rather than an increase in its
- 3:00"pulling" power, the US "America First"
- 3:02policy has created diplomatic pressure
- 3:05—a "pushing" force—and this article
- 3:07points out that countries are simply
- 3:09fed up with the unpredictability of the
- 3:12US. Therefore, saying that China is
- 3:14more liked is a completely different
- 3:16matter. It isn't a shift in direction;
- 3:18while we use terms like "favorability"
- 3:20toward China, the reality is that
- 3:22countries haven't switched from the US
- 3:25to China, but are instead hedging their
- 3:27bets. They are reacting to the
- 3:29unpredictability of US actions, where
- 3:30it’s unclear what they will do next,
- 3:32coupled with immense pressure being
- 3:34applied. The response of middle-power
- 3:35nations is not about siding with China
- 3:37just because they are annoyed with
- 3:39America. They are hedging their risks,
- 3:42which we call "coordinative
- 3:43diversification." In other words, they
- 3:46are trying to become chameleons. This
- 3:49is a strategic move. The prime example
- 3:51of this is India, which is really
- 3:53taking this hedging to the extreme.
- 3:55India is often called a "chameleon
- 3:57diplomat" because they claim not to be
- 3:59an ally of either China or America,
- 4:01stating that they do this to diversify
- 4:03their risks. For example, in May 2025,
- 4:05a conflict broke out between India and
- 4:07Pakistan. I featured this on my YouTube
- 4:09channel as well. After that, President
- 4:11Trump took office. However, the US has
- 4:14restricted crude oil purchases from
- 4:16Russia. The US is trying to export its
- 4:18own oil. Yet, India ended up buying
- 4:20record amounts of it. Prime Minister
- 4:22Modi says the US has been very kind to
- 4:25them, like stopping the fighting
- 4:27between India and Pakistan, but at the
- 4:29same time, he attends meetings for the
- 4:31SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization)
- 4:33, Oceania, and the BRICS. On top of
- 4:36that, he visits China to project
- 4:37intimacy with President Xi Jinping and
- 4:40President Putin, highlighting the
- 4:42breadth of his country's diplomatic
- 4:44options. Nevertheless, they maintain a
- 4:46defensive wariness toward China, and
- 4:48issues like the border dispute remain
- 4:51unresolved, keeping relations very
- 4:53tense. India is currently managing to
- 4:55get along well with both China and
- 4:57America, taking the best of both worlds
- 4:59. While India emphasizes its
- 5:00relationship with the US, it is also
- 5:02deepening defense cooperation with
- 5:04countries like Japan, Australia, and
- 5:06the Philippines—where China is
- 5:08exerting pressure—and has even signed
- 5:10defense agreements with the EU, UK, and
- 5:12New Zealand, thereby advancing this
- 5:14strategy of coordinative
- 5:15diversification. We are talking about
- 5:17Europe, and the idea of becoming
- 5:19independent from the United States has
- 5:21actually existed for a long time. This
- 5:23might cause Europe to change
- 5:24drastically in 2027. As for what that
- 5:26means, the French president will change
- 5:28—I'll talk about that somewhere else
- 5:29later. Europe has always had this
- 5:31mindset of wanting to be independent
- 5:33from the U.S., and that process is
- 5:35currently accelerating. For example,
- 5:37back in 1966 under President Charles de
- 5:39Gaulle, there was a clear concern about
- 5:42not wanting to be automatically dragged
- 5:44into America's wars. Back in that era,
- 5:48around 1966 or 1967, Europe actually
- 5:50withdrew from NATO's integrated
- 5:53military command. They didn't break the
- 5:56Western alliance, but it was positioned
- 5:58as a necessary adjustment relative to
- 6:00the United States. France rejoined the
- 6:02integrated command in 2009 under
- 6:04President Sarkozy, but even then, the
- 6:06idea was that while maintaining
- 6:08sovereignty is important, we must also
- 6:11maintain alliance relations,
- 6:12emphasizing the philosophy of being an
- 6:15independent allied nation; leaders like
- 6:17President Macron have since been
- 6:19promoting "strategic autonomy" for
- 6:21Europe, including at events like the
- 6:23Davos Forum. Europe is constantly
- 6:26trying to strike a balance, trying to
- 6:28get along with the U.S. while
- 6:30simultaneously building a bulwark
- 6:32against the law of the strong or the
- 6:34risk of becoming a vassal state due to
- 6:36U.S. confrontation. That said, both
- 6:38France and Germany are strongly opposed
- 6:40to things like America's trade
- 6:41protectionism and tariffs, but they are
- 6:43also facing the issue of being undercut
- 6:45by China's excess production capacity
- 6:47flooding the market with exports. They
- 6:49share a common concern regarding this,
- 6:51which leads them to act in coordination
- 6:53with the U.S., acting like a chameleon
- 6:54depending on the situation. Europe is
- 6:56exactly like that. So, you understand
- 6:58now that it's not like America is just
- 7:00going wild, but that doesn't mean
- 7:02China's favorability has gone up. The
- 7:04reason for that is because information
- 7:06opacity is far too high; when you ask
- 7:08why people don't lean toward China,
- 7:10it's first a security issue, and
- 7:11politically, their systems and legal
- 7:13frameworks are just difficult to see
- 7:15through. In contrast, America's
- 7:17political structure becomes clear when
- 7:19policy decisions are made, and while
- 7:21there is, of course, uncertainty, they
- 7:23do disclose information in real-time,
- 7:24don't they? China is completely a black
- 7:27box, so moving toward China becomes a
- 7:29risk in itself. The question is how to
- 7:31navigate this effectively. This is the
- 7:33current focal point; right now, if
- 7:34anything, because of this balancing act
- 7:36, America's favorability has dropped
- 7:38from overdoing things. However, it is a
- 7:40completely separate matter to say that
- 7:42China's favorability has risen. This is
- 7:43easily understood through the
- 7:45industrial structure, specifically the
- 7:46AI sector. They use the term "silica,"
- 7:48referring to the supply chain of
- 7:50critical components like AI and
- 7:52semiconductors, and America has
- 7:53essentially locked this down entirely,
- 7:55right? For example, in China, we see
- 7:57companies like Alibaba's Qwen or
- 7:59Moonshot AI emerging, and they are
- 8:01competing by releasing open-source
- 8:03models to the world, but if we look at
- 8:05what Europe is actually doing, there is
- 8:07a startup called Mistral AI. And for
- 8:09this, at the software layer, they are
- 8:11using China. But for hardware, they are
- 8:13completely excluding China. The reason
- 8:15for that part is the fear of being
- 8:17backdoored by China or having data
- 8:18compromised, so they are in a state of
- 8:20thoroughly avoiding China. Well, take
- 8:22the British Navy, for example; they've
- 8:24found Chinese signal transmitters and
- 8:26eavesdropping devices in drones,
- 8:28leading to fears of data theft and
- 8:29backdoors, so they are now making sure
- 8:31not to use Chinese tech in their
- 8:33infrastructure. So, what kind of
- 8:35situation have we been in until now? Up
- 8:37until recently, America was favored.
- 8:38China, meanwhile, has remained
- 8:40unchanged as always. They are a bit
- 8:41wary of them. As for America, they
- 8:43aren't wary, but they are opposed to it
- 8:44because of all the reckless things
- 8:45they've been doing. Well, since this is
- 8:47the current state of affairs, all we're
- 8:49seeing is a drop in support for the
- 8:51U.S. as a result. In fact, the
- 8:52conclusion is that it's not that
- 8:54China's favorability has risen, but
- 8:56simply that America's has fallen, and
- 8:58what other countries are seeking—like
- 9:00the example of France I mentioned
- 9:02earlier—is greater autonomy. Because
- 9:04America is acting so aggressively and
- 9:07unilaterally, rubbing many countries
- 9:09the wrong way, China just looks more
- 9:11reasonable by comparison; that doesn't
- 9:13mean China's appeal or soft power has
- 9:16actually increased. China remains
- 9:18highly opaque, using coercion, exports,
- 9:21and intimidation to gain territory and
- 9:23influence its political systems.
- 9:25Countries like Japan, South Korea,
- 9:27India, and the Philippines haven't let
- 9:29their guard down either. So, even as
- 9:30American favorability plummets, the
- 9:33threat posed by China is actually
- 9:35increasing. Whether it's nuclear or
- 9:38conventional deterrence, there may come
- 9:40a time when countries have to rely on
- 9:42the U.S., so they can't just turn away;
- 9:44it's purely that America's soft power
- 9:46is waning, and while the data might
- 9:48suggest China's favorability is up, I
- 9:50don't think it's fair to say their soft
- 9:53power is truly growing, so I think it's
- 9:55easier to understand if you view it
- 9:57that way. Next, I need to talk about
- 9:59the French presidential election
- 10:01sometime. It's a good point, but if Le
- 10:03Pen were to somehow become president,
- 10:05France itself would see some massive
- 10:06internal changes. It would actually
- 10:08impact the Japanese economy, and the
- 10:10shape of the EU would change
- 10:11drastically, too. There's also the fact
- 10:12that she’s been making proposals that
- 10:14would effectively render the EU
- 10:15non-functional, so I’ll discuss that
- 10:17for the sake of the nation, looking at
- 10:18it from the perspective of a potential
- 10:20Le Pen presidency. That was today’s
- 10:23topic: articles are circulating even in
- 10:25the US suggesting that favorability
- 10:26toward China has risen while
- 10:28favorability toward the US has dropped,
- 10:30leading to a reversal in sentiment. But
- 10:32when you analyze it, it's clear that
- 10:34soft power is simply weakening. It’s
- 10:36not that favorability toward China is
- 10:38actually rising, but rather that
- 10:40favorability toward the US is
- 10:42plummeting. That’s the current
- 10:44reality. Many countries are caught up
- 10:47in this, moving toward an "Indian style
- 10:49" of cherry-picking the best of both
- 10:51worlds. They are seeking their own
- 10:54regional autonomy, staying wary of
- 10:56China while keeping the US at a
- 10:58distance, yet trying to avoid any major
- 11:00friction. That’s the situation now,
- 11:04so I think this news becomes quite
- 11:05interesting if you look at how the US
- 11:07and China move, and which countries end
- 11:10up frustrated or pleased as a result.
- 11:12Anyway, thank you all for watching
- 11:13until the end today. I've summarized
- 11:15what we talked about today in a report,
- 11:16so if you'd like to receive it, please
- 11:18check out our official LINE account to
- 11:19grab a copy. Also, if you found
- 11:21today’s video interesting,
- 11:22educational, or helpful, please
- 11:24subscribe to the channel and support us
- 11:26. As I mentioned in the main segment,
- 11:29I’ve been looking into various
- 11:30economic factors, and I’ve just
- 11:31become a monthly subscriber to The Wall
- 11:33Street Journal.
- 11:34>> Oh, really? That’s great.
- 11:36>> Watching YouTube,
- 11:37>> I was thinking that, well, I don't know
- 11:39if I mentioned this before, but I
- 11:40wanted to include this video after
- 11:41covering how to look at the media.
- 11:43>> How is it? Is it difficult? No, not
- 11:45really.
- 11:46>> No, not really. Relatively.
- 11:48>> Inagaki-kun never studies those things
- 11:50and just wings it every single time. It
- 11:52just so happens that Inagaki-kun isn't
- 11:54here today. There's an area here where
- 11:58you are a bit more forward-thinking
- 11:59than Inagaki-san. You're picking on
- 12:03Inagaki-kun again, aren't you? That's
- 12:06right.
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