ماجرای جنگ 2 | به روایت جواد موگویی | روایت بیستم | گفتوگو با سیدعباس عراقچی (بخش اول) — Transcript
Full transcript
- 0:16In the name of God, hello. After the 12
- 0:21-day war, we held a series of
- 0:23interviews with commanders and
- 0:25political figures of the country. Well,
- 0:29when the 40-day war began,
- 0:31communications were cut off; it was
- 0:33impossible to find the gentlemen. I
- 0:35personally tried to provide some
- 0:37accounts from the field; I went to
- 0:39Minab, the Strait of Hormuz, Kharg
- 0:41Island, and Lamerd. Now, a shaky
- 0:46ceasefire has been established, so we
- 0:48have resumed the interviews. Like the
- 0:5312-day war, we have started the first
- 0:55session with Dr. Araghchi. Sir, we are
- 0:57at your service. In the name of God,
- 0:59the Compassionate, the Merciful.
- 1:01Apparently, you didn't learn the
- 1:03lessons from that interview to repeat
- 1:04it again.
- 1:05Yes, I was really taken aback. After
- 1:09that interview, [the war] continues;
- 1:11although you are one of the few who
- 1:13survived after the interview. Meaning,
- 1:18many of those dear ones we interviewed
- 1:20were martyred in the 40-day war: Martyr
- 1:23Shamkhani, Martyr Naeini, Martyr
- 1:25Larijani. Well, well, Mr. Doctor!
- 1:29Exactly this time last year, in this
- 1:31very month of Tir, we were at your
- 1:34service; I asked what your idea was for
- 1:36after the ceasefire? You said we have
- 1:41two ways to reach our rights: either
- 1:43fight or negotiate. Negotiate; well,
- 1:47dialogue is the easier, lower-cost path
- 1:50, and because we won the 12-day war, we
- 1:56are in a position of strength, so
- 1:58negotiation is honorable; thus, we
- 2:00proceed to achieve our rights. What
- 2:03happened that led to war again? We told
- 2:09ourselves that Mr. Araghchi finally has
- 2:12IRGC roots, he has fought, he has no
- 2:14fear of war, and he has a 34-year
- 2:17diplomatic background, so let's follow
- 2:19your lead; your lead led us to war
- 2:21again.
- 2:29First of all, it wasn't my lead; It was
- 2:38a decision by the other side to reach
- 2:40certain objectives regarding Iran, and
- 2:47we were trying to steer that lead of
- 2:49the other side toward something other
- 2:54than war. Let me explain this a bit,
- 2:57because this false impression that
- 3:01exists must be corrected, that "
- 3:03negotiation caused the war" or "we
- 3:06negotiated and they fought again"; in
- 3:08my opinion, this is not an accurate
- 3:10interpretation, because negotiation was
- 3:13not my decision, but a collective
- 3:15decision that was made. Everything, I
- 3:18think I said this last time too,
- 3:20everything started with the perception
- 3:22of a weak Iran; meaning when after the
- 3:24events that occurred in Lebanon, the
- 3:26martyrdom of Sayyed Hassan...
- 3:29The fall of Syria.
- 3:34The fall of Syria and finally other
- 3:36developments that took place, this
- 3:38perception arose that Iran has lost its
- 3:40regional deterrence and will move
- 3:42toward nuclear deterrence to compensate
- 3:44for it, and therefore this must be
- 3:46stopped. Before it reaches a nuclear
- 3:54deterrent, its nuclear facilities must
- 3:56be destroyed; and likewise, the more
- 3:58extreme view on the side of the Zionist
- 4:00regime was that Iran is weakened, and
- 4:03now is the time to end the matter once
- 4:05and for all. With this perception, they
- 4:11entered the 12-day war, and before that
- 4:13, we had approached the brink of war
- 4:15two or three other times; however, for
- 4:17various reasons, Now, a large part of
- 4:23it was due to the diplomatic efforts
- 4:25that were made, and the fear created in
- 4:28the region that a comprehensive
- 4:29regional war would break out and
- 4:31everyone would suffer; so to speak, we
- 4:33either prevented it or delayed it. In
- 4:37principle, in the 12-day war, well,
- 4:40they came and Tried diplomacy; as I
- 4:45said, diplomacy is a less costly path.
- 4:52From the beginning, they demanded zero
- 4:54enrichment; before the 12-day war, in
- 4:56the negotiations that were taking place
- 4:58, we resisted and stood firm against
- 5:01their illegal and unreasonable demand
- 5:03for zero enrichment. When they saw they
- 5:07could not achieve what they wanted in
- 5:08negotiations, they started the war.
- 5:10This means the war started here; when
- 5:12the other side saw it could not reach
- 5:15its demands through negotiation, it
- 5:17turned to war, not that negotiation led
- 5:19to war. Our persistence in our
- 5:22positions and the fact that we were not
- 5:23willing to give them what they wanted
- 5:25at the negotiating table caused them to
- 5:27choose the harder path. Well, they
- 5:30chose the harder path. They were
- 5:32defeated in the 12-day war. The story
- 5:37of the 40-day war begins here, as after
- 5:39the 12-day war, in my opinion, they
- 5:42made another miscalculation
- 5:46that
- 5:49they had not imagined this level of
- 5:51resistance, so they should have been
- 5:53more prepared and therefore increased
- 5:55their equipment and weaponry; meaning
- 5:57they had the impression that the
- 5:59Zionist regime thought with a few-day
- 6:01attack it would destroy everything,
- 6:02cause a collapse, and perhaps the
- 6:04regime would fall, and the Islamic
- 6:06Republic would surrender; all these
- 6:08were false notions they had, and when
- 6:10it did not happen, because they were
- 6:12not prepared for the prolongation of
- 6:14this war and because they saw the
- 6:16people did not take to the streets and
- 6:18supported the system, standing behind
- 6:20the system, they were forced to end and
- 6:22stop the war.
- 6:25Well, this is exactly where they say, "
- 6:27Sir, if we had continued the war, it
- 6:29would have been better," meaning if we
- 6:31had continued the 12-day one, because
- 6:33there was a lack of preparedness, their
- 6:36assessment had turned out wrong, and
- 6:38Israel had also entered that 12-day war
- 6:40alone; this is where they say that
- 6:42negotiation caused the 40-day war,
- 6:44saying "you should have continued that
- 6:46one.""You should not have gone toward
- 6:49negotiation," and this same perception
- 6:51exists on the other side as well, that
- 6:53if you had continued that 12-day war,
- 6:55you would have reached a result, so to
- 6:58speak, because the 12-day war and the
- 7:00lessons of the 12-day war actually
- 7:01caused us to become stronger and more
- 7:03prepared for the next war. We learned
- 7:06many military lessons from the 12-day
- 7:08war. We also learned political lessons,
- 7:10but we learned many military lessons as
- 7:12well. First of all, the decision to end
- 7:14the war was, so to speak, a collective
- 7:16decision. The Supreme National Security
- 7:18Council made it. The Supreme National
- 7:20Security Council also knows when its
- 7:21resolutions will be implemented.
- 7:23No. I acknowledge that our situation in
- 7:25the military sphere improved
- 7:27significantly after the 12-day war. I
- 7:29asked Mr. Naini, the martyr Naini
- 7:31himself, what our missile situation is
- 7:33like? He said Mr. Pakpour had stated we
- 7:36have tripled. I asked him again, for
- 7:39instance, to ask Mr. Pakpour, "Sir, how
- 7:42is our operational status when under
- 7:44pressure?" He said that, for example,
- 7:47some of our garrisons, our missile
- 7:49bases, would be non-operational for 10
- 7:52to 15 hours, and I brought that down to
- 7:5435 or 40 minutes; I believe that
- 7:56breathing room was very beneficial for
- 7:58us.
- 7:59From the fourth day of the war
- 8:0012-day
- 8:0140-day war
- 8:0240-day
- 8:04One American think tank released an
- 8:06analysis, saying that between 10 to 25
- 8:08of Iran's launchers are destroyed daily
- 8:10, and that one-third have been
- 8:12destroyed so far, and that Iran can
- 8:14hold out at most until the end of
- 8:16Esfand; meaning it can maintain its
- 8:18missile firing capability. On what
- 8:21basis was this assessment made? It was
- 8:23based on their experience from the 12-
- 8:25day war, unaware that in these 8 months
- 8:26, Iran's launcher system had completely
- 8:28changed and had become such that no
- 8:30matter how much they hit, it wouldn't
- 8:32end. Meaning, this is just one of the
- 8:34differences that occurred during this
- 8:35period. And in the 12-day war, well, we
- 8:41, considering our resilience and our
- 8:43social resilience, because we were not
- 8:45prepared for war in this manner, we
- 8:47decided to stop. Whether this decision
- 8:53was right or wrong should be judged in
- 8:55its own place in history, but in my
- 8:56opinion, it was the right decision the
- 8:58establishment made, and we saw its
- 9:00effects in the next war; meaning the 12
- 9:02-day war became a prelude to victory.
- 9:04Well, what happened after the 12-day
- 9:06war? The enemy drew two wrong
- 9:11conclusions; first, that it must
- 9:13prepare itself for a longer war to be
- 9:15able to confront Iran. Second, it must
- 9:20first strike the social base of the
- 9:22establishment and then strike the
- 9:24establishment itself. Therefore, we
- 9:27witnessed that in this interval, a
- 9:31massive military formation was created
- 9:33in our region, and they established
- 9:35what they call a "military buildup" in
- 9:37the region; they brought everything the
- 9:39US had and equipped the Zionist regime
- 9:41as much as they could. They
- 9:44strengthened its defense system, which
- 9:46had fallen short at the end of the 12-
- 9:48day war, so it could wage a longer war,
- 9:50and then they worked on social issues,
- 9:53leading to the event of the 18th or
- 9:5519th of Dey; and it was after that they
- 9:57concluded, "Well, now is the time."
- 10:00When the enemy's military formation in
- 10:06the region was almost complete, their
- 10:08request for re-negotiation began, and
- 10:11this request was once again for zero
- 10:13enrichment. It meant returning again to
- 10:18whether they accept zero enrichment, or
- 10:20we strike. This time it was like this.
- 10:22There was a lot of debate back then
- 10:24about whether to have new negotiations
- 10:26or not, and finally, it was concluded
- 10:29that we should start negotiations
- 10:30mainly to exhaust all arguments, so no
- 10:33one could later say, "If you had
- 10:34negotiated, the war wouldn't have
- 10:36happened."
- 10:37So you were sure that war would happen?
- 10:39We were sure. I will talk about the
- 10:41details later. Our military forces were
- 10:44sure, we ourselves were sure, and
- 10:45because we were sure, we said a round
- 10:47or two of negotiations should take
- 10:49place. Either the other side backs down
- 10:51from its zero-enrichment stance, which
- 10:53is unlikely, or if they don't, we have
- 10:55our proof, and no one—neither in the
- 10:57international community nor within our
- 10:59own society—will be able to say, "
- 11:00It's your own fault, you should have
- 11:02negotiated." This was the philosophy
- 11:04behind entering negotiations; otherwise
- 11:06, if you recall, my interviews exist,
- 11:08my TV talks exist, and my speech in the
- 11:11parliament exists, saying, "Sir, the
- 11:13goal of these negotiations is clear;
- 11:15the enemy's military objectives are
- 11:16also completely clear." Do you think
- 11:18negotiation is a deception? Very well,
- 11:20don't be deceived! The way is very easy
- 11:22: don't be deceived. Don't let
- 11:24yourselves be deceived. The armed
- 11:25forces shouldn't pin their hopes on me
- 11:27as a negotiator; I have a mission I am
- 11:28carrying out—either I succeed or I
- 11:30don't. The armed forces shouldn't sit
- 11:31waiting for me, the government
- 11:32shouldn't sit waiting for me; in
- 11:34securing people's livelihoods, every
- 11:35warehouse must be filled, every reserve
- 11:37must be created, everything must be
- 11:38done. Therefore, when the war started,
- 11:40we were prepared, completely; the proof
- 11:43is that we started responding two hours
- 11:45later, because all these designs had
- 11:47been made. It was completely clear that
- 11:50whatever level the enemy's attack might
- 11:52be, we would respond proportionally to
- 11:54that level. Why was the Strait of
- 11:57Hormuz closed on the very first day?
- 11:59Because it had been designed beforehand
- 12:01that if the leadership were targeted,
- 12:02the strait would be closed immediately.
- 12:04I don't want to go into those details
- 12:06now, but we will put this in the
- 12:07forty-day account. No, my question is,
- 12:09did you go to negotiate just for the
- 12:12record and history?
- 12:13Look.
- 12:14Look, once Mr. Larijani—I heard this
- 12:16from myself and Mr. Larijani, I think
- 12:18it was in the sixth month—he said
- 12:20that we will definitely have a war in
- 12:22late autumn, and then I asked, "So why
- 12:24are we negotiating?" He said that 30
- 12:26percent of the probability of war is in
- 12:29our hands. Seventy percent of the means
- 12:31are in the enemy's hands, for example.
- 12:33We are striving for that 30 percent.
- 12:35Look, the negotiation had several goals
- 12:38. One is that maybe a way could be
- 12:41found in the negotiations, and we
- 12:43shouldn't lose that. War has its own
- 12:46costs, in any case, and if any country
- 12:48can reach its goals through
- 12:50negotiations, that path is definitely
- 12:52less risky and less costly. Well, we
- 12:56said maybe we could reach a result
- 12:58other than war in the negotiations, for
- 13:00example, 10 percent. We had to try that
- 13:04chance. We might not reach an agreement
- 13:07, but at least we will have made a
- 13:09final effort, whether with the enemy,
- 13:11the international community, or our own
- 13:13people, to show we tried every path; as
- 13:16you say, it goes down in history. I
- 13:18accept that, but the credibility of the
- 13:20negotiators is lost. When you keep
- 13:22going to negotiate and war keeps
- 13:24happening. Do you accept this? You
- 13:29might be right, but we are not here to
- 13:31risk war just for our own credibility;
- 13:33meaning, to protect our own reputation.
- 13:35I am the Foreign Minister of the
- 13:37Islamic Republic for the interests of
- 13:39the Islamic Republic, not for my own
- 13:40reputation. And unfortunately, I admit
- 13:42that in some places, individuals make
- 13:44or avoid certain decisions for the sake
- 13:46of their own reputation; and personally
- 13:48, given the spirit with which I grew up
- 13:50in the Islamic Republic, I consider
- 13:52this a betrayal. If a task must be done
- 13:54, and the mission is entrusted to me,
- 13:57then my political future, or I don't
- 13:59know, my reputation, none of these are
- 14:01important at all. If people are laying
- 14:03down their lives for this country, I
- 14:05should be willing to sacrifice my
- 14:07reputation in their place; this is my
- 14:09outlook on the principle. And therefore
- 14:12, when the decision was made that we
- 14:14should negotiate and so-called
- 14:19principles and rules were defined, all
- 14:21of this was worked on in the meetings
- 14:23held at that time; all the minutes
- 14:25exist. There was a nuclear committee
- 14:28back then that turned into the
- 14:29negotiation committee, known as the 6-
- 14:31man committee; you've probably heard of
- 14:33it.
- 14:33Yes.
- 14:34Back then.
- 14:35Who are these 6 people?
- 14:36Wait, let's reach that point.
- 14:38Fine, okay, go ahead.
- 14:40Is this tea for drinking or is it just
- 14:42a stage prop?
- 14:42No, please drink it, it's getting cold.
- 14:45Yes.
- 14:47You were talking about the 6-man
- 14:49committee; all of this is on record.
- 14:50Yes, well; back then it was called the
- 14:52"Nuclear Committee" within the
- 14:54Secretariat of the Supreme Council. For
- 14:56a long time. Mr. Shamkhani, may his
- 15:01soul be joined with the martyrs of
- 15:03Karbala, was responsible for this
- 15:05committee. Later, when Dr. Larijani
- 15:08became the Secretary of the Supreme
- 15:10National Security Council, he chaired
- 15:12this committee himself; may his soul
- 15:14also rest in peace. All discussions
- 15:16about the negotiations—whether they
- 15:18should happen or not, under what
- 15:20principles, what should be said, what
- 15:22shouldn't be—all these were discussed
- 15:24and summarized in that committee, and
- 15:26the committee's approvals went exactly
- 15:28like the Supreme Council's own
- 15:29approvals to be confirmed and then
- 15:31communicated; meaning it followed that
- 15:33exact path, and all these minutes exist
- 15:35. The meetings that eventually, one day
- 15:39in history after 30 years, they will
- 15:41publish; the terms used there regarding
- 15:43the negotiators and the negotiation
- 15:45process are interesting, anyway.
- 15:49When is the right time? Now, I...
- 15:51You mean regarding you?
- 15:52Let's set these aside; well, it was
- 15:55decided there that we should negotiate,
- 15:57but the country must be prepared for
- 16:01war. When I said several times that no
- 16:04one should be deceived, even in one of
- 16:06the meetings, I remember one of the
- 16:08senior military commanders was a bit
- 16:09offended; he said, what is this that
- 16:11you keep saying don't be deceived? We
- 16:13are not going to be deceived; we are
- 16:15ready, we are prepared; go do your job.
- 16:17Do not worry about this; we are
- 16:19prepared. We went into the negotiations
- 16:21with this logic. In the negotiations,
- 16:23the other side's demand was still zero
- 16:25enrichment, and our position remained
- 16:27that we would not give up this right of
- 16:29the Iranian people. During the
- 16:31negotiations before the 40-day war, it
- 16:33was a time when they had hit our
- 16:34nuclear facilities. At that very moment
- 16:38, we proudly said that you hit our
- 16:40facility building, but the building
- 16:42will be rebuilt. The machinery will be
- 16:46rebuilt. It is science and technology
- 16:48that you cannot hit, and it still
- 16:50exists. Our materials are also in their
- 16:52place. Well, they came with zero
- 16:53enrichment and demanded the handover of
- 16:56materials. It was natural what our
- 16:57position would be. Ultimately, they
- 17:01backed down from zero enrichment at
- 17:03that time and said, accept a suspension
- 17:05period, and even though our facilities
- 17:07had been damaged and we were in a state
- 17:09of......forced suspension, for example,
- 17:15we still had a mission not to accept
- 17:17this as an official matter. In any case
- 17:19, our position in the three rounds of
- 17:21negotiations we held there was clear;
- 17:23the minutes of those negotiations exist
- 17:24, and the reports are available. On
- 17:29Thursday, February 26th, we had the
- 17:32third round of negotiations, which fell
- 17:34apart over this enrichment suspension;
- 17:36they wanted a suspension period of, I
- 17:38don't know, several years, which we did
- 17:41not accept, but we agreed that, given
- 17:43the discussions held, the technical
- 17:45committees of both sides would meet in
- 17:47Vienna, for example, on the following
- 17:49Monday.
- 17:53Wait a moment here, if we had accepted
- 17:55that, would the war not have happened?
- 17:58If we had accepted that two or
- 18:00three-year suspension on February 26th?
- 18:03It cannot be said with certainty, but
- 18:04if you had accepted it, you would have
- 18:06suffered losses greater than the war.
- 18:08Why?
- 18:09In any case, you would have sold the
- 18:11country's dignity, and we would have
- 18:13had the 12-day war's damages and such,
- 18:15plus we would have finally accepted for
- 18:18the enemy to achieve its demands.
- 18:19Now, we could have suspended for two or
- 18:22three years. Netanyahu and Trump, this
- 18:24golden pair, would have gone, and we
- 18:26would have gone back into a hole and
- 18:28started enrichment again. I mean, if it
- 18:30were me, I would say the world has no
- 18:32accountability anyway. There is no
- 18:34commitment in the world either, so we
- 18:36could have suspended for two or three
- 18:38years. We could have suspended for two
- 18:40or three years, waited for those two to
- 18:42go, and then started again. Well, with
- 18:44all due respect, the decision-making is
- 18:46not up to me or you, and it is a good
- 18:48thing that it isn't. But...
- 18:52Meaning suspension was also part of our
- 18:54red lines?
- 18:54Look, it's not about suspension and
- 18:56materials; firstly, the number of years
- 18:58they wanted was not a small number.
- 19:00How much was it?
- 19:02Well, because it is still one of the
- 19:04final requests and...
- 19:07Even now that we have made the
- 19:08negotiations two-staged, we have
- 19:10delayed the nuclear issue because there
- 19:11were issues in the nuclear sector that
- 19:13were unsolvable and remain so under
- 19:15current conditions; perhaps after a
- 19:16month or two of talks, there might be
- 19:18room for...
- 19:19It was more than 5 years, Dr.
- 19:21Yeah.
- 19:21Well, now, should we just build a
- 19:23larger police station for 5 years? I
- 19:24mean, I’m saying...
- 19:26No, you didn't let me explain; the
- 19:27issue wasn't just about building or
- 19:29waiting, the issue was allowing the
- 19:31enemy to come and fight and then
- 19:33achieve their demands. Defeat is here;
- 19:37defeat is not in the destruction of
- 19:39facilities or the loss of, as you put
- 19:41it, a police station. They hit our
- 19:43police station, but our police forces
- 19:45were sleeping under tarps at night.
- 19:47They were sleeping in buses and doing
- 19:49their duty. The issue of defeat is when
- 19:51police forces raise their hands, say "
- 19:53we're done," and run away to their
- 19:55homes; that defeat didn't happen. In
- 19:58the nuclear issue, if we had given the
- 19:59enemy what they wanted, we would have
- 20:01created a pattern where whenever you
- 20:03want something from the Islamic
- 20:04Republic, you come, hit it, destroy it,
- 20:06and the Islamic Republic says, "Okay,
- 20:08come take whatever you want." This
- 20:09should not have happened. This pattern
- 20:12should not have formed, and that is why
- 20:14we stood firm in the negotiations, even
- 20:16if it meant the cost of war. Our
- 20:20martyred leader has a phrase that has
- 20:22always been before my eyes: "We, the
- 20:24Islamic Republic, we don't fight
- 20:26because war has costs and risks; we
- 20:28have seen it...we don't fight unless
- 20:30the cost of not fighting is higher than
- 20:33the cost of fighting." If you reach a
- 20:37point where you don't fight, you pay a
- 20:41higher cost than if you were to fight,
- 20:43you must fight; you should not hesitate
- 20:45. And this is what happened in both the
- 20:4812-day war and the 40-day war. We had
- 20:52negotiations in Geneva on February 26th
- 20:54; the talks almost reached no result,
- 20:56yet we decided our technical committees
- 20:59would meet in Vienna the following
- 21:01Monday. Well, we returned, and from
- 21:05that Friday, I saw the atmosphere was
- 21:08completely prepared for war. Friday
- 21:11night, I had a call with two or three
- 21:14foreign ministers in the region, and
- 21:16they all told me: "We are also
- 21:17surprised; even though Thursday's talks
- 21:20weren't bad overall, why did the
- 21:22atmosphere suddenly shift on Friday?"
- 21:25It meant it was clear the U.S. had
- 21:26reached the conclusion that it wouldn't
- 21:28get what it wanted through negotiations
- 21:30and had to fight and finish the job.
- 21:32Besides the fact that your
- 21:35interpretation, which you mentioned,
- 21:36might also be correct; at least from
- 21:38the Zionist perspective, it is correct
- 21:40that the nuclear issue and nuclear
- 21:42materials were just an excuse. The main
- 21:44goal was something else. The main goal
- 21:45for Netanyahu—and some believe there
- 21:47is no difference between them, that the
- 21:49U.S. and Israel are headed in the same
- 21:51direction. We can discuss whether these
- 21:53two are truly on the same path; yes,
- 21:55they certainly are on the same path and
- 21:57complement each other, but there are
- 21:59differences in their goals and
- 22:00positions that can sometimes be
- 22:02exploited. But let's assume that's a
- 22:05separate discussion for another time.
- 22:07Netanyahu had said many times that
- 22:09there is an "unfinished job"; an
- 22:11unfinished task remains, and what is
- 22:14that task? It is the 12-day war and the
- 22:16destruction of the Islamic Republic. He
- 22:18believed the job wasn't finished and
- 22:20had to be completed, and that the
- 22:22Islamic Republic had to be destroyed.
- 22:23He thought there was no better
- 22:25opportunity in history than now, as it
- 22:27had become completely weak; it had
- 22:29fought a round, its strength was
- 22:31drained, people were protesting in the
- 22:33streets; we saw what happened in '18
- 22:35and '19, the economic sanctions,
- 22:37regional tools, everything; in short,
- 22:39it was at the peak of weakness and the
- 22:41job had to be finished. This was
- 22:43Israel's goal; with this goal, they
- 22:45dragged the U.S. into the war. They
- 22:46gave this wrong analysis to Trump, and
- 22:48we later heard in various places that
- 22:50Trump had been angry about the analysis
- 22:52they gave him, saying the whole thing
- 22:54would be over in two or three days.
- 22:56When they started the war, I think it
- 22:58was on the second day that Trump posted
- 23:00a two-word tweet: "Unconditional
- 23:02surrender." Yesterday, well, it was the
- 23:07official funeral ceremony, and foreign
- 23:09guests had come; I met with many of
- 23:12them before and after the ceremony.
- 23:15Last night until 10 or 11, I had
- 23:17meetings with some of the foreign
- 23:19ministers who had stayed behind. I told
- 23:23them, and they all acknowledged it; I
- 23:25said that in the war, the enemy started
- 23:27with unconditional surrender, but we
- 23:29ultimately reached a memorandum of
- 23:31understanding in which the enemy stated
- 23:33it would no longer start any war
- 23:35against Iran and would no longer
- 23:37threaten Iran. Meaning both sides—it
- 23:41is like this; both sides commit to not
- 23:43starting a war against each other, not
- 23:45attacking, not threatening each other,
- 23:47not using force against each other,
- 23:48respecting each other's sovereignty,
- 23:50respecting each other's territorial
- 23:52integrity, and refraining from
- 23:54interfering in each other's internal
- 23:56affairs. Meaning the one who said
- 23:57unconditional surrender is now making
- 23:59all these commitments; then it asks, "
- 24:00For God's sake, you also make a
- 24:01reciprocal commitment, you also respect
- 24:03my sovereignty, you also don't
- 24:04interfere in my internal affairs, and
- 24:06you also don't be the one to start a
- 24:07war against me." This memorandum of
- 24:10understanding, especially its first and
- 24:12second articles, is truly a source of
- 24:14pride in this sense, because Iran and
- 24:16the U.S.—Iran facing the U.S. as a
- 24:18superpower—sit down and commit to
- 24:20each other to respect each other's
- 24:22sovereignty and not interfere in each
- 24:25other's internal affairs. There is a
- 24:33flaw in our diplomacy—and since two
- 24:35wars occurred during your time as
- 24:37Foreign Minister, it traces back to you
- 24:39—which is that you lack a threatening
- 24:41rhetoric that leads to deterrence.
- 24:46Relative to what? Relative to the
- 24:48countries in the region. For instance,
- 24:50the Americans go and reassure the
- 24:53Saudis, Qataris, and Emiratis,
- 24:55promising them, "Sir, we will strike
- 24:57Iran and it will be over," so they
- 24:59cooperate. Why don’t you go and
- 25:02threaten them in...Private messages, in
- 25:08private meetings—meaning threats can
- 25:10actually create deterrence.
- 25:14How do you know I didn't? I have said
- 25:16that before the 12-day war...We went to
- 25:20the brink of war two or three times and
- 25:22prevented it with these very threats.
- 25:24Those periodic trips I took in the
- 25:26region after the Syria issue...That was
- 25:31exactly the reason, and the threats we
- 25:33made at one or two junctures prevented
- 25:36war. I will give you one example,
- 25:40though without mentioning names and
- 25:42such. In a meeting I had with one of
- 25:47the regional leaders, he spoke from a
- 25:49position of great arrogance and with a
- 25:51hidden joy you could sense: "You can be
- 25:53sure they will attack you, destroy your
- 25:55nuclear facilities, wipe out your
- 25:57missile capacity, and destroy your oil
- 25:59installations. And don't you dare
- 26:04respond, because they will strike you
- 26:06yourselves, they will strike your
- 26:08leadership."
- 26:10Who said this?
- 26:11One of the regional leaders.
- 26:13And I told him...
- 26:14Saudi Arabia, right?
- 26:16Now, let’s not get into specifics; we
- 26:18still have to work with all of them.
- 26:20This rhetoric sounds like Bin Salman.
- 26:23Let me finish, I said don't get into
- 26:25names. No, it applies to all of them.
- 26:28Let us do our job. Their mood was all
- 26:31the same; they were all waiting for
- 26:33this event, but were afraid. I told him
- 26:36there that...
- 26:37They thought it was over.
- 26:39Yes, I told him that the matter is not
- 26:41as easy as you say. If they hit any
- 26:44point of ours, we will hit their
- 26:46corresponding point. If they hit our
- 26:48nuclear facilities, we will hit their
- 26:50nuclear facilities. If they hit our
- 26:52military capabilities, we will hit
- 26:53Israel's military capabilities. And if
- 26:55America participates, we will
- 26:57inevitably strike American bases in the
- 26:59region, because our missiles don't
- 27:00reach the US mainland, but they do
- 27:02reach their bases in the region. If
- 27:04they hit our oil facilities and we
- 27:06can't sell oil, no one in the region
- 27:07will be able to sell oil. This very
- 27:09sentence made the other side a bit
- 27:11angry, and he said, "No one can
- 27:13threaten us.""If anyone threatens us, I
- 27:15don't know, all of Europe, all of
- 27:17America will turn against them; even
- 27:19China will turn against them, because
- 27:21we have so much trade, this and that
- 27:24with China. The flow of oil in the
- 27:26world is in our hands, the supply chain
- 27:28, this and that, is in our hands." I
- 27:31laughed at these words and said, "Sir,
- 27:33heaven forbid, we don't intend to hit
- 27:35you!" We strike American bases which,
- 27:37unfortunately, are on your soil. Well,
- 27:41that caused the region to take action
- 27:43at that time and prevent a war; but
- 27:45later we heard analyses from American
- 27:47and Zionist institutions, and some told
- 27:50us that they went and convinced the
- 27:52countries of the region, saying, "At
- 27:54most, hold on for one more month, and
- 27:56this whole story will be wrapped up
- 27:58forever." Yes, Iran strikes, fires
- 28:01missiles, brings this and that, but if
- 28:03we hold on for a month, everything will
- 28:05be fixed, and they prepared them to
- 28:07just hold on until the situation ended.
- 28:09Well, in the 12-day war, they thought
- 28:11it would happen, but it didn't. They
- 28:13analyzed that we must first strike the
- 28:15regime's social base; they came and did
- 28:18those things, prepared themselves for a
- 28:20longer war with newer methods, and then
- 28:22at that time, in the 12-day war, they
- 28:24reached a conclusion. Another
- 28:27conclusion they reached was that we
- 28:29made a mistake by only striking the
- 28:31military; we struck the military, but
- 28:33the politicians came and held the
- 28:35country together.
- 28:36And this time we must strike the
- 28:38politicians, and most importantly, we
- 28:40must strike the leadership. The
- 28:41Venezuela experience had again given
- 28:43them a false impression that if you
- 28:45remove the leadership from the center,
- 28:48the regime will collapse and the rest
- 28:50will, so to speak, resolve itself. Now,
- 28:52our friendly countries keep telling us,
- 28:54"Yes, we told them so much not to think
- 28:56this way; Iranians are different,
- 28:58Iranians are this way, that way." There
- 29:00is a multi-thousand-year-old
- 29:01civilization behind them, plus a Shia
- 29:03mindset and martyrdom-seeking beliefs;
- 29:05when these two are combined, no one can
- 29:07stop them. They are telling us this now
- 29:09.
- 29:09They are saying it now.
- 29:10Yes, they say we had told them this.
- 29:12Now, if needed, I will even name the
- 29:14people who told us, "We went to them
- 29:15and said, 'Sir, don't mess with
- 29:17Iranians, Iran is different from
- 29:19Venezuela, different from here,
- 29:20different from there, and these people
- 29:22will stand their ground,'" but that was
- 29:24the reality. That is why they started
- 29:27with the leadership and then began
- 29:29striking political officials as well.
- 29:31We were not surprised in the 12-day war
- 29:34, but we did have tactical surprises.
- 29:36Meaning, in terms of strategy, in terms
- 29:39of confronting the enemy, and in terms
- 29:41of military and defensive resilience
- 29:43against the enemy, we were completely
- 29:45prepared. We were not caught by
- 29:47surprise. Just as we started striking
- 29:49back two hours later. But in protecting
- 29:52ourselves and, so to speak, our
- 29:54officials, in my opinion, a bit...If a
- 29:58surprise did occur, this was the area.
- 30:04Yes, because if you mention this, could
- 30:06the events of the 18th have been
- 30:08predicted in the country during those
- 30:1010 days leading up to the 18th? No. In
- 30:20this regard, it can be said that we
- 30:22were not prepared for such an incident.
- 30:25I mean, Mr. Larijani, did the military
- 30:27forces, the Ministry, or the IRGC
- 30:29Intelligence think that this crowd
- 30:31would come out? I want to say that this
- 30:34surprise here was, in my opinion,
- 30:36strategic.
- 30:36Look, in any case, we have to admit
- 30:38that we had some weak points. Just as
- 30:41the enemy's calculations and analyses
- 30:43were wrong, some of our own analyses
- 30:45were perhaps wrong as well. Everyone
- 30:51knew and said that economic pressures
- 30:53could lead to social dissatisfaction,
- 30:56but its scale, timing, and speed of
- 30:58spread were perhaps not predicted in
- 31:00this way. That is not within my area of
- 31:04expertise. I truly cannot say, but
- 31:08since we were involved once it started,
- 31:10we were compelled to defend the country
- 31:12against
- 31:14a media and psychological assault.
- 31:17Regarding the media and psychological
- 31:19assault, the perception was that these
- 31:22were sporadic protests that would soon
- 31:24end; and perhaps that was the reality,
- 31:26but on January 8th and 9th, a foreign
- 31:28conspiracy really entered the situation
- 31:30. I have explained this in detail in
- 31:33previous interviews and talks. From the
- 31:368th to the 18th, it was just public
- 31:38protests by the people. And it was
- 31:43tolerated; even the government, so to
- 31:46speak, responded positively to it. I
- 31:50remember in one of the cabinet meetings
- 31:51those days, the head of the Trade Union
- 31:53and the head of the Chamber of Commerce
- 31:55were invited to voice their issues; the
- 31:57President had a separate meeting with
- 31:59the trade unions and such. Peaceful
- 32:05demonstrations were held without any
- 32:07issues; but from January 8th, the
- 32:09factor of weapons was introduced, and
- 32:11it was clear that there had been prior
- 32:14organization that we had failed to
- 32:16identify—that is where our weakness
- 32:18lay—and weapons were introduced on a
- 32:20large scale, and trained forces entered
- 32:22. You know what happened after that,
- 32:30and they started shooting not at the
- 32:32armed forces, but only at the people,
- 32:34because the goal was to increase the
- 32:35death toll. Trump had said that if
- 32:41people are killed, we will come to help
- 32:43, we will come to rescue; they wanted
- 32:45to put Trump in a position where, with
- 32:47so many people killed, he would have to
- 32:49intervene.
- 32:50So, if it had dragged on from the 8th
- 32:52to the 28th, for example, do you think
- 32:54a war would have started right then? It
- 32:58cannot be analyzed. I don’t know if
- 32:59they were ready to fight at that time
- 33:01or not. But Trump had made this threat,
- 33:04and on one Wednesday, we really went to
- 33:06the brink of war. Yes. I mean
- 33:10The Wednesday after January 8th.
- 33:12The Wednesday after January 8th. Our
- 33:16armed forces had reports that the enemy
- 33:18was ready to attack and that the attack
- 33:20would take place that night. I don’t
- 33:22know if you remember, but at 8
- 33:23o’clock that night, I did an
- 33:25interview with Fox News and explained
- 33:27all of this, that this was not at all a
- 33:29matter of public protest. Ah, that
- 33:30night they said that Trump had stated
- 33:32that executions were going to happen
- 33:34tomorrow, and after all, many people
- 33:36had already been killed.
- 33:37And then the military build-up of the
- 33:39enemy, all these things indicated to
- 33:40our armed forces
- 33:41that if the Islamic Republic carries
- 33:43out executions, I will attack.
- 33:44No, he said executions are taking place
- 33:46and we will attack. They had told him
- 33:48that the executions would start the
- 33:49next morning.
- 33:51So that night I did an interview with
- 33:53Fox News and said we have no intention
- 33:55of executing anyone right now, because
- 33:57the trials hadn't really started yet.
- 34:00Yes, individuals had been detained, but
- 34:02the judicial process had not yet been
- 34:04followed. Maybe some of them deserved
- 34:06to be executed, which they did and were
- 34:08, but the judicial process hadn't even
- 34:10begun for us to execute anyone the next
- 34:12morning. I said we don't have any such
- 34:14plan for now, the judicial process
- 34:16hasn't started. And by the way, the
- 34:19so-called killings had ended seven or
- 34:21eight days prior; from the 18th, 19th,
- 34:24and 20th of Dey onwards, we had no more
- 34:27casualties, the casualties had ended.
- 34:30It is a false report that they are
- 34:31being killed in the streets every day,
- 34:33and well, perhaps Trump was looking for
- 34:35an excuse or whatever it was, it was
- 34:37announced that night that it would not
- 34:39happen.
- 34:39How much did the 18th and 19th of Dey
- 34:42impact the outbreak of the war, the 40-
- 34:44day war?
- 34:46In my opinion, it had an impact on the
- 34:48enemy reaching the conclusion that the
- 34:50groundwork was ready, meaning they saw,
- 34:52well...From their perspective, a
- 34:56popular movement took place and the
- 34:58system, for example, suppressed it.
- 35:00From our point of view, it was the
- 35:02suppression of a terrorist movement,
- 35:03but the perception was that it
- 35:05suppressed it, and therefore, the
- 35:06social environment is ready.
- 35:07How much, how much did this influence
- 35:09the outbreak of the war?
- 35:10I am telling you, a lot.
- 35:12A lot.
- 35:12Because they imagined that the social
- 35:14environment was ready and if they
- 35:15attacked, the people would also come to
- 35:17the streets from within. People did
- 35:18come to the streets, but with another
- 35:20goal; with the goal of supporting the
- 35:21system. This was their mistake right
- 35:23here. Two factors caused the 40-day war
- 35:26to start, as I mentioned: one was that
- 35:28they imagined the social environment
- 35:30was now ready. The social capital of
- 35:34the system is gone; in the 12-day war,
- 35:36the system's social capital came into
- 35:39play. Well, and we all realized what
- 35:43capital we had and we underappreciated
- 35:45it, and unfortunately, after the 12-day
- 35:47war, we still didn't appreciate it and
- 35:50eventually continued some processes
- 35:52that led to problems. The enemy,
- 35:54however, imagined that with the 18th
- 35:56and 19th of Dey, the system's social
- 35:58capital was destroyed. Militarily, if
- 36:01they stretched the war from 12 days to,
- 36:03say, two weeks, the job would be done.
- 36:06There is economic pressure and all that
- 36:08, and there is no hope in the region
- 36:10either. They had also told the
- 36:11countries in the region to hold on for
- 36:13a bit and the job would be done. They
- 36:16also don't have the nerve to close the
- 36:18Strait of Hormuz. The Islamic Republic
- 36:21is bluffing. It cannot spread the war
- 36:23to the region either, because the
- 36:25region will confront it. With all these
- 36:27analyses, they started the war. In the
- 36:28negotiations, they came and said, "Sir,
- 36:30do you accept this and that?" We said
- 36:32no. Well, describe those two days
- 36:36leading up to 9:30 in the morning. You
- 36:39returned from Geneva. That Omani
- 36:41gentleman, I remember he went to
- 36:43America; he went there quickly and gave
- 36:45some interviews, said some things; that
- 36:47, well, Iran has given good concessions
- 36:50and I don't know, everything is fine.
- 36:54And one felt that he could smell that
- 36:55the Americans were planning to attack,
- 36:57and he was trying to dissuade them with
- 36:59these words. Did you also imagine that
- 37:04war was definitely a day or two away?
- 37:07He went from Geneva to Washington and
- 37:09called me from there. He said the
- 37:12atmosphere and the mood here are very
- 37:14bad, and he himself was extremely
- 37:16depressed or what they call it, upset,
- 37:19saddened; because his own credibility
- 37:21was also at risk. While the negotiation
- 37:26on Thursday, although it didn't reach
- 37:28the result they wanted, we finally took
- 37:30some steps forward, and we offered some
- 37:32innovative, so-called side proposals
- 37:34where the principle of enrichment would
- 37:36continue, but could ultimately address
- 37:38their concerns. Because our position
- 37:42from the beginning of the nuclear talks
- 37:44until now has always been that we will
- 37:46not give up our rights, but if there is
- 37:48a concern that the program might go
- 37:49toward weapons, we are willing to
- 37:51resolve that concern. Our position in
- 37:53the negotiations has always been: fine,
- 37:55we are willing to take
- 37:55confidence-building measures, but we
- 37:57will not give up our rights. We won't
- 37:59give up enrichment, but if you say, for
- 38:01example, limit enrichment for a period
- 38:03of time in such and such a way. I don't
- 38:05know; do this with your materials, do
- 38:06that with your materials, to ensure
- 38:08that we are not going after a bomb.
- 38:10Fine, we don't believe in an atomic
- 38:12bomb and we consider it forbidden; this
- 38:14is the fatwa of our martyred leader.
- 38:18Therefore, we brought up these
- 38:19initiatives so that perhaps we could
- 38:21somehow control the negotiations in
- 38:22this way. Well, it didn't work; Mr.
- 38:24Busaidi went to Washington and called
- 38:27me from there, he said the atmosphere
- 38:29here is very...something. Then he
- 38:31started giving interviews himself and
- 38:33said these same things, perhaps to try
- 38:35to prevent the war in his own way. I
- 38:39said Thursday, when it ended, on Friday
- 38:41the atmosphere became completely
- 38:43military.
- 38:45Did he call you to say war is certain?
- 38:47He didn't say war is certain. He said
- 38:49the atmosphere here is a war atmosphere
- 38:51.
- 38:51And I went and gave an interview, then
- 38:53he had requested that you meet with
- 38:55Vance because he felt that perhaps
- 38:57people like Witkoff and Sherman hadn't
- 38:59conveyed the message correctly. He had
- 39:02met with Vance, but apparently in
- 39:04Washington, Trump himself had made his
- 39:06decision and had been persuaded by the
- 39:08Zionist lobby or by Netanyahu that the
- 39:11war would end in two or three days.
- 39:14Therefore, Friday night the atmosphere
- 39:17had changed completely. On Saturday at
- 39:198 AM, I went to see the President and
- 39:22gave a report on the Geneva
- 39:23negotiations. At the same time, they
- 39:25asked, I said the negotiation was good
- 39:27relative to the negotiation itself, but
- 39:29the atmosphere that exists is not a
- 39:31negotiating atmosphere at all, it is a
- 39:33war atmosphere. I had an appointment at
- 39:379:00 AM; I came to the Leader's office
- 39:39to meet with one of the officials.
- 39:41So, you didn't have a meeting with the
- 39:43Leader?
- 39:45No, our standard procedure was to meet
- 39:48with Mr. Hejazi, and reports would go
- 39:50to him. He would present the daily
- 39:54reports from everywhere to the Leader
- 39:56and would bring back answers if there
- 39:58were any questions. If it were
- 39:59necessary, the Leader would hold a
- 40:01meeting himself at that point. It
- 40:03wasn't that this was the only path. The
- 40:07martyred leader's way was to receive
- 40:09reports from everywhere; he would
- 40:11review them all, provide guidance, and
- 40:13if he deemed it necessary, he would
- 40:15summon—well, not summon, he would ask
- 40:17for the person, meet with them, and
- 40:19brief them. If necessary, he would also
- 40:23hold group meetings; he would invite
- 40:25specific individuals or invite the
- 40:27Supreme Council. Ultimately, a
- 40:29decision-making system existed that, in
- 40:31my opinion, was perfectly good. Now
- 40:34that security issues are being resolved
- 40:36, it should follow the same pattern.
- 40:38You were with Mr. Hejazi.
- 40:42I was with Mr. Hejazi at 9:00 AM, and I
- 40:44was giving him a report on the
- 40:45negotiations, and I had just reached
- 40:48the part about the heavy atmosphere of
- 40:50war, saying how the situation has been
- 40:52like this since last night, not that it
- 40:54was suddenly attacked right then.
- 40:59So they say it was the Strategic
- 41:01Council on Foreign Policy, right?
- 41:03No.
- 41:04Because Mr. Kharrazi is there, you are
- 41:07there, and Mr. Rahim Safavi is there,
- 41:09no?
- 41:10Well, look, that is a large complex
- 41:12containing various sections; the
- 41:14Strategic Council on Foreign Relations
- 41:16has a location a few buildings over.
- 41:19They were also holding a meeting at the
- 41:21same time, but it wasn't hit; what was
- 41:23worse was the meeting Mr. Shamkhani had
- 41:25organized, where a number of commanders
- 41:27were martyred.
- 41:29We won't air this, or rather, I doubt
- 41:31we could air it. Well, perhaps it is
- 41:34for the historical record. There were
- 41:38three meetings that day. One was the
- 41:41Intelligence Ministry's Deputies
- 41:42Council meeting at the ministry. One
- 41:45was the Strategic Council on Foreign
- 41:46Policy meeting at the Leader's office.
- 41:49One was the Defense Council meeting
- 41:51that Mr. Shamkhani had organized. And
- 41:53Mr. Khamenei himself was at the office.
- 41:57How do you interpret this? Three or
- 42:01four meetings simultaneously at 9:30 AM
- 42:03? Well...The Strategic Council itself
- 42:13had a standing meeting every Saturday.
- 42:18When I was on the Strategic Council, we
- 42:20had meetings every Saturday morning.
- 42:23However, it was in the building they
- 42:25have on Pasdaran Street. What happened
- 42:31that they held it in the lower building
- 42:32that day, I don't know. Besides, that
- 42:35place wasn't the target; but Mr.
- 42:37Shamkhani's meeting was a target, Mr.
- 42:39Shirazi's office was a target, Mr.
- 42:42Hejazi's office was a target, and the
- 42:44Leader's office itself was a target;
- 42:46they hit these quickly.
- 42:48They also hit the ministry's Deputies
- 42:49Council meeting.
- 42:50That building was somewhere else
- 42:52entirely.
- 42:52I know, but I don't consider this
- 42:54simultaneous occurrence of multiple
- 42:56meetings to be normal.
- 42:57Well, those days, you see, every
- 42:59building you entered had a meeting
- 43:00going on inside. But yes, both the
- 43:02meeting with the Supreme Leader at his
- 43:05office—well, that's one thing, but
- 43:07the fact that Mr. Shamkhani had also
- 43:09convened the Defense Council meeting.
- 43:12Now, whether it was a coincidence or
- 43:13not, I don't know, but the Ministry of
- 43:15Intelligence was also holding a meeting
- 43:17at the same time. In my opinion, they
- 43:22were aware of these meetings, and this
- 43:25is perhaps a security breach that
- 43:27existed and likely still exists; this
- 43:29must be addressed, which the security
- 43:31forces are pursuing, and I be...I. I
- 43:33believe the extent of this security
- 43:36breach is not just about infiltration
- 43:38and gathering information; it sometimes
- 43:40lies in influencing decision-making,
- 43:43and even worse, in shaping our
- 43:44psychological space. These are just
- 43:47brief points.
- 43:48Yes; well, I personally believe that
- 43:50nothing can destroy the Islamic
- 43:52Republic except for meetings. I mean,
- 43:56this meeting has ruined the Islamic
- 43:58Republic! But this synchronization,
- 44:01this level of intelligence, and
- 44:03striking at 9:30 AM—I don't attribute
- 44:05this to technology or artificial
- 44:07intelligence or things like that. I
- 44:11think, now that you also have an
- 44:13intelligence background, I think we
- 44:15should be looking for a few "Kashmiris"
- 44:17or people like that.
- 44:20It's not that simple.
- 44:21Ettela'at newspaper has written
- 44:23articles several times.
- 44:25Well, let me say that, in my opinion,
- 44:27they knew that the Leader is in his
- 44:29office every morning and that this
- 44:31target was accessible. And well, he had
- 44:34a habit; he wouldn't go into a shelter.
- 44:36They realized that the commanders '
- 44:38meeting was right next to him or a
- 44:40building away; that’s why they chose
- 44:42that moment. Perhaps by chance, the
- 44:45Ministry of Intelligence meeting was
- 44:47also simultaneous, but that was in a
- 44:49much more distant location. Regardless,
- 44:52this disaster happened. Let’s see,
- 44:56well, we were sitting in...I was in a
- 44:58meeting...they hit the same building.
- 45:02They hit your building; I mean, were
- 45:04there any...debris or something?
- 45:05Yes. I heard, did they pull you out
- 45:09from under the rubble?
- 45:11Almost.
- 45:11So they must have pulled you out of the
- 45:13rubble then, right?
- 45:14Well, we got out ourselves; look, three
- 45:17missiles hit. As far as I remember in
- 45:21that moment, the first one was at a
- 45:23distance and we were finally stunned;
- 45:25then a second or two later, the second
- 45:28one hit, closer, and the building shook
- 45:30, and...The third one also hit our
- 45:34building a second or two later. However
- 45:36, this building of Mr. Hejazi—for
- 45:38example, we were in a meeting on this
- 45:40side, and his office was on that side;
- 45:42they hit the office; meaning the left
- 45:44side of the building was destroyed. For
- 45:49example, may God have mercy on Mr.
- 45:51Iyozi, the martyr Iyozi's secretary;
- 45:54they said absolutely nothing was even
- 45:56found of him.
- 45:59Hejazi's secretaries.
- 46:03But we were on this side of the
- 46:05building, and that was that; the
- 46:06ceiling and everything simply collapsed
- 46:08. When it finished, I was waiting for
- 46:12the fourth one to completely end it,
- 46:14but it didn't continue. I looked at Mr.
- 46:17Hejazi and asked, "Are you alright?" I
- 46:19saw him say, "Yes." So I took his hand,
- 46:23and we eventually got up together. He
- 46:25himself said, "We must get out quickly
- 46:27because it will likely continue." We
- 46:31made our way through the rubble and
- 46:33beams, leaving the room and entering a
- 46:35hall where I could hear cries of "Ya
- 46:37Hossein," water was dripping from the
- 46:39ceiling, and everything was destroyed.
- 46:45We struggled to get out of the building
- 46:47, and then I saw the compound; various
- 46:49parts had been hit. As we came out, I
- 46:53asked Mr. Hejazi, "Sir, is he here?" He
- 46:58said, "I don't know." Meaning he wasn't
- 47:01sure either where exactly the leader
- 47:05had been in the building. Anyway, we
- 47:08got out; they had struck everywhere, it
- 47:11was absolute chaos. The security guards
- 47:14arrived; in short, they grabbed me
- 47:16quickly and I said we should leave
- 47:18because it would likely continue. We
- 47:20left quickly; our car was stuck, and
- 47:22from the gate it had been hit by
- 47:27shrapnel, and it was impossible to
- 47:29leave. We went out to the street, and a
- 47:31young man appeared.
- 47:33He got a taxi.
- 47:34Not a taxi, a young man took us, he was
- 47:36doing his duty to take us. The poor guy
- 47:40came, I think it was a Peykan or maybe
- 47:43a 206, I don't remember, he brought us,
- 47:45we got in, and he took me to the
- 47:47Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Well, the
- 47:51dust and everything, that's not
- 47:53important now.
- 47:54When did you find out Mr. Khamenei had
- 47:56been assassinated?
- 47:58Well, we realized almost that same
- 48:00night that
- 48:02meaning from sunset onwards. We, I came
- 48:08here from that place to the Ministry of
- 48:10Foreign Affairs and for perhaps 3 days
- 48:15we were completely cut off from
- 48:17everything. We were only trying to see
- 48:22who was alive and who had been martyred
- 48:24. I didn't even have definitive news
- 48:26about the president, though word
- 48:27arrived that day that he was not
- 48:31martyred, but we had no communication.
- 48:34I saw the president for the first time
- 48:363 days after the war started. I saw Mr.
- 48:41Larijani perhaps 5 days later for the
- 48:43first time, and the first meeting, as
- 48:45you call it, the first meeting that was
- 48:47held was 6 days later in a safe
- 48:49location where...three members of that
- 48:55meeting were later martyred.
- 48:56Were you in that meeting too? Well.
- 48:58No, it was a more limited meeting. Who
- 49:01were martyred? Mr. Khatib was martyred,
- 49:04Mr. Larijani was martyred, Mr. Batani
- 49:06was martyred; there were two others of
- 49:09us who are still here. Let me tell you,
- 49:15however, from the moment I arrived at
- 49:17the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we
- 49:18acted autonomously and immediately
- 49:20issued a statement, and I started
- 49:22calling the foreign ministries of the
- 49:24countries in the region. Well, I knew
- 49:30that the plan was pre-arranged; if they
- 49:32strike us, we will immediately strike
- 49:34U.S. military bases in the region, and
- 49:37the regime itself is a separate matter.
- 49:41From that very noon, I started
- 49:42contacting the foreign ministers of the
- 49:44region, the Persian Gulf Cooperation
- 49:46Council countries, and told them all
- 49:48that we are hitting US military bases,
- 49:50and you should know this is not against
- 49:52you, it is against the Americans. They
- 49:54all protested, saying "no, you can't,
- 49:56this and that"; I said this is not a
- 49:58war we started anyway, it is a war that
- 50:00was imposed on us, and we had told you
- 50:02beforehand. Well, they started
- 50:04protesting; by the afternoon, they were
- 50:06summoning our ambassadors and such
- 50:08because we were hitting them repeatedly
- 50:10. It was perhaps the third day of the
- 50:14war when one of the regional foreign
- 50:16ministers called me in the morning and
- 50:18said: "To retaliate for the places you
- 50:20hit from our soil, we will hit
- 50:22such-and-such location at, say, 8
- 50:24o'clock"—he called me at 7: 30— "
- 50:26but we won't continue; you stop hitting
- 50:28us, and we won't hit you anymore either
- 50:30." Very classy, for instance.
- 50:33Was it the UAE or Saudi Arabia?
- 50:35Man, one of the countries in the region
- 50:37.
- 50:40So, aside from the US and Israel, they
- 50:42also started calling and threatening?
- 50:45They threatened, and I said if you
- 50:46target us, this time we will target you
- 50:49directly, and a war will start between
- 50:51us and you—between us and the US, and
- 50:53between us and Israel is one thing, but
- 50:55it will start with you.
- 50:56Did you say this on your own or...No,
- 51:00well, that was our policy.
- 51:02Aha, so this was part of the approved
- 51:04resolutions.
- 51:05Yes, all of these, I mean all of these
- 51:06had been thought out. Of course, I did
- 51:08check this matter, yes. Additionally, I
- 51:12should say that our communications were
- 51:14difficult, but...There were two places
- 51:18in the armed forces where our
- 51:20connection was instantaneous. I mean,
- 51:23honestly, whenever they called, I was
- 51:25available, and whenever I called, they
- 51:27were available. Others, no, I won't
- 51:29mention names now. For Mr. So-and-so,
- 51:32we would need him, and 24 hours later
- 51:34they would say they couldn't reach him;
- 51:36now, the Leadership was a different
- 51:38matter entirely, but for all ordinary
- 51:40people, whoever we needed, we had to
- 51:43search all morning just to get an
- 51:45answer.
- 51:45But the armed forces were not like that
- 51:47.
- 51:47The armed forces, the armed forces.
- 51:51Contact was instantaneous. Whenever I
- 51:54called, honestly, Mr. Vahid would pick
- 51:56up the phone, or General Abdollahi, or
- 51:59the others, or the force commanders.
- 52:02Because when the "Na-Dena" issue came
- 52:04up, well, there were many problems
- 52:06regardless. Anyway, he told me that "we
- 52:09will strike," and I said "we will
- 52:11respond immediately, and a war between
- 52:13us and you will begin as well." Then he
- 52:16said: "Well, what should we do now?" I
- 52:18said: "Wait until 12 noon, push it back
- 52:20a little, maybe we will reach a
- 52:22conclusion." They delayed it, and then
- 52:25we had some discussions and made an
- 52:26agreement that if they didn't allow
- 52:28American bases to be used against us,
- 52:30we wouldn't strike them either; but
- 52:32they didn't stick to it. We kept
- 52:34striking them until the end of the war,
- 52:36and they didn't make such threats again
- 52:38because we would respond. We give, and
- 52:41the rest of them are the same. The
- 52:43region couldn't believe that we struck
- 52:45the region and they couldn't respond;
- 52:46this was a major transformation that
- 52:48took place. It completely transformed
- 52:50the security structure of the region;
- 52:52that Iran would strike the entire
- 52:54region, all of it, even Oman, which was
- 52:56ultimately our friend and we really
- 52:57didn't strike; but...
- 52:59You struck a part of it? No, that's
- 53:00what I want to say: they had a company
- 53:03in one of their ports that provided
- 53:05fuel to American ships; only that, we
- 53:07struck that. We hit it once or twice;
- 53:10of course, the Omanis were very upset,
- 53:12since they had really supported us; but
- 53:14that ended too, and they themselves
- 53:17stopped the companies. We struck the
- 53:20entire region, and not a single one of
- 53:22them could respond, which showed that
- 53:24the regional security structure could
- 53:26no longer be like it was before. This
- 53:30war, well, at some point we must...we
- 53:32need to get to it later; I have to
- 53:33mention our strategic achievements in
- 53:35this war, what we achieved and what
- 53:37strategic victories we gained, and in
- 53:39contrast, the damages we suffered,
- 53:41which were not strategic up to a point;
- 53:43some of our damages were strategic, but
- 53:45on balance, our strategic victories
- 53:47were greater. For the first time, we
- 53:51struck the region, we struck all these
- 53:53countries in the region for the first
- 53:55time, and then we closed the strait.
- 53:58Whose decision was this before the war?
- 54:04Before the war, we had numerous
- 54:06meetings; in the Supreme Council, all
- 54:08scenarios were reviewed, for example:
- 54:14Now I have to say these things; for
- 54:15instance, if America struck alone and
- 54:17the regime didn't participate, what
- 54:19should we do? If they both struck
- 54:21together, what should we do? If, for
- 54:22example, their targets remained limited
- 54:24to military objectives and they didn't
- 54:26strike the cities, if they hit their
- 54:28targets, what should we do? If it went
- 54:30further, if they went for the
- 54:31infrastructure, what should we do? And
- 54:33there was a scenario that was the very
- 54:35last one, if they struck the leadership
- 54:37, what should they do?
- 54:38So this was predicted.
- 54:40It even had a code, almost.
- 54:43What does that mean?
- 54:44For example, "Code So-and-So", if it
- 54:46happened, what should we do? In the
- 54:49meetings, I mean. In the sense that in
- 54:53the meeting, no one had the heart to
- 54:57say this, that, for example, the
- 55:00leadership; even saying it was hard,
- 55:02the code. If "Code 11" was mentioned,
- 55:05everyone knew what Code 11 meant if
- 55:07Code 11 happened, we would do this; it
- 55:09had been written down and approved, and
- 55:12the Supreme Leader himself had seen and
- 55:14confirmed it. That is why it began
- 55:17immediately and started in a very
- 55:19organized and systematic way. We were
- 55:22not caught off guard at all; we were
- 55:24prepared for everything. Yes, we also
- 55:27used negotiation as a tool; if it
- 55:29worked, it worked, if not?
- 55:31I once asked Mr. Larijani, I think in [
- 55:33year] 87, I said, "What will happen if
- 55:35they strike the Leader?" He gave an
- 55:37answer, I asked again, and he said, "
- 55:39Mr. [Name], stop it already."
- 55:42Meaning he scolded me to never speak of
- 55:44it again.
- 55:46Yes, even talking about it was
- 55:48difficult. That’s why I say there
- 55:50were codes; we didn't say the thing
- 55:52itself, we used that code which
- 55:53everyone knew the meaning of. When it
- 56:02started, well, I, since I finally knew
- 56:05what was happening, I personally called
- 56:07the regional ministers and said it is
- 56:09like this. Then we issued a statement,
- 56:13we started giving interviews, and the
- 56:15main goal we had those days was to
- 56:17immediately get Iran’s voice to the
- 56:19world, and this voice had to be one of
- 56:21self-confidence; not a voice that
- 56:23showed hesitation so the enemy would
- 56:25think, "Yes, they’ve really given up,
- 56:27it's over, for instance, they will
- 56:29reach their goals in two or three days.
- 56:31" It shouldn't be; if you look at the
- 56:34interviews I gave those days, and Mr.
- 56:36Baghaei, my spokesperson, gave.
- 56:38Mr. Baghaei who really
- 56:40Mr. Baghaei really went above and
- 56:42beyond; the number of interviews he did
- 56:44, the number of...
- 56:45Their meetings were never canceled,
- 56:47their weekly meetings; he even said a
- 56:49very tough phrase that we [showed] our
- 56:51superpower...Meaning this
- 56:55They fought very hard.
- 56:56In the literature of the Ministry of
- 56:58Foreign Affairs, it was like this.
- 57:00During these 40 days, Mr. Baghaei, as
- 57:02our spokesperson, as you said, never
- 57:04canceled his spokesperson meeting even
- 57:07once. In these 40 days, and I must say
- 57:09in these 40 days, I and my deputies and
- 57:12all my colleagues did not leave the
- 57:14Ministry of Foreign Affairs building;
- 57:16everyone else went to other places,
- 57:18other buildings. Of course, we weren't
- 57:21in our offices, but within the Ministry
- 57:23of Foreign Affairs site, we had
- 57:25anticipated some locations, which I
- 57:27don’t know how safe they were, but
- 57:29finally...
- 57:29There was no safe place.
- 57:31There was no safe place.
- 57:32Except for the tunnels, there was no
- 57:34safe place.
- 57:35Now, the tunnel also had its own
- 57:37hardships, anyway, but we were at the
- 57:39Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all the
- 57:41deputies were there; I’ve told this
- 57:43famous story in a few places, maybe you
- 57:46know, the interpretation that a foreign
- 57:48think tank had made, that we...Had
- 57:55underestimated a few things. One, they
- 57:58underestimated Iran’s armed forces.
- 58:02They didn't think they could resist so
- 58:04much and could, I mean, continue the
- 58:06missile fire. Second, they had
- 58:09underestimated the people of Iran. They
- 58:11didn't think they would support [the
- 58:13state] like this. They thought that as
- 58:15soon as something happened, everyone
- 58:17would come to the streets and protest
- 58:19and the problems you know; but the
- 58:21people stood firm. And the third, which
- 58:24is interesting, is that we had
- 58:25underestimated the Iranian officials.
- 58:29No one imagined that they would be
- 58:31martyred one by one, yet still stand
- 58:33their ground; in all similar cases, it
- 58:36happens frequently that they leave
- 58:38their posts, resign, leave the country,
- 58:40flee, and seek asylum.
- 58:43They seek asylum, and how much effort
- 58:45they put into making them seek asylum.
- 58:47From the diplomats.
- 58:48From our diplomats, because they were
- 58:50accessible; they were both accessible
- 58:51and under intense psychological
- 58:53pressure. I experienced this; since
- 58:562009. I was the ambassador to Japan.
- 59:01Watching the crisis in your own country
- 59:03from the outside makes the anxiety and
- 59:05turmoil many times worse; because you
- 59:07can't do anything about it from the
- 59:09outside, and then being exposed to the
- 59:11psychological pressure of Western media
- 59:14is truly crushing. But none of my
- 59:17colleagues not only didn't quit their
- 59:19jobs, but they didn't lose their morale
- 59:21either. Perhaps you noticed that this
- 59:24time our public diplomacy was much more
- 59:26active than last time. Most of our
- 59:28embassies were tweeting, and
- 59:30significant tweets that got millions of
- 59:32views, and the Westerners themselves
- 59:34admitted that many Western media
- 59:36outlets acknowledged that Iran's public
- 59:38diplomacy prevailed over American
- 59:40public diplomacy. These works they
- 59:43created, these AI-generated pieces, the
- 59:45Lego topic which was the initiative of
- 59:48our Iranian youth, and many other
- 59:49things; and then our embassies tweeted
- 59:52and shared them, some of which received
- 59:54over twenty million views. No, my
- 59:56colleagues, both inside and outside the
- 59:59country, stood firm; not even a single
- 1:00:01local employee of ours quit their job,
- 1:00:03saying "I won't come in from tomorrow."
- 1:00:05Protection doesn't even make much sense
- 1:00:07anymore.
- 1:00:08No.
- 1:00:09The poor security guards. I mean, what
- 1:00:13can they do? It's a missile, it just
- 1:00:15comes and hits.
- 1:00:17I even, since we had to go to different
- 1:00:19places at night, sometimes I would tell
- 1:00:21the security guards: "Sir, don't come;
- 1:00:23because if a missile hits, there's
- 1:00:25nothing you can do, you'll just be
- 1:00:27martyred for nothing, don't sacrifice
- 1:00:29yourselves for me." But no, my security
- 1:00:32guards were truly with me everywhere;
- 1:00:34they had various initiatives, because
- 1:00:36even this can at least be mitigated
- 1:00:38with some initiatives. For example,
- 1:00:44suppose that no other official had a
- 1:00:46phone due to the security situation
- 1:00:48everyone knows about, but unfortunately
- 1:00:50, I couldn't put the phone aside;
- 1:00:52because all my foreign contacts with
- 1:00:54foreign ministers, constant interviews,
- 1:00:57calls, contacts with our own embassies,
- 1:00:59I had to do all of them, and therefore,
- 1:01:01for example, the only thing that...
- 1:01:07Maybe it lowered the risk factor a bit,
- 1:01:09was dedicating some hours of the day to
- 1:01:11me getting in the car, and we would
- 1:01:13drive around the city so that at least
- 1:01:15I wouldn't be in one fixed place, just
- 1:01:17in case...we could leave.
- 1:01:19But there were many innovative methods,
- 1:01:22and well, at a certain point we finally
- 1:01:24managed to control it; the rate of
- 1:01:26martyrdom among officials went down,
- 1:01:28but unfortunately, we lost precious
- 1:01:30people too.
- 1:01:32The real perception was that this place
- 1:01:34is like Venezuela, meaning...
- 1:01:35That by hitting, for example, the
- 1:01:37leadership and, say, a few officials,
- 1:01:39the work would be finished.
- 1:01:41I said it before; I said officials were
- 1:01:43martyred one by one, but we didn't back
- 1:01:45down. Once, I think it was in one of
- 1:01:49the talks for the Americans, I don't
- 1:01:51remember where.
- 1:01:55For Vidcafa.
- 1:01:56For Vidcafa, I said: "Have you ever
- 1:02:01been in a meeting where you suspected
- 1:02:03at any moment that the whole meeting
- 1:02:05might explode?" He just stared blankly.
- 1:02:10I said, "Have you ever talked on the
- 1:02:12phone and suspected that at the very
- 1:02:14moment you were talking, you might, so
- 1:02:16to speak, blow up and be destroyed?""
- 1:02:23Have you ever asked about your family
- 1:02:24on the phone and told yourself it might
- 1:02:26be the last time?" I said we have
- 1:02:32experienced these things and we stood
- 1:02:34firm; you have to talk to us
- 1:02:36differently. You can't threaten us; you
- 1:02:41can't bribe us. In the negotiations
- 1:02:45before the 12-day war, they had come to
- 1:02:47bribe—no, not normalize—to bribe
- 1:02:50the Islamic Republic, saying "we will
- 1:02:52do this, we will build that." I told
- 1:02:55him there that our enrichment is not
- 1:02:57for sale. This is something for which
- 1:03:00the people of Iran have endured
- 1:03:02sanctions for 20 years, and their
- 1:03:03scientists have shed their blood. How
- 1:03:05could we sell it? You say, "I will
- 1:03:07build you what kind of power plant?""I
- 1:03:08will build what?" I told him here,
- 1:03:10neither bribery nor threats. Someone
- 1:03:12should threaten when there is fear.
- 1:03:14When we...Go and...Wait every moment
- 1:03:19for any disaster to happen to us, you
- 1:03:21can no longer scare me by saying, "I'll
- 1:03:23come, I'll strike, I'll do this, I'll
- 1:03:25wage war."
- 1:03:26This is not Venezuela.
- 1:03:27Yes, this is not Venezuela where you
- 1:03:29can take someone out and the rest get
- 1:03:31scared and back down. The same goes for
- 1:03:33infrastructure; because the discussion
- 1:03:35of attacking infrastructure became very
- 1:03:37hot at one point, they threatened me,
- 1:03:39they gave me an ultimatum, and they hit
- 1:03:41a few places, so we immediately hit a
- 1:03:43few places back. In response, as I
- 1:03:45mentioned, one scenario was that if
- 1:03:47they hit our infrastructure, which
- 1:03:49infrastructure of theirs should we hit?
- 1:03:52All these were identified beforehand...
- 1:03:54Why didn't it continue? Why didn't they
- 1:03:56hit our infrastructure? That was a
- 1:03:58fundamental question! I mean, when I
- 1:04:00was threatening back then, I said, "God
- 1:04:02, why did they only peck at our
- 1:04:03infrastructure now?" They pecked at a
- 1:04:06few places; now, bridges and such are
- 1:04:08not even considered infrastructure. In
- 1:04:10my opinion, infrastructure means
- 1:04:12Assaluyeh, it means steel; these are it
- 1:04:14. These are the infrastructures. Why
- 1:04:16didn't they hit our infrastructure
- 1:04:18extensively? "
- 1:04:19In my opinion, when they started
- 1:04:20hitting our infrastructure, well, we
- 1:04:22hit the region's infrastructure; of
- 1:04:24course, the infrastructure whose
- 1:04:25shareholders were American. When the
- 1:04:28region's infrastructure started taking
- 1:04:30hits, they finally realized that the
- 1:04:32war was serious. At that time, the
- 1:04:35region started pressuring Trump to stop
- 1:04:37; well, we would have targeted the
- 1:04:39infrastructure sooner, meaning we would
- 1:04:41have been the ones to start it.
- 1:04:44Well, it's a good thing you're not a
- 1:04:45commander. After all, this has its own
- 1:04:51calculations; it's not just about
- 1:04:53hitting, you have to be able to defend
- 1:04:55your own infrastructure, and you have
- 1:04:57to be able to predict, for example, if
- 1:04:59they hit our power plants, how long I
- 1:05:01can continue, or what if they hit our
- 1:05:04gas.
- 1:05:04No, I’m saying if they hit it—well,
- 1:05:07you’re not a commander, we should ask
- 1:05:09others this—but I say if they hit
- 1:05:11infrastructure, it increases pressure
- 1:05:13on the Americans and lowers the
- 1:05:15threshold for war; I don’t know,
- 1:05:17other things happen, so why not strike
- 1:05:19first?
- 1:05:20No, if striking infrastructure had
- 1:05:21started from our side, it would have
- 1:05:22created legitimacy for them to hit our
- 1:05:24infrastructure.
- 1:05:25Is it a world of legitimacy now, Mr.
- 1:05:27Doctor? Everyone does whatever they
- 1:05:29want.
- 1:05:29It is. Look, they started with caution;
- 1:05:32for example, they hit four phases of
- 1:05:34Assaluyeh, I think. If we had started
- 1:05:37it, they would have hit all 24 phases
- 1:05:39immediately. After all, this has its
- 1:05:41own calculations. I’m saying it’s a
- 1:05:43good thing you and I aren't military
- 1:05:45commanders to ruin this country. We...
- 1:05:52what days we went through...one day I
- 1:05:54must write down the exact memories or
- 1:05:56tell what days we endured. The first
- 1:06:01days were really very hard, very, very
- 1:06:03hard; because news just kept arriving
- 1:06:06about where they hit, who they hit, and
- 1:06:08the threats that were being made that
- 1:06:10...We should surrender unconditionally,
- 1:06:16and I don't know what else.
- 1:06:17Didn't you lose heart, Mr. Doctor?
- 1:06:19No. A person might get worried in their
- 1:06:23heart that we must prevent these things
- 1:06:25, but losing heart to the point of
- 1:06:27saying" it's over, just let it go, "no,
- 1:06:30never.
- 1:06:31No, everyone was worried in the sense
- 1:06:34that, well, I personally had predicted
- 1:06:36that they might target the leadership,
- 1:06:38and many in these meetings said so, but
- 1:06:40I really didn't anticipate the Defense
- 1:06:42Council being hit with that scale; I
- 1:06:44didn't think that seven, eight, or ten
- 1:06:46people in the Defense Council would be
- 1:06:49hit suddenly all at once.
- 1:06:51Of course, it wasn't the Defense
- 1:06:53Council.
- 1:06:54It was beyond the Defense Council.
- 1:06:56No, no, it was smaller; it was one of
- 1:06:58the sub-committees of the Defense
- 1:07:00Council, because the Defense Council
- 1:07:02includes the Foreign Minister, and the
- 1:07:04President himself chairs it. That is
- 1:07:06something like a Supreme Council. Two
- 1:07:08or three people are different in it.
- 1:07:10However, just like the Supreme Council
- 1:07:11which has sub-committees. This was one
- 1:07:13of its committees. But unfortunately,
- 1:07:15four or five of the main people were in
- 1:07:17it.
- 1:07:17For example, the previous head of SPND,
- 1:07:20the current head of SPND, and their
- 1:07:22deputies.
- 1:07:23Where is SPND?
- 1:07:24It belongs to the Ministry of Defense.
- 1:07:26Well, we're saying they were all there.
- 1:07:28Now, I want to say, didn't you lose
- 1:07:30heart? Look, actually, that was the
- 1:07:34enemy's plan; why did they hit the
- 1:07:36Minav school anyway? I really think
- 1:07:43they hit it on purpose, and one of
- 1:07:44their intentions was to dishearten us;
- 1:07:46meaning to show the depth of the
- 1:07:48tragedy to the people. Why did they hit
- 1:07:52the Dena [ship]? It was really a
- 1:07:54completely defenseless ship, hundreds
- 1:07:56of kilometers away from Iran; it was a
- 1:07:59training vessel, it had gone for a
- 1:08:01ceremonial maneuver, that's all. All of
- 1:08:04this is to scare and dishearten. And
- 1:08:08they have tested us many times. When
- 1:08:10they entered the infrastructure, well,
- 1:08:12they hit some places to see if we would
- 1:08:14have short hands [give in]. They tested
- 1:08:17us a lot to reach a point, and with the
- 1:08:19propaganda they were doing, they wanted
- 1:08:21to bring us to that point, but really
- 1:08:23no one...
- 1:08:23What about the cabinet, Dr.?
- 1:08:26There was no cabinet; the cabinet
- 1:08:28perhaps held its first meeting just
- 1:08:30last week. Of course, we were in
- 1:08:32contact, we would contact the ministers
- 1:08:38we needed to coordinate with, we would
- 1:08:40find each other; but no, in this period
- 1:08:42, perhaps the person I saw the most was
- 1:08:44the President. The President was truly
- 1:08:47available, and regularly, at least for
- 1:08:49my own work, I would visit him, and if
- 1:08:52necessary, he would set up a meeting,
- 1:08:54that 6-member committee.
- 1:08:55Are you talking about during the war?
- 1:08:57Both in the war and in the negotiations
- 1:08:59.
- 1:08:59Did you see each other in the 6-member
- 1:09:00committee during the war?
- 1:09:02The 6-member committee, well, it was a
- 1:09:05group because it wasn't possible to
- 1:09:07invite everyone at all; it was
- 1:09:08dangerous security-wise.
- 1:09:12The tunnel is safe, nothing happens in
- 1:09:14the tunnel; you were invited to go to
- 1:09:16the tunnel, nothing happens, meaning
- 1:09:18they aren't strong enough to hit the
- 1:09:20tunnel. They hit the front of the door,
- 1:09:23the guys there filled the oxygen tanks,
- 1:09:25meaning I know nothing happens in there
- 1:09:27.
- 1:09:30Well, they hit their own. No, it wasn't
- 1:09:33like everyone could go to the tunnels;
- 1:09:35after all, there are considerations.
- 1:09:37You know what the condition is? That if
- 1:09:39you go, you have to stay for a few days
- 1:09:41, for instance; you can't just go and
- 1:09:43come back quickly. And you can't go
- 1:09:46because you have work outside.
- 1:09:48Yes, well, I will tell these types of
- 1:09:50stories when some time has passed, God
- 1:09:53willing, about where we went, what we
- 1:09:55did, and how it was, but; We had the
- 1:10:00most interaction with the President. He
- 1:10:04would invite people accordingly: Mr.
- 1:10:06Larijani and then Mr. Zolnour, who
- 1:10:08became his successor, Mr. Ghalibaf. It
- 1:10:14was a truly 5-6 person group that
- 1:10:16regularly would see each other in some
- 1:10:21way. And later, when it was decided
- 1:10:23that a committee should be formed and
- 1:10:26it was left to the President himself to
- 1:10:28appoint the individuals, when he added,
- 1:10:30I think, one person to those same 5-6
- 1:10:32people, it became 6 people so that they
- 1:10:35could make decisions in the moment for
- 1:10:37the negotiations; because really,
- 1:10:39contact with the top was a bit
- 1:10:42difficult. And sometimes it was
- 1:10:45necessary for decisions to be made
- 1:10:47quickly; this committee was formed for
- 1:10:49that purpose.
- 1:10:50How was your relationship with Mr.
- 1:10:52Mojtaba? Have you ever seen him?
- 1:10:54No, never.
- 1:10:55You haven't seen him at all?
- 1:10:56In this period, I haven't seen him, and
- 1:10:59I don't think—meaning, except for a
- 1:11:01few select people, [others] have seen
- 1:11:03him; before this, the same [applies], I
- 1:11:05...
- 1:11:06I had no relationship.
- 1:11:08No, I don't know him at all.
- 1:11:10Well, from afar, yes, from what I've
- 1:11:12heard from others, but I haven't had
- 1:11:14personal contact. I've seen him a few
- 1:11:16times at some events from a distance,
- 1:11:18but we haven't had a conversation.
- 1:11:20No, I saw him too; I saw him at the
- 1:11:23Book Fair. Did you imagine they would
- 1:11:26elect him to the Assembly of Experts?
- 1:11:31Well, he was always considered one of
- 1:11:33the candidates. One of the individuals
- 1:11:36—let's not say candidate—deemed
- 1:11:38worthy of this position, well, it's up
- 1:11:40to the Assembly of Experts. What worked
- 1:11:45out very well for us was that It sent a
- 1:11:51very important message to the world:
- 1:11:53despite the war and despite all this,
- 1:11:55there has been no change in the
- 1:11:57policies, principles, and ideals of the
- 1:11:59Islamic Republic, and there will not be
- 1:12:02. And it was very important that this
- 1:12:04message be sent. For the Americans, the
- 1:12:06expression they used themselves to mock
- 1:12:08Trump was:" So, what did you do? "" A
- 1:12:10... "
- 1:12:11Khamenei became young.
- 1:12:12Khamenei became young; the old Khamenei
- 1:12:14was gone, and a young Khamenei, so to
- 1:12:16speak, replaced him. You couldn't do
- 1:12:18anything else either. The Strait of
- 1:12:20Hormuz was open, and now, so to speak,
- 1:12:22because of you, it closed. You couldn't
- 1:12:24even gain access to resources. Aside
- 1:12:27from eventually killing some people and
- 1:12:29destroying some buildings and places,
- 1:12:31what achievement did you have? And this
- 1:12:34has truly remained the case for Trump,
- 1:12:36that he cannot present any achievement.
- 1:12:39I mean, in this war, my own opinion
- 1:12:41regarding the 12-day war was that it
- 1:12:44was a draw; however, our" one "was just
- 1:12:47one, while their" one "was the whole
- 1:12:49world—that is, America, Israel, NATO
- 1:12:52countries, and regional countries. What
- 1:12:56do you say now? Because I remember you
- 1:12:58said back then," No, it wasn't a draw,
- 1:13:00we won the 12-day war. "What is your
- 1:13:02opinion now?
- 1:13:04No, I now believe that we actually
- 1:13:06achieved a strategic victory. In my
- 1:13:08opinion, the position of the Islamic
- 1:13:10Republic changed drastically after this
- 1:13:12war. And most importantly, the image of
- 1:13:15a weak Iran was shattered. Perhaps that
- 1:13:20was our greatest achievement, and in
- 1:13:22its place, the image of a strong and
- 1:13:24resilient Iran was established.
- 1:13:27Didn't this happen after the 12-day war
- 1:13:29?
- 1:13:29Why? At that time, they realized it
- 1:13:32themselves, but they didn't believe it.
- 1:13:34They thought the cause was, for example
- 1:13:36, equipment issues or something, and if
- 1:13:38they hit Iran's launchers—what to do,
- 1:13:41what to do—they could resolve it; but
- 1:13:43in this 40-day war, it was proven.
- 1:13:45Especially since last time, well, they
- 1:13:47finally called for a ceasefire after
- 1:13:49the war, and we eventually accepted it.
- 1:13:53This time you said we won't even have a
- 1:13:55ceasefire; we want to fight until we
- 1:13:57reach a point that marks the end of the
- 1:13:59war. We don't want this scenario to
- 1:14:02repeat every year anymore. And
- 1:14:05therefore, I believe our most important
- 1:14:07achievement was that the image of a
- 1:14:09weak Iran was shattered. An image of a
- 1:14:12strong Iran replaced the previous one.
- 1:14:14When I say God knows, it is not a
- 1:14:16slogan at all. I am the one seeing it
- 1:14:18every day in my talks with other
- 1:14:20countries and the kind
- 1:14:21of feedback that exists out there.
- 1:14:23Absolutely, absolutely, everyone, the
- 1:14:26ministers we meet with, friend and foe,
- 1:14:28say Iran emerged from this war stronger
- 1:14:31. That is their own interpretation.
- 1:14:33Iran astonished the world. Iran
- 1:14:35demonstrated its remaining power. We
- 1:14:39just realized that your atomic bomb is
- 1:14:41the Strait of Hormuz. We had been
- 1:14:43looking for something else until now.
- 1:14:44The world realized that Iran is strong.
- 1:14:47This may have been our greatest victory
- 1:14:49. Well, how did they realize we are
- 1:14:51strong? Because we resisted. We did not
- 1:14:53surrender, no regime change occurred,
- 1:14:56and Iran was not partitioned. They had
- 1:14:58planned to partition Iran. On the
- 1:15:03fourth day of the war, Trump called
- 1:15:05some leaders; now that it is public, he
- 1:15:07called into the Iraqi Kurdistan region
- 1:15:10and spoke to them one by one. He
- 1:15:14himself said a while ago:" We sent
- 1:15:16weapons there and didn't know where the
- 1:15:18weapons went. "Meaning, on the same day
- 1:15:22he spoke, I spoke in the evening; with
- 1:15:25Mr. Barzani, Mr. Talabani, Fidan the
- 1:15:27Turkish Foreign Minister, and Mr.
- 1:15:30Sudani. I personally called the Iraqi
- 1:15:34Prime Minister and warned that if the
- 1:15:36slightest threat, so to speak, is
- 1:15:38directed at us from the Iraqi Kurdistan
- 1:15:40region, we will retaliate; do not think
- 1:15:42we are occupied elsewhere, we will
- 1:15:44definitely retaliate and we will
- 1:15:46definitely strike.
- 1:15:48Did these calls have an effect?
- 1:15:52The regional officials and Sudani
- 1:15:53himself assured me that they would
- 1:15:55never let this happen and said that we
- 1:15:57will control them and will not allow it
- 1:15:58. Turkey played an effective role; they
- 1:16:03spoke to the Americans and also took
- 1:16:05very firm positions in this regard. A
- 1:16:08set of efforts caused this plot to fail
- 1:16:10, but my point is that they had planned
- 1:16:12for the partition of Iran too. Now, it
- 1:16:15is well known that he, now it is beyond
- 1:16:17trivialities, that little fledgling.
- 1:16:22Pahlavi.
- 1:16:23Yes, it was later revealed that during
- 1:16:26a trip to Israel, he had agreed to the
- 1:16:28partition of Iran, saying the periphery
- 1:16:30is yours and the central region, for
- 1:16:33example, I become the King.
- 1:16:35Throne for me, yes, meaning they had
- 1:16:37laid out their plans for the partition
- 1:16:39of Iran, for the fall of the system,
- 1:16:44and for internal chaos. If we had such
- 1:16:51an upper hand, if we were at the point
- 1:16:53of victory, then why did we accept the
- 1:16:55ceasefire? For the very reason you
- 1:16:58mentioned, at what point should a war
- 1:17:00end? When you are defeated or when you
- 1:17:03are victorious? The answer is very
- 1:17:05clear, in the sense that if we had
- 1:17:07continued, we would have solidified it
- 1:17:09more.
- 1:17:10What does" solidified more "mean?
- 1:17:12It means that we don't have it happen
- 1:17:14one more time.
- 1:17:15Let me then give you the answer to this
- 1:17:17question very precisely and firmly. One
- 1:17:20. How should a war end? How do wars end
- 1:17:27in general? Either through absolute
- 1:17:30military victory or through negotiation
- 1:17:32. Absolute military victory means you
- 1:17:35go and defeat the opponent completely,
- 1:17:38they raise their hands and say," Sir, I
- 1:17:40have been defeated, I will listen to
- 1:17:42whatever you say, "like, for example,
- 1:17:44the fate that befell Germany in the war
- 1:17:46.
- 1:17:46Meaning you occupy them or
- 1:17:48The fate that befell Saddam in the war,
- 1:17:50or I don't know, other cases, or
- 1:17:52otherwise.
- 1:17:52Which we do not have the capability for
- 1:17:54.
- 1:17:54If, if you have this capability, go do
- 1:17:56it. We don't have the capability to
- 1:17:58make Israel and America raise their
- 1:18:00hands or go and occupy them, no.
- 1:18:01We would kiss the hand of anyone who
- 1:18:03could do that. Well, if you don't have
- 1:18:05it, then there must be negotiation.
- 1:18:07When should you negotiate? When you
- 1:18:10have the upper hand on the military
- 1:18:11front, or when you have the lower hand?
- 1:18:13When you have the upper hand.
- 1:18:15When you have the upper hand. When you
- 1:18:17have the upper hand and are victorious
- 1:18:19on the field, and have achieved field
- 1:18:21and strategic gains, you must negotiate
- 1:18:24. Not when, so to speak, the other side
- 1:18:27has the upper hand. Would our gains
- 1:18:31have been greater or lesser if we had
- 1:18:32continued the war?
- 1:18:34Military.
- 1:18:35Military, strategic, in any form.
- 1:18:37Also the risk.
- 1:18:38Would our losses have been greater or
- 1:18:40lesser? As you say, it's a risk; you
- 1:18:42cannot take risks with people's lives,
- 1:18:44you cannot gamble with the country's
- 1:18:47destiny. You must make the right
- 1:18:48decision and make a full calculation.
- 1:18:51If, at the point where we accepted the
- 1:18:53ceasefire or the agreement, we had
- 1:18:55fought longer, would our gains have
- 1:18:56been greater? No, look, some people say
- 1:18:59we are, I don't know, ten meters away
- 1:19:01from the tent.
- 1:19:02I am not concerned with" some people, "
- 1:19:04we are talking to each other.
- 1:19:05Now, let me put it this way: they say,"
- 1:19:07Sir, we must fight to a point where war
- 1:19:09no longer happens. "In your opinion,
- 1:19:11have we fought to that point? Does it
- 1:19:13reach that?
- 1:19:14When you want to end a war, let's go
- 1:19:16step by step. When you have the upper
- 1:19:18hand, you must negotiate. If you can
- 1:19:20fight and finish the job with war—if
- 1:19:22you are behind their tent and can go
- 1:19:23and burn it down—then go do it. But
- 1:19:25if you want to end the war through
- 1:19:27negotiation in a way that it never
- 1:19:29happens again, I agree. When should you
- 1:19:30do this? And
- 1:19:31When you have the upper hand.
- 1:19:33You have the upper hand. Where is the
- 1:19:35point of the upper hand? Where is the
- 1:19:37point of negotiation? Is it the point
- 1:19:39where, if you go any further, your
- 1:19:41victories might not increase, and your
- 1:19:43losses might increase? Or do you say,"
- 1:19:45Now is not the time, let me take 10
- 1:19:47more steps forward, record two more
- 1:19:49victories, and enter the field with a
- 1:19:51stronger hand "?
- 1:19:52This carries a risk. We tested this
- 1:19:54once in the Imposed War in '66, it
- 1:19:56didn't work.
- 1:19:57We hit a wall in '66. If we had
- 1:19:59definitely accepted 598 [UN Resolution]
- 1:20:01, it would have been better.
- 1:20:02That is exactly what I am telling you.
- 1:20:03But we left it until '67 to accept it.
- 1:20:05I am saying that, in my opinion, our
- 1:20:07strategic gains were completed in the
- 1:20:10first two weeks of the war. Now,
- 1:20:12Meaning they realized the Islamic
- 1:20:14Republic cannot be folded.
- 1:20:16They did not reach any of their goals.
- 1:20:18We established the Strait of Hormuz as
- 1:20:20a new tool of deterrence, showed our
- 1:20:22authority to the region, showed that we
- 1:20:24are invincible, showed our resilience,
- 1:20:27and imposed costs on the world and the
- 1:20:29region so that no one would ever crave
- 1:20:31war with us again. In this war, we
- 1:20:33emerged as an international player,
- 1:20:35moving beyond regional status. They
- 1:20:38were telling us," Sir, Africa is
- 1:20:39desperate, open up this channel so the
- 1:20:41fertilizer reaches them; they are
- 1:20:43starving. "Pardon me, this phrasing
- 1:20:45might be a bit informal, or as you say,
- 1:20:47street-style.
- 1:20:49They were desperate.
- 1:20:50They were desperate in East Asia,
- 1:20:52things had reached the point of
- 1:20:54rationing and so on, and in Europe, it
- 1:20:56was the same. This means Iran's action
- 1:20:58in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian
- 1:21:01Gulf had global consequences, and
- 1:21:03therefore, we became a global player;
- 1:21:05that is no small thing. The region
- 1:21:07understood that without ensuring Iran's
- 1:21:09security, it cannot have security;
- 1:21:12without Iran's economic capability, the
- 1:21:14region cannot have security. These were
- 1:21:17all achievements we reached in the
- 1:21:18first two or three weeks. We also had
- 1:21:22damages. We lost our leadership. Of
- 1:21:24course, we replaced them. After all,
- 1:21:26our system is robust. We showed that
- 1:21:28the system is robust. We showed that
- 1:21:30our social capital is firmly in place.
- 1:21:32These are all achievements, but we
- 1:21:34suffered losses. We lost some
- 1:21:36individuals. I don't know, we lost some
- 1:21:39infrastructure. We lost Mobarakeh Steel
- 1:21:41. I don't know.
- 1:21:42The people.
- 1:21:44Ultimately, the people were troubled.
- 1:21:46If we sit down and calculate, had we
- 1:21:49agreed to a ceasefire earlier, in my
- 1:21:51opinion, our achievements would still
- 1:21:54be intact, but we would have kept
- 1:21:56Larijani, Khatib, Asaluyeh, and
- 1:21:58Mobarakeh Steel. Now, you are saying
- 1:22:02that if we had continued from the point
- 1:22:04where we agreed to the ceasefire, our
- 1:22:06achievements would have increased.
- 1:22:09Ah, so you're saying instead of the
- 1:22:10fortieth day, your opinion is that if
- 1:22:12we had a ceasefire on, say, the
- 1:22:13twenty-seventh or twenty-eighth day, it
- 1:22:15wouldn't have been bad.
- 1:22:16I am saying this in theory, yes. If we
- 1:22:19sit and write it down precisely on
- 1:22:20paper, we might say the twenty-eighth,
- 1:22:22no, the thirtieth; maybe we would say
- 1:22:23the thirtieth, no, the fifth day of the
- 1:22:25war. But let's do the math; look, you
- 1:22:27are deciding the fate of a country,
- 1:22:29it’s not a matter of ifs and buts.
- 1:22:31You cannot gamble with the fate of a
- 1:22:32country, with the lives of the people.
- 1:22:34You must calculate precisely: If I
- 1:22:36fight longer from this moment, will I
- 1:22:38have more achievements and be stronger
- 1:22:40in negotiations, or will I suffer more
- 1:22:43losses and be weaker in negotiations?
- 1:22:46If my infrastructure reaches a point
- 1:22:48where, for instance, I'm short on
- 1:22:50people's electricity, their gas, and so
- 1:22:52on, can I then appear stronger in the
- 1:22:54negotiation arena? No. If, God forbid,
- 1:22:57some damage is done to my social
- 1:22:59capital—I don't want to use certain
- 1:23:02terms here. If we create problems and
- 1:23:04our stature is suddenly broken, then
- 1:23:06going into negotiations is useless.
- 1:23:08Therefore, determining the point of
- 1:23:10negotiation is a very difficult task.
- 1:23:13No, I'm saying if at that point of
- 1:23:14negotiation, if it had reached the
- 1:23:16fortieth day, say the fifty-fifth, we
- 1:23:19wouldn't have had the upper hand.
- 1:23:21In my opinion, no.
- 1:23:22You know, I don't see those 15 days as
- 1:23:24having any upper hand, we wouldn't have
- 1:23:26gained any strategic achievement either
- 1:23:28. I say maybe those 15 days would make
- 1:23:30the enemy more desperate so they
- 1:23:32wouldn't come back next time, or maybe
- 1:23:34they wouldn't. You're saying" maybe "
- 1:23:36yourself; you can't make a decision
- 1:23:38based on" maybe, "tell me for sure.
- 1:23:40I cannot say for sure.
- 1:23:41Well, exactly.
- 1:23:42Sir, who can say anything for sure
- 1:23:44anyway?
- 1:23:45Who can say?
- 1:23:46No one can say for sure; can you say
- 1:23:47for sure right now that...
- 1:23:49Who has our Constitution entrusted this
- 1:23:51duty to? The Supreme National Security
- 1:23:53Council. The Supreme National Security
- 1:23:55Council; look at the entire composition
- 1:23:57of the Council in the Constitution; the
- 1:23:59military is there, politicians are
- 1:24:00there, domestic policy is there,
- 1:24:02foreign policy is there, economists are
- 1:24:04there, the person in charge of the
- 1:24:05country's financial resources is there,
- 1:24:07and security officials are there too.
- 1:24:09The Constitution has foreseen this,
- 1:24:11specified such a composition from the
- 1:24:12highest ranks of each field, and said
- 1:24:14they should decide during peace or war
- 1:24:16or...and then peace and war, according
- 1:24:18to the Constitution, still rests with
- 1:24:20the Leadership; so these are all
- 1:24:21provided for. Decision-making is not
- 1:24:23like you and me saying," Sir, maybe
- 1:24:24this will happen, maybe that will
- 1:24:26happen. "" If this happens "—there
- 1:24:27are no" ifs "; it must be calculated
- 1:24:29precisely. In those Supreme Council
- 1:24:30meetings, everyone spoke precisely from
- 1:24:31their own perspective; one would say,"
- 1:24:33Sir, how much is my resilience, for
- 1:24:34example, in terms of providing for
- 1:24:35people's livelihoods? "Another would
- 1:24:37say," How much is my military
- 1:24:38resilience? "How long can I fight? How
- 1:24:40long can I not do such and such? I
- 1:24:41would say," Suppose our foreign policy
- 1:24:43situation is what? "Are we isolated now
- 1:24:45, or are we not? Are we getting
- 1:24:46resolutions against us now? It covers
- 1:24:48everything; where our strength is,
- 1:24:49where our weakness is. Everyone spoke
- 1:24:51in the meeting. In that specific final
- 1:24:54meeting, it started at 9 PM and went
- 1:24:56until 3 AM.
- 1:24:57What day?
- 1:24:59The one that approved the note with
- 1:25:01America, the last session, the one that
- 1:25:03is under scrutiny and there is finally
- 1:25:04a lot of talk about it.
- 1:25:06Meaning out of those 13 people, 12
- 1:25:08voted for the ceasefire, the discussion
- 1:25:10was the same number.
- 1:25:11The ceasefire took place under much
- 1:25:13harder security conditions; at that
- 1:25:15time, it was impossible to hold a
- 1:25:17Supreme Council meeting because if we
- 1:25:19had convened the Supreme Council and,
- 1:25:21for instance, were bombed at that
- 1:25:23moment, the country would have truly...
- 1:25:25Well then, what process led to the
- 1:25:27approval of us accepting the ceasefire?
- 1:25:29At that time, it was approved in
- 1:25:31smaller meetings and, you know...
- 1:25:33Meaning four by four, three by three,
- 1:25:35and then the conclusion—were they all
- 1:25:37in agreement? Well, back then naturally
- 1:25:41there were pros and cons, although you
- 1:25:43really cannot compare the conditions of
- 1:25:46that time with later conditions; you
- 1:25:48were under a war where even two people
- 1:25:50meeting was difficult, but eventually
- 1:25:52the meetings were held and the
- 1:25:53discussion...
- 1:25:55Were they all in agreement?
- 1:26:00I'm saying, there were finally pros and
- 1:26:02cons there too, but ultimately...On the
- 1:26:08condition that if America accepts that
- 1:26:10the 10 points we provided be the basis
- 1:26:12for negotiations, we can accept a
- 1:26:14ceasefire.
- 1:26:17Everyone agreed on this too, I mean the
- 1:26:19military officials agreed.
- 1:26:21Look, essentially the military is in
- 1:26:23charge, let's put it that way, because
- 1:26:25the war is in their hands; if they
- 1:26:27don't agree, it won't work. I heard
- 1:26:31that there was a threat of resignation
- 1:26:35from the government, for instance from
- 1:26:37your side.
- 1:26:38I...
- 1:26:38I...no.
- 1:26:42No, actually, my situation in foreign
- 1:26:44policy was good; we had issues with the
- 1:26:46Persian Gulf countries, but the war had
- 1:26:49brought our foreign policy to a point
- 1:26:51where our flag was flying high. But
- 1:26:56regarding livelihood issues, it was a
- 1:26:58bit difficult; no one authorized my
- 1:27:00resignation. Now let's move past the
- 1:27:03ceasefire, let's leave it; so the
- 1:27:05ceasefire is with Mr. Mojtaba’s
- 1:27:07opinion, right?
- 1:27:10Look, in those days, communication with
- 1:27:12him was extremely difficult, and our
- 1:27:14connection was through people who were
- 1:27:16liaisons, and issues were conveyed that
- 1:27:18way. Who first proposed the ceasefire?
- 1:27:26I don't mean internally.
- 1:27:29The ceasefire proposal.
- 1:27:31What was the process exactly? Who said
- 1:27:33it, what day was it?
- 1:27:36Look, almost from the end of the second
- 1:27:38week of the war, the requests for a
- 1:27:40ceasefire began from the Americans. The
- 1:27:43first time, they offered a plan; they
- 1:27:45said let's have a ceasefire and
- 1:27:47negotiate based on that plan, which was
- 1:27:49the surrender plan—the famous 15-
- 1:27:51point plan. Well, we rejected that plan
- 1:27:55; we wrote a 10-point one, which in our
- 1:27:57view, these 10 points are the criteria,
- 1:28:00and the first point was that the war
- 1:28:02must end, not just a ceasefire. Then
- 1:28:06they offered a, let’s say, a point,
- 1:28:08we made revisions again, and we
- 1:28:10presented our 10 points again. They
- 1:28:13said," Well, let's have a ceasefire so
- 1:28:15we can talk; if we are going to talk
- 1:28:18about these 10 points of yours, we
- 1:28:19can't have a ceasefire while at war. "
- 1:28:23Ultimately, in the meetings, it was
- 1:28:25settled that if they accept our 10
- 1:28:27points as the basis for negotiations,
- 1:28:29we will accept the ceasefire, which is
- 1:28:31in the tweet Trump sent...
- 1:28:34His admission is there, so that was the
- 1:28:36basis for the ceasefire.
- 1:28:37That these 10 points would be the basis
- 1:28:39for negotiation, and this was agreed
- 1:28:41upon by everyone, right?
- 1:28:43Yes, well, anyway, there were also
- 1:28:45conditions that had been announced,
- 1:28:46which were included in it. These same
- 1:28:48things are in the memorandum of
- 1:28:50understanding; they exist. Of course,
- 1:28:52if we don't reach a final agreement,
- 1:28:54the situation might fall apart; that's
- 1:28:57there, so one can't say there is no
- 1:28:59room for doubt. But what is stated in
- 1:29:01the memorandum of understanding, Mr.
- 1:29:03Trump also signed it with that famous
- 1:29:05signature of his; It declares the
- 1:29:10immediate and permanent end of the war,
- 1:29:12war on all fronts, has been announced.
- 1:29:17This was our main demand; the issue of
- 1:29:19the frozen funds being released, the
- 1:29:21issue of...
- 1:29:23Let's not get into the agreement now.
- 1:29:25I want to say that this process
- 1:29:26ultimately reached the things we wanted
- 1:29:28to be in it.
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This page contains the full transcript of ماجرای جنگ 2 | به روایت جواد موگویی | روایت بیستم | گفتوگو با سیدعباس عراقچی (بخش اول) by ماجرا مدیا / Majara Media, generated from the public captions YouTube serves with the video. The transcript has 14,932 words across 2,365 segments, with the original timestamps preserved so you can click any line to jump to that moment in the embedded player.
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