216,000,000 Spy TVs | The LG Smart TV Problem — Transcript
Full transcript
- 0:00LG TVs are able to be utilized as
- 0:01eavesdropping listening devices in part
- 0:03because of the advertising functionality
- 0:05that's built into them. We are able to
- 0:07retrieve a plain text transcripts of a
- 0:09voice conversations and input from the
- 0:11TV. Utilize the TV to record from a
- 0:14webcam and from a microphone while the
- 0:16TV appeared to be off and it was clean
- 0:19captured, too. But
- 0:20>> All right, so the screen appears to be
- 0:21off right now. Currently, Wendall and I
- 0:23are in a boardroom with Scott and you.
- 0:25>> Yikes. We are even able to capture
- 0:27microphone audio while the TV was
- 0:29unplugged from the network.
- 0:30>> This LG G5 TV has a microphone connected
- 0:33to it and right now it's listening to me
- 0:35and saving the information. In fact, we
- 0:38can even unplug the network
- 0:41and it's still listening to me.
- 0:43And what I'm saying is being stored
- 0:45by someone with remote access to the TV.
- 0:48>> And then we were able to exfiltrate that
- 0:50recording via vulnerabilities after the
- 0:52user reconnected the network.
- 0:54>> In fact, we can even unplug the network
- 0:58and it's still listening to me.
- 1:00>> No network.
- 1:01>> is being stored
- 1:03by someone with remote access to the TV.
- 1:05>> But that requires an adversary, which
- 1:07sounds scary. What we think is scarier
- 1:09is LG itself. LG's first-party
- 1:11profit-seeking functionality pries deep
- 1:13into your private life. The TV crawled
- 1:15our entire network and found dozens of
- 1:16unrelated devices including smartwatches
- 1:18and phones of our staff who didn't even
- 1:20know we were working on this, which
- 1:22might explain how LG ads can claim it
- 1:24knows about 363 million addressable
- 1:26secondary devices in the US despite
- 1:28claiming a smaller 216 million smart TVs
- 1:30sold worldwide. We don't think this is
- 1:32an innocent Chromecast connected device
- 1:34lookup considering LG itself admits
- 1:36>> We know who's in the LG household. We
- 1:38know which devices are there. We know
- 1:40how to extend that reach into mobile.
- 1:43>> And they use secondary devices in
- 1:44political targeting. We also found
- 1:46through Wireshark and inspecting
- 1:47firmware that LG TVs are capable of
- 1:49identifying your IP address, geographic
- 1:51location, name of every Wi-Fi network in
- 1:52the vicinity and signal strength,
- 1:54channel numbers of neighboring Wi-Fi
- 1:55networks in the range and other devices
- 1:57on the network, even if not connected to
- 1:58the TV in any way, and the internal IP
- 2:01address of other devices on the network,
- 2:03alongside others. In fact, the data that
- 2:05we collected through Wireshark shown
- 2:06here is such an egregious invasion of
- 2:08privacy that we can't even show you it
- 2:11because every line has something that we
- 2:14don't want to put out there. And this is
- 2:16the TV's native functionality. This
- 2:18didn't require vulnerabilities. Security
- 2:20researchers we worked with this
- 2:22investigation also discovered several
- 2:24additional vulnerabilities that are
- 2:26going through the responsible disclosure
- 2:27period right now. So,
- 2:29we can't fully detail them yet, but
- 2:31the researchers have recommended
- 2:33disconnecting any LG smart TVs from any
- 2:36network. Ideally, you don't own
- 2:40thousands of dollars of LG TVs.
- 2:44Maybe if they're unplugged or
- 2:46physically destroyed, it's okay.
- 2:48But,
- 2:50this is because there's some concerning
- 2:53vulnerabilities. Like, for example,
- 2:56remote code execution vulnerabilities
- 2:57where an attacker could manipulate what
- 3:00your TV does,
- 3:02like this.
- 3:11Goodnight, LG.
- 3:14That's the
- 3:16That's LG calling me right now.
- 3:19The listening device capability is
- 3:21partly because of ACR, a function that
- 3:24leads LG to tell its advertising
- 3:26partners that it, quote, owns the living
- 3:28room, end quote, and your TV. Here's LG
- 3:31Ad Solutions President Sergey Mata and
- 3:34also the head of research and
- 3:35development for LG Ad Solutions, Justin
- 3:37From.
- 3:38>> And the fact that we have the glass, we
- 3:40own the glass, we own the TV. Because,
- 3:42you know, we own the glass, um and we
- 3:46have first-party ACR data, automated
- 3:48content recognition data, and we
- 3:50understand everything that that hits the
- 3:52screen.
- 3:52>> We own the glass.
- 3:55I paid $2,400 for this particular glass
- 3:58that arrived
- 4:00curved on one side.
- 4:03But I
- 4:04I guess I don't own it. Serge Mata, the
- 4:06first man who said LG owns the glass, is
- 4:09the president of LG Ad Solutions, which
- 4:12sells the data harvested from your
- 4:13television to partners. LG owns LG Ad
- 4:17Solutions, which is a private company,
- 4:19and that's a good thing because Mata is
- 4:22legally banned by the SEC from running a
- 4:25public company after settling charges
- 4:27relating to a fraudulent scheme. Now,
- 4:29he's in charge of the data collected
- 4:31from your TV.
- 4:32>> Automated content recognition can be
- 4:34audio or video data, including
- 4:36screenshots, that's converted into a
- 4:38fingerprint and transmitted back to
- 4:40servers. In this case, those servers are
- 4:43LG's servers for its LG Ad Solutions
- 4:47company. So, even though we paid $3,000
- 4:49for some of these really nice TVs with
- 4:52multiple embedded microphones and webcam
- 4:54accessory options, some of these TV
- 4:56companies are now making more margin
- 4:59dollars from targeted ads
- 5:01than they are from
- 5:04selling the actual TV hardware.
- 5:09So, that's what we're going to talk
- 5:09about. To sort through all this capture,
- 5:12we went on a road trip to see Wendell of
- 5:14Level One Techs in his bunker of
- 5:15secrets. We stopped at a Best Buy to buy
- 5:18a brand new LG G5 TV.
- 5:20>> I think we need a G5.
- 5:22>> Okay.
- 5:22>> We need something we can do a
- 5:24man-in-the-middle attack on to make it
- 5:25spy on us.
- 5:26>> Okay.
- 5:27>> So.
- 5:27>> And then we packed our future spy device
- 5:29into our rental car that's filled with
- 5:31other spy devices. And then
- 5:33we hacked the TV.
- 5:35>> I'm just sorry, one second. Let me just
- 5:37I need to read a comment here.
- 5:39>> For purposes of this video, the phrase
- 5:41hacking refers to the colloquial
- 5:43definition found in the Merriam-Webster
- 5:44dictionary under hack, definition two,
- 5:47noun one, paragraph six, sub subline A,
- 5:51quote, "A usually creatively improvised
- 5:53solution to a computer hardware or
- 5:55programming problem or limitation." End
- 5:57quote. Now, our lawyers have made the
- 6:00totally unrelated point that we cannot
- 6:03legally agree to contract, such as terms
- 6:06of service or conditions, while
- 6:08incredibly inebriated.
- 6:10>> ethernet plugged into Gamers Nexus LLC's
- 6:13TV.
- 6:13>> There you go.
- 6:15That Gamers Nexus purchased
- 6:18while it was inebriated heavily.
- 6:21>> [laughter]
- 6:22>> It was unable to agree to the EULA.
- 6:24>> If a check checkbox were checked,
- 6:26>> it was entirely accidental.
- 6:27>> Right.
- 6:28>> Yes.
- 6:28>> But we don't know if one had been
- 6:31checked. [music]
- 6:31>> Unlikely.
- 6:32>> Because of the inebriation.
- 6:34>> Yes.
- 6:34>> Yeah. You see that Stanley Cup over
- 6:36there?
- 6:37That's just all margarita. It's
- 6:39[laughter] just the entire thing.
- 6:40>> It's like 180 proof.
- 6:43>> Oh, yeah, look.
- 6:45Oh, I accidentally clicked accept
- 6:47on the terms for voice, and I'm
- 6:49incredibly inebriated. So, this is
- 6:51storing what we say we So, in the time
- 6:53you were doing this, Tannin activated
- 6:56the hands-free version.
- 6:58>> Oh.
- 6:58>> Also by accident, also incredibly
- 7:00inebriated. He can barely stand over
- 7:01there. Yeah, frankly, it's amazing
- 7:03Vitali can hold the camera so straight.
- 7:05>> [laughter]
- 7:09>> We need your support on
- 7:10store.gamersnexus.net for these
- 7:12investigations. We spent around $70,000
- 7:16to make this investigation happen when
- 7:17counting the over 500 hours of our
- 7:19team's work, and the fact that we now
- 7:21have enough LG spy TVs to create a new
- 7:23three-letter agency. All that we paid
- 7:26for. So, we're launching our data
- 7:27dragnet Kickstarter-style campaign that
- 7:29we've linked below to help fund our
- 7:31consumer device buying and production
- 7:32budget as we deep dive into more
- 7:34household spy devices, like maybe other
- 7:37smart TV brands in this series, and pay
- 7:39for this investigation. Our backer
- 7:41rewards include things like our brand
- 7:43new LG investigation Blu-ray disc packs,
- 7:45including an impressively high-quality
- 7:47thermally printed disc label with parody
- 7:49evil LG logo that has a camera for its
- 7:52eye. We're burning these discs
- 7:54completely in-house with our new
- 7:55duplicator machine. Then we put the
- 7:57discs in a special red edition 3D
- 7:59printed disc case [music] that we also
- 8:01make entirely in-house in our print
- 8:02farm. Each disc pack comes with a 128 GB
- 8:05USB drive that we duplicate in-house
- 8:08with our USB cloner. Video coming soon
- 8:10on that. And the drive contains a
- 8:12digital copy of this very video that
- 8:14you're watching right now as a DMCA
- 8:16abuse dead man's switch. Besides, we all
- 8:19know how valuable 128 GB of flash is
- 8:21right now. The backer tiers also have
- 8:23exclusive benefits like additional
- 8:25footage and bonus videos and very small
- 8:27group live stream Q&A sessions with me
- 8:29in case you want to ask about this
- 8:30project, testing, advice getting a job
- 8:32in the industry, and more. We're also
- 8:34launching this brand new cyberpunk
- 8:35skeleton foil t-shirt featuring a
- 8:37dystopian skeletal front made of
- 8:39components and wiring. Plus a splash of
- 8:42red foil for the surveillance camera
- 8:44because, of course, the back has a spine
- 8:47that runs all the way down the shirt and
- 8:48contains some Easter egg text relating
- 8:50to Gamers Nexus. Our Polygon Shard V2
- 8:53shirt is also launching as part of this,
- 8:55a reprisal and rework of a nearly
- 8:57decade-old popular design. Now with
- 8:59improved sizing, color, and endurance.
- 9:02The front looks 3D in the light and has
- 9:04a wireframe GN logo while the back has a
- 9:06polygon shard rainfall effect. All of
- 9:09these tiers are themed around our data
- 9:11dragnet hellscape. Our highest tier even
- 9:14includes a supporter credit for our
- 9:16future disappointment tour 2026 video.
- 9:19We have a ton of other cool stuff for
- 9:20this campaign to get you unique items,
- 9:22many of which we're now making entirely
- 9:23at GNHQ with our own team while
- 9:26supporting our expensive content. We're
- 9:27even 3D printing these miniature
- 9:29paintable goblin figurines to include
- 9:31with the e-waste and Dr. Dice included
- 9:33in some of the backer tiers. And we have
- 9:35a new sticker pack available with
- 9:37[music] a micro slot sticker. We need
- 9:39your help to pay for this very video
- 9:41that you're watching right now, plus our
- 9:42next deep dives in this category of
- 9:44content. We're 70 grand deep in this
- 9:46report alone, and as a reminder, our
- 9:47reviews these days, like our half to 500
- 9:49case review, lose us money since no one
- 9:51can afford RAM, but we still produce
- 9:53them and subsidize them with support
- 9:54from campaigns like this. Visit
- 9:56store.gamersnexus.net
- 9:58to grab one of our backer tier kits now,
- 10:00or check out the individual items, all
- 10:02links below. Thanks sincerely for your
- 10:04support. Now, back to the program. We
- 10:06have a lot to talk about in this video.
- 10:09Like LG's automatic content recognition
- 10:11functionality that's designed to build
- 10:12advanced profiles on everything in your
- 10:13life, including secondary devices in the
- 10:15same household. The sale of that data,
- 10:17LG's political campaign targeting for
- 10:18quote voters that matter, end quote, and
- 10:21we'll even go over 40,000 words of
- 10:22agreements relating to LG's smart TVs,
- 10:24including this sneaky change to the
- 10:26class action sections that they made
- 10:28after our first video. Oh, and we also
- 10:31hacked the TVs. Whoopsie doodle. But
- 10:33don't let that distract from LG's native
- 10:35spying functionality. One of the common
- 10:37misconceptions we've seen propagated
- 10:38online in comments and in videos is that
- 10:40simply unplugging your TV from Ethernet
- 10:43is enough to stop it from spying on you.
- 10:45That might not be enough, and in fact,
- 10:47even using an LG smart TV as a dumb
- 10:49monitor doesn't necessarily stop all of
- 10:52the functionality we're talking about
- 10:53today. Internet service providers
- 10:54sometimes have dual SSIDs that include
- 10:56open neighborhood Wi-Fi broadcast from
- 10:58customer routers, such as with Comcast
- 10:59Xfinity neighborhood hotspot and AT&T's
- 11:01public hotspots, which are sometimes
- 11:03auto connected to by devices when they
- 11:04discover the open network, such as in an
- 11:06apartment building from neighbors using
- 11:07such routers. So, this is a concern
- 11:09broadly speaking and future looking for
- 11:11smart TVs regardless of the brand. We're
- 11:13also talking to a lot of people for this
- 11:14video.
- 11:15>> I'm a robotic general surgeon. What
- 11:16happens when I'm taking a patient phone
- 11:18call or I'm doing patient video visits
- 11:21and there's an LG monitor in the
- 11:23background. Yeah. What happens if it's
- 11:25doing it on a on an LG monitor itself?
- 11:28What's listening in? How is that How is
- 11:31that patient information protected?
- 11:33>> Yeah, I love giving up my 7th Amendment
- 11:34rights to a company in an agreement that
- 11:37I never actually read. It's a complete
- 11:38scam in my opinion.
- 11:39>> Let's say worst case scenario, you turn
- 11:41it into a listening device. That seems
- 11:42pretty straightforward. You turn it into
- 11:44a device to exfiltrate information from
- 11:46a corporate network or a boardroom.
- 11:48>> Mhm.
- 11:48>> That seems pretty straightforward.
- 11:50Um you use it to maintain access like as
- 11:54a point of presence on a network. Um
- 11:56even if you don't intend to capture
- 11:58audio and video.
- 11:59>> Just go through it, tunnel through it.
- 12:01>> It is perfectly functional as a proxy.
- 12:03So, you can proxy internet traffic and I
- 12:05can just It's like, "Oh, I'm going to
- 12:06use this to move laterally through
- 12:08somebody's network." The kinds of things
- 12:10we see in the news where it's like, "Oh,
- 12:11Fancy Bear is attacking routers." Uh
- 12:13Fancy Bear would be very comfortable
- 12:15inside an LG TV.
- 12:16>> And we're even using our investigation
- 12:17today as a push for actual legislation
- 12:19to protect consumers from this type of
- 12:21technology. I've been on the phone for 3
- 12:23days with various people in Washington,
- 12:25D.C. about this, and we just went on
- 12:27tour with Louis Rossmann's team to talk
- 12:29about some protections and getting laws
- 12:32created.
- 12:33>> How many people have had their TV or
- 12:35monitor for more than 3 years? Yeah.
- 12:38And And so, this you are all part of the
- 12:40problem. They need you to buy
- 12:42They need you They need you to buy
- 12:43monitors every year.
- 12:45>> Because of Section 1201 of the DMCA,
- 12:48simply circumventing a digital lock can
- 12:50become a copyright crime.
- 12:51>> Okay.
- 12:52>> And so, when you're looking at these
- 12:53cases, right? You've got your TV that's
- 12:55spying on you, that's watching you,
- 12:56that's listening to you, right? You
- 12:58might want to go in and remove that
- 13:00software.
- 13:00>> Sure, there are ways that you can go
- 13:02through the menu. There's no way to know
- 13:04for sure
- 13:04>> Right.
- 13:05>> that that data flow is stopping unless
- 13:07you go in and take it out yourself. So,
- 13:09because Section 1201 does have that
- 13:11prohibition on the circumvention of
- 13:12digital locks, um
- 13:15you're screwed.
- 13:16>> In other words, woo, that's a lot for
- 13:18one video. Let's start with ACR. ACR is
- 13:22automatic content recognition that
- 13:23harvests data from devices like TVs,
- 13:26including screenshots of what the TV is
- 13:28showing and audio snippets coming out of
- 13:30the TV speakers. ACR can also run when
- 13:32the TV is used as a monitor. That data
- 13:34is converted into a digital fingerprint
- 13:36and compared to media databases that
- 13:38these companies have to identify your
- 13:40habits. In their own words,
- 13:42>> So, at LG, we know who's in the LG
- 13:45household. [music]
- 13:45We know which devices are there. We know
- 13:48what you're exposed to on TV, and we
- 13:49know how to extend that reach into
- 13:51mobile.
- 13:52>> You know, most streaming households
- 13:54subscribe to, you know, multiple
- 13:57streaming services. So, our line of
- 13:59sight to the screen can really help our
- 14:02partners.
- 14:03>> We own the glass. We own the TV.
- 14:05>> We own the glass.
- 14:06>> Since we own the screen and we own the
- 14:09operating system,
- 14:10>> most people are on their phone while
- 14:11they're watching TV now. Being able to
- 14:14have ad experiences that are both on the
- 14:15big screen, but also on the screen in
- 14:17your hand. So, within an LG TV
- 14:19household, we can help extend a campaign
- 14:22footprint to the other devices in the
- 14:24household.
- 14:24>> AI is going to provide us. We're
- 14:26providing like all the rich data that we
- 14:29have from either our first-party data,
- 14:31our viewing data, third-party [snorts]
- 14:33data. How do we put it all together and
- 14:35then expose it to our clients in a in a
- 14:39tool or in a platform that's built on
- 14:41AR, right? So, where I think the next
- 14:43evolution of ACR is the emergence of AC
- 14:46of AI
- 14:47com- com- combined with contextual
- 14:50targeting.
- 14:51So, how does AI play down to a scene
- 14:55level? Leveraging the ACR, leveraging
- 14:57all the AI in real time of what they're
- 15:00watching, all the product placements, if
- 15:02there's a bar scene, and that bar scene,
- 15:05you leverage AI to scan all the product
- 15:08placements.
- 15:09>> Yep.
- 15:10>> Well, instead of a generic CPG brand
- 15:14>> Mhm.
- 15:15>> in the ad break, why [music] not put
- 15:17immediately, and you have to send that
- 15:19data in the metadata, in the bitstream,
- 15:22send that data and
- 15:23>> [music]
- 15:23>> expose a
- 15:26beverage ad, a alcohol brand ad, like
- 15:29because you're in a bar.
- 15:30>> But even if you don't buy a smart TV
- 15:32with ACR, you probably will still
- 15:34encounter them day-to-day. You can find
- 15:36LG displays everywhere. Hospitals,
- 15:38doctors' offices, waiting rooms, Airbnbs
- 15:39pointed straight at beds, pay-per-hour
- 15:41conference rooms, college locker rooms,
- 15:42and they're in hotels everywhere. We
- 15:44even found this photo on Facebook of
- 15:46someone's dental visit referencing what
- 15:47they say is an LG C4 OLED, which anyone
- 15:50can buy off a shelf, and it's displaying
- 15:52sensitive medical information. Not to
- 15:54mention law firms or corporate
- 15:55boardrooms, and of course, your living
- 15:57room.
- 15:58But no, wait, sorry.
- 16:00LG's advertisers' living room. They made
- 16:03that clear. I forgot. Uh we're not
- 16:05saying that each of these TVs in these
- 16:08environments is actively being used as a
- 16:10listening device.
- 16:11That's not
- 16:13the point here.
- 16:14What we're saying is that in cases where
- 16:17the issues we found on our TVs exist on
- 16:21others or can exist on others, the
- 16:23capability
- 16:25may be there to do so, to use it as a
- 16:28listening device. By whom is another
- 16:31question. So, to get into this mystery
- 16:33of what exactly is being potentially
- 16:35sent back to LG from the LG smart TV, we
- 16:38needed to set up an interceptor. Get
- 16:40into it. We worked with three security
- 16:41researchers for this piece, Mr. Bro, who
- 16:43previously found major vulnerabilities
- 16:45in MSI software, AMD software, and now
- 16:48LG software in TVs, and who works for
- 16:50community good off of donations. We also
- 16:52worked with U-turn, who discovered and
- 16:55published several vulnerabilities
- 16:56relating to routers and network devices,
- 16:58and who likewise has his own coffee page
- 17:00for community donations. And we worked
- 17:02with Wendell, who himself has published
- 17:04vulnerabilities in various devices,
- 17:06including routers. During our testing,
- 17:08our TV continuously scanned our LAN, our
- 17:11local area network, for all nearby
- 17:13devices. It obtained display names,
- 17:15signal strength, MAC addresses, which
- 17:17are uniquely identifiable, and more. Mr.
- 17:19Brub confirmed his findings by
- 17:21decrypting and decompiling LG's firmware
- 17:23from one of its TVs with help from the
- 17:25TV jailbreaking community. Among other
- 17:27things, the TV did a reverse sweep of
- 17:30our entire local network. The TV seems
- 17:32to have found at least 38 other devices
- 17:36on our network. Based on our
- 17:37understanding, here's the complete list
- 17:39with some information like specific
- 17:41device serial numbers, unique names, and
- 17:43internal IP addresses scrubbed. You can
- 17:45find everything on our network here. A
- 17:48Prusa XL 3D printer, an ESP32
- 17:52dev board, air purifier, and then you
- 17:54get into the creepy stuff if that wasn't
- 17:56creepy enough. LG's TV seems to have
- 17:58detected that Vitaly's editing machine
- 18:00was even running TeamViewer from its
- 18:02generic network discovery query, which
- 18:04Mr. Brub says was quote, "Caught in the
- 18:06blast radius." end quote. The log files
- 18:09from the TV's data transmission also saw
- 18:11our internal servers. They found a
- 18:13Samsung smartphone with the staff
- 18:14members username exposed. Another
- 18:16uninvolved staff member's S23 Galaxy on
- 18:19the network, the Alienware piece of
- 18:21that we use as a backup editing machine,
- 18:23someone's Note 9. LG's TV found various
- 18:26smartwatches, Pixels, [music] iPhones,
- 18:28internet gateways, and switches. And on
- 18:30top of it all, LG's TV even found what
- 18:33thermostats we have. LG happens to be a
- 18:35company that sells air conditioners and
- 18:37air conditioner accessories.
- 18:39>> [music]
- 18:39>> And we now have a device that pinned our
- 18:43HVAC system or parts of it
- 18:46all because we bought a television and
- 18:49plugged it into the network
- 18:51to watch TV.
- 18:53I can't wait to start getting targeted
- 18:55ads for their AC units. So, if that's
- 18:57the way it's used, all of this is very
- 18:59creepy.
- 19:00>> [music]
- 19:00>> And if it's not the way it's used, all
- 19:02of this is very creepy. LG's Alphaso
- 19:04also collects these items. LG
- 19:06advertising ID, non-resettable device
- 19:08UUID, Alphaso user ID, active input,
- 19:10active application, uniquely
- 19:11identifiable MAC address, signal
- 19:13strength, device attributes, location,
- 19:14system power on/off timestamps, and
- 19:16privacy consent flags noting if the user
- 19:18opted in or out, among other data like
- 19:19nearby Wi-Fi networks that the TV
- 19:21detects. LG also sends its third-party
- 19:23advertisers the user's locale, language,
- 19:25and device ID when the user views,
- 19:26hovers, or clicks on their
- 19:27advertisement. Mr. Bra noted that his LG
- 19:30TV also scanned neighboring Wi-Fi
- 19:32networks, which can then be used for
- 19:34geolocating you and your TV. There's an
- 19:37LG Channels feature built into the TV
- 19:39that acts like old cable TV providing
- 19:41you CNN or Fox or MSNBC or whoever else,
- 19:44but without cable. Mr. Bra noted that
- 19:47this is heavily logged by LG's Alphonso
- 19:50automatic content recognition system,
- 19:52and even an HDMI connection was
- 19:55undergoing ACR. When he provided yet
- 19:57more log files to Mr. Bra, he found
- 19:58these telemetry endpoints pinging
- 20:00anywhere from every 75 to 90 seconds to
- 20:03300 seconds to sometimes as infrequently
- 20:05as every 5 to 10 minutes. With the LG
- 20:07Channels feature, he noted these
- 20:09telemetry endpoints. It's not a surprise
- 20:11to see Amazon or Google ads in here, but
- 20:14what is interesting is that Conviva, a
- 20:17video analytics, has a unique
- 20:19fingerprint to our device as far as we
- 20:21can tell, which allows us tracking as we
- 20:23look at content on our TV. Mr. Bra told
- 20:25us, quote, "There's no privacy when
- 20:27watching IPTV via LG Channels as the DNS
- 20:30requests made can be reversed to
- 20:32determine what channel you are watching
- 20:34at any given time. This is available to
- 20:37anyone on the LAN or your ISP or the
- 20:40government by extension." And quote. As
- 20:42seen here, the TV sends a DNS query
- 20:45containing CNN US while watching CNN US,
- 20:49NBCNN while watching NBC News Now, Fox
- 20:52Digital WTTG while watching Fox's
- 20:55regional WTTG news station, and so on.
- 20:58When we asked Mr. Bra what his thoughts
- 20:59were on why they might want to harvest
- 21:01every device a TV buyer owns, he said,
- 21:04quote, "The display regularly scans your
- 21:06LAN to detect what devices you are
- 21:08running. This is likely being done both
- 21:10for legitimate, e.g. auto discovery
- 21:13network shares and folders, reasons and
- 21:15tracking reasons, e.g. if it sees you
- 21:17have an iPhone 12, you might get adverts
- 21:20for the latest iPhone 17. End quote. Our
- 21:22TV is sending an estimated 4 GB of just
- 21:26ACR data alone back to LG every month.
- 21:30Now, that's predominantly text
- 21:32fingerprints at this point. That's a lot
- 21:35of data for something that's just text.
- 21:37In addition to the IP address that LG's
- 21:39able to harvest, networks are also
- 21:41pretty unique. This is true for
- 21:42everybody, even if you think your
- 21:44network is pretty boring. And that means
- 21:47that in theory, even if we were to opt
- 21:50out of tracking, get rid of the TV, and
- 21:52then buy a different LG device later,
- 21:54like an air purifier that has the same
- 21:56type of functionality or similar to it,
- 21:59there's a chance that those data
- 22:02profiles are linked back together. The
- 22:04TV employs dark patterns that make it
- 22:06unclear whether you're opted in or out
- 22:08of targeting. LG buries do not sell my
- 22:10personal information toggles deep in the
- 22:12TV menus and disables the option by
- 22:14default on our tested TVs, even before
- 22:17users ever connect the internet or
- 22:19accept any agreements. It adds
- 22:21advertising tracking IDs to years-old
- 22:23TVs after firmware updates and seemingly
- 22:26without having ever agreed to terms of
- 22:28service of any kind. In certain software
- 22:30versions, LG silently adds and toggles a
- 22:32setting called cookies. It's off by
- 22:35default, which sounds like a good thing,
- 22:37except upon closer inspection, we found
- 22:40that the toggle misleadingly actually
- 22:42corresponds to quote advertising
- 22:44frequency capping cookies, end quote,
- 22:47which tracks the number of times a
- 22:48particular ad is shown on your TV. If
- 22:50you want to download an app, you're
- 22:52required to accept two agreements, but
- 22:54LG pops up six with select all
- 22:57highlighted by default. If you want to
- 23:00use the app you just downloaded, You're
- 23:02required to accept another three
- 23:04agreements, but LG pops up four with
- 23:08select all highlighted again. But what
- 23:10if you just opt out of all of this
- 23:12stuff? As for the opt out, Mr. Brod
- 23:14noted from the firmware decompile that
- 23:16when you opt out of tracking, quote,
- 23:18they do send one final snapshot of all
- 23:20tracking data to Alphonso upon opting
- 23:23out though, which is pretty dirty of
- 23:25them. The TV still does occasional
- 23:27beacons that tell LG when your TV starts
- 23:30or when it's online. However, the data
- 23:32sent during those beacons is minimal.
- 23:34Said beacons to LG contain an X device
- 23:37ID. Upon fully opting out and refusing
- 23:40the terms and conditions, the algorithm
- 23:42that generates this device ID switches
- 23:45from using the full MAC address of the
- 23:47device to only use the MAC OUI, or the
- 23:49organizationally unique identifier,
- 23:52which is an ID assigned per vendor, same
- 23:54across all LG devices, and makes
- 23:57requests using it semi-anonymous. This X
- 23:59device ID is also provided to any
- 24:02first-party adverts when you view,
- 24:05hover, or click on an advert that's
- 24:07shown on the TV. However, since the MAC
- 24:10address can be derived from a key set
- 24:12per model, you can brute-force the
- 24:14decryption keys until one works, and you
- 24:18can figure out the model of LG that sent
- 24:20the beacon request to LG. So, LG would
- 24:24get your public IP and device model, and
- 24:26know when it boots and is online. We've
- 24:28just put a formula on screen. The
- 24:30formula you're seeing on the screen is
- 24:32our understanding of how the X device ID
- 24:34is constructed. Amusingly, Mr. Brod
- 24:36describes how even this device ID
- 24:38seemingly has its own vulnerabilities.
- 24:40It's supposed to be randomly generated,
- 24:42he thinks, and anonymous. But LG's
- 24:44implementation is flawed. He states,
- 24:46quote, it generates the device ID by
- 24:48combining a random salt generated on
- 24:50boot with the device's MAC address.
- 24:52Normally, this is done using a process
- 24:54called hashing, where it generates a
- 24:56pseudo-random output based on an input,
- 24:59and it cannot be reversed. However, LG
- 25:01chose to encrypt the MAC address and
- 25:03random salt instead of hashing it. This
- 25:06means anyone who has the model secret
- 25:08key can reverse the device ID and
- 25:10recover the MAC address, which means the
- 25:12advertisers would have a persistent
- 25:14identifier that is not random and no
- 25:16longer changes on reboot." End quote.
- 25:18Now, Mr. Bra also noted that at least
- 25:20these trackers remain when going through
- 25:22the opt-out process. Quote, "Device
- 25:24still authenticates on boot with LG. It
- 25:27still sends a plain text TV is online
- 25:28beacon to LG every time it boots up or
- 25:30you change network, or if it drops the
- 25:32network and then auto reconnects. When
- 25:33you opt out, it sends a network request
- 25:35to LG saying that you have opted out and
- 25:37includes that your TV's MAC address in
- 25:39the request. A notification of opt-out
- 25:42is sent to Alphonso in relation to the
- 25:43ACR. This includes a snapshot of the
- 25:46majority of the information Mr. Bra
- 25:48specified as collected and shared with
- 25:50Alphonso." End quote. Further,
- 25:52LG's firmware stores the model secret in
- 25:55the mount LG cmn data log folder,
- 25:58meaning users can jailbreak their TV,
- 26:00extract the model secret, which is the
- 26:02same for all TVs of that model, and
- 26:04deanonymize the advertisement data to
- 26:06tie it back to users' original MAC
- 26:08addresses. Look, there's a lot of
- 26:10technicals here today. We're not going
- 26:12to go into all of them. This is probably
- 26:14enough to kind of get to the TLDR of
- 26:16this part, which is
- 26:18TLDR,
- 26:20is We think all of this is
- 26:24related to LG's decision to build such
- 26:28tracking to begin with. Regarding the
- 26:31audio, Mr. Bra describes how it
- 26:33processes these captures, explaining,
- 26:35quote, "It downsamples it to 8 kHz mono,
- 26:38then runs a fast Fourier transform on 40
- 26:41chunks of 100 ms of audio, combines the
- 26:44FFTs into a fingerprint, and uploads the
- 26:47result." End quote. If you clicked
- 26:48select all to the agreements when
- 26:50setting up your LG smart TV, your TV is
- 26:52very likely collecting ACR data, even if
- 26:55you disconnect it from the internet
- 26:56after, and you only use it as a dumb
- 26:59display from that point forward. This is
- 27:01important. Those of you watching this
- 27:03video were like, "I'm just going to
- 27:04unplug it from the internet.
- 27:07I'll connect it to a computer." This is
- 27:08what you need to pay attention to, okay?
- 27:10Our understanding is that your TV has
- 27:14the capability to transmit it back to LG
- 27:16if it connects to the internet again.
- 27:19We're not the only one saying this.
- 27:20According to the New York Times, quote,
- 27:22"The Center for Digital Democracy study
- 27:24found that in the Smart TVs they tested
- 27:26from LG and Samsung, ACR continued to
- 27:29run and capture data even when the Smart
- 27:31TV was offline." Now, we can't test
- 27:34every single LG TV, monitor, display,
- 27:38and all the firmware and software
- 27:40versions that are out there for them.
- 27:41So, this may not always be the case.
- 27:44But, to the best of our understanding,
- 27:45this is the case in at least some of the
- 27:48situations we've been able to verify
- 27:50or where we found third-party sources
- 27:52that have verified it. We also collected
- 27:54some of our own Wireshark samples to
- 27:56identify how often our TV sends ACR data
- 27:58to Alfonso when a laptop is connected to
- 28:01the TV via HDMI. Before testing, we also
- 28:04had to modify some network settings to
- 28:06do this. So, we forced our test bench
- 28:08running Wireshark to mirror the port of
- 28:10our LG Smart TV, and here's what we
- 28:13found. When we didn't accept any
- 28:15agreements when setting up the TV, but
- 28:17with it connected to the internet, based
- 28:19on the samples we collected locally on
- 28:21our LG G3, it seems that the TV didn't
- 28:24collect or transmit ACR data, but it
- 28:26still reaches out to several of LG's
- 28:29advertising
- 28:30>> [music]
- 28:30>> and customer data platform endpoints,
- 28:32and repeatedly scans for nearby devices.
- 28:35That's not to mention the fact that if
- 28:36you don't accept any agreements, it has
- 28:39very limited usefulness for basically
- 28:42any of the TV functionality. That's kind
- 28:43of a different point, though. In the
- 28:44hour-long sample we collected before
- 28:46accepting any agreements and while using
- 28:47our LG G3 as a dumb display connected to
- 28:50a laptop via HDMI, our LG TV connected
- 28:53to eight different endpoints including
- 28:56those for LG's customer data and smart
- 28:58advertising platforms. It transmitted or
- 29:00received roughly 8.9 megabytes of data
- 29:03in the hour long sample. We'd estimate
- 29:06the TV sends or receives around 6.4
- 29:08gigabytes a month. It sent out 38 DNS
- 29:11queries to different LG domains and it
- 29:13repeatedly pinged devices including our
- 29:16TrueNAS server, our PCs, our phones, our
- 29:19network switch and some IP addresses
- 29:20which we redacted, our printer, our 3D
- 29:23printers and basically everything else.
- 29:25But we can't show a lot of it for
- 29:27privacy reasons. We found several MAC
- 29:29addresses in our Wireshark logs which
- 29:31are identifiable and that we'd assume
- 29:33our TV is sending back to LG. After
- 29:36agreeing to LG's terms but while only
- 29:38using the TV as a dumb monitor, our G3
- 29:41connected to 29 different endpoints a
- 29:43total of 107 times with 44 connections
- 29:46to Alfanso ACR sending it a total of 4
- 29:49megabytes of data. We also collected two
- 29:52roughly 50 minute samples using our
- 29:54newer 43 inch QNED 73B TV as a dumb
- 29:58monitor in the first and using LG
- 30:00channels in the second. In the first
- 30:02capture, our QNED connected to 22
- 30:04different endpoints a total of 157 times
- 30:07connecting to the Alfanso ACR 54 of
- 30:10those times and sending 5.2 megabytes of
- 30:12data. In the LG channels capture, it
- 30:15connected to 60 different endpoints a
- 30:16total of 847 times connecting to Alfanso
- 30:20ACR 618 of those times and sending a
- 30:23slightly less 4.5 megabytes of data. Now
- 30:25some of the data harvesting that we've
- 30:27spent the last I don't know whatever it
- 30:29is half hour or something discussing
- 30:31seemingly contradicts LG's own
- 30:33statements on its upgraded ACR solution
- 30:36in 2022 where it stated, "The ACR data
- 30:39which is in compliance with all global
- 30:41and regional consumer data privacy
- 30:43regulations helps brands understand in
- 30:45an anonymized fashion how frequent
- 30:48certain TV ads were aired in any given
- 30:51household, end quote. We think there's
- 30:53contradictions to that statement in
- 30:54here, or put another way, to quote
- 30:56Wendel,
- 30:57>> Oopsie doodle.
- 30:58>> Now, unfortunately, without a
- 30:59man-in-the-middle certificate,
- 31:02You can help if you want to.
- 31:04Uh, we don't know exactly what
- 31:06information is being harvested of that
- 31:07list, as the data being sent to LG is
- 31:10encrypted.
- 31:12If you happen to know things that would
- 31:16be helpful for this, you can email us at
- 31:19tips, t.i.p.s. @gamersnexus.net.
- 31:21>> There is encrypted stuff happening on
- 31:23the wire between LG and the TV.
- 31:26>> Things that the user can't decipher.
- 31:28>> Yeah, and if you look at it, it really
- 31:30doesn't look a lot different than
- 31:32malware with a command and control
- 31:33server. LG has
- 31:36like their command and control server in
- 31:37the
- 31:38the TV phones home. That's encrypted.
- 31:40You can't There's nothing you can do
- 31:41about that. It's encrypted. You can't
- 31:44peel back the linoleum, you can't
- 31:45unencrypt it and figure it out. In order
- 31:47to unencrypt it, you have to load
- 31:50an encryption certificate on your TV.
- 31:52You have to say, "If you see an
- 31:54encryption certificate signed by this
- 31:56entity, which is me,
- 31:58then you can trust it." And that's what
- 31:59That's what the certificate store is.
- 32:00It's a store of things to trust. So, you
- 32:03add a thing to the thing to trust, and
- 32:06then now, when the TV tries to access
- 32:08LG, it's not accessing LG, it's
- 32:09accessing me. And then I, in turn,
- 32:11access LG. So, the TV accesses me, and
- 32:14then it's decrypted, and then I can
- 32:16examine it, and then I establish a new
- 32:18encrypted connection from me to LG.
- 32:20>> Okay.
- 32:20>> So, I can see what's coming from LG on
- 32:22the one side, and I can see what the TV
- 32:24is saying on the other side.
- 32:26>> Right.
- 32:26>> But in order to do that, we have to
- 32:28convince the TV to trust the certificate
- 32:29A man that I'm the man in the middle
- 32:31>> Right.
- 32:32>> in the certificate store. And this is
- 32:34like for malware or research or
- 32:36whatever, that is a man-in-the-middle
- 32:37attack.
- 32:38>> Mhm. And so, this is also a way that you
- 32:40can steal passwords and things like
- 32:41that. Google has gone to great lengths
- 32:43to make sure that their certificates,
- 32:45like there's extra checks in their
- 32:46software to make sure that the
- 32:47certificate is actually a Google
- 32:48certificate. The LG has done the same.
- 32:51LG has said, "We don't want you to be
- 32:52able to customize the certificates." But
- 32:55this is a legit thing businesses do. So,
- 32:57if you buy an LG TV in a commercial
- 32:59setting, they have not nerfed your
- 33:01ability to load custom certificates on a
- 33:03commercial version of a TV. Which seems
- 33:05a weird. It's like, why would you limit
- 33:07a residential TV unless you wanted to
- 33:09hide what
- 33:10>> capabilities it's collecting.
- 33:11>> Yeah.
- 33:12Here's where it gets weird. There's a
- 33:14lot of traffic that we observed that's
- 33:15unencrypted, which is weird cuz your ISP
- 33:17can steal that, too. Like that's a whole
- 33:18other conversation. But um
- 33:21uh with my encryption certificate on the
- 33:23TV, I have a better ability to look at
- 33:25things. But the TV was still failing. It
- 33:28turns out LG has set up a separate
- 33:30certificate store in some of their
- 33:32applications. And so, again, I had to
- 33:33like go into running processes and
- 33:36inject the custom certificate as a
- 33:39trusted certificate so that the
- 33:41com.os.lg,
- 33:44like custom software machinery outside
- 33:46the Linux part of it, would also trust
- 33:48my encrypted
- 33:49>> Our researcher mentioned something about
- 33:50I want to say Chromium, maybe?
- 33:51>> Yeah, and cuz like the Chromium browser
- 33:53automations are like part of the thing.
- 33:55And so, that is like the mechanical
- 33:57underbelly of how that happens. But
- 33:59they've bypassed the operating system to
- 34:01DIY it. You only need one or two flaws
- 34:04that you could chain together in order
- 34:06to convince the TV to trust or to
- 34:09exchange. And then, at that point, if
- 34:11you're in the middle between the TV and
- 34:13the internet, then it's a command and
- 34:15control type situation.
- 34:16>> So, you spent the first part of this
- 34:17video talking about LG's first-party
- 34:19features. Now, we're going to talk about
- 34:20some of the security vulnerabilities and
- 34:22exploits that increase the risk due to
- 34:24LG's lackadaisical security approach and
- 34:27a combination of its intended features.
- 34:29To do this, we rooted the TV. This
- 34:31changes the functionality that LG has
- 34:33built into their software, but that lets
- 34:35us audit and look around. It might not
- 34:37be obvious to a typical end user that a
- 34:39TV has been rooted or that a TV has been
- 34:41compromised. Mr. Brad has an exploit
- 34:43that lets you non-interactively
- 34:45compromise the television in a way that
- 34:47most people likely wouldn't notice. And
- 34:50because it's a computer, you can alter
- 34:52the functionality of the TV. For
- 34:54example, if your conference room TV is
- 34:56on public Wi-Fi, somebody on the network
- 34:58could exploit the TV non-interactively,
- 35:01and then they're living in your TV. In
- 35:04one instance, before we ever accepted
- 35:06any voice agreements, Wendel was already
- 35:08able to show voice capture via
- 35:10microphones that are part of the system.
- 35:14Okay.
- 35:16Can you play the
- 35:17the audio we just captured? It's going
- 35:19to be very painful.
- 35:29We think that's from a wake on voice
- 35:31pulse density modulation microphone
- 35:33that's built into the TV, capturable and
- 35:35exportable in an attacker scenario, even
- 35:38without opting into the voice
- 35:39agreements. Now, that audio didn't sound
- 35:42particularly
- 35:43comprehensible, but I noticed that
- 35:46running a high-pass filter and killing
- 35:47the static from one channel made it
- 35:49sound like human speech. Then I pitch
- 35:52and frequency adjusted the remaining
- 35:53channel, and that gave us this.
- 35:57>> I know it's trying to
- 35:59to
- 36:00sample audio, and then it does
- 36:02>> We think someone with some skill and
- 36:04some time could easily exploit this
- 36:06microphone's presence as a listening
- 36:08device, and in some exploit scenarios,
- 36:10likely without the TV owner ever
- 36:12knowing. But the question we need to be
- 36:14asking isn't how can we make our
- 36:16microphones embedded in our TVs more
- 36:18secure?
- 36:20The question we need to be asking is
- 36:22why are there microphones embedded in
- 36:23our TVs?
- 36:25Cuz they're only there as a byproduct or
- 36:28a direct product of LG's profit-seeking
- 36:32functionality, if you can call it that,
- 36:34that they try to add to their TVs. But,
- 36:37there's more.
- 36:39In some of the scenarios that we were
- 36:40testing,
- 36:42at one point, we were even able to
- 36:45exfiltrate microphone audio that sounds
- 36:49like this.
- 36:53The waveforms on the screen dead silence
- 36:56is what it sounds like. But, when I
- 36:57inspected the waveform, I noticed a
- 36:59couple pixels of sound. So, I amplified
- 37:02the recording by 50 decibels, which
- 37:04showed some more pixels of deviation
- 37:05from silence, then amplified another 50
- 37:08decibels. That looked like a speech
- 37:11waveform. Because it is. This is what
- 37:14that sounded like.
- 37:15>> Hello, this is another 32-bit test.
- 37:18Woo.
- 37:23Voice.
- 37:24>> So, we retrieved from the TV a warbly,
- 37:25but with some work, clear and usable
- 37:27section of audio. We don't know this
- 37:29part for sure, but it looks like the
- 37:32intent was for the microphone to have
- 37:35been muted, maybe for example by
- 37:37dropping the gain instead of some other
- 37:38more surefire method of killing that
- 37:41microphone. We're not exactly sure why
- 37:43it behaves in the way that
- 37:45we are describing, but consumers don't
- 37:47realize how vulnerable this makes them
- 37:49to
- 37:50outside attackers or invasions of
- 37:52privacy, whether that's LG's or others'
- 37:56actions now or in the future. This
- 37:58raises some other concerns. We noticed
- 37:59that when you use the toggle to turn the
- 38:01microphone off, it only turns off the
- 38:03built-in microphone. It doesn't turn off
- 38:05all other microphones that are part of
- 38:07the system. We suspect there's a path to
- 38:09capture audio anyway, especially if the
- 38:11microphone lockout is merely a software
- 38:13lockout.
- 38:13>> Now, the mic thing is a little
- 38:15complicated. This TV happens to be one
- 38:17of the ones that has a mechanical
- 38:19switch.
- 38:20We can turn it on.
- 38:21And then the built-in microphone is
- 38:22listening. I've got some debugging
- 38:24stuff.
- 38:24>> [music]
- 38:25>> You know, it's telling us what the
- 38:26preprocessor is. Don't worry about that.
- 38:27But, we can also turn it off.
- 38:30The promise is the switch is off, the TV
- 38:32is not listening. The problem is that
- 38:35that doesn't mean the TV can't capture
- 38:37audio at all. This is a terminal shell,
- 38:40and it is remote access to the TV. So, I
- 38:44have a shell on the TV, and that is a
- 38:45list of audio devices that are on the
- 38:47TV. There's a lot. There's a lot of
- 38:50audio devices. Even with that microphone
- 38:52switch off, I've got the option to
- 38:53capture audio from HDMI. I've got the
- 38:56option to capture audio from other
- 38:57sources that are connected, like
- 38:59Bluetooth or [groaning] USB speaker or
- 39:03USB webcam. Any other USB peripherals
- 39:06you might have, maybe your stereo setup
- 39:07is kind of fancy and it has like an echo
- 39:09cancellation mic. If that shows up as an
- 39:11audio device, I can capture from that as
- 39:13well. The LG remote, it also has a
- 39:16microphone, and I can press the button
- 39:20and get a light. Is it all about the
- 39:21Pentiums?
- 39:26And this works. Now, remember that the
- 39:28mic switch is off.
- 39:30>> We searched using AI, but couldn't find
- 39:32the content you requested. Try finding
- 39:34more information with Copilot or check
- 39:36the YouTube results.
- 39:38>> It It found all about the Pentiums.
- 39:41So, just because the built-in mic is
- 39:43off, which
- 39:44in my opinion is a little bit suspect
- 39:47from stuff that I'll show you in a
- 39:48second, but all the other audio sources
- 39:51work just fine. Now, let me show you
- 39:52something cool. I'm running a program on
- 39:54the TV,
- 39:55and I'm now pressing the button on the
- 39:58remote,
- 39:59and notice there's no pop-up. An
- 40:01attacker can send audio over this
- 40:03channel and capture it, [music] and
- 40:04that's what we see in the output here.
- 40:06The nice thing about this is that when I
- 40:08press the button, I get the voice input
- 40:10remote 1.soc.
- 40:12The fact that this is open,
- 40:14it creates a device. And when it's
- 40:17closed, there's no device there. There's
- 40:18nothing to capture [music] from. I'm
- 40:20suppressing the UI. I'm suppressing the
- 40:23LG functionality. I've taken it over,
- 40:25but I'm using that to listen to the
- 40:27room. I could listen to the room through
- 40:29a webcam continuously. I could set up
- 40:31something like this where I've got a
- 40:32wireless microphone somewhere that's
- 40:34sending to the TV, and the TV's used as
- 40:36a capture endpoint. You know, if you're
- 40:38an adversary, the sky's the limit in
- 40:40terms of creativity because it's a
- 40:41powerful computer behind the glass. And
- 40:44the hacker will own the glass. It's very
- 40:46difficult for you as the end user to own
- 40:49the glass or even know what's going on
- 40:50behind the glass. I love push-to-talk.
- 40:52That's That's great in terms of privacy.
- 40:54I like the idea of a mechanical switch.
- 40:56It's just not clear to me if the
- 40:58mechanical switch is actually killing
- 41:00everything that it should. Even with the
- 41:02mechanical switch off, I can still see
- 41:04an audio device. Sometimes the
- 41:05microphone control is
- 41:07not a mechanical switch. Sometimes it's
- 41:09just in the menu. The problem is that if
- 41:11I'm in remotely, I can manipulate the
- 41:13menu from the shell as well. Voice
- 41:16recognition settings, very serious. It
- 41:18clears the display.
- 41:20You can see everything is enabled here,
- 41:21the functions enabled, the whole nine
- 41:23yards. Now I'm going to show you
- 41:24something really cool. It's like, "Oh,
- 41:26I've disabled all of those features
- 41:27through the menu." Hands-free voice
- 41:28control is disabled or the microphone is
- 41:30disabled in the menu. [music]
- 41:32You think you're you're good to go,
- 41:33right? I ran a command on the TV just
- 41:35now to change the parameters, and now
- 41:38all of the AI voice recognition stuff
- 41:40[music]
- 41:40is enabled.
- 41:42If I go back in the menu,
- 41:45now the function's enabled. So, if you
- 41:48need to enable or disable something in
- 41:50the menus as an attacker, it's not
- 41:51really a big deal to do that from the
- 41:53command line once you've got control of
- 41:54the TV over the network or whatever
- 41:56else.
- 41:57But it turns out the voice hardware
- 41:59works whether or not you agree to the
- 42:00terms anyway for somebody that's in the
- 42:02TV the way that we are.
- 42:03>> These are fundamentally display devices
- 42:05with, credit to LG, pretty powerful
- 42:07computers inside of them. So, really the
- 42:10only limit to what you can do with a
- 42:12computer
- 42:14and a TV is your imagination. This LG G5
- 42:17TV has a microphone connected to it and
- 42:19right now it's listening to me and
- 42:21saving the information. In fact, we can
- 42:24even unplug the network.
- 42:26And it's still listening to me.
- 42:29And what I'm saying is being stored by
- 42:31someone with remote access to the TV.
- 42:34>> So, it's recording now, but we're going
- 42:36to plug it back in and I'm going to copy
- 42:37the audio off because it's got a smart
- 42:39microphone. You can do wake words and
- 42:41all sorts of fun things like that and so
- 42:43it's a Linux box. I've got access.
- 42:46>> So, he's got remote access. Let's prove
- 42:48the concept
- 42:50and give it internet again.
- 42:53>> Yay. All right.
- 42:59>> You want to walk us through what you're
- 43:00doing here?
- 43:07>> No network.
- 43:12>> [clears throat]
- 43:22>> There you go. 30 seconds of audio.
- 43:25Uh
- 43:25yeah, I mean there's a microphone in
- 43:27there. There's actually several. Um
- 43:29we figured out how to activate the
- 43:31far-field microphone, which is a lower
- 43:33bit rate, but it or it uses like
- 43:35feedback and it can like it does that
- 43:37for improving the audio, but you can use
- 43:39it as a listening device. It's the audio
- 43:41quality is good enough.
- 43:42>> Do you imagine this in a hotel room?
- 43:47>> The hackers are already in your TV.
- 43:50>> [laughter]
- 43:51>> So, there is a mechanical microphone
- 43:53switch on the TV. Well, it's not really
- 43:56mechanical. It's just
- 43:57there's a switch.
- 44:00If I turn the microphone switch off, it
- 44:03says the built-in mic is turned off, but
- 44:05there's a more than one microphone.
- 44:08>> Now, the the microphone switch is
- 44:10actually off right now.
- 44:12I'm recording.
- 44:14>> That's weird, cuz we can record the
- 44:15audio.
- 44:15>> Audio from the webcam. From the webcam.
- 44:19>> So, if you've got the USB webcam
- 44:20accessory, guess what?
- 44:22>> Yeah, we have a webcam plugged in. So,
- 44:24this is just a generic webcam.
- 44:27And while I was working on the TV,
- 44:30Wendall was surreptitiously recording
- 44:32our conversation.
- 44:34>> Woo! And this it's like, oh, yeah, of
- 44:36course, a USB webcam plugged into the
- 44:38TV. But, there's also an official LG
- 44:40webcam accessory, which is also USB. So,
- 44:42it's six one way, half a dozen the
- 44:44other. It's possible it's the same
- 44:45mechanism. Yeah. So,
- 44:48this is, you know, at least it says the
- 44:51built-in microphone. But, like every
- 44:52word like it's every it's like weasel
- 44:54words. It's like, I was flip flip the
- 44:56switch. It's not listening. And it's
- 44:57like, are you sure about that?
- 44:58>> Wendall's setting up the next demo. So,
- 45:00we're going to have a private
- 45:01conversation about our next rug pull
- 45:04crypto scam. And it would really be
- 45:06unfortunate if anyone had recording of
- 45:07this. All right, so the screen appears
- 45:09to be off right now. Currently, Wendall
- 45:11and I are in a boardroom to discuss our
- 45:13new crypto coin rug pull scam. We don't
- 45:15want anyone to hear about this.
- 45:16>> We trust that no device in the thing is
- 45:18listening because of the appearance
- 45:20here. And definitely things capturing
- 45:22video and audio surreptitiously would be
- 45:24very bad.
- 45:25>> Well, the only device in this room is
- 45:26the TV and it looks like it's off.
- 45:27>> It sure does look like it's off. Yeah.
- 45:29>> the plan is we're going to launch the
- 45:31coin. We're going to let the price go
- 45:32up. Then we're going to sell all of our
- 45:33tokens and rug pull everyone.
- 45:35>> Rug pull friends. Yeah, I mean, how else
- 45:36would you do a crypto?
- 45:37>> I hope they don't hear about it.
- 45:40Yeah, it looks like it's off. It sure
- 45:41does look like it's off. Yeah. The plan
- 45:43is we're going to launch the coin. We're
- 45:44going to let the price go up. Then we're
- 45:46going to sell all of our tokens and rug
- 45:48pull everyone.
- 45:51Oh, there's evidence of our rug pull
- 45:52scam.
- 45:53>> Oh, no.
- 45:55>> It's a little bit of an uphill climb,
- 45:56but doable.
- 45:58>> Well, we've only been working on this
- 45:59particular problem for like an hour to
- 46:01an hour and a half, that's not a bad
- 46:03time investment for
- 46:04>> Yeah, can you imagine if we were the NSA
- 46:06or
- 46:08some other nation state? It would be
- 46:09very bad. Yeah, we literally just like I
- 46:12had no idea I was going to be doing this
- 46:13and it was just like I don't know, can I
- 46:14just bang my fist on the keyboard and
- 46:16get this to happen? And it turns out,
- 46:18yeah.
- 46:18>> Many of the LG smart TVs we bought are
- 46:20either equipped with embedded
- 46:22microphones or have remote control
- 46:24options that include them. In our
- 46:26testing, we found that the voice input
- 46:27data is transcribed to plain text in
- 46:30memory. We suspect it gets analyzed by
- 46:32LG as well, especially with the AI
- 46:36features. This would also include
- 46:38so-called ambient conversation that
- 46:40happens nearby while someone else is
- 46:42using the TV voice inputs or is within
- 46:45the ongoing trigger window during that
- 46:47period of silence after it.
- 46:49>> What are we looking at? Why does it say
- 46:51the thing I just said? Uh
- 46:55Wendell past the 180 proof Kentucky
- 46:57bourbon.
- 46:58>> Um because it has done the
- 47:01speech-to-text thing and it doesn't cost
- 47:03a lot to store text forever. But it
- 47:05seems to be the
- 47:06speech-to-text uh
- 47:09text log of the things that we said.
- 47:11>> Do we have the other stuff that we said?
- 47:13>> Yes. It's all in here.
- 47:14>> Why is there so many references to the
- 47:16things I said?
- 47:18>> [laughter]
- 47:19>> So, Wendell, is it still logging that
- 47:22stuff?
- 47:22>> Mhm.
- 47:23>> Hi LG.
- 47:26LG.
- 47:28>> Hi LG.
- 47:31>> You We know you're listening to
- 47:33us.
- 47:33>> [laughter]
- 47:34>> I can literally see the process running.
- 47:36Like it is listening.
- 47:38>> Can you hear it actually?
- 47:38>> Yeah. Voice agent result, input voice,
- 47:41keyboard.
- 47:43Like it's listening. Like there's a
- 47:44process running.
- 47:46>> LG said that they don't pick up ambient
- 47:48conversations. When you go to the enable
- 47:51function for talking to the TV with
- 47:53voice recognition, it says "Excessive
- 47:55ambient noise around the TV may affect
- 47:57hands-free voice control performance.
- 48:00I rest my case.
- 48:02>> [snorts]
- 48:02>> It's literally right there.
- 48:05The same words.
- 48:07>> Yeah, there's your
- 48:09My personally identifiable information
- 48:10is as follows. Birthday, January 1st.
- 48:13>> [laughter]
- 48:15>> So, is it still in the log?
- 48:17>> Yeah, it's still in the
- 48:18>> On the TV, right?
- 48:19>> It's still in the log on the toaster. My
- 48:20LG social security number is 1111111.
- 48:25>> Nice.
- 48:26>> That raised concerns of the TV's hearing
- 48:28conversations they weren't intended to
- 48:30hear. However, this is something LG
- 48:33denied last time. LG responded to our
- 48:35previous video by saying, quote, LG
- 48:38Electronics LGE reaffirms that LG TVs do
- 48:41not collect, record, or store ambient
- 48:45conversations, end quote. That's some
- 48:47slippery use of the word ambient here,
- 48:49but we can work with that, too. On
- 48:51multiple occasions in our testing, the
- 48:52TV continued capturing ambient audio by
- 48:55our definition of ambient conversation,
- 48:59uh following the high LG trigger, even
- 49:02after we thought it had long completed
- 49:05the input command window, because it
- 49:07remains listening for so long after that
- 49:10trigger point.
- 49:11>> I'm going to stop talking right now.
- 49:23It's now been 10 seconds of no talking.
- 49:25Holy That's a long time to record.
- 49:27Jesus.
- 49:37Oh, that should probably be enough to
- 49:38work with to check the logs, I guess.
- 49:42Oh, wait. We need to do a few others
- 49:44that are more targeted.
- 49:47Wendell, do you have any automobile or
- 49:49car recommendations? I'm in the market
- 49:51for a new vehicle.
- 49:53>> Oh, yes. We will be buying the Jeep
- 49:55Grand Cherokee because we know that LG
- 49:57partners with Jeep in order to
- 50:00sell ads. So, let's see if we get some
- 50:02Jeep ads.
- 50:02>> Do you like the Jeep?
- 50:04>> The The Jeep is very Jeepy.
- 50:07>> Which hotel?
- 50:08>> Here are the search results for Wendel,
- 50:09do you have any automobile or car
- 50:11recommendations? I am in the market for
- 50:13a new vehicle. Oh, yes. We will be
- 50:15buying the Jeep Grand Cherokee. We know
- 50:17that LG partners with Jeep in order to
- 50:20>> [laughter]
- 50:23>> It didn't do that for the other ones.
- 50:25Why did it decide this was the time to
- 50:27search?
- 50:29Wendel, which of the hotel
- 50:30establishments in Las Vegas is your
- 50:32favorite and why is it LG partner MGM?
- 50:36>> LG partner MGM or the Venetian? I don't
- 50:38know. Las Vegas resorts and vacation.
- 50:45>> Here are the search results for Wendel,
- 50:46which of the hotel establishments in Las
- 50:48Vegas is your favorite and why is it LG
- 50:50partner MGM?
- 50:52>> Home lord.
- 50:53>> Uh here's if you want to get B-roll of
- 50:55all that, here is
- 50:57like
- 50:59It's like we know this and we know that.
- 51:05>> What is this showing?
- 51:06>> This is the logs.
- 51:07>> Is this from what we're saying?
- 51:08>> Yeah.
- 51:10>> Does it have any of the other stuff I
- 51:12said in here like in an interesting way?
- 51:14>> Yeah.
- 51:15Uh what do you want to look for?
- 51:16>> I don't know.
- 51:18Password.
- 51:23>> It's still listening.
- 51:26>> Wow, it's hard to make this thing stop
- 51:27listening, huh?
- 51:28>> I think that's the idea.
- 51:31>> It's like it's still listening. We're
- 51:34not even trying to address LG. It's just
- 51:36over It's taking everything we're
- 51:38talking about. Wendel and I are just
- 51:40having a conversation ambiently and and
- 51:44the TV is just over here
- 51:47listening. it literally is still
- 51:49listening right now.
- 51:51You want to show the corner here like
- 51:53as long as you don't let it time out.
- 51:57>> We also found that our LG TV was capable
- 51:59of recording clear audio from nearly 70
- 52:02ft away. You can see me walking my paces
- 52:05to test that.
- 52:10>> Jeep Wrangler 2026. Also, I want to go
- 52:13on a family vacation.
- 52:14>> Meaning that if someone has used the
- 52:16input functionality and if speech noises
- 52:19continued, that microphone capture
- 52:21window can remain open until all speech
- 52:25and other similar noises stop for around
- 52:2710 to 15 seconds or so. If anyone is
- 52:30nearby, the TV can pick up ambient
- 52:32conversation.
- 52:33>> LG, are you listening to me still?
- 52:36I
- 52:37Is it Can you still hear me, LG? What's
- 52:40the
- 52:41Can it still hear me right now? Can it
- 52:43hear me?
- 52:46Is it uh registering everything?
- 52:50No?
- 52:56>> Oh no, it was still It was listening the
- 52:57whole time. It was listening for all of
- 52:58that.
- 53:00>> Uh or is it just delayed?
- 53:01>> Yeah.
- 53:02>> Voice is not recognized.
- 53:05>> That's me.
- 53:08It's building a profile of who's talking
- 53:10to it, which is definitely not
- 53:11disturbing at all.
- 53:13>> We've increased the mic sensitivity, so
- 53:14we're going to see how far away it can
- 53:15hear me. For example, if someone in this
- 53:17room is talking to the TV, but there's
- 53:19other conversation happening out there.
- 53:21We want to see how far away it can pick
- 53:22up. So
- 53:24>> [snorts]
- 53:25>> uh
- 53:26I'm going to speak at a relatively low
- 53:28speaking volume.
- 53:30Hi, LG.
- 53:34Can you tell me about the new 2026 Jeep
- 53:36Wrangler?
- 53:38All-wheel drive, preferably.
- 53:41Green.
- 53:48>> What's wild about that is that I
- 53:49actually had to strain to hear you.
- 53:51>> You had what?
- 53:52>> I had to strain to hear you.
- 53:54>> You had to strain to what what?
- 53:55>> We didn't even do that for camera.
- 53:57>> Oh, that's true. Yeah, that's that's
- 53:58[laughter] a good point. I actually
- 53:59Let's see how far it can hear. I don't
- 54:01know. Probably not much further than
- 54:02that. Hi LG.
- 54:07Las Vegas Casino and Resorts.
- 54:11>> Yeah, that worked fine.
- 54:13>> What?
- 54:14>> That worked fine.
- 54:15>> Okay.
- 54:18It's kind of
- 54:19kind of hard to hear you out here.
- 54:21I'll try a little further.
- 54:24Hi LG.
- 54:27>> That worked.
- 54:29>> Jeep Wrangler 2026, black, all-wheel
- 54:32drive.
- 54:46>> You're you're over 40 ft away.
- 54:48>> literally can't hear a word you guys are
- 54:50saying.
- 54:52>> You're
- 54:53You're 40 ft away and it's picking you
- 54:55up perfectly.
- 54:56>> I can hear the sound of Wendell's voice,
- 54:58but I
- 55:00>> [laughter]
- 55:03>> This is crazy.
- 55:06Okay, I've kind of run out of room here.
- 55:08>> That microphone might be better than our
- 55:10microphones.
- 55:11I don't know how
- 55:13Wendell, do you have any idea how wide
- 55:15your building is?
- 55:16>> 60 ft.
- 55:17>> That's insane. Imagine a scenario where
- 55:19there's an emergency boardroom meeting
- 55:21at a company and that's broadcast
- 55:24through one of these TVs. The CEO is
- 55:26somewhere else, gets on the TV through
- 55:29the conference room, broadcasts it to
- 55:31upper management of some kind,
- 55:33and you could exploit a vulnerability to
- 55:37listen to that.
- 55:39And I don't trade on the information or
- 55:41something. Here's our boardroom meeting
- 55:43demonstration where Wendell was able to
- 55:44infiltrate the TV from external devices
- 55:46on the network, then capture speaker
- 55:48audio.
- 55:49All right, thanks guys for joining this
- 55:51call so late in the day your time. We
- 55:54We really got to talk about this GPU
- 55:55smuggling situation that
- 55:57the It sure would be a
- 55:59a shame if anyone knew about these
- 56:00conversations like if somehow there were
- 56:04an entity on the TV playing the
- 56:05conference call that could record it,
- 56:07but
- 56:09Well, anyway, let's get this next
- 56:10shipment of a billion dollars of
- 56:11Supermicro servers over to China.
- 56:14>> Woo!
- 56:17So, you know, my computer's clean and
- 56:20everything is good there.
- 56:21>> Call was recorded somehow.
- 56:23>> But, you know,
- 56:25the TV turns out can capture audio.
- 56:27>> Nobody Nobody heard that conference
- 56:29call, right?
- 56:34There were no cameras in the room?
- 56:38>> [laughter]
- 56:39>> Mhm.
- 56:41All right, wait, we'll just copy all the
- 56:42stuff. We'll copy the fresh versions of
- 56:44everything.
- 56:45>> So, Wendell, this is
- 56:48whatever entity has access to the TV,
- 56:50whether that's LG or an attacker or
- 56:52whatever,
- 56:53was in this case capable of recording
- 56:55the sound coming out of the speakers
- 56:56during our conference call.
- 56:58>> Yeah, that the sound We were just using
- 57:00the TV as a display, but the display has
- 57:03an audio capability.
- 57:05And so, the sound goes from the computer
- 57:07to the display, but there's nothing
- 57:09stopping you from recording the audio
- 57:11from the display.
- 57:12>> And to be clear, you as the intended
- 57:15recipient for the call were not the one
- 57:18recording on your device receiving the
- 57:20call.
- 57:21>> Yeah, if if it was an adversary if an
- 57:23adversary had control of your TV or LG
- 57:25just wakes up one day and decides,
- 57:27"We're going to record everything when
- 57:30it's in Yeah, display mode,
- 57:32then the the experience is something
- 57:34like this.
- 57:35>> All right, thanks guys for joining this
- 57:37call so late in the day your time. We
- 57:39>> Wait, it's good quality.
- 57:41>> Why is there good quality evidence of
- 57:42this?
- 57:43>> [laughter]
- 57:44>> The fans are just knocking on
- 57:45>> No, no, no, this was a private call.
- 57:47>> I know it's late at night over there in
- 57:48the US. I'm here in Taiwan where we're
- 57:50trying to arrange the next shipment to
- 57:51China, but
- 57:52>> [sighs]
- 57:53>> the
- 57:53>> See, the fun thing with this is that IT
- 57:55departments are not really equipped to
- 57:56detect this kind of thing
- 57:59if the TVs are on the network. Like they
- 58:00have to be monitoring and and and
- 58:02blocking that kind of traffic outbound
- 58:04or looking is like, wait a minute.
- 58:06Here's all the list of domains, but if
- 58:07you look at the list of domains that are
- 58:09on the TV to see what it phones home to,
- 58:11it's a lot. There's a lot of domains
- 58:13there. If you registered one that kind
- 58:15of looked like it might be an LG domain,
- 58:17would the IT even notice?
- 58:18>> Yeah, I mean, you could just
- 58:19lgitservices.com
- 58:21or whatever, right? Like some BS.
- 58:24>> It's like, oh, that domain name's not
- 58:25one of the legit domain names.
- 58:27>> lgadstelemetry.com.
- 58:29Like some boring looking, you know,
- 58:31like, oh, okay, that makes sense. And
- 58:33yeah.
- 58:34>> I mean, it's a Linux box. You can use it
- 58:35for all sorts of fun exfiltration
- 58:37things.
- 58:37>> Right. Yes, you got the full recording
- 58:40for that call then.
- 58:41>> Yeah. Yeah.
- 58:42>> Mhm.
- 58:43>> Now, these aren't LG's only security
- 58:44concerns, either. Somehow, this keeps
- 58:47going. In fact, we had to cut a lot of
- 58:48them from this video. They also have
- 58:50residential proxy concerns. In June,
- 58:52cybersecurity research firm Spur
- 58:54discovered that 1,213
- 58:57of 2,851,
- 58:59or nearly 43% of tested apps in LG's
- 59:02webOS store permitted developers to turn
- 59:04customers' TVs into residential proxies,
- 59:07allowing the proxy companies to route
- 59:09their internet traffic through the
- 59:10user's home network. For context, Spur
- 59:12describes a residential proxy as, quote,
- 59:14an intermediary service that routes a
- 59:16user's traffic through an IP address
- 59:18assigned to a real household by consumer
- 59:20internet service provider. Instead of
- 59:22appearing to come from a data center or
- 59:24cloud network, the connection looks like
- 59:27it originates from a normal home router
- 59:29on a cable, fiber network, or other
- 59:31broadband network." End quote. Digging
- 59:33further, Spur found that the proxy
- 59:35companies that were often publishers of
- 59:37these apps, suggesting their apps were
- 59:39merely wrappers to obtain more
- 59:41residential IPs. It also noted that
- 59:44other platforms, including Amazon and
- 59:46Roku, had already banned apps from
- 59:49facilitating third-party proxy services.
- 59:51Spur concluded, stating, "A one-time
- 59:53consent prompt buried in a TV app is not
- 59:56a substitute for meaningful
- 59:57transparency, ongoing control, and
- 59:59platform oversight. The risk is
- 1:00:01amplified when consent comes from
- 1:00:03individuals within the household who use
- 1:00:06the device, but shouldn't give consent,
- 1:00:09such as minors." End quote. In a
- 1:00:11statement to Krebs on Security, LG SVP
- 1:00:14John Taylor responded to Spur's
- 1:00:16reporting, stating, "A
- 1:00:18residential proxy network is not an
- 1:00:20intended use for LG smart TVs, and LG
- 1:00:23Electronics is working with developers
- 1:00:26to remove the residential proxy option
- 1:00:28from their apps on the webOS platform.
- 1:00:30If this option is not removed, these
- 1:00:32apps will be suspended." End quote. So,
- 1:00:34that's a start, but we don't think it's
- 1:00:36possible that LG was unaware of these
- 1:00:40over 1,200 apps
- 1:00:43in their webOS store containing proxy
- 1:00:47SDKs. We also think that if LG truly
- 1:00:50were unaware of the situation until Spur
- 1:00:53informed them about it or they found the
- 1:00:54findings online, then LG, we think,
- 1:00:58acted negligently in how it managed its
- 1:01:01webOS store and customer security by
- 1:01:04refusing to implement basic vetting
- 1:01:06procedures for apps in its webOS store,
- 1:01:10opening users to vulnerabilities. And
- 1:01:13there's more. While working on this, Mr.
- 1:01:15Bruh found another vulnerability,
- 1:01:17stating, "For any third party that
- 1:01:19obtains a standard partner trust for the
- 1:01:21app Store. Their app can list and
- 1:01:24control any UPnP or Universal Plug and
- 1:01:27Play devices on the LAN. They have an
- 1:01:29API that any standard app can call with
- 1:01:33e.g. list devices, list services, list
- 1:01:35service actions, list state variables,
- 1:01:37request action, request subscription,
- 1:01:39register, unregister. An example of
- 1:01:41this, you might have a NAS network
- 1:01:44attached storage device that's
- 1:01:45accessible via UPnP. A malicious app or
- 1:01:50game you install on the TV could try to
- 1:01:53access or read files from it." End
- 1:01:55quote. This is where it's the
- 1:01:58consequences of what LG's trying to
- 1:02:00enable get them here. It might not even
- 1:02:02be them in some of these scenarios
- 1:02:04acting maliciously, just some game that
- 1:02:07your kid installs on the TV
- 1:02:09when you get them to the part of the
- 1:02:12webOS that has a list of games to
- 1:02:14download. At least during the time that
- 1:02:16these types of vulnerabilities have been
- 1:02:18open. This is while they're making it
- 1:02:21harder for advanced residential users to
- 1:02:24load custom certificates on their TVs
- 1:02:27that would allow them to decrypt the
- 1:02:29data that their TV is sending presumably
- 1:02:32to LG or its partners so that you can
- 1:02:35know what it is they're spying on
- 1:02:39that's happening on your TV, on your
- 1:02:41network. They've made that harder to
- 1:02:43inspect, we think, because
- 1:02:45>> We own the glass. We own the TV.
- 1:02:47>> We're not allowed to know what our TVs
- 1:02:49are telling LG about us, even if we paid
- 1:02:51for them. Not to mention LG can change
- 1:02:53the TV's functionality as well as modify
- 1:02:55its terms and policies
- 1:02:57at any point. Next, we'll do what even
- 1:02:59LG's lawyers won't do and read the
- 1:03:01draconian agreements. Or maybe they do
- 1:03:03read them and the word test was actually
- 1:03:05what they meant to publish. When we set
- 1:03:07up two LG TVs, we went through LG's
- 1:03:09privacy policies, terms of service, and
- 1:03:10agreements for US customers. This is
- 1:03:12footage of Tana clicking through the
- 1:03:14agreements using the painful process of
- 1:03:16navigating a TV with a remote. Enjoy
- 1:03:18while we talk through this. In these
- 1:03:20agreements, LG describes how it collects
- 1:03:22and uses customer data. LG tucks many
- 1:03:25clauses into novel-length terms to tie
- 1:03:27its data collection together without, we
- 1:03:29think, people understanding what they're
- 1:03:31agreeing to, which is likely the point.
- 1:03:33People don't have literal hours to read
- 1:03:36through agreements, and the TV might
- 1:03:38even time out or sleep before you can
- 1:03:40read them all. While setting up one of
- 1:03:41the TVs, we clicked on our TV remote
- 1:03:431,246 times to read LG's six user
- 1:03:47agreements and an additional 1,459
- 1:03:51times to get through the four LG account
- 1:03:54terms and conditions. In total so far,
- 1:03:57we had clicked 2,705 times to read the
- 1:04:01first layer of LG's terms and
- 1:04:02conditions. These agreements are
- 1:04:04lengthy. LG's smart TV terms had more
- 1:04:07than 18,500 words, while the LG account
- 1:04:10terms had nearly 12,400 words. The
- 1:04:13average Gamers Nexus 30-minute review is
- 1:04:15around 4,000 words for reference. While
- 1:04:18scrolling through the TV agreements, we
- 1:04:20read more than 30,000 words. That's not
- 1:04:23all though. LG's terms of service and
- 1:04:25privacy policy for US customers, which
- 1:04:27LG confusingly says also cover LG
- 1:04:30accounts, have another 17,000 words
- 1:04:33between them. We're close to reading a
- 1:04:3550,000 words just to understand all the
- 1:04:37terms for an LG smart TV and LG account
- 1:04:41if we were to actually understand them,
- 1:04:43and if we weren't incredibly infuriated.
- 1:04:45For reference, the average adult reads
- 1:04:47220 to 350 words per minute. It'd take
- 1:04:50the average adult between 2.8 and 3.8
- 1:04:53hours to actually read all these terms.
- 1:04:55Nearly 4 hours to use your TV. At that
- 1:04:59point, they should be paying you
- 1:05:01paralegal rates. Lawyers could have a
- 1:05:03field day with how it's impossible to
- 1:05:05actually read these realistically,
- 1:05:07especially consider we wager, although
- 1:05:09we haven't fully tested, that there may
- 1:05:11be timeouts if you read too slowly. Of
- 1:05:13course, some terms are faster than
- 1:05:15others to read. Several of LG's legal
- 1:05:17pages on its website simply said the
- 1:05:19word test, and after our first video, LG
- 1:05:22also simply Thanos snapped multiple
- 1:05:24exhibits out of existence while still
- 1:05:27referencing them in the broader legal
- 1:05:28documents, showing a level of sloppiness
- 1:05:31we wouldn't expect from a mega
- 1:05:32corporation's lawyers. LG does, however,
- 1:05:35force users to accept its terms of use
- 1:05:37and privacy policy before downloading
- 1:05:39any apps. When customers try to use a
- 1:05:41built-in app or some other app like
- 1:05:43YouTube or Hulu, LG informs them that
- 1:05:46they need to create an LG account, which
- 1:05:48requires the users to accept even more
- 1:05:50agreements. If you're watching this
- 1:05:52video in the LG TV YouTube app, you will
- 1:05:55have agreed to LG's terms already, where
- 1:05:57they bury damning clauses deep in the
- 1:06:00agreements. As described in the LG Smart
- 1:06:02TV privacy policy, LG collects
- 1:06:04information about the device, such as
- 1:06:05its IP address, MAC address, model
- 1:06:07information, in addition to information
- 1:06:08about every device linked to the TV with
- 1:06:09a the console, phone, or DVD player. It
- 1:06:11also may include other connected devices
- 1:06:13such as light bulbs, switches, and
- 1:06:14appliances. And if that's not enough, LG
- 1:06:16also collects location data like zip
- 1:06:17codes and area codes. LG aggregates this
- 1:06:19data with other services. LG says it
- 1:06:21may, quote, use and combine information
- 1:06:23collected under this agreement with
- 1:06:24information collected and associated
- 1:06:25with your use of other LG services, end
- 1:06:27quote. Ultimately, there's little
- 1:06:29difference in where your data goes when
- 1:06:31LG combines everything anyway. The
- 1:06:33purpose is to sell customer data. LG
- 1:06:36says as much. LG says it can share
- 1:06:38personal information for, quote,
- 1:06:40business purposes, end quote, with
- 1:06:41payment processor companies, customer
- 1:06:43service companies, security vendors, and
- 1:06:45data analytics companies. Even if you
- 1:06:47live in a state like California with
- 1:06:48some data protection laws, LG, quote,
- 1:06:50may sell or share, end quote, personal
- 1:06:52information categories related to
- 1:06:54identifiers like your IP address,
- 1:06:55internet usage, commercial activity, and
- 1:06:57geolocation data, among other
- 1:06:58categories. LG also makes users agree to
- 1:07:01its voice information agreement if they
- 1:07:03want to use the heavily advertised voice
- 1:07:05command features.
- 1:07:07>> [music]
- 1:07:08>> Hi LG, put the match back on.
- 1:07:14>> US customers need to agree that their
- 1:07:15voice information may be quote
- 1:07:17transferred to and processed in other
- 1:07:19countries including Korea, some of which
- 1:07:20may not offer the same level of data
- 1:07:22protection and quote, and that LG will
- 1:07:24hold on to the voice data for 6 months
- 1:07:26before deleting or anonymizing it.
- 1:07:28Customers also need to obtain consent
- 1:07:30from other household members or guests
- 1:07:33in the household whose voices may be
- 1:07:35overheard by LG quote, I have obtained
- 1:07:38consent from all other members of my
- 1:07:39household whose information may be
- 1:07:41collected through the smart media
- 1:07:42product and am providing consent on
- 1:07:45their behalf and quote. So then, the
- 1:07:46next time you play games with your
- 1:07:47friends in front of your LG TV and you
- 1:07:49start to use LG's voice controls, make
- 1:07:51sure everyone knows that their voices
- 1:07:52could be shipped off overseas for data
- 1:07:53processing, but it'll probably be
- 1:07:55deleted in 6 months, maybe, and LG pinky
- 1:07:57swears that it won't sell your voice
- 1:07:58information or biometric data for a
- 1:07:59third party despite already dragging his
- 1:08:01feet and will sell other data. That's
- 1:08:02just one agreement. For US customers, LG
- 1:08:04has a separate privacy policy that
- 1:08:06covers LG's website, LG's appliances,
- 1:08:07the LG ThinQ app, LG robots, customer
- 1:08:09service calls, marketing activities, and
- 1:08:11of course the LG account. In this
- 1:08:12agreement, LG's lawyers ensured the
- 1:08:14company covered its ability to collect
- 1:08:16everything about its customers including
- 1:08:17demographic information like gender and
- 1:08:19birthdays, contact data such as
- 1:08:21addresses and phone numbers, and user
- 1:08:23generated data like profile photos,
- 1:08:25images, videos, and music. And we know
- 1:08:26the extent to which this data can be
- 1:08:27harvested because LG Ad Solutions has
- 1:08:29multiple marketing PDFs where they
- 1:08:30analyze different racial and demographic
- 1:08:32groups under a microscope as if alien
- 1:08:33creatures for inspection. Dissecting the
- 1:08:35media interests of groups such as Asian
- 1:08:36Americans, Black Americans, LGBTQ+
- 1:08:38Americans, and Hispanic Americans at
- 1:08:40which point they seemingly ran out of
- 1:08:41groups to study. LG combines customer
- 1:08:43data that's harvested with data from
- 1:08:44private and public third-party sources
- 1:08:46including from social media platforms,
- 1:08:48utility and energy companies, data
- 1:08:50licensers, and data providers. When LG
- 1:08:53posted its statement replying to our
- 1:08:54video, it told other media that quote,
- 1:08:57"LGE is committed to protecting customer
- 1:08:59privacy and ensuring transparency in how
- 1:09:01user data is handled and quote. Nothing
- 1:09:03says privacy like LG harvesting your
- 1:09:06data from your utility company to find
- 1:09:08out how much energy you're using on LG
- 1:09:10appliances or scraping social media
- 1:09:12pages for information. LG also has a
- 1:09:14unique take on words like selling. In
- 1:09:17LG's US privacy policy about rights for
- 1:09:19people who live in certain states, LG
- 1:09:21says it does not quote sell personal
- 1:09:23data for money and quote, but that it
- 1:09:25may share the personal data with
- 1:09:27partners for quote targeted advertising
- 1:09:30purposes and quote. If you do agree to
- 1:09:32LG's requirements, LG doesn't want to be
- 1:09:33sued later. So, LG's US legal notice
- 1:09:35makes sure that you waive your rights to
- 1:09:37be part of a class action lawsuit or
- 1:09:39proceeding and to pursue disputes or
- 1:09:41claims. LG notes this in its fine print
- 1:09:43on the packaging, too. Luckily for users
- 1:09:45without magnifying glasses on hand at
- 1:09:46the time of purchase, LG slaps a sticker
- 1:09:49on the back of some of its TVs,
- 1:09:50sometimes, ensuring that buyer's remorse
- 1:09:52doesn't set in until after the user's
- 1:09:54already unboxed the TV and set it up. It
- 1:09:56wasn't on all of them. So, feasibly,
- 1:09:58someone could argue that the sticker may
- 1:09:59not have been present. But, if you
- 1:10:00thought those agreements were bad, we
- 1:10:02have good news. There's tens of
- 1:10:03thousands more words in LG's terms and
- 1:10:05privacy policies to agree or not agree
- 1:10:07to. LG automatically collects
- 1:10:09geolocation data from mobile devices
- 1:10:10that use the LG ThinQ app. It uses your
- 1:10:13personal information for research and
- 1:10:15development related to AI. It identifies
- 1:10:18what you watch or listen to, shares
- 1:10:19personal identifiers with a plethora of
- 1:10:21data companies for advertising, declares
- 1:10:24that its AI services aren't free of
- 1:10:26quote harmful components and quote, and
- 1:10:29ultimately shares customers quote
- 1:10:31de-identified data and quote for
- 1:10:32literally quote any purpose and quote
- 1:10:35with subsidiaries that within its
- 1:10:37corporate umbrella and with quote
- 1:10:39outside entities and quote for business
- 1:10:41purposes. Because LG continually
- 1:10:43harvests data from its customers to sell
- 1:10:45their data to advertisers and third
- 1:10:47parties or, as they say for some places,
- 1:10:50share it
- 1:10:52and then make advertising agreements. To
- 1:10:54cap it all off, LG will change its
- 1:10:55agreements whenever the it wants
- 1:10:57to. Not only does the company explicitly
- 1:10:59say so, but while working on this video,
- 1:11:01we purchased an LG smart monitor Swin.
- 1:11:03Upon booting and connecting to the
- 1:11:05internet, we received the following
- 1:11:07notification, quote, "Please note that
- 1:11:09the terms of use will be updated and
- 1:11:10will be effective in 30 days on August
- 1:11:1326th, 2026. Amendment details,
- 1:11:16arbitration agreement, and AI-based
- 1:11:18service terms." End quote. So, straight
- 1:11:20out of the box, we were told that we
- 1:11:21were pre-accepting an update to the
- 1:11:23terms within 30 days despite not
- 1:11:25necessarily knowing what precisely those
- 1:11:27new terms would be. Even while
- 1:11:29conducting our research, LG actually
- 1:11:31changed its smart TV terms of use. LG
- 1:11:34added legal language that would require
- 1:11:35US customers to resolve issues with LG
- 1:11:37through, quote, "binding and final
- 1:11:40arbitration." End quote. With limited
- 1:11:42exceptions, LG added legalese to cover
- 1:11:44more instances as well. Following our
- 1:11:46first video, LG said that, quote, "any
- 1:11:48disagreement or, quote, controversy."
- 1:11:50End quote. Between LG and its customers
- 1:11:53would be resolved through binding
- 1:11:54arbitration rather than in court. LG's
- 1:11:56terms of service updates happened on
- 1:11:58July 28th. We posted our initial
- 1:12:00investigation into LG TVs and monitors
- 1:12:02on July 16th. Forced arbitration clauses
- 1:12:05are an evil anti-consumer measure that
- 1:12:07we think should be illegal. They're
- 1:12:09slipped into terms all the time,
- 1:12:11requiring that all disputes are resolved
- 1:12:13privately and forfeiting your right to
- 1:12:15court trial. This not only helps
- 1:12:17eliminate lawsuits that become public
- 1:12:19record and which may have precedent, but
- 1:12:21can be combined with preventative
- 1:12:23clauses that stop class actions in their
- 1:12:25tracks. LG knows it's at risk of
- 1:12:27lawsuits, including expensive class
- 1:12:29actions, and we think it's trying to
- 1:12:31head them off. LG's customers buying TVs
- 1:12:33costing thousands of dollars aren't just
- 1:12:35customers. They're also the product. LG
- 1:12:38can sell or share its customers' data
- 1:12:41with basically any third party for any
- 1:12:43reason. LG has clauses to weasel out of
- 1:12:45effectively everything. Selling a TV is
- 1:12:48a one-time sale. Selling data and
- 1:12:50advertisements and training AI continues
- 1:12:52indefinitely. According to LG Ad
- 1:12:54Solutions, customers who purchased the
- 1:12:55TV don't own the glass. It does. Just
- 1:12:58ask LG Ad Solutions spokespeople.
- 1:13:01>> In the fact that we have the glass, we
- 1:13:03own the glass, we own the TV. Because,
- 1:13:05you know, we own the glass,
- 1:13:08um and we have first-party ACR data,
- 1:13:11automated content recognition data, and
- 1:13:13we understand everything that that hits
- 1:13:15the screen.
- 1:13:15>> The other thing that we focus on when we
- 1:13:18think about intelligent systems is
- 1:13:20really our advantage of being in a CTV
- 1:13:23environment and owning the glass and
- 1:13:25owning working with the consumer to
- 1:13:26create a really cool environment.
- 1:13:28>> Ignoring that near-Freudian slip about
- 1:13:30owning the customer, sorry, working with
- 1:13:32the customer, LG Ad Solutions goes so
- 1:13:35far as to offer marketers the ability to
- 1:13:37quote "own the living room"
- 1:13:39of LG TV users, not just the TV, but
- 1:13:42part of your house. LG monetizes users
- 1:13:45by collecting viewing data and then
- 1:13:47using this information for selling
- 1:13:48advertisements on smart TVs. LG Smart TV
- 1:13:51agreement names Alphonso Inc. as its
- 1:13:54service partner for collecting and using
- 1:13:56viewing information to serve ads to its
- 1:13:58customers. In Alphonso's privacy policy,
- 1:14:01the company says it provides quote
- 1:14:03"viewing data in aggregated or
- 1:14:04anonymized form" to clients who can then
- 1:14:07use the data for as long as they want
- 1:14:09to. Alphonso is also known as
- 1:14:12LG Ad Solutions, which means LG controls
- 1:14:15it. LG Ad Solutions website says the
- 1:14:18company is quote "incorporated as
- 1:14:20Alphonso Inc." and quote, and LG
- 1:14:22acquired a controlling stake in Alphonso
- 1:14:25in 2021. At the time, LG said the
- 1:14:27investment in Alphonso would create
- 1:14:29quote "cross-device advertising platform
- 1:14:32with integrated analytics platform for
- 1:14:34LG TVs in the smart TV marketplace as a
- 1:14:36whole" and quote. Alphonso subsequently
- 1:14:39rebranded as LG Ads. LG Ad Solutions
- 1:14:42also has some shady connections within
- 1:14:44its executive team. Two years before
- 1:14:46becoming LG Ad Solutions President of
- 1:14:48Global Ad Sales, the SEC charged Serge
- 1:14:51Mata and Comscore, the company he was
- 1:14:53previously CEO of, quote, with engaging
- 1:14:56in a fraudulent scheme to overstate
- 1:14:58revenue by approximately $50 million
- 1:15:01and making false and misleading
- 1:15:02statements about key performance
- 1:15:04metrics, end quote. Mata settled the
- 1:15:06charges in 2019, agreeing to pay a
- 1:15:09$700,000 penalty and to reimburse
- 1:15:12Comscore $2.1 million. The SEC barred
- 1:15:15Mata from, quote, serving as an officer
- 1:15:18or director of a public company for 10
- 1:15:20years, end quote. Luckily for Mata, the
- 1:15:23SEC didn't say anything about serving as
- 1:15:25the president of a private company.
- 1:15:27Additionally, LG Ad Solutions backslid
- 1:15:29on previous claims about their terms and
- 1:15:31conditions for consumers. In 2022, LG Ad
- 1:15:34Solutions said,
- 1:15:35>> Our ACR technology is a double opt-in
- 1:15:39um experience for consumers and and we
- 1:15:41believe that's extremely important.
- 1:15:43>> [snorts]
- 1:15:43>> Um so, that's the most important thing
- 1:15:46to say.
- 1:15:46>> As far as we could tell, we only
- 1:15:48received a single opt-in for ACR,
- 1:15:50suggesting that LG removed safeguards to
- 1:15:52protect users' privacy after the
- 1:15:54statement. Likewise, when working with
- 1:15:56Wendell on his comparatively ancient LG
- 1:15:58TV that he says he's never accepted any
- 1:16:00terms on, we watched in horror as the
- 1:16:02slow roll of firmware updates added
- 1:16:04unique identifiers, cookie tracking, and
- 1:16:06tricky dark patterns of language.
- 1:16:08>> Aha.
- 1:16:10>> So, that's new.
- 1:16:11>> That was not there, right?
- 1:16:13>> Right. And limit ad tracking is off by
- 1:16:15default. So, your ad tracking is not
- 1:16:18limited.
- 1:16:19>> I didn't Same thing.
- 1:16:20>> I have agreed to nothing.
- 1:16:21>> So, as we said there, we think LG
- 1:16:23architected its UI using dark patterns
- 1:16:25to make it easy for users to
- 1:16:27accidentally accept its ACR terms and
- 1:16:29conditions. Users need to agree only to
- 1:16:32LG's terms of use and privacy policy to
- 1:16:34install apps on their smart TV. But,
- 1:16:37when a user tries to install an app, LG
- 1:16:39pops up six user agreements and
- 1:16:41automatically highlights the select all
- 1:16:43button, we think, to deceive users into
- 1:16:46accepting its ACR agreement even when
- 1:16:48it's actually not required. It's
- 1:16:50highlighted as an accept all by default.
- 1:16:54This is a huge problem. Once you've
- 1:16:56accepted these agreements, even if by
- 1:16:57accident, you have no idea where your
- 1:17:00data could go, and it can be
- 1:17:01instantaneous. When in Wendel's office,
- 1:17:04the terms may have been accepted by
- 1:17:06somebody, but we're not sure who or if
- 1:17:09it was intentional or if that person was
- 1:17:10even sober. We immediately saw a stream
- 1:17:13of data flowing back to LG via
- 1:17:15Wireshark. We saw similar in our office.
- 1:17:18If you accidentally accept these terms,
- 1:17:20there's really no going back, even if
- 1:17:22adjusting your preferences later. For
- 1:17:24example, LG Ad Solutions partners with
- 1:17:27Affinity Solutions to tie ads to credit
- 1:17:29card purchases. LG Ad Solutions
- 1:17:32president, a man who settled a fraud
- 1:17:33case, explains.
- 1:17:35>> In the retail world, you go you want to
- 1:17:37tie it to an actual credit card or a
- 1:17:40bank transaction, an actual purchase.
- 1:17:43So, we went ahead and partnered and
- 1:17:45created a product called LoopIQ with
- 1:17:47Affinity Solutions. It's a premier
- 1:17:49company that actually has thousands and
- 1:17:51thousands of these credit card
- 1:17:52merchants' data in a privacy-friendly
- 1:17:54manner that they get the access to the
- 1:17:56information, and we've tied it to the
- 1:17:58media side of the house. So, we're not
- 1:18:00going to go ahead and just provide just
- 1:18:01the data. We're always going to tie it
- 1:18:03to a specific campaign and say, "Okay,
- 1:18:05somebody went in and saw a Target ad,
- 1:18:08either we delivered it to them on a
- 1:18:10managed services or a programmatic
- 1:18:11basis, and then did they actually go to
- 1:18:14Target and pay XYZ at Target at that
- 1:18:17merchant on that specific day?"
- 1:18:19Tying the actual a CTV exposure to a
- 1:18:23merchant to a merchant into an actual
- 1:18:25purchase is where we're heading with
- 1:18:27with this partnership.
- 1:18:28>> Despite LG handing Alphonso millions of
- 1:18:30dollars to acquire a majority stake in
- 1:18:322021, the companies aren't on the best
- 1:18:35of terms. LG intended to let Alphonso go
- 1:18:37public when it acquired equity in the ad
- 1:18:40service, but according to the news
- 1:18:41outlet AdExchanger, LG changed its mind
- 1:18:44and wanted a bigger piece of the company
- 1:18:46after Alphonso began making more money
- 1:18:49than expected. AdExchanger reported that
- 1:18:51LG orchestrated a quote boardroom coup
- 1:18:54end quote in 2022. Alphonso sued LG and
- 1:18:58won. LG and Alphonso Inc. have been
- 1:19:01locked in ongoing legal battles since
- 1:19:04with Alphonso filing up more lawsuits
- 1:19:06against LG with billions of dollars at
- 1:19:08stake. AdExchanger said that Alphonso
- 1:19:10has filed four lawsuits against
- 1:19:12controlling entity LG in the last few
- 1:19:15years to wrestle back control from its
- 1:19:17corporate overlord. In short,
- 1:19:19advertising on smart TVs is worth
- 1:19:20millions and future billions of dollars
- 1:19:23and LG wants more control. Earlier this
- 1:19:25year, Korean outlet Chosun Biz reported
- 1:19:28through machine translation that LG is
- 1:19:29pursuing a full takeover and could
- 1:19:32increase its equity in Alphonso to 100%.
- 1:19:35We dug through LG's financial documents
- 1:19:37and we found out why the Korean
- 1:19:38conglomerate wants more control. In the
- 1:19:41first quarter of 2026, Alphonso
- 1:19:43generated 273 billion 698 million won in
- 1:19:48sales and 32 billion 646 million Korean
- 1:19:52won in profit. This works out to be
- 1:19:54about 185 million dollars in US dollars
- 1:19:56in sales and 22 million dollars in US
- 1:19:59dollars in profit. Walmart made a
- 1:20:01similar play a few years ago. In 2024,
- 1:20:04Walmart acquired the television
- 1:20:05manufacturer Vizio and specified Vizio's
- 1:20:08advertising revenue as one of the main
- 1:20:10drivers of Vizio's growth. Walmart said
- 1:20:12the acquisition would quote create new
- 1:20:14opportunities to help advertisers
- 1:20:16connect with customers empowering brands
- 1:20:18with differentiated and compelling
- 1:20:20opportunities to engage at scale and to
- 1:20:23realize greater impact from their
- 1:20:24advertising spend with Walmart end
- 1:20:26quote. Walmart, the largest retail
- 1:20:29company in the world, bought TV
- 1:20:30manufacturer Vizio for advertising.
- 1:20:33Vizio's last annual report shows how
- 1:20:36much more the company made from
- 1:20:37advertising and services compared to
- 1:20:39hardware. In 2023, Vizio made about $1.1
- 1:20:43billion from its device group, which
- 1:20:45includes smart TVs and soundbars, and
- 1:20:48about $598 million from its platform
- 1:20:50plus group, which includes advertising
- 1:20:53revenue. While selling TVs generated
- 1:20:55more money for Vizio in 2023, the two
- 1:20:57business groups had vastly different
- 1:20:59margins. Vizio's device business had a
- 1:21:01gross margin of -0.8%.
- 1:21:05They were losing money on it, whereas
- 1:21:07the platform plus group had a gross
- 1:21:09margin of 61%.
- 1:21:12That's where it came back. Microsoft was
- 1:21:13quick to throw LG under the bus when we
- 1:21:15found LG using Windows update to, in our
- 1:21:18opinions, distribute malware in the form
- 1:21:20of McAfee advertisements via LG's
- 1:21:22equally malware installer app that we
- 1:21:24didn't consent to be installed, but it
- 1:21:26was. But Microsoft was saving face. It's
- 1:21:28just as involved. In fact, LG turned to
- 1:21:31its long-time partner Microsoft to serve
- 1:21:33up that Windows adware. Microsoft and LG
- 1:21:35have worked together on Windows phones,
- 1:21:36patent agreements, cloud services,
- 1:21:38robots, cars, gaming in cars, gaming in
- 1:21:39the cloud, and according to Microsoft,
- 1:21:41turning LG TVs into Xboxes. Their
- 1:21:43collaboration goes way back. Microsoft
- 1:21:45and LG tried to make the now extinct
- 1:21:47Windows phones a success. In 2009, LG
- 1:21:49made Windows its primary operating
- 1:21:51system for smartphones. Microsoft and LG
- 1:21:53signed a patent agreement in 2012 that
- 1:21:55covered Android and Chrome OS devices
- 1:21:56since Ballmer's Microsoft wanted to make
- 1:21:58money from LG's phone sales even if it
- 1:21:59had Google software on them. In 2019, LG
- 1:22:02and Microsoft entered into a memorandum
- 1:22:03of understandings to grow LG's
- 1:22:05autonomous vehicles business using
- 1:22:06Microsoft's cloud services. In 2025,
- 1:22:08Microsoft released a new Xbox app that
- 1:22:10would be available on LG's automotive
- 1:22:11content platform. So, now Microsoft can
- 1:22:13call cars an Xbox or something. Even
- 1:22:15today, LG pushes Microsoft's Co-pilot
- 1:22:17Plus PCs. They work together on the
- 1:22:18robot Q9 using Microsoft voice AI
- 1:22:20technologies to make AI cute. And of
- 1:22:23course, data centers. Microsoft
- 1:22:24purchases cooling solutions from LG for
- 1:22:26data centers for AI. LG and Microsoft
- 1:22:29reportedly signed a deal worth billions
- 1:22:31of dollars to do this. These companies
- 1:22:33know each other, but the biggest
- 1:22:36collaboration of all is with Nuance.
- 1:22:38Found in LG's agreements, this is a data
- 1:22:41management company that Microsoft owns.
- 1:22:43Microsoft is every bit as guilty as LG,
- 1:22:47we think, even though it was convenient
- 1:22:49for them to throw LG under the bus on
- 1:22:51Twitter. Microsoft even appears in LG's
- 1:22:53smart TV legal agreements that we went
- 1:22:55through. That's because LG names Nuance
- 1:22:57Communications as the service partner
- 1:22:59that collects and analyzes voice data
- 1:23:01when someone uses voice commands with an
- 1:23:03LG TV. Microsoft purchased Nuance for
- 1:23:0619.7 billion dollars in 2021 and
- 1:23:10completed the acquisition in 2022. After
- 1:23:12numerous user reports about LG monitors
- 1:23:14installing bloatware on computers and
- 1:23:16after our first video, LG and Microsoft
- 1:23:19responded to the PR shitstorm that came
- 1:23:21about due to displaying unwanted ads. LG
- 1:23:24responded to questions through comments
- 1:23:26to media outlets like TechRadar saying,
- 1:23:28quote, "LG Electronics reiterates that
- 1:23:31McAfee is not installed automatically
- 1:23:33and is never installed without the
- 1:23:35user's explicit consent. The LG monitor
- 1:23:37app installer is distributed through
- 1:23:39Microsoft's official Windows
- 1:23:41distribution process which included
- 1:23:43McAfee as an option. McAfee will be
- 1:23:45installed only if a user actively
- 1:23:48chooses to proceed with the installation
- 1:23:49and provides consent. Under no
- 1:23:52circumstances
- 1:23:52is McAfee installed automatically or
- 1:23:55without user authorization. The LG
- 1:23:57monitor app installer does not access,
- 1:23:59collect, or transmit any customer
- 1:24:02personal data." End quote. But we never
- 1:24:04claimed that our LG monitor
- 1:24:05automatically installed McAfee. We said
- 1:24:08it automatically installed LG monitor
- 1:24:09app installer without consent, which it
- 1:24:11did, and that promoted McAfee adware
- 1:24:13without user consent, which it also did.
- 1:24:16We think they're lying. Also, and this
- 1:24:18is a separate issue entirely, our
- 1:24:20security researchers we worked with
- 1:24:22found security vulnerabilities in
- 1:24:24basically every single application
- 1:24:26connected to the LG monitor app
- 1:24:27installer, but that's a story for
- 1:24:30another time. Additionally, while LG
- 1:24:32claims its monitor app doesn't access,
- 1:24:34collect, or transmit any customer
- 1:24:36personal data, it can, quote, use all
- 1:24:39system resources and access your
- 1:24:42internet connection, end quote,
- 1:24:43according to its page in the Microsoft
- 1:24:45store at the time of writing. And so,
- 1:24:46it's not a far leap. In a statement to
- 1:24:48TechRadar, LG also stated, quote, LG
- 1:24:51Electronics reaffirms that LG TVs do not
- 1:24:53collect, record, or store ambient
- 1:24:56conversations. Voice recognition is an
- 1:24:58optional user-initiated feature that
- 1:25:00processes voice data only when activated
- 1:25:02by the user to fulfill a specific
- 1:25:04request. Customers can use smart TV
- 1:25:07features without enabling voice
- 1:25:09recognition, end quote. Well, that's a
- 1:25:10lot of specific statements we can shut
- 1:25:12down right away. Immediately after we
- 1:25:13enabled our LG TV's voice feature, it
- 1:25:16recorded Andrew and Vitaly's background
- 1:25:18conversation despite neither realizing
- 1:25:20the TV was listening. The TV was also
- 1:25:22not, quote, fulfilling a specific
- 1:25:25request, end quote, immediately
- 1:25:27debunking LG's statement. In this clip,
- 1:25:29Tannen is on the other side of a large
- 1:25:31room from Vitaly and Andrew. Tannen is
- 1:25:33setting up the TV and using voice input
- 1:25:36to command it. Vitaly and Andrew are on
- 1:25:38the backside of the TV, behind it,
- 1:25:40talking about work without knowledge of
- 1:25:42what Tannen is testing or that the TV is
- 1:25:44listening.
- 1:25:45>> Just give them a little more margin from
- 1:25:47the wall.
- 1:25:47>> Hi, LG.
- 1:25:49Keep changing channels.
- 1:25:52Is there one of my glare?
- 1:25:55>> I think I can see it.
- 1:25:56>> Uh I think it's two or three layers.
- 1:25:59Three?
- 1:26:11>> You guys see it's kind of stuck.
- 1:26:17See, I think it just got to shave off.
- 1:26:20>> I mean
- 1:26:20>> Notice that after Andrew says two
- 1:26:22layers, the whole room is silent for a
- 1:26:25really long period. Long enough that we
- 1:26:26considered cutting it down, but it makes
- 1:26:28the point. The TV continued listening.
- 1:26:31All the way through he broke the silence
- 1:26:33and spoke again. In fact, Tynan didn't
- 1:26:35even interrupt them to say that the TV
- 1:26:37was hearing all of this and it continued
- 1:26:39recording for a couple minutes. This
- 1:26:41data is the same type of data that we
- 1:26:43recovered transcribed in the plain text
- 1:26:45file with Wendell. LG's response
- 1:26:47concluded with this, quote LGE is
- 1:26:49committed to protecting customer privacy
- 1:26:52and ensuring transparency in how user
- 1:26:54data is handled, end quote. If LG really
- 1:26:57cared about ensuring transparency in how
- 1:26:59user data is handled, it wouldn't hide
- 1:27:02the do not sell my personal information
- 1:27:04option in its menu settings. This was
- 1:27:06disabled by default even before we
- 1:27:08connected to the internet or agreed to
- 1:27:11any terms or conditions, meaning it acts
- 1:27:13like a claymore for your privacy as soon
- 1:27:16as you trip it. And when a claymore says
- 1:27:18this side towards enemy, that enemy is
- 1:27:20you. This isn't new either. Louis
- 1:27:23Rossmann pointed it out in his LG Smart
- 1:27:25TV video nearly 3 years ago.
- 1:27:27>> If you go in any one of the default
- 1:27:29profiles and you go to privacy and
- 1:27:30terms, what you'll notice with a smart
- 1:27:32television is there's an option called
- 1:27:33do not sell my personal information. And
- 1:27:36because we live in a dystopian world,
- 1:27:38this option is not by default checked.
- 1:27:40>> Which by the way, on a $3,000 LG OLED
- 1:27:43should be opt in, not opt out for
- 1:27:46tracking. FU LG for doing that.
- 1:27:48>> Microsoft also took some, albeit
- 1:27:49limited, action. Epic Games CEO and AI
- 1:27:52lunatic Tim Sweeney alerted Microsoft VP
- 1:27:55Pavan Davuluri about LG monitors
- 1:27:57covertly installing its app and showing
- 1:28:00ads for McAfee. According to the
- 1:28:01Microsoft VP, LG disabled the McAfee
- 1:28:03pop-up ad from its app. Microsoft's lip
- 1:28:05service about the problem said nothing
- 1:28:07about LG installing its app without
- 1:28:09alerting users in the first place. Nor
- 1:28:11did Microsoft mention how its own
- 1:28:13subsidiary partners with LG in its data
- 1:28:16management and collection. With all of
- 1:28:18that explained, let's get back to some
- 1:28:20of the people we spoke to for this
- 1:28:21piece. We'll start with Louis Rossmann,
- 1:28:23specifically talking about forced
- 1:28:25arbitration, the clause that was added
- 1:28:28after our first video on LG's monitors.
- 1:28:31And he can explain why that's a bad
- 1:28:33thing.
- 1:28:34>> I was working on the LG monitor the TV
- 1:28:37TVs for this story the smart TVs and
- 1:28:40I saw something that immediately
- 1:28:41reminded me of you, which is they have a
- 1:28:43sticker on the back of one of the TVs we
- 1:28:45bought that says forced arbitration
- 1:28:47notice.
- 1:28:49And from what I remember you you really
- 1:28:51like forced arbitration clauses.
- 1:28:53>> Yeah, I love giving up my seventh
- 1:28:54amendment rights to a company in an
- 1:28:56agreement that I never actually read.
- 1:28:57And one of the reasons it's important to
- 1:28:58say that you haven't actually read it is
- 1:28:59because with their refrigerators they
- 1:29:01were telling people when the I forget if
- 1:29:03it was the condenser or there was some
- 1:29:04part of the refrigerators that was
- 1:29:05failing en masse and LG was not
- 1:29:07replacing it under warranty. So people
- 1:29:09wanted to sue them. And they said you
- 1:29:10can't sue us because you agreed to
- 1:29:11forced arbitration. They go, "What?"
- 1:29:13It's in the manual and it's on the box.
- 1:29:15Now when you buy a refrigerator if the
- 1:29:16box for the refrigerator is larger than
- 1:29:18your door frame, what that means is that
- 1:29:20you're never going to actually see the
- 1:29:21notice because the delivery people en
- 1:29:23masse were getting rid of the box and
- 1:29:26throwing it away because most people
- 1:29:28don't want to save the box of the
- 1:29:28refrigerator especially in a small
- 1:29:30apartment. So they never actually got to
- 1:29:31see a copy of the notice that they
- 1:29:33supposedly signed for. What they were
- 1:29:34referring to is that when you receive
- 1:29:35the refrigerator, you signed saying you
- 1:29:37received it, but that apparently also
- 1:29:39meant that you were agreed to the terms
- 1:29:41of arbitration in their manual which you
- 1:29:43hadn't read yet or and on the box that
- 1:29:45you've never seen.
- 1:29:46>> And that's and that's somehow legally
- 1:29:48okay.
- 1:29:48>> Some of these TVs we noticed that they
- 1:29:49don't have it on all of the the sticker
- 1:29:51doesn't always make it on. So that's
- 1:29:53where I would address it.
- 1:29:54>> How many words is too many words? Is it
- 1:29:554,000, 2,000, 1,000? How many words do
- 1:29:58you need to have where it is okay to
- 1:29:59take away somebody's constitutional
- 1:30:00right?
- 1:30:01>> Can you explain briefly so forced
- 1:30:02arbitration in general? Like what what
- 1:30:05is that? Why do the companies want
- 1:30:06people to agree to a clause for forced
- 1:30:08arbitration?
- 1:30:08>> If I screw over my customers, if I do
- 1:30:10something horrible, they can either
- 1:30:11commit acts of violence against me or
- 1:30:13they can sue me. And that
- 1:30:15Luckily, most people in New York chose
- 1:30:16the first one. It's much cheaper than
- 1:30:18lawyers. Okay, but
- 1:30:18>> [laughter]
- 1:30:19>> the if if I do something wrong to my
- 1:30:21customers, they have the ability to take
- 1:30:23me to court. And I think that that is a
- 1:30:24good thing because it means that it
- 1:30:25gives me an incentive structure to treat
- 1:30:28my customers properly. Forced
- 1:30:29arbitration means that they sign away
- 1:30:31the right to that. Instead of taking me
- 1:30:32to court, they can take me to
- 1:30:34arbitration. Arbitration is a court that
- 1:30:37I pay for. So, I'm paying a mediator
- 1:30:40that's going to figure out between the
- 1:30:42two of us what are how we going to
- 1:30:44resolve this problem. And the mediator,
- 1:30:46being paid by me personally, is most
- 1:30:48likely going to have an incentive
- 1:30:50structure to resolve issues in a manner
- 1:30:52that I find amicable.
- 1:30:53>> Right.
- 1:30:53>> And they're also going to have an
- 1:30:54incentive structure to screw me over. In
- 1:30:56court, like there's a judge banging a
- 1:30:58gavel, right?
- 1:30:59>> Yeah, yeah, yeah.
- 1:30:59>> And there, like where's the judge?
- 1:31:01>> it doesn't go through the legal process.
- 1:31:02>> going through the legal process. There's
- 1:31:03no It's an out-of-court
- 1:31:05>> out-of-court process.
- 1:31:05>> And I can understand why people are
- 1:31:07cynical. I get it. Class action lawsuits
- 1:31:09cost money. How many people here have a
- 1:31:1150-cent check on their refrigerator
- 1:31:13because Visa or MasterCard them
- 1:31:14and a lawyer got $20 to handle the case,
- 1:31:16right? Like how many I have I have
- 1:31:18checks on my refrigerator for less than
- 1:31:2050 cents.
- 1:31:21>> Yeah.
- 1:31:21>> And they're annoying and we roll our
- 1:31:22eyes at the lawyers getting rich. And
- 1:31:24that does suck that lawyers are getting
- 1:31:25rich while consumers are not getting
- 1:31:27help in those cases.
- 1:31:28And it's a shitty system, but it's
- 1:31:30better than nothing. So, for instance,
- 1:31:31when Apple has a class action lawsuit
- 1:31:32against them, even though it sucks that
- 1:31:35the the lawyers got rich and that all
- 1:31:37you got was some sort of 50 or $20
- 1:31:38refund, often times they'll say, "You
- 1:31:40must have a repair program." As a part
- 1:31:43of the settlement, there'll be a repair
- 1:31:44program for the butterfly keyboard. So,
- 1:31:47that's a good thing cuz it's not just
- 1:31:48the the check that you get on your
- 1:31:50fridge. Class action lawsuits can often
- 1:31:52lead to companies changing their
- 1:31:53behavior.
- 1:31:53>> It's still a punishment for the company.
- 1:31:55>> And not only is it a punishment, but it
- 1:31:56helps the consumer. I'm not So, a lot of
- 1:31:58people will look at the 50-cent check
- 1:31:59you get get your fridge, but they won't
- 1:32:00look at Apple in 2015 deciding, "You
- 1:32:02know what? We are going to replace the
- 1:32:04motherboard for free for anybody that
- 1:32:06has an A1286 A202915 board where the GPU
- 1:32:08died. We are going to replace all the
- 1:32:10butterfly keyboards on the A1706, A1707,
- 1:32:13and A1708 models where it broke. We are
- 1:32:14going to actually cover our customers
- 1:32:16the way that we should have been
- 1:32:17doing it before somebody sued us." And
- 1:32:19that's better than nothing. And I'd
- 1:32:20rather take that than just removing my
- 1:32:22seventh amendment rights altogether and
- 1:32:23saying that I'm not allowed to sue.
- 1:32:24>> After after our video on the monitors,
- 1:32:26the LG monitors, we noticed that they
- 1:32:29updated the agreements and they added a
- 1:32:32whole big section talking about class
- 1:32:34action lawsuits. And so, they already
- 1:32:37had a thing buried in there about you're
- 1:32:39agreeing that you can't
- 1:32:42go through a class action process if
- 1:32:43there is a dispute. So, they already had
- 1:32:45that there, but they added like
- 1:32:47paragraphs of clarifying text that just
- 1:32:50continued to to make that same point.
- 1:32:53Which is like that's a foot, you're
- 1:32:54admitting guilt, [laughter] I feel like.
- 1:32:56You're changing the terms when there's a
- 1:32:58major class action concern.
- 1:33:00>> Yes.
- 1:33:00>> Roku did this as well. There was a data
- 1:33:02breach and they wound up sending it Did
- 1:33:04you see the notice where when you turned
- 1:33:05on the TV it said agree, but it there
- 1:33:07was no disagree option? So, in order to
- 1:33:09use the TV to change the input,
- 1:33:11you needed I'm pretty sure it was Roku.
- 1:33:13I have an article. It was Yeah, yeah, it
- 1:33:14was Roku. In order to change the channel
- 1:33:16or change the inputs, you had to hit
- 1:33:18agree. There was no disagree button and
- 1:33:19this happened at the exact same time
- 1:33:21that there was a large data breach which
- 1:33:23might cause people to push back against
- 1:33:25it. I think it was Maine where they
- 1:33:27filed the official notice of data
- 1:33:28breach. I have the paperwork for this.
- 1:33:30>> Yeah.
- 1:33:30>> 15,000 people that had their data
- 1:33:32potentially breached.
- 1:33:32>> Is there anything people should do?
- 1:33:35You know, cuz a lot of these devices now
- 1:33:36are going to have forced arbitration.
- 1:33:38>> Be annoying.
- 1:33:39Take it to court anyway. Go to small
- 1:33:40claims. Be Like there was this one
- 1:33:41person, Steven Ryan, at the Vancouver
- 1:33:44stop of the tour. And he was saying
- 1:33:45companies say I'm annoying. He takes
- 1:33:46companies to court for the stupidest
- 1:33:48When I say stupid, I don't mean
- 1:33:50stupid like it's stupid he did it. I
- 1:33:51mean it's stupid that the company is
- 1:33:52actually letting this go to court
- 1:33:54instead of just resolving the
- 1:33:56issue with the customer instead of just
- 1:33:58helping them out.
- 1:33:59>> And I like it. Like he said they found
- 1:34:00me annoying. I said, "Be annoying." We
- 1:34:01need more people to be annoying.
- 1:34:03Progress moves forward because of
- 1:34:04unreasonable people.
- 1:34:06>> [laughter]
- 1:34:06>> If If If 1% of your audience was was as
- 1:34:09annoying as they needed to be, these
- 1:34:11problems would all be fixed tomorrow.
- 1:34:13>> Next we'll speak with a surgeon we ran
- 1:34:14into at Louis's event. Aaron was an
- 1:34:16attendee there. He came up to speak to
- 1:34:17me after I spoke with Louis about owning
- 1:34:20your and here's what he had to say
- 1:34:22with concerns from the medical field.
- 1:34:24>> You're You're Aaron, right?
- 1:34:25>> Yep. A A R O N
- 1:34:27>> A A Ron, yep.
- 1:34:27>> Yeah, okay.
- 1:34:29>> [laughter]
- 1:34:29>> And we were just talking We're at
- 1:34:31Louis's event in South Carolina. We're
- 1:34:33talking about LG TVs, which conveniently
- 1:34:35enough there's one right behind us.
- 1:34:37So they So they'll hear this
- 1:34:39conversation before anyone watching
- 1:34:40does.
- 1:34:41>> They're already listening.
- 1:34:43>> What was You know, what was interesting
- 1:34:45You mentioned to me you're in the
- 1:34:47medical field, I guess.
- 1:34:48>> Yes, that's correct. Yeah, I'm a
- 1:34:50healthcare worker. Specifically, I work
- 1:34:52in robotic surgery. So I'm a robotic
- 1:34:54general surgeon.
- 1:34:56I'm just finishing up my training.
- 1:34:58I'm very interested in tech, so like the
- 1:35:00merger of tech and healthcare, you get
- 1:35:02robotic surgery.
- 1:35:03Um my, you know, being tech-savvy and
- 1:35:07following you, and of course Louis, um
- 1:35:10my concern is is primarily in privacy.
- 1:35:15So what what happens when I'm taking a
- 1:35:18patient phone call or I'm doing patient
- 1:35:20uh video visits, and there's an LG
- 1:35:22monitor in the background? What happens
- 1:35:25if it's doing it on a on an LG monitor
- 1:35:27itself? Uh what's listening in? How is
- 1:35:30that How is that patient information
- 1:35:32protected? Because I'm expected to have
- 1:35:35everything encrypted. Anything on my
- 1:35:37device that has patient to do with
- 1:35:39patients has to be through a VPN and
- 1:35:42encrypted completely.
- 1:35:44But if that is recorded and taken out of
- 1:35:46my control,
- 1:35:48who's to say that that's HIPAA compliant
- 1:35:50or anything? I mean, there's a lot to do
- 1:35:52with you know, how we use AI tools and
- 1:35:55how specific ones need to be HIPAA
- 1:35:56compliant if we're going to use them as
- 1:35:58healthcare providers. And that's very
- 1:36:00clear, but if
- 1:36:02LG is listening to us on a TV, where
- 1:36:05does that patient information go?
- 1:36:06>> I obviously can't speak for like all
- 1:36:08medical providers, but um broadly
- 1:36:10speaking, with something like a TV,
- 1:36:12typically is that just like someone just
- 1:36:14buys it for the office, you know, like
- 1:36:16cuz cuz that doesn't strike me as
- 1:36:18something like if you're going to use an
- 1:36:20an AI transcription tool, that strikes
- 1:36:22me as something where administrative
- 1:36:24staff or IT or whoever would kind of go,
- 1:36:26"Okay, we probably need to check for
- 1:36:27HIPAA compliance." Right. Right. But
- 1:36:29something like a TV seems like it it's
- 1:36:32maybe you send the assistant to Best Buy
- 1:36:33or whatever.
- 1:36:34>> Or if I take a patient phone call from
- 1:36:36home, you know, I I I take those from
- 1:36:39from my own house. And so, I have a few
- 1:36:41LG products before I watch a video. And
- 1:36:45so, where is that data going? I I I'm
- 1:36:48not in control of that. I'm expected to
- 1:36:50be, you know, advocating for my patients
- 1:36:52and making sure that their privacy
- 1:36:54is secure,
- 1:36:56but I don't even know who's listening in
- 1:36:57my own household. And that makes it very
- 1:36:59hard when I'm doing patient care within
- 1:37:01privacy of my own home.
- 1:37:02>> I think that's one of the concerns we
- 1:37:03have, too, is like LG's response is, you
- 1:37:06know, is probably "We're not listening
- 1:37:08through the microphone." And maybe the
- 1:37:10capability exists, but they they would
- 1:37:11say we're not doing it. But one of the
- 1:37:13other
- 1:37:14concerns we had doing this piece was
- 1:37:17um if there's audio playing through the
- 1:37:19speakers of the TV, there's also the
- 1:37:21capability of capturing that or parts of
- 1:37:24that. And so, you I I guess, you know,
- 1:37:29probably telehealth type of situations.
- 1:37:31>> Yeah.
- 1:37:31>> So, I mean, those are those are required
- 1:37:33to be encrypted and they
- 1:37:35if I log into anything like Epic is our
- 1:37:38main Epic Healthcare is our main
- 1:37:40um our main
- 1:37:42electronic medical record EMR. Um when I
- 1:37:45connect to that on my phone or on my
- 1:37:47laptop, it goes through a VPN
- 1:37:49that's mandated by my employer.
- 1:37:52And so, if it's being recorded outside
- 1:37:54of that, you know, where that's not
- 1:37:56that's not HIPAA compliant. And so, I
- 1:37:58don't have any control over that cuz
- 1:37:59there's no notice to me saying, "Hey,
- 1:38:02you're actually being listened in on
- 1:38:03right now." And so, how can I possibly
- 1:38:05be in control of the entire environment
- 1:38:08when
- 1:38:09everything else is being listened in on?
- 1:38:11>> Have you tried putting tin foil and lead
- 1:38:13up
- 1:38:14around like I actually have a Faraday
- 1:38:16cage around my clinic. Yeah, yeah, yeah.
- 1:38:18Right, that would do it.
- 1:38:19>> Yeah, yeah, that's what I have.
- 1:38:20>> That'll be my next business. I'm going
- 1:38:21to start selling Faraday cages for
- 1:38:23clinics.
- 1:38:24>> That's great.
- 1:38:24>> Yeah.
- 1:38:25>> I'll be your first customer.
- 1:38:26>> Awesome. Thank you for the for joining
- 1:38:28for the story.
- 1:38:29>> you. I appreciate it.
- 1:38:30>> Next, we'll check in with Kevin from the
- 1:38:31Fulu Foundation. Kevin is the executive
- 1:38:33director for the Fulu Foundation. He
- 1:38:35works alongside Louis at it. Kevin is
- 1:38:37specifically pushing against DMCA
- 1:38:39section 1201, which is a part of law
- 1:38:41that makes it a criminal act in some
- 1:38:43circumstances to circumvent digital
- 1:38:45locks. He was also one of the organizers
- 1:38:47for the Own Your Tour that we went
- 1:38:48on with Louis. Here's his take on the
- 1:38:50situation.
- 1:38:51>> My understanding is with the Digital
- 1:38:53Millennium Copyright Act, the DMCA
- 1:38:55section 1201 specifically,
- 1:38:57there's some level of criminality, I
- 1:39:00guess, to circumventing
- 1:39:02uh digital locks.
- 1:39:03>> Yeah, that's exactly right, right? So,
- 1:39:06because of section 1201 of the DMCA,
- 1:39:08simply circumventing a digital lock can
- 1:39:10become a copyright crime.
- 1:39:12>> Okay.
- 1:39:12>> And so, when you're looking at these
- 1:39:14cases, right? You've got your TV that's
- 1:39:15spying on you, that's watching you,
- 1:39:17that's listening to you, right? You
- 1:39:19might want to go in and remove that
- 1:39:20software. Sure, there are ways that you
- 1:39:22can go through the menu and you can kind
- 1:39:24of
- 1:39:25you know, parse through the legalese and
- 1:39:27try and find a way, but there's no way
- 1:39:29to know for sure
- 1:39:30>> Right.
- 1:39:30>> that that data flow is stopping unless
- 1:39:32you go in and take it out yourself. So,
- 1:39:34because section 1201 does have that
- 1:39:36prohibition on the circumvention of
- 1:39:37digital locks,
- 1:39:39um
- 1:39:40you're screwed.
- 1:39:41>> I guess if you walk me through the the
- 1:39:42basics of the DMCA and of section 1201 a
- 1:39:46little more that would probably help.
- 1:39:48>> Yeah, so to do a little bit of the
- 1:39:49history, right? The DMCA was passed back
- 1:39:50in 1998 and the goal of it was to stop
- 1:39:54piracy of media off of CDs and DVDs,
- 1:39:58right? I would argue it was the wrong
- 1:40:00solution at that time, but it's hard for
- 1:40:02anyone to disagree with the fact that
- 1:40:03it's the wrong solution for this time
- 1:40:05because
- 1:40:06Congress or the architects of this law
- 1:40:08did not think that we would have
- 1:40:10computers in our park pockets, that we
- 1:40:11would have computers in our cars, in our
- 1:40:14tractors, everything we use, right?
- 1:40:15Pretty much these days is a computer.
- 1:40:17And what that means is that those
- 1:40:20digital locks kind of invade on our
- 1:40:21access to control. So, one analogy I
- 1:40:24like to use is right if like if you
- 1:40:25bought a house,
- 1:40:26you would expect to be able to get
- 1:40:27through every door and get into every
- 1:40:29room. One of those doors you
- 1:40:31accidentally lock you lock yourself out,
- 1:40:33picking that lock
- 1:40:34isn't breaking and entering.
- 1:40:36>> Right.
- 1:40:36>> You own the house, you own the door, you
- 1:40:38own what's behind it, right? Because of
- 1:40:40section 1201, that's a completely
- 1:40:41different story for our digital devices.
- 1:40:44If a manufacturer puts a digital lock in
- 1:40:46front of a copyrighted work, such as yes
- 1:40:49a movie or a song, but also just source
- 1:40:51code or something like that,
- 1:40:53the mere act of circumventing that
- 1:40:54becomes a copyright crime. And just as
- 1:40:56importantly, right? Like I'm sure that a
- 1:40:59lot of your viewers will be able to go
- 1:41:01and do this yourself.
- 1:41:02>> Mhm.
- 1:41:02>> Um I'm a normie, so I can't do that. If
- 1:41:05I wanted to hire someone to do it for me
- 1:41:07or if someone were to try to make a tool
- 1:41:09that would be easy for consumers use to
- 1:41:10go in and strip the ACR software out of
- 1:41:12their TVs, um that would be again a
- 1:41:16violation of section 1201, and that one
- 1:41:18comes with serious penalties of up to
- 1:41:21$500,000 in fines and 5 years in federal
- 1:41:24prison per offense.
- 1:41:25>> Seems proportional for
- 1:41:27>> Yes, exactly. Helping people not get
- 1:41:29spied on, right? Helping people fix
- 1:41:31their stuff
- 1:41:32is just an outrageous
- 1:41:35thing to be a copyright crime.
- 1:41:36>> Lewis had in his presentation, he
- 1:41:39showed, I think it was the author of I
- 1:41:42don't know if it was the whole DMCA or
- 1:41:44okay.
- 1:41:45>> Yeah, he was one of the architects. So,
- 1:41:46Bruce Lehman who worked in the Clinton
- 1:41:48administration,
- 1:41:50you know, he did some interviews after
- 1:41:51the fact after this law passed in 1998
- 1:41:54and talked in 2007 and I think beyond
- 1:41:56that. First of all, said, "Look, this
- 1:41:58law didn't work that well, right? Like
- 1:42:00Napster happened after the passing
- 1:42:03of the DMCA. So,
- 1:42:05it didn't work the way they wanted it
- 1:42:06to.
- 1:42:08And one of the other things that was
- 1:42:09pretty shocking was he talked about how
- 1:42:12you know, he basically executed an end
- 1:42:13run around Congress. So,
- 1:42:15>> Right.
- 1:42:15>> when they first developed this idea,
- 1:42:17this policy framework, they took it to
- 1:42:19Congress and Congress said, "No, right?
- 1:42:22This is going to get in the way of fair
- 1:42:23use, right? This is going to infringe on
- 1:42:26people's rights, on their ownership
- 1:42:28rights, on all that kind of things,
- 1:42:30those kind of things."
- 1:42:31Um
- 1:42:32So, instead, he went and negotiated an
- 1:42:35international treaty through what was
- 1:42:36called WIPO, which is the World
- 1:42:38Intellectual Property Organization,
- 1:42:41trying to solve this problem. Came back,
- 1:42:43went to Congress and said, "Hey,
- 1:42:45we've got this treaty. If we don't pass
- 1:42:47this law, we are going to be not in
- 1:42:50compliance with this treaty and also
- 1:42:53we're leaders in the world and we need
- 1:42:54to do something about this, right? So,
- 1:42:56it was just a total kind of
- 1:42:59pretty questionable move, if you ask me.
- 1:43:01Um and that's the reason that we, you
- 1:43:03know, kind of sit here today.
- 1:43:04>> Is there actually something people can
- 1:43:06do? Obviously, we just, you know, we did
- 1:43:08part of this tour I mentioned
- 1:43:10to try to get people to write
- 1:43:12representatives and
- 1:43:14I think there is probably
- 1:43:16a
- 1:43:17healthy and and earned skepticism
- 1:43:20towards it, but
- 1:43:22you're actually trying to write to
- 1:43:24representatives is probably one of the
- 1:43:26only, you know,
- 1:43:28really good tools available to try to
- 1:43:31really
- 1:43:32>> right? Because I think there's a mixture
- 1:43:33of things happening, right? People in
- 1:43:35Congress, right? I I go to DC a lot as a
- 1:43:37part of my job and
- 1:43:39many members of Congress don't
- 1:43:40understand tech- technology.
- 1:43:42>> Mhm.
- 1:43:43>> And at the same time, many don't
- 1:43:45understand copyright law, right?
- 1:43:46>> Right. Okay. Cool.
- 1:43:47>> Which fair enough, right? Like if unless
- 1:43:50you are into copyright law, you might
- 1:43:52not understand it. Not every member of
- 1:43:54Congress is going to be an expert on
- 1:43:55every aspect of the law. But that makes
- 1:43:58education that much more important and
- 1:44:00it makes it that much more important
- 1:44:02that they're hearing from their
- 1:44:02constituents who care about these kind
- 1:44:05of things, right? So, as you mentioned,
- 1:44:06right? We've got this tour. We're going
- 1:44:08to 14 cities and states around the
- 1:44:10country. We just had one of our biggest
- 1:44:12in Raleigh last night, which was
- 1:44:13awesome. Um
- 1:44:15great crowd and also, you know, had a
- 1:44:18member of the local representative's
- 1:44:20office out to see
- 1:44:21>> Yeah, she was listening.
- 1:44:23>> And she was listening.
- 1:44:24>> Yeah, and she she did to her credit uh
- 1:44:27she did seem to be engaged and possibly
- 1:44:29on board with the idea of owning your
- 1:44:31stuff.
- 1:44:32>> Yeah.
- 1:44:32>> So, I you know, I guess point of
- 1:44:33bringing that up is
- 1:44:35in the very least, if not the
- 1:44:36representatives it's themselves, then
- 1:44:38the the staff might actually listen and
- 1:44:41you just kind of hope that they filter
- 1:44:42the message up.
- 1:44:43>> Exactly.
- 1:44:44>> Um so, for ஏழு we'll point people there
- 1:44:47as well uh for future tours and things
- 1:44:50like that, but where should they go and
- 1:44:53>> Yeah, go to f
- 1:44:54dot org, right? To stay up-to-date on
- 1:44:56our work. We've got our blog. We post
- 1:44:58kind of um
- 1:45:00you know, regular updates. Uh we're also
- 1:45:02on, you know, all all the social
- 1:45:04channels. Uh one of my favorite features
- 1:45:06is, right? The Consumer Rights Wiki is a
- 1:45:08big part of what we do.
- 1:45:10Um and so, every week we do the Wiki
- 1:45:12Hall of Shame and highlight uh you know,
- 1:45:15>> manufacturers and products that are
- 1:45:17particularly bad actors. There's so many
- 1:45:19options.
- 1:45:20>> There are so many options. We could keep
- 1:45:21going forever. Honestly.
- 1:45:23>> Infinite content.
- 1:45:24>> Yeah. Um but yeah, check us out there.
- 1:45:27Um and then get involved, right? We like
- 1:45:29you said, it's one thing when we as an
- 1:45:31organization go there and that's our job
- 1:45:33and that's, you know, we work really
- 1:45:35hard at that. But when members are
- 1:45:37hearing from their own constituents, it
- 1:45:39goes that much further.
- 1:45:40>> And finally, we'll check in with Wendell
- 1:45:41for an extended discussion about our
- 1:45:43findings. This was sort of our debrief
- 1:45:45after working on the TVs for days. So,
- 1:45:48some of the demos we had
- 1:45:50can you help explain what are some of
- 1:45:53the ways that the findings, the
- 1:45:56vulnerabilities, whatever, could the
- 1:45:58features of the TV could be used uh, for
- 1:46:00example, when the TV appears to be off
- 1:46:04but it's capable of
- 1:46:07uh, storing video and audio.
- 1:46:09>> Yeah, internally the TV has 16 GB of
- 1:46:12flash, which doesn't sound like a lot,
- 1:46:14but it's got kind of a lot of
- 1:46:15computational horsepower, especially the
- 1:46:17newer TVs. And so, you can record audio,
- 1:46:19you can compress it, you could stream it
- 1:46:20to somebody over the network. It's a
- 1:46:22full computer. So, it's basically as
- 1:46:25creative as your imagination is, you can
- 1:46:28run stuff on it. Uh, there's stuff on
- 1:46:31the TV for like package management. And
- 1:46:33commercial customers of LG use a lot of
- 1:46:35these features for like digital signage
- 1:46:37and everything else like that. But, you
- 1:46:38know, the consumer version of the TV,
- 1:46:40they rip out some of those features. And
- 1:46:42some of the features that, you know, as
- 1:46:43like homebrew enthusiasts and like home
- 1:46:45lab enthusiasts, I'd like to have those
- 1:46:47and LG takes that out. But, you know,
- 1:46:50there's microphones, multiple
- 1:46:51microphones there.
- 1:46:53Uh, there is the ability to read what is
- 1:46:55being displayed on the TV
- 1:46:57programmatically. So, you could look,
- 1:46:59you could, you know, capture a frame or
- 1:47:00capture short clips limited by storage
- 1:47:02or streaming capability of what's on the
- 1:47:04display. I mean, theoretically, it's a
- 1:47:06whole computer. So, basically, anything
- 1:47:08you can do with a computer, but it's in
- 1:47:09the TV.
- 1:47:10>> Even in the places where we ran into
- 1:47:12limitations, such as the few instances
- 1:47:13where we had 6-second recordings, I feel
- 1:47:16like given more time than we had here,
- 1:47:18it's it's possible a sophisticated
- 1:47:20>> Yeah. a
- 1:47:21>> could
- 1:47:22>> The TV is literally built for something
- 1:47:23called automatic content recognition and
- 1:47:26it seems like the implementation that LG
- 1:47:28uses for automatic content recognition
- 1:47:30is designed to do 6-second captures of
- 1:47:33what you're looking at. That's audio and
- 1:47:35video fingerprinting. So, when ACR is
- 1:47:37working as advertised as the
- 1:47:39specification says, it's capturing about
- 1:47:426 seconds of audio or video and using
- 1:47:44that as a fingerprint and then it's got
- 1:47:45a dormant period where it's not
- 1:47:47capturing. And this is I think the the
- 1:47:49ad industry's hedge against accidentally
- 1:47:51leaking, you know, a
- 1:47:53hours of conversations. Like, "Oh, we
- 1:47:55only capture 6 seconds of audio." It's
- 1:47:56enough to fingerprint it. But, that's
- 1:47:58still a lot. You can do a lot with that.
- 1:48:00>> lot with that. Uh it may also be a sort
- 1:48:03of convention for copyright law or
- 1:48:05something if the movie studios are
- 1:48:06unhappy. But, what about so,
- 1:48:08fingerprinting? Walk me through that cuz
- 1:48:09I think one of the security researchers
- 1:48:12we worked with thought that from his
- 1:48:14findings
- 1:48:16he can see evidence that
- 1:48:18uh ACR was necessarily transmitting
- 1:48:20screenshots.
- 1:48:21Like, JPEGs or PNGs.
- 1:48:23>> You don't need to. You can take a a you
- 1:48:25know, if you're watching a 4K, you know,
- 1:48:27Lord of the Rings, you don't need a full
- 1:48:28frame. You can have a tiny tiny tiny
- 1:48:30little frame and generate a hash of it.
- 1:48:33Effectively, effectively, it's a hash.
- 1:48:35And then that hash is a very small
- 1:48:37amount of text.
- 1:48:38>> Mhm.
- 1:48:38>> And so, that text can be sent back and
- 1:48:40say, "Hey, this is the hash of the thing
- 1:48:42that I see."
- 1:48:42>> And then what? They they compare that
- 1:48:44against the database and say, "Oh, this
- 1:48:45is a frame from Lord of the Rings."
- 1:48:47>> Yes. And we can see content of the TV
- 1:48:51connecting to known Alphonso, that's one
- 1:48:53of the name of the libraries, and known
- 1:48:56domains that have to do with automatic
- 1:48:58content recognition. Um and we can see
- 1:49:00it downloading a thing that looks like a
- 1:49:02database, like a fingerprint database,
- 1:49:03which is I think some clues to the TV,
- 1:49:06some hints to TV about how it takes that
- 1:49:08audio data and that video data to
- 1:49:10generate the hash to then share with LG.
- 1:49:13>> Why might they choose to do it this way
- 1:49:15rather than send a screenshot or an
- 1:49:17audio file.
- 1:49:18>> Well, they did in the past and you know,
- 1:49:22if you look at LG's history of security
- 1:49:24issues
- 1:49:25uh you know, 10 years ago almost they
- 1:49:27were sending the raw file names and then
- 1:49:29that turned into a PR incident.
- 1:49:31>> Yeah.
- 1:49:31>> And there is almost an adversarial
- 1:49:33relationship with the TV here. If you
- 1:49:35look at how the software behaves like as
- 1:49:37I was using it, it changed behavior a
- 1:49:39couple of times and I don't know if that
- 1:49:41was because these TVs hadn't been on the
- 1:49:42network and they were just downloading
- 1:49:44application updates which is different
- 1:49:46than a firmware update. Like I didn't
- 1:49:47agree to a firmware update. Like I did
- 1:49:48that very deliberately.
- 1:49:49>> Right.
- 1:49:50>> But even saying no, I don't agree to the
- 1:49:52terms. No, I don't want to do this app.
- 1:49:53It was doing stuff in the background
- 1:49:54like downloading stuff for app Amazon
- 1:49:56was doing stuff. The YouTube app was
- 1:49:57doing stuff. It's like what I don't even
- 1:49:59we didn't even dig into what those
- 1:50:00applications are doing.
- 1:50:01>> Yeah, so you're not sure if it's because
- 1:50:02it was downloading stuff or because it
- 1:50:04was detecting your access basically.
- 1:50:06>> Yeah, cuz sometimes the TV would go to
- 1:50:08sleep and then it would lose I would
- 1:50:10lose network access. And then other
- 1:50:11times the TV would be doing something in
- 1:50:13the background and so everything the TV
- 1:50:15appeared to be off but I had full access
- 1:50:17to USB and I had full access to run my
- 1:50:20programs. I had full access to audit
- 1:50:21whatever was going on on the on the TV.
- 1:50:23And so I just I would like to know like
- 1:50:25what what is LG doing? Can I audit this?
- 1:50:28Do I have the tools to audit this?
- 1:50:30>> Right.
- 1:50:30>> And the answer was mostly no. It was an
- 1:50:32uphill battle for me to like dig my way
- 1:50:35out and figure out what it was doing.
- 1:50:36Let's say worst case scenario, you turn
- 1:50:38it into a listening device. That seems
- 1:50:39pretty straightforward. You turn it into
- 1:50:41a device to exfiltrate information from
- 1:50:43a corporate network or boardroom.
- 1:50:45>> Mhm.
- 1:50:45>> That seems pretty straightforward. Um
- 1:50:47you use it to maintain access like as a
- 1:50:51point of presence on a network. Um even
- 1:50:54if you don't intend to capture audio and
- 1:50:56video
- 1:50:56>> Just to go through it, tunnel through
- 1:50:58it.
- 1:50:58>> It is perfectly functional as a proxy.
- 1:51:00So you can proxy internet traffic and I
- 1:51:02can just it's like oh, I'm going to use
- 1:51:03this to move laterally through
- 1:51:05somebody's network. We've seen that in
- 1:51:07the in security uh circles. We've seen
- 1:51:10that with like copy machines. Uh
- 1:51:12certainly the TV is is uh more
- 1:51:14sophisticated than the copy machine that
- 1:51:16I am acquainted with that was a command
- 1:51:18and control server for very bad malware.
- 1:51:21So, yeah, the kinds of things we see in
- 1:51:23the news where it's like, "Oh, Fancy
- 1:51:24Bear is attacking routers."
- 1:51:26Fancy Bear would be very comfortable
- 1:51:27inside an LG TV.
- 1:51:28>> Mhm.
- 1:51:29What about the scenario where the TV
- 1:51:32speaker output
- 1:51:35could be captured? So, this was as we
- 1:51:36called it the boardroom scenario.
- 1:51:38>> Yeah, so if you're using your TV as a
- 1:51:41display, the HDMI audio that goes
- 1:51:43through the display is also capturable
- 1:51:46from the interfaces that we have on the
- 1:51:48Linux side.
- 1:51:48>> you proved. You were able to do it.
- 1:51:53>> Right.
- 1:51:53>> [laughter]
- 1:51:54>> And and this just to be clear again,
- 1:51:56like there cuz there's a few links here,
- 1:51:57but you can do this without
- 1:52:01your laptop and you being physically
- 1:52:05connected to the TV directly.
- 1:52:07>> Yes.
- 1:52:07>> can do this through the network.
- 1:52:09>> Yeah. And we can do it with the TV off
- 1:52:11of the network and just have it capture
- 1:52:13and then as soon as it gets network
- 1:52:14access again, it was basically used as a
- 1:52:17recording device.
- 1:52:18>> Right, you go back in after it's
- 1:52:19reconnected. So, let's say you're a
- 1:52:21super paranoid, I guess, and there's a
- 1:52:24scenario where you you not you just you
- 1:52:26unplug the Ethernet from your TV
- 1:52:29during this boardroom meeting or
- 1:52:30something. I guess as long as it's still
- 1:52:32powered on and capable of
- 1:52:34>> Yeah.
- 1:52:34>> capturing.
- 1:52:35>> You've got at least 4 GB of space to
- 1:52:36work with.
- 1:52:37>> Right.
- 1:52:37>> you had an adversary that knew that
- 1:52:39there was going to be a big important
- 1:52:40shareholder meeting, um they could have
- 1:52:43the TV completely offline, off of the
- 1:52:45internet, and it's perfectly capable of
- 1:52:48recording and storing the audio for that
- 1:52:50meeting. And then somebody could come in
- 1:52:51later and get
- 1:52:51>> As long as they've prepared for it in
- 1:52:53advance, they know it's going to happen,
- 1:52:54they set it to record,
- 1:52:55>> Yeah.
- 1:52:56>> whatever shareholders, someone's super
- 1:52:57paranoid, they unplug the Ethernet
- 1:52:58cable, but it was already rolling the
- 1:53:00capture, I guess.
- 1:53:01>> Yeah, for audio, uh you know, it's it's
- 1:53:0316 GB total storage, you got probably
- 1:53:05about 4 GB to work with out of the box
- 1:53:08if you don't get creative. And that is a
- 1:53:10that's 4 GB of audio. That's a lot of
- 1:53:13audio. But imagine also I've got a 256
- 1:53:16GB USB stick. I stick that in there.
- 1:53:18That's weeks of audio.
- 1:53:19>> Right.
- 1:53:20Uh so in so in this example, you know,
- 1:53:21the boardroom example, I guess,
- 1:53:24use cases might be
- 1:53:26let's just take the least nefarious, I
- 1:53:28guess, just just good old like fraud,
- 1:53:31basically market manipulation.
- 1:53:32>> Yeah. Stock I'm going to I'm going to
- 1:53:33play the stock market. What's going to
- 1:53:35be said in this thing? Boop. There you
- 1:53:36go.
- 1:53:36>> Yeah.
- 1:53:37>> Yeah.
- 1:53:37>> [laughter]
- 1:53:38>> Uh which could be useful also to nation
- 1:53:40states or, you know,
- 1:53:42intelligence agencies. Like I'm sure
- 1:53:44there's all kinds of stories of North
- 1:53:46Korea, for example, doing things in the
- 1:53:48crypto market or whatever. So
- 1:53:49>> Yeah.
- 1:53:50>> Um
- 1:53:51What
- 1:53:51>> And if your TV like let's say that your
- 1:53:54IT organization is like super on the
- 1:53:55ball and the TV is normally not on the
- 1:53:58network at all and is completely
- 1:53:59isolated and it's not even in scope for
- 1:54:02them to monitor. If you had somebody
- 1:54:04acting nefariously like that and they
- 1:54:06had a lone time with the TV, you could
- 1:54:08be in and out in 10 minutes.
- 1:54:10>> So yeah, so there's potential vectors
- 1:54:11both on and off network, I suppose. Uh
- 1:54:15and with and without physical access
- 1:54:17depending on how you get in.
- 1:54:18>> Yeah, your guy found a zero day that
- 1:54:20seems like it would be able to connect
- 1:54:22to the TV over the network uh
- 1:54:25non-interactively.
- 1:54:26>> Right.
- 1:54:27Yeah.
- 1:54:28>> [laughter]
- 1:54:28>> The one that we found requires you to
- 1:54:31hit okay. It's like a mobile device
- 1:54:34would like to pair with your TV. Is that
- 1:54:36okay? And then you say yes and then
- 1:54:38that's all she wrote.
- 1:54:39>> Right.
- 1:54:39>> [laughter]
- 1:54:40>> Um what about the scenario where a TV
- 1:54:43ACR audio capture? So we were able to
- 1:54:46pull the 6-second or so audio clips. So
- 1:54:49this is separate from the one where it's
- 1:54:50just the speakers for the boardroom
- 1:54:52scenario.
- 1:54:52>> Yeah, this was a little bit of creative
- 1:54:54debugging. So like we really we were we
- 1:54:56were we were up to our elbow inside the
- 1:54:58TV if you know, mental picture for that.
- 1:55:01It's pretty amazing, I think. And the
- 1:55:03ACR process so
- 1:55:04>> call on us to be a LG. [laughter]
- 1:55:06>> We were we were running
- 1:55:09very deep analysis of the ACR process
- 1:55:12and we were able to see cuz this is also
- 1:55:14helped us figure out some of the audio
- 1:55:15formats. Like some of the audio formats
- 1:55:16are non-obvious. There's also a speaker
- 1:55:18feedback microphone, a secondary
- 1:55:19microphone, which could be used for
- 1:55:21audio capture, which we should talk
- 1:55:22about. We were able to intercept the
- 1:55:25audio recording before it was converted
- 1:55:27into a hash and save it.
- 1:55:29>> Okay.
- 1:55:30>> And so without And that sounds like it's
- 1:55:31a lot of manipulation, but like once you
- 1:55:33know how to do that, you can have a
- 1:55:34very, very tiny program that's just
- 1:55:36watching the other program and when it
- 1:55:37captures the audio, it's like, "Yoink,
- 1:55:39that's mine." And you can save those
- 1:55:416-second clips and that would That's
- 1:55:43very hard to detect.
- 1:55:45>> Yeah.
- 1:55:46>> Cuz the TV is is behaving normally.
- 1:55:48>> Right.
- 1:55:50What about um the feedback mic? You just
- 1:55:53mentioned that.
- 1:55:54>> So the feedback The audio quality from
- 1:55:55that is terrible, but it seems like
- 1:55:57there is a secondary microphone that's
- 1:55:58used somehow as part of like the audio
- 1:56:01solution. I have no idea how it's
- 1:56:03supposed to work in normal scenarios,
- 1:56:06uh but it's very low bit rate, which is
- 1:56:08good, but it's not low enough bit rate
- 1:56:10that we couldn't reconstruct speech from
- 1:56:11it.
- 1:56:12>> Mhm. What about um log files on RAM? So
- 1:56:16that was pretty interesting.
- 1:56:17>> Okay, so it's only 16 GB of flash and it
- 1:56:21does seem like in So I started like full
- 1:56:24background here. I started on an older
- 1:56:25TV. You you bought a newer one. It's a
- 1:56:28donation to the cause. I don't know.
- 1:56:29We're going to We're going to run that
- 1:56:30and then it doesn't matter. Doesn't
- 1:56:31matter. Uh my older TV um
- 1:56:35was a little bit more verbose with
- 1:56:37logging and I think that LG probably ran
- 1:56:40into situations where that was wearing
- 1:56:41out the flash prematurely. Um and so
- 1:56:44this new one logs everything to RAM
- 1:56:46disk, but there is a process that runs
- 1:56:48and collects the logs, I guess the
- 1:56:50interesting stuff, and puts it in flash.
- 1:56:53There's also a lot of evidence in the
- 1:56:54packet capture that this stuff is sent
- 1:56:57to LG. And so in the debug logs, which
- 1:56:59are stored on a RAM disk, and so even
- 1:57:01when the TV is off, it doesn't erase
- 1:57:02that. You have to like physically unplug
- 1:57:04it or do something with that.
- 1:57:06In those logs, we can see everything
- 1:57:10that you've said to the TV.
- 1:57:11>> Right.
- 1:57:12Do you want to pull up an example? This
- 1:57:14is stored in a log file.
- 1:57:17I mean, that's concerning for a number
- 1:57:18of reasons. Devil's advocate position
- 1:57:21might be okay, but you explicitly said,
- 1:57:24"Hi LG." and triggered it, right? Before
- 1:57:26you So you knew it was recording, but in
- 1:57:30fact, there were several instances where
- 1:57:31genuinely we did not know. I didn't know
- 1:57:33it was still recording. And so some of
- 1:57:35the testing I was doing was it appears
- 1:57:37to be
- 1:57:39somewhere between 10 and 15 seconds or
- 1:57:42so, it will remain active.
- 1:57:44>> I just heard it ding.
- 1:57:45>> Did you really?
- 1:57:46>> [laughter]
- 1:57:47>> I mean, that was the other thing. We we
- 1:57:49got it working from at least 60 ft
- 1:57:51roughly away, maybe 70, around a corner
- 1:57:53in some instances, around two corners,
- 1:57:56and
- 1:57:56>> Microphone's really good.
- 1:57:58>> amazing. It like we should maybe replace
- 1:58:00some of our studio mics. But the
- 1:58:02>> That's another thing. An adversary
- 1:58:04[clears throat]
- 1:58:05with a little bit more time can figure
- 1:58:07out the voice wake microphone. Now that
- 1:58:09also was a little It was a little weird
- 1:58:12for us to try to co-opt the voice
- 1:58:15capture microphone, but clearly LG is
- 1:58:17doing something there. And I feel
- 1:58:19certain that
- 1:58:20an appropriately skilled security
- 1:58:21researcher could co-opt that microphone
- 1:58:24and get even better recordings than we
- 1:58:25did.
- 1:58:26>> Yeah, and I think really the key is it's
- 1:58:29writing these log files
- 1:58:31even if if you have ambient conversation
- 1:58:34that's happening around the TV when
- 1:58:35someone triggers it,
- 1:58:37it will remain active if it can
- 1:58:39continues to hear speech for some period
- 1:58:41of time. It seemed pretty long.
- 1:58:43And it's it's collecting all that, and
- 1:58:45it's writing it here.
- 1:58:46>> Yeah, this is without any modifications,
- 1:58:48I think, is is what is what you're
- 1:58:49you're getting at.
- 1:58:50>> Yes.
- 1:58:50>> Is like I I'm co-opting the microphone
- 1:58:53to record audio. And we know that that
- 1:58:56the 6-second clips are destroyed in
- 1:58:58favor of but these captures yes
- 1:59:01>> This is as the TV works.
- 1:59:03>> Yeah, as the TV works, the text that it
- 1:59:06was able to convert from your speech
- 1:59:08ends up in the log.
- 1:59:09>> Right. So, as long as you can get access
- 1:59:12to those logs, you can get access to
- 1:59:13what was said. And once again,
- 1:59:16it may be more than just "Hi LG, please
- 1:59:18change the channel."
- 1:59:20>> Yeah, it's funny. Actually, um I'm now
- 1:59:22I'm remember remembering from like an IT
- 1:59:24audit standpoint. Uh one of the things
- 1:59:27in like ISO and not not just ISO, but
- 1:59:29like process certification and um the
- 1:59:32California privacy law, having debug
- 1:59:35logs that log sensitive information is
- 1:59:37verboten. And this would probably run
- 1:59:39afoul of that.
- 1:59:40>> Well, we had
- 1:59:41an example where I said
- 1:59:43>> Right there.
- 1:59:44>> So, here you go.
- 1:59:46So, here was Now, it was triggered,
- 1:59:49but then I I I was started talking about
- 1:59:51something else. I was talking about my
- 1:59:53social security number. Maybe I was on a
- 1:59:54phone call with a hospital or something
- 1:59:57I needed to verify who I am.
- 1:59:58>> Yeah.
- 1:59:59>> Whatever the case may be, maybe a credit
- 2:00:00agency. And I said, "Hi LG." I told it
- 2:00:03to do what I wanted and then I continued
- 2:00:05my conversation.
- 2:00:06>> Yeah.
- 2:00:06>> And here it is. Here's my social
- 2:00:07security number, 1111111111.
- 2:00:10The response to this, I guess, is
- 2:00:14Well, first of all, it appeared to
- 2:00:16persist
- 2:00:17after we cleared we told it to clear the
- 2:00:20data.
- 2:00:21>> Yes.
- 2:00:21>> persisted.
- 2:00:22>> Yeah, so
- 2:00:23>> There's one asterisk we'll get to, but
- 2:00:25>> Yeah, we clear it's like, "Okay, clear
- 2:00:27the data."
- 2:00:28The TV treats that as a "Let me just
- 2:00:30phone LG servers and clear the data." It
- 2:00:33doesn't really seem to do much locally
- 2:00:35with that. Now, these logs, the full
- 2:00:38verbose logs are stored on a on a RAM
- 2:00:41disk.
- 2:00:41>> Mhm.
- 2:00:41>> And if you reboot the TV, it doesn't
- 2:00:43clear the RAM disk.
- 2:00:44>> Right.
- 2:00:45>> But if you physically unplug the TV
- 2:00:47>> If you kill the power completely.
- 2:00:48>> If you kill the power, it does and so we
- 2:00:49lose this. They It also seems to rotate
- 2:00:51these verbose logs pretty quickly.
- 2:00:54Um but
- 2:00:55>> If someone's pulling them though
- 2:00:57>> Yes.
- 2:00:57>> in the in real time it doesn't matter.
- 2:00:59>> Yeah, it doesn't matter.
- 2:01:00Um and it seems like a lot of the
- 2:01:02applications and uh like the
- 2:01:04applications that are generating this
- 2:01:06that are doing this are actually doing
- 2:01:08kind of a lot of writing to the flash.
- 2:01:10Like it's it's still It's like, "Oh,
- 2:01:11we've taken steps to make sure that we
- 2:01:13don't prematurely wear out the flash."
- 2:01:15But it's still doing a lot. And so I
- 2:01:17think there's there's a lot of fertile
- 2:01:18ground here for researchers to go. It's
- 2:01:20like, "Okay, what is it doing exactly?"
- 2:01:22But most of the, you know, delete my
- 2:01:23data or forget this, it doesn't do it
- 2:01:26doesn't care what's on the TV. It just
- 2:01:28does
- 2:01:29the remote.
- 2:01:30>> Yeah, so the the situation we were
- 2:01:32concerned about was, "Okay, if you do
- 2:01:33delete my data, you're bringing the TV
- 2:01:34to Goodwill, and it's gone, does that
- 2:01:37data persist?" Initially, we thought
- 2:01:39maybe because when we rebooted it, it
- 2:01:41was still there in the logs. But then
- 2:01:43after pulling the power cable it got
- 2:01:45wiped out, right?
- 2:01:46>> Yeah.
- 2:01:46>> So at least locally to the TV, those
- 2:01:49specific verbose logs appeared to be
- 2:01:51gone.
- 2:01:51>> Yeah, but other logs persist.
- 2:01:53>> Other logs were still there, and we
- 2:01:54haven't dug into every single one of
- 2:01:56them. So we we can't say with certainty
- 2:01:58like what it retained, but It was
- 2:02:00something.
- 2:02:01>> unsettling. It's like, "How do you
- 2:02:02format your TV?" LG doesn't It's like,
- 2:02:05"Do you trust LG to do that?" It's like,
- 2:02:07"No, I would like to get in there and
- 2:02:08look around and
- 2:02:09>> make sure it's formatted, yeah.
- 2:02:11>> That seems reasonable.
- 2:02:13>> What about um
- 2:02:14how does the TV know where it is?
- 2:02:16>> Uh so uh one
- 2:02:18>> GPS?
- 2:02:18>> Well, other researchers have sort of
- 2:02:21noticed that, "Hey, when we look at the
- 2:02:23traffic to LG, it sure seems like that
- 2:02:26it's inventorying the wireless networks
- 2:02:29that are around." So there is no GPS
- 2:02:31unit. If you take it, it's like, "Oh,
- 2:02:32yeah, this is great." Even though I only
- 2:02:34ever used the TV for a wired interface,
- 2:02:37it seems like it's noticing the wireless
- 2:02:40networks that are around it. And based
- 2:02:41on the wireless networks you can see,
- 2:02:43you can use that for geolocation.
- 2:02:45Because you can see the wire the names
- 2:02:46of the wireless networks, but also the
- 2:02:47MAC addresses of the access points. And
- 2:02:49that is a cheap, easy way to do GPS.
- 2:02:52I'll go you one better. If you had a
- 2:02:54rogue employee inside of LG or a hacker
- 2:02:57that leaks this database to the
- 2:02:59internet. So, the information that that
- 2:03:02Mr. Brock captured and was submitted, if
- 2:03:05that is in a database at LG somewhere,
- 2:03:07then someone could exfiltrate that
- 2:03:10information from LG and now they can
- 2:03:13find a specific TV based on interesting
- 2:03:15places the TV exists.
- 2:03:17>> like Washington D.C.
- 2:03:19Yeah, right.
- 2:03:20>> Yeah, it's like I'm looking for the TV
- 2:03:22in this boardroom. What do they have?
- 2:03:23What are my options? And even before
- 2:03:25setting foot inside the business, they
- 2:03:27can know, oh, there's an LG TV there
- 2:03:29because I have looked at the geolocation
- 2:03:31database in LG.
- 2:03:32>> There's this 30-acre campus with nothing
- 2:03:34but giant corporation A.
- 2:03:36>> Yeah. Now, that sounds absurd, but if
- 2:03:38you look at the you set aside LG for a
- 2:03:41second and look at Meta and how Meta has
- 2:03:43sold ads. Meta has literally gotten in
- 2:03:45trouble for selling to would-be
- 2:03:48advertisers the ability to geo-locate
- 2:03:50down to like individual street
- 2:03:52addresses.
- 2:03:53>> [laughter]
- 2:03:53>> It's like, I want to sell an ad to the
- 2:03:54person in this house. Okay, the the
- 2:03:57platform is capable of that.
- 2:03:59>> There's so many ways to abuse that.
- 2:04:01>> I don't want a TV that I have to have an
- 2:04:03adversarial relationship. And
- 2:04:05immediately out of the box, you're on
- 2:04:06the wrong foot with LG because
- 2:04:09they own the glass.
- 2:04:11>> They do say they own the glass.
- 2:04:12>> So, this is unencrypted. They don't even
- 2:04:14try with this. This is just not even a
- 2:04:15thing. If you're in the middle between
- 2:04:18the TV and the internet, then it's a
- 2:04:19command-and-control type situation. You
- 2:04:21could also make the argument like if LG
- 2:04:23lets one of those bazillion domains
- 2:04:25expire, that's going to be a great
- 2:04:26vector to take over tons of TVs. So,
- 2:04:30LG gets kind of a black mark here, too,
- 2:04:31because my older TVs have
- 2:04:34security vulnerabilities that LG is not
- 2:04:36interested in patching. They're like,
- 2:04:37"Oh, it's a 6-year-old TV or a
- 2:04:385-year-old TV. We don't care."
- 2:04:40>> Right. Great.
- 2:04:42Yeah, but if you have Yeah, right. Um
- 2:04:46RCE, so can you help explain some of
- 2:04:48this where
- 2:04:49Mr. Bra has a vulnerability that we
- 2:04:52can't disclose
- 2:04:54beyond basically saying it's bad and and
- 2:04:58it could grant someone access to the TV.
- 2:05:00I think that's about the extent of what
- 2:05:01we can say.
- 2:05:02>> Yeah.
- 2:05:03>> Um but can you help without exposing too
- 2:05:06much of that information explain the
- 2:05:09concept of like an What is, you know,
- 2:05:11remote code execution? What is that
- 2:05:13without going into how it works here?
- 2:05:15>> So, you're going to you're going to show
- 2:05:16on TV what we did using the stuff from
- 2:05:18GitHub, right?
- 2:05:19>> Yes.
- 2:05:19>> Okay. So, that was remote code execution
- 2:05:22effectively.
- 2:05:22>> can use our work to explain it. Okay.
- 2:05:25>> Uh he found a way to do it
- 2:05:27non-interactively, probably.
- 2:05:29>> Right.
- 2:05:30>> Which is amazing. Nice job.
- 2:05:32>> [laughter]
- 2:05:32>> Uh
- 2:05:33the
- 2:05:35the first uh attempt that we had failed.
- 2:05:39And so, we got the pop-up at the bottom
- 2:05:40where it was trying to install, you
- 2:05:42know, whatever it was, but it was not
- 2:05:44able to um
- 2:05:45remotely execute all of the code. It was
- 2:05:47able to remotely execute some of the
- 2:05:48code to give us the banner, but it
- 2:05:50wasn't able to remotely execute all of
- 2:05:51these codes.
- 2:05:52>> Let's take a step back just like first
- 2:05:54like a definition of remote code
- 2:05:55execution broadly.
- 2:05:57>> Um
- 2:05:58>> as a vulnerability.
- 2:05:59>> Uh you can cause something to download
- 2:06:03code and execute it with whatever level
- 2:06:06of permissions.
- 2:06:07>> Okay.
- 2:06:08>> So, uh remote code execution, you might
- 2:06:10be executing the code in a sandbox, but
- 2:06:13then you might be able to escalate your
- 2:06:14permissions from the sandbox to some
- 2:06:16something else. And so, this is this
- 2:06:18that's uh more broadly described as like
- 2:06:20exploit chaining, but RCE remote code
- 2:06:23execution is one of the best
- 2:06:28uh beachheads into a system
- 2:06:30as like a starting point. If you can
- 2:06:32find a vulnerability that is remote code
- 2:06:34execution, then you can get a lot more
- 2:06:37access to the system. Um the less
- 2:06:38interactive
- 2:06:40>> Mhm.
- 2:06:40>> uh requirements you have for remote code
- 2:06:42execution, the more ability you have to
- 2:06:46take over more TVs
- 2:06:47>> Okay.
- 2:06:48>> surreptitiously.
- 2:06:48>> Right.
- 2:06:49>> So, the the the more holes that you
- 2:06:52find, sort of the worse it becomes.
- 2:06:54>> That makes sense.
- 2:06:55>> Um ours
- 2:06:57the one that worked was actually, I
- 2:06:59think, a worse remote code execution
- 2:07:01than the one that had been patched by
- 2:07:02LG. The one that had been patched by LG
- 2:07:04was we had to put in the um the IP
- 2:07:07address of the TV, and then the TV would
- 2:07:10pair uh the the exploit application
- 2:07:13would pair to the TV like as if it was a
- 2:07:14mobile device, and so there was a pop-up
- 2:07:16and we had to say yes. And then it took
- 2:07:19off, and that was fun. Um
- 2:07:21but that didn't result in
- 2:07:23control of the TV. The one that worked
- 2:07:25was from the browser in the TV. So, like
- 2:07:28if you go on the web browser in the TV
- 2:07:29and you went to a web page
- 2:07:32and you went to the wrong web page
- 2:07:34and you accidentally hit yes or on
- 2:07:35purpose was like, "Wait, what? A mobile
- 2:07:37cuz the web page also generated
- 2:07:38>> the one you ran?
- 2:07:39>> Yeah, yeah.
- 2:07:40>> Okay.
- 2:07:40>> And so, the pop-up said, "Oh, there's a
- 2:07:42mobile device. Would you like to pair
- 2:07:43with a mobile device?" There was no
- 2:07:44mobile device. That was a web page. The
- 2:07:46mobile device was the web page.
- 2:07:48And so, if you said yes because, you
- 2:07:50know, the thing is a little fiddly. Or
- 2:07:52if you just were in a loop and you said
- 2:07:53no, you can just have it say yes over
- 2:07:55and over again.
- 2:07:55>> Right, until they finally like, "Ugh,
- 2:07:56fine. Okay."
- 2:07:57>> Yeah, the the LG browser is not it's
- 2:07:59terrible. And but it's Chromium-based,
- 2:08:01but it's old Chromium. And so, it's
- 2:08:04Um and so, you say yes, and then we're
- 2:08:07in.
- 2:08:08So, that's really not a a really super
- 2:08:10high bar for
- 2:08:11>> Right. For access, yeah.
- 2:08:13>> Yeah. And also, LG doesn't give you like
- 2:08:16their even if you go in their developer
- 2:08:18program like like like that's the legit
- 2:08:19way to do this kind of thing. They
- 2:08:21really don't give you full access to the
- 2:08:23hardware that you own because
- 2:08:27they don't think you own it.
- 2:08:28>> Yeah.
- 2:08:29As we keep going back to.
- 2:08:31>> Yeah. And that's that's offensive. It's
- 2:08:32like it's my TV. I'd like to audit it.
- 2:08:34If If you look at the old TVs that we
- 2:08:36have like 6 years ago, um
- 2:08:38those TVs didn't even have a an
- 2:08:39advertising ID out of the box.
- 2:08:41And then you get a firmware update and
- 2:08:43even without opting into anything, boom,
- 2:08:45there's your advertising ID. I didn't
- 2:08:46agree to that.
- 2:08:47>> What What We showed it on your TV. You
- 2:08:49literally had no terms you had agreed
- 2:08:51to, right? Ever. And then
- 2:08:53>> From one update to the next, it's like,
- 2:08:54oh,
- 2:08:55now we've got an advertising ID and you
- 2:08:56can't turn it off.
- 2:08:58>> It added that cookies thing, too. The
- 2:09:00kind of dark pattern toggle, yeah.
- 2:09:03>> I did not give you permission to alter
- 2:09:05the functionality of the TV with this
- 2:09:06update. There was no notice that the
- 2:09:08functionality of the TV would be altered
- 2:09:10with this update.
- 2:09:10>> Right.
- 2:09:11Well, and that also seems like it would
- 2:09:12require some kind of TOS agreement or
- 2:09:15something, user agreement, but
- 2:09:16>> Even basic stuff There's There's people
- 2:09:18on on on the forum that have been
- 2:09:21raising heck because LG keeps changing
- 2:09:23how they deal with DTS audio. And that
- 2:09:25has nothing to do with any of the stuff
- 2:09:27that we're talking about except for LG
- 2:09:29is changing the functionality of the TV
- 2:09:31after the fact.
- 2:09:33>> Right. All right, any other Any other
- 2:09:35points you want to talk about here? I
- 2:09:36mean, you're you have owned several LG
- 2:09:38TVs in your office.
- 2:09:39>> Yeah, they're It's basically all LG. Uh
- 2:09:42it's funny though because all the LGs
- 2:09:44that I've had here for years, every one
- 2:09:46of them is the out-of-the-box firmware.
- 2:09:48>> That's LG right there.
- 2:09:49>> Yeah. Yeah. This is like the other one
- 2:09:51that's on a They're all LG and yet
- 2:09:53they've never been on the network
- 2:09:54because I never I've never trusted LG to
- 2:09:56do that. Actually, the crossover
- 2:09:59monitor, the like the the the one on the
- 2:10:01wall back there is an LG panel with LG
- 2:10:03alternative electronics. And as a
- 2:10:06company Crossover, that was a viable
- 2:10:07business model for them.
- 2:10:09We can actually go peel the sticker off
- 2:10:10and there's an LG sticker behind the
- 2:10:12Crossover sticker.
- 2:10:13>> Crossover is the name of a brand? Okay,
- 2:10:15so Crossover put their sticker on top of
- 2:10:17the LG sticker?
- 2:10:18>> Yep. But it's a completely different set
- 2:10:20of electronics.
- 2:10:21>> Why? What's the
- 2:10:24>> [laughter]
- 2:10:28>> I think you know why.
- 2:10:29>> [laughter]
- 2:10:31>> You know, short version recap, how do
- 2:10:32you feel about the What's your level of
- 2:10:34concern with this? You know, as as
- 2:10:37both a a business owner with these types
- 2:10:39of devices, but also someone who may,
- 2:10:42you know, advise or work with businesses
- 2:10:44on security or infrastructure.
- 2:10:46>> I've never advised using the TV's
- 2:10:48built-in apps. It is It It's a devil's
- 2:10:51deal, and eventually it will come to
- 2:10:52you.
- 2:10:52>> Yeah.
- 2:10:53>> But, I have to admit that it was very
- 2:10:54creative of LG cuz like a computer
- 2:10:56display is a dumb display. It was very
- 2:10:58creative of them to co-opt the Windows
- 2:11:00update system to use that to inshitify.
- 2:11:03>> Well, you know, that Microsoft owns the
- 2:11:06data management service that LG uses
- 2:11:09for that stuff.
- 2:11:10>> That tracks.
- 2:11:12>> But, don't worry, Microsoft will throw
- 2:11:13LG under the bus and pretend that it was
- 2:11:15[laughter] all their fault.
- 2:11:17>> Yeah, I like how Microsoft's reaction to
- 2:11:19that was like, "Hey, could you maybe cut
- 2:11:20that out and not just terminating that
- 2:11:22Windows update account and rolling back
- 2:11:24all the changes?"
- 2:11:24>> I mean, that's probably what they would
- 2:11:25do to a small developer, right? Like
- 2:11:28some no-name, they would just terminate
- 2:11:29your account. Like you've abused this
- 2:11:31function, goodbye, you know, but
- 2:11:32>> They certainly did that to the security
- 2:11:34researchers trying to tell them problems
- 2:11:36with things. Thanks, Microsoft.
- 2:11:39>> Thanks, Microsoft.
- 2:11:41>> [laughter]
- 2:11:42>> All right, I think that's kind of That's
- 2:11:44pretty good recap, so
- 2:11:45>> Okay.
- 2:11:46>> we'll jump over to the next part.
- 2:11:47Thanks, Wendell.
- 2:11:49>> Thanks, Steve.
- 2:11:50>> LG will probably say that they take
- 2:11:52vulnerabilities very seriously and will
- 2:11:54patch them right away, but they didn't
- 2:11:56reply to us when we sent them a ton of
- 2:11:58our concerns. The bigger up, we
- 2:12:00think, is LG deliberately designing this
- 2:12:03to make money off of your privacy after
- 2:12:05you paid for a thing and off of your
- 2:12:07personal information. You have to reject
- 2:12:10this outright, or it will just keep
- 2:12:12getting worse. If you want flock cameras
- 2:12:14on your living room wall, this is how
- 2:12:17you get flocked cameras on your living
- 2:12:19room wall. The only reason to give a TV
- 2:12:21this kind of power is to visit horrors
- 2:12:24upon you, not to make a better product.
- 2:12:27Ultimately, we wouldn't recommend any LG
- 2:12:29smart products to literally anybody.
- 2:12:32That'll wrap this part of our deep dive
- 2:12:33investigation. We do have more though.
- 2:12:35It's likely we'll have more installments
- 2:12:36in this saga, and we really need your
- 2:12:38help to pay for this video. I spent a
- 2:12:41lot of money on this video. I
- 2:12:43seriously, it was a lot. We spent more
- 2:12:46than a month working on this, including
- 2:12:47travel, buying thousands of dollars of
- 2:12:49TVs. We had most of the team on this
- 2:12:50project. Really, the best way to support
- 2:12:52us on this one and the other upcoming
- 2:12:54videos in this series would be through
- 2:12:56our data dragnet campaign on the store,
- 2:12:57which is a Kickstarter-style campaign
- 2:13:00where we transparently show you how much
- 2:13:01money we've raised, and we have some
- 2:13:03goals what we're going to do with it.
- 2:13:04So, for example, we'd really like to go
- 2:13:05back in with Samsung, Vizio, anyone
- 2:13:07else, and kind of do a bunch of this
- 2:13:08research again or stuff like it. See
- 2:13:10what we can find. This is so expensive
- 2:13:13both in time and in actual cost. The two
- 2:13:16related together.
- 2:13:18I mean, I can't just like stop
- 2:13:19everything for 3 months every time we do
- 2:13:20one of these, kind of like we did with
- 2:13:22LG. And so, that's where we really need
- 2:13:24your help. We have some pretty damn cool
- 2:13:26stuff on the store for this as well. So,
- 2:13:28in addition to the individually
- 2:13:29available items like our new foil
- 2:13:31cyberskeleton shirt and our foil polygon
- 2:13:34V2 shirt and our LG investigation
- 2:13:36Blu-ray discs available that we're
- 2:13:38burning in house, we're 3D printing the
- 2:13:39cases in house, all that stuff. We also
- 2:13:42have four different backer tiers that
- 2:13:43give some good discounts on bundling a
- 2:13:44bunch of items together. They also give
- 2:13:46bonus videos. And then, in the case of
- 2:13:49the Saboteur tier, the highest one,
- 2:13:51there's a live stream Q&A with me that
- 2:13:53you'll get to join. I'll send those
- 2:13:53invites out at the end of the campaign.
- 2:13:55So, be a little while, but uh those were
- 2:13:57always really fun to hang out with the
- 2:13:58community. So, this is the best way to
- 2:13:59support us. If you don't need one of
- 2:14:01these, we also have a donate button in
- 2:14:02the bottom left of store.gamersnexus.net
- 2:14:05and on patreon.com/gamersnexus
- 2:14:07for monthly support. Or, you could
- 2:14:09consider buying one of our other items
- 2:14:11like our project and soldering mats,
- 2:14:13great for any project. We think the
- 2:14:14extent of LG's data harvesting is
- 2:14:16intrusive and grotesque. Additionally,
- 2:14:19despite the Overton window shifting
- 2:14:20further and further away, we still
- 2:14:22believe that when you purchase
- 2:14:23something, especially for thousands of
- 2:14:25dollars, you should own that thing. LG
- 2:14:28isn't the only smart TV manufacturer
- 2:14:29behaving this way, and we'd like to
- 2:14:31expand the scope of our investigation
- 2:14:33and eventually test TVs from other
- 2:14:34manufacturers in a follow-up piece, but
- 2:14:37we are going to need funding for that.
- 2:14:39If you have any tips or leads for a
- 2:14:40follow-up, please email us at
- 2:14:42[email protected].
- 2:14:44Mr. Bra advised immediately
- 2:14:45disconnecting LG smart TVs from any
- 2:14:47network. Wendell felt much the same. Our
- 2:14:50other researcher we worked with, Uturn,
- 2:14:52said this, quote, "My recommendation to
- 2:14:54users would be to demand ownership over
- 2:14:56your devices. First, by using and
- 2:14:58supporting pro-consumer projects that
- 2:15:00seek to give you device control back,
- 2:15:02and second, by demanding legislation
- 2:15:05that reflects the changes you want to
- 2:15:06see. Cell carriers only carrier unlock
- 2:15:09your phone because the 113th Congress
- 2:15:11made it law." End quote, which I thought
- 2:15:14was an excellent point. That's where
- 2:15:16groups like Hulu come in. Both Uturn and
- 2:15:18Mr. Bra have community-funded coffee
- 2:15:20pages we'll link below. Our thanks to
- 2:15:22Wendell, Mr. Bra, and Uturn for their
- 2:15:24help with researching this piece, and to
- 2:15:26the informants in our inbox. We'll have
- 2:15:28a lot more to talk about with all of
- 2:15:29this soon. And one final time, we really
- 2:15:32do need the help funding this expensive
- 2:15:34type of work so we can do the next set
- 2:15:36of smart TVs. So, if you feel like you
- 2:15:37can spare it, please head over to our
- 2:15:39store or Patreon to leave a super thanks
- 2:15:41below so I can spend thousands of
- 2:15:45dollars on TVs that will spy on us.
- 2:15:47Thanks for watching, subscribe for more,
- 2:15:49and we'll see you all next time.
About this transcript
This page contains the full transcript of 216,000,000 Spy TVs | The LG Smart TV Problem by Gamers Nexus, generated from the public captions YouTube serves with the video. The transcript has 25,406 words across 4,063 segments, with the original timestamps preserved so you can click any line to jump to that moment in the embedded player.
What you can do with it
Use the transcript to take notes, quote the speaker, build a study guide, generate a summary with ChatGPT or Claude via the YouTube Summary tool, or export it as a timed subtitle file with YouTube to SRT. You can also re-open it in the transcriber to choose a caption track available on the video.
Free YouTube transcript tool
YouTube2Text is a free YouTube transcript generator — no signup, no daily limit. Paste any YouTube link and get the full transcript instantly, with timestamps, click-to-jump, caption language selection, AI prompts for ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini, and exports to TXT, SRT, VTT, or Markdown.