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229: Find Courage to Speak When It Matters Most, with Allan McDonald — Transcript

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0:0030 years ago this week the space shuttle
0:02Challenger launched with the first
0:04teacher in space on board 73 seconds
0:08into flight it exploded I was a child
0:12and I remember watching the custodian of
0:14our school lowering the flag to half
0:16staff that cold January morning in the
0:20three decades that have passed since the
0:22accident most of us have seen the video
0:25again and again of the accident on
0:27January 28th 1986
0:30but I wonder if you know what happened
0:33the night of January
0:3627th the evening before on a special
0:39show today I welcome the one person who
0:42officially refused to sign off on the
0:44launch of Challenger and his lessons for
0:47all of us on leadership and ethics this
0:51is coaching for leaders episode
0:54229 produced by innovate learning
0:57maximizing human potential
1:03[Music]
1:04greetings to you from Orange County
1:07California this is coaching for leaders
1:09and I'm your host Dave stovak leaders
1:12aren't born they're made and this weekly
1:16show will give you access to the best
1:18thinkers resources and actions to
1:22develop your leadership skills and I am
1:25really glad that you tuned in for
1:27today's show because when when I first
1:30met this week's guest in person a year
1:34ago I was immediately captivated by his
1:37story and I knew it was one that I
1:39wanted the coaching for leaders
1:40Community to hear and what many of you
1:43know is that NASA launched the space
1:45shuttle Challenger on January 28th 1986
1:5030 years ago and of course the resulting
1:53accident that happened just moments
1:55after the spacecraft launched what you
1:59may not know was that there were
2:01warnings against doing so from many
2:03individuals including my guest today Al
2:06McDonald Al as he sought to draw
2:09attention to the real reasons behind the
2:11disaster was singled out for Retribution
2:13by his employer and he not only
2:16accurately diagnosed the problem with
2:19the troubled boosters joints but also a
2:23failure in management that led to the
2:25demise of Challenger as a result of his
2:27efforts he ended up being instrumental
2:29in implementing the sweeping changes
2:31that markedly improved the safety of
2:33future space shuttle missions he
2:35published a book in 2009 titled truth
2:39lies and O-rings inside the space
2:41shuttle Challenger disaster with Dr
2:44James R Hansen and Al when you and I
2:47were talking before we had this
2:48conversation today I mentioned that I
2:51was in elementary school at the time
2:53this accident happened and outside of a
2:56couple of extended family members who
2:59passed away when I was a child this is
3:01the moment that I
3:02remember that really sent put a sense of
3:07of shock but also grief into something
3:10that happened as a child and it's one of
3:11the first times I really remembering
3:13experiencing grief and it it was
3:17really an accident that that captivated
3:20the world's attention and I'm really
3:22grateful for your time and in joining us
3:24today and sharing your story maybe you
3:27could set the stage for us not only for
3:29where the space program was in early
3:321986 but also your role with Morton thol
3:35Al and and how you were involved
3:38specifically with the shuttle program
3:40okay well I actually had come into the
3:41shuttle program just a couple years
3:44before the accident
3:461984 under some rather unusual
3:48circumstances because we had a big
3:51accident at the plant Martin thol that I
3:54worked at well we burned up part of the
3:57uh shuttle Pro shuttle facilities and
4:01we're very fortunate we didn't lose a
4:04bunch of people because of that accident
4:06and as a result of the ACT investigation
4:09I was called in and told that I was now
4:11going to be the new director of the
4:12Space Shuttle Solid Rock and motor
4:14project certainly had more on my plate
4:16than I had ever anticipated it also was
4:20uh unique to me because I had spent my
4:22prior 25 years up to that time in
4:26various facets of engineering from
4:28design to running
4:30laboratory uh project engineers and so
4:33this was my first assignment as a
4:35program
4:36manager and I quickly realized after I
4:40started doing that job for a very short
4:42period of time that a program manager's
4:45plate has had is much larger than
4:47Engineers not only has to worry about
4:50all the engineering problems and issues
4:52that are being worked they asked to
4:55worry about schedules and costs and
4:57budgets and customer relations and all
5:00of those things are on a program
5:03manager's
5:04plate and uh we were going along uh
5:07fairly well except we were looking
5:10forward to NASA's uh new schedule which
5:14they were at that time proposing that
5:17they were going to start flying space
5:18shuttles at a rate of two per month 24
5:22per year by the end of probably
5:261988 so we got into 1986 had more than
5:29double the flight rate from the previous
5:31year and they were going to double it
5:33again
5:34almost so it was a tremendous lot of
5:37pressure on the agency uh to perform
5:41with all of the components and all the
5:43shuttle systems to get them up into even
5:45a production rate to meet that much less
5:48turn around the the shuttle as much as
5:51fast as they could and that became uh
5:55part of the problem with the launch of
5:57the Space Shuttle Challenger on that
5:59cold morning of January 28th because the
6:03prior launch which actually had
6:07Congressman Bill Nelson from Florida who
6:09was now a senator I believe uh was on
6:12that launch and it had suffered the most
6:15delays of any space shuttle launch prior
6:19to that time in fact it was like six or
6:21seven delays was actually supposed to
6:23fly about a week before Christmas and
6:27the media was just absolutely merciless
6:30on NASA they publish things like you
6:32know NASA is showing their out budget
6:35here in a couple years they're going to
6:36fly two of these shuttles a month and
6:38they couldn't even get one of them off
6:40the launch pad after it was declared to
6:44go within a month and so that brought a
6:48lot of pressure obviously to all the
6:50folks down at the cape because now we
6:54had another shuttle launch schedule the
6:57Challenger for January which meant that
6:59we could get two launches off in
7:01January and uh that added some added
7:04schedule pressure to make sure we got
7:06this one off but it wasn't clean either
7:10it actually suffered two delays prior to
7:13the plan launch of the 28th of January
7:18and the prior delay just before that was
7:21due to some very strong ground winds
7:24that prevented the the vehicle from
7:27being launched because it exceeded the
7:29constraints for the uh return to launch
7:32site and so it got postponed to the next
7:34day I remember leaving the launch
7:37control center and going to my friend in
7:40Titusville I wasn't there for about an
7:42hour and I got a phone call from one of
7:44the fellow who worked from me and said
7:46you know Al we were just informed that
7:48there's a meteorologist in Orlando just
7:51announced that these strong ground winds
7:53that we experien today right behind it
7:56it's a real coldfront moving to the cape
7:58and it could be as cold as 18° fhe by
8:02tomorrow morning at the opening of the
8:03launch window and I says good grief I'm
8:07really worried that our o-ring seals and
8:09our field joints will operate properly
8:11at those kind of temperatures and he
8:13said yes our Engineers are too and the
8:15reason I called you is that they want
8:17you to find out from NASA what the
8:20actual forecast hour by hour is at the
8:23launch site not in Orlando so that we
8:26can predict the actual temperatures on
8:28our Hardware at the opening of the
8:30launch window tomorrow morning this was
8:32on January 27th so the the day before
8:35the accident so you're you're in this
8:37relatively new job as a program manager
8:39there's unbelievable pressure from all
8:42kinds of different stakeholders for the
8:44shuttle program to stay on schedule and
8:47and that's when you learn about this the
8:48the the weather factor that was going on
8:50that day and and why is why was the cold
8:53temperature such a factor and such a
8:55concern for you when you found out about
8:56that well it was a real concern because
9:00I quickly remembered that one year ago
9:03in January of 1985 just one year before
9:06that we pulled a couple of these two
9:09boosters out of the ocean after a flight
9:12and when we pulled them apart we noticed
9:15that a joint in each booster both of
9:18them had evidence of black soot trapped
9:22between the two O-rings there's two
9:24O-rings in these joints because it's
9:26such a critical function it has to have
9:29tendency so there's two O-rings what
9:32that indicated was that some hot gas got
9:35past the first o-ring and stopped by the
9:38second one and it was a fairly large
9:42quantity of black soot fairly
9:45penetrating in the joint in fact it went
9:47most of the way around this big joint
9:51which is 12T in
9:52diameter and we couldn't understand why
9:55we saw this in these two joints we went
9:58back through all the uh records of the
10:02buildup and the fabrication thinking
10:04maybe some tolerance problems or
10:06something and the only thing we found
10:08that was different from any other flight
10:11that we had flown was that that was the
10:14coldest launch that we had ever seen up
10:17to that time and we had calculated that
10:20the joint at that time it was launched
10:22was at 53 deg
10:24Fahrenheit and I remember making the
10:27flight Readiness review for the next
10:30launch convincing NASA while it was
10:32still safe to launch I had actually
10:35clipped out a article in the Orlando
10:38Sentinel which said that that launch
10:41that we saw this observation was
10:43preceded by the three coldest days in
10:46all of Florida history in over 100 Years
10:48of Records it actually got down into the
10:51teenss for three consecutive nights
10:53before the
10:54launch and I said we obviously aren't
10:57going to see this again certainly not in
10:59April which was at that time the next
11:01scheduled launch and so everybody felt
11:03comfortable that that was a unique
11:06condition but it certainly was scary
11:09because we knew that came too close to
11:12not only losing all the safety factor in
11:15that joint but actually could be
11:17catastrophic if the second o-ring ever
11:19got passed the temperature Factor was
11:23strongly suspected to be a a huge factor
11:26in whether or not the joints failed and
11:28so this this brings us back to the night
11:32before the accident then January 27th
11:34and you hearing that weather report and
11:37take us take us there and tell us what
11:39happened after you went and found more
11:42of the information about the weather and
11:43what conversations happened with NASA
11:46that
11:47evening well once I uh realized that we
11:50needed to get this information to our
11:53Engineers on the predicted
11:55temperatures I obtained that and sent it
11:58to them and told them
11:59but they need to take that information
12:02along with what other information they
12:04have and put together a
12:06presentation
12:08for uh that evening that I would arrange
12:11on a teleconference tying our engineers
12:14in with the engineers the NASA Marshall
12:16space flight center in Huntsville
12:18Alabama and also management of NASA
12:21Kennedy Space Center where I was at I
12:23said now I want you to to uh analyze it
12:28the best you can but at the end I want
12:30the actual vice president of engineering
12:33to make a recommendation what is the
12:36coldest temperature that it is safe to
12:39launch and that ought to be the bottom
12:42line I did arrange that meeting we were
12:45on the teleconference in fact almost all
12:47the charts were handwritten Engineers
12:50didn't even have time to type them and
12:53the engineers that prepared them were
12:55the ones that gave it over the
12:57teleconference they had facts these
12:59charts to every location so people could
13:02look at them and uh at the end of the
13:06presentation the vice president of
13:08engineering came on fellow by name Mr
13:10Bob Lund and he said based on the
13:12presentation that we've given here uh
13:15this evening by my engineering staff I
13:18would not recommend that we launch the
13:20space shuttle below 53 degrees fah which
13:24was clearly the threshold that we had
13:27seen a year earlier that that scared us
13:30somewhat and I was absolutely shocked at
13:33NASA's response to that they challenged
13:36the basis for such a strict
13:39recommendation they said Gee that's
13:41really uh only based on some qualitative
13:44observation uh you haven't presented any
13:46hard test data that says it won't
13:49operate properly or some hard
13:51analysis I I was absolutely amazed that
13:54they challenged that recommendation in
13:56fact the head of the solid rocket
13:59booster project at Marshall fellowman
14:01name Lori Malloy then said my God April
14:05what my God I call when do you want me
14:06to launch next April and which was a
14:09very intimidating statement and and then
14:12he said you know the eve of a launch is
14:14a hell of a time to be creating new
14:17launch commit
14:18criteria and so he asked his fellow at
14:22Huntsville the deputy director of
14:24Science and Engineering fellow George
14:26Hardy what his position was
14:29and he basically said that he was
14:31appalled that th could make such a
14:34recommendation based on information we
14:36presented that evening but he would not
14:38go against the contractor's uh
14:42recommendation and then the head of the
14:44shuttles project office who was also at
14:46the gate with me fellow by name of
14:48Stanley Reinhard and he was responsible
14:50for all of the elements from Marshall
14:53the external tank the saw rocket
14:55boosters and the space shuttle main
14:57engines uh he said said well he thinks
15:00that that recommendation certainly is
15:01not consistent but what he understood
15:05the S Rocka boosters are supposed to be
15:07qualified for which he understood it was
15:09supposed to be from 40 degrees
15:11Fahrenheit to 90 degrees
15:13Fahrenheit uh which by the way I agreed
15:16with I mean just so people don't miss
15:18the number you you all were recommending
15:20a benchmark of 53 how cold did it
15:22actually get on the Launchpad that night
15:25well that night it got down to the low
15:2720s about 20 21 agrees and and I thought
15:30it you know his comment was correct but
15:32it's kind of a moot point because
15:34they're asking us based on the predicted
15:37temperatures at the launch site it was
15:39going to be at the opening of launch
15:41window someplace between 22 and 26
15:43degrees fenhe so it doesn't matter if
15:46it's 40 is the upper that wasn't apply
15:49either so yeah it's not a it's not a
15:51degree or two we're talking about a huge
15:53difference we're not there close where
15:55you could move it a few degrees one way
15:57or the other we're still long ways away
15:59what happened with this conversation so
16:01so you you both in th call your your
16:04company the contractor in charge of the
16:06solid rocket boosters was in in one
16:07place with one recommendation and the
16:09shuttle management was in another place
16:12what what happened what evolved from
16:15that discussion was what I didn't want
16:18to happen and that is that finally the
16:20the NASA management asked my boss who
16:23was the vice president of space booster
16:26programs name of Joe kilminster but his
16:29position
16:30was as I indicated earlier I wanted this
16:33to be a an engineering recommendation
16:35based on a technical merits only and he
16:39basically said well you know he can't go
16:41against the engineering recommendation
16:43but he said uh we'll go back and revisit
16:47our analysis and what information we
16:50presented make sure that we have
16:52included everything that we have
16:54available because there was some
16:55implication that maybe we only presented
16:58reason and data that says why it might
17:00be a concern but didn't present any data
17:03we may have it said it might not be a
17:04concern and he said we'll go back and
17:06revisit that we'll take about five
17:08minutes uh offline on mute to make sure
17:12that we've presented everything we have
17:15and he did that and that five minutes
17:18turned into about 30 minutes and I was
17:22thoroughly convinced myself of what
17:23they're doing is that they're trying to
17:25run some analysis to see if they could
17:29go lower than 53 so they would have some
17:33analytical basis along with the uh
17:36qualitative observation they got
17:38criticized for to support some number
17:41but my guess was they were going to try
17:43to support maybe going down as far as 40
17:47which in from a real launch uh for
17:50tomorrow probably wouldn't impact it but
17:52it certainly could impact whether they
17:54delay one day or two days or something
17:56yeah so you're at the Kennedy Space
17:58Center and they're all having this
18:00conversation back in Utah if I'm
18:01recalling correctly and and you're just
18:03waiting to see what happens when they
18:05come back on the line and what the
18:06recommendation is that comes back with
18:08once the conversation did resume and
18:12your people in Utah came back on the
18:14line what happened well the first thing
18:17that happened which which kind of took
18:19me aback was that it wasn't the vice
18:21president of engineering coming back on
18:23the line who had made the recommendation
18:25in the first place it was my boss the
18:28vice president of space booster programs
18:30and program management joil kilminster
18:32and he basically came back and said they
18:34had Revisited everything and had
18:37concluded that it was okay to proceed on
18:40with the launch as planned no specific
18:42temperature at all and that really took
18:45me back a little bit because I didn't
18:47quite understand that because he didn't
18:48present any real information there was
18:51much different than what we had
18:52discussed before I went offline to
18:55support that and it was clear that NASA
18:58got the answer they wanted and George
19:00Hardy immediately came in and said well
19:03you know you need to put that in writing
19:05which was also very unusual had never
19:07been done before in the shuttle program
19:10and sign have it signed by a responsible
19:13FAL
19:14official and that's when as I said in my
19:17book I made the smartest decision I ever
19:19made in my lifetime I knew who That
19:22official was that was me that was be
19:24refused to sign it yeah and because I
19:27refused to sign it
19:29my boss back in Utah Joe kilminster had
19:32to sign it and fax it down to me I mean
19:36at this point it's the middle of the
19:37night I mean the launch is literally
19:38hours away they essentially come to you
19:40in the middle of the night with this
19:41document and say sign this document you
19:45you refuse what was going through your
19:47head at the moment that you said I'm not
19:50signing it well I I concluded that we
19:55were taking risks that we shouldn't have
19:57to take and that we could avoid that
20:00risk by just delaying a day or two at
20:03most probably just one we didn't have to
20:06pull the shuttle apart or anything and
20:09that would take care of of that risk
20:11because I knew that the engineers as
20:14well as myself did not know when this
20:17would get to such a temperature that it
20:20would not operate properly at all but we
20:23were heading towards that Cliff
20:25someplace we didn't know where it was we
20:28didn't know whether it was 10° away or
20:3150° away but we knew that it was going
20:35in the wrong direction and it wasn't
20:38worth taking that
20:40risk so I was so upset by that decision
20:44and it took a long time for the signed
20:47facts to come down that I decid I argued
20:51with the NASA officials that first of
20:53all they couldn't even accept the
20:55recommendation because they know as well
20:57as I do that that recommendation is
20:59outside what those Motors are qualified
21:01to fly in and they can't even accept
21:03that it's against
21:05protocol so ultimately your boss signed
21:09it the the shuttle launched on schedule
21:13the next morning and we all know what
21:15happened and unfortunately the
21:18catastrophe that you and many others
21:20thought could be the cliff as you
21:23mentioned was exactly what happened to
21:25Challenger what happened to you
21:27afterwards as the investigation unfolded
21:31what happened I had went immediately to
21:35the Marshall space flight center the day
21:36after the launch to be part of the
21:38failure team I had went through what dat
21:41did they had at that time and
21:43frankly convinced myself that the only
21:46thing that did not fail or caused the
21:49failure was the solid rocket boosters
21:51because they were the only thing that
21:53kept flying after the accident occurred
21:55when exploded oh so you thought it was
21:59something else initially so I thought it
22:01was either the space shuttle main engine
22:04uh uh turbine blades that run at 40,000
22:06RPM one of them finally came loose
22:09because they had observed cracks in some
22:11of them and uh that would have caused
22:14that kind of explosion or the tank
22:16itself structure had some problem
22:19because that's where all the explosion
22:21was from the external tank liquid oxygen
22:24liquid hydrogen getting together it
22:26wasn't until later that day
22:29when one of the fellows at the cape
22:31happened to be actually the director of
22:33Science and Engineering from the
22:35Marshall space flight center fellow Nam
22:37of Jim Kingsbury had called in and said
22:39he just reviewed a film and saw fire
22:42coming out of the side of the solid
22:44rocket booster and I was actually uh
22:48leaving the what they call the Hosk the
22:51Huns operation support center where they
22:53had this failure team at trying to get
22:55an airplane to go home and I was called
22:58back by Mr lar Malloy saying I need to
23:00get in the conference room because they
23:02have seen some films down there and
23:04claim that there's Fire coming outside
23:06the solid rocket booster and I just
23:08basically told him well you tell Mr
23:10kingsbery he doesn't know what the hell
23:11he's even talking about because solid
23:13Rockets still go flying around with fire
23:15coming outside of them they they explode
23:18they blow up so I went back in and I
23:20said you sure that this Fire's coming
23:22out of the solid rocket booster not the
23:24external tank oh yeah we're absolutely
23:26sure it's coming out boost
23:29I said uh could it be coming of a field
23:33joint and he says well I don't know he
23:36says coming out in the area you know
23:38where close to where the solid rocket
23:40boosters are attached to the external
23:43tank I said yes that's exactly in the
23:46area of the a field joint and right then
23:50my heart about dropped because I
23:53realized that that was a joint failure
23:56but I couldn't comprehend how it could
23:59happen that late in in the flight 73
24:02seconds after ignition I think I saw or
24:05saw you saw it in writing that it it
24:08just it didn't even cross your mind that
24:10it was the O-rings even though you had
24:11predicted that there that could be an
24:13issue even though you had been the one
24:15who most most visibly and officially you
24:18know put up the objection to the launch
24:21that ultimately you had to be convinced
24:23that it was really that that actually
24:25brought the shuttle down yes I did
24:28because I was convinced that if it
24:30really failed due to the O-rings not
24:33seating properly it would happen at
24:36ignition and that the whole thing would
24:38probably explode before it cleared the
24:41tower that didn't happen so I asked them
24:45if they looked at any of the film of the
24:48liftoff and I said go get the camera
24:51that's looking right at what you think
24:52you see this fire coming out the side he
24:55called me back shortly and said well the
24:57camera was looking at area was froze up
24:59they didn't have any thil I said well go
25:01find the next one that's closest and
25:04when he called back then he said yeah we
25:06can see a big puff of black smoke coming
25:09out of the joint I says is around 610 of
25:12a second he said yeah between 6/10 and
25:157/10 of a second then I knew that the
25:19actual initial failure was exactly what
25:22we were concerned about it just
25:24manifested itself into a final failure
25:26that we hadn't projected it's a and it's
25:28a famous photo and I've seen it many
25:30times and I'm sure many of people in the
25:32audience have as well I mean there's
25:34just so many complex and and fascinating
25:39things that that revolve around the
25:41incidents that led to the the accident
25:43and what really captivates me about your
25:45story Al is what happened to you
25:48afterwards CU ultimately you were
25:50probably uh you and a few other people
25:53were were ultimately the people who
25:54really had were on the side of you know
25:56having not really predicted exactly how
25:59it would happen but that this was going
26:00to happen and this was a real concern
26:03what happened to you as far as your work
26:06and with Morton thall and and your job
26:08and you were in charge of the solid
26:10locket booster program for Morton
26:12thall yes I was and I uh quickly
26:15diagnosed exactly what happened res sent
26:18it to Marshall and went home I was
26:21totally exhausted because I was working
26:23almost 20 hours a day for several days
26:25trying to find another reason why it
26:27failed cuz I didn't want it to be my
26:29solid rocket booster I was hoping I'd
26:31find a reason that it was a secondary
26:33failure or something something else
26:35caused that and I couldn't was another
26:37nail in the coffin when I came home uh
26:40that Sunday from skiing with my children
26:42because i' been working all week my wife
26:45said I had to catch a plane out of Ogden
26:49for for the company to go to an
26:50emergency meeting of the presidential
26:53commission and what had happened was
26:55that the New York Times had published a
26:57memo from a budget analyst of NASA
27:00saying that uh these folks from Morton
27:02thol were here last summer asking for a
27:05whole bunch of money to fix this field
27:07joint o-ring thing they have could that
27:10have had anything to do with this
27:11accident well immediately the
27:13presidential commission got inundated by
27:15the Press about that they knew nothing
27:18about it NASA had not told them even any
27:20idea they had of what caused the shutle
27:23failure much less that and so they asked
27:26NASA to come in explain to whether this
27:29memo was credible this guy had any uh
27:32knowledge about the technical issues he
27:34said in this memo that we're trying to
27:36be fixed and they immediately called me
27:38back because the memo was written about
27:41a meeting in the summer of 85 that I had
27:44actually presented to NASA what I
27:46thought was the most critical area to
27:48fix and that was the field joint o-ring
27:51system exactly the system that caused
27:53the accident and it ended up getting
27:55turned down when we submitted our
27:56proposal because it was
27:58very costly and it was considered uh uh
28:01too costly at the time and not cost
28:04effective and that was the memo this guy
28:07sent from the budget side well the
28:10commission decided to have a meeting
28:12with NASA and NASA won meeting earlier
28:15that morning and asked me to bring all
28:16the viewgraphs I had brought to
28:19Washington that summer about that issue
28:21back with me and update him to what we
28:23know now I did gave him to him we went
28:26over to the old execu Ive office
28:28building next to the White House where
28:30they had the meeting and NASA started to
28:33present what they knew and took a break
28:35and finally came back to resume their
28:38presentation they hadn't asked me to
28:40participate in fact they made it clear
28:42that they would take care of the whole
28:44thing and if they needed any specific
28:46help they would specifically ask for
28:49when they went in the commission's
28:50hearings they shut the door and I was
28:51out in the hway with a couple of
28:52Engineers I invited we sat up in the
28:55gallery essentially and Sally Ry finally
28:59asked him if it was really true she
29:01returned her some of phone calls that a
29:03reporter asked if it was really true
29:04that they'd heard a rumored that one of
29:06the contractors was so concerned about
29:08the cold weather they may have even
29:10asked NASA to cancel the launch is that
29:13true and the response was that yeah
29:16there was a lot of people worried about
29:17the cold weather and all and batteries
29:20and other things and even Morton th all
29:22wanted to make sure that we understood
29:23that we were flying outside of what our
29:26experience space was and so
29:28we tied all our engineers in with our
29:30engineers and the management People
29:33review all that and as a result in
29:34that's Martin F all told us to proceed
29:37on with the launch as planned and we
29:39have a signed document to that effect
29:41and so there you are in this in the in
29:43the galleries upstairs listening to all
29:46this you're the guy at the contract who
29:48refused to sign the document for launch
29:51what did you
29:52do well I I couldn't restrain myself I
29:55thought you know that's that's true but
29:57it's very dece him and so I walked down
30:01from the gallery and waving my hand and
30:03finally got acknowledged by fact Mr
30:06Malloy was presenting some of my
30:08viewgraph saying I he I had something to
30:10add he was being asked questions I said
30:12forget about what's on the wall I'd like
30:13to steep back here a couple minutes ago
30:16when Dr Ry had asked the question about
30:18whether one of the contractors was
30:20concerned enough about temperatures they
30:21may have recommended not to launch I
30:24said I think this commission should know
30:26that Martin FAL was so conc concerned
30:28about those temperatures that we
30:30recommended not to launch below 53° fah
30:34and we put that in writing now never
30:37forget chairman William Rogers of the
30:39commission and Neil Armstrong Vice
30:41chairman standing up and kind of looking
30:43at me uh wondering who this guy was
30:46coming down and chairman Rogers said
30:49would you please come down here on the
30:51floor and repeat what I think I heard
30:56because if I heard what I think I heard
30:59this will be in litigation for years to
31:02come and I repeated what he had heard
31:05and my life changed when he said that
31:07because I knew who was going to be in
31:09all this litigation for years to come so
31:13I made a conscious decision at that
31:15instance that I was going to soon as I
31:17got out of this meeting start writing
31:18down as much detail as I could about
31:21everything that I had been involved in
31:23since I came into the shuttle program
31:25two years earlier up through the days
31:28before this launch the day of the launch
31:31and whatever transpired from the
31:33commission's
31:34hearings well when I got back home to
31:37the plant that following Monday the
31:39first thing I found on my desk was a
31:42note general manager wants me in his
31:44office ASAP I went in there and he said
31:48Al you're no longer had a shut program
31:51all people work for you working for the
31:53SLE fellow even your secretary you can
31:55keep your office because you're going to
31:57be head of
31:58scheduling I said scheduling what the
32:00hell we going to schedule going to build
32:02anything and he said well you that's for
32:04you to figure out it was obviously a non
32:07job hoping that I would
32:10quit and I probably would have if it
32:13hadn't been for the chief scientist
32:15company coming in and after he heard
32:17about that and said Al you know he said
32:19this whole company is going to be
32:20inundated with responses to this
32:22commission and investigation he said so
32:24I appointed myself as a committee of one
32:27to figure out how going to fix this
32:28problem so it can never happen again and
32:31I'd like to make that a committee of two
32:33would you join me I said absolutely I
32:36think I know how to fix it wow and uh
32:39and I did that for a few months and
32:41ironically a few months later I was back
32:43in Washington DC for another reason I
32:46was the chairman of the American
32:48Institute of Aeronautics and
32:49astronautics solid rocket technical
32:50committee I was handing my gavl over to
32:52the new chairman and I went to a
32:55symposium they had there
32:58because what happened in in April of
33:011986 just a few months after Challenger
33:03the Titan 34d blew up about 800 feet off
33:07the ground at Vandenburg Air Force Base
33:10and it was the only other vehicle was
33:12capable of launching these huge spy
33:14satellites we were still in this cold
33:16war with the Soviet Union so we had a
33:19big crisis and they were going to have
33:21this fellow talk about it and I sat in
33:23the front row and the speaker was
33:25General Don CA Who was the commander of
33:28the LA Air Force Station there Air Force
33:31systems command he gave his speech and
33:33he saw me sit in the front row and he
33:35walked down because he was a member of
33:36the presidential commission he said Al
33:38he says what are you doing here
33:41listening this rhetoric that we're
33:43putting out to the Press of how we're
33:45going to crawl out from this big mess we
33:47made for ourselves he said you ought to
33:48be spending all of your time figuring
33:50out why the shuttle failed the way it
33:52did that's why I'm not doing that what
33:54do you mean you're not doing that I says
33:56no I got removed from the failure team
33:59you got removed he says when did that
34:00happen I said I think it was exactly one
34:03day after I testified before you people
34:05he said you're kidding me we'll fix that
34:08problem and he immediately called
34:10chairman Rogers who brought all my
34:13senior Executives back for a meeting a
34:15couple days later and wire brushed them
34:17the following Monday I went in and had a
34:21meeting with our new general
34:23manager and he offered to give me this
34:26new position there were creating between
34:28nassa and Morton blacka to make this
34:30super task force to return the shuttle
34:32of safe flight as soon as possible to
34:34bypass a lot of the red tape so it's
34:36more like he said a Skunk Works locked
34:39and that we would have this senior
34:41position in that task force and they
34:43were offering that to me and asked me if
34:45I'd take it I said yes and uh I was
34:49working long days long hours and a
34:53couple months later I got a phone call
34:55from a congressman Marky from
34:57massachusett now a senator he says Mr
34:59McDonald is really true that you're
35:01heading the super task force between
35:03your AG between NASA and your company to
35:06restore the shuttle a safe flight or is
35:07that just some rhetoric your company
35:09putting out to the press to make it
35:11appear as if you got a responsible job
35:13and they just got you doing some
35:15scheduling because that had leaked to
35:16the press and I says no I uh I really am
35:20doing that I'm working 16 hours a day
35:22six days a week do you know something I
35:24don't know said well I'm sure you're
35:25aware of house joint resolutions 634 on
35:28you I said never heard of it well that
35:31was a resolution I introduced to
35:32Congress that was passed not only by the
35:34entire Congress but also by the entire
35:36Senate on your behalf to re reinstate
35:39you to your job would you like to have a
35:42copy of that I said I sure would and uh
35:46he sent me a copy I'll send you a copy
35:48also of the letter I sent to your CEO in
35:49Chicago and I'll talk to my colleagues
35:52in the Senate namely Eagleton and Gore
35:54who sent a similar letter on your behalf
35:56to the nassa administrator
35:58and that basically said that if they
36:00didn't reinstate me your job equivalent
36:02to the one I had before I testified
36:04before the presidential commission they
36:06would not only cancel their existing
36:08shuttle contract with the company but
36:10they would ban the company from ever
36:12having any kind of a NASA contract in
36:15the future so if I'm reading my uh
36:18history right and the documentation I
36:21know of on this you have the distinction
36:23sir of being the only person in the
36:26history of the United States where
36:27Congress passed a law directed at one
36:30individual and that was you to reinstate
36:32your job that is correct and I did not
36:35know that until I was speaking at
36:37Cornell a few years ago and Professor
36:39had researched that because he couldn't
36:41hardly believe it and he finally went
36:43down to the library Congress when he was
36:45in Washington and put in a search for
36:47that and they came back and said yes
36:49this fellow did get reinstated and he is
36:51the only one ever in American history
36:53that got reinstated to his job by an act
36:55of Congress that's awesome that's
36:57awesome so this actually leads me to a
37:01question that that is one I've wondered
37:03about after meeting you is this accident
37:05happened in
37:061986 you didn't leave your job for
37:09Morton thy call
37:11until it was at 2008
37:142009 uh what is that 2001 2001 so it was
37:19another 15 years after all of this
37:22happened after they had tried to remove
37:26you from the position of responsibility
37:29after they basically you know I mean
37:32everything imaginable that a company
37:34could try to do they did to you and yet
37:36you you chose to stay there for another
37:3815 years well the first reason I chose
37:41to stay is once I accepted that job to
37:44fix the problem I it totally consumed me
37:48but it also put a very good memory bank
37:52next to the bad one of Challenger of
37:54fixing that problem so indeed it would
37:56never happen happened again and I was
37:59ahead of that program for the next three
38:02years I went ahead and was the lunch
38:07representative for the company for the
38:09first three flights after Challenger in
38:111988 and ' 89 where we demonstrated that
38:15system was much safer than it ever was
38:17in fact I always quoted it was the
38:19safest part of the shuttle but it
38:21retired back in 2011
38:25after 10 110 perfect flights after that
38:29so it was the best part of the shuttle I
38:30felt very good about that but I also did
38:33not want to stay in that hot seat for
38:36that length of time so I told them I
38:38would stay on the first three flights
38:40which were fully instrumented and then I
38:43wanted to find another position and I
38:45did I got involved in some advanced
38:48technology that I certainly enjoyed
38:50doing and then several years later there
38:53was a big scare about saw Rockets
38:56causing ozone
38:57that I got involved in and uh at the end
39:01of my career I was head of all the
39:04advanced technology out at the plant
39:07everything from airbags to our missiles
39:10strategic tactical space Motors and well
39:14and that it actually brings me to one
39:17question I've wondered about since
39:18you're in your story and why does it
39:21matter that you did what you did even
39:24though it didn't change the
39:26outcome well the the first thing why it
39:29really matters is that I've always told
39:32people
39:34that that they shouldn't be afraid to
39:37ask questions or speak up because I
39:40always feel that their professional
39:43opinion uh is not only important it's
39:46their responsibility as as being a
39:49professional and I also told people that
39:53you know you need to take personal
39:55ownership and pride in what you do so
39:58that when you walk away at night you
40:00feel like you did the best that you
40:02could have done and I'll tell you
40:05that'll make the rest of your life much
40:07more pleasant if you really feel that
40:10way and I know that from my own
40:14experience that was the right course to
40:17take because now that I have an
40:19opportunity to speak
40:22to University students are about to
40:25enter into their profession I tell them
40:28that one of the lessons I truly Learned
40:32was don't always assume everything don't
40:36always assume if it's really critical
40:39and and by critical it could really
40:41impact people's lives that other people
40:45always do their job and I've always
40:48reflected back on absolute shock when I
40:52heard the presidential commission's
40:54testimony from some of the NASA managers
40:56and found out that the ones I argued
40:59with the ones who heard all of this
41:01controversy never mentioned a word to
41:04the fellow sitting right next to them
41:06and the mission management team which
41:08was 100% NASA that time saying there was
41:10even any concern about cold
41:14temperatures you know Al you I'm so
41:17grateful for your your leadership in not
41:22only that day but in what you did since
41:24then of helping to make this the safest
41:27part of the shuttle like you said and
41:30also just your own uh your willingness
41:33to examine you know where you were right
41:35where you were wrong you know all of us
41:36contribute when something when an
41:38accident like this happens you know
41:39obviously you dealt with an accident far
41:41greater scale than I hope any of us ever
41:44will deal with in our careers and I'm
41:46also grateful for the fact that you've
41:48even after retirement have been writing
41:50have been going around and speaking um
41:52and and have continued to educate people
41:54your books required reading and and and
41:56some engineering programs and I feel
41:58really honored for the lessons of of
42:00leadership that you've continued to
42:01bring to people and I'm I'm really
42:02wondering for those who really want to
42:04get into this more obviously the book's
42:06a great place for people to to go and
42:08check out more about the story there's
42:09so much detail we're not even covering
42:12in the conversation today what else is a
42:14good way for folks to track you down or
42:15if they'd like to have you come speak at
42:16their
42:17organization well I do have a website at
42:23www. ethics keynote speaker .c all in
42:28one word ethics Keynotes speaker.com
42:31that has some background uh relative to
42:34my book and some of my background also
42:37relative to my prior history at the
42:40company I worked on all these other
42:41missile systems so they can find out
42:43information there uh I have my email
42:47address at that site as well they
42:49certainly welcome to send me an email my
42:51phone number is on there they can call
42:53me and I'd be happy to hear from them
42:55and I'd like to hear their response to
42:57to my book if they have a chance to read
42:59it well and I'll certainly share any
43:01comments that come in on the show notes
43:03and I'd encourage our audience to to
43:04share those as well and and having been
43:06in the audience for now two of the
43:09presentations I've seen Al give over the
43:11last couple of years I have never seen a
43:14group of people sit more still and more
43:17captivated by every word of the story
43:19you you've told Al than they did during
43:22watching you speak about this accident
43:24so thank you so much for your your
43:26leader ERS ship your your your courage
43:29now and also then and uh I'm really
43:32grateful for you sharing your story with
43:33us today well I appreciate the
43:36opportunity to share my story with your
43:38audience thanks a lot Dave El McDonald
43:42is the former program manager for the
43:44solid rocket boosters when during the
43:46Challenger accident and is the author of
43:48the book truth lies and O-rings inside
43:50the space shuttle Challenger disaster
43:52with James R Hansen Al thank you so much
43:56thank you Dave
43:57[Music]
44:04two thoughts for you after today's
44:06conversation first it would be a mistake
44:10to come away from this episode today
44:13having listened to Al's story and to
44:15believe that all we need to do as
44:18Leaders is to make the right call in a
44:21difficult situation and that people will
44:22rush to our defense afterwards to defend
44:26the right that we've taken and the good
44:28decisions that we've made well couple
44:32problems with that first of all we don't
44:34always know we're making the right
44:36decision and secondly and more
44:38importantly is almost never does that
44:41happen even in this amazing story we've
44:45heard from
44:46Al and as many people that did come to
44:50his defense ultimately including some
44:52very powerful people like Neil Armstrong
44:54and Sally Ry it literally took an act of
44:58Congress to get his job back something
45:01that has never happened in the history
45:03of this
45:04country many people who speak truth to
45:07power in organizations and even if they
45:10are in the right often do not Prevail
45:15the way Al did in his career and in fact
45:18it's one of the consistent messages that
45:21I've heard Al speak to groups on and him
45:24and I talked about some even after
45:26recording this conversation is he fully
45:29expected especially when he got up and
45:31spoke in front of that hearing he fully
45:33expected his career to be over and so a
45:36caution for all of us yes do the right
45:39thing and also understand the
45:42consequences of those actions I'm
45:45reminded of the quote from Martin Luther
45:48King Jr the time is always right to do
45:51the right thing I've always liked that
45:53quote and I just heard a presentation
45:56earlier this month from the pastor at
45:59our church talking about that quote and
46:01while he's a huge fan of Martin Luther
46:03King and of that quote his argument was
46:06in his sermon that sometimes people
46:09oversimplify that
46:10message how you do things and the timing
46:13you choose to do them in or not does
46:16make a big
46:18difference my second thought is you
46:20heard me ask Al why it mattered why does
46:23it matter that he refused to sign off on
46:26the launch when at the end of the day it
46:28didn't change the
46:29outcome my detailed answer is coming in
46:32this week's leadership guide on
46:34Wednesday at least my answer to that
46:36question you already heard Al's but
46:37here's The Abridged version of my answer
46:40it matters because it's 30 years later
46:44and we're all still learning from this
46:47accident thanks again to Al for taking
46:49the time today to be on the show I hope
46:51that you'll join the conversation as
46:53well maybe have thoughts or comments
46:56about uh today episode and if you do
46:58have a comment and you'd like to share a
47:00message with Al I will be sure to get
47:03those to him if you post it up on the
47:05show notes and the best way to do that
47:07is just to go to coaching for
47:08leaders.com
47:10229 if you post something there I'll
47:12make sure that he does receive it
47:13afterwards and as always your feedback
47:17is welcome for the Q&A show that is
47:19coming up next week on the first Monday
47:22of the month that'll be episode 230 if
47:24you have a comment or question that you
47:25would like to be considered for that
47:28show or future Q&A show just go to
47:30coaching for leaders.com
47:32feedback and if you're not already
47:34subscribed to the show please do so and
47:36you'll get new episodes every Monday
47:38just search for coaching for leaders on
47:40whatever podcast app or service you use
47:43and I mentioned that this week's
47:45leadership guide is going to be about
47:48the answer to that question why does it
47:50matter and the leadership guide comes to
47:52your inbox every Wednesday each
47:55Wednesday it includes my thoughts and
47:56recommendations on articles podcast
47:59videos books other links online that
48:01will support your development between
48:03the shows and it also includes a brief
48:06overview and link to the full weekly
48:08show notes each week so if you'll listen
48:10on the go like I do it will help you to
48:13have a good follow-up source for getting
48:15the resources we talk about in every
48:17show and when you first join the
48:19leadership guide you'll get instant
48:22access to my readers guide that lists
48:24the 10 leadership books that will help
48:27you get better results from others with
48:30brief summaries for me on the value of
48:32each one of those books it's an 11-page
48:34readers guide and a 9-minute video of
48:38all of those book recommendations and
48:40you can get access to all of that at
48:42coaching for leaders.com
48:45ssubscribe is the way to get on to that
48:48and thank you so much to the person out
48:51in France who wrote a really kind review
48:54on iTunes and compared my work to the
48:57work of a jeweler who is working to
49:01shine and make diamonds more brilliant
49:04thank you that was really kind of you to
49:06write I so appreciate it and if you'd
49:09like to post a review for the show as
49:11well and you've been listening for a bit
49:13I'm always grateful for those just go to
49:14coaching for leaders.com iTunes if you
49:17use iTunes or if you use Stitcher
49:19coaching for leaders.com
49:21SL Stitcher and thanks as always for
49:25your support it's such a Prett privilege
49:27to be able to bring the show to you each
49:28week and I look forward to speaking with
49:30you again next Monday along with Bonnie
49:33on the Q&A show have a great week take
49:35care
49:43[Music]

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