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الحل إيه؟ صراع القرن الأفريقي وتهديدات سد النهضة مع د. أماني الطويل — Transcript

by الحل إيه؟ مع د. رباب المهدي · 9,418 words · 1,638 segments · language en · Watch on YouTube

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0:00The Horn of Africa is a vital gateway
0:02for Egyptian national security.
0:04>> Today, Somalia is prone to fragmentation
0:06, Ethiopia is prone to fragmentation,
0:08and Sudan is prone to fragmentation.
0:10>> What are the most important challenges
0:12facing Egyptian national security?
0:14>> Israeli security is, in fact,
0:16historically and strategically linked to
0:18the fragmentation of this region.
0:20>> What should Egypt's role be regarding
0:22what is happening in Sudan now?
0:24>> Put a great deal of effort into creating
0:26a Sudanese civil consensus in Sudan.
0:28>> And are we playing that role? We do not
0:30have an understanding of the personal
0:32African approaches. Presenters say "the
0:34dark continent" or "the black continent
0:35"—why are you color-coding the continent
0:37, folks? Despite what was spent to
0:39cultivate it, America did not protect
0:42the Gulf. And here is the option, which
0:43is the Emirates hub. So, should it be
0:45Israel? What would Israel be? Israel
0:47would be a security partner, a
0:48technological partner, and an economic
0:50partner. And we have seen this over the
0:51last two or three years with the UAE.
0:54If I cannot rely on America to secure me
0:56, I will rely on Israel for security.
1:00What can Egypt and Saudi Arabia do? If
1:03Egypt and Saudi Arabia truly manage to
1:05build a solid relationship, many people
1:08in the region will recalculate.
1:11>> In a region where conflict is now
1:12escalating between what is happening in
1:15Sudan and what is happening in Ethiopia
1:17.
1:18>> Our problem with Ethiopia is a problem
1:19that transcends the political system; we
1:21might enter into proxy confrontations.
1:23>> Regarding the Renaissance Dam
1:25specifically, did Egypt err in managing
1:27this file?
1:28What exactly are its estimates for the
1:30profit and the solution regarding the
1:32Renaissance Dam and Egypt's security?
1:35These people have a historical problem
1:37with us and view us as colonizers.
1:39>> How should we deal with the refugee file
1:42?
1:42>> A girl who is in medical school, gets
1:44picked up at the gate of the college,
1:46and is deprived of her exam because of
1:48paperwork—if she became Minister of
1:49Health, what would that look like?
1:59The Horn of Africa is a vital gateway
2:02for security.
2:04Egyptian national security, not only
2:07related to Bab el-Mandeb, the Red Sea,
2:10and maritime security, but also Egyptian
2:13water security in a region where
2:16conflict is now escalating between what
2:19is happening in Sudan and what is
2:22happening in Ethiopia.
2:25And international and regional
2:27competition.
2:29Axes competing to have a foothold.
2:34At the heart of it is Israeli
2:36competition and presence. In the midst
2:40of all this, what can? Egypt do to
2:43guarantee its national security and the
2:46security of the continent?
2:49With me today is Dr. Amani El-Tawil, a
2:52researcher in African affairs and a
2:55member of the Al-Ahram Center for
2:58Political and Strategic Studies. Welcome
3:02, Doctor.
3:03>> Welcome, Dr. Rabab.
3:04>> Today, as we talk about the Horn of
3:07Africa. The region that includes Eritrea
3:10, Somalia, and Djibouti.
3:12What are the most important challenges
3:15facing Egyptian national security? In
3:18relation to the Horn of Africa.
3:21The truth is, we are facing a number of
3:23multiple, or hybrid, challenges, as they
3:26say.
3:27The traditional challenges are those
3:28related to maritime security. In
3:30connection with the Suez Canal. And what
3:32is related to water security, in
3:33connection with the Nile Basin.
3:35Considering that the Horn of Africa. Is
3:36largely in Ethiopia. You mentioned those
3:39three, which is the classic
3:41classification of the Horn of Africa.
3:45But we have additional threats linked to
3:50direct security threats.
3:55Regarding demographic security, because
3:57this is a region for human trafficking,
4:00arms smuggling, and drug smuggling.
4:04One of the hubs for organized crime.
4:10From the Horn of Africa to West Africa,
4:12passing through both Egypt and Sudan.
4:17>> All of this is what we call real threats
4:20that affect the Egyptian citizen, number
4:23one, and affect Egypt's geopolitical
4:26situation.
4:29The ability to maintain its interests
4:32and comprehensive capabilities as a
4:35state.
4:36>> Have these threats increased recently?
4:39The importance of the Horn of Africa to
4:42Egypt is historical, dating back to the
4:45Pharaohs, but recently, for example,
4:48when we see a quadrilateral summit
4:51including Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan.
4:54In early October. In Asmara.
4:59Is its timing linked to the increase in
5:01risks facing Egypt?
5:04Or facing the continent? How do you
5:06interpret it? No, I read it within a
5:09broader framework.
5:10I read it within the framework of
5:12Egyptian interest in Africa, because I
5:14can say that since roughly 2013 or 2014
5:17, Africa began to take its natural
5:19weight. Which was not present in the
5:21period before it. In Egyptian diplomacy
5:23. And in Egyptian strategic interests.
5:27This was linked to two things.
5:30>> The current challenge regarding water
5:33security, the Renaissance Dam, and the
5:35increasing security threats from the
5:37West Africa region; so the situation was
5:40assessed, meaning Africa was placed
5:42within the framework of Egyptian
5:44strategic interest, and I want to tell
5:47you that Egyptian interest in Africa is
5:49not focused only on the Horn of Africa;
5:52now we are also very interested in West
5:54Africa.
5:57>> So this is a deeper and more
5:59comprehensive interest regarding current
6:01challenges, but of course there is a
6:03component of current challenges or
6:05current variables, let's be more precise
6:08, which is related to the threat to
6:10states, the threat to the national state
6:12; today Somalia is prone to
6:14fragmentation, Ethiopia is prone to
6:16fragmentation, Sudan is prone to
6:18fragmentation.
6:19>> Will this reflect directly on Egypt? It
6:22will reflect, yes, I will tell you how
6:23it will reflect.
6:26>> Fluidity in any state means that you
6:28have uncontrolled groups or the rise of
6:31a non-official actor.
6:34>> Which is the militias; we saw these
6:37militias practicing piracy off the
6:40Somali coast, affecting Red Sea security
6:43, and we saw them affecting the Sudanese
6:46state.
6:48>> We saw Al-Shabaab in Somalia affecting
6:51Somalia.
6:53>> This is regarding the direct security
6:56threats. And the possibilities of the
6:58increasing capabilities of extremist
7:00groups. The second issue is the nature
7:02of the regional projects proposed.
7:05These projects are linked to accessing
7:09resources. Easy access. Not ordinary
7:12access. Easy or lower-cost access. Let
7:15me tell you, because access to resources
7:18can be done through agreements with
7:20states. Meaning direct investments.
7:23Agreements with states and so on, but.
7:25There has become a trend for lower-cost
7:28access. That we fragment states.
7:31And we obtain resources through groups
7:34controlling areas. Through militias,
7:37through.
7:38Uh.
7:39Meaning local groups controlling areas.
7:43And we saw this in Sudan. Meaning it was
7:45.
7:47Looting of gold.
7:49>> In one way or another through
7:50non-governmental forces, or not through
7:53the state; meaning the second issue is
7:55what is related to the security of some
7:57countries.
7:59>> Especially Israel; Israeli security, in
8:02fact, historically and strategically is
8:04linked to the fragmentation of this
8:06region.
8:08>> And we saw during the last decade the
8:10idea of fragmentation on a sectarian
8:12basis, Shiite-Sunni, and these are
8:13repercussions we are still suffering
8:15from in our region.
8:16>> Uh.
8:18Ours. The second thing is the presence
8:21of ready-made Israeli projects
8:23historically in existence. Being
8:25promoted in American research centers to
8:28fragment states. Sudan is larger than
8:31necessary, Somalia. Somalia, Somaliland
8:34is the stable one. And the rest of
8:36Somalia is not stable. This is a better
8:38model than that. In truth, this is an
8:40Israeli project for the region. And it
8:42has been declared since '55.
8:44Meaning the periphery alliances. Israel
8:46was a state that emerged in a hostile
8:49environment. It was natural for it to
8:52find footholds on the fringes of this
8:54Arab environment. So Ethiopia was chosen
8:57. Chad was chosen. Talk along these
8:59lines.
9:00So we are facing a project of a regional
9:03nature.
9:04We have a project of an international
9:05nature.
9:06>> Because the Chinese Belt and Road
9:08project, its maritime route in our
9:10region is the Red Sea.
9:12>> Rigging the Red Sea, the lack of
9:15stability in the Red Sea is an American
9:18interest against Chinese interests, so
9:20you have more than one level of conflict
9:23. Then the militarization of the Red Sea
9:26that took place in Djibouti.
9:28So all of these are threats, in fact.
9:31We can say. About them as multi-level
9:33existential threats.
9:35That require Egyptian attention at the
9:38highest level. And require hard
9:40mechanisms, which are.
9:44Mechanisms meaning military power and so
9:47on. And also require non-hard, flexible
9:49, and soft mechanisms. Including
9:52cultural and media tools and so on.
9:56>> We will come to these tools in detail,
9:59but let me understand with you another
10:02axis we have been seeing in recent years
10:05, which is the competition over ports, I
10:08mean.
10:09>> Ports.
10:10>> Over ports, there is Saudi-Emirati
10:12competition, a Turkish entry; what is
10:15the importance of these ports, why is
10:18there this level of competition, and
10:20what does this mean for Egypt's security
10:23?
10:25>> The truth is, the competition over ports
10:27is linked to ease of access to resources
10:30.
10:30One, two, the economies of the ports
10:33themselves. And how to develop them. And
10:35how they join economic operations that
10:39are linked, interconnected, or
10:42sequential, I mean.
10:46Ports also provide opportunities to
10:49secure supply chains.
10:51And provide opportunities for regional
10:54influence in one way or another. So all
10:56of this, meaning its reasons. Especially
10:59the Red Sea.
11:00Because if you notice, the Red Sea is an
11:03enclosed sea.
11:07>> Its eastern ports affect the conditions
11:10on its west; the geographical proximity
11:12between the eastern and western ports is
11:15a factor with a security nature, so all
11:18these are issues also linked to the Gulf
11:21, actually, and the Cooperation Council
11:24has placed the Red Sea as one of the
11:26areas of strategic interest.
11:30>> For almost more than a decade,
11:33investment, or investment of oil
11:35revenues in the Gulf region.
11:38>> Was directed toward the Horn of Africa
11:41region and the Red Sea as a point.
11:44As an initial foothold for accessing the
11:47African continent. Through hard and
11:49flexible mechanisms, and so on,
11:51including agriculture. Including
11:52religious proselytizing. Including, I
11:54mean.
11:56I want to tell you, with various goals.
11:58So ports are the hub that allows all of
12:02this.
12:03>> When we talk about accessing the
12:07continent. And the projects you are
12:09mentioning. And we find, for example,
12:12that someone like the UAE. Is now the
12:15fourth largest investor on the continent
12:18. There are many analyses from
12:20international research centers that
12:23point. To the crystallization of two
12:26competing axes now.
12:28An Emirati-Israeli-Ethiopian axis and a
12:32Saudi-Egyptian axis, with Turkish
12:36support or agreements with Turkey in
12:39certain dimensions; to what extent have
12:43these axes formed and become fixed, and
12:47can we really say they are in a duel or
12:51competition to reshape the region?
12:55>> Look, I don't call it a duel or
12:57competition; I simply call it that Egypt
13:00and Saudi Arabia are the pillars of the
13:02Arab system; the Arab system has been
13:04battered since the first Gulf War and
13:07its aftermath.
13:08>> Good.
13:09And this has actually allowed for the
13:11increase of Israeli-Ethiopian influence
13:13at the expense of Arab interests.
13:17And today we see the manifestations of
13:19this situation in all Arab countries.
13:23How many regions do we have with war,
13:24how many countries are at war?
13:27Egypt, with its historical depth and
13:30strategic awareness, and Saudi Arabia,
13:33as a true state—meaning land and people
13:36—
13:37>> Um.
13:38>> They possess the capacity for foresight
13:42and understanding, for, I mean, risk
13:46assessment.
13:50>> Not only for the Arab system, but also
13:52for their own countries individually.
13:55Therefore, I believe the Egyptian-Saudi
13:57rapprochement must be a strategic one,
14:00and I think it is being discussed in
14:02certain circles and has been discussed
14:04academically; I have personally been
14:06part of panel discussions on this matter
14:09. What is the future of Egyptian-Saudi
14:11interaction?
14:12>> We, uh.
14:14I mean, let me tell you. Until the
14:17beginning of the nineties. The Arab
14:19region was, to some extent. Able to
14:22interact. Regarding its shared interests
14:25.
14:26There was a degree of consensus.
14:29How do you measure it? How much does it
14:30weigh? That is not the problem. But
14:32today, there is a degree of conflict.
14:34What is the cause?
14:36In my opinion, Gulf security is the
14:39reason.
14:40>> Gulf security, the answer to the
14:42question of Gulf security, is what
14:44happened in the nineties; we witnessed
14:46an encroachment—and I will be frank
14:47about this—
14:49>> Please do.
14:50>> Syrian, Iraqi, Iranian encroachment on
14:52the Gulf states.
14:54>> And this is where it distinguishes
14:56between Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
14:59states, the UAE and others, which are
15:01smaller.
15:02>> This encroachment raised the question in
15:05this region: what do we do about our
15:07security? There were two options, in
15:09fact: an option to have comprehensive
15:11Arab security, meaning a collective
15:13security system.
15:16For the Arab region, and there was an
15:18option to rely on the powerful forces in
15:20the world, or the invincible forces in
15:22the world.
15:23>> America.
15:24>> America.
15:26>> And these countries chose America, and
15:28it happened that there were American
15:31bases in this region on a large scale.
15:35But events, interactions, and variables
15:38proved that America, despite what was
15:41spent.
15:42>> To appease it, did not protect the Gulf
15:45, and here is the option the other chose
15:48, which is the UAE.
15:50>> Well, what about Israel?
15:51>> What if Israel remains as a security
15:53partner to maintain security? What
15:55remains of Israel?
15:56>> What if Israel remains as a security
15:58partner, a technological partner, and an
15:59economic partner?
16:01We have seen this over the past two or
16:03three years with the UAE. In this
16:04context, this partnership was put
16:06forward to see if it could withstand
16:08Israel’s third historical ally, Ethiopia
16:10, especially since there are
16:12Gulf-Ethiopian relations.
16:14>> If I could not rely on America to secure
16:17me, I will rely on Israel to secure me.
16:21I mean, I want to tell you, what is this
16:24?
16:25These are choices; it chose.
16:27>> Yes, I just want to understand the logic
16:29behind it.
16:30>> It chose; it saw that this is a country
16:32poised to be a major regional power, a
16:35power that is influential on regional
16:37security with American support.
16:39>> Therefore, it is here on the winning
16:42side; this is an assessment. I cannot
16:44say why this is its assessment.
16:45>> Based on multiple factors.
16:48>> Good. There is a different assessment
16:50for states that are more, I mean,
16:52meeting the conditions of a true state
16:55that you and I know in academia—meaning
16:58land, people, functions, and so on.
17:01>> They are Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
17:03>> So the assessment here is different from
17:05the assessment here.
17:07>> And then, if I look at many of the Gulf
17:11states, let me tell you that their
17:14behaviors are corporate behaviors; they
17:18don't have—in academia, we use the idea
17:23of a "corporate state."
17:25>> Exactly.
17:26>> So its assessments are of profit; it has
17:28an assessment of profit.
17:30>> Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s assessment is
17:32not like that, despite Egypt’s economic
17:35conditions, mind you.
17:37But the idea of profit is the survival
17:38of the state, the continuation of the
17:40state, its ability to perform its
17:42functions—these are the Egyptian
17:44strategic foundations, right?
17:46>> Well, by virtue of their geopolitical
17:48and strategic situation, and their
17:49presence in the region—historically in
17:51other regions, the situation isn't like
17:53that; these are modern states.
17:55>> They have not yet been able to leap
17:58beyond the factor of profit.
18:02>> I mean, to have an appreciation of the
18:05state.
18:07>> Let me say that I see this as perhaps
18:10natural, because these are essentially
18:13rentier economies.
18:15>> True.
18:16>> And they have attracted residents from
18:19all over the world to perform these
18:22roles and help in—I mean—utilizing the
18:25resources, which was oil; the phase has
18:29changed.
18:30>> Oil has dried up; oil—perhaps renewable
18:33energy is displacing it a little,
18:36perhaps climate change is displacing it
18:39a little—so other options remain for
18:42investing abroad.
18:44We benefit from the revenues of this oil
18:47in various activities: critical minerals
18:49, gold, ports, meaning it is to survive
18:52, okay.
18:55>> He did not choose to enter this region
18:56into a collective security system
18:58because the region is his fate.
19:00>> Yes.
19:01>> It is a region with major problems, with
19:04problems where major powers can bully
19:06these smaller states, and he has
19:08experience with that, so he knows. So,
19:11honestly, I don't like to criminalize.
19:14But I always say that there is an
19:16assessment linked to the circumstances.
19:18If Egypt and Saudi Arabia succeed in
19:21establishing a strategic alliance.
19:26>> And maintaining what remains of the Arab
19:28system.
19:29>> This point will be attractive.
19:32>> To the Gulf states, because they will
19:34discover that this entity or this
19:36alliance is a solid alliance that can
19:39protect them and defend their security.
19:42>> So if Egypt and Saudi Arabia succeed in
19:44this, we can say that this could be an
19:47attractive model for the rest, because
19:49in the end, everyone is looking to
19:50secure their interests, and what is the
19:53most important of these interests?
19:56Security interests. Well, let me ask two
19:59questions here.
20:01When you were talking about this
20:03Emirati-Israeli alliance, you relied on
20:06Israel as a partner.
20:08>> The Israeli-Ethiopian partnership.
20:10>> Yes, the Ethiopian one. How does this
20:13reflect on Egyptian national security?
20:18This is the first question, and then we
20:21will go to what Egypt and Saudi Arabia
20:24can do.
20:28Regarding the first question, it does
20:29not reflect directly; you saw, the
20:31security is final.
20:33>> You saw that you are threatened today by
20:35Ethiopia.
20:36>> You saw that Ethiopia did not reach any
20:39agreements with you; you saw
20:41Israeli-Ethiopian cooperation during the
20:44negotiation period.
20:47>> I mean, the methodology of the
20:49negotiations or the discussions that
20:52took place over, I think, from November
20:542011, stopped in 2020.
20:59>> And then it took—in 2019, it took three
21:01months for the 2020 agreement in
21:03Washington, and then we failed.
21:07>> So, this is your water security, your
21:10economic security through the Red Sea.
21:15>> So this will affect all Egyptian
21:17interests related to the south, the rise
21:20of security threats, because the
21:22Ethiopian mentality—we did not deal with
21:25it with deep understanding, and we
21:27understood that these people have a
21:30problem with us historically.
21:33>> And they look at us as colonizers.
21:35>> Colonizers.
21:37>> So, if we do not deal with the correct
21:39methods—one, two—they also left
21:42themselves, like Djibouti, completely in
21:44favor of Israeli and Western projects.
21:47I mean, imagine, imagine.
21:50>> Cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia—
21:53economic, social, and cultural—and Sudan
21:56and Eritrea.
21:56>> Yes.
21:57>> Imagine what the geopolitical size of
21:59this cooperative system would be.
22:01>> What its weight would be.
22:03>> How great its threat to others would be
22:05, of course.
22:05>> Imagine if this system entered eastwards
22:08, towards the Gulf.
22:09>> True.
22:10>> You understand me, you have created here
22:12a huge cooperative system.
22:14>> Huge.
22:15>> So this is not Israel's interests, it is
22:17the West's interests.
22:18>> The West historically, and when I say "
22:21the West" here, I am not talking only
22:23about America; the West also, from its
22:25colonial foundation, Britain.
22:27>> You understand me, it’s still based on
22:29the idea of fragmentation—fragmentation
22:31to gain influence, control, and access
22:33to resources. You are currently in a
22:35phase of international "scramble" for
22:37Africa; it's the third scramble.
22:40>> Okay, over the past two centuries using
22:44various methods.
22:46>> Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as you mentioned
22:48, are the cornerstone of regional
22:50security.
22:51>> What should they do? Regarding the Red
22:54Sea, we have the Red Sea Council. This
22:57Red Sea Council was the fruit of
22:59regional Arab-African cooperation.
23:02>> It was announced in Riyadh, but this
23:04council is currently stalled—stalled due
23:07to internal disputes.
23:10Meaning, one of the reasons for it is
23:15the UAE.
23:16>> The second issue concerns the joint
23:19security system, and this is not
23:22directed against anyone.
23:25>> This is related to defense—defending our
23:28interests. Okay, so this is a level that
23:32perhaps could be the building block upon
23:35which Arab collective security is built
23:38, or collective security in the Levant
23:41region. I mean, I always prefer not to
23:44put things into a massive framework. The
23:47framework I always lean toward is the
23:49step-by-step idea.
23:50>> Yes.
23:52>> The third thing, which I see as
23:53important—I actually asked if it existed
23:55or not, and they told me no.
23:58>> It is the idea of elite interaction with
24:00one another. We have no interaction
24:02between us and the Saudi elites.
24:04>> I mean, lately, there have been the
24:06Riyadh festivals or artistic frameworks
24:08.
24:08>> Yes.
24:09>> But the cultural problems, the cultural
24:12frameworks, the academic frameworks—
24:14what they call "Track Two" or "Track
24:16Three."
24:18>> No, we don't have that.
24:21>> Therefore, what you are proposing is
24:24also, in fact, extremely important
24:26because it links Egypt’s security and
24:29its presence in the Horn of Africa, the
24:31security of the Horn of Africa and its
24:34Arab dimension, and Gulf security.
24:37>> Look, I see the bloc from the Arabian
24:41Gulf all the way to the western Libyan
24:45borders.
24:46>> Up to Sudan and the Horn of Africa, this
24:48entire bloc.
24:50>> Well, I see it as one single bloc that
24:53influences itself, and these people in
24:55this region must think—and perhaps Chad
24:58could also join them.
25:01>> In this region, regarding their common
25:03interests.
25:05>> I mean, I see this as important, and I
25:07claim that we are just not interacting
25:09well with African elites. I claim that
25:12these are areas of African discussion
25:14now—the idea of the competitive scramble
25:17for the African continent due to
25:19resources; it’s not just a Western
25:21scramble, there is an Arab scramble too
25:24.
25:24>> True.
25:25>> You understand me, so the Africans, whom
25:28we are part of.
25:30>> How will they deal with this? There is
25:33an awareness of the issue, but perhaps
25:35the mechanisms for action are still in
25:37the early stages of discussion. We are
25:40not close at all to the Pan-African
25:42movement.
25:42>> Yes.
25:43>> Not at all. We barely know how this
25:45movement has operated until now. We are
25:47very afraid for our Egyptian
25:48civilization, and rightly so, regarding
25:50the idea of "colorizing" it.
25:53>> Or tampering with the issue of its
25:55origins and so on, but to this day,
25:57these people value African national
26:00liberation, and the founding fathers of
26:02this struggle, including Abdel Nasser,
26:05are highlighted.
26:07>> So it is strange that we in Egypt.
26:10>> Are not linked to this, not linked to
26:14this.
26:15And it is strange that we see, I mean,
26:17the competitiveness over this
26:19civilization.
26:21We don't see it as part of the symbolic
26:24capital that we actually need in Africa
26:26.
26:27You have to build it.
26:29I mean, you have capital in Africa, deal
26:32with it.
26:33Deal with it with an Egyptian vision, I
26:35mean.
26:37>> Here, I will take your point—and you
26:40have pointed this out, and I want to be
26:42clear—when we were talking about the
26:45conflict, meaning what happened with
26:47Ethiopia, and what I can now call an
26:50Egyptian-Ethiopian conflict, has this
26:53conflict now become a zero-sum game?
26:57I mean, have we reached the stage where
26:59Ethiopia is a zero-sum game?
27:03>> Because of the parties involved in it to
27:06serve their own interests, because there
27:09is no common ground between us and
27:12Ethiopia, and the Ethiopians have an
27:14imperial mentality.
27:16>> Hmm.
27:18>> And Abiy Ahmed is practicing imperial
27:20behaviors, and this is the performance
27:23that is causing the problem internally
27:25because he is not letting the Ethiopian
27:27nationalities reach an understanding
27:30with each other peacefully.
27:32>> Hmm.
27:33>> He wants to create a large centralized
27:36state; he has a major ambition to build
27:39a large centralized state that is
27:41influential in the Horn of Africa and
27:44for it to be number one in Africa.
27:47>> Can't we handle these ambitions in a way
27:50that serves our interests?
27:54You recently had an article talking
27:57about the port of Assab, which is a port
28:00in Eritrea, and that Ethiopia has a
28:03terrible problem in that it does not
28:06have an outlet to the sea.
28:09>> And part of the Egyptian-Ethiopian
28:12disagreement was always the idea of the
28:14sea.
28:14>> Mind you, it is not just an outlet.
28:17>> A sovereign military outlet; it has the
28:19right to civilian commercial access to
28:21the sea.
28:22>> And Egypt has no problem with that.
28:25>> But a sovereign military center, that is
28:27the problem, because it violates
28:29international law and the littoral
28:31states do not allow this.
28:34>> And mind you, the military presence in
28:37Djibouti is through leasing.
28:39>> For specific tasks.
28:41>> Well, Dr. Amani, is it possible to build
28:45on—I won't say greed, but—Ethiopia's
28:48desire to be part of the geopolitical
28:51and security agreements of the Red Sea
28:54with the littoral states?
28:58Is it possible for Egypt to exploit this
29:01desire to build a wider alliance in this
29:04exchange of benefits, meaning you be
29:07part of this to ensure...
29:11>> This is not—I don't know how to put it—
29:13this is not an Egyptian option.
29:15>> This is an Ethiopian option.
29:18>> Meaning, the first step should come from
29:20Ethiopia, because I am the one being
29:22threatened at the moment, so I cannot
29:25turn to Ethiopia to make this a quid pro
29:27quo.
29:28>> Okay, but this would be a cooperative
29:30Ethiopian proposal. The first step is
29:33with Ethiopia. Mind you, this first step
29:36is difficult in Ethiopia so that we can
29:38understand a very important issue: a
29:41state takes a decision or has an
29:43assessment to cooperate with its region
29:45when it feels it is not threatened. Why
29:48does it feel threatened? Has it felt
29:50threatened since the Middle Ages? That
29:53is what we do not understand. We do not
29:54understand this about Ethiopia.
29:56>> Okay, this region, the Horn of Africa,
29:59in the Middle Ages, consisted of
30:02kingdoms that had wars and pressures
30:04between them.
30:07What happened was that Egypt at that
30:09time was under Turkish rule; the
30:12Ethiopians decided to penetrate the Red
30:15Sea.
30:16>> So they had zones of influence, even
30:19Harar—okay, Harar had a Muslim emir—
30:22while the areas inside were Christian.
30:26>> So he decided to go inside.
30:29To seize the kingdoms within. So they
30:31appealed to the Vatican for help.
30:34The Vatican supported the Christians.
30:38This was in a phase even before the 18th
30:41century and such.
30:43And then we came in the 18th century and
30:46tried, as well, to enter these regions.
30:48We were viewed as colonizers.
30:51>> Fine.
30:53Not appreciated. That is what has always
30:55been said about Egypt. Egypt at what
30:57stage, with what political elite, and
30:59with what political system? Anyone who
31:00talks about Egypt does not make these
31:02distinctions.
31:04Egypt under Egyptian rule, under Turkish
31:06rule, under British rule, the elites.
31:09And the political and civil forces in
31:11the Horn of Africa and Sudan do not make
31:14this distinction.
31:16>> And they see us as colonial powers.
31:17>> They see us as colonial powers, so you
31:21didn't deal with this.
31:24You neither understood it sufficiently
31:28historically, nor diversified your tools
31:33to present a different stereotypical
31:36image of yourself, nor were your
31:40cooperative projects well-founded, nor
31:44was your attention good.
31:47I mean, we had a presence until the end
31:52of the Abdel Nasser era, until Sadat was
31:56asked to withdraw from Somalia.
32:00Because Sadat, and this was a correct
32:02role, was supporting Somalia and
32:04supporting President Siad Barre.
32:06Within the framework of the
32:08Egyptian-American understanding, there
32:11was, or there emerged...
32:15...an American desire for Egypt to
32:16withdraw from Somalia.
32:18From the Horn of Africa, and Ethiopia
32:20was put in as a substitute for the
32:22required roles in the Horn of Africa
32:24region.
32:25To protect common American-Israeli
32:27interests, or even in cases of conflict
32:30.
32:30>> And we agreed to that.
32:31>> We agreed to that and we withdrew. I
32:33mean, keep in mind, from the Sadat
32:36period until Mubarak, we weren't lucky
32:38with Ethiopia either. Again, at the time
32:40of the rise of the Ethiopian national
32:42project under Meles Zenawi in '95, the
32:45assassination attempt on President
32:46Mubarak occurred.
32:48>> Mubarak, so we stopped attending...
32:54...the African Union at the summit level
32:57, so there was a gap at the summit level
32:59, which we call presidential diplomacy
33:02between Egypt and its African
33:04counterparts.
33:06>> So, Dr. Amani, what you are telling me
33:09now is a problem that seems
33:11contradictory, yet it is a complex
33:13problem: they see us as a colonial power
33:15, but we are a colonial power that has
33:18actually withdrawn, meaning we no longer
33:21have a presence.
33:22>> No, I mean our colonial behavior...
33:26...
33:26>> was not by an Egyptian decision.
33:28>> Let me be clear, our behavior, if we say
33:31that the state of Egypt...
33:33...
33:33>> has practiced colonial behavior, it was
33:35not an Egyptian decision.
33:39>> But let me also be clear with you, while
33:42we are being frank and self-criticism is
33:45an important part of this: do you think
33:48there is a part of Egyptian chauvinism
33:51and Egyptian arrogance that led to this
33:54position from these countries?
33:58No, this is a tool others use against us
34:01.
34:01>> Mm.
34:02>> We just don't understand African
34:04personal approaches.
34:07>> Good, what are these approaches and what
34:10should we do about them?
34:12>> Ehh, approaches of equality.
34:15>> Mmm, okay, so you can imagine that a
34:17Sudanese citizen might address the
34:19President of the Republic by saying "Oh
34:21So-and-So," not "Mr. President." Nor "
34:23His Excellency the President." Nor all
34:24that talk. Because in African societies
34:27, the state does not play a fundamental
34:29role in development.
34:32>> Okay, some or most of the means of
34:34production are not owned by the state.
34:39>> Therefore, local communities are strong
34:41communities, so they feel a sense of
34:43equality even when dealing with the
34:45bureaucratic administrative apparatus,
34:47even the head of the apparatus.
34:50>> True.
34:51>> We don't have that.
34:52>> Of course.
34:53>> Ehh, the second thing is to be
34:55straightforward.
34:57>> Be clear and frank, and don't try to
34:59please.
35:00>> Don't imagine that you have capabilities
35:02they don't have.
35:03>> Especially in the recent period.
35:05>> True.
35:06>> You see, because you’re looking at
35:09African capitals that are honestly
35:12impressive, like Kenya, the Addis Ababa
35:16region in Ethiopia—the African middle
35:20class is growing, cities are growing, so
35:23there is talk along these lines.
35:28>> Meaning openness, dealing as equals.
35:31>> Openness, dealing as equals, and dealing
35:34with credibility.
35:38>> Not exporting Arab-Arab problems to
35:40Africa.
35:42>> Uh.
35:44Discovering common ground and interests
35:47.
35:48>> True.
35:48>> At the popular level.
35:51>> Not just the state, and at the elite
35:53level.
35:55>> Our Egyptian elites are far from
35:56understanding.
36:00>> The Ethiopian character, and the—sorry—
36:02the African mindset and the African
36:03character in general, and of course,
36:05Ethiopia is part of that.
36:07>> Now, when you were talking about our
36:09prolonged problems with Ethiopia and
36:12even traced them back to historical
36:14things, but is there anything related to
36:16the Renaissance Dam specifically?
36:19Did Egypt err in managing this file,
36:21whether by relying on negotiations or
36:24the idea that we can take someone's word
36:26, and that friendly relations between
36:29presidents supersede these interests?
36:32What did we do wrong, and how can we
36:34rectify it? What we did wrong, we did
36:37early on.
36:38>> Yes, not from the current stage.
36:39>> Not in managing the file specifically.
36:40>> Not in managing the file, but the
36:42relationship with Ethiopia entirely; the
36:43relationship with Ethiopia and the lack
36:45of realization of it.
36:46>> We see Ethiopia as warring factions.
36:50>> And we see these groups as something
36:52that will keep the state unstable all
36:54the time.
36:56>> And we also saw, regarding the dam
36:58projects that were proposed by the U.S.
37:00Bureau of Reclamation in the sixties of
37:02the last century, uh, I mean, [Gamal]
37:04Abdel Nasser, or, you know, fighting
37:06against it.
37:08>> That it wasn't feasible.
37:11>> And we didn't understand that scientific
37:13progress could create many possibilities
37:15.
37:16We didn't understand the issues of the
37:18Ethiopian mindset towards us, and
37:20therefore we imagined, as you said, that
37:23a word is enough.
37:25>> And we didn't understand that they
37:27address the Nile by calling it "Abay."
37:30>> For them, "Abay" means "traitor,"
37:32because when you go there to the sources
37:34of the Nile—I went to the sources of the
37:36Blue Nile—it is underground, 50 meters
37:38below ground level. You see the Nile
37:40here at sight level. So you benefit from
37:42it. He didn't benefit from it. So he
37:44calls it Abay, a traitor. These are
37:47Ethiopian literary and creative
37:49narratives.
37:51There is a kind of bitterness and lump
37:53in the throat from the Ethiopian citizen
37:55towards this Nile, which we feel is the
37:57source of our blessing because God
37:58decreed that this river should come to
38:00us at ground level. So we benefit from
38:03it. Do you understand me?
38:04All of this we don't know. And we didn't
38:07engage with it.
38:09I mean, we should have understood and
38:12interacted more, and so on.
38:14>> Today, what is the way out specifically
38:17for the Renaissance Dam issue and
38:19Egypt’s water security?
38:22>> In my opinion, the way out is what Egypt
38:25is doing now; I mean, we are doing two
38:28things, we are proposing in a subtle way
38:31.
38:33>> A proposal, of course, publicly and
38:35significantly from President Sisi to
38:37Abiy Ahmed.
38:38Before and after the 2015 Declaration of
38:41Principles, in cooperative and
38:44interactive systems.
38:46Positive and so on; that wasn't dealt
38:48with seriously by Ethiopia, but now you
38:51have no choice but to pressure, so you
38:54are pressuring.
38:58>> You are pressuring with the
39:00international law system, you are
39:02pressuring with the diplomatic system in
39:05the areas directly adjacent to the
39:08Ethiopian borders, you are pressuring
39:10with disciplined diplomatic discourse
39:13against populist, undisciplined, and
39:15non-state discourse—I want to tell you,
39:18like the rhetoric of that water minister
39:21.
39:22And he withdrew the tweet afterwards.
39:23That you didn't ask for our opinion on
39:25the High Dam.
39:25>> Yes.
39:26>> And he doesn't understand the hydraulics
39:28of the Nile.
39:29>> So.
39:32Regarding why they didn't ask our
39:34opinion on the High Dam, the water
39:36agreement with Sudan, and the High Dam
39:38itself, the British worked hard against
39:40us to prevent that project from
39:41happening.
39:43>> They sowed resentment between us and the
39:45Africans, and between us and the Nile
39:47Basin countries.
39:48>> True, and they still use it to this day
39:50.
39:51And honestly, when we built the High Dam
39:53, to be fair—and I want to be truthful
39:56here—we didn't handle the entire system
39:58with the necessary seriousness.
40:02>> You know, our preoccupation with the
40:05Middle East and the war against Israel
40:08meant the Egyptian capacity couldn't
40:11balance or manage the Middle Eastern
40:14problems and the threats in the Horn of
40:17Africa, so that's an overload we're
40:20dealing with now.
40:23>> Will these pressures be enough, or in
40:26your assessment, will we be forced to
40:29enter into a military confrontation with
40:32Ethiopia?
40:34>> Look, I think we won't enter into a
40:36military confrontation with Ethiopia,
40:37but we might engage in proxy
40:38confrontations.
40:40>> Um.
40:41>> This is a pattern that exists in the
40:43region.
40:45>> I hope, I hope that Saudi-Egyptian
40:48relations are founded on the strategic
40:50model I mentioned to you.
40:53>> Actually, I published an article on this
40:55context about three weeks ago, and I
40:57think one a year ago as well.
41:00>> In this context, I am interested in the
41:04idea of the Arab system and how it can
41:07rise again, which could be an
41:10opportunity—an opportunity to meet
41:13Egyptian-Saudi needs and address threats
41:17.
41:18How would this help resolve this
41:21conflict with Ethiopia regarding
41:25increasing the Arab weight in the coming
41:28phase if it happens?
41:31>> If it rises, it will definitely make a
41:35difference in other interactions.
41:38What is the idea? The idea is that
41:40Ethiopia deals with Arab countries one
41:42by one.
41:43>> Yes.
41:43>> It deals with Egypt, it deals with Saudi
41:45Arabia, it deals with the UAE.
41:47>> Okay, so it is able to dismantle the
41:48relationship and keep it in a bilateral
41:50framework, rather than a multilateral
41:52one.
41:53>> Good, it has a collective security
41:55system and strategic understandings.
41:58>> Which I hope the UAE will join.
42:01>> And that the situation is reassessed.
42:07>> And that the question of Gulf security
42:08is answered in a more positive way for
42:10the region and for the Emirati citizen.
42:12>> Alright, I'll go back to what is
42:15happening now in Ethiopia.
42:19You were talking about how Abiy Ahmed
42:22has imperial dreams and ambitions.
42:26>> Let's say imperial.
42:27>> Fine.
42:29Does the war going on now, or...
42:36Do these military confrontations
42:39threaten the fall of this regime, and if
42:42it fell...
42:43>> No.
42:44>> No.
42:45>> No, and if it fell, would our problems
42:49be solved? No.
42:50>> Ah, and even if it doesn't fall, look,
42:52our problem with Ethiopia is one that
42:54transcends the political regime, and we
42:56must understand it as such.
42:58>> To deal with the state of Ethiopia, okay
43:01.
43:01>> We must understand it that way to deal
43:02with the state of Ethiopia, one and two
43:04.
43:05>> Because the state of Ethiopia is the hub
43:08for Western and Israeli interests, and
43:11let's see what happened in the 2018-2022
43:14war.
43:15>> 2022.
43:17>> What happened was that the American
43:18ambassador took the Tigrayan
43:20representatives, brought the Tigrayan
43:21leadership by direct order on his plane
43:23, and they went to Pretoria to sign a
43:25peace agreement because the fall of
43:26Ethiopia is not allowed.
43:28>> So if we understand that, no matter what
43:30the dream is...
43:34Internal challenges in Ethiopia and the
43:36tension against the ruling regime do not
43:39mean that Ethiopia will fall.
43:42>> But there is a difference between the
43:43fall of the state and a regime change.
43:46>> Of course, suppose the regime changes; I
43:48mean, will it collapse?
43:51>> Into chaos? No, there are buffers.
43:56>> It will help prevent this, and notice
43:58that Abiy Ahmed obtained drones and
44:01missiles and so on when the Tigray
44:03forces were on the outskirts of Addis
44:05Ababa in 2022. Okay, so would the
44:07political system change?
44:09Yes, the political system would change.
44:11Well, if the political system changes,
44:12would its stance toward Egypt change? No
44:13, not its stance toward Egypt.
44:15>> Because the Ethiopian mentality is that
44:17it wants to develop itself, and Egypt is
44:19depriving it because it is withholding
44:21water. And he doesn't understand what is
44:23actually happening. Yes, he doesn't...
44:25he has 11 rivers. He has 930 billion
44:28cubic meters of water. The loss in the
44:31Nile River, which is what we are
44:32fighting over, is about 56 billion. And
44:34that cooperation between him and Egypt.
44:37>> Could increase his capabilities and
44:39Egypt's capabilities.
44:41The matter is not a fight, but you have
44:44media, you notice.
44:46>> I want you to follow up if you have time
44:48.
44:49>> Yes.
44:50>> The research centers in South Africa and
44:53the studies at Chatham House.
44:55>> Um.
44:56>> And what the Western studies 'vision is
44:58for Ethiopia and its developmental needs
45:01.
45:01>> Right.
45:01>> And the extent of its realism; it sees
45:04you as a state that has existed for
45:065,000 years.
45:07>> So you have accumulated statehood and
45:09power, and it doesn't feel your
45:11existential need for water.
45:14>> It sees you as capable all the time, so
45:16the developmental narrative that
45:17Ethiopia exports—that the cause is
45:19purely Egyptian—in reality, it doesn't
45:21take into account that it is a purely
45:23internal cause because it is
45:25conflict-driven.
45:27>> But they do have energy needs and
45:28developmental needs, Doctor, regardless
45:30.
45:30>> I want to tell you something; I know
45:32they have energy needs.
45:35They are sitting on their energy wells,
45:37the geothermal energy that generates
45:38power in Kenya.
45:40>> He hasn't resorted to renewable energy.
45:42>> Correct.
45:43>> You, today, when you fill and create
45:45massive lakes, in lands that have
45:47critical minerals.
45:49>> Correct.
45:50>> And you are losing economic resources;
45:53you have energy alternatives. You have
45:55hydrogen, geothermal, and wind, and
45:57these are mountains, so they can.
46:00>> They can, but you have a conflict; you
46:02are in the Addis Ababa region and you
46:04cannot expand.
46:06>> Why? Because the lands are Oromia lands
46:09, the lands are Oromo lands; they cannot
46:12expand.
46:13That's what happened in 2015. The land
46:15dispute in Africa over tribal lands is a
46:18very big issue.
46:20>> What you are saying as well.
46:21>> This is not realized, and if it is
46:24realized, because Western interests are
46:27not with it, it is overlooked, and you
46:30don't have media.
46:32>> Capable of confronting Western-Israeli
46:34narratives; do you see what I mean?
46:37Ping pong.
46:38>> But honestly, what you are saying is
46:41extremely important and extremely
46:44dangerous, because it also explains why
46:47this conflict continues.
46:50The Egyptian-Ethiopian conflict has
46:53internal reasons that make it, I mean,
46:56necessary to always export this major
47:00problem to distract and cover up
47:02internal problems and conflicts.
47:06>> Not just that, not just that; obviously
47:09, the political system has an interest
47:11in denying its own incompetence.
47:14>> Inability to manage internal conflict,
47:16inability to achieve stability—this is a
47:18direct interest.
47:20>> Fine, but there are also other elements
47:24.
47:25>> In the matter, there are elements
47:27related to it seeing its strategic
47:28interests as being like Djibouti, a hub
47:31for the interests of others.
47:34>> As a regime, you understand me, while
47:36the interests of the African Ethiopian
47:37citizen are to cooperate, of course.
47:40>> That we shouldn't build empires at each
47:42other's expense. That we should
47:44cooperate because we are all poor. We
47:45are all in need, and we all have health
47:47problems.
47:49We have problems regarding education,
47:51healthcare, and resource management for
47:53food security, with regions facing
47:55famine.
47:57So this is not, this is not the right
47:59mechanism.
48:00That we confront each other by being
48:02staging grounds for interests outside
48:04the region.
48:06No, we want to create mechanisms for
48:09cooperation between us and with others.
48:13>> So, what you are proposing, to be clear
48:15regarding dealing with Ethiopia, is
48:18continued pressure on Ethiopia, but
48:20broadening the circle of cooperation
48:22whether with Saudi Arabia or other
48:25African parties so you can create
48:27additional geopolitical weight for
48:29yourself.
48:31>> Exactly.
48:32>> And the ability to project a cooperative
48:34discourse; all the time, our ability to
48:37project this discourse and its tools are
48:39missing because direct interaction
48:41between—
48:44People here in Egypt and their
48:46counterparts in African countries and
48:48Horn of Africa countries does not exist
48:51.
48:52>> Your cultural system, your cultural
48:54policies do not take into account the
48:56African dimension in your identity, the
48:59educational system is the same story,
49:01and as for the media system, don't even
49:03get me started.
49:04>> Don't get me started. No, of course not
49:06. I will come to you because you had a
49:08very important article regarding dealing
49:10with the refugee issue as well.
49:13But let us, before we go to that point,
49:15ask you about the file closest, even in
49:18a geographic sense, to Egypt.
49:21And which is supposed to play a
49:22fundamental role, which is the Sudanese
49:25file.
49:25>> We won't, I mean, we won't go into the
49:28details of the problem in Sudan, but
49:31what I want to focus on with you is what
49:34Egypt's role should be in what is
49:36happening in Sudan now.
49:40>> And are we playing this role?
49:42>> Look, we started playing it, and we were
49:45not successful due to two things: the
49:48nature of the disagreements between the
49:50Sudanese political elites and the
49:52Emirati role.
49:54>> My opinion is that Egypt should put a
49:57very great effort into creating a
50:00Sudanese-Sudanese civil consensus.
50:05>> Creating a Sudanese-Sudanese civil
50:07consensus, because a military regime in
50:09Sudan will not guarantee Sudan's
50:11stability, and the stability of Sudan is
50:14now a given for Egyptian national
50:16security.
50:17>> Certainly.
50:20>> And understanding with this, with this
50:23component, understanding each other—
50:25Egypt tried to do that and held a very
50:28important conference on July 24, 2024.
50:33>> But unfortunately, the Sudanese elites
50:35were not up to the level of
50:36responsibility to produce the required
50:38consensus, and in the end, they did not
50:40—the final statement was not signed by
50:42all parties.
50:44>> Well, with the militarization of the
50:46conflict as we see it now, I mean, after
50:49we were all celebrating the Sudanese
50:52revolution and civil forces and
50:55plurality, Sudan has now become a
50:57battlefield between the Rapid Support
51:00Forces and the Sudanese Army.
51:03And Egypt supports the army, the
51:05national army.
51:07What should Egypt do in the face of this
51:11militarization?
51:13I mean, a conflict that has been
51:15militarized.
51:16>> That is exactly what I am saying. I will
51:18tell you, you need a Sudanese-Sudanese
51:20consensus, specifically a civil one.
51:24To emerge with an equation whose parties
51:27are what? All parties.
51:28>> Reality says all parties.
51:30What is the problem now is that with the
51:33support of the UAE, or the direction of
51:36the UAE, for the regime of the Islamic,
51:39I mean the Sudanese political Islamic
51:41current, not to be a part, not to be a
51:44party, and this naturally finds favor
51:46with the Sudanese, frankly, because they
51:49suffered from the National Islamic Front
51:52a lot.
51:53>> And because the political Islam project
51:55in Sudan and in the region is worrying.
51:57>> So it is natural for it to find favor.
52:00>> Good.
52:02>> But reality says that, that they exist.
52:07>> And there are social bases we must deal
52:10with, and there are parties we can deal
52:12with.
52:13>> So, under pressure from the UAE, the
52:15Quartet produced in September 2025 a
52:17statement rejecting engagement with the
52:19Muslim Brotherhood, and in my opinion,
52:21that was wrong.
52:22>> I wrote about this.
52:26>> This is an obstacle to Sudanese-Sudanese
52:29understandings because the Islamists do
52:32not accept Sumud.
52:36>> That is the Sumud alliance of the
52:38Sudanese civil component, nor the
52:40Declaration of Principles, nor any
52:43parties from the Sudanese civil
52:45government.
52:47>> Conversely, the others reject all.
52:52Manifestations of political Islam in
52:54Sudan, especially the National Congress
52:56Party.
52:57>> So, this is the knot involving the
52:59parties of the political process.
53:02>> This is a knot, and it is distinct from
53:05the knot that has a regional
53:07manifestation.
53:09>> Yes.
53:10>> Because here we have the UAE saying the
53:12army belongs to the Brotherhood.
53:14>> Um.
53:14>> Do you see? And we have Egypt saying I
53:16cannot dismantle the army institution,
53:18even if it belongs to the Brotherhood.
53:20>> I can dismantle the Brotherhood presence
53:22within the army.
53:23>> Right.
53:23>> So, this is the regional manifestation
53:26of the internal Sudanese conflict. If a
53:29Sudanese consensus is reached.
53:32>> It will reflect regionally, but.
53:39Frankly, the UAE and Egypt—the thing I
53:41cannot understand.
53:44>> Is that here in Egypt, there is an
53:47understanding and space.
53:50>> Um.
53:51>> Between Egypt and the UAE, while there
53:54is conflict in Sudan.
53:55>> Um.
53:57>> The UAE cannot understand the
53:58sensitivity of Sudan for us.
54:02And it is able to align more with the
54:04Israeli project in Sudan to divide it.
54:08>> In Sudan, in Somalia, and in...
54:12>> Meaning it is capable of doing this, so
54:14perhaps understanding between Egypt and
54:16the UAE is also needed in this matter.
54:20What I know is that the UAE has
54:22sidelined the Sudanese file from
54:24Egyptian bilateral relations.
54:28>> It is clear that it has sidelined many
54:29files. And the Ethiopian file, in my
54:31opinion.
54:33So, in my opinion. So, in my opinion, if
54:36Egypt and Saudi Arabia can truly build a
54:39type of—I want to say—solid relationship
54:43. Many in the region will rethink their
54:46positions. And they can, in this sense.
54:50Are they capable of pushing the internal
54:53Sudanese parties to reach a consensus?
54:57>> Yes, in this sense, yes. We did it in
55:002024, there was an attempt.
55:02>> Some additional mechanisms, and the
55:04momentum continues. I want to say
55:06something important here.
55:07>> This is not against Yemen, and we have
55:10no relation with parties in Yemen.
55:13>> I mean, I am not talking about this
55:15against the Houthis, for example, or
55:17against Iran.
55:17>> I am talking about.
55:19>> Data of the capacity and strength of the
55:23Arab system.
55:24>> Of course.
55:25>> But.
55:26>> No, Saudi Arabia cannot be compared with
55:29that idea. I am not entering the realm
55:31where building a solid force with Saudi
55:34Arabia is a strategy against Yemen or a
55:37party in Yemen. No, I am not talking
55:40about that at all; on the contrary.
55:43>> If an Egyptian-Emirati understanding
55:45happens in Sudan, it could happen in
55:47Yemen.
55:47>> Egyptian-Emirati or Egyptian-Saudi?
55:49>> Egyptian-Emirati in Sudan. I am speaking
55:51to you about the idea of an
55:52Egyptian-Emirati understanding to create
55:54a civil consensus.
55:56>> Do you see?
55:57Perhaps this consensus could extend to
56:00Yemen, and thus we would spare ourselves
56:03many conflicts.
56:05>> Doctor, you recently had a very
56:08important article called "In Defense of
56:11Egypt and No One Else," which spoke
56:14about the importance of the Egyptian
56:17role in welcoming refugees.
56:21Truly, I see this as a pivotal point,
56:24because Egypt is great in its history
56:27and geography, but also in the current
56:30roles it plays.
56:33So, could you talk to us about how we
56:36should deal with the refugee file?
56:39>> Um.
56:42I once wrote on Facebook: "We are the
56:44ones who said,' Enter them in peace,
56:45secure, 'and no one else."
56:48>> This is an important condition, or an
56:51important issue, but this issue has
56:53conditions—conditions that don't stem
56:56from the economy or anything else, but
56:58from the security threats present in the
57:01region.
57:02>> It is not acceptable for there to be a
57:04human being in Egypt without paperwork.
57:07>> I mean, honestly.
57:09>> Everyone in Egypt must have papers.
57:12>> A large part of the problem is that in
57:15previous periods, over past decades, the
57:17volume of security threats to Egypt
57:19wasn't at this level, so it was very
57:21normal for people to enter through
57:23smuggling, not by proper documentation.
57:26>> It was normal, and the policeman on the
57:29street didn't have the task of checking
57:31for papers.
57:32>> This happens in all countries of the
57:34world.
57:34>> Fine. Any human being present on
57:37Egyptian soil must have papers; this is
57:40the right of Egyptian citizens before it
57:43is the state's.
57:44>> One, two.
57:47The outbursts that happened, the
57:49chauvinism or racism that occurred from
57:52Egyptians—let me honestly say that
57:55Egyptians, to be precise, received the
57:57Sudanese with great welcome in the first
58:00phase.
58:01>> Um.
58:02>> But a third element entered between the
58:03Egyptians and the Sudanese.
58:05>> Um.
58:05>> There were videos talking about "We are
58:08entering with our own money."
58:10>> And "We are such and such," and the talk
58:12you know.
58:15It’s not necessarily a Sudanese act, by
58:17the way.
58:18>> We have Ethiopian pages in Arabic.
58:22>> Their mission is to booby-trap the
58:24relationship between Egyptians and
58:27Sudanese at the highest level of
58:29technological readiness, so the result
58:31of the emergence of these videos—some of
58:34which are Sudanese and some are
58:36fabricated—was:
58:39>> That Sudanese teenagers in Egypt also
58:43went along with this trend, so Egyptians
58:46developed a desire to respond.
58:49>> Um.
58:50>> So this debate happened; some of this
58:52debate is [from] electronic committees,
58:54by the way.
58:54>> Regarding the state, there is a cost to
58:56the refugees.
58:58>> Because today, instead of securing for
59:01100 million, you are forced to secure
59:03for 120 million in hard currency: oil,
59:06sugar, tea, and so on.
59:08So there were, you know, other reasons.
59:14But I want to tell you.
59:16We must also deal with it with.
59:21With continuity.
59:23>> In having refugees in Egypt be safe.
59:27>> On the condition that they are known.
59:31>> Because today, the Rapid Support Forces
59:33are still threatening Egypt. Will you be
59:36able to tell who is who here in Egypt?
59:38You won't be able to, so there must be
59:41papers.
59:42>> Culture, then.
59:44>> Media, then, education, then—where are
59:48we? We don't exist.
59:49>> Yeah.
59:51>> Fine, you have the movie "Asad"(Lion) of
59:53, of—what's his name?
59:56Mohamed Ramadan.
59:57>> The one by Mohamed Ramadan, you have a
59:58play that said I don't know what, "Fasu
1:00:00," I don't know.
1:00:02>> Do you understand me? You have the.
1:00:06The Egyptian presenter, there is—you
1:00:08don't interact with Africans, so you
1:00:10don't understand them, nor are you able
1:00:13to express them, so when you see one on
1:00:15the street, you treat them perhaps with
1:00:17violence.
1:00:20>> If there is violence.
1:00:21>> Because when the Egyptian media does a
1:00:25program about Africa.
1:00:28>> What does its promo look like?
1:00:31>> If you did an analysis of the promo.
1:00:34>> Conflict zones.
1:00:35>> Conflict zones, hunger.
1:00:38>> Truly, it's as if we are conjuring the
1:00:40colonial discourse and the colonial
1:00:41image of the continent.
1:00:43>> I, I haven't seen a promo.
1:00:47The presenters: "The brown continent,""
1:00:49The black continent."
1:00:50>> Why are you coloring the continent,
1:00:51folks? Of course, of course.
1:00:52>> Are we white?
1:00:53>> No, based on the idea that we are—we are
1:00:55white, I mean, blue-eyed, God make it
1:00:57good, I mean, may God protect us.
1:00:59>> So no, our cultural policy also,
1:01:01truthfully, is not.
1:01:04Not engaged in any way, shape, or form
1:01:06with dealing with the African component
1:01:08in the Egyptian identity.
1:01:11>> But the thing that really interested me
1:01:14in your article, and that I want to
1:01:16emphasize, is the idea that this is part
1:01:19of our future.
1:01:21I want to tell you something, I want to
1:01:24tell you something.
1:01:26>> High-ranking Sudanese officials.
1:01:29>> Who held ministerial roles, preferred
1:01:33not to be in Egypt.
1:01:36>> What does that loss look like?
1:01:37>> Of course, of course.
1:01:39>> They went to Kampala and they went to
1:01:40Nairobi.
1:01:41>> The political hub for the Sudanese now
1:01:44is in Nairobi, of course.
1:01:46>> You see, it’s not in Egypt. That loss is
1:01:49a massive loss in our influence on
1:01:51decision-making and in...
1:01:53>> The girl who is in medical school, taken
1:01:57from the college gate, and deprived of
1:02:00her exam just because of paperwork.
1:02:04>> And the lack of urgency in resolving the
1:02:07matter.
1:02:09>> If she were to become Minister of Health
1:02:10.
1:02:11>> Of course.
1:02:11>> What would that look like? I want to
1:02:13tell you something.
1:02:14>> I will never forget that once a South
1:02:16Sudanese man told me, he was studying at
1:02:18the American University here and was a
1:02:20minister in his country.
1:02:23>> That he hates Egypt so much, so I asked
1:02:25him why? He told me, "They used to tell
1:02:27me to smile so we can see you."
1:02:30Do you see?
1:02:31>> Racism, of course.
1:02:32>> Do you see how the matter is going?
1:02:34>> Of course.
1:02:35>> Do you see...have we spread in our media
1:02:38that people are equal like the teeth of
1:02:40a comb?
1:02:41>> Yes.
1:02:42>> God said it.
1:02:43>> Of course.
1:02:44>> Have we spread this?
1:02:45>> Yes.
1:02:47>> Have we said that there is no
1:02:49discrimination between human beings for
1:02:52any reason, neither religion, nor gender
1:02:55, nor color, nor anyone we addressed?
1:02:58>> Of course.
1:02:59>> Contributes to this.
1:03:01>> I wish it were only a moral duty, but we
1:03:04always need to remember that Egypt is
1:03:07great in its history and geography, but
1:03:10also in the roles it plays now.
1:03:14>> I want to tell you something: didn't the
1:03:16refugees, the Syrian and Levantine
1:03:17refugees in the 18th and 19th centuries
1:03:19, do something for Egypt?
1:03:21>> True, of course.
1:03:22>> Didn't they create Al-Ahram newspaper?
1:03:24Of course, of course.
1:03:25>> Let us be...
1:03:28>> More confident that whoever enters Egypt
1:03:31.
1:03:33Becomes Egyptian more than anything else
1:03:35.
1:03:35>> Influences and is influenced.
1:03:36>> Meaning, they become Egyptian more than
1:03:39anything else.
1:03:40>> Lovely, Dr. Amani, you honored us and
1:03:43lit up our show; it was an important
1:03:45addition, and God willing, we will have
1:03:47other meetings to discuss various
1:03:49aspects of African affairs.
1:03:51>> God willing, Captain.
1:03:53>> I am the one who is happy to have been
1:03:54with you.

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