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ماجرای جنگ 2 | به روایت جواد موگویی | روایت بیستم | گفت‌وگو با سیدعباس عراقچی (بخش اول) — Transcript

by ماجرا مدیا / Majara Media · 14,932 words · 2,365 segments · language en · Watch on YouTube

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  1. 0:16In the name of God, hello. After the 12
  2. 0:21-day war, we held a series of
  3. 0:23interviews with commanders and
  4. 0:25political figures of the country. Well,
  5. 0:29when the 40-day war began,
  6. 0:31communications were cut off; it was
  7. 0:33impossible to find the gentlemen. I
  8. 0:35personally tried to provide some
  9. 0:37accounts from the field; I went to
  10. 0:39Minab, the Strait of Hormuz, Kharg
  11. 0:41Island, and Lamerd. Now, a shaky
  12. 0:46ceasefire has been established, so we
  13. 0:48have resumed the interviews. Like the
  14. 0:5312-day war, we have started the first
  15. 0:55session with Dr. Araghchi. Sir, we are
  16. 0:57at your service. In the name of God,
  17. 0:59the Compassionate, the Merciful.
  18. 1:01Apparently, you didn't learn the
  19. 1:03lessons from that interview to repeat
  20. 1:04it again.
  21. 1:05Yes, I was really taken aback. After
  22. 1:09that interview, [the war] continues;
  23. 1:11although you are one of the few who
  24. 1:13survived after the interview. Meaning,
  25. 1:18many of those dear ones we interviewed
  26. 1:20were martyred in the 40-day war: Martyr
  27. 1:23Shamkhani, Martyr Naeini, Martyr
  28. 1:25Larijani. Well, well, Mr. Doctor!
  29. 1:29Exactly this time last year, in this
  30. 1:31very month of Tir, we were at your
  31. 1:34service; I asked what your idea was for
  32. 1:36after the ceasefire? You said we have
  33. 1:41two ways to reach our rights: either
  34. 1:43fight or negotiate. Negotiate; well,
  35. 1:47dialogue is the easier, lower-cost path
  36. 1:50, and because we won the 12-day war, we
  37. 1:56are in a position of strength, so
  38. 1:58negotiation is honorable; thus, we
  39. 2:00proceed to achieve our rights. What
  40. 2:03happened that led to war again? We told
  41. 2:09ourselves that Mr. Araghchi finally has
  42. 2:12IRGC roots, he has fought, he has no
  43. 2:14fear of war, and he has a 34-year
  44. 2:17diplomatic background, so let's follow
  45. 2:19your lead; your lead led us to war
  46. 2:21again.
  47. 2:29First of all, it wasn't my lead; It was
  48. 2:38a decision by the other side to reach
  49. 2:40certain objectives regarding Iran, and
  50. 2:47we were trying to steer that lead of
  51. 2:49the other side toward something other
  52. 2:54than war. Let me explain this a bit,
  53. 2:57because this false impression that
  54. 3:01exists must be corrected, that "
  55. 3:03negotiation caused the war" or "we
  56. 3:06negotiated and they fought again"; in
  57. 3:08my opinion, this is not an accurate
  58. 3:10interpretation, because negotiation was
  59. 3:13not my decision, but a collective
  60. 3:15decision that was made. Everything, I
  61. 3:18think I said this last time too,
  62. 3:20everything started with the perception
  63. 3:22of a weak Iran; meaning when after the
  64. 3:24events that occurred in Lebanon, the
  65. 3:26martyrdom of Sayyed Hassan...
  66. 3:29The fall of Syria.
  67. 3:34The fall of Syria and finally other
  68. 3:36developments that took place, this
  69. 3:38perception arose that Iran has lost its
  70. 3:40regional deterrence and will move
  71. 3:42toward nuclear deterrence to compensate
  72. 3:44for it, and therefore this must be
  73. 3:46stopped. Before it reaches a nuclear
  74. 3:54deterrent, its nuclear facilities must
  75. 3:56be destroyed; and likewise, the more
  76. 3:58extreme view on the side of the Zionist
  77. 4:00regime was that Iran is weakened, and
  78. 4:03now is the time to end the matter once
  79. 4:05and for all. With this perception, they
  80. 4:11entered the 12-day war, and before that
  81. 4:13, we had approached the brink of war
  82. 4:15two or three other times; however, for
  83. 4:17various reasons, Now, a large part of
  84. 4:23it was due to the diplomatic efforts
  85. 4:25that were made, and the fear created in
  86. 4:28the region that a comprehensive
  87. 4:29regional war would break out and
  88. 4:31everyone would suffer; so to speak, we
  89. 4:33either prevented it or delayed it. In
  90. 4:37principle, in the 12-day war, well,
  91. 4:40they came and Tried diplomacy; as I
  92. 4:45said, diplomacy is a less costly path.
  93. 4:52From the beginning, they demanded zero
  94. 4:54enrichment; before the 12-day war, in
  95. 4:56the negotiations that were taking place
  96. 4:58, we resisted and stood firm against
  97. 5:01their illegal and unreasonable demand
  98. 5:03for zero enrichment. When they saw they
  99. 5:07could not achieve what they wanted in
  100. 5:08negotiations, they started the war.
  101. 5:10This means the war started here; when
  102. 5:12the other side saw it could not reach
  103. 5:15its demands through negotiation, it
  104. 5:17turned to war, not that negotiation led
  105. 5:19to war. Our persistence in our
  106. 5:22positions and the fact that we were not
  107. 5:23willing to give them what they wanted
  108. 5:25at the negotiating table caused them to
  109. 5:27choose the harder path. Well, they
  110. 5:30chose the harder path. They were
  111. 5:32defeated in the 12-day war. The story
  112. 5:37of the 40-day war begins here, as after
  113. 5:39the 12-day war, in my opinion, they
  114. 5:42made another miscalculation
  115. 5:46that
  116. 5:49they had not imagined this level of
  117. 5:51resistance, so they should have been
  118. 5:53more prepared and therefore increased
  119. 5:55their equipment and weaponry; meaning
  120. 5:57they had the impression that the
  121. 5:59Zionist regime thought with a few-day
  122. 6:01attack it would destroy everything,
  123. 6:02cause a collapse, and perhaps the
  124. 6:04regime would fall, and the Islamic
  125. 6:06Republic would surrender; all these
  126. 6:08were false notions they had, and when
  127. 6:10it did not happen, because they were
  128. 6:12not prepared for the prolongation of
  129. 6:14this war and because they saw the
  130. 6:16people did not take to the streets and
  131. 6:18supported the system, standing behind
  132. 6:20the system, they were forced to end and
  133. 6:22stop the war.
  134. 6:25Well, this is exactly where they say, "
  135. 6:27Sir, if we had continued the war, it
  136. 6:29would have been better," meaning if we
  137. 6:31had continued the 12-day one, because
  138. 6:33there was a lack of preparedness, their
  139. 6:36assessment had turned out wrong, and
  140. 6:38Israel had also entered that 12-day war
  141. 6:40alone; this is where they say that
  142. 6:42negotiation caused the 40-day war,
  143. 6:44saying "you should have continued that
  144. 6:46one.""You should not have gone toward
  145. 6:49negotiation," and this same perception
  146. 6:51exists on the other side as well, that
  147. 6:53if you had continued that 12-day war,
  148. 6:55you would have reached a result, so to
  149. 6:58speak, because the 12-day war and the
  150. 7:00lessons of the 12-day war actually
  151. 7:01caused us to become stronger and more
  152. 7:03prepared for the next war. We learned
  153. 7:06many military lessons from the 12-day
  154. 7:08war. We also learned political lessons,
  155. 7:10but we learned many military lessons as
  156. 7:12well. First of all, the decision to end
  157. 7:14the war was, so to speak, a collective
  158. 7:16decision. The Supreme National Security
  159. 7:18Council made it. The Supreme National
  160. 7:20Security Council also knows when its
  161. 7:21resolutions will be implemented.
  162. 7:23No. I acknowledge that our situation in
  163. 7:25the military sphere improved
  164. 7:27significantly after the 12-day war. I
  165. 7:29asked Mr. Naini, the martyr Naini
  166. 7:31himself, what our missile situation is
  167. 7:33like? He said Mr. Pakpour had stated we
  168. 7:36have tripled. I asked him again, for
  169. 7:39instance, to ask Mr. Pakpour, "Sir, how
  170. 7:42is our operational status when under
  171. 7:44pressure?" He said that, for example,
  172. 7:47some of our garrisons, our missile
  173. 7:49bases, would be non-operational for 10
  174. 7:52to 15 hours, and I brought that down to
  175. 7:5435 or 40 minutes; I believe that
  176. 7:56breathing room was very beneficial for
  177. 7:58us.
  178. 7:59From the fourth day of the war
  179. 8:0012-day
  180. 8:0140-day war
  181. 8:0240-day
  182. 8:04One American think tank released an
  183. 8:06analysis, saying that between 10 to 25
  184. 8:08of Iran's launchers are destroyed daily
  185. 8:10, and that one-third have been
  186. 8:12destroyed so far, and that Iran can
  187. 8:14hold out at most until the end of
  188. 8:16Esfand; meaning it can maintain its
  189. 8:18missile firing capability. On what
  190. 8:21basis was this assessment made? It was
  191. 8:23based on their experience from the 12-
  192. 8:25day war, unaware that in these 8 months
  193. 8:26, Iran's launcher system had completely
  194. 8:28changed and had become such that no
  195. 8:30matter how much they hit, it wouldn't
  196. 8:32end. Meaning, this is just one of the
  197. 8:34differences that occurred during this
  198. 8:35period. And in the 12-day war, well, we
  199. 8:41, considering our resilience and our
  200. 8:43social resilience, because we were not
  201. 8:45prepared for war in this manner, we
  202. 8:47decided to stop. Whether this decision
  203. 8:53was right or wrong should be judged in
  204. 8:55its own place in history, but in my
  205. 8:56opinion, it was the right decision the
  206. 8:58establishment made, and we saw its
  207. 9:00effects in the next war; meaning the 12
  208. 9:02-day war became a prelude to victory.
  209. 9:04Well, what happened after the 12-day
  210. 9:06war? The enemy drew two wrong
  211. 9:11conclusions; first, that it must
  212. 9:13prepare itself for a longer war to be
  213. 9:15able to confront Iran. Second, it must
  214. 9:20first strike the social base of the
  215. 9:22establishment and then strike the
  216. 9:24establishment itself. Therefore, we
  217. 9:27witnessed that in this interval, a
  218. 9:31massive military formation was created
  219. 9:33in our region, and they established
  220. 9:35what they call a "military buildup" in
  221. 9:37the region; they brought everything the
  222. 9:39US had and equipped the Zionist regime
  223. 9:41as much as they could. They
  224. 9:44strengthened its defense system, which
  225. 9:46had fallen short at the end of the 12-
  226. 9:48day war, so it could wage a longer war,
  227. 9:50and then they worked on social issues,
  228. 9:53leading to the event of the 18th or
  229. 9:5519th of Dey; and it was after that they
  230. 9:57concluded, "Well, now is the time."
  231. 10:00When the enemy's military formation in
  232. 10:06the region was almost complete, their
  233. 10:08request for re-negotiation began, and
  234. 10:11this request was once again for zero
  235. 10:13enrichment. It meant returning again to
  236. 10:18whether they accept zero enrichment, or
  237. 10:20we strike. This time it was like this.
  238. 10:22There was a lot of debate back then
  239. 10:24about whether to have new negotiations
  240. 10:26or not, and finally, it was concluded
  241. 10:29that we should start negotiations
  242. 10:30mainly to exhaust all arguments, so no
  243. 10:33one could later say, "If you had
  244. 10:34negotiated, the war wouldn't have
  245. 10:36happened."
  246. 10:37So you were sure that war would happen?
  247. 10:39We were sure. I will talk about the
  248. 10:41details later. Our military forces were
  249. 10:44sure, we ourselves were sure, and
  250. 10:45because we were sure, we said a round
  251. 10:47or two of negotiations should take
  252. 10:49place. Either the other side backs down
  253. 10:51from its zero-enrichment stance, which
  254. 10:53is unlikely, or if they don't, we have
  255. 10:55our proof, and no one—neither in the
  256. 10:57international community nor within our
  257. 10:59own society—will be able to say, "
  258. 11:00It's your own fault, you should have
  259. 11:02negotiated." This was the philosophy
  260. 11:04behind entering negotiations; otherwise
  261. 11:06, if you recall, my interviews exist,
  262. 11:08my TV talks exist, and my speech in the
  263. 11:11parliament exists, saying, "Sir, the
  264. 11:13goal of these negotiations is clear;
  265. 11:15the enemy's military objectives are
  266. 11:16also completely clear." Do you think
  267. 11:18negotiation is a deception? Very well,
  268. 11:20don't be deceived! The way is very easy
  269. 11:22: don't be deceived. Don't let
  270. 11:24yourselves be deceived. The armed
  271. 11:25forces shouldn't pin their hopes on me
  272. 11:27as a negotiator; I have a mission I am
  273. 11:28carrying out—either I succeed or I
  274. 11:30don't. The armed forces shouldn't sit
  275. 11:31waiting for me, the government
  276. 11:32shouldn't sit waiting for me; in
  277. 11:34securing people's livelihoods, every
  278. 11:35warehouse must be filled, every reserve
  279. 11:37must be created, everything must be
  280. 11:38done. Therefore, when the war started,
  281. 11:40we were prepared, completely; the proof
  282. 11:43is that we started responding two hours
  283. 11:45later, because all these designs had
  284. 11:47been made. It was completely clear that
  285. 11:50whatever level the enemy's attack might
  286. 11:52be, we would respond proportionally to
  287. 11:54that level. Why was the Strait of
  288. 11:57Hormuz closed on the very first day?
  289. 11:59Because it had been designed beforehand
  290. 12:01that if the leadership were targeted,
  291. 12:02the strait would be closed immediately.
  292. 12:04I don't want to go into those details
  293. 12:06now, but we will put this in the
  294. 12:07forty-day account. No, my question is,
  295. 12:09did you go to negotiate just for the
  296. 12:12record and history?
  297. 12:13Look.
  298. 12:14Look, once Mr. Larijani—I heard this
  299. 12:16from myself and Mr. Larijani, I think
  300. 12:18it was in the sixth month—he said
  301. 12:20that we will definitely have a war in
  302. 12:22late autumn, and then I asked, "So why
  303. 12:24are we negotiating?" He said that 30
  304. 12:26percent of the probability of war is in
  305. 12:29our hands. Seventy percent of the means
  306. 12:31are in the enemy's hands, for example.
  307. 12:33We are striving for that 30 percent.
  308. 12:35Look, the negotiation had several goals
  309. 12:38. One is that maybe a way could be
  310. 12:41found in the negotiations, and we
  311. 12:43shouldn't lose that. War has its own
  312. 12:46costs, in any case, and if any country
  313. 12:48can reach its goals through
  314. 12:50negotiations, that path is definitely
  315. 12:52less risky and less costly. Well, we
  316. 12:56said maybe we could reach a result
  317. 12:58other than war in the negotiations, for
  318. 13:00example, 10 percent. We had to try that
  319. 13:04chance. We might not reach an agreement
  320. 13:07, but at least we will have made a
  321. 13:09final effort, whether with the enemy,
  322. 13:11the international community, or our own
  323. 13:13people, to show we tried every path; as
  324. 13:16you say, it goes down in history. I
  325. 13:18accept that, but the credibility of the
  326. 13:20negotiators is lost. When you keep
  327. 13:22going to negotiate and war keeps
  328. 13:24happening. Do you accept this? You
  329. 13:29might be right, but we are not here to
  330. 13:31risk war just for our own credibility;
  331. 13:33meaning, to protect our own reputation.
  332. 13:35I am the Foreign Minister of the
  333. 13:37Islamic Republic for the interests of
  334. 13:39the Islamic Republic, not for my own
  335. 13:40reputation. And unfortunately, I admit
  336. 13:42that in some places, individuals make
  337. 13:44or avoid certain decisions for the sake
  338. 13:46of their own reputation; and personally
  339. 13:48, given the spirit with which I grew up
  340. 13:50in the Islamic Republic, I consider
  341. 13:52this a betrayal. If a task must be done
  342. 13:54, and the mission is entrusted to me,
  343. 13:57then my political future, or I don't
  344. 13:59know, my reputation, none of these are
  345. 14:01important at all. If people are laying
  346. 14:03down their lives for this country, I
  347. 14:05should be willing to sacrifice my
  348. 14:07reputation in their place; this is my
  349. 14:09outlook on the principle. And therefore
  350. 14:12, when the decision was made that we
  351. 14:14should negotiate and so-called
  352. 14:19principles and rules were defined, all
  353. 14:21of this was worked on in the meetings
  354. 14:23held at that time; all the minutes
  355. 14:25exist. There was a nuclear committee
  356. 14:28back then that turned into the
  357. 14:29negotiation committee, known as the 6-
  358. 14:31man committee; you've probably heard of
  359. 14:33it.
  360. 14:33Yes.
  361. 14:34Back then.
  362. 14:35Who are these 6 people?
  363. 14:36Wait, let's reach that point.
  364. 14:38Fine, okay, go ahead.
  365. 14:40Is this tea for drinking or is it just
  366. 14:42a stage prop?
  367. 14:42No, please drink it, it's getting cold.
  368. 14:45Yes.
  369. 14:47You were talking about the 6-man
  370. 14:49committee; all of this is on record.
  371. 14:50Yes, well; back then it was called the
  372. 14:52"Nuclear Committee" within the
  373. 14:54Secretariat of the Supreme Council. For
  374. 14:56a long time. Mr. Shamkhani, may his
  375. 15:01soul be joined with the martyrs of
  376. 15:03Karbala, was responsible for this
  377. 15:05committee. Later, when Dr. Larijani
  378. 15:08became the Secretary of the Supreme
  379. 15:10National Security Council, he chaired
  380. 15:12this committee himself; may his soul
  381. 15:14also rest in peace. All discussions
  382. 15:16about the negotiations—whether they
  383. 15:18should happen or not, under what
  384. 15:20principles, what should be said, what
  385. 15:22shouldn't be—all these were discussed
  386. 15:24and summarized in that committee, and
  387. 15:26the committee's approvals went exactly
  388. 15:28like the Supreme Council's own
  389. 15:29approvals to be confirmed and then
  390. 15:31communicated; meaning it followed that
  391. 15:33exact path, and all these minutes exist
  392. 15:35. The meetings that eventually, one day
  393. 15:39in history after 30 years, they will
  394. 15:41publish; the terms used there regarding
  395. 15:43the negotiators and the negotiation
  396. 15:45process are interesting, anyway.
  397. 15:49When is the right time? Now, I...
  398. 15:51You mean regarding you?
  399. 15:52Let's set these aside; well, it was
  400. 15:55decided there that we should negotiate,
  401. 15:57but the country must be prepared for
  402. 16:01war. When I said several times that no
  403. 16:04one should be deceived, even in one of
  404. 16:06the meetings, I remember one of the
  405. 16:08senior military commanders was a bit
  406. 16:09offended; he said, what is this that
  407. 16:11you keep saying don't be deceived? We
  408. 16:13are not going to be deceived; we are
  409. 16:15ready, we are prepared; go do your job.
  410. 16:17Do not worry about this; we are
  411. 16:19prepared. We went into the negotiations
  412. 16:21with this logic. In the negotiations,
  413. 16:23the other side's demand was still zero
  414. 16:25enrichment, and our position remained
  415. 16:27that we would not give up this right of
  416. 16:29the Iranian people. During the
  417. 16:31negotiations before the 40-day war, it
  418. 16:33was a time when they had hit our
  419. 16:34nuclear facilities. At that very moment
  420. 16:38, we proudly said that you hit our
  421. 16:40facility building, but the building
  422. 16:42will be rebuilt. The machinery will be
  423. 16:46rebuilt. It is science and technology
  424. 16:48that you cannot hit, and it still
  425. 16:50exists. Our materials are also in their
  426. 16:52place. Well, they came with zero
  427. 16:53enrichment and demanded the handover of
  428. 16:56materials. It was natural what our
  429. 16:57position would be. Ultimately, they
  430. 17:01backed down from zero enrichment at
  431. 17:03that time and said, accept a suspension
  432. 17:05period, and even though our facilities
  433. 17:07had been damaged and we were in a state
  434. 17:09of......forced suspension, for example,
  435. 17:15we still had a mission not to accept
  436. 17:17this as an official matter. In any case
  437. 17:19, our position in the three rounds of
  438. 17:21negotiations we held there was clear;
  439. 17:23the minutes of those negotiations exist
  440. 17:24, and the reports are available. On
  441. 17:29Thursday, February 26th, we had the
  442. 17:32third round of negotiations, which fell
  443. 17:34apart over this enrichment suspension;
  444. 17:36they wanted a suspension period of, I
  445. 17:38don't know, several years, which we did
  446. 17:41not accept, but we agreed that, given
  447. 17:43the discussions held, the technical
  448. 17:45committees of both sides would meet in
  449. 17:47Vienna, for example, on the following
  450. 17:49Monday.
  451. 17:53Wait a moment here, if we had accepted
  452. 17:55that, would the war not have happened?
  453. 17:58If we had accepted that two or
  454. 18:00three-year suspension on February 26th?
  455. 18:03It cannot be said with certainty, but
  456. 18:04if you had accepted it, you would have
  457. 18:06suffered losses greater than the war.
  458. 18:08Why?
  459. 18:09In any case, you would have sold the
  460. 18:11country's dignity, and we would have
  461. 18:13had the 12-day war's damages and such,
  462. 18:15plus we would have finally accepted for
  463. 18:18the enemy to achieve its demands.
  464. 18:19Now, we could have suspended for two or
  465. 18:22three years. Netanyahu and Trump, this
  466. 18:24golden pair, would have gone, and we
  467. 18:26would have gone back into a hole and
  468. 18:28started enrichment again. I mean, if it
  469. 18:30were me, I would say the world has no
  470. 18:32accountability anyway. There is no
  471. 18:34commitment in the world either, so we
  472. 18:36could have suspended for two or three
  473. 18:38years. We could have suspended for two
  474. 18:40or three years, waited for those two to
  475. 18:42go, and then started again. Well, with
  476. 18:44all due respect, the decision-making is
  477. 18:46not up to me or you, and it is a good
  478. 18:48thing that it isn't. But...
  479. 18:52Meaning suspension was also part of our
  480. 18:54red lines?
  481. 18:54Look, it's not about suspension and
  482. 18:56materials; firstly, the number of years
  483. 18:58they wanted was not a small number.
  484. 19:00How much was it?
  485. 19:02Well, because it is still one of the
  486. 19:04final requests and...
  487. 19:07Even now that we have made the
  488. 19:08negotiations two-staged, we have
  489. 19:10delayed the nuclear issue because there
  490. 19:11were issues in the nuclear sector that
  491. 19:13were unsolvable and remain so under
  492. 19:15current conditions; perhaps after a
  493. 19:16month or two of talks, there might be
  494. 19:18room for...
  495. 19:19It was more than 5 years, Dr.
  496. 19:21Yeah.
  497. 19:21Well, now, should we just build a
  498. 19:23larger police station for 5 years? I
  499. 19:24mean, I’m saying...
  500. 19:26No, you didn't let me explain; the
  501. 19:27issue wasn't just about building or
  502. 19:29waiting, the issue was allowing the
  503. 19:31enemy to come and fight and then
  504. 19:33achieve their demands. Defeat is here;
  505. 19:37defeat is not in the destruction of
  506. 19:39facilities or the loss of, as you put
  507. 19:41it, a police station. They hit our
  508. 19:43police station, but our police forces
  509. 19:45were sleeping under tarps at night.
  510. 19:47They were sleeping in buses and doing
  511. 19:49their duty. The issue of defeat is when
  512. 19:51police forces raise their hands, say "
  513. 19:53we're done," and run away to their
  514. 19:55homes; that defeat didn't happen. In
  515. 19:58the nuclear issue, if we had given the
  516. 19:59enemy what they wanted, we would have
  517. 20:01created a pattern where whenever you
  518. 20:03want something from the Islamic
  519. 20:04Republic, you come, hit it, destroy it,
  520. 20:06and the Islamic Republic says, "Okay,
  521. 20:08come take whatever you want." This
  522. 20:09should not have happened. This pattern
  523. 20:12should not have formed, and that is why
  524. 20:14we stood firm in the negotiations, even
  525. 20:16if it meant the cost of war. Our
  526. 20:20martyred leader has a phrase that has
  527. 20:22always been before my eyes: "We, the
  528. 20:24Islamic Republic, we don't fight
  529. 20:26because war has costs and risks; we
  530. 20:28have seen it...we don't fight unless
  531. 20:30the cost of not fighting is higher than
  532. 20:33the cost of fighting." If you reach a
  533. 20:37point where you don't fight, you pay a
  534. 20:41higher cost than if you were to fight,
  535. 20:43you must fight; you should not hesitate
  536. 20:45. And this is what happened in both the
  537. 20:4812-day war and the 40-day war. We had
  538. 20:52negotiations in Geneva on February 26th
  539. 20:54; the talks almost reached no result,
  540. 20:56yet we decided our technical committees
  541. 20:59would meet in Vienna the following
  542. 21:01Monday. Well, we returned, and from
  543. 21:05that Friday, I saw the atmosphere was
  544. 21:08completely prepared for war. Friday
  545. 21:11night, I had a call with two or three
  546. 21:14foreign ministers in the region, and
  547. 21:16they all told me: "We are also
  548. 21:17surprised; even though Thursday's talks
  549. 21:20weren't bad overall, why did the
  550. 21:22atmosphere suddenly shift on Friday?"
  551. 21:25It meant it was clear the U.S. had
  552. 21:26reached the conclusion that it wouldn't
  553. 21:28get what it wanted through negotiations
  554. 21:30and had to fight and finish the job.
  555. 21:32Besides the fact that your
  556. 21:35interpretation, which you mentioned,
  557. 21:36might also be correct; at least from
  558. 21:38the Zionist perspective, it is correct
  559. 21:40that the nuclear issue and nuclear
  560. 21:42materials were just an excuse. The main
  561. 21:44goal was something else. The main goal
  562. 21:45for Netanyahu—and some believe there
  563. 21:47is no difference between them, that the
  564. 21:49U.S. and Israel are headed in the same
  565. 21:51direction. We can discuss whether these
  566. 21:53two are truly on the same path; yes,
  567. 21:55they certainly are on the same path and
  568. 21:57complement each other, but there are
  569. 21:59differences in their goals and
  570. 22:00positions that can sometimes be
  571. 22:02exploited. But let's assume that's a
  572. 22:05separate discussion for another time.
  573. 22:07Netanyahu had said many times that
  574. 22:09there is an "unfinished job"; an
  575. 22:11unfinished task remains, and what is
  576. 22:14that task? It is the 12-day war and the
  577. 22:16destruction of the Islamic Republic. He
  578. 22:18believed the job wasn't finished and
  579. 22:20had to be completed, and that the
  580. 22:22Islamic Republic had to be destroyed.
  581. 22:23He thought there was no better
  582. 22:25opportunity in history than now, as it
  583. 22:27had become completely weak; it had
  584. 22:29fought a round, its strength was
  585. 22:31drained, people were protesting in the
  586. 22:33streets; we saw what happened in '18
  587. 22:35and '19, the economic sanctions,
  588. 22:37regional tools, everything; in short,
  589. 22:39it was at the peak of weakness and the
  590. 22:41job had to be finished. This was
  591. 22:43Israel's goal; with this goal, they
  592. 22:45dragged the U.S. into the war. They
  593. 22:46gave this wrong analysis to Trump, and
  594. 22:48we later heard in various places that
  595. 22:50Trump had been angry about the analysis
  596. 22:52they gave him, saying the whole thing
  597. 22:54would be over in two or three days.
  598. 22:56When they started the war, I think it
  599. 22:58was on the second day that Trump posted
  600. 23:00a two-word tweet: "Unconditional
  601. 23:02surrender." Yesterday, well, it was the
  602. 23:07official funeral ceremony, and foreign
  603. 23:09guests had come; I met with many of
  604. 23:12them before and after the ceremony.
  605. 23:15Last night until 10 or 11, I had
  606. 23:17meetings with some of the foreign
  607. 23:19ministers who had stayed behind. I told
  608. 23:23them, and they all acknowledged it; I
  609. 23:25said that in the war, the enemy started
  610. 23:27with unconditional surrender, but we
  611. 23:29ultimately reached a memorandum of
  612. 23:31understanding in which the enemy stated
  613. 23:33it would no longer start any war
  614. 23:35against Iran and would no longer
  615. 23:37threaten Iran. Meaning both sides—it
  616. 23:41is like this; both sides commit to not
  617. 23:43starting a war against each other, not
  618. 23:45attacking, not threatening each other,
  619. 23:47not using force against each other,
  620. 23:48respecting each other's sovereignty,
  621. 23:50respecting each other's territorial
  622. 23:52integrity, and refraining from
  623. 23:54interfering in each other's internal
  624. 23:56affairs. Meaning the one who said
  625. 23:57unconditional surrender is now making
  626. 23:59all these commitments; then it asks, "
  627. 24:00For God's sake, you also make a
  628. 24:01reciprocal commitment, you also respect
  629. 24:03my sovereignty, you also don't
  630. 24:04interfere in my internal affairs, and
  631. 24:06you also don't be the one to start a
  632. 24:07war against me." This memorandum of
  633. 24:10understanding, especially its first and
  634. 24:12second articles, is truly a source of
  635. 24:14pride in this sense, because Iran and
  636. 24:16the U.S.—Iran facing the U.S. as a
  637. 24:18superpower—sit down and commit to
  638. 24:20each other to respect each other's
  639. 24:22sovereignty and not interfere in each
  640. 24:25other's internal affairs. There is a
  641. 24:33flaw in our diplomacy—and since two
  642. 24:35wars occurred during your time as
  643. 24:37Foreign Minister, it traces back to you
  644. 24:39—which is that you lack a threatening
  645. 24:41rhetoric that leads to deterrence.
  646. 24:46Relative to what? Relative to the
  647. 24:48countries in the region. For instance,
  648. 24:50the Americans go and reassure the
  649. 24:53Saudis, Qataris, and Emiratis,
  650. 24:55promising them, "Sir, we will strike
  651. 24:57Iran and it will be over," so they
  652. 24:59cooperate. Why don’t you go and
  653. 25:02threaten them in...Private messages, in
  654. 25:08private meetings—meaning threats can
  655. 25:10actually create deterrence.
  656. 25:14How do you know I didn't? I have said
  657. 25:16that before the 12-day war...We went to
  658. 25:20the brink of war two or three times and
  659. 25:22prevented it with these very threats.
  660. 25:24Those periodic trips I took in the
  661. 25:26region after the Syria issue...That was
  662. 25:31exactly the reason, and the threats we
  663. 25:33made at one or two junctures prevented
  664. 25:36war. I will give you one example,
  665. 25:40though without mentioning names and
  666. 25:42such. In a meeting I had with one of
  667. 25:47the regional leaders, he spoke from a
  668. 25:49position of great arrogance and with a
  669. 25:51hidden joy you could sense: "You can be
  670. 25:53sure they will attack you, destroy your
  671. 25:55nuclear facilities, wipe out your
  672. 25:57missile capacity, and destroy your oil
  673. 25:59installations. And don't you dare
  674. 26:04respond, because they will strike you
  675. 26:06yourselves, they will strike your
  676. 26:08leadership."
  677. 26:10Who said this?
  678. 26:11One of the regional leaders.
  679. 26:13And I told him...
  680. 26:14Saudi Arabia, right?
  681. 26:16Now, let’s not get into specifics; we
  682. 26:18still have to work with all of them.
  683. 26:20This rhetoric sounds like Bin Salman.
  684. 26:23Let me finish, I said don't get into
  685. 26:25names. No, it applies to all of them.
  686. 26:28Let us do our job. Their mood was all
  687. 26:31the same; they were all waiting for
  688. 26:33this event, but were afraid. I told him
  689. 26:36there that...
  690. 26:37They thought it was over.
  691. 26:39Yes, I told him that the matter is not
  692. 26:41as easy as you say. If they hit any
  693. 26:44point of ours, we will hit their
  694. 26:46corresponding point. If they hit our
  695. 26:48nuclear facilities, we will hit their
  696. 26:50nuclear facilities. If they hit our
  697. 26:52military capabilities, we will hit
  698. 26:53Israel's military capabilities. And if
  699. 26:55America participates, we will
  700. 26:57inevitably strike American bases in the
  701. 26:59region, because our missiles don't
  702. 27:00reach the US mainland, but they do
  703. 27:02reach their bases in the region. If
  704. 27:04they hit our oil facilities and we
  705. 27:06can't sell oil, no one in the region
  706. 27:07will be able to sell oil. This very
  707. 27:09sentence made the other side a bit
  708. 27:11angry, and he said, "No one can
  709. 27:13threaten us.""If anyone threatens us, I
  710. 27:15don't know, all of Europe, all of
  711. 27:17America will turn against them; even
  712. 27:19China will turn against them, because
  713. 27:21we have so much trade, this and that
  714. 27:24with China. The flow of oil in the
  715. 27:26world is in our hands, the supply chain
  716. 27:28, this and that, is in our hands." I
  717. 27:31laughed at these words and said, "Sir,
  718. 27:33heaven forbid, we don't intend to hit
  719. 27:35you!" We strike American bases which,
  720. 27:37unfortunately, are on your soil. Well,
  721. 27:41that caused the region to take action
  722. 27:43at that time and prevent a war; but
  723. 27:45later we heard analyses from American
  724. 27:47and Zionist institutions, and some told
  725. 27:50us that they went and convinced the
  726. 27:52countries of the region, saying, "At
  727. 27:54most, hold on for one more month, and
  728. 27:56this whole story will be wrapped up
  729. 27:58forever." Yes, Iran strikes, fires
  730. 28:01missiles, brings this and that, but if
  731. 28:03we hold on for a month, everything will
  732. 28:05be fixed, and they prepared them to
  733. 28:07just hold on until the situation ended.
  734. 28:09Well, in the 12-day war, they thought
  735. 28:11it would happen, but it didn't. They
  736. 28:13analyzed that we must first strike the
  737. 28:15regime's social base; they came and did
  738. 28:18those things, prepared themselves for a
  739. 28:20longer war with newer methods, and then
  740. 28:22at that time, in the 12-day war, they
  741. 28:24reached a conclusion. Another
  742. 28:27conclusion they reached was that we
  743. 28:29made a mistake by only striking the
  744. 28:31military; we struck the military, but
  745. 28:33the politicians came and held the
  746. 28:35country together.
  747. 28:36And this time we must strike the
  748. 28:38politicians, and most importantly, we
  749. 28:40must strike the leadership. The
  750. 28:41Venezuela experience had again given
  751. 28:43them a false impression that if you
  752. 28:45remove the leadership from the center,
  753. 28:48the regime will collapse and the rest
  754. 28:50will, so to speak, resolve itself. Now,
  755. 28:52our friendly countries keep telling us,
  756. 28:54"Yes, we told them so much not to think
  757. 28:56this way; Iranians are different,
  758. 28:58Iranians are this way, that way." There
  759. 29:00is a multi-thousand-year-old
  760. 29:01civilization behind them, plus a Shia
  761. 29:03mindset and martyrdom-seeking beliefs;
  762. 29:05when these two are combined, no one can
  763. 29:07stop them. They are telling us this now
  764. 29:09.
  765. 29:09They are saying it now.
  766. 29:10Yes, they say we had told them this.
  767. 29:12Now, if needed, I will even name the
  768. 29:14people who told us, "We went to them
  769. 29:15and said, 'Sir, don't mess with
  770. 29:17Iranians, Iran is different from
  771. 29:19Venezuela, different from here,
  772. 29:20different from there, and these people
  773. 29:22will stand their ground,'" but that was
  774. 29:24the reality. That is why they started
  775. 29:27with the leadership and then began
  776. 29:29striking political officials as well.
  777. 29:31We were not surprised in the 12-day war
  778. 29:34, but we did have tactical surprises.
  779. 29:36Meaning, in terms of strategy, in terms
  780. 29:39of confronting the enemy, and in terms
  781. 29:41of military and defensive resilience
  782. 29:43against the enemy, we were completely
  783. 29:45prepared. We were not caught by
  784. 29:47surprise. Just as we started striking
  785. 29:49back two hours later. But in protecting
  786. 29:52ourselves and, so to speak, our
  787. 29:54officials, in my opinion, a bit...If a
  788. 29:58surprise did occur, this was the area.
  789. 30:04Yes, because if you mention this, could
  790. 30:06the events of the 18th have been
  791. 30:08predicted in the country during those
  792. 30:1010 days leading up to the 18th? No. In
  793. 30:20this regard, it can be said that we
  794. 30:22were not prepared for such an incident.
  795. 30:25I mean, Mr. Larijani, did the military
  796. 30:27forces, the Ministry, or the IRGC
  797. 30:29Intelligence think that this crowd
  798. 30:31would come out? I want to say that this
  799. 30:34surprise here was, in my opinion,
  800. 30:36strategic.
  801. 30:36Look, in any case, we have to admit
  802. 30:38that we had some weak points. Just as
  803. 30:41the enemy's calculations and analyses
  804. 30:43were wrong, some of our own analyses
  805. 30:45were perhaps wrong as well. Everyone
  806. 30:51knew and said that economic pressures
  807. 30:53could lead to social dissatisfaction,
  808. 30:56but its scale, timing, and speed of
  809. 30:58spread were perhaps not predicted in
  810. 31:00this way. That is not within my area of
  811. 31:04expertise. I truly cannot say, but
  812. 31:08since we were involved once it started,
  813. 31:10we were compelled to defend the country
  814. 31:12against
  815. 31:14a media and psychological assault.
  816. 31:17Regarding the media and psychological
  817. 31:19assault, the perception was that these
  818. 31:22were sporadic protests that would soon
  819. 31:24end; and perhaps that was the reality,
  820. 31:26but on January 8th and 9th, a foreign
  821. 31:28conspiracy really entered the situation
  822. 31:30. I have explained this in detail in
  823. 31:33previous interviews and talks. From the
  824. 31:368th to the 18th, it was just public
  825. 31:38protests by the people. And it was
  826. 31:43tolerated; even the government, so to
  827. 31:46speak, responded positively to it. I
  828. 31:50remember in one of the cabinet meetings
  829. 31:51those days, the head of the Trade Union
  830. 31:53and the head of the Chamber of Commerce
  831. 31:55were invited to voice their issues; the
  832. 31:57President had a separate meeting with
  833. 31:59the trade unions and such. Peaceful
  834. 32:05demonstrations were held without any
  835. 32:07issues; but from January 8th, the
  836. 32:09factor of weapons was introduced, and
  837. 32:11it was clear that there had been prior
  838. 32:14organization that we had failed to
  839. 32:16identify—that is where our weakness
  840. 32:18lay—and weapons were introduced on a
  841. 32:20large scale, and trained forces entered
  842. 32:22. You know what happened after that,
  843. 32:30and they started shooting not at the
  844. 32:32armed forces, but only at the people,
  845. 32:34because the goal was to increase the
  846. 32:35death toll. Trump had said that if
  847. 32:41people are killed, we will come to help
  848. 32:43, we will come to rescue; they wanted
  849. 32:45to put Trump in a position where, with
  850. 32:47so many people killed, he would have to
  851. 32:49intervene.
  852. 32:50So, if it had dragged on from the 8th
  853. 32:52to the 28th, for example, do you think
  854. 32:54a war would have started right then? It
  855. 32:58cannot be analyzed. I don’t know if
  856. 32:59they were ready to fight at that time
  857. 33:01or not. But Trump had made this threat,
  858. 33:04and on one Wednesday, we really went to
  859. 33:06the brink of war. Yes. I mean
  860. 33:10The Wednesday after January 8th.
  861. 33:12The Wednesday after January 8th. Our
  862. 33:16armed forces had reports that the enemy
  863. 33:18was ready to attack and that the attack
  864. 33:20would take place that night. I don’t
  865. 33:22know if you remember, but at 8
  866. 33:23o’clock that night, I did an
  867. 33:25interview with Fox News and explained
  868. 33:27all of this, that this was not at all a
  869. 33:29matter of public protest. Ah, that
  870. 33:30night they said that Trump had stated
  871. 33:32that executions were going to happen
  872. 33:34tomorrow, and after all, many people
  873. 33:36had already been killed.
  874. 33:37And then the military build-up of the
  875. 33:39enemy, all these things indicated to
  876. 33:40our armed forces
  877. 33:41that if the Islamic Republic carries
  878. 33:43out executions, I will attack.
  879. 33:44No, he said executions are taking place
  880. 33:46and we will attack. They had told him
  881. 33:48that the executions would start the
  882. 33:49next morning.
  883. 33:51So that night I did an interview with
  884. 33:53Fox News and said we have no intention
  885. 33:55of executing anyone right now, because
  886. 33:57the trials hadn't really started yet.
  887. 34:00Yes, individuals had been detained, but
  888. 34:02the judicial process had not yet been
  889. 34:04followed. Maybe some of them deserved
  890. 34:06to be executed, which they did and were
  891. 34:08, but the judicial process hadn't even
  892. 34:10begun for us to execute anyone the next
  893. 34:12morning. I said we don't have any such
  894. 34:14plan for now, the judicial process
  895. 34:16hasn't started. And by the way, the
  896. 34:19so-called killings had ended seven or
  897. 34:21eight days prior; from the 18th, 19th,
  898. 34:24and 20th of Dey onwards, we had no more
  899. 34:27casualties, the casualties had ended.
  900. 34:30It is a false report that they are
  901. 34:31being killed in the streets every day,
  902. 34:33and well, perhaps Trump was looking for
  903. 34:35an excuse or whatever it was, it was
  904. 34:37announced that night that it would not
  905. 34:39happen.
  906. 34:39How much did the 18th and 19th of Dey
  907. 34:42impact the outbreak of the war, the 40-
  908. 34:44day war?
  909. 34:46In my opinion, it had an impact on the
  910. 34:48enemy reaching the conclusion that the
  911. 34:50groundwork was ready, meaning they saw,
  912. 34:52well...From their perspective, a
  913. 34:56popular movement took place and the
  914. 34:58system, for example, suppressed it.
  915. 35:00From our point of view, it was the
  916. 35:02suppression of a terrorist movement,
  917. 35:03but the perception was that it
  918. 35:05suppressed it, and therefore, the
  919. 35:06social environment is ready.
  920. 35:07How much, how much did this influence
  921. 35:09the outbreak of the war?
  922. 35:10I am telling you, a lot.
  923. 35:12A lot.
  924. 35:12Because they imagined that the social
  925. 35:14environment was ready and if they
  926. 35:15attacked, the people would also come to
  927. 35:17the streets from within. People did
  928. 35:18come to the streets, but with another
  929. 35:20goal; with the goal of supporting the
  930. 35:21system. This was their mistake right
  931. 35:23here. Two factors caused the 40-day war
  932. 35:26to start, as I mentioned: one was that
  933. 35:28they imagined the social environment
  934. 35:30was now ready. The social capital of
  935. 35:34the system is gone; in the 12-day war,
  936. 35:36the system's social capital came into
  937. 35:39play. Well, and we all realized what
  938. 35:43capital we had and we underappreciated
  939. 35:45it, and unfortunately, after the 12-day
  940. 35:47war, we still didn't appreciate it and
  941. 35:50eventually continued some processes
  942. 35:52that led to problems. The enemy,
  943. 35:54however, imagined that with the 18th
  944. 35:56and 19th of Dey, the system's social
  945. 35:58capital was destroyed. Militarily, if
  946. 36:01they stretched the war from 12 days to,
  947. 36:03say, two weeks, the job would be done.
  948. 36:06There is economic pressure and all that
  949. 36:08, and there is no hope in the region
  950. 36:10either. They had also told the
  951. 36:11countries in the region to hold on for
  952. 36:13a bit and the job would be done. They
  953. 36:16also don't have the nerve to close the
  954. 36:18Strait of Hormuz. The Islamic Republic
  955. 36:21is bluffing. It cannot spread the war
  956. 36:23to the region either, because the
  957. 36:25region will confront it. With all these
  958. 36:27analyses, they started the war. In the
  959. 36:28negotiations, they came and said, "Sir,
  960. 36:30do you accept this and that?" We said
  961. 36:32no. Well, describe those two days
  962. 36:36leading up to 9:30 in the morning. You
  963. 36:39returned from Geneva. That Omani
  964. 36:41gentleman, I remember he went to
  965. 36:43America; he went there quickly and gave
  966. 36:45some interviews, said some things; that
  967. 36:47, well, Iran has given good concessions
  968. 36:50and I don't know, everything is fine.
  969. 36:54And one felt that he could smell that
  970. 36:55the Americans were planning to attack,
  971. 36:57and he was trying to dissuade them with
  972. 36:59these words. Did you also imagine that
  973. 37:04war was definitely a day or two away?
  974. 37:07He went from Geneva to Washington and
  975. 37:09called me from there. He said the
  976. 37:12atmosphere and the mood here are very
  977. 37:14bad, and he himself was extremely
  978. 37:16depressed or what they call it, upset,
  979. 37:19saddened; because his own credibility
  980. 37:21was also at risk. While the negotiation
  981. 37:26on Thursday, although it didn't reach
  982. 37:28the result they wanted, we finally took
  983. 37:30some steps forward, and we offered some
  984. 37:32innovative, so-called side proposals
  985. 37:34where the principle of enrichment would
  986. 37:36continue, but could ultimately address
  987. 37:38their concerns. Because our position
  988. 37:42from the beginning of the nuclear talks
  989. 37:44until now has always been that we will
  990. 37:46not give up our rights, but if there is
  991. 37:48a concern that the program might go
  992. 37:49toward weapons, we are willing to
  993. 37:51resolve that concern. Our position in
  994. 37:53the negotiations has always been: fine,
  995. 37:55we are willing to take
  996. 37:55confidence-building measures, but we
  997. 37:57will not give up our rights. We won't
  998. 37:59give up enrichment, but if you say, for
  999. 38:01example, limit enrichment for a period
  1000. 38:03of time in such and such a way. I don't
  1001. 38:05know; do this with your materials, do
  1002. 38:06that with your materials, to ensure
  1003. 38:08that we are not going after a bomb.
  1004. 38:10Fine, we don't believe in an atomic
  1005. 38:12bomb and we consider it forbidden; this
  1006. 38:14is the fatwa of our martyred leader.
  1007. 38:18Therefore, we brought up these
  1008. 38:19initiatives so that perhaps we could
  1009. 38:21somehow control the negotiations in
  1010. 38:22this way. Well, it didn't work; Mr.
  1011. 38:24Busaidi went to Washington and called
  1012. 38:27me from there, he said the atmosphere
  1013. 38:29here is very...something. Then he
  1014. 38:31started giving interviews himself and
  1015. 38:33said these same things, perhaps to try
  1016. 38:35to prevent the war in his own way. I
  1017. 38:39said Thursday, when it ended, on Friday
  1018. 38:41the atmosphere became completely
  1019. 38:43military.
  1020. 38:45Did he call you to say war is certain?
  1021. 38:47He didn't say war is certain. He said
  1022. 38:49the atmosphere here is a war atmosphere
  1023. 38:51.
  1024. 38:51And I went and gave an interview, then
  1025. 38:53he had requested that you meet with
  1026. 38:55Vance because he felt that perhaps
  1027. 38:57people like Witkoff and Sherman hadn't
  1028. 38:59conveyed the message correctly. He had
  1029. 39:02met with Vance, but apparently in
  1030. 39:04Washington, Trump himself had made his
  1031. 39:06decision and had been persuaded by the
  1032. 39:08Zionist lobby or by Netanyahu that the
  1033. 39:11war would end in two or three days.
  1034. 39:14Therefore, Friday night the atmosphere
  1035. 39:17had changed completely. On Saturday at
  1036. 39:198 AM, I went to see the President and
  1037. 39:22gave a report on the Geneva
  1038. 39:23negotiations. At the same time, they
  1039. 39:25asked, I said the negotiation was good
  1040. 39:27relative to the negotiation itself, but
  1041. 39:29the atmosphere that exists is not a
  1042. 39:31negotiating atmosphere at all, it is a
  1043. 39:33war atmosphere. I had an appointment at
  1044. 39:379:00 AM; I came to the Leader's office
  1045. 39:39to meet with one of the officials.
  1046. 39:41So, you didn't have a meeting with the
  1047. 39:43Leader?
  1048. 39:45No, our standard procedure was to meet
  1049. 39:48with Mr. Hejazi, and reports would go
  1050. 39:50to him. He would present the daily
  1051. 39:54reports from everywhere to the Leader
  1052. 39:56and would bring back answers if there
  1053. 39:58were any questions. If it were
  1054. 39:59necessary, the Leader would hold a
  1055. 40:01meeting himself at that point. It
  1056. 40:03wasn't that this was the only path. The
  1057. 40:07martyred leader's way was to receive
  1058. 40:09reports from everywhere; he would
  1059. 40:11review them all, provide guidance, and
  1060. 40:13if he deemed it necessary, he would
  1061. 40:15summon—well, not summon, he would ask
  1062. 40:17for the person, meet with them, and
  1063. 40:19brief them. If necessary, he would also
  1064. 40:23hold group meetings; he would invite
  1065. 40:25specific individuals or invite the
  1066. 40:27Supreme Council. Ultimately, a
  1067. 40:29decision-making system existed that, in
  1068. 40:31my opinion, was perfectly good. Now
  1069. 40:34that security issues are being resolved
  1070. 40:36, it should follow the same pattern.
  1071. 40:38You were with Mr. Hejazi.
  1072. 40:42I was with Mr. Hejazi at 9:00 AM, and I
  1073. 40:44was giving him a report on the
  1074. 40:45negotiations, and I had just reached
  1075. 40:48the part about the heavy atmosphere of
  1076. 40:50war, saying how the situation has been
  1077. 40:52like this since last night, not that it
  1078. 40:54was suddenly attacked right then.
  1079. 40:59So they say it was the Strategic
  1080. 41:01Council on Foreign Policy, right?
  1081. 41:03No.
  1082. 41:04Because Mr. Kharrazi is there, you are
  1083. 41:07there, and Mr. Rahim Safavi is there,
  1084. 41:09no?
  1085. 41:10Well, look, that is a large complex
  1086. 41:12containing various sections; the
  1087. 41:14Strategic Council on Foreign Relations
  1088. 41:16has a location a few buildings over.
  1089. 41:19They were also holding a meeting at the
  1090. 41:21same time, but it wasn't hit; what was
  1091. 41:23worse was the meeting Mr. Shamkhani had
  1092. 41:25organized, where a number of commanders
  1093. 41:27were martyred.
  1094. 41:29We won't air this, or rather, I doubt
  1095. 41:31we could air it. Well, perhaps it is
  1096. 41:34for the historical record. There were
  1097. 41:38three meetings that day. One was the
  1098. 41:41Intelligence Ministry's Deputies
  1099. 41:42Council meeting at the ministry. One
  1100. 41:45was the Strategic Council on Foreign
  1101. 41:46Policy meeting at the Leader's office.
  1102. 41:49One was the Defense Council meeting
  1103. 41:51that Mr. Shamkhani had organized. And
  1104. 41:53Mr. Khamenei himself was at the office.
  1105. 41:57How do you interpret this? Three or
  1106. 42:01four meetings simultaneously at 9:30 AM
  1107. 42:03? Well...The Strategic Council itself
  1108. 42:13had a standing meeting every Saturday.
  1109. 42:18When I was on the Strategic Council, we
  1110. 42:20had meetings every Saturday morning.
  1111. 42:23However, it was in the building they
  1112. 42:25have on Pasdaran Street. What happened
  1113. 42:31that they held it in the lower building
  1114. 42:32that day, I don't know. Besides, that
  1115. 42:35place wasn't the target; but Mr.
  1116. 42:37Shamkhani's meeting was a target, Mr.
  1117. 42:39Shirazi's office was a target, Mr.
  1118. 42:42Hejazi's office was a target, and the
  1119. 42:44Leader's office itself was a target;
  1120. 42:46they hit these quickly.
  1121. 42:48They also hit the ministry's Deputies
  1122. 42:49Council meeting.
  1123. 42:50That building was somewhere else
  1124. 42:52entirely.
  1125. 42:52I know, but I don't consider this
  1126. 42:54simultaneous occurrence of multiple
  1127. 42:56meetings to be normal.
  1128. 42:57Well, those days, you see, every
  1129. 42:59building you entered had a meeting
  1130. 43:00going on inside. But yes, both the
  1131. 43:02meeting with the Supreme Leader at his
  1132. 43:05office—well, that's one thing, but
  1133. 43:07the fact that Mr. Shamkhani had also
  1134. 43:09convened the Defense Council meeting.
  1135. 43:12Now, whether it was a coincidence or
  1136. 43:13not, I don't know, but the Ministry of
  1137. 43:15Intelligence was also holding a meeting
  1138. 43:17at the same time. In my opinion, they
  1139. 43:22were aware of these meetings, and this
  1140. 43:25is perhaps a security breach that
  1141. 43:27existed and likely still exists; this
  1142. 43:29must be addressed, which the security
  1143. 43:31forces are pursuing, and I be...I. I
  1144. 43:33believe the extent of this security
  1145. 43:36breach is not just about infiltration
  1146. 43:38and gathering information; it sometimes
  1147. 43:40lies in influencing decision-making,
  1148. 43:43and even worse, in shaping our
  1149. 43:44psychological space. These are just
  1150. 43:47brief points.
  1151. 43:48Yes; well, I personally believe that
  1152. 43:50nothing can destroy the Islamic
  1153. 43:52Republic except for meetings. I mean,
  1154. 43:56this meeting has ruined the Islamic
  1155. 43:58Republic! But this synchronization,
  1156. 44:01this level of intelligence, and
  1157. 44:03striking at 9:30 AM—I don't attribute
  1158. 44:05this to technology or artificial
  1159. 44:07intelligence or things like that. I
  1160. 44:11think, now that you also have an
  1161. 44:13intelligence background, I think we
  1162. 44:15should be looking for a few "Kashmiris"
  1163. 44:17or people like that.
  1164. 44:20It's not that simple.
  1165. 44:21Ettela'at newspaper has written
  1166. 44:23articles several times.
  1167. 44:25Well, let me say that, in my opinion,
  1168. 44:27they knew that the Leader is in his
  1169. 44:29office every morning and that this
  1170. 44:31target was accessible. And well, he had
  1171. 44:34a habit; he wouldn't go into a shelter.
  1172. 44:36They realized that the commanders '
  1173. 44:38meeting was right next to him or a
  1174. 44:40building away; that’s why they chose
  1175. 44:42that moment. Perhaps by chance, the
  1176. 44:45Ministry of Intelligence meeting was
  1177. 44:47also simultaneous, but that was in a
  1178. 44:49much more distant location. Regardless,
  1179. 44:52this disaster happened. Let’s see,
  1180. 44:56well, we were sitting in...I was in a
  1181. 44:58meeting...they hit the same building.
  1182. 45:02They hit your building; I mean, were
  1183. 45:04there any...debris or something?
  1184. 45:05Yes. I heard, did they pull you out
  1185. 45:09from under the rubble?
  1186. 45:11Almost.
  1187. 45:11So they must have pulled you out of the
  1188. 45:13rubble then, right?
  1189. 45:14Well, we got out ourselves; look, three
  1190. 45:17missiles hit. As far as I remember in
  1191. 45:21that moment, the first one was at a
  1192. 45:23distance and we were finally stunned;
  1193. 45:25then a second or two later, the second
  1194. 45:28one hit, closer, and the building shook
  1195. 45:30, and...The third one also hit our
  1196. 45:34building a second or two later. However
  1197. 45:36, this building of Mr. Hejazi—for
  1198. 45:38example, we were in a meeting on this
  1199. 45:40side, and his office was on that side;
  1200. 45:42they hit the office; meaning the left
  1201. 45:44side of the building was destroyed. For
  1202. 45:49example, may God have mercy on Mr.
  1203. 45:51Iyozi, the martyr Iyozi's secretary;
  1204. 45:54they said absolutely nothing was even
  1205. 45:56found of him.
  1206. 45:59Hejazi's secretaries.
  1207. 46:03But we were on this side of the
  1208. 46:05building, and that was that; the
  1209. 46:06ceiling and everything simply collapsed
  1210. 46:08. When it finished, I was waiting for
  1211. 46:12the fourth one to completely end it,
  1212. 46:14but it didn't continue. I looked at Mr.
  1213. 46:17Hejazi and asked, "Are you alright?" I
  1214. 46:19saw him say, "Yes." So I took his hand,
  1215. 46:23and we eventually got up together. He
  1216. 46:25himself said, "We must get out quickly
  1217. 46:27because it will likely continue." We
  1218. 46:31made our way through the rubble and
  1219. 46:33beams, leaving the room and entering a
  1220. 46:35hall where I could hear cries of "Ya
  1221. 46:37Hossein," water was dripping from the
  1222. 46:39ceiling, and everything was destroyed.
  1223. 46:45We struggled to get out of the building
  1224. 46:47, and then I saw the compound; various
  1225. 46:49parts had been hit. As we came out, I
  1226. 46:53asked Mr. Hejazi, "Sir, is he here?" He
  1227. 46:58said, "I don't know." Meaning he wasn't
  1228. 47:01sure either where exactly the leader
  1229. 47:05had been in the building. Anyway, we
  1230. 47:08got out; they had struck everywhere, it
  1231. 47:11was absolute chaos. The security guards
  1232. 47:14arrived; in short, they grabbed me
  1233. 47:16quickly and I said we should leave
  1234. 47:18because it would likely continue. We
  1235. 47:20left quickly; our car was stuck, and
  1236. 47:22from the gate it had been hit by
  1237. 47:27shrapnel, and it was impossible to
  1238. 47:29leave. We went out to the street, and a
  1239. 47:31young man appeared.
  1240. 47:33He got a taxi.
  1241. 47:34Not a taxi, a young man took us, he was
  1242. 47:36doing his duty to take us. The poor guy
  1243. 47:40came, I think it was a Peykan or maybe
  1244. 47:43a 206, I don't remember, he brought us,
  1245. 47:45we got in, and he took me to the
  1246. 47:47Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Well, the
  1247. 47:51dust and everything, that's not
  1248. 47:53important now.
  1249. 47:54When did you find out Mr. Khamenei had
  1250. 47:56been assassinated?
  1251. 47:58Well, we realized almost that same
  1252. 48:00night that
  1253. 48:02meaning from sunset onwards. We, I came
  1254. 48:08here from that place to the Ministry of
  1255. 48:10Foreign Affairs and for perhaps 3 days
  1256. 48:15we were completely cut off from
  1257. 48:17everything. We were only trying to see
  1258. 48:22who was alive and who had been martyred
  1259. 48:24. I didn't even have definitive news
  1260. 48:26about the president, though word
  1261. 48:27arrived that day that he was not
  1262. 48:31martyred, but we had no communication.
  1263. 48:34I saw the president for the first time
  1264. 48:363 days after the war started. I saw Mr.
  1265. 48:41Larijani perhaps 5 days later for the
  1266. 48:43first time, and the first meeting, as
  1267. 48:45you call it, the first meeting that was
  1268. 48:47held was 6 days later in a safe
  1269. 48:49location where...three members of that
  1270. 48:55meeting were later martyred.
  1271. 48:56Were you in that meeting too? Well.
  1272. 48:58No, it was a more limited meeting. Who
  1273. 49:01were martyred? Mr. Khatib was martyred,
  1274. 49:04Mr. Larijani was martyred, Mr. Batani
  1275. 49:06was martyred; there were two others of
  1276. 49:09us who are still here. Let me tell you,
  1277. 49:15however, from the moment I arrived at
  1278. 49:17the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we
  1279. 49:18acted autonomously and immediately
  1280. 49:20issued a statement, and I started
  1281. 49:22calling the foreign ministries of the
  1282. 49:24countries in the region. Well, I knew
  1283. 49:30that the plan was pre-arranged; if they
  1284. 49:32strike us, we will immediately strike
  1285. 49:34U.S. military bases in the region, and
  1286. 49:37the regime itself is a separate matter.
  1287. 49:41From that very noon, I started
  1288. 49:42contacting the foreign ministers of the
  1289. 49:44region, the Persian Gulf Cooperation
  1290. 49:46Council countries, and told them all
  1291. 49:48that we are hitting US military bases,
  1292. 49:50and you should know this is not against
  1293. 49:52you, it is against the Americans. They
  1294. 49:54all protested, saying "no, you can't,
  1295. 49:56this and that"; I said this is not a
  1296. 49:58war we started anyway, it is a war that
  1297. 50:00was imposed on us, and we had told you
  1298. 50:02beforehand. Well, they started
  1299. 50:04protesting; by the afternoon, they were
  1300. 50:06summoning our ambassadors and such
  1301. 50:08because we were hitting them repeatedly
  1302. 50:10. It was perhaps the third day of the
  1303. 50:14war when one of the regional foreign
  1304. 50:16ministers called me in the morning and
  1305. 50:18said: "To retaliate for the places you
  1306. 50:20hit from our soil, we will hit
  1307. 50:22such-and-such location at, say, 8
  1308. 50:24o'clock"—he called me at 7: 30— "
  1309. 50:26but we won't continue; you stop hitting
  1310. 50:28us, and we won't hit you anymore either
  1311. 50:30." Very classy, for instance.
  1312. 50:33Was it the UAE or Saudi Arabia?
  1313. 50:35Man, one of the countries in the region
  1314. 50:37.
  1315. 50:40So, aside from the US and Israel, they
  1316. 50:42also started calling and threatening?
  1317. 50:45They threatened, and I said if you
  1318. 50:46target us, this time we will target you
  1319. 50:49directly, and a war will start between
  1320. 50:51us and you—between us and the US, and
  1321. 50:53between us and Israel is one thing, but
  1322. 50:55it will start with you.
  1323. 50:56Did you say this on your own or...No,
  1324. 51:00well, that was our policy.
  1325. 51:02Aha, so this was part of the approved
  1326. 51:04resolutions.
  1327. 51:05Yes, all of these, I mean all of these
  1328. 51:06had been thought out. Of course, I did
  1329. 51:08check this matter, yes. Additionally, I
  1330. 51:12should say that our communications were
  1331. 51:14difficult, but...There were two places
  1332. 51:18in the armed forces where our
  1333. 51:20connection was instantaneous. I mean,
  1334. 51:23honestly, whenever they called, I was
  1335. 51:25available, and whenever I called, they
  1336. 51:27were available. Others, no, I won't
  1337. 51:29mention names now. For Mr. So-and-so,
  1338. 51:32we would need him, and 24 hours later
  1339. 51:34they would say they couldn't reach him;
  1340. 51:36now, the Leadership was a different
  1341. 51:38matter entirely, but for all ordinary
  1342. 51:40people, whoever we needed, we had to
  1343. 51:43search all morning just to get an
  1344. 51:45answer.
  1345. 51:45But the armed forces were not like that
  1346. 51:47.
  1347. 51:47The armed forces, the armed forces.
  1348. 51:51Contact was instantaneous. Whenever I
  1349. 51:54called, honestly, Mr. Vahid would pick
  1350. 51:56up the phone, or General Abdollahi, or
  1351. 51:59the others, or the force commanders.
  1352. 52:02Because when the "Na-Dena" issue came
  1353. 52:04up, well, there were many problems
  1354. 52:06regardless. Anyway, he told me that "we
  1355. 52:09will strike," and I said "we will
  1356. 52:11respond immediately, and a war between
  1357. 52:13us and you will begin as well." Then he
  1358. 52:16said: "Well, what should we do now?" I
  1359. 52:18said: "Wait until 12 noon, push it back
  1360. 52:20a little, maybe we will reach a
  1361. 52:22conclusion." They delayed it, and then
  1362. 52:25we had some discussions and made an
  1363. 52:26agreement that if they didn't allow
  1364. 52:28American bases to be used against us,
  1365. 52:30we wouldn't strike them either; but
  1366. 52:32they didn't stick to it. We kept
  1367. 52:34striking them until the end of the war,
  1368. 52:36and they didn't make such threats again
  1369. 52:38because we would respond. We give, and
  1370. 52:41the rest of them are the same. The
  1371. 52:43region couldn't believe that we struck
  1372. 52:45the region and they couldn't respond;
  1373. 52:46this was a major transformation that
  1374. 52:48took place. It completely transformed
  1375. 52:50the security structure of the region;
  1376. 52:52that Iran would strike the entire
  1377. 52:54region, all of it, even Oman, which was
  1378. 52:56ultimately our friend and we really
  1379. 52:57didn't strike; but...
  1380. 52:59You struck a part of it? No, that's
  1381. 53:00what I want to say: they had a company
  1382. 53:03in one of their ports that provided
  1383. 53:05fuel to American ships; only that, we
  1384. 53:07struck that. We hit it once or twice;
  1385. 53:10of course, the Omanis were very upset,
  1386. 53:12since they had really supported us; but
  1387. 53:14that ended too, and they themselves
  1388. 53:17stopped the companies. We struck the
  1389. 53:20entire region, and not a single one of
  1390. 53:22them could respond, which showed that
  1391. 53:24the regional security structure could
  1392. 53:26no longer be like it was before. This
  1393. 53:30war, well, at some point we must...we
  1394. 53:32need to get to it later; I have to
  1395. 53:33mention our strategic achievements in
  1396. 53:35this war, what we achieved and what
  1397. 53:37strategic victories we gained, and in
  1398. 53:39contrast, the damages we suffered,
  1399. 53:41which were not strategic up to a point;
  1400. 53:43some of our damages were strategic, but
  1401. 53:45on balance, our strategic victories
  1402. 53:47were greater. For the first time, we
  1403. 53:51struck the region, we struck all these
  1404. 53:53countries in the region for the first
  1405. 53:55time, and then we closed the strait.
  1406. 53:58Whose decision was this before the war?
  1407. 54:04Before the war, we had numerous
  1408. 54:06meetings; in the Supreme Council, all
  1409. 54:08scenarios were reviewed, for example:
  1410. 54:14Now I have to say these things; for
  1411. 54:15instance, if America struck alone and
  1412. 54:17the regime didn't participate, what
  1413. 54:19should we do? If they both struck
  1414. 54:21together, what should we do? If, for
  1415. 54:22example, their targets remained limited
  1416. 54:24to military objectives and they didn't
  1417. 54:26strike the cities, if they hit their
  1418. 54:28targets, what should we do? If it went
  1419. 54:30further, if they went for the
  1420. 54:31infrastructure, what should we do? And
  1421. 54:33there was a scenario that was the very
  1422. 54:35last one, if they struck the leadership
  1423. 54:37, what should they do?
  1424. 54:38So this was predicted.
  1425. 54:40It even had a code, almost.
  1426. 54:43What does that mean?
  1427. 54:44For example, "Code So-and-So", if it
  1428. 54:46happened, what should we do? In the
  1429. 54:49meetings, I mean. In the sense that in
  1430. 54:53the meeting, no one had the heart to
  1431. 54:57say this, that, for example, the
  1432. 55:00leadership; even saying it was hard,
  1433. 55:02the code. If "Code 11" was mentioned,
  1434. 55:05everyone knew what Code 11 meant if
  1435. 55:07Code 11 happened, we would do this; it
  1436. 55:09had been written down and approved, and
  1437. 55:12the Supreme Leader himself had seen and
  1438. 55:14confirmed it. That is why it began
  1439. 55:17immediately and started in a very
  1440. 55:19organized and systematic way. We were
  1441. 55:22not caught off guard at all; we were
  1442. 55:24prepared for everything. Yes, we also
  1443. 55:27used negotiation as a tool; if it
  1444. 55:29worked, it worked, if not?
  1445. 55:31I once asked Mr. Larijani, I think in [
  1446. 55:33year] 87, I said, "What will happen if
  1447. 55:35they strike the Leader?" He gave an
  1448. 55:37answer, I asked again, and he said, "
  1449. 55:39Mr. [Name], stop it already."
  1450. 55:42Meaning he scolded me to never speak of
  1451. 55:44it again.
  1452. 55:46Yes, even talking about it was
  1453. 55:48difficult. That’s why I say there
  1454. 55:50were codes; we didn't say the thing
  1455. 55:52itself, we used that code which
  1456. 55:53everyone knew the meaning of. When it
  1457. 56:02started, well, I, since I finally knew
  1458. 56:05what was happening, I personally called
  1459. 56:07the regional ministers and said it is
  1460. 56:09like this. Then we issued a statement,
  1461. 56:13we started giving interviews, and the
  1462. 56:15main goal we had those days was to
  1463. 56:17immediately get Iran’s voice to the
  1464. 56:19world, and this voice had to be one of
  1465. 56:21self-confidence; not a voice that
  1466. 56:23showed hesitation so the enemy would
  1467. 56:25think, "Yes, they’ve really given up,
  1468. 56:27it's over, for instance, they will
  1469. 56:29reach their goals in two or three days.
  1470. 56:31" It shouldn't be; if you look at the
  1471. 56:34interviews I gave those days, and Mr.
  1472. 56:36Baghaei, my spokesperson, gave.
  1473. 56:38Mr. Baghaei who really
  1474. 56:40Mr. Baghaei really went above and
  1475. 56:42beyond; the number of interviews he did
  1476. 56:44, the number of...
  1477. 56:45Their meetings were never canceled,
  1478. 56:47their weekly meetings; he even said a
  1479. 56:49very tough phrase that we [showed] our
  1480. 56:51superpower...Meaning this
  1481. 56:55They fought very hard.
  1482. 56:56In the literature of the Ministry of
  1483. 56:58Foreign Affairs, it was like this.
  1484. 57:00During these 40 days, Mr. Baghaei, as
  1485. 57:02our spokesperson, as you said, never
  1486. 57:04canceled his spokesperson meeting even
  1487. 57:07once. In these 40 days, and I must say
  1488. 57:09in these 40 days, I and my deputies and
  1489. 57:12all my colleagues did not leave the
  1490. 57:14Ministry of Foreign Affairs building;
  1491. 57:16everyone else went to other places,
  1492. 57:18other buildings. Of course, we weren't
  1493. 57:21in our offices, but within the Ministry
  1494. 57:23of Foreign Affairs site, we had
  1495. 57:25anticipated some locations, which I
  1496. 57:27don’t know how safe they were, but
  1497. 57:29finally...
  1498. 57:29There was no safe place.
  1499. 57:31There was no safe place.
  1500. 57:32Except for the tunnels, there was no
  1501. 57:34safe place.
  1502. 57:35Now, the tunnel also had its own
  1503. 57:37hardships, anyway, but we were at the
  1504. 57:39Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all the
  1505. 57:41deputies were there; I’ve told this
  1506. 57:43famous story in a few places, maybe you
  1507. 57:46know, the interpretation that a foreign
  1508. 57:48think tank had made, that we...Had
  1509. 57:55underestimated a few things. One, they
  1510. 57:58underestimated Iran’s armed forces.
  1511. 58:02They didn't think they could resist so
  1512. 58:04much and could, I mean, continue the
  1513. 58:06missile fire. Second, they had
  1514. 58:09underestimated the people of Iran. They
  1515. 58:11didn't think they would support [the
  1516. 58:13state] like this. They thought that as
  1517. 58:15soon as something happened, everyone
  1518. 58:17would come to the streets and protest
  1519. 58:19and the problems you know; but the
  1520. 58:21people stood firm. And the third, which
  1521. 58:24is interesting, is that we had
  1522. 58:25underestimated the Iranian officials.
  1523. 58:29No one imagined that they would be
  1524. 58:31martyred one by one, yet still stand
  1525. 58:33their ground; in all similar cases, it
  1526. 58:36happens frequently that they leave
  1527. 58:38their posts, resign, leave the country,
  1528. 58:40flee, and seek asylum.
  1529. 58:43They seek asylum, and how much effort
  1530. 58:45they put into making them seek asylum.
  1531. 58:47From the diplomats.
  1532. 58:48From our diplomats, because they were
  1533. 58:50accessible; they were both accessible
  1534. 58:51and under intense psychological
  1535. 58:53pressure. I experienced this; since
  1536. 58:562009. I was the ambassador to Japan.
  1537. 59:01Watching the crisis in your own country
  1538. 59:03from the outside makes the anxiety and
  1539. 59:05turmoil many times worse; because you
  1540. 59:07can't do anything about it from the
  1541. 59:09outside, and then being exposed to the
  1542. 59:11psychological pressure of Western media
  1543. 59:14is truly crushing. But none of my
  1544. 59:17colleagues not only didn't quit their
  1545. 59:19jobs, but they didn't lose their morale
  1546. 59:21either. Perhaps you noticed that this
  1547. 59:24time our public diplomacy was much more
  1548. 59:26active than last time. Most of our
  1549. 59:28embassies were tweeting, and
  1550. 59:30significant tweets that got millions of
  1551. 59:32views, and the Westerners themselves
  1552. 59:34admitted that many Western media
  1553. 59:36outlets acknowledged that Iran's public
  1554. 59:38diplomacy prevailed over American
  1555. 59:40public diplomacy. These works they
  1556. 59:43created, these AI-generated pieces, the
  1557. 59:45Lego topic which was the initiative of
  1558. 59:48our Iranian youth, and many other
  1559. 59:49things; and then our embassies tweeted
  1560. 59:52and shared them, some of which received
  1561. 59:54over twenty million views. No, my
  1562. 59:56colleagues, both inside and outside the
  1563. 59:59country, stood firm; not even a single
  1564. 1:00:01local employee of ours quit their job,
  1565. 1:00:03saying "I won't come in from tomorrow."
  1566. 1:00:05Protection doesn't even make much sense
  1567. 1:00:07anymore.
  1568. 1:00:08No.
  1569. 1:00:09The poor security guards. I mean, what
  1570. 1:00:13can they do? It's a missile, it just
  1571. 1:00:15comes and hits.
  1572. 1:00:17I even, since we had to go to different
  1573. 1:00:19places at night, sometimes I would tell
  1574. 1:00:21the security guards: "Sir, don't come;
  1575. 1:00:23because if a missile hits, there's
  1576. 1:00:25nothing you can do, you'll just be
  1577. 1:00:27martyred for nothing, don't sacrifice
  1578. 1:00:29yourselves for me." But no, my security
  1579. 1:00:32guards were truly with me everywhere;
  1580. 1:00:34they had various initiatives, because
  1581. 1:00:36even this can at least be mitigated
  1582. 1:00:38with some initiatives. For example,
  1583. 1:00:44suppose that no other official had a
  1584. 1:00:46phone due to the security situation
  1585. 1:00:48everyone knows about, but unfortunately
  1586. 1:00:50, I couldn't put the phone aside;
  1587. 1:00:52because all my foreign contacts with
  1588. 1:00:54foreign ministers, constant interviews,
  1589. 1:00:57calls, contacts with our own embassies,
  1590. 1:00:59I had to do all of them, and therefore,
  1591. 1:01:01for example, the only thing that...
  1592. 1:01:07Maybe it lowered the risk factor a bit,
  1593. 1:01:09was dedicating some hours of the day to
  1594. 1:01:11me getting in the car, and we would
  1595. 1:01:13drive around the city so that at least
  1596. 1:01:15I wouldn't be in one fixed place, just
  1597. 1:01:17in case...we could leave.
  1598. 1:01:19But there were many innovative methods,
  1599. 1:01:22and well, at a certain point we finally
  1600. 1:01:24managed to control it; the rate of
  1601. 1:01:26martyrdom among officials went down,
  1602. 1:01:28but unfortunately, we lost precious
  1603. 1:01:30people too.
  1604. 1:01:32The real perception was that this place
  1605. 1:01:34is like Venezuela, meaning...
  1606. 1:01:35That by hitting, for example, the
  1607. 1:01:37leadership and, say, a few officials,
  1608. 1:01:39the work would be finished.
  1609. 1:01:41I said it before; I said officials were
  1610. 1:01:43martyred one by one, but we didn't back
  1611. 1:01:45down. Once, I think it was in one of
  1612. 1:01:49the talks for the Americans, I don't
  1613. 1:01:51remember where.
  1614. 1:01:55For Vidcafa.
  1615. 1:01:56For Vidcafa, I said: "Have you ever
  1616. 1:02:01been in a meeting where you suspected
  1617. 1:02:03at any moment that the whole meeting
  1618. 1:02:05might explode?" He just stared blankly.
  1619. 1:02:10I said, "Have you ever talked on the
  1620. 1:02:12phone and suspected that at the very
  1621. 1:02:14moment you were talking, you might, so
  1622. 1:02:16to speak, blow up and be destroyed?""
  1623. 1:02:23Have you ever asked about your family
  1624. 1:02:24on the phone and told yourself it might
  1625. 1:02:26be the last time?" I said we have
  1626. 1:02:32experienced these things and we stood
  1627. 1:02:34firm; you have to talk to us
  1628. 1:02:36differently. You can't threaten us; you
  1629. 1:02:41can't bribe us. In the negotiations
  1630. 1:02:45before the 12-day war, they had come to
  1631. 1:02:47bribe—no, not normalize—to bribe
  1632. 1:02:50the Islamic Republic, saying "we will
  1633. 1:02:52do this, we will build that." I told
  1634. 1:02:55him there that our enrichment is not
  1635. 1:02:57for sale. This is something for which
  1636. 1:03:00the people of Iran have endured
  1637. 1:03:02sanctions for 20 years, and their
  1638. 1:03:03scientists have shed their blood. How
  1639. 1:03:05could we sell it? You say, "I will
  1640. 1:03:07build you what kind of power plant?""I
  1641. 1:03:08will build what?" I told him here,
  1642. 1:03:10neither bribery nor threats. Someone
  1643. 1:03:12should threaten when there is fear.
  1644. 1:03:14When we...Go and...Wait every moment
  1645. 1:03:19for any disaster to happen to us, you
  1646. 1:03:21can no longer scare me by saying, "I'll
  1647. 1:03:23come, I'll strike, I'll do this, I'll
  1648. 1:03:25wage war."
  1649. 1:03:26This is not Venezuela.
  1650. 1:03:27Yes, this is not Venezuela where you
  1651. 1:03:29can take someone out and the rest get
  1652. 1:03:31scared and back down. The same goes for
  1653. 1:03:33infrastructure; because the discussion
  1654. 1:03:35of attacking infrastructure became very
  1655. 1:03:37hot at one point, they threatened me,
  1656. 1:03:39they gave me an ultimatum, and they hit
  1657. 1:03:41a few places, so we immediately hit a
  1658. 1:03:43few places back. In response, as I
  1659. 1:03:45mentioned, one scenario was that if
  1660. 1:03:47they hit our infrastructure, which
  1661. 1:03:49infrastructure of theirs should we hit?
  1662. 1:03:52All these were identified beforehand...
  1663. 1:03:54Why didn't it continue? Why didn't they
  1664. 1:03:56hit our infrastructure? That was a
  1665. 1:03:58fundamental question! I mean, when I
  1666. 1:04:00was threatening back then, I said, "God
  1667. 1:04:02, why did they only peck at our
  1668. 1:04:03infrastructure now?" They pecked at a
  1669. 1:04:06few places; now, bridges and such are
  1670. 1:04:08not even considered infrastructure. In
  1671. 1:04:10my opinion, infrastructure means
  1672. 1:04:12Assaluyeh, it means steel; these are it
  1673. 1:04:14. These are the infrastructures. Why
  1674. 1:04:16didn't they hit our infrastructure
  1675. 1:04:18extensively? "
  1676. 1:04:19In my opinion, when they started
  1677. 1:04:20hitting our infrastructure, well, we
  1678. 1:04:22hit the region's infrastructure; of
  1679. 1:04:24course, the infrastructure whose
  1680. 1:04:25shareholders were American. When the
  1681. 1:04:28region's infrastructure started taking
  1682. 1:04:30hits, they finally realized that the
  1683. 1:04:32war was serious. At that time, the
  1684. 1:04:35region started pressuring Trump to stop
  1685. 1:04:37; well, we would have targeted the
  1686. 1:04:39infrastructure sooner, meaning we would
  1687. 1:04:41have been the ones to start it.
  1688. 1:04:44Well, it's a good thing you're not a
  1689. 1:04:45commander. After all, this has its own
  1690. 1:04:51calculations; it's not just about
  1691. 1:04:53hitting, you have to be able to defend
  1692. 1:04:55your own infrastructure, and you have
  1693. 1:04:57to be able to predict, for example, if
  1694. 1:04:59they hit our power plants, how long I
  1695. 1:05:01can continue, or what if they hit our
  1696. 1:05:04gas.
  1697. 1:05:04No, I’m saying if they hit it—well,
  1698. 1:05:07you’re not a commander, we should ask
  1699. 1:05:09others this—but I say if they hit
  1700. 1:05:11infrastructure, it increases pressure
  1701. 1:05:13on the Americans and lowers the
  1702. 1:05:15threshold for war; I don’t know,
  1703. 1:05:17other things happen, so why not strike
  1704. 1:05:19first?
  1705. 1:05:20No, if striking infrastructure had
  1706. 1:05:21started from our side, it would have
  1707. 1:05:22created legitimacy for them to hit our
  1708. 1:05:24infrastructure.
  1709. 1:05:25Is it a world of legitimacy now, Mr.
  1710. 1:05:27Doctor? Everyone does whatever they
  1711. 1:05:29want.
  1712. 1:05:29It is. Look, they started with caution;
  1713. 1:05:32for example, they hit four phases of
  1714. 1:05:34Assaluyeh, I think. If we had started
  1715. 1:05:37it, they would have hit all 24 phases
  1716. 1:05:39immediately. After all, this has its
  1717. 1:05:41own calculations. I’m saying it’s a
  1718. 1:05:43good thing you and I aren't military
  1719. 1:05:45commanders to ruin this country. We...
  1720. 1:05:52what days we went through...one day I
  1721. 1:05:54must write down the exact memories or
  1722. 1:05:56tell what days we endured. The first
  1723. 1:06:01days were really very hard, very, very
  1724. 1:06:03hard; because news just kept arriving
  1725. 1:06:06about where they hit, who they hit, and
  1726. 1:06:08the threats that were being made that
  1727. 1:06:10...We should surrender unconditionally,
  1728. 1:06:16and I don't know what else.
  1729. 1:06:17Didn't you lose heart, Mr. Doctor?
  1730. 1:06:19No. A person might get worried in their
  1731. 1:06:23heart that we must prevent these things
  1732. 1:06:25, but losing heart to the point of
  1733. 1:06:27saying" it's over, just let it go, "no,
  1734. 1:06:30never.
  1735. 1:06:31No, everyone was worried in the sense
  1736. 1:06:34that, well, I personally had predicted
  1737. 1:06:36that they might target the leadership,
  1738. 1:06:38and many in these meetings said so, but
  1739. 1:06:40I really didn't anticipate the Defense
  1740. 1:06:42Council being hit with that scale; I
  1741. 1:06:44didn't think that seven, eight, or ten
  1742. 1:06:46people in the Defense Council would be
  1743. 1:06:49hit suddenly all at once.
  1744. 1:06:51Of course, it wasn't the Defense
  1745. 1:06:53Council.
  1746. 1:06:54It was beyond the Defense Council.
  1747. 1:06:56No, no, it was smaller; it was one of
  1748. 1:06:58the sub-committees of the Defense
  1749. 1:07:00Council, because the Defense Council
  1750. 1:07:02includes the Foreign Minister, and the
  1751. 1:07:04President himself chairs it. That is
  1752. 1:07:06something like a Supreme Council. Two
  1753. 1:07:08or three people are different in it.
  1754. 1:07:10However, just like the Supreme Council
  1755. 1:07:11which has sub-committees. This was one
  1756. 1:07:13of its committees. But unfortunately,
  1757. 1:07:15four or five of the main people were in
  1758. 1:07:17it.
  1759. 1:07:17For example, the previous head of SPND,
  1760. 1:07:20the current head of SPND, and their
  1761. 1:07:22deputies.
  1762. 1:07:23Where is SPND?
  1763. 1:07:24It belongs to the Ministry of Defense.
  1764. 1:07:26Well, we're saying they were all there.
  1765. 1:07:28Now, I want to say, didn't you lose
  1766. 1:07:30heart? Look, actually, that was the
  1767. 1:07:34enemy's plan; why did they hit the
  1768. 1:07:36Minav school anyway? I really think
  1769. 1:07:43they hit it on purpose, and one of
  1770. 1:07:44their intentions was to dishearten us;
  1771. 1:07:46meaning to show the depth of the
  1772. 1:07:48tragedy to the people. Why did they hit
  1773. 1:07:52the Dena [ship]? It was really a
  1774. 1:07:54completely defenseless ship, hundreds
  1775. 1:07:56of kilometers away from Iran; it was a
  1776. 1:07:59training vessel, it had gone for a
  1777. 1:08:01ceremonial maneuver, that's all. All of
  1778. 1:08:04this is to scare and dishearten. And
  1779. 1:08:08they have tested us many times. When
  1780. 1:08:10they entered the infrastructure, well,
  1781. 1:08:12they hit some places to see if we would
  1782. 1:08:14have short hands [give in]. They tested
  1783. 1:08:17us a lot to reach a point, and with the
  1784. 1:08:19propaganda they were doing, they wanted
  1785. 1:08:21to bring us to that point, but really
  1786. 1:08:23no one...
  1787. 1:08:23What about the cabinet, Dr.?
  1788. 1:08:26There was no cabinet; the cabinet
  1789. 1:08:28perhaps held its first meeting just
  1790. 1:08:30last week. Of course, we were in
  1791. 1:08:32contact, we would contact the ministers
  1792. 1:08:38we needed to coordinate with, we would
  1793. 1:08:40find each other; but no, in this period
  1794. 1:08:42, perhaps the person I saw the most was
  1795. 1:08:44the President. The President was truly
  1796. 1:08:47available, and regularly, at least for
  1797. 1:08:49my own work, I would visit him, and if
  1798. 1:08:52necessary, he would set up a meeting,
  1799. 1:08:54that 6-member committee.
  1800. 1:08:55Are you talking about during the war?
  1801. 1:08:57Both in the war and in the negotiations
  1802. 1:08:59.
  1803. 1:08:59Did you see each other in the 6-member
  1804. 1:09:00committee during the war?
  1805. 1:09:02The 6-member committee, well, it was a
  1806. 1:09:05group because it wasn't possible to
  1807. 1:09:07invite everyone at all; it was
  1808. 1:09:08dangerous security-wise.
  1809. 1:09:12The tunnel is safe, nothing happens in
  1810. 1:09:14the tunnel; you were invited to go to
  1811. 1:09:16the tunnel, nothing happens, meaning
  1812. 1:09:18they aren't strong enough to hit the
  1813. 1:09:20tunnel. They hit the front of the door,
  1814. 1:09:23the guys there filled the oxygen tanks,
  1815. 1:09:25meaning I know nothing happens in there
  1816. 1:09:27.
  1817. 1:09:30Well, they hit their own. No, it wasn't
  1818. 1:09:33like everyone could go to the tunnels;
  1819. 1:09:35after all, there are considerations.
  1820. 1:09:37You know what the condition is? That if
  1821. 1:09:39you go, you have to stay for a few days
  1822. 1:09:41, for instance; you can't just go and
  1823. 1:09:43come back quickly. And you can't go
  1824. 1:09:46because you have work outside.
  1825. 1:09:48Yes, well, I will tell these types of
  1826. 1:09:50stories when some time has passed, God
  1827. 1:09:53willing, about where we went, what we
  1828. 1:09:55did, and how it was, but; We had the
  1829. 1:10:00most interaction with the President. He
  1830. 1:10:04would invite people accordingly: Mr.
  1831. 1:10:06Larijani and then Mr. Zolnour, who
  1832. 1:10:08became his successor, Mr. Ghalibaf. It
  1833. 1:10:14was a truly 5-6 person group that
  1834. 1:10:16regularly would see each other in some
  1835. 1:10:21way. And later, when it was decided
  1836. 1:10:23that a committee should be formed and
  1837. 1:10:26it was left to the President himself to
  1838. 1:10:28appoint the individuals, when he added,
  1839. 1:10:30I think, one person to those same 5-6
  1840. 1:10:32people, it became 6 people so that they
  1841. 1:10:35could make decisions in the moment for
  1842. 1:10:37the negotiations; because really,
  1843. 1:10:39contact with the top was a bit
  1844. 1:10:42difficult. And sometimes it was
  1845. 1:10:45necessary for decisions to be made
  1846. 1:10:47quickly; this committee was formed for
  1847. 1:10:49that purpose.
  1848. 1:10:50How was your relationship with Mr.
  1849. 1:10:52Mojtaba? Have you ever seen him?
  1850. 1:10:54No, never.
  1851. 1:10:55You haven't seen him at all?
  1852. 1:10:56In this period, I haven't seen him, and
  1853. 1:10:59I don't think—meaning, except for a
  1854. 1:11:01few select people, [others] have seen
  1855. 1:11:03him; before this, the same [applies], I
  1856. 1:11:05...
  1857. 1:11:06I had no relationship.
  1858. 1:11:08No, I don't know him at all.
  1859. 1:11:10Well, from afar, yes, from what I've
  1860. 1:11:12heard from others, but I haven't had
  1861. 1:11:14personal contact. I've seen him a few
  1862. 1:11:16times at some events from a distance,
  1863. 1:11:18but we haven't had a conversation.
  1864. 1:11:20No, I saw him too; I saw him at the
  1865. 1:11:23Book Fair. Did you imagine they would
  1866. 1:11:26elect him to the Assembly of Experts?
  1867. 1:11:31Well, he was always considered one of
  1868. 1:11:33the candidates. One of the individuals
  1869. 1:11:36—let's not say candidate—deemed
  1870. 1:11:38worthy of this position, well, it's up
  1871. 1:11:40to the Assembly of Experts. What worked
  1872. 1:11:45out very well for us was that It sent a
  1873. 1:11:51very important message to the world:
  1874. 1:11:53despite the war and despite all this,
  1875. 1:11:55there has been no change in the
  1876. 1:11:57policies, principles, and ideals of the
  1877. 1:11:59Islamic Republic, and there will not be
  1878. 1:12:02. And it was very important that this
  1879. 1:12:04message be sent. For the Americans, the
  1880. 1:12:06expression they used themselves to mock
  1881. 1:12:08Trump was:" So, what did you do? "" A
  1882. 1:12:10... "
  1883. 1:12:11Khamenei became young.
  1884. 1:12:12Khamenei became young; the old Khamenei
  1885. 1:12:14was gone, and a young Khamenei, so to
  1886. 1:12:16speak, replaced him. You couldn't do
  1887. 1:12:18anything else either. The Strait of
  1888. 1:12:20Hormuz was open, and now, so to speak,
  1889. 1:12:22because of you, it closed. You couldn't
  1890. 1:12:24even gain access to resources. Aside
  1891. 1:12:27from eventually killing some people and
  1892. 1:12:29destroying some buildings and places,
  1893. 1:12:31what achievement did you have? And this
  1894. 1:12:34has truly remained the case for Trump,
  1895. 1:12:36that he cannot present any achievement.
  1896. 1:12:39I mean, in this war, my own opinion
  1897. 1:12:41regarding the 12-day war was that it
  1898. 1:12:44was a draw; however, our" one "was just
  1899. 1:12:47one, while their" one "was the whole
  1900. 1:12:49world—that is, America, Israel, NATO
  1901. 1:12:52countries, and regional countries. What
  1902. 1:12:56do you say now? Because I remember you
  1903. 1:12:58said back then," No, it wasn't a draw,
  1904. 1:13:00we won the 12-day war. "What is your
  1905. 1:13:02opinion now?
  1906. 1:13:04No, I now believe that we actually
  1907. 1:13:06achieved a strategic victory. In my
  1908. 1:13:08opinion, the position of the Islamic
  1909. 1:13:10Republic changed drastically after this
  1910. 1:13:12war. And most importantly, the image of
  1911. 1:13:15a weak Iran was shattered. Perhaps that
  1912. 1:13:20was our greatest achievement, and in
  1913. 1:13:22its place, the image of a strong and
  1914. 1:13:24resilient Iran was established.
  1915. 1:13:27Didn't this happen after the 12-day war
  1916. 1:13:29?
  1917. 1:13:29Why? At that time, they realized it
  1918. 1:13:32themselves, but they didn't believe it.
  1919. 1:13:34They thought the cause was, for example
  1920. 1:13:36, equipment issues or something, and if
  1921. 1:13:38they hit Iran's launchers—what to do,
  1922. 1:13:41what to do—they could resolve it; but
  1923. 1:13:43in this 40-day war, it was proven.
  1924. 1:13:45Especially since last time, well, they
  1925. 1:13:47finally called for a ceasefire after
  1926. 1:13:49the war, and we eventually accepted it.
  1927. 1:13:53This time you said we won't even have a
  1928. 1:13:55ceasefire; we want to fight until we
  1929. 1:13:57reach a point that marks the end of the
  1930. 1:13:59war. We don't want this scenario to
  1931. 1:14:02repeat every year anymore. And
  1932. 1:14:05therefore, I believe our most important
  1933. 1:14:07achievement was that the image of a
  1934. 1:14:09weak Iran was shattered. An image of a
  1935. 1:14:12strong Iran replaced the previous one.
  1936. 1:14:14When I say God knows, it is not a
  1937. 1:14:16slogan at all. I am the one seeing it
  1938. 1:14:18every day in my talks with other
  1939. 1:14:20countries and the kind
  1940. 1:14:21of feedback that exists out there.
  1941. 1:14:23Absolutely, absolutely, everyone, the
  1942. 1:14:26ministers we meet with, friend and foe,
  1943. 1:14:28say Iran emerged from this war stronger
  1944. 1:14:31. That is their own interpretation.
  1945. 1:14:33Iran astonished the world. Iran
  1946. 1:14:35demonstrated its remaining power. We
  1947. 1:14:39just realized that your atomic bomb is
  1948. 1:14:41the Strait of Hormuz. We had been
  1949. 1:14:43looking for something else until now.
  1950. 1:14:44The world realized that Iran is strong.
  1951. 1:14:47This may have been our greatest victory
  1952. 1:14:49. Well, how did they realize we are
  1953. 1:14:51strong? Because we resisted. We did not
  1954. 1:14:53surrender, no regime change occurred,
  1955. 1:14:56and Iran was not partitioned. They had
  1956. 1:14:58planned to partition Iran. On the
  1957. 1:15:03fourth day of the war, Trump called
  1958. 1:15:05some leaders; now that it is public, he
  1959. 1:15:07called into the Iraqi Kurdistan region
  1960. 1:15:10and spoke to them one by one. He
  1961. 1:15:14himself said a while ago:" We sent
  1962. 1:15:16weapons there and didn't know where the
  1963. 1:15:18weapons went. "Meaning, on the same day
  1964. 1:15:22he spoke, I spoke in the evening; with
  1965. 1:15:25Mr. Barzani, Mr. Talabani, Fidan the
  1966. 1:15:27Turkish Foreign Minister, and Mr.
  1967. 1:15:30Sudani. I personally called the Iraqi
  1968. 1:15:34Prime Minister and warned that if the
  1969. 1:15:36slightest threat, so to speak, is
  1970. 1:15:38directed at us from the Iraqi Kurdistan
  1971. 1:15:40region, we will retaliate; do not think
  1972. 1:15:42we are occupied elsewhere, we will
  1973. 1:15:44definitely retaliate and we will
  1974. 1:15:46definitely strike.
  1975. 1:15:48Did these calls have an effect?
  1976. 1:15:52The regional officials and Sudani
  1977. 1:15:53himself assured me that they would
  1978. 1:15:55never let this happen and said that we
  1979. 1:15:57will control them and will not allow it
  1980. 1:15:58. Turkey played an effective role; they
  1981. 1:16:03spoke to the Americans and also took
  1982. 1:16:05very firm positions in this regard. A
  1983. 1:16:08set of efforts caused this plot to fail
  1984. 1:16:10, but my point is that they had planned
  1985. 1:16:12for the partition of Iran too. Now, it
  1986. 1:16:15is well known that he, now it is beyond
  1987. 1:16:17trivialities, that little fledgling.
  1988. 1:16:22Pahlavi.
  1989. 1:16:23Yes, it was later revealed that during
  1990. 1:16:26a trip to Israel, he had agreed to the
  1991. 1:16:28partition of Iran, saying the periphery
  1992. 1:16:30is yours and the central region, for
  1993. 1:16:33example, I become the King.
  1994. 1:16:35Throne for me, yes, meaning they had
  1995. 1:16:37laid out their plans for the partition
  1996. 1:16:39of Iran, for the fall of the system,
  1997. 1:16:44and for internal chaos. If we had such
  1998. 1:16:51an upper hand, if we were at the point
  1999. 1:16:53of victory, then why did we accept the
  2000. 1:16:55ceasefire? For the very reason you
  2001. 1:16:58mentioned, at what point should a war
  2002. 1:17:00end? When you are defeated or when you
  2003. 1:17:03are victorious? The answer is very
  2004. 1:17:05clear, in the sense that if we had
  2005. 1:17:07continued, we would have solidified it
  2006. 1:17:09more.
  2007. 1:17:10What does" solidified more "mean?
  2008. 1:17:12It means that we don't have it happen
  2009. 1:17:14one more time.
  2010. 1:17:15Let me then give you the answer to this
  2011. 1:17:17question very precisely and firmly. One
  2012. 1:17:20. How should a war end? How do wars end
  2013. 1:17:27in general? Either through absolute
  2014. 1:17:30military victory or through negotiation
  2015. 1:17:32. Absolute military victory means you
  2016. 1:17:35go and defeat the opponent completely,
  2017. 1:17:38they raise their hands and say," Sir, I
  2018. 1:17:40have been defeated, I will listen to
  2019. 1:17:42whatever you say, "like, for example,
  2020. 1:17:44the fate that befell Germany in the war
  2021. 1:17:46.
  2022. 1:17:46Meaning you occupy them or
  2023. 1:17:48The fate that befell Saddam in the war,
  2024. 1:17:50or I don't know, other cases, or
  2025. 1:17:52otherwise.
  2026. 1:17:52Which we do not have the capability for
  2027. 1:17:54.
  2028. 1:17:54If, if you have this capability, go do
  2029. 1:17:56it. We don't have the capability to
  2030. 1:17:58make Israel and America raise their
  2031. 1:18:00hands or go and occupy them, no.
  2032. 1:18:01We would kiss the hand of anyone who
  2033. 1:18:03could do that. Well, if you don't have
  2034. 1:18:05it, then there must be negotiation.
  2035. 1:18:07When should you negotiate? When you
  2036. 1:18:10have the upper hand on the military
  2037. 1:18:11front, or when you have the lower hand?
  2038. 1:18:13When you have the upper hand.
  2039. 1:18:15When you have the upper hand. When you
  2040. 1:18:17have the upper hand and are victorious
  2041. 1:18:19on the field, and have achieved field
  2042. 1:18:21and strategic gains, you must negotiate
  2043. 1:18:24. Not when, so to speak, the other side
  2044. 1:18:27has the upper hand. Would our gains
  2045. 1:18:31have been greater or lesser if we had
  2046. 1:18:32continued the war?
  2047. 1:18:34Military.
  2048. 1:18:35Military, strategic, in any form.
  2049. 1:18:37Also the risk.
  2050. 1:18:38Would our losses have been greater or
  2051. 1:18:40lesser? As you say, it's a risk; you
  2052. 1:18:42cannot take risks with people's lives,
  2053. 1:18:44you cannot gamble with the country's
  2054. 1:18:47destiny. You must make the right
  2055. 1:18:48decision and make a full calculation.
  2056. 1:18:51If, at the point where we accepted the
  2057. 1:18:53ceasefire or the agreement, we had
  2058. 1:18:55fought longer, would our gains have
  2059. 1:18:56been greater? No, look, some people say
  2060. 1:18:59we are, I don't know, ten meters away
  2061. 1:19:01from the tent.
  2062. 1:19:02I am not concerned with" some people, "
  2063. 1:19:04we are talking to each other.
  2064. 1:19:05Now, let me put it this way: they say,"
  2065. 1:19:07Sir, we must fight to a point where war
  2066. 1:19:09no longer happens. "In your opinion,
  2067. 1:19:11have we fought to that point? Does it
  2068. 1:19:13reach that?
  2069. 1:19:14When you want to end a war, let's go
  2070. 1:19:16step by step. When you have the upper
  2071. 1:19:18hand, you must negotiate. If you can
  2072. 1:19:20fight and finish the job with war—if
  2073. 1:19:22you are behind their tent and can go
  2074. 1:19:23and burn it down—then go do it. But
  2075. 1:19:25if you want to end the war through
  2076. 1:19:27negotiation in a way that it never
  2077. 1:19:29happens again, I agree. When should you
  2078. 1:19:30do this? And
  2079. 1:19:31When you have the upper hand.
  2080. 1:19:33You have the upper hand. Where is the
  2081. 1:19:35point of the upper hand? Where is the
  2082. 1:19:37point of negotiation? Is it the point
  2083. 1:19:39where, if you go any further, your
  2084. 1:19:41victories might not increase, and your
  2085. 1:19:43losses might increase? Or do you say,"
  2086. 1:19:45Now is not the time, let me take 10
  2087. 1:19:47more steps forward, record two more
  2088. 1:19:49victories, and enter the field with a
  2089. 1:19:51stronger hand "?
  2090. 1:19:52This carries a risk. We tested this
  2091. 1:19:54once in the Imposed War in '66, it
  2092. 1:19:56didn't work.
  2093. 1:19:57We hit a wall in '66. If we had
  2094. 1:19:59definitely accepted 598 [UN Resolution]
  2095. 1:20:01, it would have been better.
  2096. 1:20:02That is exactly what I am telling you.
  2097. 1:20:03But we left it until '67 to accept it.
  2098. 1:20:05I am saying that, in my opinion, our
  2099. 1:20:07strategic gains were completed in the
  2100. 1:20:10first two weeks of the war. Now,
  2101. 1:20:12Meaning they realized the Islamic
  2102. 1:20:14Republic cannot be folded.
  2103. 1:20:16They did not reach any of their goals.
  2104. 1:20:18We established the Strait of Hormuz as
  2105. 1:20:20a new tool of deterrence, showed our
  2106. 1:20:22authority to the region, showed that we
  2107. 1:20:24are invincible, showed our resilience,
  2108. 1:20:27and imposed costs on the world and the
  2109. 1:20:29region so that no one would ever crave
  2110. 1:20:31war with us again. In this war, we
  2111. 1:20:33emerged as an international player,
  2112. 1:20:35moving beyond regional status. They
  2113. 1:20:38were telling us," Sir, Africa is
  2114. 1:20:39desperate, open up this channel so the
  2115. 1:20:41fertilizer reaches them; they are
  2116. 1:20:43starving. "Pardon me, this phrasing
  2117. 1:20:45might be a bit informal, or as you say,
  2118. 1:20:47street-style.
  2119. 1:20:49They were desperate.
  2120. 1:20:50They were desperate in East Asia,
  2121. 1:20:52things had reached the point of
  2122. 1:20:54rationing and so on, and in Europe, it
  2123. 1:20:56was the same. This means Iran's action
  2124. 1:20:58in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian
  2125. 1:21:01Gulf had global consequences, and
  2126. 1:21:03therefore, we became a global player;
  2127. 1:21:05that is no small thing. The region
  2128. 1:21:07understood that without ensuring Iran's
  2129. 1:21:09security, it cannot have security;
  2130. 1:21:12without Iran's economic capability, the
  2131. 1:21:14region cannot have security. These were
  2132. 1:21:17all achievements we reached in the
  2133. 1:21:18first two or three weeks. We also had
  2134. 1:21:22damages. We lost our leadership. Of
  2135. 1:21:24course, we replaced them. After all,
  2136. 1:21:26our system is robust. We showed that
  2137. 1:21:28the system is robust. We showed that
  2138. 1:21:30our social capital is firmly in place.
  2139. 1:21:32These are all achievements, but we
  2140. 1:21:34suffered losses. We lost some
  2141. 1:21:36individuals. I don't know, we lost some
  2142. 1:21:39infrastructure. We lost Mobarakeh Steel
  2143. 1:21:41. I don't know.
  2144. 1:21:42The people.
  2145. 1:21:44Ultimately, the people were troubled.
  2146. 1:21:46If we sit down and calculate, had we
  2147. 1:21:49agreed to a ceasefire earlier, in my
  2148. 1:21:51opinion, our achievements would still
  2149. 1:21:54be intact, but we would have kept
  2150. 1:21:56Larijani, Khatib, Asaluyeh, and
  2151. 1:21:58Mobarakeh Steel. Now, you are saying
  2152. 1:22:02that if we had continued from the point
  2153. 1:22:04where we agreed to the ceasefire, our
  2154. 1:22:06achievements would have increased.
  2155. 1:22:09Ah, so you're saying instead of the
  2156. 1:22:10fortieth day, your opinion is that if
  2157. 1:22:12we had a ceasefire on, say, the
  2158. 1:22:13twenty-seventh or twenty-eighth day, it
  2159. 1:22:15wouldn't have been bad.
  2160. 1:22:16I am saying this in theory, yes. If we
  2161. 1:22:19sit and write it down precisely on
  2162. 1:22:20paper, we might say the twenty-eighth,
  2163. 1:22:22no, the thirtieth; maybe we would say
  2164. 1:22:23the thirtieth, no, the fifth day of the
  2165. 1:22:25war. But let's do the math; look, you
  2166. 1:22:27are deciding the fate of a country,
  2167. 1:22:29it’s not a matter of ifs and buts.
  2168. 1:22:31You cannot gamble with the fate of a
  2169. 1:22:32country, with the lives of the people.
  2170. 1:22:34You must calculate precisely: If I
  2171. 1:22:36fight longer from this moment, will I
  2172. 1:22:38have more achievements and be stronger
  2173. 1:22:40in negotiations, or will I suffer more
  2174. 1:22:43losses and be weaker in negotiations?
  2175. 1:22:46If my infrastructure reaches a point
  2176. 1:22:48where, for instance, I'm short on
  2177. 1:22:50people's electricity, their gas, and so
  2178. 1:22:52on, can I then appear stronger in the
  2179. 1:22:54negotiation arena? No. If, God forbid,
  2180. 1:22:57some damage is done to my social
  2181. 1:22:59capital—I don't want to use certain
  2182. 1:23:02terms here. If we create problems and
  2183. 1:23:04our stature is suddenly broken, then
  2184. 1:23:06going into negotiations is useless.
  2185. 1:23:08Therefore, determining the point of
  2186. 1:23:10negotiation is a very difficult task.
  2187. 1:23:13No, I'm saying if at that point of
  2188. 1:23:14negotiation, if it had reached the
  2189. 1:23:16fortieth day, say the fifty-fifth, we
  2190. 1:23:19wouldn't have had the upper hand.
  2191. 1:23:21In my opinion, no.
  2192. 1:23:22You know, I don't see those 15 days as
  2193. 1:23:24having any upper hand, we wouldn't have
  2194. 1:23:26gained any strategic achievement either
  2195. 1:23:28. I say maybe those 15 days would make
  2196. 1:23:30the enemy more desperate so they
  2197. 1:23:32wouldn't come back next time, or maybe
  2198. 1:23:34they wouldn't. You're saying" maybe "
  2199. 1:23:36yourself; you can't make a decision
  2200. 1:23:38based on" maybe, "tell me for sure.
  2201. 1:23:40I cannot say for sure.
  2202. 1:23:41Well, exactly.
  2203. 1:23:42Sir, who can say anything for sure
  2204. 1:23:44anyway?
  2205. 1:23:45Who can say?
  2206. 1:23:46No one can say for sure; can you say
  2207. 1:23:47for sure right now that...
  2208. 1:23:49Who has our Constitution entrusted this
  2209. 1:23:51duty to? The Supreme National Security
  2210. 1:23:53Council. The Supreme National Security
  2211. 1:23:55Council; look at the entire composition
  2212. 1:23:57of the Council in the Constitution; the
  2213. 1:23:59military is there, politicians are
  2214. 1:24:00there, domestic policy is there,
  2215. 1:24:02foreign policy is there, economists are
  2216. 1:24:04there, the person in charge of the
  2217. 1:24:05country's financial resources is there,
  2218. 1:24:07and security officials are there too.
  2219. 1:24:09The Constitution has foreseen this,
  2220. 1:24:11specified such a composition from the
  2221. 1:24:12highest ranks of each field, and said
  2222. 1:24:14they should decide during peace or war
  2223. 1:24:16or...and then peace and war, according
  2224. 1:24:18to the Constitution, still rests with
  2225. 1:24:20the Leadership; so these are all
  2226. 1:24:21provided for. Decision-making is not
  2227. 1:24:23like you and me saying," Sir, maybe
  2228. 1:24:24this will happen, maybe that will
  2229. 1:24:26happen. "" If this happens "—there
  2230. 1:24:27are no" ifs "; it must be calculated
  2231. 1:24:29precisely. In those Supreme Council
  2232. 1:24:30meetings, everyone spoke precisely from
  2233. 1:24:31their own perspective; one would say,"
  2234. 1:24:33Sir, how much is my resilience, for
  2235. 1:24:34example, in terms of providing for
  2236. 1:24:35people's livelihoods? "Another would
  2237. 1:24:37say," How much is my military
  2238. 1:24:38resilience? "How long can I fight? How
  2239. 1:24:40long can I not do such and such? I
  2240. 1:24:41would say," Suppose our foreign policy
  2241. 1:24:43situation is what? "Are we isolated now
  2242. 1:24:45, or are we not? Are we getting
  2243. 1:24:46resolutions against us now? It covers
  2244. 1:24:48everything; where our strength is,
  2245. 1:24:49where our weakness is. Everyone spoke
  2246. 1:24:51in the meeting. In that specific final
  2247. 1:24:54meeting, it started at 9 PM and went
  2248. 1:24:56until 3 AM.
  2249. 1:24:57What day?
  2250. 1:24:59The one that approved the note with
  2251. 1:25:01America, the last session, the one that
  2252. 1:25:03is under scrutiny and there is finally
  2253. 1:25:04a lot of talk about it.
  2254. 1:25:06Meaning out of those 13 people, 12
  2255. 1:25:08voted for the ceasefire, the discussion
  2256. 1:25:10was the same number.
  2257. 1:25:11The ceasefire took place under much
  2258. 1:25:13harder security conditions; at that
  2259. 1:25:15time, it was impossible to hold a
  2260. 1:25:17Supreme Council meeting because if we
  2261. 1:25:19had convened the Supreme Council and,
  2262. 1:25:21for instance, were bombed at that
  2263. 1:25:23moment, the country would have truly...
  2264. 1:25:25Well then, what process led to the
  2265. 1:25:27approval of us accepting the ceasefire?
  2266. 1:25:29At that time, it was approved in
  2267. 1:25:31smaller meetings and, you know...
  2268. 1:25:33Meaning four by four, three by three,
  2269. 1:25:35and then the conclusion—were they all
  2270. 1:25:37in agreement? Well, back then naturally
  2271. 1:25:41there were pros and cons, although you
  2272. 1:25:43really cannot compare the conditions of
  2273. 1:25:46that time with later conditions; you
  2274. 1:25:48were under a war where even two people
  2275. 1:25:50meeting was difficult, but eventually
  2276. 1:25:52the meetings were held and the
  2277. 1:25:53discussion...
  2278. 1:25:55Were they all in agreement?
  2279. 1:26:00I'm saying, there were finally pros and
  2280. 1:26:02cons there too, but ultimately...On the
  2281. 1:26:08condition that if America accepts that
  2282. 1:26:10the 10 points we provided be the basis
  2283. 1:26:12for negotiations, we can accept a
  2284. 1:26:14ceasefire.
  2285. 1:26:17Everyone agreed on this too, I mean the
  2286. 1:26:19military officials agreed.
  2287. 1:26:21Look, essentially the military is in
  2288. 1:26:23charge, let's put it that way, because
  2289. 1:26:25the war is in their hands; if they
  2290. 1:26:27don't agree, it won't work. I heard
  2291. 1:26:31that there was a threat of resignation
  2292. 1:26:35from the government, for instance from
  2293. 1:26:37your side.
  2294. 1:26:38I...
  2295. 1:26:38I...no.
  2296. 1:26:42No, actually, my situation in foreign
  2297. 1:26:44policy was good; we had issues with the
  2298. 1:26:46Persian Gulf countries, but the war had
  2299. 1:26:49brought our foreign policy to a point
  2300. 1:26:51where our flag was flying high. But
  2301. 1:26:56regarding livelihood issues, it was a
  2302. 1:26:58bit difficult; no one authorized my
  2303. 1:27:00resignation. Now let's move past the
  2304. 1:27:03ceasefire, let's leave it; so the
  2305. 1:27:05ceasefire is with Mr. Mojtaba’s
  2306. 1:27:07opinion, right?
  2307. 1:27:10Look, in those days, communication with
  2308. 1:27:12him was extremely difficult, and our
  2309. 1:27:14connection was through people who were
  2310. 1:27:16liaisons, and issues were conveyed that
  2311. 1:27:18way. Who first proposed the ceasefire?
  2312. 1:27:26I don't mean internally.
  2313. 1:27:29The ceasefire proposal.
  2314. 1:27:31What was the process exactly? Who said
  2315. 1:27:33it, what day was it?
  2316. 1:27:36Look, almost from the end of the second
  2317. 1:27:38week of the war, the requests for a
  2318. 1:27:40ceasefire began from the Americans. The
  2319. 1:27:43first time, they offered a plan; they
  2320. 1:27:45said let's have a ceasefire and
  2321. 1:27:47negotiate based on that plan, which was
  2322. 1:27:49the surrender plan—the famous 15-
  2323. 1:27:51point plan. Well, we rejected that plan
  2324. 1:27:55; we wrote a 10-point one, which in our
  2325. 1:27:57view, these 10 points are the criteria,
  2326. 1:28:00and the first point was that the war
  2327. 1:28:02must end, not just a ceasefire. Then
  2328. 1:28:06they offered a, let’s say, a point,
  2329. 1:28:08we made revisions again, and we
  2330. 1:28:10presented our 10 points again. They
  2331. 1:28:13said," Well, let's have a ceasefire so
  2332. 1:28:15we can talk; if we are going to talk
  2333. 1:28:18about these 10 points of yours, we
  2334. 1:28:19can't have a ceasefire while at war. "
  2335. 1:28:23Ultimately, in the meetings, it was
  2336. 1:28:25settled that if they accept our 10
  2337. 1:28:27points as the basis for negotiations,
  2338. 1:28:29we will accept the ceasefire, which is
  2339. 1:28:31in the tweet Trump sent...
  2340. 1:28:34His admission is there, so that was the
  2341. 1:28:36basis for the ceasefire.
  2342. 1:28:37That these 10 points would be the basis
  2343. 1:28:39for negotiation, and this was agreed
  2344. 1:28:41upon by everyone, right?
  2345. 1:28:43Yes, well, anyway, there were also
  2346. 1:28:45conditions that had been announced,
  2347. 1:28:46which were included in it. These same
  2348. 1:28:48things are in the memorandum of
  2349. 1:28:50understanding; they exist. Of course,
  2350. 1:28:52if we don't reach a final agreement,
  2351. 1:28:54the situation might fall apart; that's
  2352. 1:28:57there, so one can't say there is no
  2353. 1:28:59room for doubt. But what is stated in
  2354. 1:29:01the memorandum of understanding, Mr.
  2355. 1:29:03Trump also signed it with that famous
  2356. 1:29:05signature of his; It declares the
  2357. 1:29:10immediate and permanent end of the war,
  2358. 1:29:12war on all fronts, has been announced.
  2359. 1:29:17This was our main demand; the issue of
  2360. 1:29:19the frozen funds being released, the
  2361. 1:29:21issue of...
  2362. 1:29:23Let's not get into the agreement now.
  2363. 1:29:25I want to say that this process
  2364. 1:29:26ultimately reached the things we wanted
  2365. 1:29:28to be in it.

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This page contains the full transcript of ماجرای جنگ 2 | به روایت جواد موگویی | روایت بیستم | گفت‌وگو با سیدعباس عراقچی (بخش اول) by ماجرا مدیا / Majara Media, generated from the public captions YouTube serves with the video. The transcript has 14,932 words across 2,365 segments, with the original timestamps preserved so you can click any line to jump to that moment in the embedded player.

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