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РОСІЙСЬКИЙ СПРУТ. Як Кремль впливає на світ | Документальний проєкт 2+2 (2024) [ENG SUBS] — Transcript

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  1. 0:02Since the beginning of a full-scale war of Russia
  2. 0:04against Ukraine, I hoped the war would not last long.
  3. 0:11And I think I wasn't the one who believed
  4. 0:14that sanctions would choke Russia,
  5. 0:16that Russian ruble inflates,
  6. 0:18that no one would cooperate with the terrorist state
  7. 0:21and the dictator declared internationally wanted.
  8. 0:24But the reality is entirely different.
  9. 0:27Sanctions are not working.
  10. 0:28The West imposes sanctions, and Russia circumvents them.
  11. 0:32Russian propaganda still freely poisons the world.
  12. 0:35What anti-Ukrainian narratives does it promote?
  13. 0:38Putin gains new supporters in Europe.
  14. 0:40Firstly, Fico claimed that Ukraine
  15. 0:42is not a sovereign, independent country,
  16. 0:44and yesterday didn’t notice air shellings in Kyiv.
  17. 0:49My name is Ruslan Sharipov. I am a TV host.
  18. 0:52I have been broadcasting this news for three years now
  19. 0:54and can not understand how this is possible.
  20. 0:58I want to find the answer, and I'm travelling
  21. 1:00across Europe with leading journalists, researchers,
  22. 1:04and high-level officials to find out
  23. 1:06how the Kremlin still influences the world.
  24. 1:09There is a great danger
  25. 1:11that all these conversations are being tapped.
  26. 1:14What mechanisms does it use?
  27. 1:16This is an organization that has existed for over 100 years.
  28. 1:20What pain points are being pressured?
  29. 1:22Russians have compromising evidence on Viktor Orban.
  30. 1:26What levers of influence does he use?
  31. 1:29Was it a tent of the Russian army? - Yes.
  32. 1:31And all of that in Europe?
  33. 1:33This exact event takes place in Germany.
  34. 1:36How does the Kremlin turn ballet and balalaikas into weapons?
  35. 1:41At first glance, these are pretty innocent motives.
  36. 1:45I will find answers to these questions
  37. 1:47in the most unexpected places:
  38. 1:49near the Gagarin statue at the Danish Technical University,
  39. 1:53400 meters from the Eiffel Tower,
  40. 1:56and on a memorial plaque
  41. 1:58in the historical centre of Bratislava.
  42. 2:01This is an investigative documentary
  43. 2:03that will help you understand how widely Russia has spread
  44. 2:06its influence in the world.
  45. 2:08How threatening is it to us today?
  46. 2:10And who is trying to delay our victory, and how?
  47. 2:38RUSSIAN OCTOPUS: How the Kremlin influences the world.
  48. 2:48I am going to Denmark.
  49. 2:51This Scandinavian country was the first to announce
  50. 2:53the transfer of F-16 aircraft and Leopard tanks to Ukraine,
  51. 2:58which we desperately needed,
  52. 3:00and the first to sign an allied security agreement with Ukraine.
  53. 3:02At the same time, as it has become apparent recently,
  54. 3:05Denmark has been the target of Russian special services
  55. 3:07for quite a long time.
  56. 3:10In early 2022, the country was shocked
  57. 3:13by a significant espionage scandal.
  58. 3:15The Danish authorities expelled 15 Russian diplomats
  59. 3:19from the country, accusing them of espionage.
  60. 3:21What exactly were Russian undercover
  61. 3:23spies hunting in Denmark?
  62. 3:25Has their network been wholly dismantled?
  63. 3:27And can Russia influence Ukraine's support level
  64. 3:31in the Scandinavian countries today?
  65. 3:33I am interested in finding an answer to this question.
  66. 3:36But first, we have to find out what exactly Russian agents
  67. 3:41under diplomatic cover were doing in Denmark.
  68. 3:43Investigative journalists have begun doing this.
  69. 3:46One of them agreed to meet with me to tell me
  70. 3:49about the Russian spy network in Denmark
  71. 3:52and one high-profile expose.
  72. 3:54This is Lasse Sku Andersen, an investigative journalist
  73. 3:57for the famous Danish newspaper "Information".
  74. 4:03Nice to meet you. - Nice to meet you.
  75. 4:05What was the case?
  76. 4:07There was a convicted Russian spy recently
  77. 4:10called Alexei Nikiforov.
  78. 4:13And he was in contact with his handler at the embassy,
  79. 4:16a guy who has been named as Timur Rasulov,
  80. 4:19who was the first secretary at the embassy.
  81. 4:25They met right actually here
  82. 4:27at the sushi restaurant in Longbu.
  83. 4:28Ah, here? - Yeah.
  84. 4:29In this place?
  85. 4:31Yeah. And there was a picture classified...
  86. 4:34declassified by the security service,
  87. 4:36from where you can see them meeting at this sushi restaurant.
  88. 4:41Timur Rasulov basically through the embassy
  89. 4:44he was working undercover.
  90. 4:48He was actually an SVR officer according to what's known,
  91. 4:52but he was working as a diplomat under diplomatic cover.
  92. 4:55But he was actually a spy. He was recruiting
  93. 5:00and handling Nikiforov, and then somehow sending
  94. 5:03the information further on to Russia.
  95. 5:10This story became scandalous because,
  96. 5:12unlike Timur Rasulov, a Russian spy under diplomatic cover,
  97. 5:17Alexei Nikiforov was an ordinary Russian.
  98. 5:20He moved from Moscow to Denmark to study back in 2008.
  99. 5:24The Danish authorities recognized the potential
  100. 5:26of the Russian student, and later,
  101. 5:27Nikiforov was given the opportunity to write his dissertation
  102. 5:30in Denmark and complete his postgraduate studies.
  103. 5:33After that, he arranged his life here:
  104. 5:35he built a career, bought an apartment, created a family,
  105. 5:38became a father, and, as Danish journalists found out,
  106. 5:42was recruited by Russian special services
  107. 5:44at one of these stages of his life.
  108. 5:49And why do you think they chose Nikiforov?
  109. 5:52He was a scientist working on very interesting technologies
  110. 5:56that might be of interest to Russia
  111. 5:58and Russia's national security interests.
  112. 6:01So he was working right over here
  113. 6:03at the Danish Technical University,
  114. 6:05and I mean, we could go there, have a look,
  115. 6:08I can show you, because Russia has been interested
  116. 6:11in that university for several reasons.
  117. 6:13The Danish Technical University is one
  118. 6:15of the most potent Scandinavian research centres
  119. 6:18in technology and innovation.
  120. 6:20I was thinking Lasse would show me the laboratory
  121. 6:22where Alexei Nikiforov worked.
  122. 6:24Still, there is something more attractive
  123. 6:26on the university campus territory.
  124. 6:29Yuri Gagarin, unexpected.
  125. 6:31Yeah, this statue was actually an official donation
  126. 6:34from the Russian state to Denmark.
  127. 6:36You can see here, it says on this sign that the statue
  128. 6:39is a donation to Denmark from the Russian embassy,
  129. 6:41Ambassador Mikhail Vanin.
  130. 6:45So I think an interesting point is that
  131. 6:46this was put here in 2016,
  132. 6:49two years after the illegal annexation of Crimea.
  133. 7:03And of course, the Danish government protested
  134. 7:06and said this is illegal and yet two years later
  135. 7:08you would still have official collaborations
  136. 7:11with Russian state like this.
  137. 7:15And ambassador would come here
  138. 7:17and meet with high level officials from university
  139. 7:19and everyone would smile and clap
  140. 7:21and basically life had moved on.
  141. 7:24The Danes perceived the unveiling of the Gagarin bust
  142. 7:27at the technical university as a simple cultural event.
  143. 7:29However, journalists' investigations show
  144. 7:32that the Russians had other motives.
  145. 7:38And then you see here in the background this guy,
  146. 7:40this is Artem Markarian.
  147. 7:42The leader of Rossotrudnichestvo in Denmark at the time.
  148. 7:46And he had, I think, worked for months
  149. 7:48to have this statue put off.
  150. 7:52It was the result of his work.
  151. 7:56Of course the official reasons would be scientific
  152. 7:58collaboration and sort of showing the Danes
  153. 8:01how great of a culture Russia has,
  154. 8:08and so perfectly innocent reasons,
  155. 8:09intentions on the face of it.
  156. 8:12When the lectures are held,
  157. 8:14they look at this image every lecture our wonderful hero.
  158. 8:18Russian man. Yuri Oleksiiovich Gagarin.
  159. 8:21The Russians claim that Rossotrudnichestvo
  160. 8:24is an agency that aims to introduce
  161. 8:26Russian culture to the world.
  162. 8:29But then of course there are the questions of this.
  163. 8:31It is an official Russian state entity.
  164. 8:36Does it also have a hidden agenda?
  165. 8:38And we can see from our research that Russia
  166. 8:41and Russian spies have been very interested
  167. 8:43in what's going on here at the Danish Technical University
  168. 8:46for reasons that are not innocent and are not legal.
  169. 8:49What are they?
  170. 8:50For instance, in the case of the convicted spy Nikiforov,
  171. 8:53he was working at this university,
  172. 8:56he was doing research into green energy.
  173. 9:01What the Danish security service has also said,
  174. 9:02is that Russia considers green technology
  175. 9:04a national security threat.
  176. 9:06Because they rely so much on their exports
  177. 9:09of fossil fuels, of gas and oil and so on.
  178. 9:13So any technology that could basically replace
  179. 9:17that would make Russia less powerful.
  180. 9:20So they really want to know what`s going on,
  181. 9:23what kind of new technologies are coming up.
  182. 9:26And Gagarin is a kind of a cultural tool?
  183. 9:30Gagarin is a cultural tool to get sort of, to come here.
  184. 9:35So they would have a reason to come here,
  185. 9:37they would have some sort of official ties.
  186. 9:39As we have already found out, a Russian state agency
  187. 9:42called Rossotrudnichestvo was responsible
  188. 9:44for establishing these official ties.
  189. 9:46And it acted together with the Russian embassy.
  190. 9:49Alexei Nikiforov was connected to both.
  191. 9:51He came to the Rossotrudnichestvo office in Copenhagen
  192. 9:53to play the balalaika. He leaked information
  193. 9:56about Danish green technologies to his curator
  194. 9:58at the Russian embassy.
  195. 10:00While the embassy's role in this espionage story
  196. 10:03is simple and straightforward,
  197. 10:04the role of Rossotrudnichestvo remains quite unclear.
  198. 10:08Besides making monuments and organising cultural events,
  199. 10:12how is this organization useful to Russians?
  200. 10:15The Danish authorities have never formally
  201. 10:18charged Rossotrudnichestvo.
  202. 10:20I am now at Copenhagen's main building
  203. 10:24of this Russian cultural organization. Here it is.
  204. 10:26It is a three-floor building with an attic.
  205. 10:28Seeing the architecture of this building,
  206. 10:31it is a perfect place for spies. Why?
  207. 10:34In the local archives, I have found a plan
  208. 10:36for this building from 1974. Here is the facade part.
  209. 10:40It is visible from the street.
  210. 10:41Then, there is a large area of the building, a courtyard,
  211. 10:44and, interestingly, a secret passage hidden from prying eyes.
  212. 10:49Well, it's a pretty perfect place for spy meetings.
  213. 10:53A place for secret meetings
  214. 10:54with a sign saying "House of culture".
  215. 10:56This could be one of the functions of Rossotrudnichestvo
  216. 10:59in Russian espionage schemes abroad.
  217. 11:02Who would ever think of checking
  218. 11:03a cultural institution for agents?
  219. 11:06But then, why did Alexei Nikiforov meet
  220. 11:08with his embassy handler in a sushi bar?
  221. 11:11It seems that Rossotrudnichestvo posed
  222. 11:13a more significant threat.
  223. 11:14After all, after Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine,
  224. 11:17the Danish authorities,
  225. 11:18along with the expulsion of spy diplomats,
  226. 11:21closed the organization's office in Copenhagen.
  227. 11:24By that time, the defendant in the scandalous spy case,
  228. 11:26Alexei Nikiforov, was already in prison.
  229. 11:31The espionage scandal involving the exposure
  230. 11:33of Russian citizen Alexei Nikiforov creates new challenges
  231. 11:36for foreign intelligence agencies. Take a look.
  232. 11:38Nikiforov arrived in Denmark in 2008.
  233. 11:41He studied here, built his career,
  234. 11:43and then, at some point, was recruited
  235. 11:45by the Russian intelligence services.
  236. 11:46Now imagine how many such Russians there are in Europe
  237. 11:49and the world. Could this mean that every Russian passport
  238. 11:53holder outside their country is a potential spy?
  239. 11:58The second important question is:
  240. 12:00what is the role of Rossotrudnichestvo
  241. 12:02in Russia's espionage scheme abroad?
  242. 12:05To get all the answers, I am meeting
  243. 12:07Dr. Fleming Spilsboel Hansen in Copenhagen,
  244. 12:11a Russia case expert at the Danish Institute
  245. 12:13of International Studies and author of `Putin's War` book.
  246. 12:17Dr Spilsboel Hansen is a former analyst
  247. 12:20with the Danish Military Intelligence Service.
  248. 12:21He is well aware of how the special services work.
  249. 12:25Is every Russian citizen, with Russian passport
  250. 12:28in Europe now a potential threat?
  251. 12:30No, not every Russian is a potential threat.
  252. 12:33And we have one really high ranking case,
  253. 12:36a very prominent case, and this was a Russian national.
  254. 12:37And I'm sure that there are people
  255. 12:40in the police security service
  256. 12:43who are now probably more aware of this
  257. 12:45and there is more attention.
  258. 12:47But it's not that every Russian living here
  259. 12:50of course is a threat or potential threat.
  260. 12:55Can you explain your opinion, why?
  261. 12:56Well, because some live here
  262. 12:59and have emerged in Danish society.
  263. 13:03They have jobs, they have families
  264. 13:04and they work and function here quite perfectly well.
  265. 13:08But the same we could say about Nikiforov.
  266. 13:13Yeah, well you could, but then he had this inclination
  267. 13:15to work for the Russian government,
  268. 13:18to steal information, to give information.
  269. 13:20And not everyone of course has.
  270. 13:25The inclination Mr Spilsboel Hansen discusses
  271. 13:27can be seen on Alexei Nikiforov's Facebook page.
  272. 13:31Nostalgia for military service, St. George's ribbons,
  273. 13:34narratives that Russia is a great country.
  274. 13:36In my opinion, these are clear markers
  275. 13:38of Nikiforov's way of thinking, indicating his willingness
  276. 13:41to help his homeland.
  277. 13:45It is not known how many Russians
  278. 13:47with such inclinations live in the Scandinavian
  279. 13:49countries cooperating with the Russian special services.
  280. 13:53Only one story of Alexei Nikiforov,
  281. 13:54recruited by the Russian special services,
  282. 13:57has become public.
  283. 13:59The Danish authorities leaked the materials
  284. 14:01of this case to journalists on purpose.
  285. 14:05It becomes public because our intelligence community
  286. 14:10would like to inform the public about Russian threat,
  287. 14:15to demonstrate that there is a threat that people
  288. 14:19have to be aware of, they have to be careful.
  289. 14:22Just as we are speaking now, when you go
  290. 14:24into the street of Copenhagen you will see
  291. 14:26that the police intelligence service has a campaign
  292. 14:30which is running now. It's on the bus stops,
  293. 14:32you will see posters, for instance that will say
  294. 14:37“Danish research is really really good
  295. 14:39and they agree also in Moscow”.
  296. 14:43So these kind of things to bring it to the attention
  297. 14:45specifically of people who work in research institutions.
  298. 14:49Be careful, be careful with your data,
  299. 14:51be careful with your computer,
  300. 14:53be careful with whom you communicate,
  301. 14:55but also be careful not to have meetings
  302. 14:57with the wrong people.
  303. 15:00Although in Denmark, after the revelation of Alexei Nikiforov,
  304. 15:03they do not share the opinion that every holder
  305. 15:05of a Russian passport is a potential spy,
  306. 15:08the Danish authorities informally
  307. 15:09and unofficially make it clear
  308. 15:12to their citizens that those Russians
  309. 15:15who are in close contact with Russian state
  310. 15:18organizations pose a possible threat to their society.
  311. 15:21These are Russian embassies, consulates, universities,
  312. 15:23and various cultural organizations such as Rossotrudnichestvo.
  313. 15:27Only one question remains to be answered:
  314. 15:30what was the role of Rossotrudnichestvo in the development
  315. 15:34and operation of the Russian spy network in Denmark?
  316. 15:38It could be a screening before recruitment.
  317. 15:43It could also be recruitment in itself.
  318. 15:46Well it could work perhaps in a way,
  319. 15:49let's say they organized an event, a concert,
  320. 15:54and they would approach people who attended the concert.
  321. 15:58So it could be a relatively innocent event,
  322. 15:59a piano concert, and people would show up
  323. 16:03and maybe someone from the agency would be looking out
  324. 16:06to see if there is anyone that we can speak to,
  325. 16:09maybe young students, maybe journalists,
  326. 16:11maybe someone else that could be interesting
  327. 16:14for us to speak to. So they may be more careful,
  328. 16:17let's say you attend an event and someone
  329. 16:20from the Russian embassy steps up,
  330. 16:23that may be more intimidating for people, more revealing.
  331. 16:25But if it's someone from Rossotrudnichestvo,
  332. 16:27it may be easier.
  333. 16:29It's just someone from the cultural agency.
  334. 16:31Now, it is clear how it works.
  335. 16:33The way Alexei Nikiforov was recruited is unknown.
  336. 16:37However, the fact that he frequently visited
  337. 16:39the Rossotrudnichestvo office
  338. 16:41in Copenhagen does not exclude the possibility
  339. 16:43that this is how the Russian special services
  340. 16:45made their first contact with him.
  341. 16:47Being a platform for screening and collecting information
  342. 16:49about those who tend to cooperate
  343. 16:51with the special services is one of the roles
  344. 16:54the Russian special services assign Rossotrudnichestvo.
  345. 16:58With limited opportunities to recruit agents in Denmark,
  346. 17:02the Russians are now resorting to cruder espionage.
  347. 17:05For example, in the spring of 2023,
  348. 17:07a new espionage scandal erupted in Denmark
  349. 17:10when Danish radio journalists published a photo
  350. 17:13of an unmarked man with an assault rifle
  351. 17:17on a Russian marine research vessel.
  352. 17:21“According to intelligence services and experts,
  353. 17:23the Russian military program is currently mapping
  354. 17:26offshore wind farms, gas pipelines, power,
  355. 17:28and internet cables in the waters around Denmark,
  356. 17:31Norway, Finland, and Sweden.
  357. 17:33The mapping is being done by a large number
  358. 17:35of military and civilian ships that are cruising
  359. 17:37around the Scandinavian waters and revealing
  360. 17:40what lies at the bottom of the sea
  361. 17:41and how our infrastructure is connected”
  362. 17:44Danske Radio, April 19th, 2023
  363. 17:48Russia's use of military intelligence in Danish
  364. 17:51waters demonstrates the effectiveness
  365. 17:53of the Danish policy of closing Rossotrudnichestvo.
  366. 17:56What about other countries?
  367. 17:58How influential is Rossotrudnichestvo in the world?
  368. 18:01How many branches does its network have,
  369. 18:03and who is behind it?
  370. 18:06To get answers to these questions,
  371. 18:07I meet with Nadiia Koval, Head of the Analytical
  372. 18:11and Research Department and Academic Programs
  373. 18:13at the Ukrainian Institute.
  374. 18:15Ms. Koval is the author of the analytical note
  375. 18:18"Rossotrudnichestvo: Unbearable Rigidity of Soft Power";
  376. 18:21she knows everything about this organization.
  377. 18:24This organization has existed for more than 100 years,
  378. 18:27about 100 years, let's say.
  379. 18:29And it continues the traditions of Soviet cultural diplomacy.
  380. 18:34The first organization of such cultural diplomacy
  381. 18:37in the Soviet Union was the All-Union Society
  382. 18:40for Cultural Relations Abroad, better known
  383. 18:43by its acronym VOKS. It was established in 1925.
  384. 18:50Quite essential functionaries ran it
  385. 18:52in the Soviet Union system.
  386. 18:56And they did straightforward things.
  387. 18:58They tried to bring writers, artists,
  388. 19:03and journalists to the Soviet Union.
  389. 19:06To show the Soviet Union in a certain way
  390. 19:08so they could return to their countries
  391. 19:11and create a more favourable public
  392. 19:14opinion to cooperate with.
  393. 19:16To tell them that, for example, the Soviet Union
  394. 19:18is not some wild country, that it is a country
  395. 19:20with a great culture, that everything is developing here,
  396. 19:23that everything is beautiful and dynamic,
  397. 19:25and that we should not ignore it.
  398. 19:27Did this policy bear fruit?
  399. 19:29It did bear fruit. In the 1930s,
  400. 19:32let's just say that it bore fruit very seriously
  401. 19:34because it helped the Soviet Union maintain
  402. 19:38its legitimacy in the international arena during
  403. 19:41the Stalinist era, during the times of Stalinist repression,
  404. 19:44during the Holodomor.
  405. 19:46One hundred years since then,
  406. 19:47the world has evolved so much that it seems impossible
  407. 19:50to hide crimes such as the shooting of civilians
  408. 19:52in Bucha or the ballistic attacks on Ukrainian cities.
  409. 19:57Back in the 1930s, thanks to the predecessor,
  410. 20:00Rossotrudnichestvo, the Soviet Union concealed crimes
  411. 20:03of this magnitude.
  412. 20:06Today, the old Soviet methods could have been considered
  413. 20:09useless and ineffective, apart from one thing.
  414. 20:12If we look at what is happening in countries
  415. 20:15that have not imposed sanctions on these institutions,
  416. 20:17such as Turkey, China, India, and Egypt,
  417. 20:23pro-war propaganda is running full steam ahead.
  418. 20:30For example, on the anniversary of the full-scale invasion,
  419. 20:34they made up to five different “documentaries”
  420. 20:38about the Maidan, Ukraine, the Ukrainian army,
  421. 20:46and the situation in the occupied territories,
  422. 20:48and they broadcasted them.
  423. 20:53Apparently, Rossotrudnichestvo's activities go far
  424. 20:55beyond the European continent. Now, the question arises:
  425. 20:59how many such cultural representations
  426. 21:01does Russia have worldwide?
  427. 21:04After the Second World War, we had the Cold War,
  428. 21:08and accordingly, this Russian cultural,
  429. 21:11Soviet diplomacy at that time shifted its priorities.
  430. 21:15They began to pay more attention to the countries
  431. 21:20of the Third World; now, we call those
  432. 21:23the Global South Countries.
  433. 21:25And then, such reincarnation of this Russian cultural
  434. 21:30diplomacy was in numerous societies, friendships,
  435. 21:33and cultural ties with foreign countries.
  436. 21:37At that time, they were formed worldwide
  437. 21:39in sympathetic countries.
  438. 21:41They began working more on educational cooperation,
  439. 21:45actively bringing African, Asian,
  440. 21:47and other students to the Soviet Union.
  441. 21:50I see that the name of the organization itself has changed.
  442. 21:52Yes, it was already called the Soviet Communities
  443. 21:56of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.
  444. 21:59Interestingly, although the name changed,
  445. 22:02the newly created Union of Soviet Friendship Societies
  446. 22:05inherited its predecessor organisation's entire
  447. 22:07infrastructure and contacts abroad.
  448. 22:11Thanks to heredity and this approach, today,
  449. 22:14Russia's international network of cultural missions
  450. 22:17is one of the largest in the world.
  451. 22:20The network includes almost 100 countries—up
  452. 22:22to 100 offices in approximately 87 countries worldwide.
  453. 22:27After the dissolution of the USSR, Russia inherited
  454. 22:29the network of cultural missions worldwide
  455. 22:30as the successor to the Soviet Union.
  456. 22:33In the Russian Federation, this international
  457. 22:36cultural organization underwent two more minor rebrandings,
  458. 22:39after which it acquired a modern status
  459. 22:42and received a new name - Rossotrudnichestvo.
  460. 22:45After the Orange Revolution in Ukraine,
  461. 22:49which, in fact, was a plot twist for Putin personally.
  462. 22:54The Orange Revolution was the first massive social upheaval,
  463. 22:58showing that for Ukraine, for most of the nation,
  464. 23:02Western values and Western culture are more interesting
  465. 23:05than Russian culture.
  466. 23:06This was the first turning point
  467. 23:08of the 2004 Orange Revolution.
  468. 23:11The second turning point was the aggression
  469. 23:13against Georgia in 2008.
  470. 23:16They carried it out also literally,
  471. 23:17the aggression against Georgia in August 2008,
  472. 23:21the foundation of Rossotrudnichestvo, September 2008.
  473. 23:24Wow. That's an interesting observation.
  474. 23:26The |russian| realization that people do not accept
  475. 23:29their narrative about this conflict.
  476. 23:31The reputation of Russia is terrible.
  477. 23:33We need to do something about it.
  478. 23:34And from then on,
  479. 23:36the history of this modern Rossotrudnichestvo,
  480. 23:40which we know now, begins its countdown.
  481. 23:41This dove with an olive branch.
  482. 23:44The decree on the creation of Rossotrudnichestvo
  483. 23:46was issued by the Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev,
  484. 23:49after the 2008 attack on Georgia.
  485. 23:52According to official documents,
  486. 23:53Rossotrudnichestvo is subordinated to the Russian Ministry
  487. 23:57of Foreign Affairs. But if you read this document carefully,
  488. 24:00in paragraph III. Organization of Activities,
  489. 24:02we see that the head of Rossotrudnichestvo
  490. 24:05is appointed and dismissed personally by the President
  491. 24:07of the Russian Federation.
  492. 24:09This indicates the great importance
  493. 24:10of this organization for the Kremlin.
  494. 24:13The head of Rossotrudnichestvo is a so-called
  495. 24:15Yevgeny Primakov Jr.,
  496. 24:16the grandson of Yevgeny Primakov Sr.
  497. 24:18I think Yevgeny Primakov Sr. is well-known to many people.
  498. 24:21He is a relatively well-known Russian politician
  499. 24:23who was once the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service,
  500. 24:26the Prime Minister of Russia,
  501. 24:28and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia.
  502. 24:30The post-Soviet nomenklatura
  503. 24:31and its descendants run all these institutions.
  504. 24:38Given the true motives behind Rossotrudnichestvo's activities
  505. 24:41in Europe, it is a great mystery
  506. 24:43that the organization's headquarters is located
  507. 24:45in the heart of Berlin.
  508. 24:49It is naive to believe that the German intelligence
  509. 24:51services are unaware
  510. 24:52of Rossotrudnichestvo's covert activities.
  511. 24:54But the Russian agency continues to work here.
  512. 24:57New posters with cultural events appear every month.
  513. 25:00I saw this when I arrived in Berlin
  514. 25:03at the end of February 2024.
  515. 25:06The representative office of Rossotrudnichestvo here
  516. 25:08is Russische Haus, which means "Russian House" in German.
  517. 25:12On the day of my stay in Berlin, the poster
  518. 25:15of the Russian House lists a screening
  519. 25:17of a short documentary scheduled for 19:00.
  520. 25:21In the evening, I will attend this event
  521. 25:23and try to film what is going on inside
  522. 25:25and what kind of audience attends it.
  523. 25:34In the meantime, I'm heading to the other side of Berlin,
  524. 25:36to the local prosecutor's office, where a statement
  525. 25:39by former Green Party member of the Bundestag Volker Beck
  526. 25:44has been lying around for more than a year,
  527. 25:46demanding that the Russian House's activities in Berlin be stopped.
  528. 25:48I am meeting here with Volker Beck's representative
  529. 25:50in this case, lawyer Patrick Heinemann.
  530. 26:00What is the status of this case?
  531. 26:02Well, the thing is, we don’t really know.
  532. 26:04In fact they had closed down the criminal investigation
  533. 26:07against the director of the Russian House
  534. 26:09because they say he’s got immunity.
  535. 26:13But then we said, well, what about all the other people
  536. 26:16who were working there on all the sanctions violations
  537. 26:19that are taking place?
  538. 26:21They are selling tickets for they’re giving language courses.
  539. 26:25They even have a restaurant opened there
  540. 26:28just a couple of months ago, a bookshop opened there.
  541. 26:31And we demanded to look at the files,
  542. 26:34but we weren’t allowed to look at the files.
  543. 26:37And we weren’t given any specific answers to our questions.
  544. 26:41It turns out that Rossotrudnichestvo is subject
  545. 26:43to EU sanctions imposed on the agency
  546. 26:46after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
  547. 26:50I sent an official letter to the Berlin prosecutor's office
  548. 26:52with the same questions as lawyer Patrick Heinemann.
  549. 26:55Still, I have not received a response
  550. 26:57by the time this film was aired.
  551. 26:59I see a couple of violations here.
  552. 27:02For example, the Russian house,
  553. 27:03which is run by Rossotrudnichestvo,
  554. 27:05which is a Russian state agency
  555. 27:07which is sanctioned under EU law,
  556. 27:09shouldn’t be allowed to let space there to other people
  557. 27:13and earning rent by letting space.
  558. 27:17And they have this Russian house in possession?
  559. 27:19They have it in possession and there
  560. 27:22is an international treaty between the Russian Federation
  561. 27:26and the Federal Republic of Germany.
  562. 27:27The Rossotrudnichestvo representative office
  563. 27:30in Ukraine was closed in the spring of 2021.
  564. 27:33Consider what a year of war it was and how difficult it was.
  565. 27:37A bilateral agreement determined its existence in the country.
  566. 27:43It takes time and effort to break off diplomatic ties
  567. 27:47or terminate critical international contracts in international relations.
  568. 27:51So, institutionally, this system is very well protected.
  569. 27:58It took Ukraine eight years to close the Rossotrudnichestvo
  570. 28:01offices in Kyiv and Odesa. The organization was engaged
  571. 28:05in its usual program in Ukraine,
  572. 28:07which involved sowing propaganda of the "Russian world"
  573. 28:08and conducting anti-Ukrainian activities.
  574. 28:11An international agreement signed by Ukraine
  575. 28:13and Russia in 1998 determined its functioning in Ukraine.
  576. 28:19This is a curious paradox.
  577. 28:21Russia has flagrantly violated international law
  578. 28:23by annexing Ukrainian territory and initiating hostilities
  579. 28:25in eastern Ukraine. At the same time,
  580. 28:28Ukraine has scrupulously respected international treaties with Russia.
  581. 28:32It has permitted Rossotrudnichestvo representative offices
  582. 28:35in Kyiv and Odesa to operate until recently.
  583. 28:38It remains unclear how the German authorities
  584. 28:41will resolve the dilemma of Rossotrudnichestvo's
  585. 28:43operation in Berlin. On the one hand,
  586. 28:45as in the case of Ukraine, Rossotrudnichestvo
  587. 28:48is protected here by an international treaty signed
  588. 28:49between Germany and Russia.
  589. 28:52It is unlikely that the Germans will go to the extent of breaking it.
  590. 28:54On the other hand, Rossotrudnichestvo is under EU sanctions.
  591. 28:59This would necessitate specific actions
  592. 29:01by the German authorities with this organization.
  593. 29:03This is the position that lawyer Patrick Heinemann
  594. 29:05is seeking to advance.
  595. 29:07Actually, but apart from that, there is one case.
  596. 29:10And it’s a very exciting thing,
  597. 29:13which I’d like to tell you and show you. Should we go?
  598. 29:20Patrick Hayman proposes a route from the Prosecutor's Office
  599. 29:23to the Brandenburg Gate,
  600. 29:25the most prominent landmark in Berlin, situated nearby.
  601. 29:30So, Patrick, what do you think is the main issue
  602. 29:32that they are not closing down this Russian house?
  603. 29:37Well, the thing is, unfortunately
  604. 29:40in Germany we have a tradition of leniency towards Russia
  605. 29:45and a lot of people have been sympathizing
  606. 29:48with Russia over the past 20-30 years.
  607. 29:53So, that’s one issue. And then also people
  608. 29:59at the same time are very much afraid of Russia
  609. 30:01and they are taking, and they probably
  610. 30:03should be taking Russian threats really seriously.
  611. 30:05But what do you think about the politicians?
  612. 30:08Because it’s not an issue of general, of public,
  613. 30:12like having a sympathy for Russia
  614. 30:13or not having a sympathy for Russia.
  615. 30:15So, it’s the matter of policy, no? And policy makers.
  616. 30:20It’s a matter of European law really.
  617. 30:23I mean, the sanctions have been applied
  618. 30:26on a European level and Germany shouldn’t be cherry picking.
  619. 30:36And I think Germany should enforce the sanctions also
  620. 30:39when it comes to the Russian house.
  621. 30:43I mean, also what we’ve been hearing
  622. 30:45is that the Russians are threatening to closing down
  623. 30:48the Goethe Institute, which is like the corresponding
  624. 30:50institute of Germany in Moscow.
  625. 30:54Responding to threats is a standard Russian tactic
  626. 30:57that the Germans still take into account.
  627. 30:59The strategic nuclear forces are
  628. 31:02in complete readiness for guaranteed use.
  629. 31:06We arrive at the Brandenburg Gate,
  630. 31:08and Patrick Heinemann immediately takes me
  631. 31:10to a massive building nearby.
  632. 31:19We’re standing in front of the Russian Embassy,
  633. 31:21which is right here, and the story goes as follows.
  634. 31:26Friends of mine wanted to put a shot down Russian
  635. 31:27tank from the Russian war against Ukraine
  636. 31:29right here in front of the Embassy.
  637. 31:31And what they did, they asked for permission
  638. 31:32from the local Berlin authorities to do so,
  639. 31:34but they refused to give them permission,
  640. 31:36because they were so afraid of the Russians’ reaction.
  641. 31:40They came up with so many excuses why it couldn’t be done.
  642. 31:46And then I read about this in the news,
  643. 31:47I got in touch with them,
  644. 31:49and I offered them to take the case to court.
  645. 31:53And they said: “Yes, let’s do this”.
  646. 31:54And we went to court, and we won, actually.
  647. 31:58So we were able to put a shot down Russian tank
  648. 31:59right here in front of the Embassy
  649. 32:01on the 24th of February 2023,
  650. 32:04right one year after the full-scale invasion
  651. 32:07of Ukraine began, as a sign of protest,
  652. 32:10and we had loads of people coming here,
  653. 32:13and they looked at the tank,
  654. 32:16they even climbed on top of the tank,
  655. 32:17waved the Ukrainian flag and it was a big, big thing.
  656. 32:24Nice, and what is the difference between two cases?
  657. 32:27I mean, stopping the Russian house operating
  658. 32:31and between positioning here the Russian tank.
  659. 32:35Well, with the Russian house, it’s a criminal case,
  660. 32:38which means that the public
  661. 32:41prosecutor’s office is responsible.
  662. 32:42And they’re in charge of the investigation,
  663. 32:44and there are very few things you can do
  664. 32:47as a private citizen.
  665. 32:49And when you want to put a Russian tank in front
  666. 32:52of the Russian embassy as a sign of protest,
  667. 32:54it’s a matter of free speech,
  668. 32:56and then you can take the case to the court yourself.
  669. 33:05It seems to me that the story of the hit Russian tank
  670. 33:08proves that it is possible to close the Russian House
  671. 33:10in Berlin if there is a political will to do so.
  672. 33:17It is dusk in Berlin. Ten minutes before 7:00 p.m.
  673. 33:21I arrive at the Russian House to attend a documentary
  674. 33:25screening and see how the institution functions despite
  675. 33:28the sanctions imposed on Rossotrudnichestvo.
  676. 33:35Inside, it looks like an ordinary house of culture.
  677. 33:37There are exhibitions of photographic works on the walls.
  678. 33:39People are gathering for the event,
  679. 33:41but not many though. I am openly filming everything,
  680. 33:44and no one pays attention.
  681. 33:46It all looks completely innocent.
  682. 33:49The same atmosphere prevailed in the Copenhagen office
  683. 33:53of Rossotrudnichestvo.
  684. 33:54The only difference is that an investigation
  685. 33:56was conducted there, and one of its active visitors
  686. 33:58was found to be involved in espionage activities.
  687. 34:01I have no idea whether German intelligence
  688. 34:03services are studying visitors' activities
  689. 34:05to the Russian House in Berlin.
  690. 34:08So, I decided to conduct my own investigation.
  691. 34:11In recent months, I have studied the repertoire
  692. 34:13of the Russian House in Berlin,
  693. 34:14searched for information
  694. 34:16about its visitors in open sources,
  695. 34:18and encountered one interesting poster.
  696. 34:21The Russian House in Berlin will host an incredible
  697. 34:24concert by the Choir of Don Cossacks
  698. 34:26under the direction of Prof. Petya Khudyakov.
  699. 34:29The poster was published on Facebook on December 20, 2023.
  700. 34:34What attracts my attention in this poster
  701. 34:36is the Christmas concert of the Don Cossacks Choir
  702. 34:39at the Russian House.
  703. 34:40This is the same organization of Don Cossacks
  704. 34:42that Vladimir Putin took to the wedding of Karin Kneissl,
  705. 34:46then Austrian Foreign Minister, in the summer of 2018.
  706. 34:51A photo from the wedding shows the Cossacks
  707. 34:53entertaining the guests.
  708. 34:54The Don Cossacks are still perceived
  709. 34:56in Europe as a kind of attraction,
  710. 34:59as cheerful men in colourful clothes.
  711. 35:02I associate Russian Cossacks
  712. 35:04with something completely different.
  713. 35:06With Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine.
  714. 35:09For example, in 2014, in Crimea,
  715. 35:12the men of Cossack Ataman Minikh helped
  716. 35:14the Russian military block Ukrainian military units.
  717. 35:20We blocked the entrance to the electricity.
  718. 35:21We cut off their electricity.
  719. 35:23Why did you cut off their electricity? - Minich.
  720. 35:25Minich said so. We don't know anything.
  721. 35:27There's no need to blame us.
  722. 35:30And in the Luhansk region, as of November 2014,
  723. 35:34the Don Cossacks, under the leadership of Ataman Kozitsyn,
  724. 35:37controlled 85 per cent of the occupied
  725. 35:39part of the region and continue to take
  726. 35:41an active part in the fighting in Ukraine.
  727. 35:46The media widely covered all
  728. 35:47these militaristic manifestations of the Russian Cossacks.
  729. 35:50It would be wrong to assume that Europe is unaware of this,
  730. 35:53but apparently, Russian Cossacks are still divided
  731. 35:57into two camps here:
  732. 35:59aggressive Cossacks from Russia's interior
  733. 36:02and foreign Cossacks who live peacefully,
  734. 36:04entertain guests at weddings
  735. 36:06and gather several times a year to sing songs
  736. 36:09in the Russian House. In early 2023, journalists
  737. 36:13from the Reuters agency proved this to be a misconception.
  738. 36:16The journalists attended a pro-Russian rally
  739. 36:19in the German city of Cologne.
  740. 36:21Among the security guards, they identified a member
  741. 36:23of the Hanoverian Cossack organization.
  742. 36:26His name is Andriy Kharkivsky.
  743. 36:29He was caught on camera filming
  744. 36:31the pro-Russian rally in Cologne.
  745. 36:39He is wearing dark glasses and a headset in his ear.
  746. 36:42He is wearing civilian clothes so
  747. 36:43as not to attract unnecessary attention.
  748. 36:46His characteristic tattoos on his arms identify him.
  749. 36:51This fact proves that, if necessary,
  750. 36:54the ideas of the "Russian world,"
  751. 36:55which are being voiced from the stage in Cologne,
  752. 36:59Germany, in the midst of Russia's large-scale invasion
  753. 37:01of Ukraine, have someone to defend them in Europe.
  754. 37:09Who are these people who are members
  755. 37:10of Russian Cossack organizations in Europe?
  756. 37:13How well is their network developed here?
  757. 37:15How does it function, and who runs it?
  758. 37:18In Germany, I found an insider
  759. 37:20who knows everything about Russian Cossack organizations
  760. 37:23because he was once involved in this movement.
  761. 37:25This is Serhiy Azhynov.
  762. 37:27Until 2014, he lived in Novocherkassk, Russia,
  763. 37:31was engaged in public activities
  764. 37:33and covered the activities of local Cossack organizations
  765. 37:37until he was arrested by the FSB
  766. 37:39and imprisoned for supporting the Ukrainian Maidan.
  767. 37:42Serhiy does not disclose details of his biography
  768. 37:45and asks that we not name the place of our meeting
  769. 37:48because he is still concerned for his safety.
  770. 37:50Thanks to his insider knowledge,
  771. 37:52I want to create a portrait of Russian Cossacks
  772. 37:55in Europe and find out who these people are.
  773. 37:59They are gathered in the open air, pitching tents.
  774. 38:02Here is their chief ataman,
  775. 38:03the chief ataman of Europe, as he calls himself.
  776. 38:06A who is this?
  777. 38:07This is a so-called Grigory Kremer,
  778. 38:09the main Cossack of Europe, as he considers himself.
  779. 38:14Basically, he is among the audience
  780. 38:16who are fascinated by `Russian Peace`.
  781. 38:20He is a Jewish immigrant who came here more
  782. 38:22than 30 years ago.
  783. 38:24And this is his favourite field of activity,
  784. 38:26the Russian Cossacks.
  785. 38:28They are dressed in form..
  786. 38:30Yes, everything is militarized.
  787. 38:33They really like to look like they're in a menacing position.
  788. 38:38Fingerless gloves, all sorts of Navy SEAL shirts.
  789. 38:43If I'm not mistaken, this is a Russian tent, the Russian army.
  790. 38:45Oh, that was a Russian army tent?
  791. 38:47If I'm not mistaken. Let's rewind it. Here we go.
  792. 38:50This is it, right? - Yes.
  793. 38:52And this is all in Europe?
  794. 38:54Yes, it's in Europe.
  795. 38:55This particular event is taking place in Germany.
  796. 38:59When I went to meet Serhiy to learn
  797. 39:01about Russian Cossacks in Europe,
  798. 39:03I did not expect to see a Russian army tent
  799. 39:07and Russian-speaking men dressed in military style
  800. 39:10in the middle of a German forest.
  801. 39:12Russian Cossacks did all this openly.
  802. 39:15The video that Serhiy shows me was filmed
  803. 39:17by the Cossacks themselves in 2022 on the outskirts
  804. 39:20of the German city of Hanover.
  805. 39:22They also put this video in the public domain
  806. 39:25and signed it as “international Cossack biwak.”
  807. 39:28Interestingly, even the word “biwak”
  808. 39:29has a militaristic connotation.
  809. 39:31“Biwak” is an army campsite for overnight stays or rest.
  810. 39:35Here they are, gathered.
  811. 39:37And this is who comes up, this man?
  812. 39:39This is a man we already know.
  813. 39:40Kharkivsky.
  814. 39:41How? - Kharkivsky.
  815. 39:43Yes, yes, yes. He has a very distinctive tattoo,
  816. 39:47a beard, and height.
  817. 39:50This is the one who guarded the rally in Cologne.
  818. 39:54So, he received an operational task
  819. 39:56from Ataman Kremer because they never do
  820. 40:00such things independently.
  821. 40:04A security guard at a pro-Russian rally,
  822. 40:06Kharkivsky, at a paramilitary gathering
  823. 40:08of Russian Cossacks in Germany is another surprise for me.
  824. 40:12It proves that Cossack organizations
  825. 40:14in this country are very well organized.
  826. 40:18They gather from France, Netherlands, Poland,
  827. 40:22and wherever there are these so-called Russian Cossacks.
  828. 40:25It turns out that Russian Cossacks are present
  829. 40:27in almost all European countries.
  830. 40:29Here, they are at the unveiling of a monument
  831. 40:31to Peter Potemkin in southern Spain.
  832. 40:34This is the celebration of May 9
  833. 40:36in the Spanish city of Malaga.
  834. 40:37In France, the Cossacks are very active in Paris.
  835. 40:40Once, they even organized a memorial service
  836. 40:43for the terrorist Zakharchenko with DPR flags.
  837. 40:47This is a relatively large network,
  838. 40:48but it consists of small connections.
  839. 40:51Something may be called pompously,
  840. 40:53such as the Cossack village of Berlinska.
  841. 40:56In reality, there could be 5-6 permanent members.
  842. 41:00Well, maybe 30 people will gather there
  843. 41:01for the Christian holidays.
  844. 41:03There are not many of them,
  845. 41:05but they are still influential.
  846. 41:08Up to 30 people from one Hamburg or Berlin village
  847. 41:11is not much. This is not in line
  848. 41:13with the historical spirit that Russian Cossacks
  849. 41:16in Europe follow.
  850. 41:17In the old days, a Cossack village
  851. 41:18was considered a military settlement capable
  852. 41:20of fielding one hundred Cossacks for an army.
  853. 41:24As a true descendant of the Don Cossacks,
  854. 41:26Serhiy Azhynov says that all historical inconsistencies
  855. 41:28do not matter to people who call themselves
  856. 41:32Russian Cossacks in Europe.
  857. 41:34They are not descendants of the Cossacks;
  858. 41:36their participation in the Cossack movement is just a cover.
  859. 41:41Basically, most of them are former police officers,
  860. 41:44former army personnel,
  861. 41:46or from intelligence agencies and so on.
  862. 41:49Okay, but what about the Europeans themselves?
  863. 41:51Do they not know about this?
  864. 41:53To be honest, I'm surprised.
  865. 41:54If I had the opportunity to talk to representatives
  866. 41:57of European intelligence agencies,
  867. 41:59I would ask a lot of questions about how they are simply
  868. 42:02nurturing a Trojan horse on their own land.
  869. 42:07Suppose the negative forecasts come true
  870. 42:10and Russia goes to war with Europe.
  871. 42:12In that case, these people will act as spotters,
  872. 42:15gather operational valuable information for the front,
  873. 42:18and so on because that's how they are trained.
  874. 42:21At the beginning of 2024,
  875. 42:23the German publication BILD reported:
  876. 42:26"For over a year, the military in Germany has been detecting
  877. 42:29unknown drones over Bundeswehr training grounds and barracks,
  878. 42:33where Ukrainian soldiers are also being trained."
  879. 42:36The Germans see a Russian connection,
  880. 42:38but who launched these reconnaissance
  881. 42:40drones remains a mystery.
  882. 42:43Russia cannot launch drones into Germany from its territory.
  883. 42:47Could Russian agents in Germany,
  884. 42:50former security officers disguised as Cossacks, have done this?
  885. 42:52I would not rule them out from the list of suspects.
  886. 42:56As you can see, the Cossacks
  887. 42:58have their quasi-administrative units,
  888. 43:01called "stanitsas," in Europe. Several times a year,
  889. 43:03all European Cossacks gather for paramilitary training,
  890. 43:06known as "bivouacs." And now the question arises:
  891. 43:09Who is actually behind the Cossacks in Europe?
  892. 43:13The clue is given by the same video of the Cossacks
  893. 43:15from the international paramilitary gatherings
  894. 43:17near German Hanover.
  895. 43:20Here, we have a Cossack settlement in the city of Hamburg.
  896. 43:24In the freeze-frame near the tent,
  897. 43:26you can see a sign with the inscription:
  898. 43:28"Cossack stanitsa city of Hamburg,"
  899. 43:30and at the bottom, the abbreviation "SKVRZ."
  900. 43:33Decoding this abbreviation reveals the main mystery –
  901. 43:37who is behind the Russian Cossacks in Europe.
  902. 43:40All these Cossack organizations in Europe are united
  903. 43:42by one large organization called
  904. 43:46the "Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad."
  905. 43:50At first glance, as they position themselves,
  906. 43:53this is a "public organization,"
  907. 43:54meaning a community organization where, logically,
  908. 43:57members should join on a voluntary, volunteer basis.
  909. 44:00But there's one nuance.
  910. 44:02Under President Putin's administration,
  911. 44:05an entire Council for Cossack Affairs has been established.
  912. 44:09The "Council under the President of the Russian Federation
  913. 44:11for Cossack Affairs" is a governmental organization.
  914. 44:13You can even see this in the documents.
  915. 44:16There is a document on the public service
  916. 44:18of the Russian Cossacks,
  917. 44:20and there is even a document showing that there
  918. 44:23is some state policy strategy
  919. 44:25of the Russian Federation regarding
  920. 44:26the Russian Cossacks up to 2030.
  921. 44:30And this, of course, refers to the Cossacks
  922. 44:32both in Russia and abroad.
  923. 44:35If, in Russia itself, President Putin's administration
  924. 44:38has unlimited power and can oversee
  925. 44:40and directly manage Cossack organizations,
  926. 44:43it seems that abroad,
  927. 44:45this function is carried out by another institution.
  928. 44:48I would like to specifically mention
  929. 44:50the Russian Orthodox Church,
  930. 44:51which has a significant influence in Europe,
  931. 44:55including on various Cossack organizations,
  932. 44:57which it, so to speak, oversees.
  933. 45:00As evidence to support his words,
  934. 45:02Serhiy pointed me to a fragment
  935. 45:04of the same video shot in Germany,
  936. 45:06where Russian Cossacks gathered for paramilitary training.
  937. 45:09We had a serious conversation with Father just now.
  938. 45:10With Viktor, right? - Yes.
  939. 45:12Alright. Then let's go and have a serious talk
  940. 45:14about this matter now.
  941. 45:15In this video fragment, the Kharkiv resident,
  942. 45:18already familiar to us, mentions the presence
  943. 45:21of a priest named Viktor at the Cossack gatherings in Hanover.
  944. 45:23If we look at the map of European branches
  945. 45:26of the Russian Orthodox Church
  946. 45:27and the activity of Russian Cossacks in Europe,
  947. 45:30the symbiosis of Russian Cossacks
  948. 45:33and the church is very well traced.
  949. 45:35On the map, it is evident that the Russian Orthodox Church
  950. 45:37has the most parishes in Germany.
  951. 45:39Here, you can also observe the highest activity
  952. 45:41of Cossack organizations. Our investigation shows us
  953. 45:44at least four Cossack centres
  954. 45:47in Berlin, Hamburg, Hanover, and Cologne.
  955. 45:50The Russian Orthodox Church has as many as 8 parishes
  956. 45:52in Berlin: 4 in Hamburg,
  957. 45:553 in Hanover, and 2 in Cologne.
  958. 45:58Russian Cossacks in Spain are most active
  959. 46:00in the Andalusia region.
  960. 46:02Here, the Russian Orthodox Church has one
  961. 46:04of the largest Spanish representations,
  962. 46:06with four parishes in different cities of Andalusia.
  963. 46:09In France, the few parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church
  964. 46:12are scattered throughout the country.
  965. 46:14However, in Paris and its suburbs,
  966. 46:16where Cossacks participate in rallies
  967. 46:18with flags of the Donetsk People's Republic,
  968. 46:19there are as many as 11 parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church.
  969. 46:21This is the largest concentration
  970. 46:23of Russian Orthodox Church representations
  971. 46:25among all major European capitals.
  972. 46:27Moreover, Paris is also a unique example where 8 years ago,
  973. 46:30the Russian Orthodox Church expanded
  974. 46:32with a complex of buildings in the city centre,
  975. 46:35causing significant concern among the public
  976. 46:37about the threats this complex
  977. 46:39poses to France's national security.
  978. 46:43Russians call this a spiritual-cultural Orthodox centre.
  979. 46:47The well-known French theologian
  980. 46:49and religious scholar Antoine Arjakovsky has another opinion
  981. 46:53on its true essence. In April 2023,
  982. 46:56he called on the French people on his Facebook page
  983. 46:59to sign a petition to close
  984. 47:01the Russian spiritual-cultural Orthodox centre in Paris.
  985. 47:05Why did the construction of the Russian centre
  986. 47:08in this location cause so much concern in 2016?
  987. 47:15Firstly, not far from this centre is the Elysee Palace,
  988. 47:21and nearby are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs buildings.
  989. 47:27There's a significant risk of overhearing all
  990. 47:31these conversations that take place nearby.
  991. 47:35I used to work at the French embassy in Russia,
  992. 47:38and we later found out how they listened in on all
  993. 47:40our conversations and read all our telegrams,
  994. 47:43so yes, there is a significant concern.
  995. 47:46While there is no direct evidence that Russia conducts
  996. 47:49surveillance of French government buildings
  997. 47:51from its spiritual-cultural Orthodox centre in Paris,
  998. 47:55in 2023, they were caught engaging
  999. 47:58in such activity in Moldova.
  1000. 48:00Investigative journalists identified Russian
  1001. 48:02intelligence communication officers on the roof
  1002. 48:05of the Russian embassy in Chisinau.
  1003. 48:07One appeared on the roof near the antennas
  1004. 48:08when a hacker attack was taking place on the internet
  1005. 48:11resources of the Moldovan government
  1006. 48:14and the President's administration.
  1007. 48:16As a result of this attack, there was a leak
  1008. 48:18of confidential correspondence
  1009. 48:20of Moldovan high-ranking officials.
  1010. 48:22Notably, the presidential palace and the building
  1011. 48:24of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova
  1012. 48:26are only 600 meters away from the Russian embassy
  1013. 48:30with its dangerous antennas.
  1014. 48:32This is one of the critical points.
  1015. 48:34It becomes evident that Russians require infrastructure
  1016. 48:38near the chosen target for such special operations.
  1017. 48:43Did the French not assess the threat level
  1018. 48:45when they allocated a plot to the Russians to construct
  1019. 48:48a whole complex of buildings 900 meters away
  1020. 48:51from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France
  1021. 48:53and close to the official residences
  1022. 48:56of the President's administration staff?
  1023. 48:59Back then, Sarkozy was the president,
  1024. 49:00and many people understood that it was a trade-off.
  1025. 49:05On the one hand, we give you the opportunity
  1026. 49:07to buy this spot; on the other hand,
  1027. 49:09you buy us the Mistral.
  1028. 49:13In 2010, towards the end of the year,
  1029. 49:16the French announced an agreement with the Russians
  1030. 49:19to construct and sell two Mistral-class
  1031. 49:22military ships to them.
  1032. 49:23France received 1.7 billion euros from this deal and,
  1033. 49:28as it turned out, was supposed to make a small concession
  1034. 49:31to the Russians – allowing them to purchase land
  1035. 49:33in central Paris to construct a spiritual
  1036. 49:35and cultural Orthodox centre.
  1037. 49:38After the annexation of Crimea,
  1038. 49:39France refused to hand over the ships to Russia
  1039. 49:41and paid a hefty fine for it,
  1040. 49:43but the plot in central Paris remained
  1041. 49:45in the hands of the Russians.
  1042. 49:47The French could no longer back out of this project.
  1043. 49:52It was agreed that this centre would receive
  1044. 49:55extraterritorial status.
  1045. 49:58In fact, it's Russia.
  1046. 50:01And it's impossible to resist this in any way.
  1047. 50:06After the annexation of Crimea
  1048. 50:09and even after the full-scale invasion
  1049. 50:12of the Russian army in Ukraine,
  1050. 50:17there were demonstrations here.
  1051. 50:20Still, we couldn't achieve the complete closure
  1052. 50:26of this centre because it has embassy status.
  1053. 50:32In Paris, Russians employed the same scheme as in Berlin.
  1054. 50:36The Russian spiritual and cultural Orthodox centre
  1055. 50:39in the French capital initially became the subject
  1056. 50:41of intergovernmental agreements in a significant deal.
  1057. 50:44Then, it acquired diplomatic immunity,
  1058. 50:46effectively preventing its closure.
  1059. 50:50The presence of a church on its premises also grants
  1060. 50:53this centre a specific immunity.
  1061. 50:55No country in the world wants to be seen
  1062. 50:59as forcibly closing churches.
  1063. 51:02That's why the church, alongside culture and history,
  1064. 51:05is a very convenient tool in the hands
  1065. 51:07of the Kremlin regime. I have only indirect evidence
  1066. 51:12of the church acting as a curator for Russian
  1067. 51:14paramilitary Cossack organizations in Europe.
  1068. 51:16But visit the ROC's website.
  1069. 51:19You'll see that within the structure of the Russian church,
  1070. 51:21there is a separate "Synodal Committee for Interaction
  1071. 51:24with the Cossacks." "Synodal" means it's under the control
  1072. 51:28of the ROC's hierarchy, specifically Patriarch Kirill.
  1073. 51:32Our investigation shows that Cossacks,
  1074. 51:34both in Russia and abroad, are united under
  1075. 51:37one organization – the Union of Cossack Warriors
  1076. 51:40of Russia and Abroad, abbreviated as SKVRZ.
  1077. 51:43This organization is overseen by a council
  1078. 51:45in Russia under the president. At the same time,
  1079. 51:48this mission falls to the Russian Orthodox Church abroad.
  1080. 51:51This connection between the Russian church
  1081. 51:53and the Cossacks proves that in case of necessity,
  1082. 51:55any Russian church in Europe will become a reliable
  1083. 51:58shelter for Russian Cossacks.
  1084. 52:00The danger lies in the fact that over the past 20 years,
  1085. 52:03the number of such ROC churches
  1086. 52:05in Europe has multiplied significantly.
  1087. 52:07We need to go back a little.
  1088. 52:10There was a Russian Orthodox Church at the beginning
  1089. 52:13of the 20th century. And since there was emigration,
  1090. 52:22there were two divisions within the emigration.
  1091. 52:26In 1922, the ROCOR emerged –
  1092. 52:30the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia.
  1093. 52:33The main centre was in Karlovci, Serbia.
  1094. 52:39The split of the Russian Orthodox Church occurred as
  1095. 52:40a result of the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1918.
  1096. 52:44In the USSR, the church came under the direct control
  1097. 52:47of Stalin and the KGB.
  1098. 52:49In Europe, all the churches and parishes
  1099. 52:51that were once under the care
  1100. 52:52of the Russian Empire merged into one structure -
  1101. 52:55the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad,
  1102. 52:58independent of Soviet influence.
  1103. 53:00In 2007, Patriarch Kirill succeeded
  1104. 53:05in having the central part of this church –
  1105. 53:08the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) –
  1106. 53:11transferred to the Moscow Patriarchate.
  1107. 53:14Here, we can observe a specific pattern.
  1108. 53:17Just like with "Rossotrudnichestvo,"
  1109. 53:19the large Soviet cultural legacy that Russians revived
  1110. 53:21in 2008, a year prior, in 2007,
  1111. 53:26they picked up another imperial relic —
  1112. 53:29the Russian Orthodox Church abroad.
  1113. 53:31This fits perfectly into Putin's logic:
  1114. 53:34his nostalgia for the Soviet Union
  1115. 53:36and his mission to gather the Russian imperial legacy.
  1116. 53:41It provided many premises and many buildings.
  1117. 53:47So how does it work? For example,
  1118. 53:48the Moscow Patriarchate gained a new parish or a new church.
  1119. 53:52What's the mechanism of influence,
  1120. 53:54and what does it give them?
  1121. 53:56In Strasbourg, for instance, in France,
  1122. 53:58where the parliament is, where the Council of Europe is,
  1123. 54:02they also opened a church there,
  1124. 54:04and they invite diplomats, they invite parliamentarians,
  1125. 54:09they invite various politicians,
  1126. 54:12and they present themselves
  1127. 54:15as the largest church in the world.
  1128. 54:19So it's not just about the premises
  1129. 54:21and parishes, it gives them reputation, it legitimizes them?
  1130. 54:26Reputation, legitimization, and a means of influence.
  1131. 54:30For example, in Strasbourg,
  1132. 54:32I saw it with my own eyes how extreme parties
  1133. 54:35like the "Rassemblement National" led
  1134. 54:40by Marine Le Pen or the extreme left,
  1135. 54:46"Jean-Luc Melenchon," have regular meetings
  1136. 54:50there every month, one week.
  1137. 54:53They meet not only with representatives
  1138. 54:57of the Russian embassy and consulate
  1139. 55:00but also with the church.
  1140. 55:04This means that in addition to overseeing paramilitary
  1141. 55:07Cossack organizations, the Russian Orthodox Church
  1142. 55:10in Europe also serves as a soft power.
  1143. 55:13The concept of "soft power" emerged
  1144. 55:15in the 20th century and refers to the ability to achieve
  1145. 55:17desired outcomes through cooperation and attractiveness.
  1146. 55:21So, what is the attractiveness of the ROC?
  1147. 55:22Paradoxically, one of the answers is
  1148. 55:25its zero tolerance towards the LGBT community
  1149. 55:27and its global advocacy for traditional family values,
  1150. 55:31preached by Patriarch Kirill.
  1151. 55:33These views are also shared by European far-right parties,
  1152. 55:38including the French National Front led by Marine Le Pen.
  1153. 55:46It's no secret that many countries use soft power
  1154. 55:49in geopolitics to advance their interests.
  1155. 55:52However, the difference between Russians
  1156. 55:53and civilized countries is that their influence
  1157. 55:56is destructive, aimed at sowing chaos and disinformation.
  1158. 56:01One of the main tasks of Russian disinformation policy
  1159. 56:03is to undermine the population's trust
  1160. 56:06in European institutions.
  1161. 56:08According to political expert Anton Shekhovtsov,
  1162. 56:11this is another point that unites Russians
  1163. 56:13with far-right parties in Europe.
  1164. 56:17According to Kremlin experts
  1165. 56:19and Russian pro-regime analysts,
  1166. 56:23Europe is moving towards strengthening right-wing radical
  1167. 56:28movements and parties. Moreover, it is also believed,
  1168. 56:33not only by Kremlin experts or political technologists,
  1169. 56:37that extreme right-wing parties
  1170. 56:40and movements are inherently subversive;
  1171. 56:42they work against the establishment.
  1172. 56:45This is precisely what Russia needs
  1173. 56:47at this historical moment: the fragmentation
  1174. 56:52of the political establishment
  1175. 56:54in those countries that Russia considers unfriendly.
  1176. 57:00Russia began active cooperation
  1177. 57:02with European far-right radicals after 2013.
  1178. 57:06Among the most notable collaborations
  1179. 57:08was the open financing by the Kremlin
  1180. 57:09of the pre-election campaign of the French
  1181. 57:11far-right party "National Front" led by Marine Le Pen.
  1182. 57:15What did such cooperation give the Kremlin back then?
  1183. 57:17Does Russia maintain influence over far-right parties
  1184. 57:20in Europe today?
  1185. 57:21Are these parties capable
  1186. 57:23of influencing European Union policy?
  1187. 57:25How many votes can they gather
  1188. 57:27in the European Parliament elections,
  1189. 57:28which will take place at the beginning of June this year?
  1190. 57:33I expect an overall strengthening of far-right factions.
  1191. 57:39And again, it's not certain
  1192. 57:41that all these far-right groups will advocate for Russia.
  1193. 57:46But this.. the number of far-right Euro-deputies
  1194. 57:52may influence the election of the new President
  1195. 57:55of the European Commission. That's already important.
  1196. 57:58The European Commission administers EU funds.
  1197. 58:01According to the Kyiv Institute of World Economics,
  1198. 58:04as of the beginning of 2024,
  1199. 58:06the total financial assistance from the European Union
  1200. 58:09to Ukraine was three times higher than the volume
  1201. 58:11of similar assistance from the United States.
  1202. 58:14EU funds cover a significant portion
  1203. 58:16of Ukraine's budgetary expenditures
  1204. 58:18and help sustain our economy.
  1205. 58:21The current President of the European Commission,
  1206. 58:23Ursula von der Leyen, made the final decision
  1207. 58:26on allocating this assistance.
  1208. 58:29Perhaps von der Leyen won't be re-elected.
  1209. 58:33She advocates for Ukraine
  1210. 58:35and criticizes the Russian Federation.
  1211. 58:38But perhaps some strengthening of Eurosceptics,
  1212. 58:42anti-American MEPs, and anti-Atlantic deputies
  1213. 58:48will influence the election of the new European Commission.
  1214. 58:53The strengthening of eurosceptics is a trend
  1215. 58:55that seems to be gaining momentum in Europe.
  1216. 58:58In the EU country of Slovakia,
  1217. 59:00Robert Fico came to power in the autumn of 2023.
  1218. 59:04He's a politician who openly praised Putin
  1219. 59:06for his large-scale invasion
  1220. 59:08and now calls on Ukraine to surrender
  1221. 59:10the occupied territories to Russia.
  1222. 59:12After Fico's party won local elections,
  1223. 59:15direct military assistance to Ukraine ceased.
  1224. 59:19Although Slovakia is a small country,
  1225. 59:20in the initial months of the large-scale invasion,
  1226. 59:23it provided Ukraine with the much-needed S-300 air
  1227. 59:27defense system and, together with Poland,
  1228. 59:29responded to Kyiv's request for aircraft
  1229. 59:31by transferring 13 MiG-29 fighters to the Ukrainian Air Force.
  1230. 59:36I'm coming to Slovakia to learn
  1231. 59:39what happened to its political establishment.
  1232. 59:42Why has Slovakia, which was wholeheartedly supporting Ukraine,
  1233. 59:45turned into one of Kremlin's mouthpieces in Europe?
  1234. 59:49Robert Fico's office did not respond to my request
  1235. 59:52for an interview. So, in Bratislava,
  1236. 59:54I am meeting with Olexander Duleba, an advisor
  1237. 59:57to former Slovak Prime Minister Eduard Heger.
  1238. 1:00:01Under Heger's tenure, Ukraine received critical
  1239. 1:00:04assistance from Slovakia, including the S-300 air
  1240. 1:00:06defense system and MiG-29 fighters.
  1241. 1:00:10Mr. Duleba, welcome.
  1242. 1:00:11Welcome to Bratislava.
  1243. 1:00:14Why does the Slovak political spectrum
  1244. 1:00:17swing from pro-Western to pro-Russian views?
  1245. 1:00:21There are many factors.
  1246. 1:00:22One of them, quite literally, is closely connected
  1247. 1:00:26to the city where we are meeting right now.
  1248. 1:00:29That's the school. It was a very important school
  1249. 1:00:33in Slovak history because many famous political figures,
  1250. 1:00:37basically the first generation of Slovaks
  1251. 1:00:41who formulated the political program for Slovakia,
  1252. 1:00:44studied here. I'll show you a list of them,
  1253. 1:00:48but one family is very important.
  1254. 1:00:52You see here, Ludovit Stur.
  1255. 1:00:56This is the year he graduated from this high school.
  1256. 1:00:58He studied here. And all these people, really,
  1257. 1:01:01let's say, Michal Godja, who later became the Prime Minister
  1258. 1:01:05of Czechoslovakia in the first republic.
  1259. 1:01:07Well, if we go, Samo Halupka, he was one
  1260. 1:01:10of the leaders of national poetry in Slovakia.
  1261. 1:01:14So there are many people, literati, scholars,
  1262. 1:01:17but also many political figures.
  1263. 1:01:19But you somehow single out Stur.
  1264. 1:01:20Ludovit Stur was a leader.
  1265. 1:01:22He was a political leader of that generation.
  1266. 1:01:25He studied at this high school. One of the main works,
  1267. 1:01:30I'll say, one of the main books on Slovak politics,
  1268. 1:01:33is "Slavdom and the World of the Future."
  1269. 1:01:37This book was first published in Russian in 1867
  1270. 1:01:42when Slovakia was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
  1271. 1:01:45and sought to gain autonomous status.
  1272. 1:01:48He has very radical proposals here.
  1273. 1:01:50There are proposals for the creation of a Slavic state.
  1274. 1:01:56If the Habsburg monarchy does not grant autonomy,
  1275. 1:01:59then a decision should be made to agree with Russia.
  1276. 1:02:02It's such a push that the more Russia there is
  1277. 1:02:05in Central Europe, the better
  1278. 1:02:08it is for the national freedom of the Slovaks.
  1279. 1:02:12At first glance, it seems incredible
  1280. 1:02:13that a book written in the 19th century
  1281. 1:02:16still influences Slovak perspectives today
  1282. 1:02:19and makes many of the population sympathetic to Russia.
  1283. 1:02:23But one event in Slovak history,
  1284. 1:02:26much closer to our time, explains a lot.
  1285. 1:02:301968, that's the Prague Spring.
  1286. 1:02:33There are different perspectives on these events,
  1287. 1:02:36let's say, from the standpoint
  1288. 1:02:37of Czech national identity and Slovak as well.
  1289. 1:02:41The Prague Spring was a period of political liberalization
  1290. 1:02:44and mass protests in the communist
  1291. 1:02:47Czechoslovak Republic in 1968.
  1292. 1:02:50To prevent political liberalization,
  1293. 1:02:53the Soviet Union deployed troops to Prague
  1294. 1:02:56and forcibly suppressed peaceful demonstrations.
  1295. 1:02:58This event is interpreted as such by world history
  1296. 1:03:01and by the Czechs themselves.
  1297. 1:03:03From the perspective of Slovak national understanding,
  1298. 1:03:06this was progress.
  1299. 1:03:08After all, the Czech Communists didn't give us federation.
  1300. 1:03:11Then came the occupation, and Moscow realized
  1301. 1:03:14that it was necessary to support this process.
  1302. 1:03:17Slovakia became a federative part of Czechoslovakia:
  1303. 1:03:21a government was established, ministries were established,
  1304. 1:03:23and some institutions were established.
  1305. 1:03:25It turns out that despite the dual name "Czechoslovakia,"
  1306. 1:03:29before the Prague Spring,
  1307. 1:03:30Slovaks did not have much influence
  1308. 1:03:32or their own national government in this country.
  1309. 1:03:35However, Slovaks gained all of this
  1310. 1:03:38after the Prague Spring due to Moscow's intervention
  1311. 1:03:40in the country's internal affairs.
  1312. 1:03:42After the collapse of the USSR in 1993,
  1313. 1:03:45Czechoslovakia split into two countries.
  1314. 1:03:47Slovaks obtained an independent country
  1315. 1:03:50with the same ministries
  1316. 1:03:51and within the same administrative boundaries
  1317. 1:03:53that were outlined in 1968 by Moscow's decree.
  1318. 1:03:59All these historical events explain
  1319. 1:04:01why many people are loyal to Russia today in Slovakia.
  1320. 1:04:09Local Slovak politicians, such as Robert Fico,
  1321. 1:04:12venture into the pro-Russian electoral field
  1322. 1:04:15and gain political points with their pro-Russian statements.
  1323. 1:04:19They exploit the situation to boost their ratings.
  1324. 1:04:23The open question remains how Russians gain
  1325. 1:04:26the loyalty of politicians in other European countries
  1326. 1:04:29where historically there
  1327. 1:04:31is no such pro-Russian electorate as in Slovakia.
  1328. 1:04:35I visited Slovakia in early March,
  1329. 1:04:37and just a month later, in April,
  1330. 1:04:39presidential elections were held here,
  1331. 1:04:41won by a candidate with pro-Russian views.
  1332. 1:04:45Now, with politicians holding such views
  1333. 1:04:47and having complete control in Slovakia,
  1334. 1:04:48it seems that this year, sympathizers of Russia,
  1335. 1:04:51eurosceptics, or far-right individuals
  1336. 1:04:53will succeed in the European Parliament
  1337. 1:04:56elections from Slovakia.
  1338. 1:04:59Currently, there are 59 such MEPs out of 705
  1339. 1:05:01in the European Parliament.
  1340. 1:05:04This is a united group of MEPs with far-right views,
  1341. 1:05:07mainly from France, Germany, and Italy.
  1342. 1:05:10Historically, these three countries have the largest
  1343. 1:05:13quota of MEPs among all EU countries.
  1344. 1:05:18If in the previous elections, only 14 MEPs
  1345. 1:05:20from Slovakia were elected to the European Parliament,
  1346. 1:05:23according to the quota of such a small country,
  1347. 1:05:26then from Italy - 76, from France - 79,
  1348. 1:05:29and the most from Germany - 96 MEPs.
  1349. 1:05:34Although the votes of voters
  1350. 1:05:35from each EU country are important,
  1351. 1:05:37the electoral moods in Italy, France,
  1352. 1:05:40and Germany have a significant influence
  1353. 1:05:42on the composition of the next European Parliament.
  1354. 1:05:46And the primary example here is the alternative for Germany,
  1355. 1:05:49which is now the largest right-wing radical party in Europe,
  1356. 1:05:54namely pro-Kremlin. The strengthening
  1357. 1:05:58of these forces and their popularity
  1358. 1:06:01in society cannot fail to influence mainstream forces.
  1359. 1:06:06This is already having an impact.
  1360. 1:06:07We see that this is already influencing
  1361. 1:06:09the debates in Germany.
  1362. 1:06:12I am more than confident that such an ambivalent
  1363. 1:06:16attitude of the German government towards
  1364. 1:06:19even the supply of Taurus missiles is connected
  1365. 1:06:22with this strengthening of Ukrainian-skeptical sentiments,
  1366. 1:06:25which in turn are also linked to the strengthening
  1367. 1:06:28of the extreme right and extreme left in Germany.
  1368. 1:06:33In France, Marine Le Pen, the leader
  1369. 1:06:35of the popular far-right party "National Rally,"
  1370. 1:06:38dubbed "Putin's girlfriend" by the media,
  1371. 1:06:40suddenly criticized Russia for its invasion of Ukraine.
  1372. 1:06:46Even last year, they hurried to repay the debt they owed,
  1373. 1:06:499 million euros, which they borrowed in 2014,
  1374. 1:06:54to show that we distance ourselves;
  1375. 1:06:56we have no connection to the Putin regime
  1376. 1:06:59because the Putin regime has become too toxic for many,
  1377. 1:07:02even far-right individuals.
  1378. 1:07:03Rome. Italy.
  1379. 1:07:08The situation in Italy is quite different.
  1380. 1:07:10The most popular far-right party, "Northern League,"
  1381. 1:07:14is led by Matteo Salvini.
  1382. 1:07:15Before Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine,
  1383. 1:07:18he did not hide his sympathies for Putin.
  1384. 1:07:21Still, even after the invasion in the fall of 2022,
  1385. 1:07:24this did not prevent Salvini from becoming
  1386. 1:07:26the Deputy Prime Minister of Italy.
  1387. 1:07:29How did Salvini become the Deputy Prime Minister
  1388. 1:07:32of Italy after such events,
  1389. 1:07:33and how influential is his political power now?
  1390. 1:07:39In Rome, I meet Luigi Sergio Germani,
  1391. 1:07:42the director of the Institute of Social Sciences
  1392. 1:07:43and Strategic Studies.
  1393. 1:07:45Mr. Germani is an expert on internal and external
  1394. 1:07:48Russian policy and hybrid warfare strategies.
  1395. 1:07:51He was one of the first scholars
  1396. 1:07:53in Italy to introduce the study of intelligence
  1397. 1:07:55and national security to academic circles.
  1398. 1:07:58Our meeting begins with Mr. Germani reading me
  1399. 1:08:00a fragment of the text.
  1400. 1:08:05“Yeah, he's Italian, not Italian,
  1401. 1:08:07but the European Trump, because he has now become
  1402. 1:08:11the head of all of the ultra right for Europe, in Europe”.
  1403. 1:08:17So he's referring to Salvini.
  1404. 1:08:20Russians and three Italians, among whom the voice
  1405. 1:08:26of Matteo Salvini's assistant, identified
  1406. 1:08:28by the surname Savoini, was recognized.
  1407. 1:08:30The communication took place at the Metropol Hotel
  1408. 1:08:33in Moscow in 2018. The following year,
  1409. 1:08:36an audio recording of this conversation fell
  1410. 1:08:38into the hands of journalists and was made public by them.
  1411. 1:08:41The publication of this conversation caused quite a scandal,
  1412. 1:08:44as the essence of the dialogue between Salvini's assistant
  1413. 1:08:47and the Russians boiled down to discussions
  1414. 1:08:49about financing his campaign for the European Parliament.
  1415. 1:08:54"We have Eni who will be on the Italian side, yes?
  1416. 1:09:00We have Russian oil company on our side,
  1417. 1:09:04and we have two companies in the middle.
  1418. 1:09:05The bank, you are the bank, and one Russian company
  1419. 1:09:08who will be, who will sign the contract with the bank”
  1420. 1:09:10This is the voice of a Russian explaining
  1421. 1:09:12how the financial scheme will work.
  1422. 1:09:15The Russians offer Salvini's party 4 per cent
  1423. 1:09:18of the annual contract for oil supplies
  1424. 1:09:20that the Russian oil company and the Italian company
  1425. 1:09:24ENI are to conclude. In annual terms,
  1426. 1:09:25these 4 percent were supposed to convert
  1427. 1:09:28into over $60 million for the Italian far-right party.
  1428. 1:09:32This is seven times more than the loan
  1429. 1:09:34that the Russians provided to the French far-right
  1430. 1:09:37led by Marine Le Pen in 2014.
  1431. 1:09:40Also interesting is the role of Matteo Salvini's assistant,
  1432. 1:09:43who, in this conversation with the Russians,
  1433. 1:09:45promoted himself with all his might
  1434. 1:09:47and literally sold his political services to them.
  1435. 1:09:51“Salvini is the first man that wants to change all Europe,
  1436. 1:09:55together with our allies and colleagues
  1437. 1:09:58and other parties in Europe,
  1438. 1:10:00“Freiheitlichen Partei Osterreich” in Austria,
  1439. 1:10:04German “Alternative for Deutschland”,
  1440. 1:10:05France, Madame Le Pen and other countries,
  1441. 1:10:08the same Hungary with Orban and Sweden».
  1442. 1:10:11Yes, because the idea was that Salvini would unify all
  1443. 1:10:13of these far-right parties in Europe
  1444. 1:10:17in order to change Europe completely.
  1445. 1:10:21And what was the idea of changing?
  1446. 1:10:23Their narrative was that Europe is dominated
  1447. 1:10:27by a kind of elite that oppresses the European masses.
  1448. 1:10:35An elite, an economic elite, a banking elite,
  1449. 1:10:39which is closely tied to the United States, to NATO,
  1450. 1:10:44and that has an economic policy that harms people.
  1451. 1:10:48And was this idea popular among Italians?
  1452. 1:10:51Well, it was widespread.
  1453. 1:10:54The idea was that Italy had lost its sovereignty.
  1454. 1:11:00And he was promoting it during the pre-election period?
  1455. 1:11:04Yes, he was promoting this,
  1456. 1:11:05but the Russians were also promoting it.
  1457. 1:11:08We called in Italy sovereignism, or sovereignism.
  1458. 1:11:11Sovereignty means that the idea was that Europe,
  1459. 1:11:14that the European Union had taken away Italy's economic
  1460. 1:11:18and political independence and had imposed economic policies
  1461. 1:11:23that were impoverishing the people.
  1462. 1:11:25Italy had to regain its sovereignty.
  1463. 1:11:31Suppose such a narrative gains popularity
  1464. 1:11:33in the most influential European countries.
  1465. 1:11:36In that case, it will significantly weaken the idea
  1466. 1:11:38of a united Europe.
  1467. 1:11:40That's precisely what the Russians need,
  1468. 1:11:42which is why they are interested
  1469. 1:11:43in funding far-right parties in Europe.
  1470. 1:11:46The leader of the Italian far-right, Matteo Salvini,
  1471. 1:11:49denies accusations of attempting to receive money
  1472. 1:11:50from Russia ahead of the 2019 European Parliament elections.
  1473. 1:11:54Whether Luigi Sergio Germani tried to secure
  1474. 1:11:57this funding or not, he says the Russians
  1475. 1:11:59did support Salvini to some extent.
  1476. 1:12:04Our institute analyzed Russian propaganda
  1477. 1:12:07at that time, Sputnik, for example,
  1478. 1:12:09Sputnik Italia and other outlets,
  1479. 1:12:13and the image that they wanted to depict of Salvini
  1480. 1:12:16was as the emerging leader
  1481. 1:12:18that would unify all of the European right.
  1482. 1:12:23Eventually, Matteo Salvini's party garnered enough votes
  1483. 1:12:27to enter the European Parliament
  1484. 1:12:29and has since led a coalition of far-right parties there.
  1485. 1:12:31Interestingly, the Russian money scandal erupted
  1486. 1:12:35after the European Parliament elections,
  1487. 1:12:36which should have deterred his voters.
  1488. 1:12:39Still, Salvini has retained his position in Italy.
  1489. 1:12:42He's a minister. He does not influence very much
  1490. 1:12:45foreign policy, but he's still a member of the government.
  1491. 1:12:50So he has influence.
  1492. 1:12:52In the current Italian government, Matteo Salvini
  1493. 1:12:56became an influential minister after his party,
  1494. 1:12:58Lega, won the national elections in 2022.
  1495. 1:13:02So, the main party was the Meloni`s party,
  1496. 1:13:04the Brothers of Italy. They need the Lega to govern.
  1497. 1:13:11Although the party of Italy's incumbent Prime Minister,
  1498. 1:13:13Giorgi Meloni, garnered the most votes
  1499. 1:13:15in the 2022 national elections,
  1500. 1:13:18these votes were insufficient to form a government.
  1501. 1:13:21Furthermore, the margin from the closest political
  1502. 1:13:24opponents was slight.
  1503. 1:13:25In such cases, significant parties begin
  1504. 1:13:27to negotiate with smaller ones to form a coalition.
  1505. 1:13:31This marks a golden opportunity for minor parties.
  1506. 1:13:34Now, their choice of which major party to align
  1507. 1:13:37with determines the political climate
  1508. 1:13:39and fate of the entire country.
  1509. 1:13:41Matteo Salvini opted for a coalition
  1510. 1:13:43with Giorgi Meloni's party in exchange
  1511. 1:13:45for a crucial ministerial position.
  1512. 1:13:49One conclusion is evident in the story
  1513. 1:13:51of Russian money in Italian politics:
  1514. 1:13:54Russians use the core values of democracy,
  1515. 1:13:56such as the right to vote for everyone
  1516. 1:13:58and high-party competition, as their weapon.
  1517. 1:14:03In a democratic system, even a small party sympathetic
  1518. 1:14:07to Russia can have a decisive voice
  1519. 1:14:10on issues sensitive to Russians.
  1520. 1:14:15Following Russia's large-scale incursion into Ukraine,
  1521. 1:14:18Matteo Salvini has somewhat distanced himself
  1522. 1:14:21from Putin and no longer wears T-shirts with his image.
  1523. 1:14:23Italy's example illustrates how even investing
  1524. 1:14:26in a small party can pay off over time.
  1525. 1:14:32Those individuals who are already in power
  1526. 1:14:35or close to power, gaining access to them
  1527. 1:14:38has always been plan "A" for the Kremlin.
  1528. 1:14:41Anton Shekhovtsov, a political expert
  1529. 1:14:43and renowned researcher of far-right movements,
  1530. 1:14:45explains that Russians establish contacts
  1531. 1:14:48with politicians in Europe through a proven
  1532. 1:14:51methodology of intelligence agencies.
  1533. 1:14:53In intelligence agencies, the abbreviation MICE denotes
  1534. 1:15:00four types of recruitment of politicians
  1535. 1:15:03or other individuals to carry out various tasks.
  1536. 1:15:08M stands for Money.
  1537. 1:15:13This is one of the most common types
  1538. 1:15:15of recruitment through money.
  1539. 1:15:16At one time, money contributed to making Gerhard Schroder,
  1540. 1:15:21Chancellor of Germany and one of the most influential
  1541. 1:15:24European politicians of the 2000s, a sympathizer of the Russians.
  1542. 1:15:26The Russians appointed Schroder to the Board
  1543. 1:15:28of Directors of Rosneft and put him on a salary
  1544. 1:15:31of over 200,000 euros per month.
  1545. 1:15:35One Schroder equals several dozen Marine Le Pens.
  1546. 1:15:39Schroder provided Russia with direct access
  1547. 1:15:43to part of the German political elite.
  1548. 1:15:47After the annexation of Crimea, Russian tactics changed.
  1549. 1:15:50Due to the loss of reputation, they understood
  1550. 1:15:53that they could no longer recruit politicians
  1551. 1:15:55of the stature of Schroder for money
  1552. 1:15:57and switched to less influential political movements:
  1553. 1:16:00They issued loans to the far-right in France
  1554. 1:16:02and negotiated funding for the far-right in Italy.
  1555. 1:16:05Those groups cooperated with the Russians
  1556. 1:16:07because they disregarded international politics.
  1557. 1:16:10The ideology of the far-right and their nuclear
  1558. 1:16:14electorate are solely focused on the internal affairs
  1559. 1:16:16of their countries, such as the issue of migration
  1560. 1:16:19or independence from the EU in making important
  1561. 1:16:21decisions for their countries.
  1562. 1:16:23That's why, despite Russia's negative image,
  1563. 1:16:26it manages to recruit far-right politicians for money.
  1564. 1:16:32The second type is through ideology.
  1565. 1:16:40I - ideology. These people are close to you ideologically
  1566. 1:16:47and sometimes don't even require money;
  1567. 1:16:50they don't even need recruitment on a material basis,
  1568. 1:16:53although there may be rewards.
  1569. 1:16:54They are willing to work based on ideological convictions.
  1570. 1:17:00The following C stands for compromising materials.
  1571. 1:17:05These are so-called compromising materials
  1572. 1:17:07when sensitive materials about a particular person,
  1573. 1:17:10such as a politician, can be used
  1574. 1:17:13by special services or other agencies to compel
  1575. 1:17:19the person to perform certain actions.
  1576. 1:17:25And the last E stands for ego.
  1577. 1:17:29This is the use of human vanity,
  1578. 1:17:33even healthy or unhealthy egoism,
  1579. 1:17:36to get what is needed from a person.
  1580. 1:17:40For example, it's providing Western experts
  1581. 1:17:44and politicians access to high-ranking officials in Russia.
  1582. 1:17:50Kremlin services often do this;
  1583. 1:17:54they give this access precisely to stroke the egos
  1584. 1:18:00of the people they want to recruit.
  1585. 1:18:01One example of such events related to the use
  1586. 1:18:05of ego is the so-called Valdai Forum,
  1587. 1:18:11which is aimed explicitly at Western experts,
  1588. 1:18:15politicians, journalists, and academics
  1589. 1:18:18who are brought to Russia and allowed to meet
  1590. 1:18:22not only with Putin but also
  1591. 1:18:23with other representatives of the Russian elite.
  1592. 1:18:26Well, it seems that after a large-scale invasion,
  1593. 1:18:28tools like ideology and ego are not as effective as money
  1594. 1:18:33and compromising materials.
  1595. 1:18:34Because who, for ideological reasons,
  1596. 1:18:37will support an aggressor country
  1597. 1:18:39that has openly invaded Ukraine?
  1598. 1:18:42Who will go to Russia
  1599. 1:18:43when sanctions have been imposed on Russia?
  1600. 1:18:44This is if we talk about ego.
  1601. 1:18:47Yes, now, of course, ego doesn't work
  1602. 1:18:50as effectively as before February 24, 2022,
  1603. 1:18:53but ideology is still essential.
  1604. 1:18:57These are people in the West who support,
  1605. 1:19:02say, non-liberal ideologies, oppose the establishment,
  1606. 1:19:08and oppose the US and US influence in Europe.
  1607. 1:19:12This is also an ideological direction
  1608. 1:19:13that Russia supports.
  1609. 1:19:15They still find people in Western Europe
  1610. 1:19:18who are ideologically close to them.
  1611. 1:19:22And recruitment is still carried out in this direction as well.
  1612. 1:19:27Yes, I agree, there is not as much vanity now,
  1613. 1:19:32but money and ideology are the two main types
  1614. 1:19:37of recruitment that are still prevalent.
  1615. 1:19:42The most mysterious element in this recruitment scheme
  1616. 1:19:45remains the letter "C,"
  1617. 1:19:46which stands for compromising material.
  1618. 1:19:48Did Russians employ compromising material
  1619. 1:19:50to gain the loyalty of any European politicians?
  1620. 1:19:54There is, let's say, an influential viewpoint
  1621. 1:19:56that the Russians have compromising material on Viktor Orban.
  1622. 1:20:01When Orban came to power,
  1623. 1:20:05he was a prominent sceptic of Russia.
  1624. 1:20:07Everything changed after he went to Moscow
  1625. 1:20:10and met with official representatives in Russia.
  1626. 1:20:13And when he returned to Hungary, his position changed.
  1627. 1:20:17Supporters of this theory of compromising material say
  1628. 1:20:20that something was shown to him in Russia.
  1629. 1:20:23They told him that they had something on him.
  1630. 1:20:26No matter how hard Russians have tried
  1631. 1:20:29to recruit far-right politicians,
  1632. 1:20:31they don't seem like a force that could sway Europe
  1633. 1:20:35in Russia's favour today.
  1634. 1:20:37This conclusion can be drawn at least because European
  1635. 1:20:40far-right parties hold varying positions
  1636. 1:20:42on Russia's wide-scale invasion of Ukraine
  1637. 1:20:45and do not present a united front on this issue.
  1638. 1:20:48The same far-right and populist voices calling
  1639. 1:20:51for negotiations with Russia and lifting
  1640. 1:20:53sanctions are not too numerous in Europe.
  1641. 1:20:57Here I am again, approaching this with cautious optimism,
  1642. 1:21:01and I don't think Russia will stop being toxic
  1643. 1:21:06anytime soon or even in the... well, in the medium term.
  1644. 1:21:12A favourable European political climate is essential
  1645. 1:21:15for Ukraine not only in terms of financial
  1646. 1:21:17and military assistance but also in terms
  1647. 1:21:20of maintaining and strengthening sanctions against Russia.
  1648. 1:21:22In 2022, the EU swiftly responded
  1649. 1:21:26to Russia's large-scale invasion
  1650. 1:21:28and imposed a strict package of sanctions
  1651. 1:21:30on the very next day, February 25.
  1652. 1:21:33Among all the restrictions,
  1653. 1:21:34sanctions in the technological sector
  1654. 1:21:36were particularly important—namely,
  1655. 1:21:38the ban on exporting microchips to Russia.
  1656. 1:21:42The role of microchips in modern military conflicts,
  1657. 1:21:45modern defence, and military technologies
  1658. 1:21:48is critically important.
  1659. 1:21:49If the Russians did not have access to foreign components,
  1660. 1:21:54they would not have automated artillery
  1661. 1:21:56fire control systems or such strategic aviation.
  1662. 1:22:02Russians cannot manufacture microchips.
  1663. 1:22:05This technology is only available to a few countries in the world.
  1664. 1:22:08Yet, despite imposed sanctions,
  1665. 1:22:09Russians still have access to Western microchips three years
  1666. 1:22:12into the large-scale invasion.
  1667. 1:22:16The media frequently report this.
  1668. 1:22:17The list of foreign companies whose products are found
  1669. 1:22:20in Russian weapons was published in February 2024
  1670. 1:22:23by the Kyiv School of Economics and the international
  1671. 1:22:26working group on Yermak-McFaul sanctions.
  1672. 1:22:28This list includes over 250 foreign companies.
  1673. 1:22:31Such news leads to much speculation about whether
  1674. 1:22:34the sanctions are effective or not. On the one hand,
  1675. 1:22:37the presence of foreign components
  1676. 1:22:39in Russian weapons may indicate a significant stockpile
  1677. 1:22:42made by the Russians before the large-scale invasion.
  1678. 1:22:45On the other hand, why hasn't this stockpile been depleted?
  1679. 1:22:49Russia has already launched over 10,000 missiles
  1680. 1:22:52and drones of various types over Ukraine.
  1681. 1:22:54It continues to do so to this day.
  1682. 1:22:56Perhaps the sanctions are indeed ineffective,
  1683. 1:22:58and Russians are obtaining foreign components
  1684. 1:23:01for their missiles and drones bypassing the sanctions?
  1685. 1:23:04How can we determine when exactly foreign components
  1686. 1:23:07for missiles and drones entered Russia?
  1687. 1:23:09What percentage of foreign microchips are in Russian weapons?
  1688. 1:23:14I'm meeting with someone with unique access to Russian
  1689. 1:23:17weapons and can answer these questions.
  1690. 1:23:20This is Captain Andriy Rudik, a representative
  1691. 1:23:23of the Trophies and Prospective Armament Research Center
  1692. 1:23:26and Military Equipment of the General Staff
  1693. 1:23:28of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. With special permission,
  1694. 1:23:31we will investigate together the origin
  1695. 1:23:33of microchips in Russian weapons.
  1696. 1:23:35We will work with you on the components
  1697. 1:23:38of the active radar seeker of the sea-launched cruise
  1698. 1:23:43missile 3M14 Caliber complex.
  1699. 1:23:45Here are these components.
  1700. 1:23:49The Russians are launching "Kalibr" missiles from the Black Sea.
  1701. 1:23:51Such missiles are capable of travelling hundreds
  1702. 1:23:53of kilometres and have caused extensive destruction
  1703. 1:23:57and hundreds of deaths throughout Ukraine.
  1704. 1:23:58On July 14, 2022, in Vinnytsia, 29 people were killed
  1705. 1:24:03as two "Kalibr" missiles hit the city centre.
  1706. 1:24:07These missiles also reach Lviv.
  1707. 1:24:08Russians frequently target Odessa with them.
  1708. 1:24:11This is an FPGA matrix for us responsible
  1709. 1:24:14for electronic computing operations.
  1710. 1:24:17That is, it's something that the Russian Federation
  1711. 1:24:19is currently unable to manufacture.
  1712. 1:24:21Well, they try, let's say, to search for technological solutions;
  1713. 1:24:24they have their own developments,
  1714. 1:24:25but we see that at the level of the same "Kalibr"
  1715. 1:24:28because the Russian Federation often boasts
  1716. 1:24:30that 80% of "Kalibr" is assembled from Russian components,
  1717. 1:24:34indeed Russian components are present there,
  1718. 1:24:36in the onboard computer of this strategic sea-based missile.
  1719. 1:24:40Still, the guidance system is of foreign origin.
  1720. 1:24:44So, if we imagine that Russians don't have these components,
  1721. 1:24:47then this missile couldn't find its target?
  1722. 1:24:51It would fly, but finding the target would be problematic.
  1723. 1:24:56Then let's see where this microchip is manufactured.
  1724. 1:25:01Here it is. This microchip is from the company "Altera."
  1725. 1:25:10Captain Rudik is not authorized to comment on the country
  1726. 1:25:13of origin of this microchip.
  1727. 1:25:15This is demanded by the policy of the Center
  1728. 1:25:16for Trophy and Prospective Armament Research
  1729. 1:25:18and Military Equipment, where he serves.
  1730. 1:25:20However, a simple internet search yields such information.
  1731. 1:25:25The company "Altera" is of American origin,
  1732. 1:25:28with headquarters in California.
  1733. 1:25:30Even basic information about the company "Altera"
  1734. 1:25:32on Wikipedia gives us an important clue.
  1735. 1:25:35In 2015, "Altera" was acquired by the American technological
  1736. 1:25:39giant "Intel" and subsequently changed the labelling
  1737. 1:25:42of these microchips.
  1738. 1:25:43That is, they no longer bore the inscription "Altera."
  1739. 1:25:45This allows us to assume that this particular microchip
  1740. 1:25:49with the old labelling found its way
  1741. 1:25:52to Russia even before the large-scale invasion.
  1742. 1:25:58This is a microchip.
  1743. 1:25:59It's a dual-use item; it's not military.
  1744. 1:26:02This chip can be used on many devices,
  1745. 1:26:06so it's still being determined where it came from.
  1746. 1:26:09Most likely, it was simply original,
  1747. 1:26:12manufactured somehow by the Russian Federation.
  1748. 1:26:15On the same board from "Kalibr" missiles,
  1749. 1:26:17we identified microchips
  1750. 1:26:19from two other foreign manufacturers:
  1751. 1:26:21Linear Technology and HALO Electronics.
  1752. 1:26:24Both companies are also based in the United States of America.
  1753. 1:26:27These are also dual-use microchips
  1754. 1:26:30that Russia could easily procure in large quantities
  1755. 1:26:34before the widescale invasion.
  1756. 1:26:36Restrictions on their export to Russia only
  1757. 1:26:38began to take effect in 2022.
  1758. 1:26:41Now, it remains to be seen whether foreign components
  1759. 1:26:45manufactured after the imposition
  1760. 1:26:47of sanctions are still making their way into Russia.
  1761. 1:26:50For example, let's take the latest,
  1762. 1:26:53which is supposedly indicated as made in Russia.
  1763. 1:26:57This is our "Comet-M" navigation system.
  1764. 1:27:03It concerns the navigation of our "Shahid" standoff weapon.
  1765. 1:27:11August 2022. "Made in Russia," they write.
  1766. 1:27:15Assembled in Russia. Not made.
  1767. 1:27:18Made and assembled - these are two different things.
  1768. 1:27:21Let's look at the antenna patch.
  1769. 1:27:22The antenna patch is of foreign origin.
  1770. 1:27:26They are installed so that they are jam-resistant
  1771. 1:27:29and can withstand our electronic warfare means
  1772. 1:27:33and our electronic warfare assets.
  1773. 1:27:36How do we understand if this patch antenna
  1774. 1:27:37was manufactured in 2022?
  1775. 1:27:40By the serial number.
  1776. 1:27:41We transmit this information to foreign partners
  1777. 1:27:44to determine if it is indeed manufactured.
  1778. 1:27:47Did you inquire about when it was manufactured?
  1779. 1:27:48Absolutely. - And what response did you get?
  1780. 1:27:51That, indeed, it was manufactured
  1781. 1:27:52after the full-scale invasion.
  1782. 1:27:54Was this patch antenna manufactured? - Yes.
  1783. 1:27:56There are several routes through which, despite sanctions,
  1784. 1:28:00Western microchips and essential components
  1785. 1:28:02for weapons end up in Russia.
  1786. 1:28:03The first route is through former Soviet Union countries
  1787. 1:28:07such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia.
  1788. 1:28:09In these countries, intermediary
  1789. 1:28:11firms purchase necessary foreign components abroad
  1790. 1:28:15and resell them to Russia.
  1791. 1:28:17The second route involves influential intermediary
  1792. 1:28:20countries loyal to the Kremlin, such as Turkey,
  1793. 1:28:23the United Arab Emirates, and China.
  1794. 1:28:25Thus, while Russians bypass technological sanctions,
  1795. 1:28:29these sanctions still significantly complicate their lives.
  1796. 1:28:32The restructuring of logistic routes leads
  1797. 1:28:34to increased costs of foreign components,
  1798. 1:28:36delivery delays, and not always guaranteed delivery.
  1799. 1:28:42Here, it could be added that the significant increase
  1800. 1:28:45in the cost of foreign components drains the Russian budget.
  1801. 1:28:48This would also have its advantages,
  1802. 1:28:50but it seems this factor does not create obvious
  1803. 1:28:53problems for the Russian budget.
  1804. 1:28:55The collapse of the Russian economy,
  1805. 1:28:57which financial analysts predicted at the beginning
  1806. 1:29:00of the invasion, did not happen.
  1807. 1:29:02On the contrary, there is an increase in revenues
  1808. 1:29:06in the Russian budget-forming oil industry,
  1809. 1:29:08returning to the level before the large-scale invasion.
  1810. 1:29:11This is happening despite Western sanctions
  1811. 1:29:13forcing Russia to sell its oil almost at cost.
  1812. 1:29:18How is this possible? How, against harsh sanctions,
  1813. 1:29:22do Russians still manage to generate high revenues from oil?
  1814. 1:29:26To figure this out, I travel to Finland.
  1815. 1:29:28Recently, this NATO country, which shares thousands
  1816. 1:29:32of kilometres long land border with Russia,
  1817. 1:29:34has experienced a bold attack from its neighbour,
  1818. 1:29:37resulting in the loss of some of its territories
  1819. 1:29:39in its history. Finland has always looked
  1820. 1:29:41at Russia with suspicion, and 30 years ago,
  1821. 1:29:43it established a unique institute
  1822. 1:29:45at the National Bank of Finland,
  1823. 1:29:47whose purpose is to study the economies of Russia and China.
  1824. 1:29:51I arranged a meeting with the senior economist
  1825. 1:29:54of this institute, Heli Simola.
  1826. 1:29:56She has devoted the last 20 years
  1827. 1:29:58of her career to studying the Russian economy.
  1828. 1:30:01Can you explain what happens
  1829. 1:30:03with the Russian oil trade?
  1830. 1:30:08If you think about the crude oil
  1831. 1:30:10and oil products it is estimated
  1832. 1:30:12that about half of the exports is shipped
  1833. 1:30:14by these kind of shadow fleet.
  1834. 1:30:18Russia has been able to buy ships for itself.
  1835. 1:30:21So these ships it can use to transport the oil
  1836. 1:30:26and of course they are not subject to any price caps
  1837. 1:30:30because they are just taking care of the transport
  1838. 1:30:34by themselves and not using the services provided
  1839. 1:30:36by the sanctioning countries.
  1840. 1:30:42Sanctions compel Russia to sell its oil
  1841. 1:30:45at a reduced price of $60 per barrel if Russians
  1842. 1:30:48use Western oil transportation services:
  1843. 1:30:52Western tankers and insurance companies.
  1844. 1:30:54However, Russians have taken a bypass route
  1845. 1:30:57and used tankers registered in countries
  1846. 1:30:59that have not joined the sanctions against the Kremlin
  1847. 1:31:03to sell their oil.
  1848. 1:31:04Often, these are already written off
  1849. 1:31:06or old tankers whose service life is expiring.
  1850. 1:31:08Nothing prevents Russians from loading these tankers
  1851. 1:31:12with their oil and selling it at the average market
  1852. 1:31:15price of $70 or $80 per barrel.
  1853. 1:31:18This is how the shadow fleet,
  1854. 1:31:20as mentioned by Geli Simola, operates.
  1855. 1:31:26It was to some extent expected
  1856. 1:31:29that at least to some extent they would try
  1857. 1:31:31to reorient the trade flows.
  1858. 1:31:32But of course, it might be a bit surprising
  1859. 1:31:35that this has been so rapid and in such big amounts.
  1860. 1:31:39They use their own tankers to ship the oil
  1861. 1:31:43to all those key markets.
  1862. 1:31:45We have China, India, Turkey.
  1863. 1:31:50So these are the main buyers of Russian oil at the moment.
  1864. 1:31:56According to various estimates,
  1865. 1:31:58the Russian shadow fleet consists of 600 to 1,000 vessels.
  1866. 1:32:02A third of these vessels are controlled
  1867. 1:32:04by the Russian state shipping company "Sovcomflot,"
  1868. 1:32:08while the rest are under the command
  1869. 1:32:10of foreign traders who disregard sanctions.
  1870. 1:32:13For the trade side,
  1871. 1:32:15Russia has been quite successful in shifting
  1872. 1:32:18its trade to new countries.
  1873. 1:32:21Can you tell me, because it's interesting information
  1874. 1:32:24about what is the percentage of sanctions that work?
  1875. 1:32:28If you look at the research
  1876. 1:32:31that has been conducted on this issue,
  1877. 1:32:32the general finding is that about 30% of the cases,
  1878. 1:32:37the sanctions totally or partially get to their aim.
  1879. 1:32:47Grey schemes in chip imports and shadow fleets
  1880. 1:32:49for oil exports are all signs that the Russians
  1881. 1:32:52have established good connections in illegal business.
  1882. 1:32:55This is yet another dangerous tentacle
  1883. 1:32:57of the Russian octopus.
  1884. 1:32:59A company operating within the law can be held accountable.
  1885. 1:33:02Still, all these companies that facilitate Russians
  1886. 1:33:05help them bypass sanctions effectively
  1887. 1:33:06beyond the reach of law enforcement.
  1888. 1:33:15Inaccessibility,
  1889. 1:33:19lying deep on the seabed —
  1890. 1:33:24these are the features of the octopus —
  1891. 1:33:26a marine creature with eight tentacles armed
  1892. 1:33:29with dangerous suckers.
  1893. 1:33:33They are necessary for the predator to paralyze
  1894. 1:33:36its prey and pull it into its jaws.
  1895. 1:33:42The Russian octopus operates on the same principle.
  1896. 1:33:46Only its tentacles are the imaginary
  1897. 1:33:48influence schemes concocted in the Kremlin.
  1898. 1:33:51Each element in these schemes,
  1899. 1:33:53like the suckers on the tentacles,
  1900. 1:33:55when activated, paralyze their victim.
  1901. 1:33:58The suckers on the tentacles of the Russian
  1902. 1:34:00octopus are the dozens of so-called "cultural"
  1903. 1:34:04representations of "Rossotrudnichestvo" around the world,
  1904. 1:34:06hundreds of parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church
  1905. 1:34:09in Europe, politicians and businessmen
  1906. 1:34:11who sympathize with and play into the Kremlin's hands.
  1907. 1:34:17Today, the Russian octopus still looks menacing
  1908. 1:34:20but can be defeated.
  1909. 1:34:22More and more people worldwide are realizing
  1910. 1:34:24how it operates and uses its tentacles
  1911. 1:34:27to spread its influence.
  1912. 1:34:29Such knowledge is the first step to neutralizing it.
  1913. 1:34:34Our team worked on this film for half a year.
  1914. 1:34:37While editing it, signs emerged that the West
  1915. 1:34:41is moving to the next step — the intention
  1916. 1:34:43to sever the tentacles of the Russian octopus.
  1917. 1:34:46Indeed, on April 17, the Parliamentary Assembly
  1918. 1:34:49of the Council of Europe recognized
  1919. 1:34:51the Russian Orthodox Church in its resolution
  1920. 1:34:53as an instrument of Russian influence and propaganda.
  1921. 1:34:56The following week, on April 22, the Minister
  1922. 1:35:00of Foreign Affairs of Sweden stated
  1923. 1:35:02that sanctions targeting Russia's shadow
  1924. 1:35:05fleet should be introduced.
  1925. 1:35:07The Russian Orthodox Church
  1926. 1:35:09and the shadow fleet are just two tentacles.
  1927. 1:35:11But if action is finally taken against them,
  1928. 1:35:13there is hope that the food supply
  1929. 1:35:15for the Russian octopus will soon run out,
  1930. 1:35:17and this will be the beginning of its end.

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