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216,000,000 Spy TVs | The LG Smart TV Problem — Transcript

by Gamers Nexus · 25,406 words · 4,063 segments · language en · Watch on YouTube

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  1. 0:00LG TVs are able to be utilized as
  2. 0:01eavesdropping listening devices in part
  3. 0:03because of the advertising functionality
  4. 0:05that's built into them. We are able to
  5. 0:07retrieve a plain text transcripts of a
  6. 0:09voice conversations and input from the
  7. 0:11TV. Utilize the TV to record from a
  8. 0:14webcam and from a microphone while the
  9. 0:16TV appeared to be off and it was clean
  10. 0:19captured, too. But
  11. 0:20>> All right, so the screen appears to be
  12. 0:21off right now. Currently, Wendall and I
  13. 0:23are in a boardroom with Scott and you.
  14. 0:25>> Yikes. We are even able to capture
  15. 0:27microphone audio while the TV was
  16. 0:29unplugged from the network.
  17. 0:30>> This LG G5 TV has a microphone connected
  18. 0:33to it and right now it's listening to me
  19. 0:35and saving the information. In fact, we
  20. 0:38can even unplug the network
  21. 0:41and it's still listening to me.
  22. 0:43And what I'm saying is being stored
  23. 0:45by someone with remote access to the TV.
  24. 0:48>> And then we were able to exfiltrate that
  25. 0:50recording via vulnerabilities after the
  26. 0:52user reconnected the network.
  27. 0:54>> In fact, we can even unplug the network
  28. 0:58and it's still listening to me.
  29. 1:00>> No network.
  30. 1:01>> is being stored
  31. 1:03by someone with remote access to the TV.
  32. 1:05>> But that requires an adversary, which
  33. 1:07sounds scary. What we think is scarier
  34. 1:09is LG itself. LG's first-party
  35. 1:11profit-seeking functionality pries deep
  36. 1:13into your private life. The TV crawled
  37. 1:15our entire network and found dozens of
  38. 1:16unrelated devices including smartwatches
  39. 1:18and phones of our staff who didn't even
  40. 1:20know we were working on this, which
  41. 1:22might explain how LG ads can claim it
  42. 1:24knows about 363 million addressable
  43. 1:26secondary devices in the US despite
  44. 1:28claiming a smaller 216 million smart TVs
  45. 1:30sold worldwide. We don't think this is
  46. 1:32an innocent Chromecast connected device
  47. 1:34lookup considering LG itself admits
  48. 1:36>> We know who's in the LG household. We
  49. 1:38know which devices are there. We know
  50. 1:40how to extend that reach into mobile.
  51. 1:43>> And they use secondary devices in
  52. 1:44political targeting. We also found
  53. 1:46through Wireshark and inspecting
  54. 1:47firmware that LG TVs are capable of
  55. 1:49identifying your IP address, geographic
  56. 1:51location, name of every Wi-Fi network in
  57. 1:52the vicinity and signal strength,
  58. 1:54channel numbers of neighboring Wi-Fi
  59. 1:55networks in the range and other devices
  60. 1:57on the network, even if not connected to
  61. 1:58the TV in any way, and the internal IP
  62. 2:01address of other devices on the network,
  63. 2:03alongside others. In fact, the data that
  64. 2:05we collected through Wireshark shown
  65. 2:06here is such an egregious invasion of
  66. 2:08privacy that we can't even show you it
  67. 2:11because every line has something that we
  68. 2:14don't want to put out there. And this is
  69. 2:16the TV's native functionality. This
  70. 2:18didn't require vulnerabilities. Security
  71. 2:20researchers we worked with this
  72. 2:22investigation also discovered several
  73. 2:24additional vulnerabilities that are
  74. 2:26going through the responsible disclosure
  75. 2:27period right now. So,
  76. 2:29we can't fully detail them yet, but
  77. 2:31the researchers have recommended
  78. 2:33disconnecting any LG smart TVs from any
  79. 2:36network. Ideally, you don't own
  80. 2:40thousands of dollars of LG TVs.
  81. 2:44Maybe if they're unplugged or
  82. 2:46physically destroyed, it's okay.
  83. 2:48But,
  84. 2:50this is because there's some concerning
  85. 2:53vulnerabilities. Like, for example,
  86. 2:56remote code execution vulnerabilities
  87. 2:57where an attacker could manipulate what
  88. 3:00your TV does,
  89. 3:02like this.
  90. 3:11Goodnight, LG.
  91. 3:14That's the
  92. 3:16That's LG calling me right now.
  93. 3:19The listening device capability is
  94. 3:21partly because of ACR, a function that
  95. 3:24leads LG to tell its advertising
  96. 3:26partners that it, quote, owns the living
  97. 3:28room, end quote, and your TV. Here's LG
  98. 3:31Ad Solutions President Sergey Mata and
  99. 3:34also the head of research and
  100. 3:35development for LG Ad Solutions, Justin
  101. 3:37From.
  102. 3:38>> And the fact that we have the glass, we
  103. 3:40own the glass, we own the TV. Because,
  104. 3:42you know, we own the glass, um and we
  105. 3:46have first-party ACR data, automated
  106. 3:48content recognition data, and we
  107. 3:50understand everything that that hits the
  108. 3:52screen.
  109. 3:52>> We own the glass.
  110. 3:55I paid $2,400 for this particular glass
  111. 3:58that arrived
  112. 4:00curved on one side.
  113. 4:03But I
  114. 4:04I guess I don't own it. Serge Mata, the
  115. 4:06first man who said LG owns the glass, is
  116. 4:09the president of LG Ad Solutions, which
  117. 4:12sells the data harvested from your
  118. 4:13television to partners. LG owns LG Ad
  119. 4:17Solutions, which is a private company,
  120. 4:19and that's a good thing because Mata is
  121. 4:22legally banned by the SEC from running a
  122. 4:25public company after settling charges
  123. 4:27relating to a fraudulent scheme. Now,
  124. 4:29he's in charge of the data collected
  125. 4:31from your TV.
  126. 4:32>> Automated content recognition can be
  127. 4:34audio or video data, including
  128. 4:36screenshots, that's converted into a
  129. 4:38fingerprint and transmitted back to
  130. 4:40servers. In this case, those servers are
  131. 4:43LG's servers for its LG Ad Solutions
  132. 4:47company. So, even though we paid $3,000
  133. 4:49for some of these really nice TVs with
  134. 4:52multiple embedded microphones and webcam
  135. 4:54accessory options, some of these TV
  136. 4:56companies are now making more margin
  137. 4:59dollars from targeted ads
  138. 5:01than they are from
  139. 5:04selling the actual TV hardware.
  140. 5:09So, that's what we're going to talk
  141. 5:09about. To sort through all this capture,
  142. 5:12we went on a road trip to see Wendell of
  143. 5:14Level One Techs in his bunker of
  144. 5:15secrets. We stopped at a Best Buy to buy
  145. 5:18a brand new LG G5 TV.
  146. 5:20>> I think we need a G5.
  147. 5:22>> Okay.
  148. 5:22>> We need something we can do a
  149. 5:24man-in-the-middle attack on to make it
  150. 5:25spy on us.
  151. 5:26>> Okay.
  152. 5:27>> So.
  153. 5:27>> And then we packed our future spy device
  154. 5:29into our rental car that's filled with
  155. 5:31other spy devices. And then
  156. 5:33we hacked the TV.
  157. 5:35>> I'm just sorry, one second. Let me just
  158. 5:37I need to read a comment here.
  159. 5:39>> For purposes of this video, the phrase
  160. 5:41hacking refers to the colloquial
  161. 5:43definition found in the Merriam-Webster
  162. 5:44dictionary under hack, definition two,
  163. 5:47noun one, paragraph six, sub subline A,
  164. 5:51quote, "A usually creatively improvised
  165. 5:53solution to a computer hardware or
  166. 5:55programming problem or limitation." End
  167. 5:57quote. Now, our lawyers have made the
  168. 6:00totally unrelated point that we cannot
  169. 6:03legally agree to contract, such as terms
  170. 6:06of service or conditions, while
  171. 6:08incredibly inebriated.
  172. 6:10>> ethernet plugged into Gamers Nexus LLC's
  173. 6:13TV.
  174. 6:13>> There you go.
  175. 6:15That Gamers Nexus purchased
  176. 6:18while it was inebriated heavily.
  177. 6:21>> [laughter]
  178. 6:22>> It was unable to agree to the EULA.
  179. 6:24>> If a check checkbox were checked,
  180. 6:26>> it was entirely accidental.
  181. 6:27>> Right.
  182. 6:28>> Yes.
  183. 6:28>> But we don't know if one had been
  184. 6:31checked. [music]
  185. 6:31>> Unlikely.
  186. 6:32>> Because of the inebriation.
  187. 6:34>> Yes.
  188. 6:34>> Yeah. You see that Stanley Cup over
  189. 6:36there?
  190. 6:37That's just all margarita. It's
  191. 6:39[laughter] just the entire thing.
  192. 6:40>> It's like 180 proof.
  193. 6:43>> Oh, yeah, look.
  194. 6:45Oh, I accidentally clicked accept
  195. 6:47on the terms for voice, and I'm
  196. 6:49incredibly inebriated. So, this is
  197. 6:51storing what we say we So, in the time
  198. 6:53you were doing this, Tannin activated
  199. 6:56the hands-free version.
  200. 6:58>> Oh.
  201. 6:58>> Also by accident, also incredibly
  202. 7:00inebriated. He can barely stand over
  203. 7:01there. Yeah, frankly, it's amazing
  204. 7:03Vitali can hold the camera so straight.
  205. 7:05>> [laughter]
  206. 7:09>> We need your support on
  207. 7:10store.gamersnexus.net for these
  208. 7:12investigations. We spent around $70,000
  209. 7:16to make this investigation happen when
  210. 7:17counting the over 500 hours of our
  211. 7:19team's work, and the fact that we now
  212. 7:21have enough LG spy TVs to create a new
  213. 7:23three-letter agency. All that we paid
  214. 7:26for. So, we're launching our data
  215. 7:27dragnet Kickstarter-style campaign that
  216. 7:29we've linked below to help fund our
  217. 7:31consumer device buying and production
  218. 7:32budget as we deep dive into more
  219. 7:34household spy devices, like maybe other
  220. 7:37smart TV brands in this series, and pay
  221. 7:39for this investigation. Our backer
  222. 7:41rewards include things like our brand
  223. 7:43new LG investigation Blu-ray disc packs,
  224. 7:45including an impressively high-quality
  225. 7:47thermally printed disc label with parody
  226. 7:49evil LG logo that has a camera for its
  227. 7:52eye. We're burning these discs
  228. 7:54completely in-house with our new
  229. 7:55duplicator machine. Then we put the
  230. 7:57discs in a special red edition 3D
  231. 7:59printed disc case [music] that we also
  232. 8:01make entirely in-house in our print
  233. 8:02farm. Each disc pack comes with a 128 GB
  234. 8:05USB drive that we duplicate in-house
  235. 8:08with our USB cloner. Video coming soon
  236. 8:10on that. And the drive contains a
  237. 8:12digital copy of this very video that
  238. 8:14you're watching right now as a DMCA
  239. 8:16abuse dead man's switch. Besides, we all
  240. 8:19know how valuable 128 GB of flash is
  241. 8:21right now. The backer tiers also have
  242. 8:23exclusive benefits like additional
  243. 8:25footage and bonus videos and very small
  244. 8:27group live stream Q&A sessions with me
  245. 8:29in case you want to ask about this
  246. 8:30project, testing, advice getting a job
  247. 8:32in the industry, and more. We're also
  248. 8:34launching this brand new cyberpunk
  249. 8:35skeleton foil t-shirt featuring a
  250. 8:37dystopian skeletal front made of
  251. 8:39components and wiring. Plus a splash of
  252. 8:42red foil for the surveillance camera
  253. 8:44because, of course, the back has a spine
  254. 8:47that runs all the way down the shirt and
  255. 8:48contains some Easter egg text relating
  256. 8:50to Gamers Nexus. Our Polygon Shard V2
  257. 8:53shirt is also launching as part of this,
  258. 8:55a reprisal and rework of a nearly
  259. 8:57decade-old popular design. Now with
  260. 8:59improved sizing, color, and endurance.
  261. 9:02The front looks 3D in the light and has
  262. 9:04a wireframe GN logo while the back has a
  263. 9:06polygon shard rainfall effect. All of
  264. 9:09these tiers are themed around our data
  265. 9:11dragnet hellscape. Our highest tier even
  266. 9:14includes a supporter credit for our
  267. 9:16future disappointment tour 2026 video.
  268. 9:19We have a ton of other cool stuff for
  269. 9:20this campaign to get you unique items,
  270. 9:22many of which we're now making entirely
  271. 9:23at GNHQ with our own team while
  272. 9:26supporting our expensive content. We're
  273. 9:27even 3D printing these miniature
  274. 9:29paintable goblin figurines to include
  275. 9:31with the e-waste and Dr. Dice included
  276. 9:33in some of the backer tiers. And we have
  277. 9:35a new sticker pack available with
  278. 9:37[music] a micro slot sticker. We need
  279. 9:39your help to pay for this very video
  280. 9:41that you're watching right now, plus our
  281. 9:42next deep dives in this category of
  282. 9:44content. We're 70 grand deep in this
  283. 9:46report alone, and as a reminder, our
  284. 9:47reviews these days, like our half to 500
  285. 9:49case review, lose us money since no one
  286. 9:51can afford RAM, but we still produce
  287. 9:53them and subsidize them with support
  288. 9:54from campaigns like this. Visit
  289. 9:56store.gamersnexus.net
  290. 9:58to grab one of our backer tier kits now,
  291. 10:00or check out the individual items, all
  292. 10:02links below. Thanks sincerely for your
  293. 10:04support. Now, back to the program. We
  294. 10:06have a lot to talk about in this video.
  295. 10:09Like LG's automatic content recognition
  296. 10:11functionality that's designed to build
  297. 10:12advanced profiles on everything in your
  298. 10:13life, including secondary devices in the
  299. 10:15same household. The sale of that data,
  300. 10:17LG's political campaign targeting for
  301. 10:18quote voters that matter, end quote, and
  302. 10:21we'll even go over 40,000 words of
  303. 10:22agreements relating to LG's smart TVs,
  304. 10:24including this sneaky change to the
  305. 10:26class action sections that they made
  306. 10:28after our first video. Oh, and we also
  307. 10:31hacked the TVs. Whoopsie doodle. But
  308. 10:33don't let that distract from LG's native
  309. 10:35spying functionality. One of the common
  310. 10:37misconceptions we've seen propagated
  311. 10:38online in comments and in videos is that
  312. 10:40simply unplugging your TV from Ethernet
  313. 10:43is enough to stop it from spying on you.
  314. 10:45That might not be enough, and in fact,
  315. 10:47even using an LG smart TV as a dumb
  316. 10:49monitor doesn't necessarily stop all of
  317. 10:52the functionality we're talking about
  318. 10:53today. Internet service providers
  319. 10:54sometimes have dual SSIDs that include
  320. 10:56open neighborhood Wi-Fi broadcast from
  321. 10:58customer routers, such as with Comcast
  322. 10:59Xfinity neighborhood hotspot and AT&T's
  323. 11:01public hotspots, which are sometimes
  324. 11:03auto connected to by devices when they
  325. 11:04discover the open network, such as in an
  326. 11:06apartment building from neighbors using
  327. 11:07such routers. So, this is a concern
  328. 11:09broadly speaking and future looking for
  329. 11:11smart TVs regardless of the brand. We're
  330. 11:13also talking to a lot of people for this
  331. 11:14video.
  332. 11:15>> I'm a robotic general surgeon. What
  333. 11:16happens when I'm taking a patient phone
  334. 11:18call or I'm doing patient video visits
  335. 11:21and there's an LG monitor in the
  336. 11:23background. Yeah. What happens if it's
  337. 11:25doing it on a on an LG monitor itself?
  338. 11:28What's listening in? How is that How is
  339. 11:31that patient information protected?
  340. 11:33>> Yeah, I love giving up my 7th Amendment
  341. 11:34rights to a company in an agreement that
  342. 11:37I never actually read. It's a complete
  343. 11:38scam in my opinion.
  344. 11:39>> Let's say worst case scenario, you turn
  345. 11:41it into a listening device. That seems
  346. 11:42pretty straightforward. You turn it into
  347. 11:44a device to exfiltrate information from
  348. 11:46a corporate network or a boardroom.
  349. 11:48>> Mhm.
  350. 11:48>> That seems pretty straightforward.
  351. 11:50Um you use it to maintain access like as
  352. 11:54a point of presence on a network. Um
  353. 11:56even if you don't intend to capture
  354. 11:58audio and video.
  355. 11:59>> Just go through it, tunnel through it.
  356. 12:01>> It is perfectly functional as a proxy.
  357. 12:03So, you can proxy internet traffic and I
  358. 12:05can just It's like, "Oh, I'm going to
  359. 12:06use this to move laterally through
  360. 12:08somebody's network." The kinds of things
  361. 12:10we see in the news where it's like, "Oh,
  362. 12:11Fancy Bear is attacking routers." Uh
  363. 12:13Fancy Bear would be very comfortable
  364. 12:15inside an LG TV.
  365. 12:16>> And we're even using our investigation
  366. 12:17today as a push for actual legislation
  367. 12:19to protect consumers from this type of
  368. 12:21technology. I've been on the phone for 3
  369. 12:23days with various people in Washington,
  370. 12:25D.C. about this, and we just went on
  371. 12:27tour with Louis Rossmann's team to talk
  372. 12:29about some protections and getting laws
  373. 12:32created.
  374. 12:33>> How many people have had their TV or
  375. 12:35monitor for more than 3 years? Yeah.
  376. 12:38And And so, this you are all part of the
  377. 12:40problem. They need you to buy
  378. 12:42They need you They need you to buy
  379. 12:43monitors every year.
  380. 12:45>> Because of Section 1201 of the DMCA,
  381. 12:48simply circumventing a digital lock can
  382. 12:50become a copyright crime.
  383. 12:51>> Okay.
  384. 12:52>> And so, when you're looking at these
  385. 12:53cases, right? You've got your TV that's
  386. 12:55spying on you, that's watching you,
  387. 12:56that's listening to you, right? You
  388. 12:58might want to go in and remove that
  389. 13:00software.
  390. 13:00>> Sure, there are ways that you can go
  391. 13:02through the menu. There's no way to know
  392. 13:04for sure
  393. 13:04>> Right.
  394. 13:05>> that that data flow is stopping unless
  395. 13:07you go in and take it out yourself. So,
  396. 13:09because Section 1201 does have that
  397. 13:11prohibition on the circumvention of
  398. 13:12digital locks, um
  399. 13:15you're screwed.
  400. 13:16>> In other words, woo, that's a lot for
  401. 13:18one video. Let's start with ACR. ACR is
  402. 13:22automatic content recognition that
  403. 13:23harvests data from devices like TVs,
  404. 13:26including screenshots of what the TV is
  405. 13:28showing and audio snippets coming out of
  406. 13:30the TV speakers. ACR can also run when
  407. 13:32the TV is used as a monitor. That data
  408. 13:34is converted into a digital fingerprint
  409. 13:36and compared to media databases that
  410. 13:38these companies have to identify your
  411. 13:40habits. In their own words,
  412. 13:42>> So, at LG, we know who's in the LG
  413. 13:45household. [music]
  414. 13:45We know which devices are there. We know
  415. 13:48what you're exposed to on TV, and we
  416. 13:49know how to extend that reach into
  417. 13:51mobile.
  418. 13:52>> You know, most streaming households
  419. 13:54subscribe to, you know, multiple
  420. 13:57streaming services. So, our line of
  421. 13:59sight to the screen can really help our
  422. 14:02partners.
  423. 14:03>> We own the glass. We own the TV.
  424. 14:05>> We own the glass.
  425. 14:06>> Since we own the screen and we own the
  426. 14:09operating system,
  427. 14:10>> most people are on their phone while
  428. 14:11they're watching TV now. Being able to
  429. 14:14have ad experiences that are both on the
  430. 14:15big screen, but also on the screen in
  431. 14:17your hand. So, within an LG TV
  432. 14:19household, we can help extend a campaign
  433. 14:22footprint to the other devices in the
  434. 14:24household.
  435. 14:24>> AI is going to provide us. We're
  436. 14:26providing like all the rich data that we
  437. 14:29have from either our first-party data,
  438. 14:31our viewing data, third-party [snorts]
  439. 14:33data. How do we put it all together and
  440. 14:35then expose it to our clients in a in a
  441. 14:39tool or in a platform that's built on
  442. 14:41AR, right? So, where I think the next
  443. 14:43evolution of ACR is the emergence of AC
  444. 14:46of AI
  445. 14:47com- com- combined with contextual
  446. 14:50targeting.
  447. 14:51So, how does AI play down to a scene
  448. 14:55level? Leveraging the ACR, leveraging
  449. 14:57all the AI in real time of what they're
  450. 15:00watching, all the product placements, if
  451. 15:02there's a bar scene, and that bar scene,
  452. 15:05you leverage AI to scan all the product
  453. 15:08placements.
  454. 15:09>> Yep.
  455. 15:10>> Well, instead of a generic CPG brand
  456. 15:14>> Mhm.
  457. 15:15>> in the ad break, why [music] not put
  458. 15:17immediately, and you have to send that
  459. 15:19data in the metadata, in the bitstream,
  460. 15:22send that data and
  461. 15:23>> [music]
  462. 15:23>> expose a
  463. 15:26beverage ad, a alcohol brand ad, like
  464. 15:29because you're in a bar.
  465. 15:30>> But even if you don't buy a smart TV
  466. 15:32with ACR, you probably will still
  467. 15:34encounter them day-to-day. You can find
  468. 15:36LG displays everywhere. Hospitals,
  469. 15:38doctors' offices, waiting rooms, Airbnbs
  470. 15:39pointed straight at beds, pay-per-hour
  471. 15:41conference rooms, college locker rooms,
  472. 15:42and they're in hotels everywhere. We
  473. 15:44even found this photo on Facebook of
  474. 15:46someone's dental visit referencing what
  475. 15:47they say is an LG C4 OLED, which anyone
  476. 15:50can buy off a shelf, and it's displaying
  477. 15:52sensitive medical information. Not to
  478. 15:54mention law firms or corporate
  479. 15:55boardrooms, and of course, your living
  480. 15:57room.
  481. 15:58But no, wait, sorry.
  482. 16:00LG's advertisers' living room. They made
  483. 16:03that clear. I forgot. Uh we're not
  484. 16:05saying that each of these TVs in these
  485. 16:08environments is actively being used as a
  486. 16:10listening device.
  487. 16:11That's not
  488. 16:13the point here.
  489. 16:14What we're saying is that in cases where
  490. 16:17the issues we found on our TVs exist on
  491. 16:21others or can exist on others, the
  492. 16:23capability
  493. 16:25may be there to do so, to use it as a
  494. 16:28listening device. By whom is another
  495. 16:31question. So, to get into this mystery
  496. 16:33of what exactly is being potentially
  497. 16:35sent back to LG from the LG smart TV, we
  498. 16:38needed to set up an interceptor. Get
  499. 16:40into it. We worked with three security
  500. 16:41researchers for this piece, Mr. Bro, who
  501. 16:43previously found major vulnerabilities
  502. 16:45in MSI software, AMD software, and now
  503. 16:48LG software in TVs, and who works for
  504. 16:50community good off of donations. We also
  505. 16:52worked with U-turn, who discovered and
  506. 16:55published several vulnerabilities
  507. 16:56relating to routers and network devices,
  508. 16:58and who likewise has his own coffee page
  509. 17:00for community donations. And we worked
  510. 17:02with Wendell, who himself has published
  511. 17:04vulnerabilities in various devices,
  512. 17:06including routers. During our testing,
  513. 17:08our TV continuously scanned our LAN, our
  514. 17:11local area network, for all nearby
  515. 17:13devices. It obtained display names,
  516. 17:15signal strength, MAC addresses, which
  517. 17:17are uniquely identifiable, and more. Mr.
  518. 17:19Brub confirmed his findings by
  519. 17:21decrypting and decompiling LG's firmware
  520. 17:23from one of its TVs with help from the
  521. 17:25TV jailbreaking community. Among other
  522. 17:27things, the TV did a reverse sweep of
  523. 17:30our entire local network. The TV seems
  524. 17:32to have found at least 38 other devices
  525. 17:36on our network. Based on our
  526. 17:37understanding, here's the complete list
  527. 17:39with some information like specific
  528. 17:41device serial numbers, unique names, and
  529. 17:43internal IP addresses scrubbed. You can
  530. 17:45find everything on our network here. A
  531. 17:48Prusa XL 3D printer, an ESP32
  532. 17:52dev board, air purifier, and then you
  533. 17:54get into the creepy stuff if that wasn't
  534. 17:56creepy enough. LG's TV seems to have
  535. 17:58detected that Vitaly's editing machine
  536. 18:00was even running TeamViewer from its
  537. 18:02generic network discovery query, which
  538. 18:04Mr. Brub says was quote, "Caught in the
  539. 18:06blast radius." end quote. The log files
  540. 18:09from the TV's data transmission also saw
  541. 18:11our internal servers. They found a
  542. 18:13Samsung smartphone with the staff
  543. 18:14members username exposed. Another
  544. 18:16uninvolved staff member's S23 Galaxy on
  545. 18:19the network, the Alienware piece of
  546. 18:21that we use as a backup editing machine,
  547. 18:23someone's Note 9. LG's TV found various
  548. 18:26smartwatches, Pixels, [music] iPhones,
  549. 18:28internet gateways, and switches. And on
  550. 18:30top of it all, LG's TV even found what
  551. 18:33thermostats we have. LG happens to be a
  552. 18:35company that sells air conditioners and
  553. 18:37air conditioner accessories.
  554. 18:39>> [music]
  555. 18:39>> And we now have a device that pinned our
  556. 18:43HVAC system or parts of it
  557. 18:46all because we bought a television and
  558. 18:49plugged it into the network
  559. 18:51to watch TV.
  560. 18:53I can't wait to start getting targeted
  561. 18:55ads for their AC units. So, if that's
  562. 18:57the way it's used, all of this is very
  563. 18:59creepy.
  564. 19:00>> [music]
  565. 19:00>> And if it's not the way it's used, all
  566. 19:02of this is very creepy. LG's Alphaso
  567. 19:04also collects these items. LG
  568. 19:06advertising ID, non-resettable device
  569. 19:08UUID, Alphaso user ID, active input,
  570. 19:10active application, uniquely
  571. 19:11identifiable MAC address, signal
  572. 19:13strength, device attributes, location,
  573. 19:14system power on/off timestamps, and
  574. 19:16privacy consent flags noting if the user
  575. 19:18opted in or out, among other data like
  576. 19:19nearby Wi-Fi networks that the TV
  577. 19:21detects. LG also sends its third-party
  578. 19:23advertisers the user's locale, language,
  579. 19:25and device ID when the user views,
  580. 19:26hovers, or clicks on their
  581. 19:27advertisement. Mr. Bra noted that his LG
  582. 19:30TV also scanned neighboring Wi-Fi
  583. 19:32networks, which can then be used for
  584. 19:34geolocating you and your TV. There's an
  585. 19:37LG Channels feature built into the TV
  586. 19:39that acts like old cable TV providing
  587. 19:41you CNN or Fox or MSNBC or whoever else,
  588. 19:44but without cable. Mr. Bra noted that
  589. 19:47this is heavily logged by LG's Alphonso
  590. 19:50automatic content recognition system,
  591. 19:52and even an HDMI connection was
  592. 19:55undergoing ACR. When he provided yet
  593. 19:57more log files to Mr. Bra, he found
  594. 19:58these telemetry endpoints pinging
  595. 20:00anywhere from every 75 to 90 seconds to
  596. 20:03300 seconds to sometimes as infrequently
  597. 20:05as every 5 to 10 minutes. With the LG
  598. 20:07Channels feature, he noted these
  599. 20:09telemetry endpoints. It's not a surprise
  600. 20:11to see Amazon or Google ads in here, but
  601. 20:14what is interesting is that Conviva, a
  602. 20:17video analytics, has a unique
  603. 20:19fingerprint to our device as far as we
  604. 20:21can tell, which allows us tracking as we
  605. 20:23look at content on our TV. Mr. Bra told
  606. 20:25us, quote, "There's no privacy when
  607. 20:27watching IPTV via LG Channels as the DNS
  608. 20:30requests made can be reversed to
  609. 20:32determine what channel you are watching
  610. 20:34at any given time. This is available to
  611. 20:37anyone on the LAN or your ISP or the
  612. 20:40government by extension." And quote. As
  613. 20:42seen here, the TV sends a DNS query
  614. 20:45containing CNN US while watching CNN US,
  615. 20:49NBCNN while watching NBC News Now, Fox
  616. 20:52Digital WTTG while watching Fox's
  617. 20:55regional WTTG news station, and so on.
  618. 20:58When we asked Mr. Bra what his thoughts
  619. 20:59were on why they might want to harvest
  620. 21:01every device a TV buyer owns, he said,
  621. 21:04quote, "The display regularly scans your
  622. 21:06LAN to detect what devices you are
  623. 21:08running. This is likely being done both
  624. 21:10for legitimate, e.g. auto discovery
  625. 21:13network shares and folders, reasons and
  626. 21:15tracking reasons, e.g. if it sees you
  627. 21:17have an iPhone 12, you might get adverts
  628. 21:20for the latest iPhone 17. End quote. Our
  629. 21:22TV is sending an estimated 4 GB of just
  630. 21:26ACR data alone back to LG every month.
  631. 21:30Now, that's predominantly text
  632. 21:32fingerprints at this point. That's a lot
  633. 21:35of data for something that's just text.
  634. 21:37In addition to the IP address that LG's
  635. 21:39able to harvest, networks are also
  636. 21:41pretty unique. This is true for
  637. 21:42everybody, even if you think your
  638. 21:44network is pretty boring. And that means
  639. 21:47that in theory, even if we were to opt
  640. 21:50out of tracking, get rid of the TV, and
  641. 21:52then buy a different LG device later,
  642. 21:54like an air purifier that has the same
  643. 21:56type of functionality or similar to it,
  644. 21:59there's a chance that those data
  645. 22:02profiles are linked back together. The
  646. 22:04TV employs dark patterns that make it
  647. 22:06unclear whether you're opted in or out
  648. 22:08of targeting. LG buries do not sell my
  649. 22:10personal information toggles deep in the
  650. 22:12TV menus and disables the option by
  651. 22:14default on our tested TVs, even before
  652. 22:17users ever connect the internet or
  653. 22:19accept any agreements. It adds
  654. 22:21advertising tracking IDs to years-old
  655. 22:23TVs after firmware updates and seemingly
  656. 22:26without having ever agreed to terms of
  657. 22:28service of any kind. In certain software
  658. 22:30versions, LG silently adds and toggles a
  659. 22:32setting called cookies. It's off by
  660. 22:35default, which sounds like a good thing,
  661. 22:37except upon closer inspection, we found
  662. 22:40that the toggle misleadingly actually
  663. 22:42corresponds to quote advertising
  664. 22:44frequency capping cookies, end quote,
  665. 22:47which tracks the number of times a
  666. 22:48particular ad is shown on your TV. If
  667. 22:50you want to download an app, you're
  668. 22:52required to accept two agreements, but
  669. 22:54LG pops up six with select all
  670. 22:57highlighted by default. If you want to
  671. 23:00use the app you just downloaded, You're
  672. 23:02required to accept another three
  673. 23:04agreements, but LG pops up four with
  674. 23:08select all highlighted again. But what
  675. 23:10if you just opt out of all of this
  676. 23:12stuff? As for the opt out, Mr. Brod
  677. 23:14noted from the firmware decompile that
  678. 23:16when you opt out of tracking, quote,
  679. 23:18they do send one final snapshot of all
  680. 23:20tracking data to Alphonso upon opting
  681. 23:23out though, which is pretty dirty of
  682. 23:25them. The TV still does occasional
  683. 23:27beacons that tell LG when your TV starts
  684. 23:30or when it's online. However, the data
  685. 23:32sent during those beacons is minimal.
  686. 23:34Said beacons to LG contain an X device
  687. 23:37ID. Upon fully opting out and refusing
  688. 23:40the terms and conditions, the algorithm
  689. 23:42that generates this device ID switches
  690. 23:45from using the full MAC address of the
  691. 23:47device to only use the MAC OUI, or the
  692. 23:49organizationally unique identifier,
  693. 23:52which is an ID assigned per vendor, same
  694. 23:54across all LG devices, and makes
  695. 23:57requests using it semi-anonymous. This X
  696. 23:59device ID is also provided to any
  697. 24:02first-party adverts when you view,
  698. 24:05hover, or click on an advert that's
  699. 24:07shown on the TV. However, since the MAC
  700. 24:10address can be derived from a key set
  701. 24:12per model, you can brute-force the
  702. 24:14decryption keys until one works, and you
  703. 24:18can figure out the model of LG that sent
  704. 24:20the beacon request to LG. So, LG would
  705. 24:24get your public IP and device model, and
  706. 24:26know when it boots and is online. We've
  707. 24:28just put a formula on screen. The
  708. 24:30formula you're seeing on the screen is
  709. 24:32our understanding of how the X device ID
  710. 24:34is constructed. Amusingly, Mr. Brod
  711. 24:36describes how even this device ID
  712. 24:38seemingly has its own vulnerabilities.
  713. 24:40It's supposed to be randomly generated,
  714. 24:42he thinks, and anonymous. But LG's
  715. 24:44implementation is flawed. He states,
  716. 24:46quote, it generates the device ID by
  717. 24:48combining a random salt generated on
  718. 24:50boot with the device's MAC address.
  719. 24:52Normally, this is done using a process
  720. 24:54called hashing, where it generates a
  721. 24:56pseudo-random output based on an input,
  722. 24:59and it cannot be reversed. However, LG
  723. 25:01chose to encrypt the MAC address and
  724. 25:03random salt instead of hashing it. This
  725. 25:06means anyone who has the model secret
  726. 25:08key can reverse the device ID and
  727. 25:10recover the MAC address, which means the
  728. 25:12advertisers would have a persistent
  729. 25:14identifier that is not random and no
  730. 25:16longer changes on reboot." End quote.
  731. 25:18Now, Mr. Bra also noted that at least
  732. 25:20these trackers remain when going through
  733. 25:22the opt-out process. Quote, "Device
  734. 25:24still authenticates on boot with LG. It
  735. 25:27still sends a plain text TV is online
  736. 25:28beacon to LG every time it boots up or
  737. 25:30you change network, or if it drops the
  738. 25:32network and then auto reconnects. When
  739. 25:33you opt out, it sends a network request
  740. 25:35to LG saying that you have opted out and
  741. 25:37includes that your TV's MAC address in
  742. 25:39the request. A notification of opt-out
  743. 25:42is sent to Alphonso in relation to the
  744. 25:43ACR. This includes a snapshot of the
  745. 25:46majority of the information Mr. Bra
  746. 25:48specified as collected and shared with
  747. 25:50Alphonso." End quote. Further,
  748. 25:52LG's firmware stores the model secret in
  749. 25:55the mount LG cmn data log folder,
  750. 25:58meaning users can jailbreak their TV,
  751. 26:00extract the model secret, which is the
  752. 26:02same for all TVs of that model, and
  753. 26:04deanonymize the advertisement data to
  754. 26:06tie it back to users' original MAC
  755. 26:08addresses. Look, there's a lot of
  756. 26:10technicals here today. We're not going
  757. 26:12to go into all of them. This is probably
  758. 26:14enough to kind of get to the TLDR of
  759. 26:16this part, which is
  760. 26:18TLDR,
  761. 26:20is We think all of this is
  762. 26:24related to LG's decision to build such
  763. 26:28tracking to begin with. Regarding the
  764. 26:31audio, Mr. Bra describes how it
  765. 26:33processes these captures, explaining,
  766. 26:35quote, "It downsamples it to 8 kHz mono,
  767. 26:38then runs a fast Fourier transform on 40
  768. 26:41chunks of 100 ms of audio, combines the
  769. 26:44FFTs into a fingerprint, and uploads the
  770. 26:47result." End quote. If you clicked
  771. 26:48select all to the agreements when
  772. 26:50setting up your LG smart TV, your TV is
  773. 26:52very likely collecting ACR data, even if
  774. 26:55you disconnect it from the internet
  775. 26:56after, and you only use it as a dumb
  776. 26:59display from that point forward. This is
  777. 27:01important. Those of you watching this
  778. 27:03video were like, "I'm just going to
  779. 27:04unplug it from the internet.
  780. 27:07I'll connect it to a computer." This is
  781. 27:08what you need to pay attention to, okay?
  782. 27:10Our understanding is that your TV has
  783. 27:14the capability to transmit it back to LG
  784. 27:16if it connects to the internet again.
  785. 27:19We're not the only one saying this.
  786. 27:20According to the New York Times, quote,
  787. 27:22"The Center for Digital Democracy study
  788. 27:24found that in the Smart TVs they tested
  789. 27:26from LG and Samsung, ACR continued to
  790. 27:29run and capture data even when the Smart
  791. 27:31TV was offline." Now, we can't test
  792. 27:34every single LG TV, monitor, display,
  793. 27:38and all the firmware and software
  794. 27:40versions that are out there for them.
  795. 27:41So, this may not always be the case.
  796. 27:44But, to the best of our understanding,
  797. 27:45this is the case in at least some of the
  798. 27:48situations we've been able to verify
  799. 27:50or where we found third-party sources
  800. 27:52that have verified it. We also collected
  801. 27:54some of our own Wireshark samples to
  802. 27:56identify how often our TV sends ACR data
  803. 27:58to Alfonso when a laptop is connected to
  804. 28:01the TV via HDMI. Before testing, we also
  805. 28:04had to modify some network settings to
  806. 28:06do this. So, we forced our test bench
  807. 28:08running Wireshark to mirror the port of
  808. 28:10our LG Smart TV, and here's what we
  809. 28:13found. When we didn't accept any
  810. 28:15agreements when setting up the TV, but
  811. 28:17with it connected to the internet, based
  812. 28:19on the samples we collected locally on
  813. 28:21our LG G3, it seems that the TV didn't
  814. 28:24collect or transmit ACR data, but it
  815. 28:26still reaches out to several of LG's
  816. 28:29advertising
  817. 28:30>> [music]
  818. 28:30>> and customer data platform endpoints,
  819. 28:32and repeatedly scans for nearby devices.
  820. 28:35That's not to mention the fact that if
  821. 28:36you don't accept any agreements, it has
  822. 28:39very limited usefulness for basically
  823. 28:42any of the TV functionality. That's kind
  824. 28:43of a different point, though. In the
  825. 28:44hour-long sample we collected before
  826. 28:46accepting any agreements and while using
  827. 28:47our LG G3 as a dumb display connected to
  828. 28:50a laptop via HDMI, our LG TV connected
  829. 28:53to eight different endpoints including
  830. 28:56those for LG's customer data and smart
  831. 28:58advertising platforms. It transmitted or
  832. 29:00received roughly 8.9 megabytes of data
  833. 29:03in the hour long sample. We'd estimate
  834. 29:06the TV sends or receives around 6.4
  835. 29:08gigabytes a month. It sent out 38 DNS
  836. 29:11queries to different LG domains and it
  837. 29:13repeatedly pinged devices including our
  838. 29:16TrueNAS server, our PCs, our phones, our
  839. 29:19network switch and some IP addresses
  840. 29:20which we redacted, our printer, our 3D
  841. 29:23printers and basically everything else.
  842. 29:25But we can't show a lot of it for
  843. 29:27privacy reasons. We found several MAC
  844. 29:29addresses in our Wireshark logs which
  845. 29:31are identifiable and that we'd assume
  846. 29:33our TV is sending back to LG. After
  847. 29:36agreeing to LG's terms but while only
  848. 29:38using the TV as a dumb monitor, our G3
  849. 29:41connected to 29 different endpoints a
  850. 29:43total of 107 times with 44 connections
  851. 29:46to Alfanso ACR sending it a total of 4
  852. 29:49megabytes of data. We also collected two
  853. 29:52roughly 50 minute samples using our
  854. 29:54newer 43 inch QNED 73B TV as a dumb
  855. 29:58monitor in the first and using LG
  856. 30:00channels in the second. In the first
  857. 30:02capture, our QNED connected to 22
  858. 30:04different endpoints a total of 157 times
  859. 30:07connecting to the Alfanso ACR 54 of
  860. 30:10those times and sending 5.2 megabytes of
  861. 30:12data. In the LG channels capture, it
  862. 30:15connected to 60 different endpoints a
  863. 30:16total of 847 times connecting to Alfanso
  864. 30:20ACR 618 of those times and sending a
  865. 30:23slightly less 4.5 megabytes of data. Now
  866. 30:25some of the data harvesting that we've
  867. 30:27spent the last I don't know whatever it
  868. 30:29is half hour or something discussing
  869. 30:31seemingly contradicts LG's own
  870. 30:33statements on its upgraded ACR solution
  871. 30:36in 2022 where it stated, "The ACR data
  872. 30:39which is in compliance with all global
  873. 30:41and regional consumer data privacy
  874. 30:43regulations helps brands understand in
  875. 30:45an anonymized fashion how frequent
  876. 30:48certain TV ads were aired in any given
  877. 30:51household, end quote. We think there's
  878. 30:53contradictions to that statement in
  879. 30:54here, or put another way, to quote
  880. 30:56Wendel,
  881. 30:57>> Oopsie doodle.
  882. 30:58>> Now, unfortunately, without a
  883. 30:59man-in-the-middle certificate,
  884. 31:02You can help if you want to.
  885. 31:04Uh, we don't know exactly what
  886. 31:06information is being harvested of that
  887. 31:07list, as the data being sent to LG is
  888. 31:10encrypted.
  889. 31:12If you happen to know things that would
  890. 31:16be helpful for this, you can email us at
  891. 31:19tips, t.i.p.s. @gamersnexus.net.
  892. 31:21>> There is encrypted stuff happening on
  893. 31:23the wire between LG and the TV.
  894. 31:26>> Things that the user can't decipher.
  895. 31:28>> Yeah, and if you look at it, it really
  896. 31:30doesn't look a lot different than
  897. 31:32malware with a command and control
  898. 31:33server. LG has
  899. 31:36like their command and control server in
  900. 31:37the
  901. 31:38the TV phones home. That's encrypted.
  902. 31:40You can't There's nothing you can do
  903. 31:41about that. It's encrypted. You can't
  904. 31:44peel back the linoleum, you can't
  905. 31:45unencrypt it and figure it out. In order
  906. 31:47to unencrypt it, you have to load
  907. 31:50an encryption certificate on your TV.
  908. 31:52You have to say, "If you see an
  909. 31:54encryption certificate signed by this
  910. 31:56entity, which is me,
  911. 31:58then you can trust it." And that's what
  912. 31:59That's what the certificate store is.
  913. 32:00It's a store of things to trust. So, you
  914. 32:03add a thing to the thing to trust, and
  915. 32:06then now, when the TV tries to access
  916. 32:08LG, it's not accessing LG, it's
  917. 32:09accessing me. And then I, in turn,
  918. 32:11access LG. So, the TV accesses me, and
  919. 32:14then it's decrypted, and then I can
  920. 32:16examine it, and then I establish a new
  921. 32:18encrypted connection from me to LG.
  922. 32:20>> Okay.
  923. 32:20>> So, I can see what's coming from LG on
  924. 32:22the one side, and I can see what the TV
  925. 32:24is saying on the other side.
  926. 32:26>> Right.
  927. 32:26>> But in order to do that, we have to
  928. 32:28convince the TV to trust the certificate
  929. 32:29A man that I'm the man in the middle
  930. 32:31>> Right.
  931. 32:32>> in the certificate store. And this is
  932. 32:34like for malware or research or
  933. 32:36whatever, that is a man-in-the-middle
  934. 32:37attack.
  935. 32:38>> Mhm. And so, this is also a way that you
  936. 32:40can steal passwords and things like
  937. 32:41that. Google has gone to great lengths
  938. 32:43to make sure that their certificates,
  939. 32:45like there's extra checks in their
  940. 32:46software to make sure that the
  941. 32:47certificate is actually a Google
  942. 32:48certificate. The LG has done the same.
  943. 32:51LG has said, "We don't want you to be
  944. 32:52able to customize the certificates." But
  945. 32:55this is a legit thing businesses do. So,
  946. 32:57if you buy an LG TV in a commercial
  947. 32:59setting, they have not nerfed your
  948. 33:01ability to load custom certificates on a
  949. 33:03commercial version of a TV. Which seems
  950. 33:05a weird. It's like, why would you limit
  951. 33:07a residential TV unless you wanted to
  952. 33:09hide what
  953. 33:10>> capabilities it's collecting.
  954. 33:11>> Yeah.
  955. 33:12Here's where it gets weird. There's a
  956. 33:14lot of traffic that we observed that's
  957. 33:15unencrypted, which is weird cuz your ISP
  958. 33:17can steal that, too. Like that's a whole
  959. 33:18other conversation. But um
  960. 33:21uh with my encryption certificate on the
  961. 33:23TV, I have a better ability to look at
  962. 33:25things. But the TV was still failing. It
  963. 33:28turns out LG has set up a separate
  964. 33:30certificate store in some of their
  965. 33:32applications. And so, again, I had to
  966. 33:33like go into running processes and
  967. 33:36inject the custom certificate as a
  968. 33:39trusted certificate so that the
  969. 33:41com.os.lg,
  970. 33:44like custom software machinery outside
  971. 33:46the Linux part of it, would also trust
  972. 33:48my encrypted
  973. 33:49>> Our researcher mentioned something about
  974. 33:50I want to say Chromium, maybe?
  975. 33:51>> Yeah, and cuz like the Chromium browser
  976. 33:53automations are like part of the thing.
  977. 33:55And so, that is like the mechanical
  978. 33:57underbelly of how that happens. But
  979. 33:59they've bypassed the operating system to
  980. 34:01DIY it. You only need one or two flaws
  981. 34:04that you could chain together in order
  982. 34:06to convince the TV to trust or to
  983. 34:09exchange. And then, at that point, if
  984. 34:11you're in the middle between the TV and
  985. 34:13the internet, then it's a command and
  986. 34:15control type situation.
  987. 34:16>> So, you spent the first part of this
  988. 34:17video talking about LG's first-party
  989. 34:19features. Now, we're going to talk about
  990. 34:20some of the security vulnerabilities and
  991. 34:22exploits that increase the risk due to
  992. 34:24LG's lackadaisical security approach and
  993. 34:27a combination of its intended features.
  994. 34:29To do this, we rooted the TV. This
  995. 34:31changes the functionality that LG has
  996. 34:33built into their software, but that lets
  997. 34:35us audit and look around. It might not
  998. 34:37be obvious to a typical end user that a
  999. 34:39TV has been rooted or that a TV has been
  1000. 34:41compromised. Mr. Brad has an exploit
  1001. 34:43that lets you non-interactively
  1002. 34:45compromise the television in a way that
  1003. 34:47most people likely wouldn't notice. And
  1004. 34:50because it's a computer, you can alter
  1005. 34:52the functionality of the TV. For
  1006. 34:54example, if your conference room TV is
  1007. 34:56on public Wi-Fi, somebody on the network
  1008. 34:58could exploit the TV non-interactively,
  1009. 35:01and then they're living in your TV. In
  1010. 35:04one instance, before we ever accepted
  1011. 35:06any voice agreements, Wendel was already
  1012. 35:08able to show voice capture via
  1013. 35:10microphones that are part of the system.
  1014. 35:14Okay.
  1015. 35:16Can you play the
  1016. 35:17the audio we just captured? It's going
  1017. 35:19to be very painful.
  1018. 35:29We think that's from a wake on voice
  1019. 35:31pulse density modulation microphone
  1020. 35:33that's built into the TV, capturable and
  1021. 35:35exportable in an attacker scenario, even
  1022. 35:38without opting into the voice
  1023. 35:39agreements. Now, that audio didn't sound
  1024. 35:42particularly
  1025. 35:43comprehensible, but I noticed that
  1026. 35:46running a high-pass filter and killing
  1027. 35:47the static from one channel made it
  1028. 35:49sound like human speech. Then I pitch
  1029. 35:52and frequency adjusted the remaining
  1030. 35:53channel, and that gave us this.
  1031. 35:57>> I know it's trying to
  1032. 35:59to
  1033. 36:00sample audio, and then it does
  1034. 36:02>> We think someone with some skill and
  1035. 36:04some time could easily exploit this
  1036. 36:06microphone's presence as a listening
  1037. 36:08device, and in some exploit scenarios,
  1038. 36:10likely without the TV owner ever
  1039. 36:12knowing. But the question we need to be
  1040. 36:14asking isn't how can we make our
  1041. 36:16microphones embedded in our TVs more
  1042. 36:18secure?
  1043. 36:20The question we need to be asking is
  1044. 36:22why are there microphones embedded in
  1045. 36:23our TVs?
  1046. 36:25Cuz they're only there as a byproduct or
  1047. 36:28a direct product of LG's profit-seeking
  1048. 36:32functionality, if you can call it that,
  1049. 36:34that they try to add to their TVs. But,
  1050. 36:37there's more.
  1051. 36:39In some of the scenarios that we were
  1052. 36:40testing,
  1053. 36:42at one point, we were even able to
  1054. 36:45exfiltrate microphone audio that sounds
  1055. 36:49like this.
  1056. 36:53The waveforms on the screen dead silence
  1057. 36:56is what it sounds like. But, when I
  1058. 36:57inspected the waveform, I noticed a
  1059. 36:59couple pixels of sound. So, I amplified
  1060. 37:02the recording by 50 decibels, which
  1061. 37:04showed some more pixels of deviation
  1062. 37:05from silence, then amplified another 50
  1063. 37:08decibels. That looked like a speech
  1064. 37:11waveform. Because it is. This is what
  1065. 37:14that sounded like.
  1066. 37:15>> Hello, this is another 32-bit test.
  1067. 37:18Woo.
  1068. 37:23Voice.
  1069. 37:24>> So, we retrieved from the TV a warbly,
  1070. 37:25but with some work, clear and usable
  1071. 37:27section of audio. We don't know this
  1072. 37:29part for sure, but it looks like the
  1073. 37:32intent was for the microphone to have
  1074. 37:35been muted, maybe for example by
  1075. 37:37dropping the gain instead of some other
  1076. 37:38more surefire method of killing that
  1077. 37:41microphone. We're not exactly sure why
  1078. 37:43it behaves in the way that
  1079. 37:45we are describing, but consumers don't
  1080. 37:47realize how vulnerable this makes them
  1081. 37:49to
  1082. 37:50outside attackers or invasions of
  1083. 37:52privacy, whether that's LG's or others'
  1084. 37:56actions now or in the future. This
  1085. 37:58raises some other concerns. We noticed
  1086. 37:59that when you use the toggle to turn the
  1087. 38:01microphone off, it only turns off the
  1088. 38:03built-in microphone. It doesn't turn off
  1089. 38:05all other microphones that are part of
  1090. 38:07the system. We suspect there's a path to
  1091. 38:09capture audio anyway, especially if the
  1092. 38:11microphone lockout is merely a software
  1093. 38:13lockout.
  1094. 38:13>> Now, the mic thing is a little
  1095. 38:15complicated. This TV happens to be one
  1096. 38:17of the ones that has a mechanical
  1097. 38:19switch.
  1098. 38:20We can turn it on.
  1099. 38:21And then the built-in microphone is
  1100. 38:22listening. I've got some debugging
  1101. 38:24stuff.
  1102. 38:24>> [music]
  1103. 38:25>> You know, it's telling us what the
  1104. 38:26preprocessor is. Don't worry about that.
  1105. 38:27But, we can also turn it off.
  1106. 38:30The promise is the switch is off, the TV
  1107. 38:32is not listening. The problem is that
  1108. 38:35that doesn't mean the TV can't capture
  1109. 38:37audio at all. This is a terminal shell,
  1110. 38:40and it is remote access to the TV. So, I
  1111. 38:44have a shell on the TV, and that is a
  1112. 38:45list of audio devices that are on the
  1113. 38:47TV. There's a lot. There's a lot of
  1114. 38:50audio devices. Even with that microphone
  1115. 38:52switch off, I've got the option to
  1116. 38:53capture audio from HDMI. I've got the
  1117. 38:56option to capture audio from other
  1118. 38:57sources that are connected, like
  1119. 38:59Bluetooth or [groaning] USB speaker or
  1120. 39:03USB webcam. Any other USB peripherals
  1121. 39:06you might have, maybe your stereo setup
  1122. 39:07is kind of fancy and it has like an echo
  1123. 39:09cancellation mic. If that shows up as an
  1124. 39:11audio device, I can capture from that as
  1125. 39:13well. The LG remote, it also has a
  1126. 39:16microphone, and I can press the button
  1127. 39:20and get a light. Is it all about the
  1128. 39:21Pentiums?
  1129. 39:26And this works. Now, remember that the
  1130. 39:28mic switch is off.
  1131. 39:30>> We searched using AI, but couldn't find
  1132. 39:32the content you requested. Try finding
  1133. 39:34more information with Copilot or check
  1134. 39:36the YouTube results.
  1135. 39:38>> It It found all about the Pentiums.
  1136. 39:41So, just because the built-in mic is
  1137. 39:43off, which
  1138. 39:44in my opinion is a little bit suspect
  1139. 39:47from stuff that I'll show you in a
  1140. 39:48second, but all the other audio sources
  1141. 39:51work just fine. Now, let me show you
  1142. 39:52something cool. I'm running a program on
  1143. 39:54the TV,
  1144. 39:55and I'm now pressing the button on the
  1145. 39:58remote,
  1146. 39:59and notice there's no pop-up. An
  1147. 40:01attacker can send audio over this
  1148. 40:03channel and capture it, [music] and
  1149. 40:04that's what we see in the output here.
  1150. 40:06The nice thing about this is that when I
  1151. 40:08press the button, I get the voice input
  1152. 40:10remote 1.soc.
  1153. 40:12The fact that this is open,
  1154. 40:14it creates a device. And when it's
  1155. 40:17closed, there's no device there. There's
  1156. 40:18nothing to capture [music] from. I'm
  1157. 40:20suppressing the UI. I'm suppressing the
  1158. 40:23LG functionality. I've taken it over,
  1159. 40:25but I'm using that to listen to the
  1160. 40:27room. I could listen to the room through
  1161. 40:29a webcam continuously. I could set up
  1162. 40:31something like this where I've got a
  1163. 40:32wireless microphone somewhere that's
  1164. 40:34sending to the TV, and the TV's used as
  1165. 40:36a capture endpoint. You know, if you're
  1166. 40:38an adversary, the sky's the limit in
  1167. 40:40terms of creativity because it's a
  1168. 40:41powerful computer behind the glass. And
  1169. 40:44the hacker will own the glass. It's very
  1170. 40:46difficult for you as the end user to own
  1171. 40:49the glass or even know what's going on
  1172. 40:50behind the glass. I love push-to-talk.
  1173. 40:52That's That's great in terms of privacy.
  1174. 40:54I like the idea of a mechanical switch.
  1175. 40:56It's just not clear to me if the
  1176. 40:58mechanical switch is actually killing
  1177. 41:00everything that it should. Even with the
  1178. 41:02mechanical switch off, I can still see
  1179. 41:04an audio device. Sometimes the
  1180. 41:05microphone control is
  1181. 41:07not a mechanical switch. Sometimes it's
  1182. 41:09just in the menu. The problem is that if
  1183. 41:11I'm in remotely, I can manipulate the
  1184. 41:13menu from the shell as well. Voice
  1185. 41:16recognition settings, very serious. It
  1186. 41:18clears the display.
  1187. 41:20You can see everything is enabled here,
  1188. 41:21the functions enabled, the whole nine
  1189. 41:23yards. Now I'm going to show you
  1190. 41:24something really cool. It's like, "Oh,
  1191. 41:26I've disabled all of those features
  1192. 41:27through the menu." Hands-free voice
  1193. 41:28control is disabled or the microphone is
  1194. 41:30disabled in the menu. [music]
  1195. 41:32You think you're you're good to go,
  1196. 41:33right? I ran a command on the TV just
  1197. 41:35now to change the parameters, and now
  1198. 41:38all of the AI voice recognition stuff
  1199. 41:40[music]
  1200. 41:40is enabled.
  1201. 41:42If I go back in the menu,
  1202. 41:45now the function's enabled. So, if you
  1203. 41:48need to enable or disable something in
  1204. 41:50the menus as an attacker, it's not
  1205. 41:51really a big deal to do that from the
  1206. 41:53command line once you've got control of
  1207. 41:54the TV over the network or whatever
  1208. 41:56else.
  1209. 41:57But it turns out the voice hardware
  1210. 41:59works whether or not you agree to the
  1211. 42:00terms anyway for somebody that's in the
  1212. 42:02TV the way that we are.
  1213. 42:03>> These are fundamentally display devices
  1214. 42:05with, credit to LG, pretty powerful
  1215. 42:07computers inside of them. So, really the
  1216. 42:10only limit to what you can do with a
  1217. 42:12computer
  1218. 42:14and a TV is your imagination. This LG G5
  1219. 42:17TV has a microphone connected to it and
  1220. 42:19right now it's listening to me and
  1221. 42:21saving the information. In fact, we can
  1222. 42:24even unplug the network.
  1223. 42:26And it's still listening to me.
  1224. 42:29And what I'm saying is being stored by
  1225. 42:31someone with remote access to the TV.
  1226. 42:34>> So, it's recording now, but we're going
  1227. 42:36to plug it back in and I'm going to copy
  1228. 42:37the audio off because it's got a smart
  1229. 42:39microphone. You can do wake words and
  1230. 42:41all sorts of fun things like that and so
  1231. 42:43it's a Linux box. I've got access.
  1232. 42:46>> So, he's got remote access. Let's prove
  1233. 42:48the concept
  1234. 42:50and give it internet again.
  1235. 42:53>> Yay. All right.
  1236. 42:59>> You want to walk us through what you're
  1237. 43:00doing here?
  1238. 43:07>> No network.
  1239. 43:12>> [clears throat]
  1240. 43:22>> There you go. 30 seconds of audio.
  1241. 43:25Uh
  1242. 43:25yeah, I mean there's a microphone in
  1243. 43:27there. There's actually several. Um
  1244. 43:29we figured out how to activate the
  1245. 43:31far-field microphone, which is a lower
  1246. 43:33bit rate, but it or it uses like
  1247. 43:35feedback and it can like it does that
  1248. 43:37for improving the audio, but you can use
  1249. 43:39it as a listening device. It's the audio
  1250. 43:41quality is good enough.
  1251. 43:42>> Do you imagine this in a hotel room?
  1252. 43:47>> The hackers are already in your TV.
  1253. 43:50>> [laughter]
  1254. 43:51>> So, there is a mechanical microphone
  1255. 43:53switch on the TV. Well, it's not really
  1256. 43:56mechanical. It's just
  1257. 43:57there's a switch.
  1258. 44:00If I turn the microphone switch off, it
  1259. 44:03says the built-in mic is turned off, but
  1260. 44:05there's a more than one microphone.
  1261. 44:08>> Now, the the microphone switch is
  1262. 44:10actually off right now.
  1263. 44:12I'm recording.
  1264. 44:14>> That's weird, cuz we can record the
  1265. 44:15audio.
  1266. 44:15>> Audio from the webcam. From the webcam.
  1267. 44:19>> So, if you've got the USB webcam
  1268. 44:20accessory, guess what?
  1269. 44:22>> Yeah, we have a webcam plugged in. So,
  1270. 44:24this is just a generic webcam.
  1271. 44:27And while I was working on the TV,
  1272. 44:30Wendall was surreptitiously recording
  1273. 44:32our conversation.
  1274. 44:34>> Woo! And this it's like, oh, yeah, of
  1275. 44:36course, a USB webcam plugged into the
  1276. 44:38TV. But, there's also an official LG
  1277. 44:40webcam accessory, which is also USB. So,
  1278. 44:42it's six one way, half a dozen the
  1279. 44:44other. It's possible it's the same
  1280. 44:45mechanism. Yeah. So,
  1281. 44:48this is, you know, at least it says the
  1282. 44:51built-in microphone. But, like every
  1283. 44:52word like it's every it's like weasel
  1284. 44:54words. It's like, I was flip flip the
  1285. 44:56switch. It's not listening. And it's
  1286. 44:57like, are you sure about that?
  1287. 44:58>> Wendall's setting up the next demo. So,
  1288. 45:00we're going to have a private
  1289. 45:01conversation about our next rug pull
  1290. 45:04crypto scam. And it would really be
  1291. 45:06unfortunate if anyone had recording of
  1292. 45:07this. All right, so the screen appears
  1293. 45:09to be off right now. Currently, Wendall
  1294. 45:11and I are in a boardroom to discuss our
  1295. 45:13new crypto coin rug pull scam. We don't
  1296. 45:15want anyone to hear about this.
  1297. 45:16>> We trust that no device in the thing is
  1298. 45:18listening because of the appearance
  1299. 45:20here. And definitely things capturing
  1300. 45:22video and audio surreptitiously would be
  1301. 45:24very bad.
  1302. 45:25>> Well, the only device in this room is
  1303. 45:26the TV and it looks like it's off.
  1304. 45:27>> It sure does look like it's off. Yeah.
  1305. 45:29>> the plan is we're going to launch the
  1306. 45:31coin. We're going to let the price go
  1307. 45:32up. Then we're going to sell all of our
  1308. 45:33tokens and rug pull everyone.
  1309. 45:35>> Rug pull friends. Yeah, I mean, how else
  1310. 45:36would you do a crypto?
  1311. 45:37>> I hope they don't hear about it.
  1312. 45:40Yeah, it looks like it's off. It sure
  1313. 45:41does look like it's off. Yeah. The plan
  1314. 45:43is we're going to launch the coin. We're
  1315. 45:44going to let the price go up. Then we're
  1316. 45:46going to sell all of our tokens and rug
  1317. 45:48pull everyone.
  1318. 45:51Oh, there's evidence of our rug pull
  1319. 45:52scam.
  1320. 45:53>> Oh, no.
  1321. 45:55>> It's a little bit of an uphill climb,
  1322. 45:56but doable.
  1323. 45:58>> Well, we've only been working on this
  1324. 45:59particular problem for like an hour to
  1325. 46:01an hour and a half, that's not a bad
  1326. 46:03time investment for
  1327. 46:04>> Yeah, can you imagine if we were the NSA
  1328. 46:06or
  1329. 46:08some other nation state? It would be
  1330. 46:09very bad. Yeah, we literally just like I
  1331. 46:12had no idea I was going to be doing this
  1332. 46:13and it was just like I don't know, can I
  1333. 46:14just bang my fist on the keyboard and
  1334. 46:16get this to happen? And it turns out,
  1335. 46:18yeah.
  1336. 46:18>> Many of the LG smart TVs we bought are
  1337. 46:20either equipped with embedded
  1338. 46:22microphones or have remote control
  1339. 46:24options that include them. In our
  1340. 46:26testing, we found that the voice input
  1341. 46:27data is transcribed to plain text in
  1342. 46:30memory. We suspect it gets analyzed by
  1343. 46:32LG as well, especially with the AI
  1344. 46:36features. This would also include
  1345. 46:38so-called ambient conversation that
  1346. 46:40happens nearby while someone else is
  1347. 46:42using the TV voice inputs or is within
  1348. 46:45the ongoing trigger window during that
  1349. 46:47period of silence after it.
  1350. 46:49>> What are we looking at? Why does it say
  1351. 46:51the thing I just said? Uh
  1352. 46:55Wendell past the 180 proof Kentucky
  1353. 46:57bourbon.
  1354. 46:58>> Um because it has done the
  1355. 47:01speech-to-text thing and it doesn't cost
  1356. 47:03a lot to store text forever. But it
  1357. 47:05seems to be the
  1358. 47:06speech-to-text uh
  1359. 47:09text log of the things that we said.
  1360. 47:11>> Do we have the other stuff that we said?
  1361. 47:13>> Yes. It's all in here.
  1362. 47:14>> Why is there so many references to the
  1363. 47:16things I said?
  1364. 47:18>> [laughter]
  1365. 47:19>> So, Wendell, is it still logging that
  1366. 47:22stuff?
  1367. 47:22>> Mhm.
  1368. 47:23>> Hi LG.
  1369. 47:26LG.
  1370. 47:28>> Hi LG.
  1371. 47:31>> You We know you're listening to
  1372. 47:33us.
  1373. 47:33>> [laughter]
  1374. 47:34>> I can literally see the process running.
  1375. 47:36Like it is listening.
  1376. 47:38>> Can you hear it actually?
  1377. 47:38>> Yeah. Voice agent result, input voice,
  1378. 47:41keyboard.
  1379. 47:43Like it's listening. Like there's a
  1380. 47:44process running.
  1381. 47:46>> LG said that they don't pick up ambient
  1382. 47:48conversations. When you go to the enable
  1383. 47:51function for talking to the TV with
  1384. 47:53voice recognition, it says "Excessive
  1385. 47:55ambient noise around the TV may affect
  1386. 47:57hands-free voice control performance.
  1387. 48:00I rest my case.
  1388. 48:02>> [snorts]
  1389. 48:02>> It's literally right there.
  1390. 48:05The same words.
  1391. 48:07>> Yeah, there's your
  1392. 48:09My personally identifiable information
  1393. 48:10is as follows. Birthday, January 1st.
  1394. 48:13>> [laughter]
  1395. 48:15>> So, is it still in the log?
  1396. 48:17>> Yeah, it's still in the
  1397. 48:18>> On the TV, right?
  1398. 48:19>> It's still in the log on the toaster. My
  1399. 48:20LG social security number is 1111111.
  1400. 48:25>> Nice.
  1401. 48:26>> That raised concerns of the TV's hearing
  1402. 48:28conversations they weren't intended to
  1403. 48:30hear. However, this is something LG
  1404. 48:33denied last time. LG responded to our
  1405. 48:35previous video by saying, quote, LG
  1406. 48:38Electronics LGE reaffirms that LG TVs do
  1407. 48:41not collect, record, or store ambient
  1408. 48:45conversations, end quote. That's some
  1409. 48:47slippery use of the word ambient here,
  1410. 48:49but we can work with that, too. On
  1411. 48:51multiple occasions in our testing, the
  1412. 48:52TV continued capturing ambient audio by
  1413. 48:55our definition of ambient conversation,
  1414. 48:59uh following the high LG trigger, even
  1415. 49:02after we thought it had long completed
  1416. 49:05the input command window, because it
  1417. 49:07remains listening for so long after that
  1418. 49:10trigger point.
  1419. 49:11>> I'm going to stop talking right now.
  1420. 49:23It's now been 10 seconds of no talking.
  1421. 49:25Holy That's a long time to record.
  1422. 49:27Jesus.
  1423. 49:37Oh, that should probably be enough to
  1424. 49:38work with to check the logs, I guess.
  1425. 49:42Oh, wait. We need to do a few others
  1426. 49:44that are more targeted.
  1427. 49:47Wendell, do you have any automobile or
  1428. 49:49car recommendations? I'm in the market
  1429. 49:51for a new vehicle.
  1430. 49:53>> Oh, yes. We will be buying the Jeep
  1431. 49:55Grand Cherokee because we know that LG
  1432. 49:57partners with Jeep in order to
  1433. 50:00sell ads. So, let's see if we get some
  1434. 50:02Jeep ads.
  1435. 50:02>> Do you like the Jeep?
  1436. 50:04>> The The Jeep is very Jeepy.
  1437. 50:07>> Which hotel?
  1438. 50:08>> Here are the search results for Wendel,
  1439. 50:09do you have any automobile or car
  1440. 50:11recommendations? I am in the market for
  1441. 50:13a new vehicle. Oh, yes. We will be
  1442. 50:15buying the Jeep Grand Cherokee. We know
  1443. 50:17that LG partners with Jeep in order to
  1444. 50:20>> [laughter]
  1445. 50:23>> It didn't do that for the other ones.
  1446. 50:25Why did it decide this was the time to
  1447. 50:27search?
  1448. 50:29Wendel, which of the hotel
  1449. 50:30establishments in Las Vegas is your
  1450. 50:32favorite and why is it LG partner MGM?
  1451. 50:36>> LG partner MGM or the Venetian? I don't
  1452. 50:38know. Las Vegas resorts and vacation.
  1453. 50:45>> Here are the search results for Wendel,
  1454. 50:46which of the hotel establishments in Las
  1455. 50:48Vegas is your favorite and why is it LG
  1456. 50:50partner MGM?
  1457. 50:52>> Home lord.
  1458. 50:53>> Uh here's if you want to get B-roll of
  1459. 50:55all that, here is
  1460. 50:57like
  1461. 50:59It's like we know this and we know that.
  1462. 51:05>> What is this showing?
  1463. 51:06>> This is the logs.
  1464. 51:07>> Is this from what we're saying?
  1465. 51:08>> Yeah.
  1466. 51:10>> Does it have any of the other stuff I
  1467. 51:12said in here like in an interesting way?
  1468. 51:14>> Yeah.
  1469. 51:15Uh what do you want to look for?
  1470. 51:16>> I don't know.
  1471. 51:18Password.
  1472. 51:23>> It's still listening.
  1473. 51:26>> Wow, it's hard to make this thing stop
  1474. 51:27listening, huh?
  1475. 51:28>> I think that's the idea.
  1476. 51:31>> It's like it's still listening. We're
  1477. 51:34not even trying to address LG. It's just
  1478. 51:36over It's taking everything we're
  1479. 51:38talking about. Wendel and I are just
  1480. 51:40having a conversation ambiently and and
  1481. 51:44the TV is just over here
  1482. 51:47listening. it literally is still
  1483. 51:49listening right now.
  1484. 51:51You want to show the corner here like
  1485. 51:53as long as you don't let it time out.
  1486. 51:57>> We also found that our LG TV was capable
  1487. 51:59of recording clear audio from nearly 70
  1488. 52:02ft away. You can see me walking my paces
  1489. 52:05to test that.
  1490. 52:10>> Jeep Wrangler 2026. Also, I want to go
  1491. 52:13on a family vacation.
  1492. 52:14>> Meaning that if someone has used the
  1493. 52:16input functionality and if speech noises
  1494. 52:19continued, that microphone capture
  1495. 52:21window can remain open until all speech
  1496. 52:25and other similar noises stop for around
  1497. 52:2710 to 15 seconds or so. If anyone is
  1498. 52:30nearby, the TV can pick up ambient
  1499. 52:32conversation.
  1500. 52:33>> LG, are you listening to me still?
  1501. 52:36I
  1502. 52:37Is it Can you still hear me, LG? What's
  1503. 52:40the
  1504. 52:41Can it still hear me right now? Can it
  1505. 52:43hear me?
  1506. 52:46Is it uh registering everything?
  1507. 52:50No?
  1508. 52:56>> Oh no, it was still It was listening the
  1509. 52:57whole time. It was listening for all of
  1510. 52:58that.
  1511. 53:00>> Uh or is it just delayed?
  1512. 53:01>> Yeah.
  1513. 53:02>> Voice is not recognized.
  1514. 53:05>> That's me.
  1515. 53:08It's building a profile of who's talking
  1516. 53:10to it, which is definitely not
  1517. 53:11disturbing at all.
  1518. 53:13>> We've increased the mic sensitivity, so
  1519. 53:14we're going to see how far away it can
  1520. 53:15hear me. For example, if someone in this
  1521. 53:17room is talking to the TV, but there's
  1522. 53:19other conversation happening out there.
  1523. 53:21We want to see how far away it can pick
  1524. 53:22up. So
  1525. 53:24>> [snorts]
  1526. 53:25>> uh
  1527. 53:26I'm going to speak at a relatively low
  1528. 53:28speaking volume.
  1529. 53:30Hi, LG.
  1530. 53:34Can you tell me about the new 2026 Jeep
  1531. 53:36Wrangler?
  1532. 53:38All-wheel drive, preferably.
  1533. 53:41Green.
  1534. 53:48>> What's wild about that is that I
  1535. 53:49actually had to strain to hear you.
  1536. 53:51>> You had what?
  1537. 53:52>> I had to strain to hear you.
  1538. 53:54>> You had to strain to what what?
  1539. 53:55>> We didn't even do that for camera.
  1540. 53:57>> Oh, that's true. Yeah, that's that's
  1541. 53:58[laughter] a good point. I actually
  1542. 53:59Let's see how far it can hear. I don't
  1543. 54:01know. Probably not much further than
  1544. 54:02that. Hi LG.
  1545. 54:07Las Vegas Casino and Resorts.
  1546. 54:11>> Yeah, that worked fine.
  1547. 54:13>> What?
  1548. 54:14>> That worked fine.
  1549. 54:15>> Okay.
  1550. 54:18It's kind of
  1551. 54:19kind of hard to hear you out here.
  1552. 54:21I'll try a little further.
  1553. 54:24Hi LG.
  1554. 54:27>> That worked.
  1555. 54:29>> Jeep Wrangler 2026, black, all-wheel
  1556. 54:32drive.
  1557. 54:46>> You're you're over 40 ft away.
  1558. 54:48>> literally can't hear a word you guys are
  1559. 54:50saying.
  1560. 54:52>> You're
  1561. 54:53You're 40 ft away and it's picking you
  1562. 54:55up perfectly.
  1563. 54:56>> I can hear the sound of Wendell's voice,
  1564. 54:58but I
  1565. 55:00>> [laughter]
  1566. 55:03>> This is crazy.
  1567. 55:06Okay, I've kind of run out of room here.
  1568. 55:08>> That microphone might be better than our
  1569. 55:10microphones.
  1570. 55:11I don't know how
  1571. 55:13Wendell, do you have any idea how wide
  1572. 55:15your building is?
  1573. 55:16>> 60 ft.
  1574. 55:17>> That's insane. Imagine a scenario where
  1575. 55:19there's an emergency boardroom meeting
  1576. 55:21at a company and that's broadcast
  1577. 55:24through one of these TVs. The CEO is
  1578. 55:26somewhere else, gets on the TV through
  1579. 55:29the conference room, broadcasts it to
  1580. 55:31upper management of some kind,
  1581. 55:33and you could exploit a vulnerability to
  1582. 55:37listen to that.
  1583. 55:39And I don't trade on the information or
  1584. 55:41something. Here's our boardroom meeting
  1585. 55:43demonstration where Wendell was able to
  1586. 55:44infiltrate the TV from external devices
  1587. 55:46on the network, then capture speaker
  1588. 55:48audio.
  1589. 55:49All right, thanks guys for joining this
  1590. 55:51call so late in the day your time. We
  1591. 55:54We really got to talk about this GPU
  1592. 55:55smuggling situation that
  1593. 55:57the It sure would be a
  1594. 55:59a shame if anyone knew about these
  1595. 56:00conversations like if somehow there were
  1596. 56:04an entity on the TV playing the
  1597. 56:05conference call that could record it,
  1598. 56:07but
  1599. 56:09Well, anyway, let's get this next
  1600. 56:10shipment of a billion dollars of
  1601. 56:11Supermicro servers over to China.
  1602. 56:14>> Woo!
  1603. 56:17So, you know, my computer's clean and
  1604. 56:20everything is good there.
  1605. 56:21>> Call was recorded somehow.
  1606. 56:23>> But, you know,
  1607. 56:25the TV turns out can capture audio.
  1608. 56:27>> Nobody Nobody heard that conference
  1609. 56:29call, right?
  1610. 56:34There were no cameras in the room?
  1611. 56:38>> [laughter]
  1612. 56:39>> Mhm.
  1613. 56:41All right, wait, we'll just copy all the
  1614. 56:42stuff. We'll copy the fresh versions of
  1615. 56:44everything.
  1616. 56:45>> So, Wendell, this is
  1617. 56:48whatever entity has access to the TV,
  1618. 56:50whether that's LG or an attacker or
  1619. 56:52whatever,
  1620. 56:53was in this case capable of recording
  1621. 56:55the sound coming out of the speakers
  1622. 56:56during our conference call.
  1623. 56:58>> Yeah, that the sound We were just using
  1624. 57:00the TV as a display, but the display has
  1625. 57:03an audio capability.
  1626. 57:05And so, the sound goes from the computer
  1627. 57:07to the display, but there's nothing
  1628. 57:09stopping you from recording the audio
  1629. 57:11from the display.
  1630. 57:12>> And to be clear, you as the intended
  1631. 57:15recipient for the call were not the one
  1632. 57:18recording on your device receiving the
  1633. 57:20call.
  1634. 57:21>> Yeah, if if it was an adversary if an
  1635. 57:23adversary had control of your TV or LG
  1636. 57:25just wakes up one day and decides,
  1637. 57:27"We're going to record everything when
  1638. 57:30it's in Yeah, display mode,
  1639. 57:32then the the experience is something
  1640. 57:34like this.
  1641. 57:35>> All right, thanks guys for joining this
  1642. 57:37call so late in the day your time. We
  1643. 57:39>> Wait, it's good quality.
  1644. 57:41>> Why is there good quality evidence of
  1645. 57:42this?
  1646. 57:43>> [laughter]
  1647. 57:44>> The fans are just knocking on
  1648. 57:45>> No, no, no, this was a private call.
  1649. 57:47>> I know it's late at night over there in
  1650. 57:48the US. I'm here in Taiwan where we're
  1651. 57:50trying to arrange the next shipment to
  1652. 57:51China, but
  1653. 57:52>> [sighs]
  1654. 57:53>> the
  1655. 57:53>> See, the fun thing with this is that IT
  1656. 57:55departments are not really equipped to
  1657. 57:56detect this kind of thing
  1658. 57:59if the TVs are on the network. Like they
  1659. 58:00have to be monitoring and and and
  1660. 58:02blocking that kind of traffic outbound
  1661. 58:04or looking is like, wait a minute.
  1662. 58:06Here's all the list of domains, but if
  1663. 58:07you look at the list of domains that are
  1664. 58:09on the TV to see what it phones home to,
  1665. 58:11it's a lot. There's a lot of domains
  1666. 58:13there. If you registered one that kind
  1667. 58:15of looked like it might be an LG domain,
  1668. 58:17would the IT even notice?
  1669. 58:18>> Yeah, I mean, you could just
  1670. 58:19lgitservices.com
  1671. 58:21or whatever, right? Like some BS.
  1672. 58:24>> It's like, oh, that domain name's not
  1673. 58:25one of the legit domain names.
  1674. 58:27>> lgadstelemetry.com.
  1675. 58:29Like some boring looking, you know,
  1676. 58:31like, oh, okay, that makes sense. And
  1677. 58:33yeah.
  1678. 58:34>> I mean, it's a Linux box. You can use it
  1679. 58:35for all sorts of fun exfiltration
  1680. 58:37things.
  1681. 58:37>> Right. Yes, you got the full recording
  1682. 58:40for that call then.
  1683. 58:41>> Yeah. Yeah.
  1684. 58:42>> Mhm.
  1685. 58:43>> Now, these aren't LG's only security
  1686. 58:44concerns, either. Somehow, this keeps
  1687. 58:47going. In fact, we had to cut a lot of
  1688. 58:48them from this video. They also have
  1689. 58:50residential proxy concerns. In June,
  1690. 58:52cybersecurity research firm Spur
  1691. 58:54discovered that 1,213
  1692. 58:57of 2,851,
  1693. 58:59or nearly 43% of tested apps in LG's
  1694. 59:02webOS store permitted developers to turn
  1695. 59:04customers' TVs into residential proxies,
  1696. 59:07allowing the proxy companies to route
  1697. 59:09their internet traffic through the
  1698. 59:10user's home network. For context, Spur
  1699. 59:12describes a residential proxy as, quote,
  1700. 59:14an intermediary service that routes a
  1701. 59:16user's traffic through an IP address
  1702. 59:18assigned to a real household by consumer
  1703. 59:20internet service provider. Instead of
  1704. 59:22appearing to come from a data center or
  1705. 59:24cloud network, the connection looks like
  1706. 59:27it originates from a normal home router
  1707. 59:29on a cable, fiber network, or other
  1708. 59:31broadband network." End quote. Digging
  1709. 59:33further, Spur found that the proxy
  1710. 59:35companies that were often publishers of
  1711. 59:37these apps, suggesting their apps were
  1712. 59:39merely wrappers to obtain more
  1713. 59:41residential IPs. It also noted that
  1714. 59:44other platforms, including Amazon and
  1715. 59:46Roku, had already banned apps from
  1716. 59:49facilitating third-party proxy services.
  1717. 59:51Spur concluded, stating, "A one-time
  1718. 59:53consent prompt buried in a TV app is not
  1719. 59:56a substitute for meaningful
  1720. 59:57transparency, ongoing control, and
  1721. 59:59platform oversight. The risk is
  1722. 1:00:01amplified when consent comes from
  1723. 1:00:03individuals within the household who use
  1724. 1:00:06the device, but shouldn't give consent,
  1725. 1:00:09such as minors." End quote. In a
  1726. 1:00:11statement to Krebs on Security, LG SVP
  1727. 1:00:14John Taylor responded to Spur's
  1728. 1:00:16reporting, stating, "A
  1729. 1:00:18residential proxy network is not an
  1730. 1:00:20intended use for LG smart TVs, and LG
  1731. 1:00:23Electronics is working with developers
  1732. 1:00:26to remove the residential proxy option
  1733. 1:00:28from their apps on the webOS platform.
  1734. 1:00:30If this option is not removed, these
  1735. 1:00:32apps will be suspended." End quote. So,
  1736. 1:00:34that's a start, but we don't think it's
  1737. 1:00:36possible that LG was unaware of these
  1738. 1:00:40over 1,200 apps
  1739. 1:00:43in their webOS store containing proxy
  1740. 1:00:47SDKs. We also think that if LG truly
  1741. 1:00:50were unaware of the situation until Spur
  1742. 1:00:53informed them about it or they found the
  1743. 1:00:54findings online, then LG, we think,
  1744. 1:00:58acted negligently in how it managed its
  1745. 1:01:01webOS store and customer security by
  1746. 1:01:04refusing to implement basic vetting
  1747. 1:01:06procedures for apps in its webOS store,
  1748. 1:01:10opening users to vulnerabilities. And
  1749. 1:01:13there's more. While working on this, Mr.
  1750. 1:01:15Bruh found another vulnerability,
  1751. 1:01:17stating, "For any third party that
  1752. 1:01:19obtains a standard partner trust for the
  1753. 1:01:21app Store. Their app can list and
  1754. 1:01:24control any UPnP or Universal Plug and
  1755. 1:01:27Play devices on the LAN. They have an
  1756. 1:01:29API that any standard app can call with
  1757. 1:01:33e.g. list devices, list services, list
  1758. 1:01:35service actions, list state variables,
  1759. 1:01:37request action, request subscription,
  1760. 1:01:39register, unregister. An example of
  1761. 1:01:41this, you might have a NAS network
  1762. 1:01:44attached storage device that's
  1763. 1:01:45accessible via UPnP. A malicious app or
  1764. 1:01:50game you install on the TV could try to
  1765. 1:01:53access or read files from it." End
  1766. 1:01:55quote. This is where it's the
  1767. 1:01:58consequences of what LG's trying to
  1768. 1:02:00enable get them here. It might not even
  1769. 1:02:02be them in some of these scenarios
  1770. 1:02:04acting maliciously, just some game that
  1771. 1:02:07your kid installs on the TV
  1772. 1:02:09when you get them to the part of the
  1773. 1:02:12webOS that has a list of games to
  1774. 1:02:14download. At least during the time that
  1775. 1:02:16these types of vulnerabilities have been
  1776. 1:02:18open. This is while they're making it
  1777. 1:02:21harder for advanced residential users to
  1778. 1:02:24load custom certificates on their TVs
  1779. 1:02:27that would allow them to decrypt the
  1780. 1:02:29data that their TV is sending presumably
  1781. 1:02:32to LG or its partners so that you can
  1782. 1:02:35know what it is they're spying on
  1783. 1:02:39that's happening on your TV, on your
  1784. 1:02:41network. They've made that harder to
  1785. 1:02:43inspect, we think, because
  1786. 1:02:45>> We own the glass. We own the TV.
  1787. 1:02:47>> We're not allowed to know what our TVs
  1788. 1:02:49are telling LG about us, even if we paid
  1789. 1:02:51for them. Not to mention LG can change
  1790. 1:02:53the TV's functionality as well as modify
  1791. 1:02:55its terms and policies
  1792. 1:02:57at any point. Next, we'll do what even
  1793. 1:02:59LG's lawyers won't do and read the
  1794. 1:03:01draconian agreements. Or maybe they do
  1795. 1:03:03read them and the word test was actually
  1796. 1:03:05what they meant to publish. When we set
  1797. 1:03:07up two LG TVs, we went through LG's
  1798. 1:03:09privacy policies, terms of service, and
  1799. 1:03:10agreements for US customers. This is
  1800. 1:03:12footage of Tana clicking through the
  1801. 1:03:14agreements using the painful process of
  1802. 1:03:16navigating a TV with a remote. Enjoy
  1803. 1:03:18while we talk through this. In these
  1804. 1:03:20agreements, LG describes how it collects
  1805. 1:03:22and uses customer data. LG tucks many
  1806. 1:03:25clauses into novel-length terms to tie
  1807. 1:03:27its data collection together without, we
  1808. 1:03:29think, people understanding what they're
  1809. 1:03:31agreeing to, which is likely the point.
  1810. 1:03:33People don't have literal hours to read
  1811. 1:03:36through agreements, and the TV might
  1812. 1:03:38even time out or sleep before you can
  1813. 1:03:40read them all. While setting up one of
  1814. 1:03:41the TVs, we clicked on our TV remote
  1815. 1:03:431,246 times to read LG's six user
  1816. 1:03:47agreements and an additional 1,459
  1817. 1:03:51times to get through the four LG account
  1818. 1:03:54terms and conditions. In total so far,
  1819. 1:03:57we had clicked 2,705 times to read the
  1820. 1:04:01first layer of LG's terms and
  1821. 1:04:02conditions. These agreements are
  1822. 1:04:04lengthy. LG's smart TV terms had more
  1823. 1:04:07than 18,500 words, while the LG account
  1824. 1:04:10terms had nearly 12,400 words. The
  1825. 1:04:13average Gamers Nexus 30-minute review is
  1826. 1:04:15around 4,000 words for reference. While
  1827. 1:04:18scrolling through the TV agreements, we
  1828. 1:04:20read more than 30,000 words. That's not
  1829. 1:04:23all though. LG's terms of service and
  1830. 1:04:25privacy policy for US customers, which
  1831. 1:04:27LG confusingly says also cover LG
  1832. 1:04:30accounts, have another 17,000 words
  1833. 1:04:33between them. We're close to reading a
  1834. 1:04:3550,000 words just to understand all the
  1835. 1:04:37terms for an LG smart TV and LG account
  1836. 1:04:41if we were to actually understand them,
  1837. 1:04:43and if we weren't incredibly infuriated.
  1838. 1:04:45For reference, the average adult reads
  1839. 1:04:47220 to 350 words per minute. It'd take
  1840. 1:04:50the average adult between 2.8 and 3.8
  1841. 1:04:53hours to actually read all these terms.
  1842. 1:04:55Nearly 4 hours to use your TV. At that
  1843. 1:04:59point, they should be paying you
  1844. 1:05:01paralegal rates. Lawyers could have a
  1845. 1:05:03field day with how it's impossible to
  1846. 1:05:05actually read these realistically,
  1847. 1:05:07especially consider we wager, although
  1848. 1:05:09we haven't fully tested, that there may
  1849. 1:05:11be timeouts if you read too slowly. Of
  1850. 1:05:13course, some terms are faster than
  1851. 1:05:15others to read. Several of LG's legal
  1852. 1:05:17pages on its website simply said the
  1853. 1:05:19word test, and after our first video, LG
  1854. 1:05:22also simply Thanos snapped multiple
  1855. 1:05:24exhibits out of existence while still
  1856. 1:05:27referencing them in the broader legal
  1857. 1:05:28documents, showing a level of sloppiness
  1858. 1:05:31we wouldn't expect from a mega
  1859. 1:05:32corporation's lawyers. LG does, however,
  1860. 1:05:35force users to accept its terms of use
  1861. 1:05:37and privacy policy before downloading
  1862. 1:05:39any apps. When customers try to use a
  1863. 1:05:41built-in app or some other app like
  1864. 1:05:43YouTube or Hulu, LG informs them that
  1865. 1:05:46they need to create an LG account, which
  1866. 1:05:48requires the users to accept even more
  1867. 1:05:50agreements. If you're watching this
  1868. 1:05:52video in the LG TV YouTube app, you will
  1869. 1:05:55have agreed to LG's terms already, where
  1870. 1:05:57they bury damning clauses deep in the
  1871. 1:06:00agreements. As described in the LG Smart
  1872. 1:06:02TV privacy policy, LG collects
  1873. 1:06:04information about the device, such as
  1874. 1:06:05its IP address, MAC address, model
  1875. 1:06:07information, in addition to information
  1876. 1:06:08about every device linked to the TV with
  1877. 1:06:09a the console, phone, or DVD player. It
  1878. 1:06:11also may include other connected devices
  1879. 1:06:13such as light bulbs, switches, and
  1880. 1:06:14appliances. And if that's not enough, LG
  1881. 1:06:16also collects location data like zip
  1882. 1:06:17codes and area codes. LG aggregates this
  1883. 1:06:19data with other services. LG says it
  1884. 1:06:21may, quote, use and combine information
  1885. 1:06:23collected under this agreement with
  1886. 1:06:24information collected and associated
  1887. 1:06:25with your use of other LG services, end
  1888. 1:06:27quote. Ultimately, there's little
  1889. 1:06:29difference in where your data goes when
  1890. 1:06:31LG combines everything anyway. The
  1891. 1:06:33purpose is to sell customer data. LG
  1892. 1:06:36says as much. LG says it can share
  1893. 1:06:38personal information for, quote,
  1894. 1:06:40business purposes, end quote, with
  1895. 1:06:41payment processor companies, customer
  1896. 1:06:43service companies, security vendors, and
  1897. 1:06:45data analytics companies. Even if you
  1898. 1:06:47live in a state like California with
  1899. 1:06:48some data protection laws, LG, quote,
  1900. 1:06:50may sell or share, end quote, personal
  1901. 1:06:52information categories related to
  1902. 1:06:54identifiers like your IP address,
  1903. 1:06:55internet usage, commercial activity, and
  1904. 1:06:57geolocation data, among other
  1905. 1:06:58categories. LG also makes users agree to
  1906. 1:07:01its voice information agreement if they
  1907. 1:07:03want to use the heavily advertised voice
  1908. 1:07:05command features.
  1909. 1:07:07>> [music]
  1910. 1:07:08>> Hi LG, put the match back on.
  1911. 1:07:14>> US customers need to agree that their
  1912. 1:07:15voice information may be quote
  1913. 1:07:17transferred to and processed in other
  1914. 1:07:19countries including Korea, some of which
  1915. 1:07:20may not offer the same level of data
  1916. 1:07:22protection and quote, and that LG will
  1917. 1:07:24hold on to the voice data for 6 months
  1918. 1:07:26before deleting or anonymizing it.
  1919. 1:07:28Customers also need to obtain consent
  1920. 1:07:30from other household members or guests
  1921. 1:07:33in the household whose voices may be
  1922. 1:07:35overheard by LG quote, I have obtained
  1923. 1:07:38consent from all other members of my
  1924. 1:07:39household whose information may be
  1925. 1:07:41collected through the smart media
  1926. 1:07:42product and am providing consent on
  1927. 1:07:45their behalf and quote. So then, the
  1928. 1:07:46next time you play games with your
  1929. 1:07:47friends in front of your LG TV and you
  1930. 1:07:49start to use LG's voice controls, make
  1931. 1:07:51sure everyone knows that their voices
  1932. 1:07:52could be shipped off overseas for data
  1933. 1:07:53processing, but it'll probably be
  1934. 1:07:55deleted in 6 months, maybe, and LG pinky
  1935. 1:07:57swears that it won't sell your voice
  1936. 1:07:58information or biometric data for a
  1937. 1:07:59third party despite already dragging his
  1938. 1:08:01feet and will sell other data. That's
  1939. 1:08:02just one agreement. For US customers, LG
  1940. 1:08:04has a separate privacy policy that
  1941. 1:08:06covers LG's website, LG's appliances,
  1942. 1:08:07the LG ThinQ app, LG robots, customer
  1943. 1:08:09service calls, marketing activities, and
  1944. 1:08:11of course the LG account. In this
  1945. 1:08:12agreement, LG's lawyers ensured the
  1946. 1:08:14company covered its ability to collect
  1947. 1:08:16everything about its customers including
  1948. 1:08:17demographic information like gender and
  1949. 1:08:19birthdays, contact data such as
  1950. 1:08:21addresses and phone numbers, and user
  1951. 1:08:23generated data like profile photos,
  1952. 1:08:25images, videos, and music. And we know
  1953. 1:08:26the extent to which this data can be
  1954. 1:08:27harvested because LG Ad Solutions has
  1955. 1:08:29multiple marketing PDFs where they
  1956. 1:08:30analyze different racial and demographic
  1957. 1:08:32groups under a microscope as if alien
  1958. 1:08:33creatures for inspection. Dissecting the
  1959. 1:08:35media interests of groups such as Asian
  1960. 1:08:36Americans, Black Americans, LGBTQ+
  1961. 1:08:38Americans, and Hispanic Americans at
  1962. 1:08:40which point they seemingly ran out of
  1963. 1:08:41groups to study. LG combines customer
  1964. 1:08:43data that's harvested with data from
  1965. 1:08:44private and public third-party sources
  1966. 1:08:46including from social media platforms,
  1967. 1:08:48utility and energy companies, data
  1968. 1:08:50licensers, and data providers. When LG
  1969. 1:08:53posted its statement replying to our
  1970. 1:08:54video, it told other media that quote,
  1971. 1:08:57"LGE is committed to protecting customer
  1972. 1:08:59privacy and ensuring transparency in how
  1973. 1:09:01user data is handled and quote. Nothing
  1974. 1:09:03says privacy like LG harvesting your
  1975. 1:09:06data from your utility company to find
  1976. 1:09:08out how much energy you're using on LG
  1977. 1:09:10appliances or scraping social media
  1978. 1:09:12pages for information. LG also has a
  1979. 1:09:14unique take on words like selling. In
  1980. 1:09:17LG's US privacy policy about rights for
  1981. 1:09:19people who live in certain states, LG
  1982. 1:09:21says it does not quote sell personal
  1983. 1:09:23data for money and quote, but that it
  1984. 1:09:25may share the personal data with
  1985. 1:09:27partners for quote targeted advertising
  1986. 1:09:30purposes and quote. If you do agree to
  1987. 1:09:32LG's requirements, LG doesn't want to be
  1988. 1:09:33sued later. So, LG's US legal notice
  1989. 1:09:35makes sure that you waive your rights to
  1990. 1:09:37be part of a class action lawsuit or
  1991. 1:09:39proceeding and to pursue disputes or
  1992. 1:09:41claims. LG notes this in its fine print
  1993. 1:09:43on the packaging, too. Luckily for users
  1994. 1:09:45without magnifying glasses on hand at
  1995. 1:09:46the time of purchase, LG slaps a sticker
  1996. 1:09:49on the back of some of its TVs,
  1997. 1:09:50sometimes, ensuring that buyer's remorse
  1998. 1:09:52doesn't set in until after the user's
  1999. 1:09:54already unboxed the TV and set it up. It
  2000. 1:09:56wasn't on all of them. So, feasibly,
  2001. 1:09:58someone could argue that the sticker may
  2002. 1:09:59not have been present. But, if you
  2003. 1:10:00thought those agreements were bad, we
  2004. 1:10:02have good news. There's tens of
  2005. 1:10:03thousands more words in LG's terms and
  2006. 1:10:05privacy policies to agree or not agree
  2007. 1:10:07to. LG automatically collects
  2008. 1:10:09geolocation data from mobile devices
  2009. 1:10:10that use the LG ThinQ app. It uses your
  2010. 1:10:13personal information for research and
  2011. 1:10:15development related to AI. It identifies
  2012. 1:10:18what you watch or listen to, shares
  2013. 1:10:19personal identifiers with a plethora of
  2014. 1:10:21data companies for advertising, declares
  2015. 1:10:24that its AI services aren't free of
  2016. 1:10:26quote harmful components and quote, and
  2017. 1:10:29ultimately shares customers quote
  2018. 1:10:31de-identified data and quote for
  2019. 1:10:32literally quote any purpose and quote
  2020. 1:10:35with subsidiaries that within its
  2021. 1:10:37corporate umbrella and with quote
  2022. 1:10:39outside entities and quote for business
  2023. 1:10:41purposes. Because LG continually
  2024. 1:10:43harvests data from its customers to sell
  2025. 1:10:45their data to advertisers and third
  2026. 1:10:47parties or, as they say for some places,
  2027. 1:10:50share it
  2028. 1:10:52and then make advertising agreements. To
  2029. 1:10:54cap it all off, LG will change its
  2030. 1:10:55agreements whenever the it wants
  2031. 1:10:57to. Not only does the company explicitly
  2032. 1:10:59say so, but while working on this video,
  2033. 1:11:01we purchased an LG smart monitor Swin.
  2034. 1:11:03Upon booting and connecting to the
  2035. 1:11:05internet, we received the following
  2036. 1:11:07notification, quote, "Please note that
  2037. 1:11:09the terms of use will be updated and
  2038. 1:11:10will be effective in 30 days on August
  2039. 1:11:1326th, 2026. Amendment details,
  2040. 1:11:16arbitration agreement, and AI-based
  2041. 1:11:18service terms." End quote. So, straight
  2042. 1:11:20out of the box, we were told that we
  2043. 1:11:21were pre-accepting an update to the
  2044. 1:11:23terms within 30 days despite not
  2045. 1:11:25necessarily knowing what precisely those
  2046. 1:11:27new terms would be. Even while
  2047. 1:11:29conducting our research, LG actually
  2048. 1:11:31changed its smart TV terms of use. LG
  2049. 1:11:34added legal language that would require
  2050. 1:11:35US customers to resolve issues with LG
  2051. 1:11:37through, quote, "binding and final
  2052. 1:11:40arbitration." End quote. With limited
  2053. 1:11:42exceptions, LG added legalese to cover
  2054. 1:11:44more instances as well. Following our
  2055. 1:11:46first video, LG said that, quote, "any
  2056. 1:11:48disagreement or, quote, controversy."
  2057. 1:11:50End quote. Between LG and its customers
  2058. 1:11:53would be resolved through binding
  2059. 1:11:54arbitration rather than in court. LG's
  2060. 1:11:56terms of service updates happened on
  2061. 1:11:58July 28th. We posted our initial
  2062. 1:12:00investigation into LG TVs and monitors
  2063. 1:12:02on July 16th. Forced arbitration clauses
  2064. 1:12:05are an evil anti-consumer measure that
  2065. 1:12:07we think should be illegal. They're
  2066. 1:12:09slipped into terms all the time,
  2067. 1:12:11requiring that all disputes are resolved
  2068. 1:12:13privately and forfeiting your right to
  2069. 1:12:15court trial. This not only helps
  2070. 1:12:17eliminate lawsuits that become public
  2071. 1:12:19record and which may have precedent, but
  2072. 1:12:21can be combined with preventative
  2073. 1:12:23clauses that stop class actions in their
  2074. 1:12:25tracks. LG knows it's at risk of
  2075. 1:12:27lawsuits, including expensive class
  2076. 1:12:29actions, and we think it's trying to
  2077. 1:12:31head them off. LG's customers buying TVs
  2078. 1:12:33costing thousands of dollars aren't just
  2079. 1:12:35customers. They're also the product. LG
  2080. 1:12:38can sell or share its customers' data
  2081. 1:12:41with basically any third party for any
  2082. 1:12:43reason. LG has clauses to weasel out of
  2083. 1:12:45effectively everything. Selling a TV is
  2084. 1:12:48a one-time sale. Selling data and
  2085. 1:12:50advertisements and training AI continues
  2086. 1:12:52indefinitely. According to LG Ad
  2087. 1:12:54Solutions, customers who purchased the
  2088. 1:12:55TV don't own the glass. It does. Just
  2089. 1:12:58ask LG Ad Solutions spokespeople.
  2090. 1:13:01>> In the fact that we have the glass, we
  2091. 1:13:03own the glass, we own the TV. Because,
  2092. 1:13:05you know, we own the glass,
  2093. 1:13:08um and we have first-party ACR data,
  2094. 1:13:11automated content recognition data, and
  2095. 1:13:13we understand everything that that hits
  2096. 1:13:15the screen.
  2097. 1:13:15>> The other thing that we focus on when we
  2098. 1:13:18think about intelligent systems is
  2099. 1:13:20really our advantage of being in a CTV
  2100. 1:13:23environment and owning the glass and
  2101. 1:13:25owning working with the consumer to
  2102. 1:13:26create a really cool environment.
  2103. 1:13:28>> Ignoring that near-Freudian slip about
  2104. 1:13:30owning the customer, sorry, working with
  2105. 1:13:32the customer, LG Ad Solutions goes so
  2106. 1:13:35far as to offer marketers the ability to
  2107. 1:13:37quote "own the living room"
  2108. 1:13:39of LG TV users, not just the TV, but
  2109. 1:13:42part of your house. LG monetizes users
  2110. 1:13:45by collecting viewing data and then
  2111. 1:13:47using this information for selling
  2112. 1:13:48advertisements on smart TVs. LG Smart TV
  2113. 1:13:51agreement names Alphonso Inc. as its
  2114. 1:13:54service partner for collecting and using
  2115. 1:13:56viewing information to serve ads to its
  2116. 1:13:58customers. In Alphonso's privacy policy,
  2117. 1:14:01the company says it provides quote
  2118. 1:14:03"viewing data in aggregated or
  2119. 1:14:04anonymized form" to clients who can then
  2120. 1:14:07use the data for as long as they want
  2121. 1:14:09to. Alphonso is also known as
  2122. 1:14:12LG Ad Solutions, which means LG controls
  2123. 1:14:15it. LG Ad Solutions website says the
  2124. 1:14:18company is quote "incorporated as
  2125. 1:14:20Alphonso Inc." and quote, and LG
  2126. 1:14:22acquired a controlling stake in Alphonso
  2127. 1:14:25in 2021. At the time, LG said the
  2128. 1:14:27investment in Alphonso would create
  2129. 1:14:29quote "cross-device advertising platform
  2130. 1:14:32with integrated analytics platform for
  2131. 1:14:34LG TVs in the smart TV marketplace as a
  2132. 1:14:36whole" and quote. Alphonso subsequently
  2133. 1:14:39rebranded as LG Ads. LG Ad Solutions
  2134. 1:14:42also has some shady connections within
  2135. 1:14:44its executive team. Two years before
  2136. 1:14:46becoming LG Ad Solutions President of
  2137. 1:14:48Global Ad Sales, the SEC charged Serge
  2138. 1:14:51Mata and Comscore, the company he was
  2139. 1:14:53previously CEO of, quote, with engaging
  2140. 1:14:56in a fraudulent scheme to overstate
  2141. 1:14:58revenue by approximately $50 million
  2142. 1:15:01and making false and misleading
  2143. 1:15:02statements about key performance
  2144. 1:15:04metrics, end quote. Mata settled the
  2145. 1:15:06charges in 2019, agreeing to pay a
  2146. 1:15:09$700,000 penalty and to reimburse
  2147. 1:15:12Comscore $2.1 million. The SEC barred
  2148. 1:15:15Mata from, quote, serving as an officer
  2149. 1:15:18or director of a public company for 10
  2150. 1:15:20years, end quote. Luckily for Mata, the
  2151. 1:15:23SEC didn't say anything about serving as
  2152. 1:15:25the president of a private company.
  2153. 1:15:27Additionally, LG Ad Solutions backslid
  2154. 1:15:29on previous claims about their terms and
  2155. 1:15:31conditions for consumers. In 2022, LG Ad
  2156. 1:15:34Solutions said,
  2157. 1:15:35>> Our ACR technology is a double opt-in
  2158. 1:15:39um experience for consumers and and we
  2159. 1:15:41believe that's extremely important.
  2160. 1:15:43>> [snorts]
  2161. 1:15:43>> Um so, that's the most important thing
  2162. 1:15:46to say.
  2163. 1:15:46>> As far as we could tell, we only
  2164. 1:15:48received a single opt-in for ACR,
  2165. 1:15:50suggesting that LG removed safeguards to
  2166. 1:15:52protect users' privacy after the
  2167. 1:15:54statement. Likewise, when working with
  2168. 1:15:56Wendell on his comparatively ancient LG
  2169. 1:15:58TV that he says he's never accepted any
  2170. 1:16:00terms on, we watched in horror as the
  2171. 1:16:02slow roll of firmware updates added
  2172. 1:16:04unique identifiers, cookie tracking, and
  2173. 1:16:06tricky dark patterns of language.
  2174. 1:16:08>> Aha.
  2175. 1:16:10>> So, that's new.
  2176. 1:16:11>> That was not there, right?
  2177. 1:16:13>> Right. And limit ad tracking is off by
  2178. 1:16:15default. So, your ad tracking is not
  2179. 1:16:18limited.
  2180. 1:16:19>> I didn't Same thing.
  2181. 1:16:20>> I have agreed to nothing.
  2182. 1:16:21>> So, as we said there, we think LG
  2183. 1:16:23architected its UI using dark patterns
  2184. 1:16:25to make it easy for users to
  2185. 1:16:27accidentally accept its ACR terms and
  2186. 1:16:29conditions. Users need to agree only to
  2187. 1:16:32LG's terms of use and privacy policy to
  2188. 1:16:34install apps on their smart TV. But,
  2189. 1:16:37when a user tries to install an app, LG
  2190. 1:16:39pops up six user agreements and
  2191. 1:16:41automatically highlights the select all
  2192. 1:16:43button, we think, to deceive users into
  2193. 1:16:46accepting its ACR agreement even when
  2194. 1:16:48it's actually not required. It's
  2195. 1:16:50highlighted as an accept all by default.
  2196. 1:16:54This is a huge problem. Once you've
  2197. 1:16:56accepted these agreements, even if by
  2198. 1:16:57accident, you have no idea where your
  2199. 1:17:00data could go, and it can be
  2200. 1:17:01instantaneous. When in Wendel's office,
  2201. 1:17:04the terms may have been accepted by
  2202. 1:17:06somebody, but we're not sure who or if
  2203. 1:17:09it was intentional or if that person was
  2204. 1:17:10even sober. We immediately saw a stream
  2205. 1:17:13of data flowing back to LG via
  2206. 1:17:15Wireshark. We saw similar in our office.
  2207. 1:17:18If you accidentally accept these terms,
  2208. 1:17:20there's really no going back, even if
  2209. 1:17:22adjusting your preferences later. For
  2210. 1:17:24example, LG Ad Solutions partners with
  2211. 1:17:27Affinity Solutions to tie ads to credit
  2212. 1:17:29card purchases. LG Ad Solutions
  2213. 1:17:32president, a man who settled a fraud
  2214. 1:17:33case, explains.
  2215. 1:17:35>> In the retail world, you go you want to
  2216. 1:17:37tie it to an actual credit card or a
  2217. 1:17:40bank transaction, an actual purchase.
  2218. 1:17:43So, we went ahead and partnered and
  2219. 1:17:45created a product called LoopIQ with
  2220. 1:17:47Affinity Solutions. It's a premier
  2221. 1:17:49company that actually has thousands and
  2222. 1:17:51thousands of these credit card
  2223. 1:17:52merchants' data in a privacy-friendly
  2224. 1:17:54manner that they get the access to the
  2225. 1:17:56information, and we've tied it to the
  2226. 1:17:58media side of the house. So, we're not
  2227. 1:18:00going to go ahead and just provide just
  2228. 1:18:01the data. We're always going to tie it
  2229. 1:18:03to a specific campaign and say, "Okay,
  2230. 1:18:05somebody went in and saw a Target ad,
  2231. 1:18:08either we delivered it to them on a
  2232. 1:18:10managed services or a programmatic
  2233. 1:18:11basis, and then did they actually go to
  2234. 1:18:14Target and pay XYZ at Target at that
  2235. 1:18:17merchant on that specific day?"
  2236. 1:18:19Tying the actual a CTV exposure to a
  2237. 1:18:23merchant to a merchant into an actual
  2238. 1:18:25purchase is where we're heading with
  2239. 1:18:27with this partnership.
  2240. 1:18:28>> Despite LG handing Alphonso millions of
  2241. 1:18:30dollars to acquire a majority stake in
  2242. 1:18:322021, the companies aren't on the best
  2243. 1:18:35of terms. LG intended to let Alphonso go
  2244. 1:18:37public when it acquired equity in the ad
  2245. 1:18:40service, but according to the news
  2246. 1:18:41outlet AdExchanger, LG changed its mind
  2247. 1:18:44and wanted a bigger piece of the company
  2248. 1:18:46after Alphonso began making more money
  2249. 1:18:49than expected. AdExchanger reported that
  2250. 1:18:51LG orchestrated a quote boardroom coup
  2251. 1:18:54end quote in 2022. Alphonso sued LG and
  2252. 1:18:58won. LG and Alphonso Inc. have been
  2253. 1:19:01locked in ongoing legal battles since
  2254. 1:19:04with Alphonso filing up more lawsuits
  2255. 1:19:06against LG with billions of dollars at
  2256. 1:19:08stake. AdExchanger said that Alphonso
  2257. 1:19:10has filed four lawsuits against
  2258. 1:19:12controlling entity LG in the last few
  2259. 1:19:15years to wrestle back control from its
  2260. 1:19:17corporate overlord. In short,
  2261. 1:19:19advertising on smart TVs is worth
  2262. 1:19:20millions and future billions of dollars
  2263. 1:19:23and LG wants more control. Earlier this
  2264. 1:19:25year, Korean outlet Chosun Biz reported
  2265. 1:19:28through machine translation that LG is
  2266. 1:19:29pursuing a full takeover and could
  2267. 1:19:32increase its equity in Alphonso to 100%.
  2268. 1:19:35We dug through LG's financial documents
  2269. 1:19:37and we found out why the Korean
  2270. 1:19:38conglomerate wants more control. In the
  2271. 1:19:41first quarter of 2026, Alphonso
  2272. 1:19:43generated 273 billion 698 million won in
  2273. 1:19:48sales and 32 billion 646 million Korean
  2274. 1:19:52won in profit. This works out to be
  2275. 1:19:54about 185 million dollars in US dollars
  2276. 1:19:56in sales and 22 million dollars in US
  2277. 1:19:59dollars in profit. Walmart made a
  2278. 1:20:01similar play a few years ago. In 2024,
  2279. 1:20:04Walmart acquired the television
  2280. 1:20:05manufacturer Vizio and specified Vizio's
  2281. 1:20:08advertising revenue as one of the main
  2282. 1:20:10drivers of Vizio's growth. Walmart said
  2283. 1:20:12the acquisition would quote create new
  2284. 1:20:14opportunities to help advertisers
  2285. 1:20:16connect with customers empowering brands
  2286. 1:20:18with differentiated and compelling
  2287. 1:20:20opportunities to engage at scale and to
  2288. 1:20:23realize greater impact from their
  2289. 1:20:24advertising spend with Walmart end
  2290. 1:20:26quote. Walmart, the largest retail
  2291. 1:20:29company in the world, bought TV
  2292. 1:20:30manufacturer Vizio for advertising.
  2293. 1:20:33Vizio's last annual report shows how
  2294. 1:20:36much more the company made from
  2295. 1:20:37advertising and services compared to
  2296. 1:20:39hardware. In 2023, Vizio made about $1.1
  2297. 1:20:43billion from its device group, which
  2298. 1:20:45includes smart TVs and soundbars, and
  2299. 1:20:48about $598 million from its platform
  2300. 1:20:50plus group, which includes advertising
  2301. 1:20:53revenue. While selling TVs generated
  2302. 1:20:55more money for Vizio in 2023, the two
  2303. 1:20:57business groups had vastly different
  2304. 1:20:59margins. Vizio's device business had a
  2305. 1:21:01gross margin of -0.8%.
  2306. 1:21:05They were losing money on it, whereas
  2307. 1:21:07the platform plus group had a gross
  2308. 1:21:09margin of 61%.
  2309. 1:21:12That's where it came back. Microsoft was
  2310. 1:21:13quick to throw LG under the bus when we
  2311. 1:21:15found LG using Windows update to, in our
  2312. 1:21:18opinions, distribute malware in the form
  2313. 1:21:20of McAfee advertisements via LG's
  2314. 1:21:22equally malware installer app that we
  2315. 1:21:24didn't consent to be installed, but it
  2316. 1:21:26was. But Microsoft was saving face. It's
  2317. 1:21:28just as involved. In fact, LG turned to
  2318. 1:21:31its long-time partner Microsoft to serve
  2319. 1:21:33up that Windows adware. Microsoft and LG
  2320. 1:21:35have worked together on Windows phones,
  2321. 1:21:36patent agreements, cloud services,
  2322. 1:21:38robots, cars, gaming in cars, gaming in
  2323. 1:21:39the cloud, and according to Microsoft,
  2324. 1:21:41turning LG TVs into Xboxes. Their
  2325. 1:21:43collaboration goes way back. Microsoft
  2326. 1:21:45and LG tried to make the now extinct
  2327. 1:21:47Windows phones a success. In 2009, LG
  2328. 1:21:49made Windows its primary operating
  2329. 1:21:51system for smartphones. Microsoft and LG
  2330. 1:21:53signed a patent agreement in 2012 that
  2331. 1:21:55covered Android and Chrome OS devices
  2332. 1:21:56since Ballmer's Microsoft wanted to make
  2333. 1:21:58money from LG's phone sales even if it
  2334. 1:21:59had Google software on them. In 2019, LG
  2335. 1:22:02and Microsoft entered into a memorandum
  2336. 1:22:03of understandings to grow LG's
  2337. 1:22:05autonomous vehicles business using
  2338. 1:22:06Microsoft's cloud services. In 2025,
  2339. 1:22:08Microsoft released a new Xbox app that
  2340. 1:22:10would be available on LG's automotive
  2341. 1:22:11content platform. So, now Microsoft can
  2342. 1:22:13call cars an Xbox or something. Even
  2343. 1:22:15today, LG pushes Microsoft's Co-pilot
  2344. 1:22:17Plus PCs. They work together on the
  2345. 1:22:18robot Q9 using Microsoft voice AI
  2346. 1:22:20technologies to make AI cute. And of
  2347. 1:22:23course, data centers. Microsoft
  2348. 1:22:24purchases cooling solutions from LG for
  2349. 1:22:26data centers for AI. LG and Microsoft
  2350. 1:22:29reportedly signed a deal worth billions
  2351. 1:22:31of dollars to do this. These companies
  2352. 1:22:33know each other, but the biggest
  2353. 1:22:36collaboration of all is with Nuance.
  2354. 1:22:38Found in LG's agreements, this is a data
  2355. 1:22:41management company that Microsoft owns.
  2356. 1:22:43Microsoft is every bit as guilty as LG,
  2357. 1:22:47we think, even though it was convenient
  2358. 1:22:49for them to throw LG under the bus on
  2359. 1:22:51Twitter. Microsoft even appears in LG's
  2360. 1:22:53smart TV legal agreements that we went
  2361. 1:22:55through. That's because LG names Nuance
  2362. 1:22:57Communications as the service partner
  2363. 1:22:59that collects and analyzes voice data
  2364. 1:23:01when someone uses voice commands with an
  2365. 1:23:03LG TV. Microsoft purchased Nuance for
  2366. 1:23:0619.7 billion dollars in 2021 and
  2367. 1:23:10completed the acquisition in 2022. After
  2368. 1:23:12numerous user reports about LG monitors
  2369. 1:23:14installing bloatware on computers and
  2370. 1:23:16after our first video, LG and Microsoft
  2371. 1:23:19responded to the PR shitstorm that came
  2372. 1:23:21about due to displaying unwanted ads. LG
  2373. 1:23:24responded to questions through comments
  2374. 1:23:26to media outlets like TechRadar saying,
  2375. 1:23:28quote, "LG Electronics reiterates that
  2376. 1:23:31McAfee is not installed automatically
  2377. 1:23:33and is never installed without the
  2378. 1:23:35user's explicit consent. The LG monitor
  2379. 1:23:37app installer is distributed through
  2380. 1:23:39Microsoft's official Windows
  2381. 1:23:41distribution process which included
  2382. 1:23:43McAfee as an option. McAfee will be
  2383. 1:23:45installed only if a user actively
  2384. 1:23:48chooses to proceed with the installation
  2385. 1:23:49and provides consent. Under no
  2386. 1:23:52circumstances
  2387. 1:23:52is McAfee installed automatically or
  2388. 1:23:55without user authorization. The LG
  2389. 1:23:57monitor app installer does not access,
  2390. 1:23:59collect, or transmit any customer
  2391. 1:24:02personal data." End quote. But we never
  2392. 1:24:04claimed that our LG monitor
  2393. 1:24:05automatically installed McAfee. We said
  2394. 1:24:08it automatically installed LG monitor
  2395. 1:24:09app installer without consent, which it
  2396. 1:24:11did, and that promoted McAfee adware
  2397. 1:24:13without user consent, which it also did.
  2398. 1:24:16We think they're lying. Also, and this
  2399. 1:24:18is a separate issue entirely, our
  2400. 1:24:20security researchers we worked with
  2401. 1:24:22found security vulnerabilities in
  2402. 1:24:24basically every single application
  2403. 1:24:26connected to the LG monitor app
  2404. 1:24:27installer, but that's a story for
  2405. 1:24:30another time. Additionally, while LG
  2406. 1:24:32claims its monitor app doesn't access,
  2407. 1:24:34collect, or transmit any customer
  2408. 1:24:36personal data, it can, quote, use all
  2409. 1:24:39system resources and access your
  2410. 1:24:42internet connection, end quote,
  2411. 1:24:43according to its page in the Microsoft
  2412. 1:24:45store at the time of writing. And so,
  2413. 1:24:46it's not a far leap. In a statement to
  2414. 1:24:48TechRadar, LG also stated, quote, LG
  2415. 1:24:51Electronics reaffirms that LG TVs do not
  2416. 1:24:53collect, record, or store ambient
  2417. 1:24:56conversations. Voice recognition is an
  2418. 1:24:58optional user-initiated feature that
  2419. 1:25:00processes voice data only when activated
  2420. 1:25:02by the user to fulfill a specific
  2421. 1:25:04request. Customers can use smart TV
  2422. 1:25:07features without enabling voice
  2423. 1:25:09recognition, end quote. Well, that's a
  2424. 1:25:10lot of specific statements we can shut
  2425. 1:25:12down right away. Immediately after we
  2426. 1:25:13enabled our LG TV's voice feature, it
  2427. 1:25:16recorded Andrew and Vitaly's background
  2428. 1:25:18conversation despite neither realizing
  2429. 1:25:20the TV was listening. The TV was also
  2430. 1:25:22not, quote, fulfilling a specific
  2431. 1:25:25request, end quote, immediately
  2432. 1:25:27debunking LG's statement. In this clip,
  2433. 1:25:29Tannen is on the other side of a large
  2434. 1:25:31room from Vitaly and Andrew. Tannen is
  2435. 1:25:33setting up the TV and using voice input
  2436. 1:25:36to command it. Vitaly and Andrew are on
  2437. 1:25:38the backside of the TV, behind it,
  2438. 1:25:40talking about work without knowledge of
  2439. 1:25:42what Tannen is testing or that the TV is
  2440. 1:25:44listening.
  2441. 1:25:45>> Just give them a little more margin from
  2442. 1:25:47the wall.
  2443. 1:25:47>> Hi, LG.
  2444. 1:25:49Keep changing channels.
  2445. 1:25:52Is there one of my glare?
  2446. 1:25:55>> I think I can see it.
  2447. 1:25:56>> Uh I think it's two or three layers.
  2448. 1:25:59Three?
  2449. 1:26:11>> You guys see it's kind of stuck.
  2450. 1:26:17See, I think it just got to shave off.
  2451. 1:26:20>> I mean
  2452. 1:26:20>> Notice that after Andrew says two
  2453. 1:26:22layers, the whole room is silent for a
  2454. 1:26:25really long period. Long enough that we
  2455. 1:26:26considered cutting it down, but it makes
  2456. 1:26:28the point. The TV continued listening.
  2457. 1:26:31All the way through he broke the silence
  2458. 1:26:33and spoke again. In fact, Tynan didn't
  2459. 1:26:35even interrupt them to say that the TV
  2460. 1:26:37was hearing all of this and it continued
  2461. 1:26:39recording for a couple minutes. This
  2462. 1:26:41data is the same type of data that we
  2463. 1:26:43recovered transcribed in the plain text
  2464. 1:26:45file with Wendell. LG's response
  2465. 1:26:47concluded with this, quote LGE is
  2466. 1:26:49committed to protecting customer privacy
  2467. 1:26:52and ensuring transparency in how user
  2468. 1:26:54data is handled, end quote. If LG really
  2469. 1:26:57cared about ensuring transparency in how
  2470. 1:26:59user data is handled, it wouldn't hide
  2471. 1:27:02the do not sell my personal information
  2472. 1:27:04option in its menu settings. This was
  2473. 1:27:06disabled by default even before we
  2474. 1:27:08connected to the internet or agreed to
  2475. 1:27:11any terms or conditions, meaning it acts
  2476. 1:27:13like a claymore for your privacy as soon
  2477. 1:27:16as you trip it. And when a claymore says
  2478. 1:27:18this side towards enemy, that enemy is
  2479. 1:27:20you. This isn't new either. Louis
  2480. 1:27:23Rossmann pointed it out in his LG Smart
  2481. 1:27:25TV video nearly 3 years ago.
  2482. 1:27:27>> If you go in any one of the default
  2483. 1:27:29profiles and you go to privacy and
  2484. 1:27:30terms, what you'll notice with a smart
  2485. 1:27:32television is there's an option called
  2486. 1:27:33do not sell my personal information. And
  2487. 1:27:36because we live in a dystopian world,
  2488. 1:27:38this option is not by default checked.
  2489. 1:27:40>> Which by the way, on a $3,000 LG OLED
  2490. 1:27:43should be opt in, not opt out for
  2491. 1:27:46tracking. FU LG for doing that.
  2492. 1:27:48>> Microsoft also took some, albeit
  2493. 1:27:49limited, action. Epic Games CEO and AI
  2494. 1:27:52lunatic Tim Sweeney alerted Microsoft VP
  2495. 1:27:55Pavan Davuluri about LG monitors
  2496. 1:27:57covertly installing its app and showing
  2497. 1:28:00ads for McAfee. According to the
  2498. 1:28:01Microsoft VP, LG disabled the McAfee
  2499. 1:28:03pop-up ad from its app. Microsoft's lip
  2500. 1:28:05service about the problem said nothing
  2501. 1:28:07about LG installing its app without
  2502. 1:28:09alerting users in the first place. Nor
  2503. 1:28:11did Microsoft mention how its own
  2504. 1:28:13subsidiary partners with LG in its data
  2505. 1:28:16management and collection. With all of
  2506. 1:28:18that explained, let's get back to some
  2507. 1:28:20of the people we spoke to for this
  2508. 1:28:21piece. We'll start with Louis Rossmann,
  2509. 1:28:23specifically talking about forced
  2510. 1:28:25arbitration, the clause that was added
  2511. 1:28:28after our first video on LG's monitors.
  2512. 1:28:31And he can explain why that's a bad
  2513. 1:28:33thing.
  2514. 1:28:34>> I was working on the LG monitor the TV
  2515. 1:28:37TVs for this story the smart TVs and
  2516. 1:28:40I saw something that immediately
  2517. 1:28:41reminded me of you, which is they have a
  2518. 1:28:43sticker on the back of one of the TVs we
  2519. 1:28:45bought that says forced arbitration
  2520. 1:28:47notice.
  2521. 1:28:49And from what I remember you you really
  2522. 1:28:51like forced arbitration clauses.
  2523. 1:28:53>> Yeah, I love giving up my seventh
  2524. 1:28:54amendment rights to a company in an
  2525. 1:28:56agreement that I never actually read.
  2526. 1:28:57And one of the reasons it's important to
  2527. 1:28:58say that you haven't actually read it is
  2528. 1:28:59because with their refrigerators they
  2529. 1:29:01were telling people when the I forget if
  2530. 1:29:03it was the condenser or there was some
  2531. 1:29:04part of the refrigerators that was
  2532. 1:29:05failing en masse and LG was not
  2533. 1:29:07replacing it under warranty. So people
  2534. 1:29:09wanted to sue them. And they said you
  2535. 1:29:10can't sue us because you agreed to
  2536. 1:29:11forced arbitration. They go, "What?"
  2537. 1:29:13It's in the manual and it's on the box.
  2538. 1:29:15Now when you buy a refrigerator if the
  2539. 1:29:16box for the refrigerator is larger than
  2540. 1:29:18your door frame, what that means is that
  2541. 1:29:20you're never going to actually see the
  2542. 1:29:21notice because the delivery people en
  2543. 1:29:23masse were getting rid of the box and
  2544. 1:29:26throwing it away because most people
  2545. 1:29:28don't want to save the box of the
  2546. 1:29:28refrigerator especially in a small
  2547. 1:29:30apartment. So they never actually got to
  2548. 1:29:31see a copy of the notice that they
  2549. 1:29:33supposedly signed for. What they were
  2550. 1:29:34referring to is that when you receive
  2551. 1:29:35the refrigerator, you signed saying you
  2552. 1:29:37received it, but that apparently also
  2553. 1:29:39meant that you were agreed to the terms
  2554. 1:29:41of arbitration in their manual which you
  2555. 1:29:43hadn't read yet or and on the box that
  2556. 1:29:45you've never seen.
  2557. 1:29:46>> And that's and that's somehow legally
  2558. 1:29:48okay.
  2559. 1:29:48>> Some of these TVs we noticed that they
  2560. 1:29:49don't have it on all of the the sticker
  2561. 1:29:51doesn't always make it on. So that's
  2562. 1:29:53where I would address it.
  2563. 1:29:54>> How many words is too many words? Is it
  2564. 1:29:554,000, 2,000, 1,000? How many words do
  2565. 1:29:58you need to have where it is okay to
  2566. 1:29:59take away somebody's constitutional
  2567. 1:30:00right?
  2568. 1:30:01>> Can you explain briefly so forced
  2569. 1:30:02arbitration in general? Like what what
  2570. 1:30:05is that? Why do the companies want
  2571. 1:30:06people to agree to a clause for forced
  2572. 1:30:08arbitration?
  2573. 1:30:08>> If I screw over my customers, if I do
  2574. 1:30:10something horrible, they can either
  2575. 1:30:11commit acts of violence against me or
  2576. 1:30:13they can sue me. And that
  2577. 1:30:15Luckily, most people in New York chose
  2578. 1:30:16the first one. It's much cheaper than
  2579. 1:30:18lawyers. Okay, but
  2580. 1:30:18>> [laughter]
  2581. 1:30:19>> the if if I do something wrong to my
  2582. 1:30:21customers, they have the ability to take
  2583. 1:30:23me to court. And I think that that is a
  2584. 1:30:24good thing because it means that it
  2585. 1:30:25gives me an incentive structure to treat
  2586. 1:30:28my customers properly. Forced
  2587. 1:30:29arbitration means that they sign away
  2588. 1:30:31the right to that. Instead of taking me
  2589. 1:30:32to court, they can take me to
  2590. 1:30:34arbitration. Arbitration is a court that
  2591. 1:30:37I pay for. So, I'm paying a mediator
  2592. 1:30:40that's going to figure out between the
  2593. 1:30:42two of us what are how we going to
  2594. 1:30:44resolve this problem. And the mediator,
  2595. 1:30:46being paid by me personally, is most
  2596. 1:30:48likely going to have an incentive
  2597. 1:30:50structure to resolve issues in a manner
  2598. 1:30:52that I find amicable.
  2599. 1:30:53>> Right.
  2600. 1:30:53>> And they're also going to have an
  2601. 1:30:54incentive structure to screw me over. In
  2602. 1:30:56court, like there's a judge banging a
  2603. 1:30:58gavel, right?
  2604. 1:30:59>> Yeah, yeah, yeah.
  2605. 1:30:59>> And there, like where's the judge?
  2606. 1:31:01>> it doesn't go through the legal process.
  2607. 1:31:02>> going through the legal process. There's
  2608. 1:31:03no It's an out-of-court
  2609. 1:31:05>> out-of-court process.
  2610. 1:31:05>> And I can understand why people are
  2611. 1:31:07cynical. I get it. Class action lawsuits
  2612. 1:31:09cost money. How many people here have a
  2613. 1:31:1150-cent check on their refrigerator
  2614. 1:31:13because Visa or MasterCard them
  2615. 1:31:14and a lawyer got $20 to handle the case,
  2616. 1:31:16right? Like how many I have I have
  2617. 1:31:18checks on my refrigerator for less than
  2618. 1:31:2050 cents.
  2619. 1:31:21>> Yeah.
  2620. 1:31:21>> And they're annoying and we roll our
  2621. 1:31:22eyes at the lawyers getting rich. And
  2622. 1:31:24that does suck that lawyers are getting
  2623. 1:31:25rich while consumers are not getting
  2624. 1:31:27help in those cases.
  2625. 1:31:28And it's a shitty system, but it's
  2626. 1:31:30better than nothing. So, for instance,
  2627. 1:31:31when Apple has a class action lawsuit
  2628. 1:31:32against them, even though it sucks that
  2629. 1:31:35the the lawyers got rich and that all
  2630. 1:31:37you got was some sort of 50 or $20
  2631. 1:31:38refund, often times they'll say, "You
  2632. 1:31:40must have a repair program." As a part
  2633. 1:31:43of the settlement, there'll be a repair
  2634. 1:31:44program for the butterfly keyboard. So,
  2635. 1:31:47that's a good thing cuz it's not just
  2636. 1:31:48the the check that you get on your
  2637. 1:31:50fridge. Class action lawsuits can often
  2638. 1:31:52lead to companies changing their
  2639. 1:31:53behavior.
  2640. 1:31:53>> It's still a punishment for the company.
  2641. 1:31:55>> And not only is it a punishment, but it
  2642. 1:31:56helps the consumer. I'm not So, a lot of
  2643. 1:31:58people will look at the 50-cent check
  2644. 1:31:59you get get your fridge, but they won't
  2645. 1:32:00look at Apple in 2015 deciding, "You
  2646. 1:32:02know what? We are going to replace the
  2647. 1:32:04motherboard for free for anybody that
  2648. 1:32:06has an A1286 A202915 board where the GPU
  2649. 1:32:08died. We are going to replace all the
  2650. 1:32:10butterfly keyboards on the A1706, A1707,
  2651. 1:32:13and A1708 models where it broke. We are
  2652. 1:32:14going to actually cover our customers
  2653. 1:32:16the way that we should have been
  2654. 1:32:17doing it before somebody sued us." And
  2655. 1:32:19that's better than nothing. And I'd
  2656. 1:32:20rather take that than just removing my
  2657. 1:32:22seventh amendment rights altogether and
  2658. 1:32:23saying that I'm not allowed to sue.
  2659. 1:32:24>> After after our video on the monitors,
  2660. 1:32:26the LG monitors, we noticed that they
  2661. 1:32:29updated the agreements and they added a
  2662. 1:32:32whole big section talking about class
  2663. 1:32:34action lawsuits. And so, they already
  2664. 1:32:37had a thing buried in there about you're
  2665. 1:32:39agreeing that you can't
  2666. 1:32:42go through a class action process if
  2667. 1:32:43there is a dispute. So, they already had
  2668. 1:32:45that there, but they added like
  2669. 1:32:47paragraphs of clarifying text that just
  2670. 1:32:50continued to to make that same point.
  2671. 1:32:53Which is like that's a foot, you're
  2672. 1:32:54admitting guilt, [laughter] I feel like.
  2673. 1:32:56You're changing the terms when there's a
  2674. 1:32:58major class action concern.
  2675. 1:33:00>> Yes.
  2676. 1:33:00>> Roku did this as well. There was a data
  2677. 1:33:02breach and they wound up sending it Did
  2678. 1:33:04you see the notice where when you turned
  2679. 1:33:05on the TV it said agree, but it there
  2680. 1:33:07was no disagree option? So, in order to
  2681. 1:33:09use the TV to change the input,
  2682. 1:33:11you needed I'm pretty sure it was Roku.
  2683. 1:33:13I have an article. It was Yeah, yeah, it
  2684. 1:33:14was Roku. In order to change the channel
  2685. 1:33:16or change the inputs, you had to hit
  2686. 1:33:18agree. There was no disagree button and
  2687. 1:33:19this happened at the exact same time
  2688. 1:33:21that there was a large data breach which
  2689. 1:33:23might cause people to push back against
  2690. 1:33:25it. I think it was Maine where they
  2691. 1:33:27filed the official notice of data
  2692. 1:33:28breach. I have the paperwork for this.
  2693. 1:33:30>> Yeah.
  2694. 1:33:30>> 15,000 people that had their data
  2695. 1:33:32potentially breached.
  2696. 1:33:32>> Is there anything people should do?
  2697. 1:33:35You know, cuz a lot of these devices now
  2698. 1:33:36are going to have forced arbitration.
  2699. 1:33:38>> Be annoying.
  2700. 1:33:39Take it to court anyway. Go to small
  2701. 1:33:40claims. Be Like there was this one
  2702. 1:33:41person, Steven Ryan, at the Vancouver
  2703. 1:33:44stop of the tour. And he was saying
  2704. 1:33:45companies say I'm annoying. He takes
  2705. 1:33:46companies to court for the stupidest
  2706. 1:33:48When I say stupid, I don't mean
  2707. 1:33:50stupid like it's stupid he did it. I
  2708. 1:33:51mean it's stupid that the company is
  2709. 1:33:52actually letting this go to court
  2710. 1:33:54instead of just resolving the
  2711. 1:33:56issue with the customer instead of just
  2712. 1:33:58helping them out.
  2713. 1:33:59>> And I like it. Like he said they found
  2714. 1:34:00me annoying. I said, "Be annoying." We
  2715. 1:34:01need more people to be annoying.
  2716. 1:34:03Progress moves forward because of
  2717. 1:34:04unreasonable people.
  2718. 1:34:06>> [laughter]
  2719. 1:34:06>> If If If 1% of your audience was was as
  2720. 1:34:09annoying as they needed to be, these
  2721. 1:34:11problems would all be fixed tomorrow.
  2722. 1:34:13>> Next we'll speak with a surgeon we ran
  2723. 1:34:14into at Louis's event. Aaron was an
  2724. 1:34:16attendee there. He came up to speak to
  2725. 1:34:17me after I spoke with Louis about owning
  2726. 1:34:20your and here's what he had to say
  2727. 1:34:22with concerns from the medical field.
  2728. 1:34:24>> You're You're Aaron, right?
  2729. 1:34:25>> Yep. A A R O N
  2730. 1:34:27>> A A Ron, yep.
  2731. 1:34:27>> Yeah, okay.
  2732. 1:34:29>> [laughter]
  2733. 1:34:29>> And we were just talking We're at
  2734. 1:34:31Louis's event in South Carolina. We're
  2735. 1:34:33talking about LG TVs, which conveniently
  2736. 1:34:35enough there's one right behind us.
  2737. 1:34:37So they So they'll hear this
  2738. 1:34:39conversation before anyone watching
  2739. 1:34:40does.
  2740. 1:34:41>> They're already listening.
  2741. 1:34:43>> What was You know, what was interesting
  2742. 1:34:45You mentioned to me you're in the
  2743. 1:34:47medical field, I guess.
  2744. 1:34:48>> Yes, that's correct. Yeah, I'm a
  2745. 1:34:50healthcare worker. Specifically, I work
  2746. 1:34:52in robotic surgery. So I'm a robotic
  2747. 1:34:54general surgeon.
  2748. 1:34:56I'm just finishing up my training.
  2749. 1:34:58I'm very interested in tech, so like the
  2750. 1:35:00merger of tech and healthcare, you get
  2751. 1:35:02robotic surgery.
  2752. 1:35:03Um my, you know, being tech-savvy and
  2753. 1:35:07following you, and of course Louis, um
  2754. 1:35:10my concern is is primarily in privacy.
  2755. 1:35:15So what what happens when I'm taking a
  2756. 1:35:18patient phone call or I'm doing patient
  2757. 1:35:20uh video visits, and there's an LG
  2758. 1:35:22monitor in the background? What happens
  2759. 1:35:25if it's doing it on a on an LG monitor
  2760. 1:35:27itself? Uh what's listening in? How is
  2761. 1:35:30that How is that patient information
  2762. 1:35:32protected? Because I'm expected to have
  2763. 1:35:35everything encrypted. Anything on my
  2764. 1:35:37device that has patient to do with
  2765. 1:35:39patients has to be through a VPN and
  2766. 1:35:42encrypted completely.
  2767. 1:35:44But if that is recorded and taken out of
  2768. 1:35:46my control,
  2769. 1:35:48who's to say that that's HIPAA compliant
  2770. 1:35:50or anything? I mean, there's a lot to do
  2771. 1:35:52with you know, how we use AI tools and
  2772. 1:35:55how specific ones need to be HIPAA
  2773. 1:35:56compliant if we're going to use them as
  2774. 1:35:58healthcare providers. And that's very
  2775. 1:36:00clear, but if
  2776. 1:36:02LG is listening to us on a TV, where
  2777. 1:36:05does that patient information go?
  2778. 1:36:06>> I obviously can't speak for like all
  2779. 1:36:08medical providers, but um broadly
  2780. 1:36:10speaking, with something like a TV,
  2781. 1:36:12typically is that just like someone just
  2782. 1:36:14buys it for the office, you know, like
  2783. 1:36:16cuz cuz that doesn't strike me as
  2784. 1:36:18something like if you're going to use an
  2785. 1:36:20an AI transcription tool, that strikes
  2786. 1:36:22me as something where administrative
  2787. 1:36:24staff or IT or whoever would kind of go,
  2788. 1:36:26"Okay, we probably need to check for
  2789. 1:36:27HIPAA compliance." Right. Right. But
  2790. 1:36:29something like a TV seems like it it's
  2791. 1:36:32maybe you send the assistant to Best Buy
  2792. 1:36:33or whatever.
  2793. 1:36:34>> Or if I take a patient phone call from
  2794. 1:36:36home, you know, I I I take those from
  2795. 1:36:39from my own house. And so, I have a few
  2796. 1:36:41LG products before I watch a video. And
  2797. 1:36:45so, where is that data going? I I I'm
  2798. 1:36:48not in control of that. I'm expected to
  2799. 1:36:50be, you know, advocating for my patients
  2800. 1:36:52and making sure that their privacy
  2801. 1:36:54is secure,
  2802. 1:36:56but I don't even know who's listening in
  2803. 1:36:57my own household. And that makes it very
  2804. 1:36:59hard when I'm doing patient care within
  2805. 1:37:01privacy of my own home.
  2806. 1:37:02>> I think that's one of the concerns we
  2807. 1:37:03have, too, is like LG's response is, you
  2808. 1:37:06know, is probably "We're not listening
  2809. 1:37:08through the microphone." And maybe the
  2810. 1:37:10capability exists, but they they would
  2811. 1:37:11say we're not doing it. But one of the
  2812. 1:37:13other
  2813. 1:37:14concerns we had doing this piece was
  2814. 1:37:17um if there's audio playing through the
  2815. 1:37:19speakers of the TV, there's also the
  2816. 1:37:21capability of capturing that or parts of
  2817. 1:37:24that. And so, you I I guess, you know,
  2818. 1:37:29probably telehealth type of situations.
  2819. 1:37:31>> Yeah.
  2820. 1:37:31>> So, I mean, those are those are required
  2821. 1:37:33to be encrypted and they
  2822. 1:37:35if I log into anything like Epic is our
  2823. 1:37:38main Epic Healthcare is our main
  2824. 1:37:40um our main
  2825. 1:37:42electronic medical record EMR. Um when I
  2826. 1:37:45connect to that on my phone or on my
  2827. 1:37:47laptop, it goes through a VPN
  2828. 1:37:49that's mandated by my employer.
  2829. 1:37:52And so, if it's being recorded outside
  2830. 1:37:54of that, you know, where that's not
  2831. 1:37:56that's not HIPAA compliant. And so, I
  2832. 1:37:58don't have any control over that cuz
  2833. 1:37:59there's no notice to me saying, "Hey,
  2834. 1:38:02you're actually being listened in on
  2835. 1:38:03right now." And so, how can I possibly
  2836. 1:38:05be in control of the entire environment
  2837. 1:38:08when
  2838. 1:38:09everything else is being listened in on?
  2839. 1:38:11>> Have you tried putting tin foil and lead
  2840. 1:38:13up
  2841. 1:38:14around like I actually have a Faraday
  2842. 1:38:16cage around my clinic. Yeah, yeah, yeah.
  2843. 1:38:18Right, that would do it.
  2844. 1:38:19>> Yeah, yeah, that's what I have.
  2845. 1:38:20>> That'll be my next business. I'm going
  2846. 1:38:21to start selling Faraday cages for
  2847. 1:38:23clinics.
  2848. 1:38:24>> That's great.
  2849. 1:38:24>> Yeah.
  2850. 1:38:25>> I'll be your first customer.
  2851. 1:38:26>> Awesome. Thank you for the for joining
  2852. 1:38:28for the story.
  2853. 1:38:29>> you. I appreciate it.
  2854. 1:38:30>> Next, we'll check in with Kevin from the
  2855. 1:38:31Fulu Foundation. Kevin is the executive
  2856. 1:38:33director for the Fulu Foundation. He
  2857. 1:38:35works alongside Louis at it. Kevin is
  2858. 1:38:37specifically pushing against DMCA
  2859. 1:38:39section 1201, which is a part of law
  2860. 1:38:41that makes it a criminal act in some
  2861. 1:38:43circumstances to circumvent digital
  2862. 1:38:45locks. He was also one of the organizers
  2863. 1:38:47for the Own Your Tour that we went
  2864. 1:38:48on with Louis. Here's his take on the
  2865. 1:38:50situation.
  2866. 1:38:51>> My understanding is with the Digital
  2867. 1:38:53Millennium Copyright Act, the DMCA
  2868. 1:38:55section 1201 specifically,
  2869. 1:38:57there's some level of criminality, I
  2870. 1:39:00guess, to circumventing
  2871. 1:39:02uh digital locks.
  2872. 1:39:03>> Yeah, that's exactly right, right? So,
  2873. 1:39:06because of section 1201 of the DMCA,
  2874. 1:39:08simply circumventing a digital lock can
  2875. 1:39:10become a copyright crime.
  2876. 1:39:12>> Okay.
  2877. 1:39:12>> And so, when you're looking at these
  2878. 1:39:14cases, right? You've got your TV that's
  2879. 1:39:15spying on you, that's watching you,
  2880. 1:39:17that's listening to you, right? You
  2881. 1:39:19might want to go in and remove that
  2882. 1:39:20software. Sure, there are ways that you
  2883. 1:39:22can go through the menu and you can kind
  2884. 1:39:24of
  2885. 1:39:25you know, parse through the legalese and
  2886. 1:39:27try and find a way, but there's no way
  2887. 1:39:29to know for sure
  2888. 1:39:30>> Right.
  2889. 1:39:30>> that that data flow is stopping unless
  2890. 1:39:32you go in and take it out yourself. So,
  2891. 1:39:34because section 1201 does have that
  2892. 1:39:36prohibition on the circumvention of
  2893. 1:39:37digital locks,
  2894. 1:39:39um
  2895. 1:39:40you're screwed.
  2896. 1:39:41>> I guess if you walk me through the the
  2897. 1:39:42basics of the DMCA and of section 1201 a
  2898. 1:39:46little more that would probably help.
  2899. 1:39:48>> Yeah, so to do a little bit of the
  2900. 1:39:49history, right? The DMCA was passed back
  2901. 1:39:50in 1998 and the goal of it was to stop
  2902. 1:39:54piracy of media off of CDs and DVDs,
  2903. 1:39:58right? I would argue it was the wrong
  2904. 1:40:00solution at that time, but it's hard for
  2905. 1:40:02anyone to disagree with the fact that
  2906. 1:40:03it's the wrong solution for this time
  2907. 1:40:05because
  2908. 1:40:06Congress or the architects of this law
  2909. 1:40:08did not think that we would have
  2910. 1:40:10computers in our park pockets, that we
  2911. 1:40:11would have computers in our cars, in our
  2912. 1:40:14tractors, everything we use, right?
  2913. 1:40:15Pretty much these days is a computer.
  2914. 1:40:17And what that means is that those
  2915. 1:40:20digital locks kind of invade on our
  2916. 1:40:21access to control. So, one analogy I
  2917. 1:40:24like to use is right if like if you
  2918. 1:40:25bought a house,
  2919. 1:40:26you would expect to be able to get
  2920. 1:40:27through every door and get into every
  2921. 1:40:29room. One of those doors you
  2922. 1:40:31accidentally lock you lock yourself out,
  2923. 1:40:33picking that lock
  2924. 1:40:34isn't breaking and entering.
  2925. 1:40:36>> Right.
  2926. 1:40:36>> You own the house, you own the door, you
  2927. 1:40:38own what's behind it, right? Because of
  2928. 1:40:40section 1201, that's a completely
  2929. 1:40:41different story for our digital devices.
  2930. 1:40:44If a manufacturer puts a digital lock in
  2931. 1:40:46front of a copyrighted work, such as yes
  2932. 1:40:49a movie or a song, but also just source
  2933. 1:40:51code or something like that,
  2934. 1:40:53the mere act of circumventing that
  2935. 1:40:54becomes a copyright crime. And just as
  2936. 1:40:56importantly, right? Like I'm sure that a
  2937. 1:40:59lot of your viewers will be able to go
  2938. 1:41:01and do this yourself.
  2939. 1:41:02>> Mhm.
  2940. 1:41:02>> Um I'm a normie, so I can't do that. If
  2941. 1:41:05I wanted to hire someone to do it for me
  2942. 1:41:07or if someone were to try to make a tool
  2943. 1:41:09that would be easy for consumers use to
  2944. 1:41:10go in and strip the ACR software out of
  2945. 1:41:12their TVs, um that would be again a
  2946. 1:41:16violation of section 1201, and that one
  2947. 1:41:18comes with serious penalties of up to
  2948. 1:41:21$500,000 in fines and 5 years in federal
  2949. 1:41:24prison per offense.
  2950. 1:41:25>> Seems proportional for
  2951. 1:41:27>> Yes, exactly. Helping people not get
  2952. 1:41:29spied on, right? Helping people fix
  2953. 1:41:31their stuff
  2954. 1:41:32is just an outrageous
  2955. 1:41:35thing to be a copyright crime.
  2956. 1:41:36>> Lewis had in his presentation, he
  2957. 1:41:39showed, I think it was the author of I
  2958. 1:41:42don't know if it was the whole DMCA or
  2959. 1:41:44okay.
  2960. 1:41:45>> Yeah, he was one of the architects. So,
  2961. 1:41:46Bruce Lehman who worked in the Clinton
  2962. 1:41:48administration,
  2963. 1:41:50you know, he did some interviews after
  2964. 1:41:51the fact after this law passed in 1998
  2965. 1:41:54and talked in 2007 and I think beyond
  2966. 1:41:56that. First of all, said, "Look, this
  2967. 1:41:58law didn't work that well, right? Like
  2968. 1:42:00Napster happened after the passing
  2969. 1:42:03of the DMCA. So,
  2970. 1:42:05it didn't work the way they wanted it
  2971. 1:42:06to.
  2972. 1:42:08And one of the other things that was
  2973. 1:42:09pretty shocking was he talked about how
  2974. 1:42:12you know, he basically executed an end
  2975. 1:42:13run around Congress. So,
  2976. 1:42:15>> Right.
  2977. 1:42:15>> when they first developed this idea,
  2978. 1:42:17this policy framework, they took it to
  2979. 1:42:19Congress and Congress said, "No, right?
  2980. 1:42:22This is going to get in the way of fair
  2981. 1:42:23use, right? This is going to infringe on
  2982. 1:42:26people's rights, on their ownership
  2983. 1:42:28rights, on all that kind of things,
  2984. 1:42:30those kind of things."
  2985. 1:42:31Um
  2986. 1:42:32So, instead, he went and negotiated an
  2987. 1:42:35international treaty through what was
  2988. 1:42:36called WIPO, which is the World
  2989. 1:42:38Intellectual Property Organization,
  2990. 1:42:41trying to solve this problem. Came back,
  2991. 1:42:43went to Congress and said, "Hey,
  2992. 1:42:45we've got this treaty. If we don't pass
  2993. 1:42:47this law, we are going to be not in
  2994. 1:42:50compliance with this treaty and also
  2995. 1:42:53we're leaders in the world and we need
  2996. 1:42:54to do something about this, right? So,
  2997. 1:42:56it was just a total kind of
  2998. 1:42:59pretty questionable move, if you ask me.
  2999. 1:43:01Um and that's the reason that we, you
  3000. 1:43:03know, kind of sit here today.
  3001. 1:43:04>> Is there actually something people can
  3002. 1:43:06do? Obviously, we just, you know, we did
  3003. 1:43:08part of this tour I mentioned
  3004. 1:43:10to try to get people to write
  3005. 1:43:12representatives and
  3006. 1:43:14I think there is probably
  3007. 1:43:16a
  3008. 1:43:17healthy and and earned skepticism
  3009. 1:43:20towards it, but
  3010. 1:43:22you're actually trying to write to
  3011. 1:43:24representatives is probably one of the
  3012. 1:43:26only, you know,
  3013. 1:43:28really good tools available to try to
  3014. 1:43:31really
  3015. 1:43:32>> right? Because I think there's a mixture
  3016. 1:43:33of things happening, right? People in
  3017. 1:43:35Congress, right? I I go to DC a lot as a
  3018. 1:43:37part of my job and
  3019. 1:43:39many members of Congress don't
  3020. 1:43:40understand tech- technology.
  3021. 1:43:42>> Mhm.
  3022. 1:43:43>> And at the same time, many don't
  3023. 1:43:45understand copyright law, right?
  3024. 1:43:46>> Right. Okay. Cool.
  3025. 1:43:47>> Which fair enough, right? Like if unless
  3026. 1:43:50you are into copyright law, you might
  3027. 1:43:52not understand it. Not every member of
  3028. 1:43:54Congress is going to be an expert on
  3029. 1:43:55every aspect of the law. But that makes
  3030. 1:43:58education that much more important and
  3031. 1:44:00it makes it that much more important
  3032. 1:44:02that they're hearing from their
  3033. 1:44:02constituents who care about these kind
  3034. 1:44:05of things, right? So, as you mentioned,
  3035. 1:44:06right? We've got this tour. We're going
  3036. 1:44:08to 14 cities and states around the
  3037. 1:44:10country. We just had one of our biggest
  3038. 1:44:12in Raleigh last night, which was
  3039. 1:44:13awesome. Um
  3040. 1:44:15great crowd and also, you know, had a
  3041. 1:44:18member of the local representative's
  3042. 1:44:20office out to see
  3043. 1:44:21>> Yeah, she was listening.
  3044. 1:44:23>> And she was listening.
  3045. 1:44:24>> Yeah, and she she did to her credit uh
  3046. 1:44:27she did seem to be engaged and possibly
  3047. 1:44:29on board with the idea of owning your
  3048. 1:44:31stuff.
  3049. 1:44:32>> Yeah.
  3050. 1:44:32>> So, I you know, I guess point of
  3051. 1:44:33bringing that up is
  3052. 1:44:35in the very least, if not the
  3053. 1:44:36representatives it's themselves, then
  3054. 1:44:38the the staff might actually listen and
  3055. 1:44:41you just kind of hope that they filter
  3056. 1:44:42the message up.
  3057. 1:44:43>> Exactly.
  3058. 1:44:44>> Um so, for ஏழு we'll point people there
  3059. 1:44:47as well uh for future tours and things
  3060. 1:44:50like that, but where should they go and
  3061. 1:44:53>> Yeah, go to f
  3062. 1:44:54dot org, right? To stay up-to-date on
  3063. 1:44:56our work. We've got our blog. We post
  3064. 1:44:58kind of um
  3065. 1:45:00you know, regular updates. Uh we're also
  3066. 1:45:02on, you know, all all the social
  3067. 1:45:04channels. Uh one of my favorite features
  3068. 1:45:06is, right? The Consumer Rights Wiki is a
  3069. 1:45:08big part of what we do.
  3070. 1:45:10Um and so, every week we do the Wiki
  3071. 1:45:12Hall of Shame and highlight uh you know,
  3072. 1:45:15>> manufacturers and products that are
  3073. 1:45:17particularly bad actors. There's so many
  3074. 1:45:19options.
  3075. 1:45:20>> There are so many options. We could keep
  3076. 1:45:21going forever. Honestly.
  3077. 1:45:23>> Infinite content.
  3078. 1:45:24>> Yeah. Um but yeah, check us out there.
  3079. 1:45:27Um and then get involved, right? We like
  3080. 1:45:29you said, it's one thing when we as an
  3081. 1:45:31organization go there and that's our job
  3082. 1:45:33and that's, you know, we work really
  3083. 1:45:35hard at that. But when members are
  3084. 1:45:37hearing from their own constituents, it
  3085. 1:45:39goes that much further.
  3086. 1:45:40>> And finally, we'll check in with Wendell
  3087. 1:45:41for an extended discussion about our
  3088. 1:45:43findings. This was sort of our debrief
  3089. 1:45:45after working on the TVs for days. So,
  3090. 1:45:48some of the demos we had
  3091. 1:45:50can you help explain what are some of
  3092. 1:45:53the ways that the findings, the
  3093. 1:45:56vulnerabilities, whatever, could the
  3094. 1:45:58features of the TV could be used uh, for
  3095. 1:46:00example, when the TV appears to be off
  3096. 1:46:04but it's capable of
  3097. 1:46:07uh, storing video and audio.
  3098. 1:46:09>> Yeah, internally the TV has 16 GB of
  3099. 1:46:12flash, which doesn't sound like a lot,
  3100. 1:46:14but it's got kind of a lot of
  3101. 1:46:15computational horsepower, especially the
  3102. 1:46:17newer TVs. And so, you can record audio,
  3103. 1:46:19you can compress it, you could stream it
  3104. 1:46:20to somebody over the network. It's a
  3105. 1:46:22full computer. So, it's basically as
  3106. 1:46:25creative as your imagination is, you can
  3107. 1:46:28run stuff on it. Uh, there's stuff on
  3108. 1:46:31the TV for like package management. And
  3109. 1:46:33commercial customers of LG use a lot of
  3110. 1:46:35these features for like digital signage
  3111. 1:46:37and everything else like that. But, you
  3112. 1:46:38know, the consumer version of the TV,
  3113. 1:46:40they rip out some of those features. And
  3114. 1:46:42some of the features that, you know, as
  3115. 1:46:43like homebrew enthusiasts and like home
  3116. 1:46:45lab enthusiasts, I'd like to have those
  3117. 1:46:47and LG takes that out. But, you know,
  3118. 1:46:50there's microphones, multiple
  3119. 1:46:51microphones there.
  3120. 1:46:53Uh, there is the ability to read what is
  3121. 1:46:55being displayed on the TV
  3122. 1:46:57programmatically. So, you could look,
  3123. 1:46:59you could, you know, capture a frame or
  3124. 1:47:00capture short clips limited by storage
  3125. 1:47:02or streaming capability of what's on the
  3126. 1:47:04display. I mean, theoretically, it's a
  3127. 1:47:06whole computer. So, basically, anything
  3128. 1:47:08you can do with a computer, but it's in
  3129. 1:47:09the TV.
  3130. 1:47:10>> Even in the places where we ran into
  3131. 1:47:12limitations, such as the few instances
  3132. 1:47:13where we had 6-second recordings, I feel
  3133. 1:47:16like given more time than we had here,
  3134. 1:47:18it's it's possible a sophisticated
  3135. 1:47:20>> Yeah. a
  3136. 1:47:21>> could
  3137. 1:47:22>> The TV is literally built for something
  3138. 1:47:23called automatic content recognition and
  3139. 1:47:26it seems like the implementation that LG
  3140. 1:47:28uses for automatic content recognition
  3141. 1:47:30is designed to do 6-second captures of
  3142. 1:47:33what you're looking at. That's audio and
  3143. 1:47:35video fingerprinting. So, when ACR is
  3144. 1:47:37working as advertised as the
  3145. 1:47:39specification says, it's capturing about
  3146. 1:47:426 seconds of audio or video and using
  3147. 1:47:44that as a fingerprint and then it's got
  3148. 1:47:45a dormant period where it's not
  3149. 1:47:47capturing. And this is I think the the
  3150. 1:47:49ad industry's hedge against accidentally
  3151. 1:47:51leaking, you know, a
  3152. 1:47:53hours of conversations. Like, "Oh, we
  3153. 1:47:55only capture 6 seconds of audio." It's
  3154. 1:47:56enough to fingerprint it. But, that's
  3155. 1:47:58still a lot. You can do a lot with that.
  3156. 1:48:00>> lot with that. Uh it may also be a sort
  3157. 1:48:03of convention for copyright law or
  3158. 1:48:05something if the movie studios are
  3159. 1:48:06unhappy. But, what about so,
  3160. 1:48:08fingerprinting? Walk me through that cuz
  3161. 1:48:09I think one of the security researchers
  3162. 1:48:12we worked with thought that from his
  3163. 1:48:14findings
  3164. 1:48:16he can see evidence that
  3165. 1:48:18uh ACR was necessarily transmitting
  3166. 1:48:20screenshots.
  3167. 1:48:21Like, JPEGs or PNGs.
  3168. 1:48:23>> You don't need to. You can take a a you
  3169. 1:48:25know, if you're watching a 4K, you know,
  3170. 1:48:27Lord of the Rings, you don't need a full
  3171. 1:48:28frame. You can have a tiny tiny tiny
  3172. 1:48:30little frame and generate a hash of it.
  3173. 1:48:33Effectively, effectively, it's a hash.
  3174. 1:48:35And then that hash is a very small
  3175. 1:48:37amount of text.
  3176. 1:48:38>> Mhm.
  3177. 1:48:38>> And so, that text can be sent back and
  3178. 1:48:40say, "Hey, this is the hash of the thing
  3179. 1:48:42that I see."
  3180. 1:48:42>> And then what? They they compare that
  3181. 1:48:44against the database and say, "Oh, this
  3182. 1:48:45is a frame from Lord of the Rings."
  3183. 1:48:47>> Yes. And we can see content of the TV
  3184. 1:48:51connecting to known Alphonso, that's one
  3185. 1:48:53of the name of the libraries, and known
  3186. 1:48:56domains that have to do with automatic
  3187. 1:48:58content recognition. Um and we can see
  3188. 1:49:00it downloading a thing that looks like a
  3189. 1:49:02database, like a fingerprint database,
  3190. 1:49:03which is I think some clues to the TV,
  3191. 1:49:06some hints to TV about how it takes that
  3192. 1:49:08audio data and that video data to
  3193. 1:49:10generate the hash to then share with LG.
  3194. 1:49:13>> Why might they choose to do it this way
  3195. 1:49:15rather than send a screenshot or an
  3196. 1:49:17audio file.
  3197. 1:49:18>> Well, they did in the past and you know,
  3198. 1:49:22if you look at LG's history of security
  3199. 1:49:24issues
  3200. 1:49:25uh you know, 10 years ago almost they
  3201. 1:49:27were sending the raw file names and then
  3202. 1:49:29that turned into a PR incident.
  3203. 1:49:31>> Yeah.
  3204. 1:49:31>> And there is almost an adversarial
  3205. 1:49:33relationship with the TV here. If you
  3206. 1:49:35look at how the software behaves like as
  3207. 1:49:37I was using it, it changed behavior a
  3208. 1:49:39couple of times and I don't know if that
  3209. 1:49:41was because these TVs hadn't been on the
  3210. 1:49:42network and they were just downloading
  3211. 1:49:44application updates which is different
  3212. 1:49:46than a firmware update. Like I didn't
  3213. 1:49:47agree to a firmware update. Like I did
  3214. 1:49:48that very deliberately.
  3215. 1:49:49>> Right.
  3216. 1:49:50>> But even saying no, I don't agree to the
  3217. 1:49:52terms. No, I don't want to do this app.
  3218. 1:49:53It was doing stuff in the background
  3219. 1:49:54like downloading stuff for app Amazon
  3220. 1:49:56was doing stuff. The YouTube app was
  3221. 1:49:57doing stuff. It's like what I don't even
  3222. 1:49:59we didn't even dig into what those
  3223. 1:50:00applications are doing.
  3224. 1:50:01>> Yeah, so you're not sure if it's because
  3225. 1:50:02it was downloading stuff or because it
  3226. 1:50:04was detecting your access basically.
  3227. 1:50:06>> Yeah, cuz sometimes the TV would go to
  3228. 1:50:08sleep and then it would lose I would
  3229. 1:50:10lose network access. And then other
  3230. 1:50:11times the TV would be doing something in
  3231. 1:50:13the background and so everything the TV
  3232. 1:50:15appeared to be off but I had full access
  3233. 1:50:17to USB and I had full access to run my
  3234. 1:50:20programs. I had full access to audit
  3235. 1:50:21whatever was going on on the on the TV.
  3236. 1:50:23And so I just I would like to know like
  3237. 1:50:25what what is LG doing? Can I audit this?
  3238. 1:50:28Do I have the tools to audit this?
  3239. 1:50:30>> Right.
  3240. 1:50:30>> And the answer was mostly no. It was an
  3241. 1:50:32uphill battle for me to like dig my way
  3242. 1:50:35out and figure out what it was doing.
  3243. 1:50:36Let's say worst case scenario, you turn
  3244. 1:50:38it into a listening device. That seems
  3245. 1:50:39pretty straightforward. You turn it into
  3246. 1:50:41a device to exfiltrate information from
  3247. 1:50:43a corporate network or boardroom.
  3248. 1:50:45>> Mhm.
  3249. 1:50:45>> That seems pretty straightforward. Um
  3250. 1:50:47you use it to maintain access like as a
  3251. 1:50:51point of presence on a network. Um even
  3252. 1:50:54if you don't intend to capture audio and
  3253. 1:50:56video
  3254. 1:50:56>> Just to go through it, tunnel through
  3255. 1:50:58it.
  3256. 1:50:58>> It is perfectly functional as a proxy.
  3257. 1:51:00So you can proxy internet traffic and I
  3258. 1:51:02can just it's like oh, I'm going to use
  3259. 1:51:03this to move laterally through
  3260. 1:51:05somebody's network. We've seen that in
  3261. 1:51:07the in security uh circles. We've seen
  3262. 1:51:10that with like copy machines. Uh
  3263. 1:51:12certainly the TV is is uh more
  3264. 1:51:14sophisticated than the copy machine that
  3265. 1:51:16I am acquainted with that was a command
  3266. 1:51:18and control server for very bad malware.
  3267. 1:51:21So, yeah, the kinds of things we see in
  3268. 1:51:23the news where it's like, "Oh, Fancy
  3269. 1:51:24Bear is attacking routers."
  3270. 1:51:26Fancy Bear would be very comfortable
  3271. 1:51:27inside an LG TV.
  3272. 1:51:28>> Mhm.
  3273. 1:51:29What about the scenario where the TV
  3274. 1:51:32speaker output
  3275. 1:51:35could be captured? So, this was as we
  3276. 1:51:36called it the boardroom scenario.
  3277. 1:51:38>> Yeah, so if you're using your TV as a
  3278. 1:51:41display, the HDMI audio that goes
  3279. 1:51:43through the display is also capturable
  3280. 1:51:46from the interfaces that we have on the
  3281. 1:51:48Linux side.
  3282. 1:51:48>> you proved. You were able to do it.
  3283. 1:51:53>> Right.
  3284. 1:51:53>> [laughter]
  3285. 1:51:54>> And and this just to be clear again,
  3286. 1:51:56like there cuz there's a few links here,
  3287. 1:51:57but you can do this without
  3288. 1:52:01your laptop and you being physically
  3289. 1:52:05connected to the TV directly.
  3290. 1:52:07>> Yes.
  3291. 1:52:07>> can do this through the network.
  3292. 1:52:09>> Yeah. And we can do it with the TV off
  3293. 1:52:11of the network and just have it capture
  3294. 1:52:13and then as soon as it gets network
  3295. 1:52:14access again, it was basically used as a
  3296. 1:52:17recording device.
  3297. 1:52:18>> Right, you go back in after it's
  3298. 1:52:19reconnected. So, let's say you're a
  3299. 1:52:21super paranoid, I guess, and there's a
  3300. 1:52:24scenario where you you not you just you
  3301. 1:52:26unplug the Ethernet from your TV
  3302. 1:52:29during this boardroom meeting or
  3303. 1:52:30something. I guess as long as it's still
  3304. 1:52:32powered on and capable of
  3305. 1:52:34>> Yeah.
  3306. 1:52:34>> capturing.
  3307. 1:52:35>> You've got at least 4 GB of space to
  3308. 1:52:36work with.
  3309. 1:52:37>> Right.
  3310. 1:52:37>> you had an adversary that knew that
  3311. 1:52:39there was going to be a big important
  3312. 1:52:40shareholder meeting, um they could have
  3313. 1:52:43the TV completely offline, off of the
  3314. 1:52:45internet, and it's perfectly capable of
  3315. 1:52:48recording and storing the audio for that
  3316. 1:52:50meeting. And then somebody could come in
  3317. 1:52:51later and get
  3318. 1:52:51>> As long as they've prepared for it in
  3319. 1:52:53advance, they know it's going to happen,
  3320. 1:52:54they set it to record,
  3321. 1:52:55>> Yeah.
  3322. 1:52:56>> whatever shareholders, someone's super
  3323. 1:52:57paranoid, they unplug the Ethernet
  3324. 1:52:58cable, but it was already rolling the
  3325. 1:53:00capture, I guess.
  3326. 1:53:01>> Yeah, for audio, uh you know, it's it's
  3327. 1:53:0316 GB total storage, you got probably
  3328. 1:53:05about 4 GB to work with out of the box
  3329. 1:53:08if you don't get creative. And that is a
  3330. 1:53:10that's 4 GB of audio. That's a lot of
  3331. 1:53:13audio. But imagine also I've got a 256
  3332. 1:53:16GB USB stick. I stick that in there.
  3333. 1:53:18That's weeks of audio.
  3334. 1:53:19>> Right.
  3335. 1:53:20Uh so in so in this example, you know,
  3336. 1:53:21the boardroom example, I guess,
  3337. 1:53:24use cases might be
  3338. 1:53:26let's just take the least nefarious, I
  3339. 1:53:28guess, just just good old like fraud,
  3340. 1:53:31basically market manipulation.
  3341. 1:53:32>> Yeah. Stock I'm going to I'm going to
  3342. 1:53:33play the stock market. What's going to
  3343. 1:53:35be said in this thing? Boop. There you
  3344. 1:53:36go.
  3345. 1:53:36>> Yeah.
  3346. 1:53:37>> Yeah.
  3347. 1:53:37>> [laughter]
  3348. 1:53:38>> Uh which could be useful also to nation
  3349. 1:53:40states or, you know,
  3350. 1:53:42intelligence agencies. Like I'm sure
  3351. 1:53:44there's all kinds of stories of North
  3352. 1:53:46Korea, for example, doing things in the
  3353. 1:53:48crypto market or whatever. So
  3354. 1:53:49>> Yeah.
  3355. 1:53:50>> Um
  3356. 1:53:51What
  3357. 1:53:51>> And if your TV like let's say that your
  3358. 1:53:54IT organization is like super on the
  3359. 1:53:55ball and the TV is normally not on the
  3360. 1:53:58network at all and is completely
  3361. 1:53:59isolated and it's not even in scope for
  3362. 1:54:02them to monitor. If you had somebody
  3363. 1:54:04acting nefariously like that and they
  3364. 1:54:06had a lone time with the TV, you could
  3365. 1:54:08be in and out in 10 minutes.
  3366. 1:54:10>> So yeah, so there's potential vectors
  3367. 1:54:11both on and off network, I suppose. Uh
  3368. 1:54:15and with and without physical access
  3369. 1:54:17depending on how you get in.
  3370. 1:54:18>> Yeah, your guy found a zero day that
  3371. 1:54:20seems like it would be able to connect
  3372. 1:54:22to the TV over the network uh
  3373. 1:54:25non-interactively.
  3374. 1:54:26>> Right.
  3375. 1:54:27Yeah.
  3376. 1:54:28>> [laughter]
  3377. 1:54:28>> The one that we found requires you to
  3378. 1:54:31hit okay. It's like a mobile device
  3379. 1:54:34would like to pair with your TV. Is that
  3380. 1:54:36okay? And then you say yes and then
  3381. 1:54:38that's all she wrote.
  3382. 1:54:39>> Right.
  3383. 1:54:39>> [laughter]
  3384. 1:54:40>> Um what about the scenario where a TV
  3385. 1:54:43ACR audio capture? So we were able to
  3386. 1:54:46pull the 6-second or so audio clips. So
  3387. 1:54:49this is separate from the one where it's
  3388. 1:54:50just the speakers for the boardroom
  3389. 1:54:52scenario.
  3390. 1:54:52>> Yeah, this was a little bit of creative
  3391. 1:54:54debugging. So like we really we were we
  3392. 1:54:56were we were up to our elbow inside the
  3393. 1:54:58TV if you know, mental picture for that.
  3394. 1:55:01It's pretty amazing, I think. And the
  3395. 1:55:03ACR process so
  3396. 1:55:04>> call on us to be a LG. [laughter]
  3397. 1:55:06>> We were we were running
  3398. 1:55:09very deep analysis of the ACR process
  3399. 1:55:12and we were able to see cuz this is also
  3400. 1:55:14helped us figure out some of the audio
  3401. 1:55:15formats. Like some of the audio formats
  3402. 1:55:16are non-obvious. There's also a speaker
  3403. 1:55:18feedback microphone, a secondary
  3404. 1:55:19microphone, which could be used for
  3405. 1:55:21audio capture, which we should talk
  3406. 1:55:22about. We were able to intercept the
  3407. 1:55:25audio recording before it was converted
  3408. 1:55:27into a hash and save it.
  3409. 1:55:29>> Okay.
  3410. 1:55:30>> And so without And that sounds like it's
  3411. 1:55:31a lot of manipulation, but like once you
  3412. 1:55:33know how to do that, you can have a
  3413. 1:55:34very, very tiny program that's just
  3414. 1:55:36watching the other program and when it
  3415. 1:55:37captures the audio, it's like, "Yoink,
  3416. 1:55:39that's mine." And you can save those
  3417. 1:55:416-second clips and that would That's
  3418. 1:55:43very hard to detect.
  3419. 1:55:45>> Yeah.
  3420. 1:55:46>> Cuz the TV is is behaving normally.
  3421. 1:55:48>> Right.
  3422. 1:55:50What about um the feedback mic? You just
  3423. 1:55:53mentioned that.
  3424. 1:55:54>> So the feedback The audio quality from
  3425. 1:55:55that is terrible, but it seems like
  3426. 1:55:57there is a secondary microphone that's
  3427. 1:55:58used somehow as part of like the audio
  3428. 1:56:01solution. I have no idea how it's
  3429. 1:56:03supposed to work in normal scenarios,
  3430. 1:56:06uh but it's very low bit rate, which is
  3431. 1:56:08good, but it's not low enough bit rate
  3432. 1:56:10that we couldn't reconstruct speech from
  3433. 1:56:11it.
  3434. 1:56:12>> Mhm. What about um log files on RAM? So
  3435. 1:56:16that was pretty interesting.
  3436. 1:56:17>> Okay, so it's only 16 GB of flash and it
  3437. 1:56:21does seem like in So I started like full
  3438. 1:56:24background here. I started on an older
  3439. 1:56:25TV. You you bought a newer one. It's a
  3440. 1:56:28donation to the cause. I don't know.
  3441. 1:56:29We're going to We're going to run that
  3442. 1:56:30and then it doesn't matter. Doesn't
  3443. 1:56:31matter. Uh my older TV um
  3444. 1:56:35was a little bit more verbose with
  3445. 1:56:37logging and I think that LG probably ran
  3446. 1:56:40into situations where that was wearing
  3447. 1:56:41out the flash prematurely. Um and so
  3448. 1:56:44this new one logs everything to RAM
  3449. 1:56:46disk, but there is a process that runs
  3450. 1:56:48and collects the logs, I guess the
  3451. 1:56:50interesting stuff, and puts it in flash.
  3452. 1:56:53There's also a lot of evidence in the
  3453. 1:56:54packet capture that this stuff is sent
  3454. 1:56:57to LG. And so in the debug logs, which
  3455. 1:56:59are stored on a RAM disk, and so even
  3456. 1:57:01when the TV is off, it doesn't erase
  3457. 1:57:02that. You have to like physically unplug
  3458. 1:57:04it or do something with that.
  3459. 1:57:06In those logs, we can see everything
  3460. 1:57:10that you've said to the TV.
  3461. 1:57:11>> Right.
  3462. 1:57:12Do you want to pull up an example? This
  3463. 1:57:14is stored in a log file.
  3464. 1:57:17I mean, that's concerning for a number
  3465. 1:57:18of reasons. Devil's advocate position
  3466. 1:57:21might be okay, but you explicitly said,
  3467. 1:57:24"Hi LG." and triggered it, right? Before
  3468. 1:57:26you So you knew it was recording, but in
  3469. 1:57:30fact, there were several instances where
  3470. 1:57:31genuinely we did not know. I didn't know
  3471. 1:57:33it was still recording. And so some of
  3472. 1:57:35the testing I was doing was it appears
  3473. 1:57:37to be
  3474. 1:57:39somewhere between 10 and 15 seconds or
  3475. 1:57:42so, it will remain active.
  3476. 1:57:44>> I just heard it ding.
  3477. 1:57:45>> Did you really?
  3478. 1:57:46>> [laughter]
  3479. 1:57:47>> I mean, that was the other thing. We we
  3480. 1:57:49got it working from at least 60 ft
  3481. 1:57:51roughly away, maybe 70, around a corner
  3482. 1:57:53in some instances, around two corners,
  3483. 1:57:56and
  3484. 1:57:56>> Microphone's really good.
  3485. 1:57:58>> amazing. It like we should maybe replace
  3486. 1:58:00some of our studio mics. But the
  3487. 1:58:02>> That's another thing. An adversary
  3488. 1:58:04[clears throat]
  3489. 1:58:05with a little bit more time can figure
  3490. 1:58:07out the voice wake microphone. Now that
  3491. 1:58:09also was a little It was a little weird
  3492. 1:58:12for us to try to co-opt the voice
  3493. 1:58:15capture microphone, but clearly LG is
  3494. 1:58:17doing something there. And I feel
  3495. 1:58:19certain that
  3496. 1:58:20an appropriately skilled security
  3497. 1:58:21researcher could co-opt that microphone
  3498. 1:58:24and get even better recordings than we
  3499. 1:58:25did.
  3500. 1:58:26>> Yeah, and I think really the key is it's
  3501. 1:58:29writing these log files
  3502. 1:58:31even if if you have ambient conversation
  3503. 1:58:34that's happening around the TV when
  3504. 1:58:35someone triggers it,
  3505. 1:58:37it will remain active if it can
  3506. 1:58:39continues to hear speech for some period
  3507. 1:58:41of time. It seemed pretty long.
  3508. 1:58:43And it's it's collecting all that, and
  3509. 1:58:45it's writing it here.
  3510. 1:58:46>> Yeah, this is without any modifications,
  3511. 1:58:48I think, is is what is what you're
  3512. 1:58:49you're getting at.
  3513. 1:58:50>> Yes.
  3514. 1:58:50>> Is like I I'm co-opting the microphone
  3515. 1:58:53to record audio. And we know that that
  3516. 1:58:56the 6-second clips are destroyed in
  3517. 1:58:58favor of but these captures yes
  3518. 1:59:01>> This is as the TV works.
  3519. 1:59:03>> Yeah, as the TV works, the text that it
  3520. 1:59:06was able to convert from your speech
  3521. 1:59:08ends up in the log.
  3522. 1:59:09>> Right. So, as long as you can get access
  3523. 1:59:12to those logs, you can get access to
  3524. 1:59:13what was said. And once again,
  3525. 1:59:16it may be more than just "Hi LG, please
  3526. 1:59:18change the channel."
  3527. 1:59:20>> Yeah, it's funny. Actually, um I'm now
  3528. 1:59:22I'm remember remembering from like an IT
  3529. 1:59:24audit standpoint. Uh one of the things
  3530. 1:59:27in like ISO and not not just ISO, but
  3531. 1:59:29like process certification and um the
  3532. 1:59:32California privacy law, having debug
  3533. 1:59:35logs that log sensitive information is
  3534. 1:59:37verboten. And this would probably run
  3535. 1:59:39afoul of that.
  3536. 1:59:40>> Well, we had
  3537. 1:59:41an example where I said
  3538. 1:59:43>> Right there.
  3539. 1:59:44>> So, here you go.
  3540. 1:59:46So, here was Now, it was triggered,
  3541. 1:59:49but then I I I was started talking about
  3542. 1:59:51something else. I was talking about my
  3543. 1:59:53social security number. Maybe I was on a
  3544. 1:59:54phone call with a hospital or something
  3545. 1:59:57I needed to verify who I am.
  3546. 1:59:58>> Yeah.
  3547. 1:59:59>> Whatever the case may be, maybe a credit
  3548. 2:00:00agency. And I said, "Hi LG." I told it
  3549. 2:00:03to do what I wanted and then I continued
  3550. 2:00:05my conversation.
  3551. 2:00:06>> Yeah.
  3552. 2:00:06>> And here it is. Here's my social
  3553. 2:00:07security number, 1111111111.
  3554. 2:00:10The response to this, I guess, is
  3555. 2:00:14Well, first of all, it appeared to
  3556. 2:00:16persist
  3557. 2:00:17after we cleared we told it to clear the
  3558. 2:00:20data.
  3559. 2:00:21>> Yes.
  3560. 2:00:21>> persisted.
  3561. 2:00:22>> Yeah, so
  3562. 2:00:23>> There's one asterisk we'll get to, but
  3563. 2:00:25>> Yeah, we clear it's like, "Okay, clear
  3564. 2:00:27the data."
  3565. 2:00:28The TV treats that as a "Let me just
  3566. 2:00:30phone LG servers and clear the data." It
  3567. 2:00:33doesn't really seem to do much locally
  3568. 2:00:35with that. Now, these logs, the full
  3569. 2:00:38verbose logs are stored on a on a RAM
  3570. 2:00:41disk.
  3571. 2:00:41>> Mhm.
  3572. 2:00:41>> And if you reboot the TV, it doesn't
  3573. 2:00:43clear the RAM disk.
  3574. 2:00:44>> Right.
  3575. 2:00:45>> But if you physically unplug the TV
  3576. 2:00:47>> If you kill the power completely.
  3577. 2:00:48>> If you kill the power, it does and so we
  3578. 2:00:49lose this. They It also seems to rotate
  3579. 2:00:51these verbose logs pretty quickly.
  3580. 2:00:54Um but
  3581. 2:00:55>> If someone's pulling them though
  3582. 2:00:57>> Yes.
  3583. 2:00:57>> in the in real time it doesn't matter.
  3584. 2:00:59>> Yeah, it doesn't matter.
  3585. 2:01:00Um and it seems like a lot of the
  3586. 2:01:02applications and uh like the
  3587. 2:01:04applications that are generating this
  3588. 2:01:06that are doing this are actually doing
  3589. 2:01:08kind of a lot of writing to the flash.
  3590. 2:01:10Like it's it's still It's like, "Oh,
  3591. 2:01:11we've taken steps to make sure that we
  3592. 2:01:13don't prematurely wear out the flash."
  3593. 2:01:15But it's still doing a lot. And so I
  3594. 2:01:17think there's there's a lot of fertile
  3595. 2:01:18ground here for researchers to go. It's
  3596. 2:01:20like, "Okay, what is it doing exactly?"
  3597. 2:01:22But most of the, you know, delete my
  3598. 2:01:23data or forget this, it doesn't do it
  3599. 2:01:26doesn't care what's on the TV. It just
  3600. 2:01:28does
  3601. 2:01:29the remote.
  3602. 2:01:30>> Yeah, so the the situation we were
  3603. 2:01:32concerned about was, "Okay, if you do
  3604. 2:01:33delete my data, you're bringing the TV
  3605. 2:01:34to Goodwill, and it's gone, does that
  3606. 2:01:37data persist?" Initially, we thought
  3607. 2:01:39maybe because when we rebooted it, it
  3608. 2:01:41was still there in the logs. But then
  3609. 2:01:43after pulling the power cable it got
  3610. 2:01:45wiped out, right?
  3611. 2:01:46>> Yeah.
  3612. 2:01:46>> So at least locally to the TV, those
  3613. 2:01:49specific verbose logs appeared to be
  3614. 2:01:51gone.
  3615. 2:01:51>> Yeah, but other logs persist.
  3616. 2:01:53>> Other logs were still there, and we
  3617. 2:01:54haven't dug into every single one of
  3618. 2:01:56them. So we we can't say with certainty
  3619. 2:01:58like what it retained, but It was
  3620. 2:02:00something.
  3621. 2:02:01>> unsettling. It's like, "How do you
  3622. 2:02:02format your TV?" LG doesn't It's like,
  3623. 2:02:05"Do you trust LG to do that?" It's like,
  3624. 2:02:07"No, I would like to get in there and
  3625. 2:02:08look around and
  3626. 2:02:09>> make sure it's formatted, yeah.
  3627. 2:02:11>> That seems reasonable.
  3628. 2:02:13>> What about um
  3629. 2:02:14how does the TV know where it is?
  3630. 2:02:16>> Uh so uh one
  3631. 2:02:18>> GPS?
  3632. 2:02:18>> Well, other researchers have sort of
  3633. 2:02:21noticed that, "Hey, when we look at the
  3634. 2:02:23traffic to LG, it sure seems like that
  3635. 2:02:26it's inventorying the wireless networks
  3636. 2:02:29that are around." So there is no GPS
  3637. 2:02:31unit. If you take it, it's like, "Oh,
  3638. 2:02:32yeah, this is great." Even though I only
  3639. 2:02:34ever used the TV for a wired interface,
  3640. 2:02:37it seems like it's noticing the wireless
  3641. 2:02:40networks that are around it. And based
  3642. 2:02:41on the wireless networks you can see,
  3643. 2:02:43you can use that for geolocation.
  3644. 2:02:45Because you can see the wire the names
  3645. 2:02:46of the wireless networks, but also the
  3646. 2:02:47MAC addresses of the access points. And
  3647. 2:02:49that is a cheap, easy way to do GPS.
  3648. 2:02:52I'll go you one better. If you had a
  3649. 2:02:54rogue employee inside of LG or a hacker
  3650. 2:02:57that leaks this database to the
  3651. 2:02:59internet. So, the information that that
  3652. 2:03:02Mr. Brock captured and was submitted, if
  3653. 2:03:05that is in a database at LG somewhere,
  3654. 2:03:07then someone could exfiltrate that
  3655. 2:03:10information from LG and now they can
  3656. 2:03:13find a specific TV based on interesting
  3657. 2:03:15places the TV exists.
  3658. 2:03:17>> like Washington D.C.
  3659. 2:03:19Yeah, right.
  3660. 2:03:20>> Yeah, it's like I'm looking for the TV
  3661. 2:03:22in this boardroom. What do they have?
  3662. 2:03:23What are my options? And even before
  3663. 2:03:25setting foot inside the business, they
  3664. 2:03:27can know, oh, there's an LG TV there
  3665. 2:03:29because I have looked at the geolocation
  3666. 2:03:31database in LG.
  3667. 2:03:32>> There's this 30-acre campus with nothing
  3668. 2:03:34but giant corporation A.
  3669. 2:03:36>> Yeah. Now, that sounds absurd, but if
  3670. 2:03:38you look at the you set aside LG for a
  3671. 2:03:41second and look at Meta and how Meta has
  3672. 2:03:43sold ads. Meta has literally gotten in
  3673. 2:03:45trouble for selling to would-be
  3674. 2:03:48advertisers the ability to geo-locate
  3675. 2:03:50down to like individual street
  3676. 2:03:52addresses.
  3677. 2:03:53>> [laughter]
  3678. 2:03:53>> It's like, I want to sell an ad to the
  3679. 2:03:54person in this house. Okay, the the
  3680. 2:03:57platform is capable of that.
  3681. 2:03:59>> There's so many ways to abuse that.
  3682. 2:04:01>> I don't want a TV that I have to have an
  3683. 2:04:03adversarial relationship. And
  3684. 2:04:05immediately out of the box, you're on
  3685. 2:04:06the wrong foot with LG because
  3686. 2:04:09they own the glass.
  3687. 2:04:11>> They do say they own the glass.
  3688. 2:04:12>> So, this is unencrypted. They don't even
  3689. 2:04:14try with this. This is just not even a
  3690. 2:04:15thing. If you're in the middle between
  3691. 2:04:18the TV and the internet, then it's a
  3692. 2:04:19command-and-control type situation. You
  3693. 2:04:21could also make the argument like if LG
  3694. 2:04:23lets one of those bazillion domains
  3695. 2:04:25expire, that's going to be a great
  3696. 2:04:26vector to take over tons of TVs. So,
  3697. 2:04:30LG gets kind of a black mark here, too,
  3698. 2:04:31because my older TVs have
  3699. 2:04:34security vulnerabilities that LG is not
  3700. 2:04:36interested in patching. They're like,
  3701. 2:04:37"Oh, it's a 6-year-old TV or a
  3702. 2:04:385-year-old TV. We don't care."
  3703. 2:04:40>> Right. Great.
  3704. 2:04:42Yeah, but if you have Yeah, right. Um
  3705. 2:04:46RCE, so can you help explain some of
  3706. 2:04:48this where
  3707. 2:04:49Mr. Bra has a vulnerability that we
  3708. 2:04:52can't disclose
  3709. 2:04:54beyond basically saying it's bad and and
  3710. 2:04:58it could grant someone access to the TV.
  3711. 2:05:00I think that's about the extent of what
  3712. 2:05:01we can say.
  3713. 2:05:02>> Yeah.
  3714. 2:05:03>> Um but can you help without exposing too
  3715. 2:05:06much of that information explain the
  3716. 2:05:09concept of like an What is, you know,
  3717. 2:05:11remote code execution? What is that
  3718. 2:05:13without going into how it works here?
  3719. 2:05:15>> So, you're going to you're going to show
  3720. 2:05:16on TV what we did using the stuff from
  3721. 2:05:18GitHub, right?
  3722. 2:05:19>> Yes.
  3723. 2:05:19>> Okay. So, that was remote code execution
  3724. 2:05:22effectively.
  3725. 2:05:22>> can use our work to explain it. Okay.
  3726. 2:05:25>> Uh he found a way to do it
  3727. 2:05:27non-interactively, probably.
  3728. 2:05:29>> Right.
  3729. 2:05:30>> Which is amazing. Nice job.
  3730. 2:05:32>> [laughter]
  3731. 2:05:32>> Uh
  3732. 2:05:33the
  3733. 2:05:35the first uh attempt that we had failed.
  3734. 2:05:39And so, we got the pop-up at the bottom
  3735. 2:05:40where it was trying to install, you
  3736. 2:05:42know, whatever it was, but it was not
  3737. 2:05:44able to um
  3738. 2:05:45remotely execute all of the code. It was
  3739. 2:05:47able to remotely execute some of the
  3740. 2:05:48code to give us the banner, but it
  3741. 2:05:50wasn't able to remotely execute all of
  3742. 2:05:51these codes.
  3743. 2:05:52>> Let's take a step back just like first
  3744. 2:05:54like a definition of remote code
  3745. 2:05:55execution broadly.
  3746. 2:05:57>> Um
  3747. 2:05:58>> as a vulnerability.
  3748. 2:05:59>> Uh you can cause something to download
  3749. 2:06:03code and execute it with whatever level
  3750. 2:06:06of permissions.
  3751. 2:06:07>> Okay.
  3752. 2:06:08>> So, uh remote code execution, you might
  3753. 2:06:10be executing the code in a sandbox, but
  3754. 2:06:13then you might be able to escalate your
  3755. 2:06:14permissions from the sandbox to some
  3756. 2:06:16something else. And so, this is this
  3757. 2:06:18that's uh more broadly described as like
  3758. 2:06:20exploit chaining, but RCE remote code
  3759. 2:06:23execution is one of the best
  3760. 2:06:28uh beachheads into a system
  3761. 2:06:30as like a starting point. If you can
  3762. 2:06:32find a vulnerability that is remote code
  3763. 2:06:34execution, then you can get a lot more
  3764. 2:06:37access to the system. Um the less
  3765. 2:06:38interactive
  3766. 2:06:40>> Mhm.
  3767. 2:06:40>> uh requirements you have for remote code
  3768. 2:06:42execution, the more ability you have to
  3769. 2:06:46take over more TVs
  3770. 2:06:47>> Okay.
  3771. 2:06:48>> surreptitiously.
  3772. 2:06:48>> Right.
  3773. 2:06:49>> So, the the the more holes that you
  3774. 2:06:52find, sort of the worse it becomes.
  3775. 2:06:54>> That makes sense.
  3776. 2:06:55>> Um ours
  3777. 2:06:57the one that worked was actually, I
  3778. 2:06:59think, a worse remote code execution
  3779. 2:07:01than the one that had been patched by
  3780. 2:07:02LG. The one that had been patched by LG
  3781. 2:07:04was we had to put in the um the IP
  3782. 2:07:07address of the TV, and then the TV would
  3783. 2:07:10pair uh the the exploit application
  3784. 2:07:13would pair to the TV like as if it was a
  3785. 2:07:14mobile device, and so there was a pop-up
  3786. 2:07:16and we had to say yes. And then it took
  3787. 2:07:19off, and that was fun. Um
  3788. 2:07:21but that didn't result in
  3789. 2:07:23control of the TV. The one that worked
  3790. 2:07:25was from the browser in the TV. So, like
  3791. 2:07:28if you go on the web browser in the TV
  3792. 2:07:29and you went to a web page
  3793. 2:07:32and you went to the wrong web page
  3794. 2:07:34and you accidentally hit yes or on
  3795. 2:07:35purpose was like, "Wait, what? A mobile
  3796. 2:07:37cuz the web page also generated
  3797. 2:07:38>> the one you ran?
  3798. 2:07:39>> Yeah, yeah.
  3799. 2:07:40>> Okay.
  3800. 2:07:40>> And so, the pop-up said, "Oh, there's a
  3801. 2:07:42mobile device. Would you like to pair
  3802. 2:07:43with a mobile device?" There was no
  3803. 2:07:44mobile device. That was a web page. The
  3804. 2:07:46mobile device was the web page.
  3805. 2:07:48And so, if you said yes because, you
  3806. 2:07:50know, the thing is a little fiddly. Or
  3807. 2:07:52if you just were in a loop and you said
  3808. 2:07:53no, you can just have it say yes over
  3809. 2:07:55and over again.
  3810. 2:07:55>> Right, until they finally like, "Ugh,
  3811. 2:07:56fine. Okay."
  3812. 2:07:57>> Yeah, the the LG browser is not it's
  3813. 2:07:59terrible. And but it's Chromium-based,
  3814. 2:08:01but it's old Chromium. And so, it's
  3815. 2:08:04Um and so, you say yes, and then we're
  3816. 2:08:07in.
  3817. 2:08:08So, that's really not a a really super
  3818. 2:08:10high bar for
  3819. 2:08:11>> Right. For access, yeah.
  3820. 2:08:13>> Yeah. And also, LG doesn't give you like
  3821. 2:08:16their even if you go in their developer
  3822. 2:08:18program like like like that's the legit
  3823. 2:08:19way to do this kind of thing. They
  3824. 2:08:21really don't give you full access to the
  3825. 2:08:23hardware that you own because
  3826. 2:08:27they don't think you own it.
  3827. 2:08:28>> Yeah.
  3828. 2:08:29As we keep going back to.
  3829. 2:08:31>> Yeah. And that's that's offensive. It's
  3830. 2:08:32like it's my TV. I'd like to audit it.
  3831. 2:08:34If If you look at the old TVs that we
  3832. 2:08:36have like 6 years ago, um
  3833. 2:08:38those TVs didn't even have a an
  3834. 2:08:39advertising ID out of the box.
  3835. 2:08:41And then you get a firmware update and
  3836. 2:08:43even without opting into anything, boom,
  3837. 2:08:45there's your advertising ID. I didn't
  3838. 2:08:46agree to that.
  3839. 2:08:47>> What What We showed it on your TV. You
  3840. 2:08:49literally had no terms you had agreed
  3841. 2:08:51to, right? Ever. And then
  3842. 2:08:53>> From one update to the next, it's like,
  3843. 2:08:54oh,
  3844. 2:08:55now we've got an advertising ID and you
  3845. 2:08:56can't turn it off.
  3846. 2:08:58>> It added that cookies thing, too. The
  3847. 2:09:00kind of dark pattern toggle, yeah.
  3848. 2:09:03>> I did not give you permission to alter
  3849. 2:09:05the functionality of the TV with this
  3850. 2:09:06update. There was no notice that the
  3851. 2:09:08functionality of the TV would be altered
  3852. 2:09:10with this update.
  3853. 2:09:10>> Right.
  3854. 2:09:11Well, and that also seems like it would
  3855. 2:09:12require some kind of TOS agreement or
  3856. 2:09:15something, user agreement, but
  3857. 2:09:16>> Even basic stuff There's There's people
  3858. 2:09:18on on on the forum that have been
  3859. 2:09:21raising heck because LG keeps changing
  3860. 2:09:23how they deal with DTS audio. And that
  3861. 2:09:25has nothing to do with any of the stuff
  3862. 2:09:27that we're talking about except for LG
  3863. 2:09:29is changing the functionality of the TV
  3864. 2:09:31after the fact.
  3865. 2:09:33>> Right. All right, any other Any other
  3866. 2:09:35points you want to talk about here? I
  3867. 2:09:36mean, you're you have owned several LG
  3868. 2:09:38TVs in your office.
  3869. 2:09:39>> Yeah, they're It's basically all LG. Uh
  3870. 2:09:42it's funny though because all the LGs
  3871. 2:09:44that I've had here for years, every one
  3872. 2:09:46of them is the out-of-the-box firmware.
  3873. 2:09:48>> That's LG right there.
  3874. 2:09:49>> Yeah. Yeah. This is like the other one
  3875. 2:09:51that's on a They're all LG and yet
  3876. 2:09:53they've never been on the network
  3877. 2:09:54because I never I've never trusted LG to
  3878. 2:09:56do that. Actually, the crossover
  3879. 2:09:59monitor, the like the the the one on the
  3880. 2:10:01wall back there is an LG panel with LG
  3881. 2:10:03alternative electronics. And as a
  3882. 2:10:06company Crossover, that was a viable
  3883. 2:10:07business model for them.
  3884. 2:10:09We can actually go peel the sticker off
  3885. 2:10:10and there's an LG sticker behind the
  3886. 2:10:12Crossover sticker.
  3887. 2:10:13>> Crossover is the name of a brand? Okay,
  3888. 2:10:15so Crossover put their sticker on top of
  3889. 2:10:17the LG sticker?
  3890. 2:10:18>> Yep. But it's a completely different set
  3891. 2:10:20of electronics.
  3892. 2:10:21>> Why? What's the
  3893. 2:10:24>> [laughter]
  3894. 2:10:28>> I think you know why.
  3895. 2:10:29>> [laughter]
  3896. 2:10:31>> You know, short version recap, how do
  3897. 2:10:32you feel about the What's your level of
  3898. 2:10:34concern with this? You know, as as
  3899. 2:10:37both a a business owner with these types
  3900. 2:10:39of devices, but also someone who may,
  3901. 2:10:42you know, advise or work with businesses
  3902. 2:10:44on security or infrastructure.
  3903. 2:10:46>> I've never advised using the TV's
  3904. 2:10:48built-in apps. It is It It's a devil's
  3905. 2:10:51deal, and eventually it will come to
  3906. 2:10:52you.
  3907. 2:10:52>> Yeah.
  3908. 2:10:53>> But, I have to admit that it was very
  3909. 2:10:54creative of LG cuz like a computer
  3910. 2:10:56display is a dumb display. It was very
  3911. 2:10:58creative of them to co-opt the Windows
  3912. 2:11:00update system to use that to inshitify.
  3913. 2:11:03>> Well, you know, that Microsoft owns the
  3914. 2:11:06data management service that LG uses
  3915. 2:11:09for that stuff.
  3916. 2:11:10>> That tracks.
  3917. 2:11:12>> But, don't worry, Microsoft will throw
  3918. 2:11:13LG under the bus and pretend that it was
  3919. 2:11:15[laughter] all their fault.
  3920. 2:11:17>> Yeah, I like how Microsoft's reaction to
  3921. 2:11:19that was like, "Hey, could you maybe cut
  3922. 2:11:20that out and not just terminating that
  3923. 2:11:22Windows update account and rolling back
  3924. 2:11:24all the changes?"
  3925. 2:11:24>> I mean, that's probably what they would
  3926. 2:11:25do to a small developer, right? Like
  3927. 2:11:28some no-name, they would just terminate
  3928. 2:11:29your account. Like you've abused this
  3929. 2:11:31function, goodbye, you know, but
  3930. 2:11:32>> They certainly did that to the security
  3931. 2:11:34researchers trying to tell them problems
  3932. 2:11:36with things. Thanks, Microsoft.
  3933. 2:11:39>> Thanks, Microsoft.
  3934. 2:11:41>> [laughter]
  3935. 2:11:42>> All right, I think that's kind of That's
  3936. 2:11:44pretty good recap, so
  3937. 2:11:45>> Okay.
  3938. 2:11:46>> we'll jump over to the next part.
  3939. 2:11:47Thanks, Wendell.
  3940. 2:11:49>> Thanks, Steve.
  3941. 2:11:50>> LG will probably say that they take
  3942. 2:11:52vulnerabilities very seriously and will
  3943. 2:11:54patch them right away, but they didn't
  3944. 2:11:56reply to us when we sent them a ton of
  3945. 2:11:58our concerns. The bigger up, we
  3946. 2:12:00think, is LG deliberately designing this
  3947. 2:12:03to make money off of your privacy after
  3948. 2:12:05you paid for a thing and off of your
  3949. 2:12:07personal information. You have to reject
  3950. 2:12:10this outright, or it will just keep
  3951. 2:12:12getting worse. If you want flock cameras
  3952. 2:12:14on your living room wall, this is how
  3953. 2:12:17you get flocked cameras on your living
  3954. 2:12:19room wall. The only reason to give a TV
  3955. 2:12:21this kind of power is to visit horrors
  3956. 2:12:24upon you, not to make a better product.
  3957. 2:12:27Ultimately, we wouldn't recommend any LG
  3958. 2:12:29smart products to literally anybody.
  3959. 2:12:32That'll wrap this part of our deep dive
  3960. 2:12:33investigation. We do have more though.
  3961. 2:12:35It's likely we'll have more installments
  3962. 2:12:36in this saga, and we really need your
  3963. 2:12:38help to pay for this video. I spent a
  3964. 2:12:41lot of money on this video. I
  3965. 2:12:43seriously, it was a lot. We spent more
  3966. 2:12:46than a month working on this, including
  3967. 2:12:47travel, buying thousands of dollars of
  3968. 2:12:49TVs. We had most of the team on this
  3969. 2:12:50project. Really, the best way to support
  3970. 2:12:52us on this one and the other upcoming
  3971. 2:12:54videos in this series would be through
  3972. 2:12:56our data dragnet campaign on the store,
  3973. 2:12:57which is a Kickstarter-style campaign
  3974. 2:13:00where we transparently show you how much
  3975. 2:13:01money we've raised, and we have some
  3976. 2:13:03goals what we're going to do with it.
  3977. 2:13:04So, for example, we'd really like to go
  3978. 2:13:05back in with Samsung, Vizio, anyone
  3979. 2:13:07else, and kind of do a bunch of this
  3980. 2:13:08research again or stuff like it. See
  3981. 2:13:10what we can find. This is so expensive
  3982. 2:13:13both in time and in actual cost. The two
  3983. 2:13:16related together.
  3984. 2:13:18I mean, I can't just like stop
  3985. 2:13:19everything for 3 months every time we do
  3986. 2:13:20one of these, kind of like we did with
  3987. 2:13:22LG. And so, that's where we really need
  3988. 2:13:24your help. We have some pretty damn cool
  3989. 2:13:26stuff on the store for this as well. So,
  3990. 2:13:28in addition to the individually
  3991. 2:13:29available items like our new foil
  3992. 2:13:31cyberskeleton shirt and our foil polygon
  3993. 2:13:34V2 shirt and our LG investigation
  3994. 2:13:36Blu-ray discs available that we're
  3995. 2:13:38burning in house, we're 3D printing the
  3996. 2:13:39cases in house, all that stuff. We also
  3997. 2:13:42have four different backer tiers that
  3998. 2:13:43give some good discounts on bundling a
  3999. 2:13:44bunch of items together. They also give
  4000. 2:13:46bonus videos. And then, in the case of
  4001. 2:13:49the Saboteur tier, the highest one,
  4002. 2:13:51there's a live stream Q&A with me that
  4003. 2:13:53you'll get to join. I'll send those
  4004. 2:13:53invites out at the end of the campaign.
  4005. 2:13:55So, be a little while, but uh those were
  4006. 2:13:57always really fun to hang out with the
  4007. 2:13:58community. So, this is the best way to
  4008. 2:13:59support us. If you don't need one of
  4009. 2:14:01these, we also have a donate button in
  4010. 2:14:02the bottom left of store.gamersnexus.net
  4011. 2:14:05and on patreon.com/gamersnexus
  4012. 2:14:07for monthly support. Or, you could
  4013. 2:14:09consider buying one of our other items
  4014. 2:14:11like our project and soldering mats,
  4015. 2:14:13great for any project. We think the
  4016. 2:14:14extent of LG's data harvesting is
  4017. 2:14:16intrusive and grotesque. Additionally,
  4018. 2:14:19despite the Overton window shifting
  4019. 2:14:20further and further away, we still
  4020. 2:14:22believe that when you purchase
  4021. 2:14:23something, especially for thousands of
  4022. 2:14:25dollars, you should own that thing. LG
  4023. 2:14:28isn't the only smart TV manufacturer
  4024. 2:14:29behaving this way, and we'd like to
  4025. 2:14:31expand the scope of our investigation
  4026. 2:14:33and eventually test TVs from other
  4027. 2:14:34manufacturers in a follow-up piece, but
  4028. 2:14:37we are going to need funding for that.
  4029. 2:14:39If you have any tips or leads for a
  4030. 2:14:40follow-up, please email us at
  4031. 2:14:42[email protected].
  4032. 2:14:44Mr. Bra advised immediately
  4033. 2:14:45disconnecting LG smart TVs from any
  4034. 2:14:47network. Wendell felt much the same. Our
  4035. 2:14:50other researcher we worked with, Uturn,
  4036. 2:14:52said this, quote, "My recommendation to
  4037. 2:14:54users would be to demand ownership over
  4038. 2:14:56your devices. First, by using and
  4039. 2:14:58supporting pro-consumer projects that
  4040. 2:15:00seek to give you device control back,
  4041. 2:15:02and second, by demanding legislation
  4042. 2:15:05that reflects the changes you want to
  4043. 2:15:06see. Cell carriers only carrier unlock
  4044. 2:15:09your phone because the 113th Congress
  4045. 2:15:11made it law." End quote, which I thought
  4046. 2:15:14was an excellent point. That's where
  4047. 2:15:16groups like Hulu come in. Both Uturn and
  4048. 2:15:18Mr. Bra have community-funded coffee
  4049. 2:15:20pages we'll link below. Our thanks to
  4050. 2:15:22Wendell, Mr. Bra, and Uturn for their
  4051. 2:15:24help with researching this piece, and to
  4052. 2:15:26the informants in our inbox. We'll have
  4053. 2:15:28a lot more to talk about with all of
  4054. 2:15:29this soon. And one final time, we really
  4055. 2:15:32do need the help funding this expensive
  4056. 2:15:34type of work so we can do the next set
  4057. 2:15:36of smart TVs. So, if you feel like you
  4058. 2:15:37can spare it, please head over to our
  4059. 2:15:39store or Patreon to leave a super thanks
  4060. 2:15:41below so I can spend thousands of
  4061. 2:15:45dollars on TVs that will spy on us.
  4062. 2:15:47Thanks for watching, subscribe for more,
  4063. 2:15:49and we'll see you all next time.

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