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【名著】なぜ株価暴落は世界恐慌になったのか?投資信託とレバレッジが増幅した1929年 — Transcript

by 聞いてわかる投資本チャンネル · 4,206 words · 664 segments · language en · Watch on YouTube

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  1. 0:00There is a book that was released last
  2. 0:02year and remains a bestseller overseas.
  3. 0:04It’s about the great crash 96 years
  4. 0:07ago, titled "The Great Crash 1929" by
  5. 0:09Ross M. Miller, but a Japanese version
  6. 0:12hasn't been released yet. When reading
  7. 0:17overseas reviews, both positive and
  8. 0:19critical, a certain other book is
  9. 0:21frequently cited. That book is "The
  10. 0:24Great Crash, 1929" by John Kenneth
  11. 0:27Galbraith. Written 70 years ago, it is
  12. 0:29a classic masterpiece still considered
  13. 0:32the go-to source for understanding 1929
  14. 0:34. I previously featured a book by the
  15. 0:36same author on this channel called "A
  16. 0:38Short History of Financial Euphoria,"
  17. 0:40and this is that very same author.
  18. 0:42Before reading the latest buzzworthy
  19. 0:44book in Japanese, I’d like to
  20. 0:46introduce this classic today to ensure
  21. 0:48we have a solid foundation. Please be
  22. 0:50sure to watch until the end. First,
  23. 0:52there is a famous story surrounding
  24. 0:54this book. It is the story that the
  25. 0:56bearer of warnings is despised. In 1955
  26. 0:58, Galbraith himself was testifying
  27. 1:01before Congress about the crash of 1929
  28. 1:04. Right in the middle of that testimony
  29. 1:06, stock prices plummeted. Just by
  30. 1:07explaining the market crash, he
  31. 1:09supposedly became an enemy to investors
  32. 1:11nationwide. As a result, what happened
  33. 1:13was that he was flooded with hate mail
  34. 1:15from investors all over the country.
  35. 1:17Some prayed that he would get sick and
  36. 1:19die young. Letters saying exactly that
  37. 1:21were delivered to him. Later, when he
  38. 1:23broke his leg while skiing, he even
  39. 1:25received letters of joy claiming that
  40. 1:27their prayers had been answered. To
  41. 1:29make matters worse, a senator even
  42. 1:31accused him of being a communist.
  43. 1:33Actually, this story about the skiing
  44. 1:35injury and the letters was also in "A
  45. 1:36Short History of Financial Euphoria"
  46. 1:38that I introduced previously, so I
  47. 1:40realized this is one of the author's
  48. 1:42signature anecdotes. As I mentioned in
  49. 1:44the last video, despite him only
  50. 1:45providing an explanation, he was
  51. 1:47treated as if he were the culprit
  52. 1:49behind the bubble bursting. Within this
  53. 1:52book, there is a figure who appears in
  54. 1:54a similar situation in real-time during
  55. 1:571929. It was when economist Roger
  56. 1:59Babson stated that a great crash was
  57. 2:01coming sooner or later, and the market
  58. 2:03plunged. In response to his statement,
  59. 2:06Wall Street fought back in three ways.
  60. 2:09First, you are not a scholar from a
  61. 2:11top-tier university. Attacks
  62. 2:13questioning one's authority or
  63. 2:15credentials. Second, your basis for
  64. 2:17predicting a crash is weak. Attacks
  65. 2:19against one's methodology, claiming
  66. 2:21you're just drawing suspicious lines on
  67. 2:23a chart to predict a crash. Third,
  68. 2:25attacks against one's track record,
  69. 2:27saying you've cried wolf about crashes
  70. 2:30many times in the past and have been
  71. 2:32wrong every single time. I felt that
  72. 2:37the way people who speak out during a
  73. 2:39bubble are attacked is quite similar to
  74. 2:41how people are bashed on social media
  75. 2:42today. It’s common to see criticism
  76. 2:47that sounds smart but misses the mark,
  77. 2:49isn’t it? Well, that’s just how it
  78. 2:51was 100 years ago and how it is today.
  79. 2:53Chapter 4 of this book states that even
  80. 2:55if you reach the right conclusion
  81. 2:56through the wrong reasoning, you won't
  82. 2:58be appreciated by those around you. It
  83. 3:00is said that it is far better to use a
  84. 3:02respectable method and be wrong. This
  85. 3:04is the irony the author is pointing out
  86. 3:06. Those who pour cold water on a bull
  87. 3:09market are hated in every era. The fact
  88. 3:13that the author himself was criticized
  89. 3:1525 years after 1929 only served to
  90. 3:17prove that rule once again. Next, let's
  91. 3:21look at the history of American bubbles
  92. 3:23mentioned early in the book. The book
  93. 3:25provides a detailed explanation of the
  94. 3:27history of bubbles in America up to
  95. 3:29that time. Continental currency used to
  96. 3:33fund the Revolutionary War went to zero
  97. 3:36, followed by land speculation after
  98. 3:39the War of 1812, the panic of 1837, the
  99. 3:42boom of the 1850s, and the railroad
  100. 3:44bubble collapse in 1873. There was also
  101. 3:48a financial crisis in 1907. And then
  102. 3:51there's the main subject, the Great
  103. 3:53Depression of 1929; just as Galbraith
  104. 3:55said in "A Short History of Financial
  105. 3:57Euphoria," the law that financial
  106. 4:00memory fades in about 20 years meant
  107. 4:02that history repeated itself as
  108. 4:04generations changed. This book acts as
  109. 4:07an autopsy of 1929, one of those
  110. 4:10specific cycles. The prologue to the
  111. 4:14story of 1929 began with the Florida
  112. 4:16land bubble. Let's start by looking at
  113. 4:20that. The main story doesn't begin with
  114. 4:22the stock market or investment trust
  115. 4:24bubble of '29, but with land. Back then
  116. 4:28, the fact of Florida’s mild climate
  117. 4:30was layered with a narrative that it
  118. 4:32would become a tourist destination like
  119. 4:34the American Riviera, fueling
  120. 4:36speculation. What I found truly
  121. 4:40terrifying in this part is the
  122. 4:41structure of the human mind that wants
  123. 4:43to believe. First of all, everyone
  124. 4:46wants to make money, right? And then,
  125. 4:49some interesting-sounding story comes
  126. 4:51along. It stated that, instead of
  127. 4:53approaching this with skepticism,
  128. 4:55people were actually looking for
  129. 4:57reasons to believe it. They wanted
  130. 5:00plausible reasons to hope that this "
  131. 5:02get-rich-quick" scheme was real.
  132. 5:05Because the desire to profit and the
  133. 5:08desire to believe come first, they then
  134. 5:10cobble together seemingly logical
  135. 5:12justifications after the fact. This
  136. 5:16line of thinking made me wonder if this
  137. 5:18is exactly how people prone to being
  138. 5:19scammed think. As for what it was
  139. 5:26actually like: land claimed to be
  140. 5:28coastal was 20km away from the shore,
  141. 5:30purchases were made with 10x leverage
  142. 5:33since only a 10%down payment was
  143. 5:35required, buyers had no intention of
  144. 5:37living there and were only interested
  145. 5:39in flipping the property, and it is
  146. 5:41even said that famous con artists
  147. 5:43joined the fray. Even when 400 people
  148. 5:50died in the 1926 hurricane, the local
  149. 5:53reaction was more concerned about
  150. 5:55Florida's image than the victims. They
  151. 5:58refused to acknowledge that the bubble
  152. 6:00had burst. It is said that bank
  153. 6:02clearings in Miami dropped by about 90%
  154. 6:05in just a few years from a peak of over
  155. 6:07$ 1 billion. And so, one story came to
  156. 6:11an end, but three years later, the same
  157. 6:13narrative would be repeated on a much
  158. 6:16larger scale: across the entire United
  159. 6:18States. Next, let's look at what served
  160. 6:22as the gasoline and what acted as the
  161. 6:24spark for this bubble. In these types
  162. 6:27of financial bubbles, central banks
  163. 6:29like the Fed are often blamed as the
  164. 6:31culprits. Around 1925, the New York Fed
  165. 6:34lowered the discount rate from 4%to 3.5
  166. 6:37%and bought massive amounts of
  167. 6:39government bonds. The overflowing
  168. 6:41capital flooded into the stock market.
  169. 6:44FRB Governor Miller himself later
  170. 6:46recalled it as the boldest and greatest
  171. 6:48mistake in the history of the Federal
  172. 6:50Reserve. However, the author Galbraith
  173. 6:53himself keeps some distance from this
  174. 6:55theory. Well, this talk of finding
  175. 7:00someone to blame for the bubble burst
  176. 7:02—as those who watched the previous
  177. 7:04bubble story will understand—is the
  178. 7:06theory that people feel reassured when
  179. 7:08they have an easy villain like the Fed.
  180. 7:12It’s easy to understand when you just
  181. 7:14conclude that it was the Fed's fault.
  182. 7:16It makes things simpler, doesn't it?
  183. 7:19And it also provides an excuse that the
  184. 7:21public and investors who jumped on the
  185. 7:23bubble weren't actually to blame.
  186. 7:25Furthermore, one could claim it was
  187. 7:27because the situation overseas was bad.
  188. 7:30Well, shifting the blame onto those
  189. 7:32kinds of things is a common story in
  190. 7:34bubbles. But here, Galbraith argues
  191. 7:38that while the Fed's monetary easing
  192. 7:40might have served as gasoline. The
  193. 7:43spark, he suggests, was the human
  194. 7:45desire to believe in these
  195. 7:47get-rich-quick schemes. Ultimately,
  196. 7:50Galbraith's view is that the biggest
  197. 7:52cause wasn't one single villain, but
  198. 7:54the fact that everyone jumped on the
  199. 7:56bandwagon. And this is another story
  200. 8:00that left a deep impression on me about
  201. 8:02what happened to a certain high-tech
  202. 8:04stock of that time. Radio Corporation
  203. 8:08of America was one of the leading
  204. 8:10stocks in the stock market back then. I
  205. 8:12mean, it was about 100 years ago, after
  206. 8:14all. When you think about it, radio was
  207. 8:16the cutting-edge technology stock of
  208. 8:18that era. The book mainly focuses on
  209. 8:21around 1928 and 1929, when the stock
  210. 8:24price was at its highest. It moved by
  211. 8:27dozens of dollars a day, and reading it
  212. 8:30, you can really feel that it was a
  213. 8:32stock with extremely high daily
  214. 8:33volatility. It would sometimes plummet
  215. 8:37due to announcements of investigations,
  216. 8:39but it was a stock that would move
  217. 8:41explosively, often recovering
  218. 8:42everything in just a few days. But when
  219. 8:46you look closely at those times when it
  220. 8:48moved so much, it actually hadn't gone
  221. 8:50up that much. Though, it certainly had
  222. 8:52been rising. So, when were the big
  223. 8:54returns actually made? In the end, it
  224. 8:58was way before the explosive price
  225. 9:00swings—about seven or eight years
  226. 9:02prior—that they were quietly and
  227. 9:04steadily generating significant returns
  228. 9:06. When the number of participants
  229. 9:09surged and the price action became
  230. 9:11volatile, the main phase of the rally
  231. 9:13was likely already over. That is
  232. 9:16certainly how it looks. It peaked in
  233. 9:20September '29 and plummeted by 98%by
  234. 9:241932. But what’s interesting here is
  235. 9:28that while the stock price itself
  236. 9:29collapsed......the companies themselves
  237. 9:31didn't necessarily fail. Radio was the
  238. 9:35cutting-edge high-tech of that era, and
  239. 9:37later they commercialized television,
  240. 9:39so the technology itself ultimately
  241. 9:41became a winner of the age. Even so,
  242. 9:45from the perspective of the stock price
  243. 9:47, it took about 35 years for someone
  244. 9:49who bought at the peak to break even.
  245. 9:53So, if you ask whether radio changed
  246. 9:55people's lives 100 years ago, it
  247. 9:57certainly did. It brought innovation to
  248. 10:00the world. Did the companies become
  249. 10:03winners? Well, they actually did. The
  250. 10:05companies continued to grow
  251. 10:07significantly even after that. But as
  252. 10:11for the shareholders, those who bought
  253. 10:13near the peak had to wait 35 years just
  254. 10:15to recover their original investment.
  255. 10:20In other words, the survival of a
  256. 10:22company or technology and its actual
  257. 10:24innovation in the world is a completely
  258. 10:26different story from whether the
  259. 10:28investor who bought the stock wins.
  260. 10:32This was one example that left a very
  261. 10:34strong impression on me. If we replace
  262. 10:36this with AI, there's a possibility
  263. 10:38that something similar could happen,
  264. 10:40right? The companies themselves will
  265. 10:42continue to grow. The technology will
  266. 10:44go on to change the future world.
  267. 10:47However, investors who jumped in
  268. 10:49without any regard for price will be
  269. 10:50burned by the bubble bursting. Well,
  270. 10:55there are already quite a few investors
  271. 10:57who are being hurt in exactly that way.
  272. 11:01While it hasn't reached the scale of
  273. 11:031929, I believe that this type of
  274. 11:05dynamic is still happening to some
  275. 11:08extent even today. Next, let's talk
  276. 11:12about investment trusts, the engine
  277. 11:14that inflated the bubble; I think this
  278. 11:17is a major topic of this book. I
  279. 11:21realized that the investment trusts of
  280. 11:23that time were completely different
  281. 11:25from the All Country or S&P 500 index
  282. 11:27funds we buy with our NISA accounts
  283. 11:29today. To start with the background, it
  284. 11:33was, well, something like a belief. I
  285. 11:38think the underlying premise was a
  286. 11:40faith that financial professionals knew
  287. 11:42something that we, the general public,
  288. 11:44did not. In short, ordinary people felt
  289. 11:48that even if they didn't really
  290. 11:49understand things, they could just
  291. 11:51leave it to these smart individuals.
  292. 11:54That kind of sentiment was spreading
  293. 11:55throughout society. It is said that the
  294. 11:58investment trusts invented during this
  295. 12:00period had several remarkable
  296. 12:02advantages. The first was that there
  297. 12:04were no limits to issuance; the cap on
  298. 12:06how much could be issued had
  299. 12:08disappeared. While the stocks and bonds
  300. 12:11a normal company can issue are tied to
  301. 12:13tangible assets like factories or
  302. 12:15operations, the corporate investment
  303. 12:17trusts of that time defined their
  304. 12:19business as buying other people's
  305. 12:20securities, so issuing 100 million
  306. 12:22dollars in shares automatically created
  307. 12:25100 million dollars in business. The
  308. 12:28limit on issuance had been completely
  309. 12:30detached from reality. Even though
  310. 12:32there were infinite people wanting to
  311. 12:34buy stocks, actual existing stocks were
  312. 12:36limited, but that constraint was
  313. 12:38removed, and they were able to
  314. 12:40manufacture paper securities from thin
  315. 12:42air. You can already smell the bubble,
  316. 12:44can't you? And what makes this
  317. 12:47different from the image of investment
  318. 12:49trusts today is that the value of the
  319. 12:51trust itself became higher than the
  320. 12:53total value of the stocks held inside
  321. 12:55it. Well, when a mutual fund held
  322. 13:00stocks with a total value of, say, 100,
  323. 13:03the fund itself was somehow being
  324. 13:05traded at 150. Where did this 50 come
  325. 13:09from? You could say it was like a
  326. 13:12payment for the brains of the geniuses
  327. 13:14managing the fund. This was justified
  328. 13:20by the idea mentioned at the start—
  329. 13:22that those financial pros knew
  330. 13:24something we didn't, so paying a
  331. 13:26premium to let them steer the fund was
  332. 13:28somehow considered acceptable. Looking
  333. 13:33back, it seems strange for the contents
  334. 13:35to carry a premium, but it was
  335. 13:37justified as a fee for the genius of
  336. 13:39the people running it. And there were
  337. 13:42people who saw an opportunity in this
  338. 13:43mechanism. Just by creating one of
  339. 13:45these mutual fund vehicles, you were,
  340. 13:47in this diagram's terms, 錬 金 (
  341. 13:49alchemy-ing) 50 out of thin air. It was
  342. 13:52alchemy. So, the smart people figured,
  343. 13:55why not just create as many of these as
  344. 13:57possible? That brings us to one of the
  345. 14:00main players in this book: the company
  346. 14:02known as Goldman Sachs. In December
  347. 14:041928, they established Goldman Sachs
  348. 14:06Trading. In July 1929, they launched
  349. 14:09the Shenandoah Corporation, and it was
  350. 14:11a huge hit, with subscriptions reaching
  351. 14:13seven times the offering amount. Then,
  352. 14:16just 25 days later, they established
  353. 14:18the Blue Ridge Corporation. The idea
  354. 14:21was to keep churning them out while
  355. 14:23they were still selling. So, what was
  356. 14:25so dangerous about these mutual funds?
  357. 14:28Ultimately, it was their extreme
  358. 14:30leverage. They also used preferred
  359. 14:34stocks and corporate bonds—
  360. 14:35essentially debt—to raise capital.
  361. 14:39Because of the leverage, if assets rose
  362. 14:41by 20%, common stock would jump 40%,
  363. 14:44but conversely, if assets halved, the
  364. 14:47common stock's value would drop to zero
  365. 14:50. As an amplification device, it had
  366. 14:53the same effect as what we now call a
  367. 14:55retail investor using margin trading.
  368. 14:59And what made it even more dangerous
  369. 15:01was the multi-layered structure that
  370. 15:02kept adding more and more leverage.
  371. 15:07Each leveraged product was structured
  372. 15:10such that the parent company bought a
  373. 15:12subsidiary, which then bought a
  374. 15:13sub-subsidiary, creating multiple
  375. 15:15layers where the leverage of the
  376. 15:17sub-subsidiary was amplified by the
  377. 15:19subsidiary, and further amplified by
  378. 15:21the parent company. So, when the market
  379. 15:27rose by 20%, a 40%return at the
  380. 15:30sub-subsidiary level became an 80%
  381. 15:32return for the subsidiary, and a 160%
  382. 15:35return for the parent company. That is
  383. 15:39why there was a rational incentive to
  384. 15:41create multi-layered companies in a
  385. 15:43short period of time. However, it was
  386. 15:45all based on the premise of a rising
  387. 15:47market. There was a system in place
  388. 15:49that seemed to completely ignore the
  389. 15:50fact that losses would be amplified
  390. 15:52just the same when the market fell.
  391. 15:54They also used prestigious names for
  392. 15:56branding purposes. The board of
  393. 16:00directors of Shenandoah included future
  394. 16:02Secretary of State John Foster Dulles;
  395. 16:04when people cannot verify the substance
  396. 16:07, they judge by who is involved. If
  397. 16:10high-value, prestigious names were
  398. 16:12attached, it served as fuel to make
  399. 16:14people trust those professionals. As
  400. 16:18for what eventually happened to
  401. 16:20Shenandoah stock, it opened at $ 30 on
  402. 16:22the first day and rose as high as $ 36,
  403. 16:25but by the end of the year it hit $ 8,
  404. 16:27and ultimately fell to 50 cents. This
  405. 16:34is the terrifying side of leverage;
  406. 16:36while the quality common stocks inside
  407. 16:38didn't disappear, the remaining value
  408. 16:40went to preferred shareholders, leaving
  409. 16:42nothing for the common stock, which is
  410. 16:44a structural issue. That is the scary
  411. 16:49part about leverage. While gains are
  412. 16:54certainly amplified, when the market
  413. 16:56drops, creditors and preferred
  414. 16:58shareholders take priority, leaving the
  415. 17:00common stock essentially worthless.
  416. 17:05Years later at a Senate hearing, it was
  417. 17:07a very clinical Q&A: Did Goldman Sachs
  418. 17:10Trading Corporation establish it? Yes,
  419. 17:12it did. And did you sell the shares to
  420. 17:14the public? Yes, that is correct. It is
  421. 17:17said that such long-term stories ended
  422. 17:19in a perfunctory Q&A session. The
  423. 17:23book's fifth chapter follows the month
  424. 17:25of the great crash chronologically, and
  425. 17:27reading it reveals that rather than
  426. 17:29dropping all at once in the short term,
  427. 17:31it gradually declined over the course
  428. 17:33of the month. It is true that the
  429. 17:38market hit an all-time high of 381.17
  430. 17:40on September 3rd, which became the
  431. 17:42ceiling, but the text notes that market
  432. 17:45confidence did not collapse all at once
  433. 17:47. In fact, new shares were issued every
  434. 17:51day in September, and margin debt
  435. 17:53increased by 670 million dollars in
  436. 17:55that month alone. Looking back, it is
  437. 17:58said that speculative fever actually
  438. 18:00accelerated for a month and a half even
  439. 18:02after the peak. However, the crash had
  440. 18:06already been slowly underway during
  441. 18:08that time. Once October arrived, that
  442. 18:11rhythm began to change slightly. Every
  443. 18:13time the market closed for the weekend,
  444. 18:15people were overcome with anxiety and
  445. 18:17sold on Monday. That cycle kept
  446. 18:19repeating. Then, on October 21st, amid
  447. 18:22a falling market, the ticker tape
  448. 18:25started to experience delays. This was
  449. 18:30largely due to the technical
  450. 18:32limitations of the time, but as
  451. 18:33information lagged, people grew even
  452. 18:36more anxious, imagined the worst, and
  453. 18:38those who might not have sold otherwise
  454. 18:40ended up panic-selling due to the delay
  455. 18:42. This is a point where I felt the
  456. 18:46environment was quite different back
  457. 18:48then compared to today. Now, no matter
  458. 18:50where you are in the world, even in the
  459. 18:52most remote corner, if you have an
  460. 18:53internet connection, information is
  461. 18:55transmitted instantly. And then, the
  462. 18:57day finally arrived: Thursday, October
  463. 19:0024th. Trading volume reached 12.89
  464. 19:02million shares. Stocks were being
  465. 19:04dumped one after another at prices that
  466. 19:06drove shareholders to despair. On Wall
  467. 19:09Street, there has long been a
  468. 19:11comforting saying that for every seller
  469. 19:13there is a buyer, but the author
  470. 19:15cynically calls this the greatest
  471. 19:17mystery. There are, indeed, buyers. The
  472. 19:20fact that a trade is executed means
  473. 19:22there is a buyer. However, they are not
  474. 19:24there at the price you want. Well, I
  475. 19:26think this is a more accurate way to
  476. 19:28put it. And during the period when the
  477. 19:31crash was ongoing, newspapers kept
  478. 19:33repeating the same set of phrases. Like
  479. 19:36, the fundamentals are sound, the worst
  480. 19:38is already behind us, or, organized
  481. 19:40buying is about to step in. And so, we
  482. 19:44don't know who. So, although these
  483. 19:47words of comfort were printed in the
  484. 19:49papers, the market would just continue
  485. 19:51to fall again the following week. Then
  486. 19:54came Tuesday, October 29th, with a
  487. 19:56volume of 16.41 million shares;
  488. 19:58collateral stocks from those unable to
  489. 20:00meet margin calls were mercilessly
  490. 20:03dumped, and the amplification devices
  491. 20:05linked in series—margin trading,
  492. 20:07leveraged investment trusts, and
  493. 20:09individuals buying on credit—all
  494. 20:11triggered in a downward spiral. After
  495. 20:14that, it took about 25 years for the
  496. 20:16Dow Jones to recover to its 1929 high.
  497. 20:19These daily, minute-by-minute movements
  498. 20:22are recounted in Chapter 5. And Chapter
  499. 20:259 of this book serves as a summary of
  500. 20:27why it all led to such a Great
  501. 20:29Depression. While the stock market
  502. 20:34crash led to the Great Depression,
  503. 20:36these two are often said to be separate
  504. 20:38phenomena. The stock market crash was
  505. 20:42merely the trigger. What actually
  506. 20:45loaded the gun for the ensuing Great
  507. 20:47Depression were the five economic
  508. 20:49vulnerabilities that existed in America
  509. 20:51at the time. The first is the problem
  510. 20:53of income distribution. The top 5%of
  511. 20:55the population held about one-third of
  512. 20:58personal income. Wealthy spending—
  513. 21:00that is, investments and luxury goods
  514. 21:02—fluctuated far more than workers '
  515. 21:05demand and disappeared immediately upon
  516. 21:07the crash. The second is corporate
  517. 21:09structure. The leverage of holding
  518. 21:11companies and investment trusts spun in
  519. 21:13reverse after the crash, halting
  520. 21:15dividends and capital investment, which
  521. 21:17deepened the deflation. It seems that
  522. 21:19leverage, represented by investment
  523. 21:21trusts, was indeed one of the reasons
  524. 21:23the depression was prolonged. The third
  525. 21:26is the banking system. It appears the
  526. 21:28cause was not so much that the bankers
  527. 21:30of the era were particularly
  528. 21:31incompetent, but rather that there were
  529. 21:33simply too many fragile banks. It was a
  530. 21:35structure where the collapse of one
  531. 21:37bank would trigger a bank run,
  532. 21:38spreading to the next. Fourth is the
  533. 21:40balance of payments. As the world's
  534. 21:42largest creditor nation maintained high
  535. 21:44tariffs, and because we were on the
  536. 21:46gold standard then, debtor nations were
  537. 21:48forced to pay in gold or default. Fifth
  538. 21:51is the poverty of economic knowledge.
  539. 21:54Bound by the obsession of a balanced
  540. 21:56budget, failing to cut taxes or
  541. 21:58increase spending, and clinging to the
  542. 22:00gold standard—these various economic
  543. 22:02vulnerabilities turned the crash into a
  544. 22:04depression, and it is said that
  545. 22:06investment trusts were indeed one of
  546. 22:08the mechanisms that prolonged it.
  547. 22:11Another concept introduced in the book
  548. 22:14is "bezzle," where embezzlement and
  549. 22:16fraud go undetected during boom times
  550. 22:18and quietly accumulate within the
  551. 22:20economy. Then, when the bubble bursts,
  552. 22:22it is suddenly exposed all at once. I
  553. 22:24believe this has happened many times
  554. 22:26throughout history when bubbles have
  555. 22:27burst. It’s like things being
  556. 22:29uncovered one after another, like
  557. 22:30pulling potatoes on a vine. So, I would
  558. 22:32like to move on to the final summary of
  559. 22:34what I read in this book. The list of
  560. 22:36vulnerabilities presented by Galbraith
  561. 22:38in Chapter 9 can be used as a checklist
  562. 22:40in the modern era. Deposit insurance
  563. 22:43was established for banks. I believe we
  564. 22:45have learned from history regarding
  565. 22:47fiscal and monetary policy, at least
  566. 22:49more so than in 1929. However, we still
  567. 22:51don't know if they are right every time
  568. 22:53. Even during bubbles, it is often said
  569. 22:55that monetary policy was the opposite
  570. 22:57of what it should have been.
  571. 22:58Regulations have been placed on
  572. 23:00corporate structures. So, if someone
  573. 23:02says the structure is different now
  574. 23:04compared to 100 years ago, they are
  575. 23:06certainly right. Therefore, I want to
  576. 23:08emphasize that I do not intend to
  577. 23:10incite fear with this video. But what
  578. 23:14Galbraith wanted to convey most—and
  579. 23:16this is also the conclusion from my
  580. 23:18previous video—is that humans are
  581. 23:20ultimately the primary cause of bubbles
  582. 23:22. Human psychology and behavioral
  583. 23:27patterns repeat themselves; while
  584. 23:29market mechanisms have changed and
  585. 23:31information transmission has evolved
  586. 23:33through the internet, human nature
  587. 23:35remains unchanged. Galbraith never
  588. 23:41makes any specific date predictions
  589. 23:43about when a market crash will occur.
  590. 23:46He avoids making such predictions or
  591. 23:48forecasts because he knows that people
  592. 23:50only remember the times when a
  593. 23:51prediction happened to be correct in
  594. 23:53hindsight. Instead, he simply describes
  595. 23:56the repetitive behavioral patterns of
  596. 23:58human beings, as mentioned earlier.
  597. 24:01People rush toward what is getting
  598. 24:03attention, and because they rush in,
  599. 24:05even more new people gather. This "
  600. 24:06locust-like" nature of humans, as he
  601. 24:09calls it, remains unchanged from the
  602. 24:11past to the present. As for how to
  603. 24:14handle bubbles or bull markets, it
  604. 24:16ultimately comes back to what I said in
  605. 24:18the last video: nobody can guess when
  606. 24:20or where the top will be. So, instead
  607. 24:24of trying to time the market, you
  608. 24:26should set up a system to ensure you
  609. 24:28don't get forced out. I believe people
  610. 24:30who get wiped out by margin calls
  611. 24:31during short-term sharp drops are
  612. 24:33essentially just gamblers. You should
  613. 24:35structure your investments so that even
  614. 24:36if a bubble pops, you won't be forced
  615. 24:38to exit the market. Remember the Radio
  616. 24:42Corporation chart; the biggest returns
  617. 24:44weren't made when prices were swinging
  618. 24:46wildly with high volatility every day,
  619. 24:48but during the boring times before that
  620. 24:50when things were rising quietly. When
  621. 24:54things are moving explosively, you
  622. 24:56don't actually see the largest returns.
  623. 24:59Of course, some people might have
  624. 25:01succeeded with short-term trades back
  625. 25:03then, but I suspect more people ended
  626. 25:05up losing. The times when things were
  627. 25:09rising quietly were when more people
  628. 25:11were building their wealth. I felt that
  629. 25:13those market movements still offer
  630. 25:15lessons we can learn from, even if they
  631. 25:17happened 100 years ago. So today, we
  632. 25:19took a look at John Galbraith’s "The
  633. 25:22Great Crash 1929." The first edition
  634. 25:24was published in 1955, and it has been
  635. 25:26reprinted for over 40 years, while the
  636. 25:29digital version I read was released in
  637. 25:312022, which is quite recent. The fact
  638. 25:33that they went to the trouble of
  639. 25:35creating a new digital version says a
  640. 25:36lot. I think by reading this book,
  641. 25:39you'll be able to feel why books about
  642. 25:41events from 100 years ago are still
  643. 25:43being revised and released in new
  644. 25:45digital editions today. Well, in terms
  645. 25:49of readability and clarity, I think the
  646. 25:51story of the bubble I introduced in my
  647. 25:54previous video is a bit easier to read
  648. 25:56and understand. Also, I read the Kindle
  649. 26:01version, but since there are various
  650. 26:03data formats, this book happens to be
  651. 26:06the type of digital file where you
  652. 26:07can't highlight specific sentences. I
  653. 26:13found that to be a bit inconvenient, so
  654. 26:15if you're planning on buying the
  655. 26:17digital version, please be aware of
  656. 26:18that. Some people might prefer the
  657. 26:21paper version instead, so I wanted to
  658. 26:23make sure to mention that at the end.
  659. 26:25Alright, that brings today's video to a
  660. 26:27close. If you enjoyed this video, I'd
  661. 26:28appreciate it if you could support me
  662. 26:30by hitting the like button, leaving a
  663. 26:31comment, and subscribing to the channel
  664. 26:33. Thank you for listening.

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