【名著】なぜ株価暴落は世界恐慌になったのか?投資信託とレバレッジが増幅した1929年 — Transcript
Full transcript
- 0:00There is a book that was released last
- 0:02year and remains a bestseller overseas.
- 0:04It’s about the great crash 96 years
- 0:07ago, titled "The Great Crash 1929" by
- 0:09Ross M. Miller, but a Japanese version
- 0:12hasn't been released yet. When reading
- 0:17overseas reviews, both positive and
- 0:19critical, a certain other book is
- 0:21frequently cited. That book is "The
- 0:24Great Crash, 1929" by John Kenneth
- 0:27Galbraith. Written 70 years ago, it is
- 0:29a classic masterpiece still considered
- 0:32the go-to source for understanding 1929
- 0:34. I previously featured a book by the
- 0:36same author on this channel called "A
- 0:38Short History of Financial Euphoria,"
- 0:40and this is that very same author.
- 0:42Before reading the latest buzzworthy
- 0:44book in Japanese, I’d like to
- 0:46introduce this classic today to ensure
- 0:48we have a solid foundation. Please be
- 0:50sure to watch until the end. First,
- 0:52there is a famous story surrounding
- 0:54this book. It is the story that the
- 0:56bearer of warnings is despised. In 1955
- 0:58, Galbraith himself was testifying
- 1:01before Congress about the crash of 1929
- 1:04. Right in the middle of that testimony
- 1:06, stock prices plummeted. Just by
- 1:07explaining the market crash, he
- 1:09supposedly became an enemy to investors
- 1:11nationwide. As a result, what happened
- 1:13was that he was flooded with hate mail
- 1:15from investors all over the country.
- 1:17Some prayed that he would get sick and
- 1:19die young. Letters saying exactly that
- 1:21were delivered to him. Later, when he
- 1:23broke his leg while skiing, he even
- 1:25received letters of joy claiming that
- 1:27their prayers had been answered. To
- 1:29make matters worse, a senator even
- 1:31accused him of being a communist.
- 1:33Actually, this story about the skiing
- 1:35injury and the letters was also in "A
- 1:36Short History of Financial Euphoria"
- 1:38that I introduced previously, so I
- 1:40realized this is one of the author's
- 1:42signature anecdotes. As I mentioned in
- 1:44the last video, despite him only
- 1:45providing an explanation, he was
- 1:47treated as if he were the culprit
- 1:49behind the bubble bursting. Within this
- 1:52book, there is a figure who appears in
- 1:54a similar situation in real-time during
- 1:571929. It was when economist Roger
- 1:59Babson stated that a great crash was
- 2:01coming sooner or later, and the market
- 2:03plunged. In response to his statement,
- 2:06Wall Street fought back in three ways.
- 2:09First, you are not a scholar from a
- 2:11top-tier university. Attacks
- 2:13questioning one's authority or
- 2:15credentials. Second, your basis for
- 2:17predicting a crash is weak. Attacks
- 2:19against one's methodology, claiming
- 2:21you're just drawing suspicious lines on
- 2:23a chart to predict a crash. Third,
- 2:25attacks against one's track record,
- 2:27saying you've cried wolf about crashes
- 2:30many times in the past and have been
- 2:32wrong every single time. I felt that
- 2:37the way people who speak out during a
- 2:39bubble are attacked is quite similar to
- 2:41how people are bashed on social media
- 2:42today. It’s common to see criticism
- 2:47that sounds smart but misses the mark,
- 2:49isn’t it? Well, that’s just how it
- 2:51was 100 years ago and how it is today.
- 2:53Chapter 4 of this book states that even
- 2:55if you reach the right conclusion
- 2:56through the wrong reasoning, you won't
- 2:58be appreciated by those around you. It
- 3:00is said that it is far better to use a
- 3:02respectable method and be wrong. This
- 3:04is the irony the author is pointing out
- 3:06. Those who pour cold water on a bull
- 3:09market are hated in every era. The fact
- 3:13that the author himself was criticized
- 3:1525 years after 1929 only served to
- 3:17prove that rule once again. Next, let's
- 3:21look at the history of American bubbles
- 3:23mentioned early in the book. The book
- 3:25provides a detailed explanation of the
- 3:27history of bubbles in America up to
- 3:29that time. Continental currency used to
- 3:33fund the Revolutionary War went to zero
- 3:36, followed by land speculation after
- 3:39the War of 1812, the panic of 1837, the
- 3:42boom of the 1850s, and the railroad
- 3:44bubble collapse in 1873. There was also
- 3:48a financial crisis in 1907. And then
- 3:51there's the main subject, the Great
- 3:53Depression of 1929; just as Galbraith
- 3:55said in "A Short History of Financial
- 3:57Euphoria," the law that financial
- 4:00memory fades in about 20 years meant
- 4:02that history repeated itself as
- 4:04generations changed. This book acts as
- 4:07an autopsy of 1929, one of those
- 4:10specific cycles. The prologue to the
- 4:14story of 1929 began with the Florida
- 4:16land bubble. Let's start by looking at
- 4:20that. The main story doesn't begin with
- 4:22the stock market or investment trust
- 4:24bubble of '29, but with land. Back then
- 4:28, the fact of Florida’s mild climate
- 4:30was layered with a narrative that it
- 4:32would become a tourist destination like
- 4:34the American Riviera, fueling
- 4:36speculation. What I found truly
- 4:40terrifying in this part is the
- 4:41structure of the human mind that wants
- 4:43to believe. First of all, everyone
- 4:46wants to make money, right? And then,
- 4:49some interesting-sounding story comes
- 4:51along. It stated that, instead of
- 4:53approaching this with skepticism,
- 4:55people were actually looking for
- 4:57reasons to believe it. They wanted
- 5:00plausible reasons to hope that this "
- 5:02get-rich-quick" scheme was real.
- 5:05Because the desire to profit and the
- 5:08desire to believe come first, they then
- 5:10cobble together seemingly logical
- 5:12justifications after the fact. This
- 5:16line of thinking made me wonder if this
- 5:18is exactly how people prone to being
- 5:19scammed think. As for what it was
- 5:26actually like: land claimed to be
- 5:28coastal was 20km away from the shore,
- 5:30purchases were made with 10x leverage
- 5:33since only a 10%down payment was
- 5:35required, buyers had no intention of
- 5:37living there and were only interested
- 5:39in flipping the property, and it is
- 5:41even said that famous con artists
- 5:43joined the fray. Even when 400 people
- 5:50died in the 1926 hurricane, the local
- 5:53reaction was more concerned about
- 5:55Florida's image than the victims. They
- 5:58refused to acknowledge that the bubble
- 6:00had burst. It is said that bank
- 6:02clearings in Miami dropped by about 90%
- 6:05in just a few years from a peak of over
- 6:07$ 1 billion. And so, one story came to
- 6:11an end, but three years later, the same
- 6:13narrative would be repeated on a much
- 6:16larger scale: across the entire United
- 6:18States. Next, let's look at what served
- 6:22as the gasoline and what acted as the
- 6:24spark for this bubble. In these types
- 6:27of financial bubbles, central banks
- 6:29like the Fed are often blamed as the
- 6:31culprits. Around 1925, the New York Fed
- 6:34lowered the discount rate from 4%to 3.5
- 6:37%and bought massive amounts of
- 6:39government bonds. The overflowing
- 6:41capital flooded into the stock market.
- 6:44FRB Governor Miller himself later
- 6:46recalled it as the boldest and greatest
- 6:48mistake in the history of the Federal
- 6:50Reserve. However, the author Galbraith
- 6:53himself keeps some distance from this
- 6:55theory. Well, this talk of finding
- 7:00someone to blame for the bubble burst
- 7:02—as those who watched the previous
- 7:04bubble story will understand—is the
- 7:06theory that people feel reassured when
- 7:08they have an easy villain like the Fed.
- 7:12It’s easy to understand when you just
- 7:14conclude that it was the Fed's fault.
- 7:16It makes things simpler, doesn't it?
- 7:19And it also provides an excuse that the
- 7:21public and investors who jumped on the
- 7:23bubble weren't actually to blame.
- 7:25Furthermore, one could claim it was
- 7:27because the situation overseas was bad.
- 7:30Well, shifting the blame onto those
- 7:32kinds of things is a common story in
- 7:34bubbles. But here, Galbraith argues
- 7:38that while the Fed's monetary easing
- 7:40might have served as gasoline. The
- 7:43spark, he suggests, was the human
- 7:45desire to believe in these
- 7:47get-rich-quick schemes. Ultimately,
- 7:50Galbraith's view is that the biggest
- 7:52cause wasn't one single villain, but
- 7:54the fact that everyone jumped on the
- 7:56bandwagon. And this is another story
- 8:00that left a deep impression on me about
- 8:02what happened to a certain high-tech
- 8:04stock of that time. Radio Corporation
- 8:08of America was one of the leading
- 8:10stocks in the stock market back then. I
- 8:12mean, it was about 100 years ago, after
- 8:14all. When you think about it, radio was
- 8:16the cutting-edge technology stock of
- 8:18that era. The book mainly focuses on
- 8:21around 1928 and 1929, when the stock
- 8:24price was at its highest. It moved by
- 8:27dozens of dollars a day, and reading it
- 8:30, you can really feel that it was a
- 8:32stock with extremely high daily
- 8:33volatility. It would sometimes plummet
- 8:37due to announcements of investigations,
- 8:39but it was a stock that would move
- 8:41explosively, often recovering
- 8:42everything in just a few days. But when
- 8:46you look closely at those times when it
- 8:48moved so much, it actually hadn't gone
- 8:50up that much. Though, it certainly had
- 8:52been rising. So, when were the big
- 8:54returns actually made? In the end, it
- 8:58was way before the explosive price
- 9:00swings—about seven or eight years
- 9:02prior—that they were quietly and
- 9:04steadily generating significant returns
- 9:06. When the number of participants
- 9:09surged and the price action became
- 9:11volatile, the main phase of the rally
- 9:13was likely already over. That is
- 9:16certainly how it looks. It peaked in
- 9:20September '29 and plummeted by 98%by
- 9:241932. But what’s interesting here is
- 9:28that while the stock price itself
- 9:29collapsed......the companies themselves
- 9:31didn't necessarily fail. Radio was the
- 9:35cutting-edge high-tech of that era, and
- 9:37later they commercialized television,
- 9:39so the technology itself ultimately
- 9:41became a winner of the age. Even so,
- 9:45from the perspective of the stock price
- 9:47, it took about 35 years for someone
- 9:49who bought at the peak to break even.
- 9:53So, if you ask whether radio changed
- 9:55people's lives 100 years ago, it
- 9:57certainly did. It brought innovation to
- 10:00the world. Did the companies become
- 10:03winners? Well, they actually did. The
- 10:05companies continued to grow
- 10:07significantly even after that. But as
- 10:11for the shareholders, those who bought
- 10:13near the peak had to wait 35 years just
- 10:15to recover their original investment.
- 10:20In other words, the survival of a
- 10:22company or technology and its actual
- 10:24innovation in the world is a completely
- 10:26different story from whether the
- 10:28investor who bought the stock wins.
- 10:32This was one example that left a very
- 10:34strong impression on me. If we replace
- 10:36this with AI, there's a possibility
- 10:38that something similar could happen,
- 10:40right? The companies themselves will
- 10:42continue to grow. The technology will
- 10:44go on to change the future world.
- 10:47However, investors who jumped in
- 10:49without any regard for price will be
- 10:50burned by the bubble bursting. Well,
- 10:55there are already quite a few investors
- 10:57who are being hurt in exactly that way.
- 11:01While it hasn't reached the scale of
- 11:031929, I believe that this type of
- 11:05dynamic is still happening to some
- 11:08extent even today. Next, let's talk
- 11:12about investment trusts, the engine
- 11:14that inflated the bubble; I think this
- 11:17is a major topic of this book. I
- 11:21realized that the investment trusts of
- 11:23that time were completely different
- 11:25from the All Country or S&P 500 index
- 11:27funds we buy with our NISA accounts
- 11:29today. To start with the background, it
- 11:33was, well, something like a belief. I
- 11:38think the underlying premise was a
- 11:40faith that financial professionals knew
- 11:42something that we, the general public,
- 11:44did not. In short, ordinary people felt
- 11:48that even if they didn't really
- 11:49understand things, they could just
- 11:51leave it to these smart individuals.
- 11:54That kind of sentiment was spreading
- 11:55throughout society. It is said that the
- 11:58investment trusts invented during this
- 12:00period had several remarkable
- 12:02advantages. The first was that there
- 12:04were no limits to issuance; the cap on
- 12:06how much could be issued had
- 12:08disappeared. While the stocks and bonds
- 12:11a normal company can issue are tied to
- 12:13tangible assets like factories or
- 12:15operations, the corporate investment
- 12:17trusts of that time defined their
- 12:19business as buying other people's
- 12:20securities, so issuing 100 million
- 12:22dollars in shares automatically created
- 12:25100 million dollars in business. The
- 12:28limit on issuance had been completely
- 12:30detached from reality. Even though
- 12:32there were infinite people wanting to
- 12:34buy stocks, actual existing stocks were
- 12:36limited, but that constraint was
- 12:38removed, and they were able to
- 12:40manufacture paper securities from thin
- 12:42air. You can already smell the bubble,
- 12:44can't you? And what makes this
- 12:47different from the image of investment
- 12:49trusts today is that the value of the
- 12:51trust itself became higher than the
- 12:53total value of the stocks held inside
- 12:55it. Well, when a mutual fund held
- 13:00stocks with a total value of, say, 100,
- 13:03the fund itself was somehow being
- 13:05traded at 150. Where did this 50 come
- 13:09from? You could say it was like a
- 13:12payment for the brains of the geniuses
- 13:14managing the fund. This was justified
- 13:20by the idea mentioned at the start—
- 13:22that those financial pros knew
- 13:24something we didn't, so paying a
- 13:26premium to let them steer the fund was
- 13:28somehow considered acceptable. Looking
- 13:33back, it seems strange for the contents
- 13:35to carry a premium, but it was
- 13:37justified as a fee for the genius of
- 13:39the people running it. And there were
- 13:42people who saw an opportunity in this
- 13:43mechanism. Just by creating one of
- 13:45these mutual fund vehicles, you were,
- 13:47in this diagram's terms, 錬 金 (
- 13:49alchemy-ing) 50 out of thin air. It was
- 13:52alchemy. So, the smart people figured,
- 13:55why not just create as many of these as
- 13:57possible? That brings us to one of the
- 14:00main players in this book: the company
- 14:02known as Goldman Sachs. In December
- 14:041928, they established Goldman Sachs
- 14:06Trading. In July 1929, they launched
- 14:09the Shenandoah Corporation, and it was
- 14:11a huge hit, with subscriptions reaching
- 14:13seven times the offering amount. Then,
- 14:16just 25 days later, they established
- 14:18the Blue Ridge Corporation. The idea
- 14:21was to keep churning them out while
- 14:23they were still selling. So, what was
- 14:25so dangerous about these mutual funds?
- 14:28Ultimately, it was their extreme
- 14:30leverage. They also used preferred
- 14:34stocks and corporate bonds—
- 14:35essentially debt—to raise capital.
- 14:39Because of the leverage, if assets rose
- 14:41by 20%, common stock would jump 40%,
- 14:44but conversely, if assets halved, the
- 14:47common stock's value would drop to zero
- 14:50. As an amplification device, it had
- 14:53the same effect as what we now call a
- 14:55retail investor using margin trading.
- 14:59And what made it even more dangerous
- 15:01was the multi-layered structure that
- 15:02kept adding more and more leverage.
- 15:07Each leveraged product was structured
- 15:10such that the parent company bought a
- 15:12subsidiary, which then bought a
- 15:13sub-subsidiary, creating multiple
- 15:15layers where the leverage of the
- 15:17sub-subsidiary was amplified by the
- 15:19subsidiary, and further amplified by
- 15:21the parent company. So, when the market
- 15:27rose by 20%, a 40%return at the
- 15:30sub-subsidiary level became an 80%
- 15:32return for the subsidiary, and a 160%
- 15:35return for the parent company. That is
- 15:39why there was a rational incentive to
- 15:41create multi-layered companies in a
- 15:43short period of time. However, it was
- 15:45all based on the premise of a rising
- 15:47market. There was a system in place
- 15:49that seemed to completely ignore the
- 15:50fact that losses would be amplified
- 15:52just the same when the market fell.
- 15:54They also used prestigious names for
- 15:56branding purposes. The board of
- 16:00directors of Shenandoah included future
- 16:02Secretary of State John Foster Dulles;
- 16:04when people cannot verify the substance
- 16:07, they judge by who is involved. If
- 16:10high-value, prestigious names were
- 16:12attached, it served as fuel to make
- 16:14people trust those professionals. As
- 16:18for what eventually happened to
- 16:20Shenandoah stock, it opened at $ 30 on
- 16:22the first day and rose as high as $ 36,
- 16:25but by the end of the year it hit $ 8,
- 16:27and ultimately fell to 50 cents. This
- 16:34is the terrifying side of leverage;
- 16:36while the quality common stocks inside
- 16:38didn't disappear, the remaining value
- 16:40went to preferred shareholders, leaving
- 16:42nothing for the common stock, which is
- 16:44a structural issue. That is the scary
- 16:49part about leverage. While gains are
- 16:54certainly amplified, when the market
- 16:56drops, creditors and preferred
- 16:58shareholders take priority, leaving the
- 17:00common stock essentially worthless.
- 17:05Years later at a Senate hearing, it was
- 17:07a very clinical Q&A: Did Goldman Sachs
- 17:10Trading Corporation establish it? Yes,
- 17:12it did. And did you sell the shares to
- 17:14the public? Yes, that is correct. It is
- 17:17said that such long-term stories ended
- 17:19in a perfunctory Q&A session. The
- 17:23book's fifth chapter follows the month
- 17:25of the great crash chronologically, and
- 17:27reading it reveals that rather than
- 17:29dropping all at once in the short term,
- 17:31it gradually declined over the course
- 17:33of the month. It is true that the
- 17:38market hit an all-time high of 381.17
- 17:40on September 3rd, which became the
- 17:42ceiling, but the text notes that market
- 17:45confidence did not collapse all at once
- 17:47. In fact, new shares were issued every
- 17:51day in September, and margin debt
- 17:53increased by 670 million dollars in
- 17:55that month alone. Looking back, it is
- 17:58said that speculative fever actually
- 18:00accelerated for a month and a half even
- 18:02after the peak. However, the crash had
- 18:06already been slowly underway during
- 18:08that time. Once October arrived, that
- 18:11rhythm began to change slightly. Every
- 18:13time the market closed for the weekend,
- 18:15people were overcome with anxiety and
- 18:17sold on Monday. That cycle kept
- 18:19repeating. Then, on October 21st, amid
- 18:22a falling market, the ticker tape
- 18:25started to experience delays. This was
- 18:30largely due to the technical
- 18:32limitations of the time, but as
- 18:33information lagged, people grew even
- 18:36more anxious, imagined the worst, and
- 18:38those who might not have sold otherwise
- 18:40ended up panic-selling due to the delay
- 18:42. This is a point where I felt the
- 18:46environment was quite different back
- 18:48then compared to today. Now, no matter
- 18:50where you are in the world, even in the
- 18:52most remote corner, if you have an
- 18:53internet connection, information is
- 18:55transmitted instantly. And then, the
- 18:57day finally arrived: Thursday, October
- 19:0024th. Trading volume reached 12.89
- 19:02million shares. Stocks were being
- 19:04dumped one after another at prices that
- 19:06drove shareholders to despair. On Wall
- 19:09Street, there has long been a
- 19:11comforting saying that for every seller
- 19:13there is a buyer, but the author
- 19:15cynically calls this the greatest
- 19:17mystery. There are, indeed, buyers. The
- 19:20fact that a trade is executed means
- 19:22there is a buyer. However, they are not
- 19:24there at the price you want. Well, I
- 19:26think this is a more accurate way to
- 19:28put it. And during the period when the
- 19:31crash was ongoing, newspapers kept
- 19:33repeating the same set of phrases. Like
- 19:36, the fundamentals are sound, the worst
- 19:38is already behind us, or, organized
- 19:40buying is about to step in. And so, we
- 19:44don't know who. So, although these
- 19:47words of comfort were printed in the
- 19:49papers, the market would just continue
- 19:51to fall again the following week. Then
- 19:54came Tuesday, October 29th, with a
- 19:56volume of 16.41 million shares;
- 19:58collateral stocks from those unable to
- 20:00meet margin calls were mercilessly
- 20:03dumped, and the amplification devices
- 20:05linked in series—margin trading,
- 20:07leveraged investment trusts, and
- 20:09individuals buying on credit—all
- 20:11triggered in a downward spiral. After
- 20:14that, it took about 25 years for the
- 20:16Dow Jones to recover to its 1929 high.
- 20:19These daily, minute-by-minute movements
- 20:22are recounted in Chapter 5. And Chapter
- 20:259 of this book serves as a summary of
- 20:27why it all led to such a Great
- 20:29Depression. While the stock market
- 20:34crash led to the Great Depression,
- 20:36these two are often said to be separate
- 20:38phenomena. The stock market crash was
- 20:42merely the trigger. What actually
- 20:45loaded the gun for the ensuing Great
- 20:47Depression were the five economic
- 20:49vulnerabilities that existed in America
- 20:51at the time. The first is the problem
- 20:53of income distribution. The top 5%of
- 20:55the population held about one-third of
- 20:58personal income. Wealthy spending—
- 21:00that is, investments and luxury goods
- 21:02—fluctuated far more than workers '
- 21:05demand and disappeared immediately upon
- 21:07the crash. The second is corporate
- 21:09structure. The leverage of holding
- 21:11companies and investment trusts spun in
- 21:13reverse after the crash, halting
- 21:15dividends and capital investment, which
- 21:17deepened the deflation. It seems that
- 21:19leverage, represented by investment
- 21:21trusts, was indeed one of the reasons
- 21:23the depression was prolonged. The third
- 21:26is the banking system. It appears the
- 21:28cause was not so much that the bankers
- 21:30of the era were particularly
- 21:31incompetent, but rather that there were
- 21:33simply too many fragile banks. It was a
- 21:35structure where the collapse of one
- 21:37bank would trigger a bank run,
- 21:38spreading to the next. Fourth is the
- 21:40balance of payments. As the world's
- 21:42largest creditor nation maintained high
- 21:44tariffs, and because we were on the
- 21:46gold standard then, debtor nations were
- 21:48forced to pay in gold or default. Fifth
- 21:51is the poverty of economic knowledge.
- 21:54Bound by the obsession of a balanced
- 21:56budget, failing to cut taxes or
- 21:58increase spending, and clinging to the
- 22:00gold standard—these various economic
- 22:02vulnerabilities turned the crash into a
- 22:04depression, and it is said that
- 22:06investment trusts were indeed one of
- 22:08the mechanisms that prolonged it.
- 22:11Another concept introduced in the book
- 22:14is "bezzle," where embezzlement and
- 22:16fraud go undetected during boom times
- 22:18and quietly accumulate within the
- 22:20economy. Then, when the bubble bursts,
- 22:22it is suddenly exposed all at once. I
- 22:24believe this has happened many times
- 22:26throughout history when bubbles have
- 22:27burst. It’s like things being
- 22:29uncovered one after another, like
- 22:30pulling potatoes on a vine. So, I would
- 22:32like to move on to the final summary of
- 22:34what I read in this book. The list of
- 22:36vulnerabilities presented by Galbraith
- 22:38in Chapter 9 can be used as a checklist
- 22:40in the modern era. Deposit insurance
- 22:43was established for banks. I believe we
- 22:45have learned from history regarding
- 22:47fiscal and monetary policy, at least
- 22:49more so than in 1929. However, we still
- 22:51don't know if they are right every time
- 22:53. Even during bubbles, it is often said
- 22:55that monetary policy was the opposite
- 22:57of what it should have been.
- 22:58Regulations have been placed on
- 23:00corporate structures. So, if someone
- 23:02says the structure is different now
- 23:04compared to 100 years ago, they are
- 23:06certainly right. Therefore, I want to
- 23:08emphasize that I do not intend to
- 23:10incite fear with this video. But what
- 23:14Galbraith wanted to convey most—and
- 23:16this is also the conclusion from my
- 23:18previous video—is that humans are
- 23:20ultimately the primary cause of bubbles
- 23:22. Human psychology and behavioral
- 23:27patterns repeat themselves; while
- 23:29market mechanisms have changed and
- 23:31information transmission has evolved
- 23:33through the internet, human nature
- 23:35remains unchanged. Galbraith never
- 23:41makes any specific date predictions
- 23:43about when a market crash will occur.
- 23:46He avoids making such predictions or
- 23:48forecasts because he knows that people
- 23:50only remember the times when a
- 23:51prediction happened to be correct in
- 23:53hindsight. Instead, he simply describes
- 23:56the repetitive behavioral patterns of
- 23:58human beings, as mentioned earlier.
- 24:01People rush toward what is getting
- 24:03attention, and because they rush in,
- 24:05even more new people gather. This "
- 24:06locust-like" nature of humans, as he
- 24:09calls it, remains unchanged from the
- 24:11past to the present. As for how to
- 24:14handle bubbles or bull markets, it
- 24:16ultimately comes back to what I said in
- 24:18the last video: nobody can guess when
- 24:20or where the top will be. So, instead
- 24:24of trying to time the market, you
- 24:26should set up a system to ensure you
- 24:28don't get forced out. I believe people
- 24:30who get wiped out by margin calls
- 24:31during short-term sharp drops are
- 24:33essentially just gamblers. You should
- 24:35structure your investments so that even
- 24:36if a bubble pops, you won't be forced
- 24:38to exit the market. Remember the Radio
- 24:42Corporation chart; the biggest returns
- 24:44weren't made when prices were swinging
- 24:46wildly with high volatility every day,
- 24:48but during the boring times before that
- 24:50when things were rising quietly. When
- 24:54things are moving explosively, you
- 24:56don't actually see the largest returns.
- 24:59Of course, some people might have
- 25:01succeeded with short-term trades back
- 25:03then, but I suspect more people ended
- 25:05up losing. The times when things were
- 25:09rising quietly were when more people
- 25:11were building their wealth. I felt that
- 25:13those market movements still offer
- 25:15lessons we can learn from, even if they
- 25:17happened 100 years ago. So today, we
- 25:19took a look at John Galbraith’s "The
- 25:22Great Crash 1929." The first edition
- 25:24was published in 1955, and it has been
- 25:26reprinted for over 40 years, while the
- 25:29digital version I read was released in
- 25:312022, which is quite recent. The fact
- 25:33that they went to the trouble of
- 25:35creating a new digital version says a
- 25:36lot. I think by reading this book,
- 25:39you'll be able to feel why books about
- 25:41events from 100 years ago are still
- 25:43being revised and released in new
- 25:45digital editions today. Well, in terms
- 25:49of readability and clarity, I think the
- 25:51story of the bubble I introduced in my
- 25:54previous video is a bit easier to read
- 25:56and understand. Also, I read the Kindle
- 26:01version, but since there are various
- 26:03data formats, this book happens to be
- 26:06the type of digital file where you
- 26:07can't highlight specific sentences. I
- 26:13found that to be a bit inconvenient, so
- 26:15if you're planning on buying the
- 26:17digital version, please be aware of
- 26:18that. Some people might prefer the
- 26:21paper version instead, so I wanted to
- 26:23make sure to mention that at the end.
- 26:25Alright, that brings today's video to a
- 26:27close. If you enjoyed this video, I'd
- 26:28appreciate it if you could support me
- 26:30by hitting the like button, leaving a
- 26:31comment, and subscribing to the channel
- 26:33. Thank you for listening.
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