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"지금 전작권 난리난 이유" 심상치 않은 한미동맹 분위기 | 1부(437회) — Transcript

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0:00Korea was able to develop into a truly
0:02decent country through the ROK-US
0:04alliance. In this situation, when we
0:07asked for the wartime operational
0:09control, the US actively told us to
0:11take it. At that time, President Trump
0:15set conditions, saying, "If you want to
0:17take it back, prove your capabilities."
0:25>> Yes. Hello, everyone. Many
0:27international issues have arisen again
0:30this week. The most important issue,
0:32above all else, could be described as
0:34the conflict between the ROK and the US
0:37over the transfer of wartime
0:39operational control. So, for this week,
0:41I have prepared a topic titled "The
0:44Essence of the Controversy over Wartime
0:46Operational Control." Yes. To
0:49understand the issue of wartime
0:51operational control, we must
0:52essentially understand the structure of
0:54the ROK-US alliance. Many Koreans
0:57wrongly think that the ROK-US alliance
1:00is only for dealing with North Korea
1:03and only for fighting on the Korean
1:05Peninsula, but that is not the case. We
1:09must know that the ROK-US alliance
1:12started as an alliance that goes far
1:15beyond the Korean Peninsula since it
1:19was signed on October 1, 1953. The
1:24ROK-US alliance is written on a very
1:28short, one-page A4 paper, but it
1:31specifies where the alliance is
1:34intended to fight wars. The word
1:39appears four times, stating that the
1:41ROK-US alliance is for wars that occur
1:43here, which Korea and the US fight
1:45together. So where is "here"? In our
1:48language, it is the Pacific region, or
1:50"Pacific Area" in technical terms. It
1:54states that we will respond together to
1:57wars caused by a common enemy of Korea
2:00and the US in the Pacific region. I
2:03think you should carefully consider the
2:06phrase "common enemy." Yes. The ROK-US
2:09alliance has had both progress and
2:11conflict over the years. Well, there
2:14couldn't have been only good things
2:15over the past 70 years. There were
2:18conflicts and also good times, but
2:21overall, it has been an excellent
2:24alliance that international political
2:27scholars would call a truly sound
2:30alliance. And it was successful. It
2:33prevented war, and not only did it
2:35prevent war, but Korea was able to
2:37develop into a truly decent country
2:40through the ROK-US alliance. However,
2:43looking back at our past
2:45administrations, such as those of Roh
2:48Moo-hyun, Moon Jae-in, and Lee
2:51Jae-myung, these problems have arisen
2:54whenever a progressive, or more
2:56strongly put, a leftist government came
3:00into power. I view the ROK-U.S.
3:03alliance as a structural issue at that
3:06time; if we think about what an
3:09alliance actually is, we can easily see
3:13that this issue is indeed structural.
3:16Most Koreans think that alliances are
3:18formed by countries that are close to
3:20each other. They also think that an
3:23alliance is a relationship based on
3:25mutual respect, but in international
3:27politics, alliances are not formed by
3:29close countries, nor are they
3:31relationships of mutual respect. As I
3:33have already mentioned, an alliance is
3:36formed by countries that share a common
3:38enemy. Let me put it very simply.
3:41During World War II, the United States
3:44and the Soviet Union were allies. How
3:46could the U.S. and the Soviet Union
3:48become allies? One was a communist
3:51dictatorship and the other was a
3:54capitalist democracy, but they had a
3:56common enemy at the time. There was a
4:00truly troublesome country, which was
4:02imperial Japan. And Nazi Germany. These
4:05two countries were feared by both the
4:08U.S. and the Soviet Union. So, the two
4:10countries had a common enemy, and
4:12because of that, they could form an
4:15alliance and fight together. After
4:17World War II ended and the common enemy
4:19disappeared, the U.S. and the Soviet
4:21Union immediately turned into enemies.
4:24This proves that an alliance is not
4:26formed by friends, but by countries
4:28that share the same enemy. However, do
4:30the current Korean government and the
4:33U.S. see North Korea and China as
4:36enemies? The U.S. has long viewed China
4:39and North Korea as enemies. But in
4:41Korea, when the government changes,
4:43people ask, "Isn't North Korea our own
4:45people?" And "Why should China be our
4:47enemy?" If the Director of the National
4:49Intelligence Service recently said so,
4:50that is. When asked to choose between
4:52China and the U.S., he asked why he had
4:54to choose one. It is being reported
4:57that he said, "We are a country that
4:59must eat both this grass and that grass
5:01." If we do not view North Korea as an
5:04enemy and do not view China as an enemy
5:07, the ROK-U.S. alliance is bound to
5:09have problems. Why? The ROK-U.S.
5:12alliance functions properly only when
5:14the concept of a common enemy is
5:16maintained. It is the same for the
5:19Korean government and the U.S. The
5:21moment one thinks that China or North
5:23Korea is not an enemy, while the other
5:26continues to think they are, the
5:28alliance is inevitably bound to have
5:30problems. We also do not accurately
5:33understand what wartime operational
5:36control is; wartime operational control
5:39is simply a matter of who is in command
5:41when a war breaks out. To understand
5:44that, we need to know the history of
5:46the ROK-U.S. alliance. Yes. Let me
5:49explain the history of how the concept
5:51of wartime operational control emerged.
5:53Operational control is something that
5:55every country holds for itself. However
5:57, in the extraordinary situation of the
5:59Korean War, Dr. Syngman Rhee
6:00transferred the operational command—
6:02back then it was called "operational
6:04command authority." He handed it over
6:06to General MacArthur. Dr. Syngman Rhee
6:09sent a letter to General MacArthur
6:12asking him to command the Republic of
6:14Korea's armed forces for the duration
6:16of the Korean War. Why did he do that?
6:20Dr. Syngman Rhee had an operational
6:22plan in mind. At the time, Dr. Syngman
6:25Rhee understood General MacArthur's
6:27philosophy of war better than anyone
6:28else. General MacArthur's war
6:31philosophy was somewhat radical. There
6:33is no alternative to victory. There is
6:36no alternative to victory. When a war
6:39breaks out, there is no other way but
6:41to win. President Syngman Rhee had to
6:44win this war, so he requested that
6:46General MacArthur, who held such a
6:48philosophy, take command. He wrote a
6:51letter. Back then, the right to command
6:54soldiers was referred to as "
6:55operational command authority." In
6:58English, it is Operational Command
7:01Authority; he wrote the letter on July
7:0414, 1950, and General MacArthur
7:07accepted it. Thus, this marked the
7:10beginning of the authority to command
7:12the South Korean military being
7:13transferred to the United States.
7:15General MacArthur readily accepted Dr.
7:18Syngman Rhee's request to take command
7:21of the South Korean forces. He wrote a
7:23letter, and this is what it says. I
7:26express my deepest gratitude for the
7:28trust you have placed in me, Your
7:30Excellency. I will regard the command
7:32of the Republic of Korea's military as
7:35a sacred responsibility. It is no light
7:37matter for the United States to take
7:39command of the war. General MacArthur,
7:42truly a great commander, replied to Dr.
7:44Syngman Rhee's letter saying he would
7:47treat the mission as a sacred duty. Now
7:51, the established unified command
7:52system—this is also an important term
7:54. A unified command system; yes, when
7:57several countries fight a war, it is
7:59much better to have one person in
8:00command. Rather than the Korean
8:02military, U.S. military, German
8:04military, or British military operating
8:06separately, it is much more effective
8:07to have one person in command. To
8:10achieve this, when two or more
8:12countries form an alliance, they
8:13inevitably create a unified command
8:15system. The South Korean military had
8:18now entered General MacArthur's unified
8:19command system. It continues further.
8:22With the continued support of the
8:25United Nations, the ultimate result
8:27must be nothing short of victory.
8:29General MacArthur received Dr. Syngman
8:32Rhee's letter and sent this reply. He
8:34wrote that he was honored to take on
8:37this sacred mission, that the war must
8:39be led to victory, and that he was
8:41pleased that a unified command
8:43authority had been established. When
8:46two nations are at war, having one
8:48nation take command. I can say that
8:51this is indeed a unified command system
8:54, a method to win the war. Yes. The
8:57Korean War ended after three years.
8:59Then, in October 1953, South Korea and
9:02the United States became allies. After
9:05the Korean War ended, the UN Command
9:07exercised full control over the South
9:09Korean military. During the Korean War,
9:13it was called "operational command,"
9:16but after the war, the UN Commander
9:18changed the term to "operational
9:21control." Changing it to "operational
9:24control," they sought to distinguish
9:27between the two concepts. To explain,
9:30operational command includes authority
9:32over personnel management. This means
9:34the person in command could replace
9:36subordinates at will. That is the power
9:37held by one with command authority.
9:39However, operational control does not
9:41extend to that level. So, the UN
9:43Commander did not have authority over
9:45the personnel of the South Korean
9:47military. South Korea retained its own
9:50personnel authority, but the U.S.
9:51military would still take command in
9:53the event of war. Thus, operational
9:56control became a more limited concept
9:59than operational command. This system
10:02persisted for a long time. Despite the
10:05South Korean military being much larger
10:08in size, the U.S. military held command
10:10, ensuring a unified chain of command,
10:12which led many scholars to argue that
10:15the ROK-U.S. alliance was a very stable
10:17one. However, as time passed, the 1970s
10:21arrived. In the 1970s, numerous African
10:25nations and newly independent countries
10:28joined the UN. Many of these countries
10:31had anti-American tendencies.
10:34Consequently, the U.S. realized it
10:36would not be easy to deter war on the
10:38Korean Peninsula solely under the UN
10:40Command banner. This is because many UN
10:43member nations supported North Korea.
10:46Fearing that the UN could not be solely
10:49trusted to defend the Republic of Korea
10:52if North Korea initiated a war, they
10:55decided to change the command structure
10:58. Thus, in the late 1970 s—
11:00specifically November 7, 1978—the
11:03ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command was
11:06established. Under the realization that
11:10relying solely on the UN was becoming
11:13too unstable, South Korea and the U.S.
11:16created the Combined Forces Command;
11:19this black-and-white photo shows
11:21soldiers marching to commemorate the
11:24establishment of the CFC on November 7,
11:271978. Let’s look at the emblem of the
11:30ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command. In
11:32the emblem, you can see the U.S. flag
11:34and the American stars. Combined with
11:36the Taegeuk symbol from the Korean flag
11:39, the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command
11:43was formed, and this command is such a
11:46shining achievement in the history of
11:49military strategy that it can be called
11:52perhaps the world's most
11:54well-integrated wartime command system
11:57between two nations. However, when the
12:01U.S. created the Combined Forces
12:03Command, it did not dissolve the UN
12:05Command. Do you know why the UN Command
12:07is still important? If North Korea were
12:10to collapse, entering under the name of
12:13the UN Command would be legally and
12:16politically much safer and easier than
12:18doing so as the ROK-U.S. Combined
12:21Forces Command. And what is USFK? It is
12:25the United States Forces Korea. So,
12:27currently, our commander serves as the
12:29Commander of USFK, the Commander of the
12:31Combined Forces Command, the UN
12:33Commander, and the U.S. Commander. The
12:35saying that one person is wearing
12:38multiple hats originates from this very
12:40situation. In any case, the ROK-U.S.
12:43Combined Forces Command has served as a
12:45well-functioning combined defense
12:47system, contributing significantly to
12:49preventing war on the Korean Peninsula.
12:52I mentioned that it is an organization
12:54established on November 7, 1978.
12:56However, not only did international
12:58politics change, but South Korean
13:00politics changed as well. This was a
13:02time when the Park Chung-hee
13:04administration was nearing its end. As
13:07a result, many protests against Park
13:08Chung-hee's authoritarian government
13:10erupted around that time. As you may
13:14all recall, there were massive
13:16demonstrations in Busan and Masan in
13:191979. And shortly after President Park
13:24Chung-hee was assassinated, the Gwangju
13:27Democratization Movement occurred in
13:291980; each time, the Marines were
13:31deployed to suppress the Busan-Masan
13:34protests, and paratroopers were sent to
13:37Gwangju. The South Korean people began
13:40to grow suspicious here. Operational
13:42control had been transferred from the
13:44UN Commander to the ROK-U.S. Combined
13:46Forces Commander, and since the person
13:49holding that authority is a U.S.
13:51general, they saw the military
13:52deployment to suppress protests as U.S.
13:55action. In other words, they asked, "
13:57Did the U.S. not send the troops?"
13:58Legally, one could certainly think so.
14:01This is because the U.S. military holds
14:03the right to mobilize and command
14:05troops. But the U.S. military argued
14:07that they were not the ones who sent
14:09them. In fact, it wasn't the U.S.
14:11military that sent them. However,
14:12legally, the Korean people raised the
14:15issue, arguing, "Since the U.S.
14:17military is in command, isn't it
14:19correct to say they sent them?" This is
14:22where the U.S. proposed a solution.
14:24Fine. We did not send them, but if that
14:27is the case, let's split the
14:29operational control into two. By
14:31dividing it into peacetime operational
14:34control and wartime operational control
14:36, we can avoid getting caught up in
14:38these political issues. In peacetime,
14:40the Korean military will command the
14:41Korean military. If war breaks out,
14:44then the U.S. military will command; it
14:46is only then that the term "wartime
14:48operational control" comes into being.
14:51And the full legal institutionalization
14:54of this happened in 1994, quite a long
14:58time after 1978. You can see the photo
15:02of President Kim Young-sam; on December
15:051, 1994, wartime and peacetime
15:08operational control were completely
15:11legally separated. Therefore, in
15:13peacetime, the U.S. military commands
15:15its own forces, and the Korean military
15:17commands its own. If a war breaks out,
15:19the U.S. military takes command; that
15:22is what wartime operational control is.
15:25The issue being raised these days is
15:28the controversy over who would take
15:31command if a war occurs. President Kim
15:34Young-sam was very pleased when he
15:36received peacetime operational control,
15:38calling it a new milestone for
15:40independent defense and a "second
15:43founding" of the military. It might be
15:45a bit of an exaggeration, as the
15:47military is most important during
15:49wartime. Regardless, the South Korean
15:52military became able to command during
15:54peacetime. So, you could say that after
15:58December 1, 1994, if the South Korean
16:01military were to intervene and suppress
16:04a protest, the U.S. military would not
16:07have to bear any responsibility.
16:10However, North Korea continues to make
16:13provocations. Let’s look at that
16:15history. In September 1996, armed
16:18infiltrators appeared in Gangwon
16:20Province, leading to combat that lasted
16:23for nearly 49 days. The South Korean
16:27military mobilized so many troops that
16:30the total reached 1.5 million, and both
16:33North and South Korea suffered dozens
16:36of casualties. While not quite a
16:39full-scale war, there was a major
16:41battle between North and South Korea.
16:43Is this peace? Is this war? This
16:46happened when wartime operational
16:48control was not in effect; it was a
16:49battle between the South Korean and
16:51North Korean militaries during
16:53peacetime. It was peacetime. Even in
16:56peacetime, the South Korean military
16:57can fight North Korea. Why? Because
16:59wartime operational control was not
17:01activated, and the U.S. military was
17:03not in command. There was another such
17:05incident. You all remember the Naval
17:06Battles of Yeonpyeong, right? In 1999
17:09and 2002, the president at the time was
17:13Kim Dae-jung. In these instances as
17:16well, the North and South Korean
17:18militaries clashed, but it was not
17:20declared a state of war, the U.S. did
17:22not lead, and it was a battle where the
17:25South Korean military fought the North
17:28on its own. There are more. Around 2003
17:31, President Roh Moo-hyun began saying
17:34that since we have peacetime
17:36operational control, we should also
17:39exercise it during wartime for a
17:41country to be truly independent and
17:44sovereign. President Roh argued that
17:47transitioning wartime operational
17:48control is about establishing national
17:50sovereignty, and that we have the
17:52capability to do so. In his speech for
17:55the 58th Liberation Day on August 15,
17:572003, he even asked, "Do we not have
17:59the capability?" He went as far as
18:01saying that. Yes. This could be seen as
18:05going a bit too far. He asked, "Does
18:08our country lack that capability?" And
18:10it seems President Roh Moo-hyun didn't
18:13fully realize that the South Korean
18:15president actually holds the
18:17decision-making power over wartime
18:20operational control as well. What I
18:24have written here in English and
18:26translated into Korean is what an
18:28American scholar named Michael O'Hanlon
18:30said. For many Koreans, having a Korean
18:34commander in charge of allied forces
18:36might be an important symbol of fully
18:38restoring their sovereignty. But in
18:41fact, the U.S. commander is already
18:43under the command of a civilian
18:46president of the U.S., yet it is
18:48written that President Roh Moo-hyun
18:50said otherwise. Yes. What does that
18:54mean? It means that the South Korean
18:57president must give permission for
18:59wartime operational control to be
19:01exercised. I will explain this in more
19:04detail later. Anyway, President Roh
19:07Moo-hyun insisted that the wartime
19:09operational control must be reclaimed.
19:12The full-scale argument appeared in his
19:15Armed Forces Day commemorative speech
19:18on October 1, 2005; President Roh said
19:20it was a natural and basic requirement
19:23for an independent sovereign nation,
19:25and that through the exercise of
19:28wartime operational control, the
19:30military would be reborn as a true,
19:32autonomous force responsible for
19:35security on the Korean Peninsula,
19:38stating his strong conviction for the
19:41return of wartime operational control,
19:43but then something surprising happens.
19:46Before I explain, look at this picture.
19:49As soon as the issue of wartime
19:51operational control was raised, ROK-U.S
19:53. relations began to crumble. At the
19:55time, the U.S. president was Bush. A
19:58British cartoonist drew this. It is a
20:00picture from a British magazine called
20:02The Economist, where the two presidents
20:04are sharing the same blanket, but the
20:05conflict is intense. It is a picture of
20:08them fighting each other. What is by
20:10President Bush's head? President Bush
20:13is an incredibly Christian president.
20:16There is a Bible. What is by President
20:18Roh Moo-hyun's head? This is a picture
20:21of Kim Jong-il. It was Kim Jong-il back
20:23then. Yes. These cartoonists are quite
20:26witty; if the two have a conflict, who
20:28loses? According to this picture, it is
20:31drawn as if Korea is losing. President
20:34Roh Moo-hyun's toes are sticking out.
20:36It is a very interesting yet meaningful
20:39cartoon, showing his toes exposed after
20:41losing the blanket when it is cold.
20:44However, despite this conflict, when
20:47President Roh Moo-hyun asked for
20:49wartime operational control, the U.S.
20:52said, "Take it." Take it. And they
20:55actively told him to take it. The U.S.
20:58side's response to President Roh
21:00Moo-hyun's request was to actively
21:03agree. Some U.S. high-ranking officials
21:06, who were even dissatisfied with the
21:08Roh administration's overall policies,
21:11said, "Take it right now." Take it
21:14right now. So, ultimately, when the
21:16ROK-U.S. Defense Ministers 'meeting was
21:20held in Washington on February 23, 2007
21:23, the U.S. said, "Take it," and they
21:26agreed. They gave it, but the funny
21:29thing is, President Roh Moo-hyun said,
21:31"Not right now." A few years later,
21:34President Roh Moo-hyun made an
21:37agreement in 2007, saying "Take back
21:39the wartime operational control," and
21:42promised that we would bring it back on
21:45April 17, 2012, not right away, but in
21:48a few years. So, an opportunity for the
21:52South Korean military to exercise
21:53wartime operational control opened up
21:56then. And President Roh Moo-hyun stated
21:59that he would bring it back on April 17
22:02, 2012, which was a few years after he
22:05would have stepped down from the
22:07presidency. Anyway, it seems the US
22:09felt a bit unhappy about that at the
22:11time. I saw Americans expressing a
22:14great deal of dissatisfaction whenever
22:16I went to the US for seminars back then
22:18. Some people, even some American
22:21scholars, went as far as to say that
22:24the ROK-US alliance was already dead. I
22:27remember hearing directly from one
22:30American professor who even said that
22:33the ROK-US alliance was dead, in its
22:36coffin, and would be finished once the
22:38final nail was driven in. April 17,
22:432012, was a time when no one knew who
22:45would be president. Yes. When did
22:48President Roh's term end? The Roh
22:50Moo-hyun administration ended in 2008.
22:53It ended on February 24, 2008, but the
22:56time to take back wartime operational
22:58control was set for 2012, which is four
23:00years after his term ended. Who was
23:04president four years later? At that
23:07time, it was President Lee Myung-bak;
23:09President Roh Moo-hyun had set it so
23:11that President Lee Myung-bak would have
23:14to take back wartime operational
23:15control. Of course, when President Roh
23:18Moo-hyun made such a promise, he
23:20couldn't have known who the president
23:22would be then. Anyway, President Lee
23:26Myung-bak was the president who would
23:28face April 17, 2012, and North Korea
23:31was very noisy during his term as well.
23:35There was the shelling of Yeonpyeong
23:37Island and the sinking of the ROKS
23:39Cheonan, so relations with North Korea
23:42were not good at all. At that time,
23:45President Lee Myung-bak thought it made
23:47no sense to take it back on April 17,
23:502012. So, he pushed it back by about
23:54another 3 years and 7 months. Therefore
23:58, the date was postponed during
24:00President Lee Myung-bak's term, and you
24:02can see the incidents that occurred
24:04during his term in the pictures. On
24:07March 26, 2010, at 9:22 PM, the Cheonan
24:10sinking incident occurred. The faces of
24:14the soldiers who perished on the
24:16Cheonan were all made into reliefs, and
24:19I think you can see a photo of a mother
24:22sobbing while looking at them.
24:26President Lee Myung-bak originally had
24:29to take it back in 2012, but he just
24:31postponed it again for 3 years and 7
24:34months. So he pushed it back, saying
24:38that South Korea would exercise wartime
24:41operational control starting from
24:43December 1, 2015. That postponement was
24:48promised during a summit with President
24:50Obama at the G20 summit held in Toronto
24:53, Canada, in June 2010. But who would
24:58be president on December 1, 2015? Of
25:01course, President Lee Myung-bak had no
25:03way of knowing who would be president.
25:05However, the president who was supposed
25:07to exercise wartime operational control
25:10starting December 1, 2015, was
25:12President Park Geun-hye. But it was
25:14really noisy even when Park Geun-hye
25:16became president. At that time, North
25:20Korea conducted nuclear tests, launched
25:22missiles, and even made provocations
25:25with wooden mines in the DMZ, so the
25:27anxiety that a war might break out with
25:29North Korea during the Park Geun-hye
25:32administration continued. At that time,
25:36President Park Geun-hye decided to
25:38postpone the wartime operational
25:40control that was to be received in 2015
25:43once again. When was it postponed? It
25:46was postponed in 2014. So, this
25:49agreement to postpone it made by
25:51President Park Geun-hye is the
25:53fundamental agreement currently in
25:54place between the US and South Korea
25:56regarding wartime operational control.
25:59Therefore, we must be well aware of the
26:032014 agreement; it was October 23, 2014
26:06. At that time, the US Secretary of
26:09Defense was Chuck Hagel, and the South
26:10Korean Minister of National Defense was
26:12Han Min-koo. These two people postponed
26:16it again at the 46th Security
26:19Consultative Meeting in Washington on
26:22October 23, 2014. So, just take a look.
26:26President Roh Moo-hyun secured it in
26:282007 and said we would start in 2012,
26:31but President Lee Myung-bak, who was
26:34supposed to receive it in 2012,
26:36postponed it to 2015, and President
26:38Park Geun-hye, who was supposed to
26:41receive it in 2015, said no. I cannot
26:44take it. So, she practically postponed
26:46it indefinitely. They made a promise in
26:502014, but why is the 2014 promise
26:52important? Why this is important is
26:55because in 2014, they decided to stop
26:57setting a date and instead set
26:59conditions. They promised that once the
27:02conditions are met, they would take it
27:04back then. That is the most rational
27:06thing to do. Rather than repeatedly
27:09setting dates and then delaying because
27:11we haven't built up the capability by
27:13that time, it is much better to set
27:15conditions from the start. So we call
27:19that promise "conditions-based OPCON
27:22transition." We could call it a
27:25transition of wartime operational
27:28control based on conditions. What are
27:31those conditions based on? They
27:34postponed what was supposed to be
27:37received on December 1, 2015, and while
27:39postponing it, there are conditions for
27:42us to eventually receive it. We now
27:46have to look at how those conditions
27:48were created, but even after we made
27:50that promise, North Korea really came
27:52on strongly against South Korea. You
27:54will see the picture now. It says "
27:57Annihilate the US imperialists." And
27:59the shooting target in the middle is
28:01President Park Geun-hye. North Korea is
28:04practicing target shooting by putting
28:07up a photo of President Park Geun-hye.
28:10That is why I said that any promise
28:12made with North Korea is not easy. I
28:15said that peace will not come. The most
28:19important remark from North Korea was
28:22made by Kim Il-sung in 1972. It is what
28:26Kim Il-sung said to the North Korean
28:29officials when they returned after
28:31visiting South Korea for the first
28:34dialogue. You must be completely dazed
28:37right now. Your minds must be clouded
28:39after visiting the South. You must be
28:41under the illusion that peace has
28:42arrived. He told them to wake up from
28:45their dreams, saying that true peace
28:48will only come on the day South Korea
28:51ceases to exist. So, North Korea's
28:54traditional stance is that they believe
28:56true peace will only come to the Korean
28:59Peninsula the day South Korea is
29:01completely gone. Yes. These are the
29:03conditions presented by President Park
29:05Geun-hye. The South Korean military
29:07will take over wartime operational
29:09control. However, it will be taken over
29:11only if these conditions are met. She
29:14set three conditions. First, the South
29:17Korean military must possess the
29:19essential military capabilities to lead
29:21combined defense. It is not possible
29:23with our current capabilities. We will
29:24take it over only if we have the
29:27capability to fight alongside the U.S.
29:29military and lead them. Second, ensure
29:32military influence at the ROK-U.S.
29:34alliance level to counter North Korea's
29:36threats. Simply put, this means North
29:39Korea must become a good country. Third
29:41, establish a regional security
29:43environment where the transfer of
29:45operational control can take place
29:47stably. What is the regional security
29:49environment? Beyond the Korean
29:50Peninsula. To put it simply, this means
29:52China must become "good." What are
29:54those three conditions? 1. Improving
29:56capabilities to the point of being able
29:59to lead the military. 2. North Korea
30:01becoming "good." 3. China becoming "
30:04good." If these three things are met,
30:06we will take it over. And back then,
30:08President Park Geun-hye thought
30:10hopefully that it might happen around
30:12the mid-2020s. She thought so hopefully
30:15, but now that we are in the mid-2020s,
30:18has North Korea become "good"? Has
30:21China become "good"? We can say that
30:23the situation has actually become much
30:26worse. Yes. But the Moon Jae-in
30:29administration tried to take it over.
30:31The Moon Jae-in administration said
30:32they would bring it back. They said
30:34they would bring it back regardless of
30:35conditions. The U.S. at that time was
30:37under President Trump. They said, "If
30:40you want to take it back, prove it."
30:42They demanded proof of capability and
30:45presented these conditions. They said
30:48they would grant it only if stages 1, 2
30:50, and 3 were all satisfied. Stage 1 is
30:52the basic operational capability. So,
30:55we will look at the first phase to see
30:56if South Korea has the capability to
30:58exercise wartime operational control.
31:00Phase two is Full Operational
31:02Capability. Phase three is Full Mission
31:05Capability; these are just terms. IOC,
31:08FOC, FMC—these are English acronyms,
31:10but essentially, the idea was that if
31:13the South Korean military could
31:15demonstrate the ability to command U.S.
31:17forces, control would be transferred,
31:19but testing this requires military
31:21drills. However, the Moon Jae-in
31:24administration needed to conduct
31:26military drills to prove this to the
31:28U.S. and reclaim that control, but they
31:30barely did any drills. Why? Because
31:33North Korea would get angry. To appease
31:35North Korea, they didn't conduct proper
31:37military drills, so they only completed
31:39phase one by the time their term ended.
31:42Phase one. They failed to complete the
31:44verification for phases two and three,
31:46and the story of the Moon Jae-in
31:48administration is that wartime
31:49operational control never came back to
31:51South Korea. It is.

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